DECLASSIFIED Authoritym US DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF AND-RESEARCH Thin report Mu pmdugw by the Emma other agencies the working level GROUP 3 it him not been coordinated elsewhere - I 4 no FOREIGN DISSEM imal WJ- S 110 CONFIDENTIAL no FOREIGN DISSEM I Mm RAE-8 March 17 1967 To The 5ecretnry Through From INR - George C Denney Jr y t3 l Subject The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Pluses and Minuses February fourteen Latin American states signed the frosty of Tletelolco creating the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone NFZ the first such area ever established in a major inhabited area This paper examines some of the more important features of the Treaty and suggests some of its _implicetions - The Treaty is largely the result of skillful Mexican diplomacy and the sdoption of a number of ingenious if somewhat ambiguous compromises Most Latin Americans clearly regard their action as having great and practical significance and see the Treaty as another concrete and possibly precedentwsetting step following the Antarctic Treaty the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty towards limiting the arms race and fostering_nn attitude conducive to the achievement of general disarmament and pesos Although there is much to be said in favor of this Treaty a cold analysis of it does not justify euphorin The compromise decision nrriyed at in Mexico City on entry into force provisions is extremely complicated and provides several loOpholes for states not desiring to enter the NFZ or wishing to avoid certain features of the Treaty The resolution of the issue of peaceful use of nuclear energy while satisfactory from the stand point-of the-US and the other nuclear powers except Communist China 1 _Ths signed on February 16 Thus the fifteen signatories are Boiivis Colombis 'Costs Rise Chile Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Uruguay Venezuela automaticallyideclaesixigg 1 mm Authoritym CONFIDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM - ii - I is still subj ct to differing interpretation and could possibly be challenged at some future date by the Brazilians or others ITwo supplemental Piotogols' may also cauae difficulties Protocol I requiring nonuLatin American powers with territories within the Zone to accept the restrictions of the Treaty for th03e territoriegg raises variou$ pblitical security and canstitutional issues for the U8 the and France Protocol II requires a guarantee of the NFZ by the five nuclear powers Communist China has r Buffed overtures aimed at securing its accession A nonwuse commitment included in Protocol II may also prove troublesome Brazil and Argentina two of the more advanced Latin American states in nuclear research and development are not enthusiastic about the NFZ have-not yet signed the Treaty and may not allaw it to come into force in their territories for quit sema time if ever CONFIDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED 7 CONFIDENTIAL ND FOREIGN BISSEM Entry inta Farce the big ifs Oat of the mast iagenioug an camplicated compromiaes on the NFZ arrived at in Mexicc'City was that on tha entry inta forte provisiona It was taquired in wider to bri ge the gap betweah the Mexicans who wanted a treaty gimmediately which chuld be perfected later and the Brazilians supported by the Atge timet and others n who argued that an NFZ treaty could act be really effective until Cuba agreed to participate all powers with territories in the hemisphere agtetd ta includa thaw in tha NFZ and the five nuclear pow ts guaranteed to respect the Zone In line with this reasoning the Btaziliant insiste that these points shhuld be regarded as preconditions to the entry into force 9f any NFZ treaty In it final farm the treaty article an entry into force emho ies both Maxicth and Brazilian points of View Article 28 specifies that the NFZ will hater into forte'aa moon as 1 All Latin Ametican Republics including Cuba deposit their inmtrumenta of ratification with the Mexican Government 2 The cantiuehtal or extraucaatihental powers with de facto or e jute international teap0haibilities for territories within the Zane_ US UK France the Netherlands _sign Protocol I ghatanteting to accept the prohibitions of the Treaty for those territories '3 Tht five nuclear powers as UK France USSR Communist China sign_Prataccl II agreeing to reapect tha NFZ and neither to use mar thrtaten the u e 0f nuclaar weapans againat the NFZ's contracting parties countrias far whom the Treaty is in force Etch tantracting party contludes hi lateral or multi latetal agtetmahtt with the Intatnatiohal Atomic Energy Agency for application 9f the safhguatdt to its nuclear activitiea thhtittians far theae ara ta begih within 180 days- _hftet depaait hf an inttrumtnt 0f ratification the agreements thauld into farce n9 later than eighteen mantha after the start at these negatiationt that -Atticlh 28 prashIVtt all Brazil s preconditions intact Hawevar t9 tatihfy tha-Htxichnh and permit-the initiatien of the NFZ each Latin hmhtitah it granttd the right to waive eithar whally or in part any at the ahava'taquitamtnta by simply appen ing a declaration apatifying its patitioh to int ihttrumtnt of ratification Far those countriet entering untunditional waivett Tttaty will imme iately cema inta effect For these statat chatting ta tubmit partial waivers the Trmaty will come into affect anly when $11 the unawaived ttquitemehts hava been