I UECLASSIFIED Authority NH ZO 6 5- 1 FOREIGN DISSEM a U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTOR or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 1 4 18 May 39 1967 To The Secretary Through 8 8 From INR - George C Denney Jr Subject Probable Effects of Chinese Possession of on the Vietnam War The likelihood that Peking soon will be able to deploy medium range ballis- tic missiles raises the question of how this development might affect the nature of Peking s involvement in the Vietnam war Already Prepared to Augment Aid we have estimated that Peking might respond to a stepping-up of the program of bombing North Vietnam by increasing its aid to the North by augmenting Chinese involvement in the war efforu and by publicizing or otherwise making obvious its commitments to Hanoi This response would be de- signed to contribute physically to North Vietnam s ability to continue the struggle and to deter the US from further pressures on Hanoi by magnifying the specter of full scale Chinese intervention In making such a reSponse we have assumed that the Chinese would still be extremely-chary of engaging in a direct confrontation with the US but would probably conclude that washington would also be reluctant to take any steps which would turn the war into a SinouAmerican con flict Under these circumstances the current stalemate in Vietnam might be likely to continue although at a higher level of violence and with a greater degree of Chinese assistance to and influence on Hanoi There would also be a greater risk of an inadvertent Sino-US confrontation due simply to the increase in the Chinese military presence and role in North Vietnam May Be Available in 1968 If such a situation were to continue into early 1968 Chinese progress in advanced weapons programs might begin to have some GROUP 1 This report was produced by the an- gau i 0 212 downgrading and imzzaiim'ksraszi FOREIGN DISSEM declassification Authority Mpg 0575 7 FOREIGN DISSEM 2 staffect on Peking s thinking and on its attitude toward the risks involved in attempting to counter US pressures on Hanoi According to most estimates by the Vt end of 1967 the Chinese may be able to deploy some medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to any of a number of US bases in Asia If these estimates prove correct the Chinese in early l968 may'believe themselves to be in possession of weapons that would help deter the US from making any retaliatory nuclear strikes against Chinese territory as a result of stepped- up Chinese actions in North Vietnam Threat to Peripheral Areas If the Chinese are able to deploy missiles with a range of 1 000 miles they would depending on the number of weapons available be able to aim them at such cities as Saigon Bangkok Tokyo Manila Naha Seoul and Taipei By making known its intention to answer a US nuclear attack on China with a missile assault on one or a number of US bases and virtually unavoidably on the surrounding local zones in any of these areas Peking might calculate that to a great extent it would inhibit the exercise of US nuclear power which con stitutes the basis for a large degree of its fear of a Sino American war Peking might thus feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it Some steps Peking could envisage might include allowing the North Vietnamese the use of Chinese airfields for attacks on US aircraft over North Vietnam lending missile patrol boats to Hanoi permitting use of Chinese ports in case Haiphong is closed and sending some ground forces into North Vietnam and advisers into South Vietnam In general Peking s strategy and objectiveS'would probably not change radically but the Chinese might feel able to employ bolder tactics once FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSHHED i FOREIGN DISSEM -3- they were in possession of operational In addition Peking might calculate that its Asian neighbors feeling themselves threatened by the prospect of nuclear '7 attack would begin to bring pressure on the US to make some sort of settlement in order to stop the hostilities Chinese Would View MRBM as Deterrent An important factor in China s risk taking calculus would probably be the assumption that it could still launch a nuclear strike against US bases on its periphery even after a US nuclear attack on the mainland had occurred Another element would be the belief that the United States would itself be thoroughly conscious of-the deleterious effect of a Chinese nuclear assault against its bases or surrounding areas in Asiaq whictg in terms of the region's immediate power relationships might be no less significant than the enormous consequences of American nuclear blows at China In the Chinese view therefore even a modest nuclear capability would be of significant deterrent value vis a vis the US Moreover the Chinese might calculate that the Americans would be particularly reluctant to risk nuclear exchanges in the context of the Vietnam war which Peking appears to be convinced is unpopular with large and influential segments of the US population and with US friends and allies abroad Extreme Risk-Taking Unlikely we doubt that an MRBM deployment would Spur the Chinese into full scale involvement in the Vietnam fighting or would lead it to take otherwise drastic steps to make the US pull out of the war Peking would still retain its fear of US power and in the final analysis would prdbably try to ayoid a situation in which it was clearly laying itself open-to the risk of nuclear assaults It would also be careful not to generate too much alarm over its nuclear capabilities and intentions for fear of stimulating a preemptive US strike at its nuclear installations or increasing the chances of US-USSR coalition against China FOREIGN DISSEM Authorityu w 7 Authority 20 11 io_ m a I FOREIGN DISSEM Moreover Peking might calculate that the United States would avoid the dilemma of a direct nuclear confrontation by using conventional air strikes against Chinese installations to inflict punishment for or impede various kinds of Chinese involvement in the Vietnam war China s own threat to respond with nuclear weapons in this instance would be far less credible than if US nuclear arms had been involved and would place on China the onus of having used nuclear weapons first Thus an MRBM arsenal may be Viewed in Peking as not significantly' reducing the problem of conventional US retaliation for acts connected with Vietnam rr Nevertheless we feel on balance that Peking will be convinced that by raising the specter of its own nuclear power it would be freer to pursue its basic policy of providing aid to North Vietnam in order to shore up Hanoi s efforts to hold the US at bay while the inexorable passage of time and piling up of casual- ties finally wear out American determination to keep um the fighting FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authoritng 20 3 DECLASSIFIED Authorityuu 20 615 1