DECLASSIFIED Authority 40 eraser Noreen DISSEM DEPARTMENT STATE 2 514 THE or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH Research Memorandum ray lh y196u To The Secretary - Through Erom INR Thomas Hughes subject Indian Nuclear weapons DeVelopment With the recent Indian announcement of the start-up of their plutonium separation plant at Trombay5 attention again is focused on Indian capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons and equally on their intentions This subject was discussed in Intelligence hots of 2h February 196M The present memorandumb designed to supplement the earlier IN grows Out of a recent review of the evidence currently available to us ABSERACT There is an intelligence report that the core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor CIR at Trombay is being changed every six months This six month Cycle is unusually short for a research reactor of the CIR type While training or some other technical reason may explain this short cycle it is appropriate- for production of weapons grade plutonium There are no technical_requirements in the Indian nuclear energy program that would demand a plutonium separation plant They will not have a power reactor using plutonium for fuel for some years Small quantities of plutonium for research can be obtained from a variety of sources at modest cost Processing power reactor fuel rods for recovery and re-use Of uranium is also not a current Indian problem since their first power reactor at Tarapur will use a US safeguarded uranium core that'will probably be reprocessed in the US DISSEM Group 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified Authority DECLASSIFIIEQW snonrr norom DISSEM ii The Indians are now in a position to begin nuclear weapons development if they choose to do so we have no eVidence however of a Weapons research and development program and would expect to see some if the program existed It may be that in the series of decisions involved in such a weapons program the Indians have deliberately taken the first to have available on demand uneafeguarded weapons grade plutonium or at the least the canaeity to produce it The next decision to begin weapons could conceivably be taken at any time While this would involve a major political decision the political environment in India for undertaking nuclear weapons development appears to be more favorable now than it was a year ago Dream DECLASSHHEDW Authorityw - - DISSEM DiscussiOn Early this year the Indian director of project Phoenix the plutonium separation plant at Trombay stated that the plant would begin actual separation operations in may He also is reported in a senSitive intelligence report to have said that the fuel core of the Canadianulndian Reactor CIR a ho MW research reactor not subject to Canadian inSpection was being changed every six months l This is an exceptionally short period for normal research reactor operations There may be other reasons for the quick change of cores a personnel training for reactor operations being one -- but a six months period is the cycle_best suited to produce weapons grade plutonium for a reactor of the-CIB specifications The separation plant itself is in terms of the Indian nuclear energy program an uneconomic investment There are no clear-cut technical reasons flowing out of India currently planned nuclear power pregram that would make a chemical separation plant essential The Indians have no known requirements for plutonium in the quantities that the plant can produce either as fuel for use in power reactors or for scientific research Nor is there any reason to believe that they may be interested in using the fission products that would come out of the separation -plant for radiological'uarfare purposes Small quantities of plutonium for research purposes are readily available from a variety of sources at very_modest cost plutoniumsburning reactors that would_make desirable a domestic source of plutonium are well into the future for India certainly not before the end of the decade While reprocessing of power reactor fuel rods for subsequent re-use of the uranium is standard practice this is not a problem the Indians will have to face for some years The US Indian Tarapur power reactor for example will use a US supplied core of enriched uranium its reprocessing therefore will undoubtedly be handled by the US not India Few countries have found it economic to build separation plants for this purpose preferring to have the work done by the US UK France or the Soviet union under bilateral agreements In fact India is the only non weapons power with such a facility if one exempts the multilateral Ehropean separation plant Ehrochemie in Belgium and possibly also the Chinese Communists smear norms DISSEM SECRET NO F'OHN DISSEM - 2 - The motivation for India's constructing a separations plant Certainly it is in keeping with Indian dislike and suspicion of foreign controls and sat'eguarda In addition it prov ldes a prestige item at fairly small cost -- roughly $7 5 million However if India intended to develop nuclear weapons then the construction of a plutonium separation plant would be a necessary capital investment may have been largely nationalistic in origin It must be emphasized tl t we have no direct evidence that the Indians currently have a weapons program India's 12r'aft Defense Plan includes around $300 million equivalent for research and development over a five-year period but no treapons laboratory has been identified and we have seen no Indian scientists doing the kind of research in instrumentation electronics and nucleonics that would be necessary for reapons development 'Iole would expect to see some evidence of such work through publication by the Indian scientists engaged in it One might also anticipate Indian scientists'interest in vreapons-z-e Iat ed subjects expressed by them to western colleagues at international scientif'ic gatherings or for that matter greater attendance by Indians at certain of these gatherings No such indications have yet become apparent On balance therefore it seems unlikelJr tl1at the Indians have yet decided to begin weapons development At the same time everything the Indians have done so far would be compatible orith a weapons program if at some future date it appeared desirable to start one This is pr-obab Iy no accident One might fairly say that the first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon has already been taken to have available on demand unsaf'eguarded weapons-grade plutonium or at the least the capacity to produce it nle n to begin weapons R fo D could conceivably be taken at any time Nehru and other top leaders of the Government of India continue to state publiCly that India ivill not attempt to develop atomic weapons These protestations have come with less frequency and ' fith a decreasing ring of conviction since India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the raIl of 1962 Although India welcomed last year's nuclear test ban treaty it did not de-emphasize or retrench its nuclear energy program SECREr NOFORN DISSEM m g a Altman M DISSEM -3- hbreover the Indians havc'menifested a continuing determination to achieve as quickly as possible the capability to produce their own military hardware including such advanced weapons as erce and supersonic planes In sum the pdlitical environment for undertaking-nuclear weapons development in India appears to be more favorable now than it was a year ago DISSEM A- 1 rm DECLASSIFIED AuthorityigL 7 uwr Vn CON FIDENTIAL with SECREELIINQFORN DISSEM attachments 5 Report Number REPORT AND RELEASE FORM 1311346 Date Completed This form and a distribution list must be completed and submitted' 1n duplicate to Rm 6528 with each issuance No classified reports are re- m 12 1961 leased outside the Department until specific approval 15 given Number of Pages 5 Title or Report Indlan Nuclear Weapons Development Requester Requester s Due Date none Name Agency Unit if Store Mm H Brown Extension 3090 Office Division Project Supervisor Project INK Evans Distribution by Producer Clearances RNA- 9 Spain draft Date No of Copies Attach List Producing Office Others Recommended for release to other US Government agencies specify on Distribution Form Recommended for release to UK Canada Australia and New Zealand Recommended for release to all NATO countries Australia and New Zealand Recommended for release to USIB contractors specify Recommended for release to other countries specify Not recommended for any distribution other than that indicatedzby the producing office Not recommended for release outside the Department Not recommended for release outside the US Government Does this Report contain Yes No 3 Statements which might diSClose US policy or agreements in the process of formulation or not yet revealed Statements about other countries which should not be revealed to foreign recipients Classified military information Classified information clearance for which must be obtained from another agency a foreign government or other non-Departmental intel- ligence source prior to release Information which is the property of private companies or individuals that should not be released 'From the intelligence standpoint is there any other reason why this report should not be released Yes I No REMARKS It is intended that as many reports will he released as is possible consistent with security and broad policy considerations Accordingly if a report in general seems appropriate for release excepting certain portions which may require excisions or clearances from other agencies the responsible officer should recommend release If any of the preceding questions are answered af rmatively please explain below as may be appropriate citing sources and page numbers and indicating passages suggested for deletion etc OBSERVATIONS DEEKRTMENT 01- STATE RECEIVED MAY 1 41 19574 ROOM 8 8 3 kW m Wipe 5L Wm May 12 1961 Typed one Signature Date 7 CORFIDENTIAL with DISSEM attachments