- DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - Research Memorandum i October 1 1962 A i i TO 2 The Acting Seeretary C i THROUGH s s FROM INR 5 Roger Hilsman - SUBJECT Japan s Reaction to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation The following study has been prepared at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Policy Planning Council and examines the implications of Japanese reactions to a Chinese- Communist nuclear detonationo It focuses on prospective develOpments durinthhe 1963 5 period the likely time for Peiping to eXplode a crude nuclear device but several years before Peiping possesses a meaningful nuclear weapons capabilitye Key assumptions underlying the analysis include 1 continuation of the existing balance of political forces within Japan 2 no international agreement banning the testing or employment of nuclear weapons in Asia and 3 exclusion of Communist China from the UN and an absence of diplomatic relations between Communist China and both Japan and the USO manner The primary impact of a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation so far as Japan is cancerned will be political rather than military In a further effort to disrupt US- Japan security relations and to neutralize_Japan3 Peiping may claim that Japanes only protection against-involvement in nuclear war is through elimination of US military bases on its territoryo This claim may be accomplished by renewed proposals for an atom free zone in the Pacific and requests for normalization of SinowJapanese relational Depending upon steps taken by the US to anticipate and follow'up Peiping s initial nuclear detonation Japanese reaction could complicate USmJapan relationsa The ruling conservative party would probably more cautiously and pursue a Wait and see policy to assess the full import of developments elsewhere in-Asia as well as in Japan itselfa In the shortmrun domestic public opinion may revive discussion of the 19h5 nuclear holocausts demonstrations against US bases and demands for a global prohibition of atomic weaponso Peiping s themes might be amplified in Japan by pacifistic and socialistic intellectuals communist front organizations and mass media sensationalisml en 33 ET 1 solvers- 3 DECLASSHHED no Authority In the longer-run the policy choices of the Japanese Government could be affected by secondarily related issues such as the stability and growth of Japan s economy the relative cohesion of radical and conservative factions and the prospects for SinoaJapenese tradeo It is possible that pre- detonation and post-detonation moves by both US and Japanese leaders could awaken Japanese public Opinion to the need for continued reliance on Free WOrld strength and a greater contribution to the security of Asia This could be of longer-run importance as Peiping acquires a strategic nuclear capability It is unlikely however that any sudden or basic changes in Japan s foreign policy will result from the detonation alone either in undermining Ustapanese security arrangements or in immediately increasing Japan's participation in Free World defense arrangements especially where nuclear weapons are concerned ii A DECIASSIFIED -A th riWW-_ swam mom Table of Contexts Hiy' A Impact of External EnvironmentEstimated Range of Japanese ReactionThe Short Ranga OutlookThe Range 0utlookShort Range Implications for US PolicyAPPENDIX I A Nuclegr Armamant and National PoliciesPoatwar Policy OutlookThe ngority View of National ecurity a 30 The Minority View of National Security Bo Major Components of Japanese ReactiOHso 10 The Japanese PublicOpinion MEdia Tre dsPrese t Status of Nuclear Ccnditioning Autho tyW - - A ggpact 0f External Environment External events are likely to have a considerable bearing on the intensity and directions of Japanese reactions to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation with Peiping's political use of the detonation perhaps playing a key role Other variables in the-external environment that could affect Japanese reactions include the state of cold war tensions relationship between Peiping and Moscow new Chinese Communist moves in SOutheast Asia or the Taiwan Straits and a measure of inter- national agreement on disarmament Peiping's posture toward Japan during the detonation and early post-detonation period will be conditioned by its primary aim of eliminating US power in Asia Japan's security treaty with the US is a cornerstone of the American military presence in the Western Pacific and therefore a major obstacle to this-goal So long as-the American position in Japan is strong Peiping s primary objective will be to weaken that position Its efforts in this phase of strategy will be directed toward undercutting the domestic strength of Japan's conservative government as a prerequisite to moving the nation-toward'neutralismi It will probably not in this phase adopt a posture of overt military threat Peiping's lack of a nuclear delivery capability will not'be the sole factor conditioning this choice Policy constructions which will avoid prompting a Japanese nuclear capability will be equally important It seems likely that Peiping will eXploit the detonation on two levels Because the event itself will not alter the balance of power in the Far East and to avoid causing an undesired over-reaction Chinese Communist moves visas-vie the Japanese Government may well_continue initially in a low key To the Japanese public however Peiping s propaganda approaches are apt to be more vigorous compresSing the timing of the detonation weapons development