U S Army War College Dept of Military Strategy Planning and Operations Center for Strategic Leadership November 2011 AY12 Edition Information Operations Primer Fundamentals of Information Operations Middle States Accreditation The U S Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools 3624 Market Street Philadelphia PA 19104 215 662-5606 The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U S Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND CARLISLE BARRACKS CARLISLE PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5217 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF ATWC-A 19 October 2011 MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION SUBJECT U S Army War College Information Operations Primer This is a document prepared primarily for use by the staff faculty and students of the U S Army War College However U S Government USG agencies and organizations may reprint this document or portions of it without further permission from the U S Army War College Further USG agencies and organizations may post this document wholly or in part to their official approved websites Non-Department of Defense or organization requests to reprint will be handled on a case-by-case basis DISTRIBUTION DMSPO 500 This Page Intentionally Blank Foreword This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense DoD Information Operations IO doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels It is primarily intended to serve students and staff of the U S Army War College as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources Wherever possible Internet websites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information This booklet is intentionally UNCLASSIFIED so that the material can be easily referenced during course work while engaged in exercises and later in subsequent assignments This booklet begins with an overview of Information Operations Strategic Communication and Cyberspace Operations At each level it describes strategies or doctrine agencies organizations and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power Finally the document concludes with an IO specific glossary and hyperlinks to information operations cyberspace operations and strategic communication related websites Readers will note that many of the concepts documents and organizations are works in progress as DoD and the services strive to address the challenges of a rapidly changing IO environment Thus this summarization effort is on-going and continuous Please address any suggested additions revisions and or corrections to the primary points of contact below for inclusion in subsequent editions The U S Army War College extends a special thanks and recognition to the individuals throughout the Department of Defense uniformed military services and Department of State whose help and assistance have made the revision of this Primer possible We also thank Benjamin Leitzel for coordinating the inputs from over 30 organizations and Judy Sosa for proofreading and ensuring that this document is accurate and readable This document may be quoted or reprinted in part or in whole by U S Government USG agencies and organizations and posted to official approved USG websites without further permission Proper credit must be given to the original source document or website or the U S Army War College as appropriate Reprinting or posting to a website of this document either wholly and partially by non-USG organizations must be done with authorization of the U S Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA Please address all such requests to Department of Military Strategy Planning and Operations U S Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle Barracks PA 17013-5242 717-245-3491 carl_ATWC-ASP@conus army mil Professor Dennis M Murphy Professor of Information Operations Information in Warfare U S Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership iii This Page Intentionally Blank Summary of Changes The following changes have been made in this edition of the IO Primer Additions • U S International Strategy for Cyberspace • DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace • The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications • Department of Defense Chief Information Officer • Army Cyber Command Deletions • The Assistant Secretary Of Defense – Networks and Information Integration ASD NII Replaced by Department of Defense Chief Information Officer • The Joint Military Information Support Command JMISC was deactivated and information on this organization was removed from the IO Primer • The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD l IO activities have been transferred to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD P Revisions • New Definition for Information Operations IO was added to the Glossary • The Information Operations Strategic Communication and Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations sections have been updated • With a few exceptions Department of Defense and Department of State agency sections have been updated where appropriate Sections have been reviewed by the responsible office and most sections have some changes v This Page Intentionally Blank vi Table of Contents Foreword iii Summary of Changes v Table of Contents vii I CONCEPTS 1 Information Operations 3 Strategic Communication 11 Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations 19 II STRATEGIES GUIDANCE DOCTRINE 33 National Strategy and Guidance 35 U S International Strategy for Cyberspace 37 National Framework for Strategic Communication 41 Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance 43 DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 45 DoD Report on Strategic Communication 49 DoD Principles of Strategic Communication 51 Department of Defense Directive DoDD 3600 01 Information Operations 55 Joint Doctrine 59 Joint Information Operations Doctrine 59 Service Doctrine 67 Army Information Doctrine 69 Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine 79 Navy Information Operations Doctrine 83 Air Force Information Operations Doctrine 89 III ORGANIZATIONS 99 Department of State 101 Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 101 The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 