- DECLASSHHED Authority - r oIssaM - DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELUGENCE AND RESEARCH Research Memorandum 28 1963 The_Secretary I THROUGH s s - Thomas La Hughes 0 SUBJECT Sweden Still Faceeruestion Nuclear' eaPOns Sweden has long been considered to be a country whiCh might attempt to develop nuclear weapons This memorandum assesses the effect-of the recent test ban pact on Swedish policy concerning this issue Abstract Although warmly welcomed by the Swedish goternment and people the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has fallen short of resolving the question of whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons for its defenses Both-the government and people had hoped that the treaty would ban all testing and open the way for restrictions on the manufacture and use of such weaponso Swedish military authorities have concluded however 'that failure to prohibit underground testing will allow the Soviets to perfect the small weapons most likely to be used to threaten countries such as Sweden and that therefore Swedish security against Soviet pressure has not-been improvedo no one in Sweden has been able to counter the military argument that Swedish con ventional defenses will become relatively ineffective in the face of the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and that Sweden s traditional policy of relying on its own defenses instead of allying itself with major powers or accepting international guarantees of its 'neutrality may beoome untenable if Sweden does not acqwire nuclear weapons When the Swedish Social Democratic government signed the test ban treaty on Angast 12 it simultaneously declared that the_treaty did not bind it in any way'cOnoerning the acquisition of nuclear weaponsg- However9 widespread domestic opposition to acquisition now bolstered by the general hope'for a detente engendered by the treaty raises formidable if not insurmountable obstacles to the undertaking of a weapons development program and the government already in a minority in the Second Channer'of Parliament will probably postpone any decision on the thorny question as it has in the pasto It had indicated that a decision on a weapons cacti 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals snot automatically declassified FOREIGN DISSEM DECiA IFi n -1·-'a Authority SECRET NO FOlmGNDISSEH 2 development program would be made byabout 1963 and on the manufacture and testing of' weapons byabout 19650 ASocial Democratic Partyposition on acquisition was scheduledto be taken atthe time of the partycongress in 19640 Nows however 9 it would probablytakea considerable worsening of the international situation before this or anylikely snceeseen government would act 9 although some researchon weapons development under the guiseof the current programfor development of tlldefense II which was against nuclear weapons started in 1958 9 might be undertaken in order to createa capability for later action SwedishAmbivalence teward the Nuclear Weaons Issue Since theSupreme Commander of the Swedish Defense Forces first asked'in19 4 that Swedish forcesacCluisi be suppliedwithnuclear weapons bythe end of the 1960is 9the question of tion of nuclear weapons has grown increasinglydifficultfor the government Swedish milltary authorities unanimously agree that nuclear weapons are necessary if the Swedishmilitary establishment is to maintain the current level of effectiveness duringa periodwhen a potential enemy  always understood tobe ar­senal Otherwise 9 conventional the USSR isdeveloping a nuclear defenses 9 and the willbecome increasinglypowerless to offer any significant resistance traditional and popular policyof relYing for securityon Swedish defenses alone instead of concluding alliances withmajor powers will be impossible to maintain0 The alternat ives wouldbe eitherto acceptinternational guarantees of neutrality or o Bothalternatives to accept assistancefromNATO or the US to Swedish traditd ons i are repugnant and nationalleaders seem convincedby the military argument However 9 opposition to acquisitions basedon emotional and moral arguments 9 has spread throughout against nuclear warfare the Swedishpeopleo It hasbeen Party eentered in the left wing of the governing Social Democratic and fear of defectionshas caused partyleaders The partyis to avoid facing the issueo already in a minorityin the Second Chamber of Parliament 9 and the loss ofonly 9 a few seatswould tumbleitfrom power The Center and Liberal party leaders althoughmore 0penly sympathetic to the militaryarguments  are also cautious on the issuebecause ofconsiderable opposition among theirrank and fileo Onlythe Conservatives have consistentlyadvocated an immediate government declaration ofintent te secure nuclear weapons 1 0 postpone Prime Minister Tage Erlanderhas used technical arguments action Heholds thatSweden cannot acquire nuclearweapons from abroad because any circumstances under Which theyare likelyto be available from the US or he UK would contravene Swedenis neutrality pollcY i and that therefore Swedencan only secure them throughmanufacture fromnative resources No decision on a weapons researchand development programneed be made until fDlJ a meaningful program these r­eaeurceshave been developed sufficiently to be started In 1959 9 the Supreme Commander declared that thepoint had been reached where weapons research could profitablybe separated from the to force the issueo peaceful uses pregram and tried The fournoncommunist 0 SECRET NoFOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED - Allthorjty ha y sauces so FOREIGN erases w 3 party'leaders reached agreement in early 1960 on expansion ef the facilities of the Defense' esearch Institute concerned with the defense against nuclear weapons program started in 19589 but postponed a decision on weapons research and development until sheet 1963 and a decision on weapons manufacture and testing until sheet 1965 on the grounds that these dates were the earliest by which any effective actien scald betakeno Delays in the construction of atomic energy plants howeverg have made these dates questionable Security Situation Unchanged by-Test Ban Treaty Virtually all Swedes have hoped that their country could avoid the nuclear weapons dilemma and have therefore been strong proponents of international nuclear control and disarmament agreements shich wenld decrease the Soviet nuclear threat to Scandinavia The government has often taken initiativestc reach these goals 'in the UN and at the lBENatisns Disarmament Conference in Geneva of which Sweden is a members Swedish military leaders believe3 however that the terms of the Limited Nuclear weapons Test Ban Treaty do not improve Sweden s security positieng They declare that the failure to ban underground testing will allow the Soviet Union to perfect small nuclear weapons most likely to be used to threaten such countries as Sweden The treaty therefore will have little effect on the growing chsolescence of Swedish conventional arms as time passes and Sweden faces the prospect cf increasing inability to ward off Soviet pressuress_ In this situation the Swedish Government by the leaders of the four noncommunist parties has publicly declared that Sweden s signature on the test han treaty still leaves it free to develop nuclear weapons if conditions requireg but has expressed hope that future disarmament agreements and international developments will make such action unnecessary Only a few leaders including former Foreign Minister sten Und h have stated their belief that the treaty removes any need for Swedish nuclear W3 3 133135 - No Action dkely in Near Futures The atmosphere created by the test When treaty will now probably'make it douhly'difficult for the'politiCal leaders c any party to take pcsitise action toward nuclear weapons acquisi tions While the press has generally earned the public against drawing the cenclusion that a significant detente between the USSR and the powers has taken placeg there is nevertheless a general feeling that Soviet willing ness to sign the treaty is the result of changes within the Soviet union and the Sommunist grasp cf natiensa The resulting Ehssian attitude it is felt is likely to continue and therefone further Soviet acticns leading toward further detects and a lessening of the danger of Soviet aggression may well -In additicng nest Swedes desire to cocperate with the current nuclear powers in preventing further proliferation cf nuclear weaponsa In this atmosphere it is very unlikely that any political leaders not even the Censervatives sill speak cut in favor-of taking acticns that Bissau DECLASSIFIED 7 Authority a FGREIGN DISSEM mm eeuld be interpreted the spirit of the test ban treaty and camplicating the @f ne entrant nuclear'powars reaah further agreements in the nualear field Mast prebablyg the gevemnment will seek he aveid gay publie ebate an the launching at a weapams d vel ym nt sehedule far this yearg While keeping itself free a _at a later timeo 381333 in the at@mie anergy'pragram @ffer a excuse to declare once again thaiyne e iaion need yet be madeo Simila lyg Sccial Democratic leaders will prbbabiy try to postpene GEES againg @n the Same graundsg a debate an nualear weapons acquiai ian smhe ule far the next Secial Democratic Party cangress in 19 ha _Gnly a warsening 9f he international sihuation W@ul make likely any posi ive actian an the part ef he gavermmento Prime Miniater Erlam er has repertedly stated that shguid Soviet nuclear weapeng be intra nge -in a Finlan 3 the Swedish Government woul also acquire sugh waapanso The Swe ish peeple generally9 heweverg would have to be convinged hat further dism' armament or weapons Qantrel were probable an that he anger @f Seviet aggressien baa increased t he point where mare Sagurity measures buld have ta'be takeno Even un er Each circumStanGesg the presant Sacial Democratic minority gevermment might net riSk taking far a' weagans pr gram9 but might instead ask the ether three n@n@@mmnnist parties tg join in a natianal egalitien gavarnment fer the purpmgeo Nevertheleasg tha damands 9f the milita y and Sonservativa leaders are likaly t9 persists In @r er t9 praw king a public debateg Erlander may ence again seek to reach a private agreement with the leadErs 0f the @ther nonc mmunist parties tha mauld allow Same further expansien ef curren research on g3defenge against nuglear which wuuld canstitute reparatien @f a @apability'far a later weaycns develapment programu FQBEIGN DISSEH A th i I I orlty I arm SPECIAL CHECKLIST This list is designed to assist the Director s office in making its high-level distribution of INR products It does not replace the regular Distribution Form It will be prepared by the producing offices for every Intelligence-Note and Research Memorandum Two copies of this form will accompany the IN 9 RM when it is forwarded to DDR for the Director s signature AUTOMATIC NSC- Debevoise or White House 29 A 36 3 5 10 INR producing office I 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