and delivery capability so as to achieve the maximum impact Peiping would hope thereby to create a ground swell of public opinion which could then be turned against the government itself The main themes of Peiping s communications to various Japanese audiences are likely to be 1 The heightened dangers of alliance with the us an attempt to equate US base rights with a quasi-belligerent status for Japan 2 Peiping93 peaceful intentions including the nonnmilitary uses cf atomic energy revived consideration of an atom-free Pacific zone snoanr rcrosn i DECLASSHHED Authority 5_ - 1 - A Impact of External'Environment External events are likely to have a considerable bearing on the intensity and directions of Japanese reactions to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation with Peiping's political use of the detonation perhaps playing a key role Other variables in the external environment that could affect Japanese reactions include the state of cold war tensions relationship between Peiping and Moscow new Chinese Communist moves in Southeast Asia Or the Taiwan Straits and a measure of inter national agreement on disarmament Peiping's posture toward Japan during the detonation and early post-detonation_period will be senditioned by its primary aim of eliminating US power in Asia Japan s security treaty with the US is a cornerstone of the American military presence in the Western Pacific and therefore a major obstacle to this goals So long as the American position in Japan is strong Peiping s primary objective will be to weaken that position Its efforts in this phase of strategy-will be directed toward undercutting the domestic strength of Japan's censervative government as a prerequisite to moving the nation toward neutralisma It will probably not in this phase adopt a posture of overt military threat Peiping's lack of a nuclear delivery capability will nOt be the sole factor conditioning this choice Policy constructions which will avoid prompting a Japanese nuclear capability will be equally importantc It seems likely that Peiping will exploit the detonation on two levels Because the event itself will not alter the balance of power in the Far East and to avoid causing an undesired over-reaction Chinese Communist moves viewauvis the Japanese Government_may well continue initially in a low key To the Japanese public however Peiping's propaganda approaches are apt to be more vigorous compressing the timing_of the detonation weapons develoPment and delivery capability so as to achieve the maximum impact Peiping would hope thereby to create a ground swell of public opinion-which could then be turned against the government itself The main themes of Peiping s communications to various Japanese audiences are likely to be 1 The heightened dangers of alliance with the an attempt to eqnate US base rights with a qnasi-belligerent status fer Japan 2 Eeiping s peaceful intentions including the nonumilitary uses of atomic energy revived consideration of an atom-free Pacific zone AuthoriU W I 2 a full membership in the UN with GRC expulsion as a precondition diplomatic recognition as a prelude to greatly enhanced trade with Japan 3 The image of Communist China as a new world power as Asia s first nuclear power as a full partner in the irresistably strong Communist bloc toward which ASia s balance of power was shifting inevitably and irrevocably R US inability to protect Japan in nuclear war the danger that US pressures on Japan to prepare for nuclear war will lead to a revival of Japanese militarism Among these main themes Peiping will have an infinite number of variations but always with the basic thrust the risk level of Japan s US alliance in a nuclear armed Asia is unacceptable B Estimated Range of Japanese Reaction _Conmunist China's initial detonation of a nuclear device will not come as a surprise in Japano Public discussion of this possibility has been underway for more than a year A government white paper published in mid 1961 predicted that 60mmunist'China'would begin nuclear'weapons tests within the next three years Nevertheless the actual detonation will impress the Japanese as signalling the entry of an nsian nation into the nuclear club and be a clear demonstration of Communist China s world power status The initial shock period is apt to be fairly short In its own political interest the Japanese Government would be obliged to pour oil on the waters of public opinion In this effort it may receive support from public media leaders who have shifted noticeably away from irresponsible emotionalism in the past two years The press is more likely to continue this trend than to revert to hysteria The Japanese public too is apt t9 react more calmly than it would have a year or so ago before Soviet and subsequently US nuclear testing resumed and the public became relatively if unhappily accustomed to itr The Chinese Communist detonation will have a special impact however it is played HWhereas many Japanese have sought re assurance frcm the belief that the preoccupations were primarily in Eur0pe they are likely to feel that Communist China will focus particular attention on technically advanced economically prosperous Japan ' The nature if not the limits of the potential soccer resent 7 Authority M37 sooner Heroes - 3 threat will be very clear Ten years ago the demonstrations of a Soviet nuclear capability found Japan with no alternatives to passivity While a similar response to a Chinese Communist capability is also possible the Japanese now have a wider range of choices The detonation