103 National Agencies 105 National Security Agency NSA 105 Department of Defense 109 Under Secretary of Defense – Policy USD P 111 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration CPI 115 Department of Defense Chief Information Officer DoD CIO 117 Defense Information Systems Agency DISA 119 Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center IATAC 121 Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions 125 Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations DDGO J39 127 Joint Spectrum Center JSC 131 Joint Public Affairs Support Element JPASE 135 Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC 137 U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM 139 U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM 143 U S Special Operations Command USSOCOM 145 Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program 149 Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School 151 Service Organizations 155 nd Army Cyber Command 2 Army 157 Army – 1st Information Operations Command 1st IO Cmd 161 Army Reserve Information Operations Command ARIOC 163 United States Army Information Proponent Office USAIPO 165 Marine Corps Information Operations Center 167 Navy Information Operations Organizations 169 Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency 171 Headquarters 24th Air Force 173 th 624 Operations Center 175 vii th 67 Network Warfare Wing 177 th 688 Information Operations Wing 179 th 689 Combat Communications Wing 181 Glossary 183 Information Operations Cyberspace and Strategic Communication Related Websites 191 viii I CONCEPTS This section includes an overview of the concepts and latest developments in • Information Operations • Strategic Communication • Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations 1 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank Back to Table of Contents Information Operations Notes on Changes This introduction examines Information Operations IO conceptually and doctrinally but is intended only as a guide to facilitate academic discussion and is not authoritative Both Army and Joint doctrine for Information Operations are being revised and will also be affected by the recent activation of U S Cyber Command As of this writing Joint IO and Cyberspace Operations doctrine are being developed in parallel with expected publication in summer 2012 While the information is current as of publication readers should consult the following sites for updates and changes http www dtic mil whs directives corres dir html DODD 3600 01 Information Operations http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jointpub_operations htm JP 3-13 Joint IO doctrine http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jointpub_reference htm Joint dictionary http www army mil usapa doctrine Active_FM html FM 3-0 Army Operations and FM 3-13 Army IO doctrine Background Information Operations are an evolving construct with roots back to antiquity thus it is both an old and a new concept The late 1970's saw the emergence of Information Warfare IW and Command and Control Warfare C2W as war-fighting constructs integrating several diverse capabilities These further evolved into Information Operations recognizing the role of information as an element of power across the spectrum of peace conflict and war 1 IO is an Integrating Function Information Operations are the integration of capabilities involving information and information systems in order to gain a military advantage This concept is similar to Joint Operations which are the integration of service capabilities or Combined Operations which are the integration of two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies The integration envisioned is not mere deconfliction but the synchronization of activities leading to action and in turn achieving desired effects that are significantly greater than the sum of the individual components 2 Purpose of IO Information Operations seek to influence the behavior of target audiences by changing their ability to make decisions while simultaneously defending the friendly capability to make proper decisions This is no different from the exercise of the other forms of national power In this instance the means is information but the resulting outcome is the same a While frequently referred to as soft-power or non-kinetic IO includes the use of physical attack against adversary information systems or directly against decision makers IO also employs technology-based activities to affect adversary information systems b Affecting the target's decision cycle sometimes referred to as his OODA-loop observe orient decide act - loop is a means of influencing target behavior Obviously reducing an adversary's ability to make timely and effective decisions will degrade his exercise of initiative or his response to friendly military action 3 Back to Table of Contents c Action must also be taken to protect friendly information and information systems from compromise or disruption since the U S military is particularly reliant on these systems to maintain situational awareness support decision making and to command and control forces These protective actions are not intended to prevent the unrestricted flow of information vital to a free society but rather to prevent a target's manipulation or distortion of information or attacks on information systems from being effective 3 The Information Environment and Communication At this point it would be helpful to conceptualize the kind of activities which would be effective in achieving the desired results of influencing target behavior while protecting friendly capabilities a All Information Operations activities occur within the broader context of the information environment This environment recognizes the critical role that information and information systems play in today's advanced societies as they progressed along a continuum from agrarian to industrial to the information age This environment pervades and transcends the boundaries of land sea air space and cyberspace It is accessible and leveraged by both state and non-state actors b Within this environment there are three conceptual dimensions of connectivity content and cognitive 1 Connectivity refers