mat When the treaty hat came lute effect far alevan states the NFZ shall be considered in effect far these etunttiat amt the Agency tat up under the Treaty to ttgulate aha auparvise the HFZ will be attahliahed CONFIDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority NU CONFIDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM - 2 i There are ueveral longhules in the above procedures for those states Which are uueuthusiaetic about the Treaty and do not wish to have it apply in their territuries The simplest of these is the refusal to either sign ratify or deposit an instrument of ratification for the Treaty Another method wuuld be ta sign and ratify conditionally with specific reference to particular requirements included in Article 28 On the baeia of the information available new both the universality requirement and the Protocols appear to raise seriOus difficulties which may delay the treaty's coming into force far all intended participants for some time to come Cuba is the principa1 obstacle to the fulfillment of the first condition in Article 28 that all Latin American Republics accede to the Treaty Cuba was invited t6 the Conference but did not attend In the past the Gubsn guvetument has made its participation in the NFZ contingent upon vs tumult- meat te abandon Guantanamo and the cessatieu by the Us of aggressive policies towards Cube There is no evidence to date that Cuba has altered this stand and it thus appears likely that it will not accede to the Treaty Accordingly there is little present prosPeet that the first condition of Article 28 can be met The Protocol signature requirements raise additional stumbling blocks Protueol I which requires that non-Latin American powers with territories Within the Zone accept the conditions of the Treaty for those territories raises difficulties for the UK the US and France The UK may have political difficulties with this Protncol becaude it 13 involved in territorial disputes with two Latin American states with Guatemala over British Hunduree Beliue and Argentina ever the Falkland Malvinau Islaude and was nut pleased by the anti-celunial resolutione passed at the Conference The US for both cunetitutionul and security-reasons is not prepared to have either the Virgin Islands 0 Puerto Rico included in the NFZ For the French nonstitutional questions are paremuunt for French territories ure-ceueidered t0 be departments of metr0pulitan France Only the Netherlands apeareutiy has as ma a prubleme with Protocol 1 rotocul_ll requiring a guarantee of the NFZ by the five Nuclear Puwers eluo_preseute probleme Cummuuiut China has rebuffed overtures aimed at ite to the rutocol and the Soviet Union has said it will eig providing the other Nuclear Beware do the same Mereover Protocol II required the Nuclear Powers to undertake net to use or threaten tu nee nuclear against contracting parties of the Treaty Here the problem is_une 0f precedent for the US to date has generally not favored unconditiueul nuuwuee cummitmeute Cuba could also present a problem in this '2e3erd If ide1 Ceetru ehould unexpectedly accede to the Treaty the US Wuuld become bound to a nuumuee clause vie-a vie Cuba by signing Protocol 11 Brazil and Argentina the tee Latin American states least enthuuiastic we the Rue are well aware of e11 these difficulties and probably feel that Article 28 ineuree that they need never participate in the NFZ until their CGEEIDENTIAL N0 FGREEGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Mr I Authority A CONFIDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM 3 i original preconditions have been mot Thus the result of the entry into force compromioo 13 likely to be a functioning NFZ without Brazilian and rgentino participation 8 3 of w An lonerfoct Eolotion Goo of the thornieot issues at the Mexico City Conference was that of the possible of nuclear explosioos for peaceful purposes The US supported by tho 3% goo the took the position that under present or foreseeable todhnology it is impossible to differentiate between an explosive avice into dod for peaceful purpooeo and one which woul have military_applications Soverol Latio American delegations however wiohod nothing written into the NEE-which would in any way hinder the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes Again razil and Argontino -already active in nuclear research Wore loaders of the group oppooing a rigid definition of what constituted a poocofol or military nucloar explosive device The key alomoot in the compromise worked out on this is to be found in Articlo 5 of the Treaty which defines a nuoloar weapon as any aovioo whioh is capable of reloaoing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which hao'o group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for war Rico Tho moo testing manufacture acquisition receipt storage dooloymoot of nuclear weapono either by the contracting portioo themoolvoo or by their agonto is prohibited Article However oozor ing to Article 18 tho contracting parties may carry out explosions of for poaooful purposos either by themselves or in collobo ration with third partieo providing that the limitationo of Articles 1 and_5 are The right to nuclear enorgy_for non-explosive peaceful is further fortifio by Article 17 which states that nothing in the Treaty-goal orojodice tho rights of the contracting parties to employ noclear onexgy for economic dovolopmont and ooCial progress provi ed again that ouch one 13 consiotoot