will inevitably bring the problem of Japan's defense posture to the forefront of public Consciousness It will serve to force reconsideration of problems_that the_Japanese have generally preferred to ignore a most prominently what to do about Japan's vulnerability to nuclear attack A of existing attitudes and a consolidation of opposing policy positions appears more likely than panic or a sharp shift in orientation Leftists who argue that a Communist state will not wage aggressive war and who have tended to discount Communist China s aggressive intentions toward Japan are not likely to alter their appraisal since it is based upon an idealistic view of China s inherent pacifism and not on estimates of Chinese capabilities To most Japanese however Peiping's possession of a nuclear potential is likely to bring home more strongly than ever the hepelessly inadequate state of their country's defenses _Barring the reopcurrence'of the 1960 type of concatenation of internal and external tensions the rethinking of Japan s defense posture is apt to be serious and solemn despite the best efforts of the articulate left-wing minority to whip up hysteriaor lo The Left The_Socialists and the Communists will predictably step up the present campaign to abrogate US Japan security arrangements and to move Japan toward a policy of neutralisml They will exploit whatever enhanced respect Communist China gains from the events as a menation capable of joining the nuclear club They will use the initial detonation as proof of the capability and efficiency of a socialist society The organised left can be expected to bring renewed vigor to its advocacy of international agreements in which Peiping would participate to ban nuclear tests and weapons to bring about general disarmament and to secure a denuclearized Pacific zone Unless careful moves were made to downgrade the detonation s impact before it occurred the Japanese left might also find it possible to use the event to exacerbate existing US Japan frictions Particularly if Peiping timed the detonation to coincide with_heightened tensions in the Far East old issues such as storing nuclear weapons in Japan Japan's involuntary involvement in crises outside its own borders and the Okinawa reversion prOblem could be exploited The question of escalation even in small conflicts might be revived by the organized left with sympathetic support from Japanis intellectuals students urban laborers and at least a part of the presso Nonwmilitary frictions such as US trade policies and inhibitions on trade with Communist China would receive renewed attention from the lefta Authority There may be some defootions from l ftwwing ranka over'the shook of disoovering that Communist china is indeed militant enough to I develop nuclear arnrronrso iFor the the leftists will be moved to rationalize PairingFo aoqpisition of nuclear oaraoity a5 a necessary defense measuro which does not constitute a threat againrt Japan 20 The Rigg supporters of a more rapid defense buildup for Japan may get a more'positirr reopenso from among those who had tended to discount Joranus vulnerability on the thesis that the USSR was preoccupied in Europe and Communist China lacked the means for a major military offensive offorta national pride and oorfidenoe that Japan is capable of outstripping Ghina technically'would also support this viowu There are powerful elements in the Liberal Democraiie AParty'who might initially press for arming Japan s defense forces with doalroapability'weapons and who might be prepared to allow th US to introduce nuclear weapons into Japano - However such advocates of greater defense effort probably-would not find ready support among the horservaiiros in control of the governmento- The latrer would be deliberate in reconsidering a defense policy'whioh they could argue has provided maximum security at minimum costu Japan has enjoyed the safety of a nuclear deterrenm without the economic or political saorifioe inh reni in the acquisition of an independent nuclear oapabilityo crises elsewhere in Asia may relate ultimateltho Japarws securiry but ihoy have been met so far without involvement of Japan s military forcon Japan s military budgot takes a smaller share of GNP than for any'Asian country communist or non- communioto In short in this View a Ghinese Conwmmist nuclear detonaiion would provide no obrious and immediate reason for altering the US allianooy for stopring up the pace of Japan's defense effort or for plunging into an independenr nuclear programo in any case the dynamioo of oomoerrativr party factionalism rad the poet record of 'oonservaiivo disunity on major oontroversial issues argue against agreemror Within rho itself on a policy of nuclear armamont 3 Who Shori Range Outlooko Short of a direct threat to the security of the home islands or an unforesoon rise to power of a dynamic new political foroo in Japan a marked oharge in the country s defense policies appears unlikelyo Neither the initial detonation nor the subsoqpont aohiovemoni of a limited delivery cagability by themselves will have that effecto Hoightenod domestic and external tensions in concert oould force the pace of policy reoonsiderationo To the extent that the resultirg dobate freed itself from sensationalism and political irresponoibility it might serve to educate Japanese 'opinion on the present and prospective shape of Free Asia s seourity sm rorcm Aumm y m ull ifi _' a 5 5 Such_public discussion might also clarify-the reasons for Japan s dependence on a continued US presence and its need to make