to the physical or electronic links which enable information to flow and includes those non-technical relationships between people 2 The content is comprised of the words images databases etc that contain the information itself as well as actions and inactions to which meaning is ascribed This dimension links the physical real world with the human consciousness of the cognitive dimension both as a source of input stimulus senses etc and to convey output intent direction decisions etc 3 The cognitive dimension exists in the mind This is where the individual processes the received information according to a unique set of perceptions interprets the information opinions within a greater context of how he sees the world organized and beliefs on a foundation of core central values These attributes act as a window to filter the information and provide a sense of meaning and context The information is evaluated and processed to form decisions which are communicated back through the information dimension to the physical world It should be noted that the cognitive dimension cannot be directly attacked short of mind-altering drugs but must be influenced indirectly through the physical and information dimensions c Information Operations impact the three dimensions of the information environment through a variety of capabilities Electronic warfare and computer network attack both disrupt connectivity while Soldier and leader engagement enhances connectivity Military Information Support Operations public affairs and Soldier and leader engagement all provide content while computer network operations can modify content and units and individual Soldiers provide the most credible content through their actions While Information Operations cannot modify human mental processing that occurs in the cognitive dimensions it can apply computer network operations to alter the automated information processing systems d While the information environment describes the context in which we work it does not fully explain the process that occurs as messages move across that environment and factors that can influence the outcome Some of the factors that influence can be explained by theoretical models of communication such as Berlo's model 1 represented in Figure 1 4 Back to Table of Contents 1 Berlo's model illustrates how various factors can modify information in a message at both the source and receiver's end of the communication process This is particularly significant for the military since there may be significant differences in the culture and social systems of the individuals or organizations involved In his pragmatic communication model Dr Rich Rowley points out that the history of interactions and expectations for the future also influence the communication process 2 The little boy who cried wolf is an obvious if quaint example of how a history of interactions can influence a receiver to ignore an otherwise timely and accurate message Figure 1 Berlo's Model of Communication 2 Just as information operations can apply various capabilities to influence the information environment these capabilities account for subtleties in the communication process when developing messages and when executing operations to convey these messages These influences can be as elementary as using audio communications means with illiterate receivers or as complex as accounting for the political influence of sub-tribal cultures when communicating in rural Afghanistan 4 IO Definition The Secretary of Defense directed a significant change to the joint definition of IO in a January 2011 memorandum IO is The integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own The memo further describes the reason for this change The previous definition listed five core capabilities within it Often this resulted in an emphasis on the capability at the expense of recognizing IO as an integrating function It further led to the perception of IO ownership of the capabilities Removing the capabilities makes it clear that as an integrating function IO owns nothing Furthermore by explicitly excluding a laundry list of 5 Back to Table of Contents capabilities the definition is no longer self-limiting since the tools available are now constrained only by the imagination of the commander and his staff While it may not be about everything you do it certainly can be about anything you can do to achieve the desired information effects in support of military operations to include physical attack i e actions 5 Traditional Capabilities This section will define and explain what were previously referred to as core capabilities of IO While removed from the new definition of IO current plans are to address them in the body of the doctrine currently under revision Consequently they are covered here as well Remember that these are not a limiting list since the new definition leaves information-related capabilities intentionally open-ended a Military Information Support Operations MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions motives objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations groups and individuals The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives b Military Deception MILDEC consists of actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities intentions and operations thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or fail to take actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission c Operations Security OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to 1 Identify critical information that would harm the organization's ability to effectively carry out normal operation if obtained by an adversary 2 Analyze the threat to determine the adversary's capabilities use for the information determination and resources 3 Analyze the vulnerabilities by viewing the organization from the adversary's perspective especially in terms of physical safeguards network electronic safeguards and personnel training which are in place to protect the critical information 4 Identify vulnerabilities which the adversary can exploit by matching the adversary's capabilities to the vulnerabilities which have been identified 5 Identify and enact countermeasures to lower or eliminate the risk d Electronic