DECLASSHHED Authorityw gecv 333-115 October 13 1965 LR To The Secretary Through 8 8 From INK Thomas L Hughes 5 Subjaot Soviet Views of Eucloor Sharing and Nonproliferation The Soviet draft treaty of September 24 1965 was examined in Research Memorandum RSBulo Soviet Conditions About Nuclear Arrangements for a Nondioaominotiou Treaty September 29 1965 FOREIGN DISSEM The present papa carries forward the analysis of the Soviet position on this subject through a detailed review of the intricate bidding in subsequent conversations ABSTRACT The Soviet position on what forms of nuclear sharing might be permitted under a nonproliferation treaty appears to be an d uisitoly contrived obfusoation Indeo Hoacow has done such a good job of wooaolmwordiog that even one usually well informed Soviet officer seems to have been lad to contradict himself in two successive luncheon conversations Although the Soviets have given some hints that their opposition to the Select Committee may not be unalterahio they have cornfully avoided taking any clear position on it The Soviet Union appears to be trying to put off any final definitions of what it will tolerate in the way of BATS sharing and still conclude a nonproliferation By putting off any such definition Moscow apparently hopes to put itself in a position where it can pass judgment on present or developing Western nuclear arrangements and than inject itself into intrownAIO rolationships FOREIGN DISSEH Authoritwa r FOREIGN DISSEM From UNDC to ENDC On June 2 1965 Tsarapkin speaking to the UNDC set out Moscow s basic position on the heNamara Select Committee proposal that it was another analogue to the MLF as a means of slipping the West Germans nuclear weapons and that consequently a non- proliferation treaty ought to forbid it In Geneva he blurred the Soviet position a bit when he made no specific reference to the McNamara proposal as such But in using much the dame sweeping language as the Soviet draft treaty subsequently tabled in New York Tsarspkin amply protected his previous stand which denounced the Select Committee as another analogous to the MLF Gromyko on the Draft Treaqx The sweeping language of the Soviet draft treaty of September 24 1965 can of course he read as prohibiting not only the MLF and ANF but the Select Committee and existing two key arrange- ments as well Indeed we believe that if all of the New York draft is taken completely literally it would prohibit current Warsaw Pact practices as well Later this month Soviet Polish East German and Czech trOOps are to carry out a Joint exercise in East Germany under what the East German press called conditions of modern warfare at the very least that would signify the ex- change of enough weapons-effects data to make simulation of nuclear battlefield conditions meaningful and would come under the stricture in the Soviet draft treaty against passing information about the application of nuclear weapons In his New York conversationsf Gromyko stated that the only issue in nonproliferation was the While it was clear that his remark meant Moscow was not drawing a direct link between the Vietnam crisis and nonproliferation the further implications of his remark were hard to fathom Presumably he did not mean that Moscow intended to accept the US provision of IAEA or equivalent safeguards he may believe that the US will cave easily on that score Be that as it may the main problem in Gromyko s remark was that he never explained what he meant or did not mean by While he denied that his basin purpose was an attack on NATO his use of the term left standing all of the questions raised by the Soviet draft treaty For he could hardly have intended not to FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSHHED jk Authorityw FOREIGN DISS - 3 include ANF and he did not explicitly exclude existing nuclear nrrangemente indeed he did not indicate that he knew of any way to draft language which would permit them and rule out the ANF and MLF or the Select Committee from the broad-ranging prohibitions of the Soviet draft treaty A French official has told no that in his talks with Couve in New York Gromyko had indicated that the Soviets were equally oppoced to the Select Committee as to tho MLF or INF even though they did not quite understand what the Select Committee one about Other Soviet Officials Give Evidence of Waffling Meanwhile conversations with other Soviet officials confirm the existence of a degree of paeeible flexibility on the subject of the Select Committee together with a meaenre of unonroneoe an to Just what the Soviet position in Three Soviets have hinted that Mhecow might not be unalterably opposed to the Select Committee but each some measure of reservation on the point Zinohuk of the Soviet Embassy in Washington in a September 27 conversation with Mr Fisher of ACDA noted -- in an almost wistful manner -- that nothing had been heard on the subject of late but seemingly as an afterthought added that hoccow had not or course approved of it Pravda Commen- tator matveov on September 