greater contributions to its own military protection Over a period of time basic modifications might occur in Japanese attitudes toward nuclear weapons perhaps permitting participation in advanced weapons systems' deployment in purely defensive fashion on the islands or in adjacent waters ' h The Long Range Outlook Japan may be expected to share with some of the stronger NATO countries a resurgence of nationalist feeling and sharpened desires for international prestige These views will not necessarily lead as they have in France and Britain to the development of a national nuclear capability More reasonable would be the expectation that Japan would share certain negative attitudes pretalent among the NATO allies -- a desire to allow the US to carry the main military burden for the Free World and persistent doubts abott US willingness to use itspnuclear deterrent thereby risking attack on itself in the defense of Japanc Japan does not enjoy 'th cushion of a mnltilateral alliance Until the day when technology -encompasses a more effective defense against missile attacks or when Japanese Strategic thinking returns to the premises that underlay its axis with Germany the country s exposed strategic position will continue to buttress existing preferences for modest low keyed defense policies As the Chinese Communists increase their nuclear delivery capabilities the range of conceivable consequences in Japan could include l -a more dynamic and nationalistic government actively promoting a military buildup in the context of a'Western alignment 2 a conservative government leading a new disengagement policy and seeking forms of accommodation with the Chinese Communists on terms which it would hope would leave_the conservatives in power domestically 3 fragmentation of both conservatives and socialists leading to a series of unstable and short lived coalitions h a socialist government actively seeking to ingratiate itself'with China and dedicated to-a neutralist foreign policy Short Range Implications for us Policy The degree of shock generated in Japan by the initial Chinese Communist nuclear detonation can be substantially lowered Within the larger framework of our policies toward Japan the specific objectives or HS initiatives in this contingency'might include 1 Countering an image of Chinese Communist power which might indace are or fear 2 Demonstrating the manageable proportions of the threat so as to spur local defense efforts and make them appear scorer morons 1514 Auth rjt I '7 - 5 3a Convinoing the Japanese that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not affect our willingness to explore all ways of-' sefeguording peace in the areaa ho Avoiding positions which might reduce the subsequent flexibility of our nuclear weapons polioyo US initiatives could encompass educative diplomacy directed at key Japanese leaders as well as several types of mass media educational programoo Such efforts will require-some time to affect and adroit handling to preclude arousing unnecessary'epprehonsionc Although there are risks involved in laying the pro-detonation groundwork they would appear to be less than responding after the fact to expected Chinese Communist exploitation of their accomplishment Among the most apparent risks inherent in a program-of proudetonation education would be pressures for creation of an atom free Zone in the Pacifioo Such pressures seem bound to sooner or later in any oaseo Similar proparations against an expected io rease in preosure to admit Commnnist China to the UN and other international organizations w including disarmament negotiations am will also be in order The methods by which US_preudetonatior initiatives are to be implemented also raiso'seriouo policy problems If initial approaches are confined to selected groups of Japanese leaders the poosibility of leaks could arouse exaggerated ooneorn and carry counterproductivo implications of US anxiety 0n the other hand a wider initial approach via mass media of information is also capable of arousing undesirable public speculation particularly if the Japanese Government itself were not adequately'prepered to handle a domestic rebuttalo A combined publicmprivate approach similar to that used to cushion the impoct of US nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1962 would probably bo fedsibler The content of US presentations shoold probably differ somewhat according to the target audiencen Japanese civilian and military leaders would have a greater appreciation of analyses of Chinese Communist defioienoios in electronics reliance on outside sources of technological information and material and similar argumentation designed to downgrade the Chinese effort than would the general public o US propaganda efforts to downgrade publicly specific Soviet technological accomplishments for examples have been less effective than pooitive demonstrations that the US oar motoh or outdo its rivals The Jeponooe publio would probably be more receptive to emphasis on Communiot China sevulnorebility to oounterblows its inability to affect US retaliatory capabilities and the probable unwillingnoSo of the Soviet Union to risk general war for unilateral Chinese Communist aggressiono The Japanese would welcome reiteration Of the defensive nature of US SECRET worowv I military strength its constant willingness to negotiate for disarmament and its demonstrable championship of World peace Int the_ same time reassurance of US willingness to defend its friends against attack and objective analyses designed to demonstrate that