Warfare EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are as follows 1 Electronic Attack EA That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires EA includes 1 actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as jamming and electromagnetic deception and 2 employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism lasers radio frequency weapons particle beams 2 Electronic Protection EP That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel facilities and equipment from any effects of 6 Back to Table of Contents friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability 3 Electronic Warfare Support ES That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an operational commander to search for intercept identify and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition targeting planning and conduct of future operations Thus electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance targeting and homing Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack and produce measurement and signature intelligence e Computer Network Operations CNO Comprised of computer network attack computer network defense and related computer network exploitation enabling operations Upcoming revisions to Joint doctrine will likely move these capabilities under cyberspace operations which are discussed in a later chapter of the primer but since the IO section will continue to coordinate with these efforts they are defined here as well 1 Computer Network Attack CNA Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt deny degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and networks themselves 2 Computer Network Defense CND Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect monitor analyze detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks 3 Computer Network Exploitation CNE Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks f Current doctrine also addresses supporting capabilities and related capabilities Supporting Capabilities provide additional operational effects Information Assurance IA Physical Security Physical Attack Counterintelligence CI and Combat Camera COMCAM Related Capabilities of Public Affairs PA Civil-Military Operations CMO and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy DSPD contribute to the accomplishment of the IO mission These activities often have regulatory statutory or policy restrictions and limitations regarding their employment which must be observed 6 IO Planning and Execution Having identified the purpose of IO its definition and some of the associated traditional activities this section will address how IO capabilities are integrated a Information Operations are planned by the IO section of a joint or service staff under the direction and supervision of a designated IO officer Within a joint command such as a Combatant Command this section normally resides within the operations directorate J-3 of the staff often designated the J-39 Appropriate representatives from information-related capabilities as well as the special staff service functional components and appropriate national agencies serve as members of the J-39 b IO planning must be fully integrated into the overall joint planning process be it deliberate or crisis action There should not be a separate IO campaign plan just as there is no separate maneuver campaign plan Additionally visualizing information as a separate Line of Operation LOO does improve visibility of IO but it is at the cost of obscuring how or whether IO has properly coordinated support to the other LOOs Commanders who describe and visualize IO as something separate will likely find that it becomes something separate 7 Back to Table of Contents c Products from the IO planning process are incorporated into the Commander's Estimate Commander's Concept and the OPLAN OPORD as documented in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOPES d Evaluation of the success of the execution of the plan is done through identified measures of effectiveness MOE which is how well the plan achieved the desired result and measures of performance MOP which is how well the plan was executed MOE and MOP must be identified as a component of the IO planning process based upon realistic expectations for timeliness and accuracy of data received 7 Current Issues a The current policy discussion of whether information operations constitute traditional military activities will affect the future of IO Note the inclusion of during military operations in the new definition which was not part of the previous definition Part of this discussion centers around attribution of MISO products and part around computer network attack and the authorities that cover these activities Additionally the military's activities to influence target audiences outside combat zones has sparked debate over whether these activities should properly fall under the Department of State These questions have caused additional media interest and Congressional scrutiny and in cases have resulted in reduced funding for military IO efforts As of this writing DoD continues to focus on codification and understanding of IO as a traditional military activity within the greater national security community b U S Army doctrine regarding IO has recently changed Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command June 2011 established the new Mission Command warfighting function and launched the Army's evolution of information operations to Inform and Influence Activities IIA These activities support and enhance current joint information operations doctrine that by definition remains focused on adversaries and potential adversaries only Inform and Influence Activities focus on all audiences within the information environment which include domestic foreign friendly and neutral adversary and enemy It is also in line with the new definition for IO and emerging joint doctrine as it also enables commanders with multiple information-related capabilities and allows them to evaluate and use available internal and request external resources to inform or influence selected populaces actors or audiences as desired to support his or her mission objectives Inform and Influence Activities are integrated by the G-7 8 Back