with Articles 1 on 5 Reactor experbmeots which oro a controllo of nuclear energy will be oonoioored exempt from the rootriotivo oopocts of the Article 5 definition Aloe peaceful nuclear oxolooiomo coodootoo for the oigootorieo b the Nuclear Powers through informational arrangements woulo bo if carried out in oonformity with Axtiolo 18 1o practical toxmo both the Nuclear Powero an the majority of the Latin amoricono that the Articlo 5 definition insures that _tho offoot of tho Treaty will be nonwproliforotive Tho US bases its position oo tho and future toohnology of nuclear oxplooive doviceo contonding that all such devices hovo a group of oharaoteristico that are appropriate for ago for warlike and that tho development of such devices 18 by Artiolo 1 Thoro is not on this position however The Brazilian dologoto at tho Conference advanced the thooio that the group of characteriotioo rofoxred to in Article 5 should be understood as the sum total of opooifio attributes that identify the device g iot oded CONFIDENTIAL no woman Mmm DECLASSHHED Au m EU llg 1 q CONFIDEKTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM - 4 for purposes of war contending further that only military devices possess those attributes which are not common to devices used for peaceful purposeo This interpretation Was imme iatcly challenged by the Chilean delegate ono his pooition was sustained coo supported by the Preparatory Commission Chairman Garcia Robles of Mexico a statement submitted to the Conference by HE Socrotary General Thant and apporontly by a majority of the other oolcgationo protect In the face of this majority opinion the Brazilians wore unhappy but said nothing Although Brazil might attempt at some futuro timc at the ENDC negotiations in Gcoovo for example to raise again itointorptotation of Characteristics the US considers that neither the record of_tho NFZ Confotcnce not any reasonable legal interpretation of the Treaty will support the Brazilian position The Brazilians could choose to consider however that the lack of a commonly accepted definition of the group of characteriStico constituting a nuclear weapon constitutes one of the Treaty'o loose ends and use this fact to leave thomooIVeo the option of aoquiring oxylosivordcviceo in the future final of this situation must be noted As neither Brazil not Argentina apparently intend to become contracting parties to the Treaty at this time they will not be subject to its provisions Thus in effect both the Argentineo and Brazilians will remain frce to develoP peaceful nuclear explooive devices in the future if they decide they wish to do so nly_pooitivo accession to the Treaty can make a nation subject to its prohibitions and obligations Other Goico Thoto oto gooetol other positive features of the Treaty which merit oommoot Tho moot obvious of those are tho probablo establishment of the itoolf coo the creation of a permanent organization or Agency based in Moxico City to acminiotor it once olevon states hove ratified the Treaty Goo of the of the Agency is to eotoblish a control system to oosuro the Treaty'o observance and to act up procedurco for ad hoc investigationo of ouopectod violations of the Treaty This is clearly a otocecont-ootting atop and could have wide implications for the future Horoovor tho Trooty_specifies a commitment by the statoo forming the NFZ to adopt the IAEA oofegucrdo as an effective nuclear non-proliferation technique Alto favorably resolved from the stan point of the US and UK was tho tra oport trcnoit issue Argootina and Venezuela that the Treaty prohibit both tronoport of nuclear_weapons through the NFZ by the contracting portico and transit of ouch oviooa by third partieo a provisionvunaccoptable to the US the UK and France This issue also was through a Mexicanmoponoorod compromise Nothing appears on the question in the Treaty documont itoolfs but a statement on transport transit is included in the Fiool Act o the Propototory The atatemo t notes that contracting portioo arc already forbi don to transport nuclear woopono by the prohibitions cf Article 1 However when the prospective tranoporter is not a contracting COHFEDENTIAL N0 FOREIGN DISSEM Ir _7 I it DECLASSHHED Authority NO DISSEM 5 patty to the Treaty it devolvea upan each aoveteign state acting in accardance With the principles 95 international law to decide whether or not a it will permit the transit of weapons through or over its territory Such permission cauld be granted on either a case by case basis or could be' other ise agread in any treaty in force between the transporter and the tranaparting third party - Certain nthar proviaiona 0f the Treaty are leaa satisfactory from the stan point of tha US Althcugh the boundaries of the'NFZ are campatible with the Antarctic Ttaaty the definition of the territory of the con tracting partiea includes the territorial aea air space and any other apace over which the stata exerciaea sovereignty in accordance with its l gialation Questions arise here with respect to various unilatmrally prcc1 imed territorial limita which the US and other countries do not recognize 83 being cansistant with-internatianal law US efforts to sature recognition of the printiples of internatienal law in the Treaty failed The US also hopad the NFZ would have closer ties with the GAS but the Treaty obligates the NFZ Agency only tn transmit to the GAS for information any reports that may be of intereat to it The US also felt that specific -m9ntien 0f