the balance of power has not been altered in the Far East also would be in order Rather than attempting to downgrade the Chinese Communist technological accompliShment directly in public argumentation that Peiping must constantly rely upon bluff and blackmail rather than superior power is available in the Qpemoy crises of 195% and 1958 Poiping's leaders should be pictured as calculating-and shrewd rather than fanatic irrational or explosive in potential behavior Their aims may be shown as jeopardizing the fate of all nonncommunist Asia 'but their means must seem amenable to defeat through firmness The Japanese Government and public should be braced for an expected Chinese Communist propaganda campaign exploiting the detonation US initiatives should be designed to reduce the impact of the Chinese campaign by placing the-detonation in its strategic perspective Regardless of the skill with which the us proudetonation program is conducted however it is bound to raise longer range fundamental issues concerning the defense of Japan The US program could generate a series of new problems in the US-Japan alliance involving not only the_specifics of Japan's own defense posture but larger policy issues concerning nuclear proliferation Heightened tensions deriving from Communist China s nuclear detonation may force the pace of Japanese policy decisions While a strong Japanese response to the initial detonation is unlikely the impact of US influence can be turned in several directions Indefinite preservation of the status guo ante is probably'impossible x It will be easier to determine What we do not want to occur iee Japanis neutralization than to cast in precise terms how far so would like Japan s defense development to proceed and at what pace In the continued absence of an international agreement on armament limitations Japan may well precede to strengthen its military establishment to give it enhanced independence of political choice and a greater voice in determining military policies in the Far East Obsolesm cence alone will demand modernization of its weapons arsenal The development of modern connentionally armed defensive weapons is already underway A transition to dual capability defensive weapons initially acquired from the Us but eventually manufactured in Japana is possible should the Japanese conclude that an international disarmament agreement is hopeless This view would be reinforced if the proliferation of nuclear weapons caused then eventually to be regarded as a normal and necessary part of the military equipment of key major powers Further development of security policies beyond a purely defensive phase to include the acquisition of a Japanese deterrent capacity in the form of an offashore based system such as Polaris is a remote possibility at best ADECLASSHHED Authority - 7 - 8 - Japan s responsible leaders have not yet formulated a firm long range policy on the development and use of nuclear weapons In constructing their national security policies however they have been careful to draw a fine line between what is politically possible at present and what may be necessary in the future Their wait and see approach 1will place a premium on the appearance of strength tempered by responsibility which must characterize US policy throughout Asia access screen - 9 - new A Nuclear Armament and National Policies Japanese popular attitudes toward nuclear armaments have been con sistently negative With rare exceptions official Views have reflected rather than led public opinion on this-subjecta The result has been What amounts to a national neurosis often ascribed to Japan's unique role as the only victim of nuclear attack The actual causes go much deepero They relate to Japanis exposed strategic position to the political and social revolution in the home islands over the past fifteen years to the lingering aftermaths of war II n- in sum to the totality of Japanis readjustment_to a revised role in Asian and world affairs lo Postwar Pblicy Outlook Under conservative leadership for all but two of thell7 postwar years Japan has consciously and deliberately turned away from its prewar position as an independent military power It has sought economic prosperity and stability at home and acceptability and equality abroadt It has with some reluctance recognized alignment with the United States acre basic requirement of its national welfare and its national securityo As Asia's most economically advanced nation and one of the world's great industrial complexes Japan-shares generally in the outlook common to other developed nations of the northern hemisphere At the same time it seeks to retain its Asian identity through close association with the Afro-Asian nations and sees itself as a bridge between these different Worlds It has learned to_live with the reality of a nearby communist- dominated mainland but has continued to seek a mere satisfactory relation- ship with both Moscow and Peking Success in this effort would hopefully without sacrifice of national interests served in its western alignment soften the harsh outlines of the aggressive threat posed by communism and perhaps even improve its security and economic wellubeing Peace for Japan is a cornerstone of national policy The creation of how to preserve it is the main foreign policy issue in Japanese politics 2 The majority View of national Securityo Japan's conservativesg who have won a s hstantial majority in every postwar election recognize' that their countryis industrial capacity and strategic position make it a primary target for