to Table of Contents Figure 2 Army Inform and Influence Activities c Recognizing the importance of operations in cyberspace draft Army doctrine labels the CNO and EW capabilities presented in the joint discussion above as falling within the newlydefined area of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities This construct is presented in Figure 3 In Army organizations the G-7 will not have the responsibility for synchronizing all Cyber EW Activities but will conduct coordination to ensure these activities support IIA activities Figure 3 Army Cyber Electromagnetic Activities 9 Back to Table of Contents 8 Additional Considerations a Personal interactions are perhaps the most important means to influence a target audience In the context of persuasive influence these interactions can range from compulsion and coercion on one end of the spectrum to cooperation and collaboration on the other Viewed in the terms of the amount of planning involved they can vary from deliberate meetings between a carefully chosen messenger and an influential target covering specific issues or chance meetings between military service members and random members of the populace b Regardless of how the message is transmitted the credibility of our messages and messengers is key to the effectiveness of our influence efforts We must recognize that we lose credibility when the implied messages of our actions do not match the messages of our overt communications If these messages are not coordinated during the IO planning process our credibility and effectiveness suffer This shortfall is often referred to as the say-do gap c An appropriate understanding of the target's culture and norms is essential to effective information operations Our communications efforts must avoid the tendency to mirror friendly cultural values and perspectives but rather must be prepared executed and evaluated from the perspective of the target audience through their cultural lens it's how the message is received that matters This often means that the U S is not the appropriate messenger Rather encouraging a credible indigenous key influencer to send the message might be a better option d Even when done effectively IO effects typically take longer to achieve and are more difficult to measure than conventional operations Therefore a long term commitment to building relationships and maintaining communication through a two-way dialog is critical Theater Security Cooperation Plans are a vital part of this effort Waiting until a crisis occurs and then throwing info ops at it is an exercise in futility Effective IO leverages the power of information to complement the other instruments of national power resulting in the achievement of national objectives with less expenditure of blood and treasure Dennis M Murphy Professor of Information Operations and Information in Warfare U S Army War College Endnotes 1 David K Berlo The Process of Communication An Introduction to Theory and Practice New York Holt Rinehart and Winston 1960 72 2 Richard D Rowley Pragmatic Communication Model 1999 http www aligningaction com prgmodel htm accessed 14 October 2010 10 Back to Table of Contents Strategic Communication Strategic Communication This section addresses some considerations of the information element of power at the national and theater strategic level 1 Information and National Power Interestingly one needs to go back to the Reagan administration to find the most succinct and pointed mention of information as an element of power in formal government documents 1 Subsequent national security documents allude to different aspects of information but without a specific strategy or definition Still it is generally accepted in the United States government today that information is an element of national power along with diplomatic military and economic power … and that information is woven through the other elements since their activities will have an informational impact 2 Given this dearth of official documentation Drs Dan Kuehl and Bob Nielson proffered the following definition of the information element use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental political economic military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments supra-governmental organizations and societies to support national security 3 Information as power is wielded in an increasingly complex environment consisting of physical information and cognitive dimensions 2 Strategic Communication Overview The executive branch of the U S government has the responsibility to develop and sustain an information strategy that ensures strategic communication occurs consistent with and in support of policy development and implementation This strategy should guide and direct information activities across the geostrategic environment Effective strategic communication is the desired way given the ends ways means model that information is wielded in accordance with that strategy The U S government provided the first national level definition of strategic communication in a report to Congress in March 2010 Strategic communication is the synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences 4 The Department of Defense maintains a separate but related definition focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs plans themes messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power Parsing these to their essentials strategic communication is the orchestration of actions images and words to achieve cognitive effects in support of policy and military objectives While the capabilities used to achieve those effects should be unconstrained primary supporting capabilities of strategic communication at the national strategic level are generally considered as Public Affairs PA military Information Operations IO and Public Diplomacy PD a Public affairs and military IO have been defined in the context of their use within the Department of Defense DOD in the previous section b Public diplomacy is primarily practiced by the Department of State DOS It is defined as those overt international public information activities of the United States Government 11 Back to Table of Contents designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad 5 c