29 told Mr Nordneea of at this etage the Select Committee posed no great problem for the Soviets -- probably because they knew no little about it He added however that as the Select Committee's role became more clear this position could change On October 3 Lukianov of the Soviet Embassy here told the Norwegian Couneelor Vibe that the Sovnete would not object to the establishment of a Select Committee as they presently underotood its terms of reference that it would not allow any kind of physical control of nuclear weapons Khrpov Backtracke The most detailed of these informal conversatione were two ludcheons with Karpov of the Soviet Embassy hero and his evident backtracking seems to bear out the sense of some confusion among usually knowledgeable Soviet officers on precisely what the Soviet rj n'may be As we read the two conversations we suspect that Khrpov has been the victim of Noncow e extreme subtlety in leaving certain aepecte of its position subject to continuing reu definition FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED It Authoritym Li FOREIGN DISBEM On September 28 Khrpov lunehed with hr Barber of ISA After reviewing the Soviet terms for ownership disposition and which appeared in the draft treaty no Barber asked Would the Soviet Government intend that this would limit in any way political or staff consultation on these matters He replied not at all This is directed toward physical to nuclear weapons At this point I said If I understand you correctly then it it the position of the Soviet Govern- ment that existing nuclear arra b mente political consultation ouch on NATO Council and Select Committee or eimilar arrangements are not affected in any way but that a new nuclear arrangement such as the MLF or INF would be forbidden In this correct He answered Yes that is correct To pin it down completely Mr Barber asked whether Karpov was expressing a personal view or the poeitdon of his government and asked if he had any objections to Mr Barber s reporting the con verontion He had none But on September 20 Kerpov lunched with Mr Owen of and gave quite different answers to the some questions hr Owen's memorandum reeds 5he referred to the latest Soviet draft on nonproliferation agreement I asked what its effect would be on the NATO Atomic Stookpile end the Select Committee He said that it would preclude the Stockpile and that its effect on the Select Committee would depend on what the Select Com- 5 mittee did If it discussed only political questione that would be 0 x But if it got into technical matters which involved information about how to use nuclear weapons or gave the non-nuclear countries nuclear weapons it would be verhoten Khrpov thue beekt acked both on the issue of existing NATO nrrange mente perhaps he did not understand what Mt Berber meant by exieting arrangemente and on the onbjeet of the Select Committee His second needing w perhaps based on some further eoneultetione i after his talk with hr Barber -- in more in keeping with the i language of the Soviet draft treaty It madettleer that the Sovieta do not hinge their case purely on physical handling of weapone hut also on passing certain etill ill-defined categories of information not only about manufacture but also about application of nuclear weapons FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSHHED Audie qu 1 FOREIGN DISSEM 4 - Goldblat on Different Tack Polish ENDC delegate Goldblat is still on a differ- ent tack It wee he who on September 2 introduced the term planning into bloc on what ought to be forbidden by nonproliferation treaty and on October 5 USUN reported that he had expressed the opinion that the Soviet Graft treaty was meant to exolude the Select Committee Goldblet'e interpretation of the Soviet draft is in keeping with his conception one not expres- eed by the Soviets except for Kerpov'e response to Mr Barber's leading question -- that a nonproliferation agreement ought to freeze the statue one with respect to alliance arrangements It has thus Goldblet who on September 2 breached the notion that there was in fact a statue quo with respect to some degree or other of nuclear sharing at which both sides ought to stop The notion of a status quo to be frozen was again mentioned by Polish delegate Lethe in New Yerk on October 12 Where Do We Stand To sum up Noncow has now given us hints that its opposition to the Select Committee may not be unelterahle but the Soviete have n- at the expense of confusing their own officials and per- haps their allies -- carefully avoided taking any clear position on it or on related issues The Soviets to be trying to defer any final definitions of what they will or will not acquiesce in and still conclude a nonproliferation treaty than offer guidelines which might facilitate a NATO sharing arrangement Nosoow would prefer to sit in Judgment on NATO plane as they are developed Thus by keeping its position obscure the Soviet Union apparently hopes to maximize its chances for injecting itself into intro NATO relationships Rather FGREIGN DISSEM