communist expansionn They reject neutralism as dangerous and unfeasible for Japan and accept mutual security arrangements with the US as the only practicable protections The chief risk is that Japan might unwillingly become involved in hostilitieso Hesever fears of general war have abated considerably and confidence that the US will not-abuse its military rights in Japan has growno For the majority Japan s security position is at least tolerablea scorer scream DECLASSIFIED I I - SECRET Noreen 10 30 The Minority View of National Securityo The position of the leftawing opposition ranging all the way from moderate Socialists to the communists is less coherent but in general embraces the severance of the security treaty with the formal peace treaties With Communist China and the a collective security arrangement with the US USSR and Communist China and a rednction of japan's own defense establishment The largest element in the loitering opposition the Japan Socialist Party advocates neutralism on the basis that Japan's only safe course lies in nonmalignment with either power bloc alliance threatens involvement in war which could only end in disaster for Japan B major Components of Japanese Reactions 1 The Japanese Public _There has been a discernible movement in the trend of Japanese public opinion toward national defense issues over the past decadea Despite the absence of an external crisis of sufficient dimensions to impinge directly'upon Japanis national security the public has moved along slowly in the wake of the governmentis emerging defense postureo A substantial majority of the voters repeatedly has returned to office conservative governments which upheld the security alliance with the US and modest levels of domestic appropriations reserved for the selfm defense forces This same majority and-some of the minority as well have endorsed Japan s pursuit of peaceful uses of atomic energy There was virtually-no political opposition to Japanis participation in the Inter national Atomic Energy Agency or to the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the US and the UK for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy Despite some public confusion over the differences between military and none military and uses of nuclear studies_ a confusion exploited by communists and other leftists the country has established a program of research that compares favorably with all but the most advanced westernnationso The Japanese public in sum has moved a long way in the past decade from an attitude of almost universal militant pacifisno The vocal minority which clings to pacifism and works for Japan s neutralization in the cold war has failed over the past ten years to increase its popular support for these objectives This suggests that it is constantly lOSing from its ranks young people who develop a more mature outlook toward Japanis position in the left depends for the maintenance of its present size upon new infusions of youth to a lesser extent the shift of the rural population toward the cities also bolsters leftwwing strength Neither of these factors seemsocapable in the short run of altering the fundamental bases which now characterize the main divisions of the Japanese electorates If the traditions of parliamentary democracy were more deeply ingrained the ability of the leftist minority to obstruct and confuse Japants defense policies would be important but not critical Given leftist license and a permissive government vies toward extramparliamentany agitationg the power of the minority opposition to influence key government policies has been seriously out of line with public opinion as measured at the pollso Steam rescue IA - sooner Heroes 2 inion Media Trends Particularly in the past few years external events-have Kept the nuclear armament issue before the public on a fairly constant basis The clearest indicators of shifting Japanese views have come from reactions to the 1961 Soviet and 1962 US nuclear test serieso The Soviet breach of the testing moratorium was poorly received in Japan even the biased Japanese-press joined in the general condemns tion leaving only a handful of extreme leftists and communists trying to find a rationale for the Soviet actiono The timing of the US tests and the preliminary groundwork to undercut predictable Japanese criticism resulted 'in an unexpectedhy moderate Japanese reaction Never had understanding of US motivations seemed so widespread or criticism milder Japanese Government officials apologetically explained in private that their official protests against the US tests were required by the domestic pelitical environment A Parallel trends were discernible in Japanese views toward negotiating positions during the Geneva disarmament negotiationso Increasingly the press has termed the Soviet terms inflexible and each new western proposal was greeted with hope that it would at least receive consideration by the Communists These views were not confined solely to Japan s major cities the tone of provincial newspaper_coverage has been generally reasonable giving fair to good treatment to us draft proposals at Geneva The testing issues and the Geneva talks nero accompanied by a larger nonber of relatively sober scientific feature Diet intorpellations have demonstrated a less obvious trend but one Which Embassy Tokyo in may 1962 described as leaving the and to some extent the US better off than before on the nuclear testing issue and the question of nuclear arms in Japan Although Prime'Minister Ikeda publicly placed himself in opposition to former