International broadcasting services are cited as a strategic communication means in some definitions The Broadcasting Board of Governors BBG includes all U S civilian international broadcasting This includes Voice of America VOA Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Radio Free Asia Radio and TV Marti and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television VOA increasingly uses the Internet mobile devices social media and other digital platforms 6 Strategic communication is considered by some to be solely a national strategic concept however it is increasingly recognized as occurring at all levels from tactical to strategic despite the lexicon of the term itself 3 History of Strategic Communication While strategic communication is a fairly new term in U S government parlance the concept theory and practice behind it is not Winfield Scott recognized the importance of strategic communication at the theater level in Veracruz in 1847 Realizing the influence of the Catholic Church on Mexican society Scott attended Mass with his staff at the Veracruz Cathedral to display the respect of U S forces He further ordered U S soldiers to salute Mexican priests in the streets Each of these measures was part of a calculated campaign to win the friendship of the Mexicans 7 The recent history of national strategic communication shows concerted efforts to positively portray the U S story in order to persuade and influence a The Committee on Public Information 1917 also known as the Creel Committee after its chief newspaperman George Creel sought to rally U S public opinion behind World War I on behalf of the Wilson administration Its focus was the domestic audience and it used public speakers advertising pamphlets periodicals and the burgeoning American motion picture industry b The Office of War Information 1942 focused both domestically and overseas with broadcasts sent in German to Nazi Germany The Voice of America VOA began its first broadcast with the statement Here speaks a voice from America Every day at this time we will bring you the news of the war The news may be good The news may be bad We shall tell you the truth c The Smith-Mundt Act 1948 actually The U S Information and Educational Exchange Act Public Law 402 80th Congress established a statutory information agency for the first time in a period of peace with a mission to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between Americans and foreigners The act also forbade the Voice of America to transmit to an American audience It is worth noting that Smith-Mundt is often cited today as the basis to limit the use of government information activities to influence since it may result in propagandizing the American public This of course is complicated by the inevitable blowback or bleedover of foreign influence activities based on the global information environment 8 d The United States Information Agency USIA 1953 was established by President Eisenhower as authorized by the Smith-Mundt Act It encompassed all the information programs including VOA its largest element that were previously in the Department of State except for the educational exchange programs which remained at State The USIA Director reported to the President through the National Security Council and received complete day-to-day guidance on U S foreign policy from the Secretary of State 12 Back to Table of Contents e A 1998 State Department reorganization occurred in response to calls by some to reduce the size of the U S foreign affairs establishment This is considered the State Department's peace dividend following the Cold War The act folded the USIA into the Department of State It pulled the Broadcasting Board of Governors out of USIA and made it a separate organization The USIA slots were distributed throughout the State Department and its mission was given to the Bureau of International Information Programs 4 National Strategic Communication - Current Models and Processes The demise of USIA is generally regarded in retrospect as diluting the ability of the United States to effectively promulgate a national communication strategy coordinate and integrate strategic themes and messages and support public diplomacy efforts worldwide 9 Additionally organizations and processes have experienced great flux in recent years Strategic communication efforts under the George W Bush administration provided mixed results While some interagency committees and offices were ineffective or became dormant there was progress under Ambassador Karen Hughes who assumed duties as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the early fall of 2005 and departed in late 2007 The Under Secretary helps ensure that public diplomacy described as engaging informing and influencing key international audiences is practiced in harmony with public affairs outreach to Americans and traditional diplomacy to advance U S interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U S leadership in the world 10 Ambassador Hughes provided specific guidance to public affairs officers at embassies throughout the world that either shortcut or eliminated bureaucratic clearances to speak to the international press She established a rapid response unit within the State Department to monitor and respond to world and domestic events She reinvigorated the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee and established communication plans for key pilot countries And she established processes to disseminate coordinated U S themes and messages laterally and horizontally within the government Finally and perhaps most importantly a long awaited National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication was published under her leadership in May 2007 The Obama administration's efforts to advance strategic communication efforts appear to be reaching steady state as of this writing While the national strategy developed under the previous administration is no longer an active document President Obama has issued a National Framework for Strategic Communication in response to a Congressional requirement While not a strategy per se this document provides the first US government definition of strategic communication and outlines the organizations and processes to