the submigsion of disputes arising under the Treaty to the International Court of Justice by consent of the parties concerned was auparflumua as thia_was alrea y'assured through the Court's statutes referral of such dimputea to the ICJ was specifically enjoined by Atticl 24 unless another mode of peaceful-settlement could be agreed on Guacluaiana Viewed in purely legal terms the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a far from perfect for whila an HFZ will probably seen be in effect for parta-gf Latin Amarica important cauntries an Cuba Brazil and Argentina wiil apparently net he intlu a Nevertheless the impact of tha Ttaaty may ha cansidarabla Tha majority of the Latin Amaricana who yartieigata i tha iacumsi na at Mexico City are canvi ce that they have gradutad a nummpralifarattve Treaty of majorimwortance an thage statea whi h ratify it may ha axpeatad to try earnestly to make it work Bathing- i th treaty the signateries from develaping their nuclear capabilitit tawmt s peaatfui pursuits in fact Mexiaw t e prima mavar in the ham alrea y anmmunced its intentian ta purc gse thrae a itianal raattut ta ta uga i making Mexicn an natian by The crutigl pwi t to the Latin Americana is that far the firat time majar part at tha wsri has eliberately chosan to axclu a itgalf Exam the nuclaar atma tact Thia acision cauld strika t ponaiva-ahar in tha warl Tha for example hava altta y taige again the gng i il ty cf 3 alkan NFZ 1% a letter to Prapawatnry Cwmwisgion Pre idant atcia Rablata 'En aha lang ran the pracedent at t the aatabliahmant 9f the Lattn Amatican EEK may prave far mare significant that any technical dafiaienciag in th@ Eraaty datumant NG DISSEM I DECLASSIFIED Authority with REIGN DISSEM INR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM REPORT NEW This form and appropriate distribution lists must be submitted in duplicate to DDR with each INR issuance INR obtains Departmental clearance before releasing any INR report DATE COMPLETED outside the Department of State The Coordination Staff arranges clearance of classified reports The producing office is responsible for obtaining clearance of unclas- NUMBER OF PAGES Slfied reports from approprlate Departmental Bureaus other than P which DDR arranges 5 TITLE OF REPORT The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Pluses and Minuses in Mexico City REQUESTOR Name 7 Agency Unit if State DUE DATE Self-initiated PRODUCER Office Division Proiect Supervisor Project Analyst CLEARANCES Other INR Offices RAR WSLester AKSleght CLEARANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED REPORT Other Departmental officers NOTE All INR issuances fall under the provisions of DCID 1 7 This directive defines the various markings that con- trol dissemination of copies and or'use of the information in reports these markings are additional to security classification Control marking is important when a report includes information from another agency DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE U 5 GOVERNMENT If it is necessary to limit distribution to specific recipients only please ex- plain in space marked Comments at bottom of form 2121 recommended for release outside the Department of State Mark DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN I TROLLED DISSEM Cl Recommended for releGSe to State and USIB agencies only Mark CONTROLLEDDISSEM Reports marked CONTROLLED DISSEM may not be released to civilian contractors without permission from the originating agency RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IR Report may be released to any U S Gaverament agency RELEASE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS general policy is to release as many reports as possible consistent with security and sensitivity If an exception is made it is especially important that the report be marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM because otherwise USIB agencies may release to foreign governments the information in any INR-report not so classified DCID 1 7 and posts overseas may release the report itself at their discretion 'll FAM 600 Answer the questions below if any question is checked Yes the report must be NO FOREIGN DISSEM with the following ex- ception in the case of information from another agency permission can be requested through Does this Report contain Yes No statements which might disclose US policy or agreements in the process of formulation or not yet revealed statements about other countries which should not be revealed to foreigners classified information clearance for which must be obtained from another agency foreign goVernment or other non- Departmentai intelligence source prior to release information which is the property of private companies or individuals that should not be released DD DIE DD DOD information which for any other reason should not be released If Yes explain below under Comments RECOMMENDATIONS I recommended for release to y foreign government Mark N0 DISSEM Recommended for release to UK Canada Australia and'New Zealand NO FOREIGN DISSEM does not Preclude distri- bution to these countries if appropriate Departmental concurrence is obtained Copies released to these countries will be appropriately marked l l Recommended for release to all NATO countries Australia and New Zealand COMMENTS DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR #1957 ROOM 7818 I TYPEDNAME SIGNATURE am March 13 1967 Alexander Sleght CONFWENTML with Attachments re I I rum-w-