Prime R nieter Yoshida's View Juhy 1962 that Japan should be ready if need be to accept nuclear weapons on behalf cf-its own interests and-those of the free world the Yoshida state ment failed to arouse the explosion which would have been expected even a year agoo Other opinion trend indicators could be cited to support the thesis that a certain amount of objectivity has crept into the Japanese public s consideration of nuclear armaments Perhaps more definitive is the governn mont'S'onn assessment of the domestic climate implied in its June 1962 rejection of the Japan Socialist Party proposal for a bipartisan declaration making Japan-a permanent nuclear free arose While the Liberal Democratic Party e clearcut answer does not presagg-ann radical shift in government policy it does suggest that the government has taken a considered position on this highly controversial issue In Japanese terms the significance of this step is an important measure of the leadershipis own assessment of its local leeway SECRET screen -I Authority I 3a Present Status of Nuclear Conditionin-t Despite the active Japanese c u an nuclear t ere are widespread information gaps within leadership groups influential in national security affairsu Even among the military forces only the senior army leaders are receiving instructive background information largely provided by the U80 Nuclear lwarftre training is given under the guise of #soientific technology disaSter control or similar covera' Navy education is presently nil but is expected to increasee nmong air force officers there is some education and training but-the leadership is still hypersensitive and shares with the other sertices a morbid fear that the public will learn of even the minimal program now in progress There is inStruction on nuclear war among the civilian components of the governmentg Some officials of the Foreign Ministry the Japan Defense Agency and intelligence groups concerned with disarmament studies and Chinese Communist nuclear-progress have been exposed to a more realistic appreciation of the nuclear weapons problem Their numbers are few howeterp and there is no indication-that the government intends to eXpand official let alone public education in the near futures Asparallel situation exists among the_political elitea Certain elements of the Liberal Ibmocratic Party the favor a stronger rearmament program recognize the need for conditioning the public but they have consistently aroided breaching the subject directly The Socialists are working in the opposite direction playing upon public fears and exaggerate ing'thems A few Japan Socialist Party mothers have-sought out senior military officers for discussions of defense problems but they are the exception Among Japanis intellectual leaders we journalists commentatore film producers we the tendensy is to treat nuclear questions in a manner which_highlights the hazards rather than the necessities of nationaledefense Deep knowledge and sophisticated appreciation of nuclear matters are concentrated within Japanis scientific community Basic research and developm ment efforts are focused on peaceful uses of atomic energy but even so negative national attitudes have retarded these programs Some of Japanis nuclear scientists undoubtedly feel frustrated and inpatient in this environment Others share widespread public prejudices and anxieties and are able to lend the weight of their'knowledge and prestige to the oppositiono Among this group are some nuclear scientists hostile to the to Military and Finance Leaders The political influence of Japanis military leaders has been and will probably continue to be at a low ebb The provision for civilian control over the Defense Agency is a more or less permanent feature of Japanese constitutional laws Illustrative of the acceptance of this postwar feature of the nationis defense outlook is the fact that the civilian heads of the Defense Agency have been third or f0urth echelon politicians with little professional experience to bring to the jobo The chief spokesman for increased rearmanent will probably continue to be the few exemilitary men serving in the list or as commentators in Authon'ty 5 ew 230mm newspapers or other public medial Evidence of politi al ambition among senior career military officers is Makinga Another traditional source 0f suppert for the eon erva iv s ana am in the past for strong national defense palicies as well ew has been the nation s major financial interestso' The extraordinary regearch and development costs of nuclear eqnipment hcwever ara not aitraative to Japan s fully occupied ind a rialiStso In the present stategof fall employment and boamwgrowth financial leaders hawe demnns rated active interest in some nuclear programs promising financial returns such as' atamie powered s ips and power generationl Mbreover this group as mach as any other in Japan feels the necessity for keeping up with modern technological developmants abroad so that it will not be outstripy ayby foreign competitorsu Based upon eXperience in a her develqped Eountries however it seems likely that new initiatives will have to came primarily fram the government rather than from private industryo SEW Roman r- DEC if 1 Aummny ggj g giHa x a with attachments Report Number INR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM i Date Completed This form and a distribution list must be completed and submitted in duplicate to Rm 6528 with each INR issuance No classified reports are re September 23' 1962 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