implement it at the national level A Global Engagement and Strategic Communication Interagency Policy Committee was initially active but has recently become dormant with a shift of focus on very specific and localized grass roots efforts to combat violent extremism overseas In light of this shift a Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication CSCC was formally codified by Presidential Executive Order to coordinate orient and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations especially al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States 11 The CSCC replaces the operational level Global Strategic Engagement Center at State Judith McHale was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs on 26 May 2009 Ms McHale published her own strategic framework for public diplomacy entitled Strengthening U S Engagement with the World That document calls for the linkage of public diplomacy efforts to foreign policy objectives It directs the redistribution of funding based on national priorities and the assignment of Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy in each of the regional bureaus among other initiatives Under Secretary McHale 13 Back to Table of Contents resigned her position to return to the private sector in July 2011 Assistant Secretary Ann Stock assumed the authorities of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs on July 8 2011 She previously led the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under McHale's office The Defense Department DoD has responded to the challenges posed by the current information environment but also with mixed results The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review QDR conducted a spin-off study on strategic communication that resulted in a roadmap addressing planning resources and coordination 12 Actions to achieve roadmap milestones are no longer formally monitored However in response to the same Congressional directive that produced the National Framework for Strategic Communication DoD produced a Report on Strategic Communication in December 2009 There they significantly noted that Emergent thinking is coalescing around the notion that strategic communication should be viewed as a process rather than as a set of capabilities organizations or discrete activities 13 Still enduring are Principles of Strategic Communication published by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs in 2008 14 The Joint Staff has moved forward with a first draft of strategic communication doctrine As of this writing however it appears that the progress of that document will be delayed until a Department of Defense Instruction DoDI is completed thus providing a policy basis for the subordinate doctrinal manual This DoD Instruction is still in an embryonic stage 5 Theater Strategic Communication Theater strategic communication receives only brief discussion in current doctrine However because of the importance of the information element of power in the current military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan combatant commanders have established processes and organizations to address the need Various organizational models exist among the combatant commands from separate strategic communication directorates to incorporation of strategic communication processes into effects cells As of June 2010 it appeared that an organization consisting of a strategic communication director with small coordination staff and supporting strategic communication working group was becoming the norm 15 As indicated above the emergence of a DoD Instruction on strategic communication is a hopeful sign that specific doctrine for the concept will soon emerge While national strategic communication lists principal capabilities of PA PD and IO DoD strategic communication and thus combatant command strategic communication includes military PA defense support to public diplomacy alternately referred to as military support to public diplomacy aspects of IO principally PSYOP recently changed to MISO or Military Information Support Operations Military Diplomacy MD and Visual Information VI 16 The concept of defense support to public diplomacy is still vaguely defined with examples ranging from theater web initiatives aimed at certain regions and demographics within those regions to theater logistical support to embassies and diplomatic staffs Military Diplomacy includes traditional interactions between U S senior military leaders and foreign military leaders Beyond the importance of theater strategic communication in ongoing military operations doctrine is correct to point out the importance of strategic communication activities in implementing theater security cooperation plans TSCPs based on its inherent shaping and deterrence capability 17 6 Ends Ways Means Where Does Strategic Communication Fit Strategists use a model of ends ways and means to describe all aspects of a national or military strategy Strategy is about how the way leaders will use the capabilities means available to achieve objectives ends 18 Understanding and engaging key audiences is meant to change perceptions attitudes and ultimately behaviors to help achieve military and in turn national objectives Thus parsing the DoD definition it is apparent that strategic communication is a way to achieve an information effect on the cognitive dimension of the information environment the required 14 Back to Table of Contents end The recent emphasis on strategic communication as a process supports this position Military leaders should not limit strategic communication means to only those primary capabilities listed above Strategic communication means should be restricted only by the requirement to achieve the desired information effect on the target audience In that light messages are certainly sent by verbal and visual communications means but they are also sent by actions Note that the definition specifically includes actions In fact senior officials point out that strategic communication is 80% actions and 20% words 19 Specifically how military operations are conducted affects the information environment by impacting perceptions attitudes and beliefs As previously noted DoD has emphasized this fact by referring to strategic communication as the orchestration of actions images and words 7 Strategic Communication and IO - A Side by Side Comparison The current definitions of IO DoD Dictionary of Terms and Strategic Communication DoD Dictionary of Terms are clear and fairly distinct to the fully engaged information practitioner but there are nuances that make those distinctions difficult to grasp for others to include operational commanders and so clarifying these concepts is well worth considering Strategic communication is the more broadly overarching concept targeting key audiences and focusing on the cognitive dimension of the information environment IO as an integrating function specifically focuses on military operations and so more specifically targets decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries which may be in the cognitive informational and or physical dimensions of the information environment 20 Target Effect Dimension SC Key audiences friendly neutral adversarial Understand and engage Cognitive people IO Adversaries' and potential adversaries' decision-making Influence disrupt corrupt or usurp Cognitive information physical people processes systems Considering the targets and effects described above it should be clear that both strategic communication and IO can be employed at all levels of warfare tactical operational theater strategic and national strategic Tactical commanders routinely employ strategic communication in Iraq and Afghanistan today based on their interactions with key audiences in their area of responsibility to a potential strategic end On the other end of the scale IO could certainly be employed strategically as part of a shaping Phase 0 operation or a deterrent Phase 1 operation against a potential adversary's decision-making capability 8 Effectively Integrating Strategic Communication in Military Planning Remembering that strategic communication is a way to achieve cognitive information effects using any means available takes the mystery out of the concept Strategic communication simply employs capabilities limited only to the imagination to support the achievement of a military objective Just as a commander integrates air land and sea capabilities into military planning and execution he can and should integrate strategic communication capabilities The planning process is not new The focus on and understanding of this new concept and its capabilities however may be First planners must define the information environment and its physical informational and cognitive dimensions How does the target audience receive their information TV radio internet rumor religious services etc How does culture play into the message Who are the 15 Back to Table of Contents credible messengers Next planners need to consider the desired effect on the cognitive dimension i e the ends or outcome Does the endstate include changing perceptions influencing people gaining acceptance gaining credibility and trust gaining support This will drive how the operation will be conducted where themes and messages are necessary but not sufficient Any military planner will quickly see how this logical thought process fits neatly into the established military decision-making process or campaign planning process The information environment is considered in the analysis of the overarching operational environment The commander's intent establishes an endstate This must include a statement of the desired information environment endstate A properly stated information endstate in the commander's intent will guide staffs in the selection of appropriate courses of action and drive subordinate units in the way they conduct operations to achieve that endstate A selected course of action will then be wargamed using the traditional friendly action expected enemy reaction and friendly counteraction methodology The wargaming process must also occur with an eye toward information effects This becomes especially important in counterinsurgency operations where the enemy uses information as an asymmetric strategic means and where changing indigenous populations' perceptions can turn them from a neutral position to one in favor of coalition forces But it also applies across all levels of the spectrum of conflict in an environment where military operations will likely be covered in real time by both mainstream and new media sources 9 Conclusion Strategic communication is simply a way to affect perceptions attitudes and behaviors of key audiences in support of objectives Certainly communications means are very important in ultimately achieving those desired information effects But how military operations are conducted or policy is implemented is also a key component of strategic communication since actions send very loud and clear messages Effective strategic communication requires an organizational culture attuned to the information environment and a recognition that strategic communication as a way to achieve information effects consists of many capabilities means that are an integral part of the leader's arsenal Dennis M Murphy Professor of Information Operations and Information in Warfare U S Army War College Endnotes 1 Ronald Reagan National Security Decision Directive 130 Washington DC The White House 6 March 1984 Available from http www fas org irp offdocs nsdd nsdd-130 htm Internet Accessed 25 October 2011 2 NATO doctrine AJP01 cites the essential trinity of diplomacy economic and military power each of which equates to an instrument of national power These are fed in turn by the instrument of information which is the fourth corner of the instruments of national power Allied Joint Doctrine December 2010 3 Robert E Neilson and Daniel T Kuehl Evolutionary Change in Revolutionary Times A Case for a New National Security Education Program National Security Strategy Quarterly Autumn 1999 40 16 Back to Table of Contents 4 Barack Obama National Framework for Strategic Communication Washington DC The White House March 2010 Available from http www carlisle army mil dime documents National%20Strategy%20for%20Strategic%20Communicati on pdf Internet Accessed 25 October 2011 5 U S Department of Defense DOD Dictionary http www dtic mil doctrine jel doddict data p 11548 html accessed 25 October 2011 6 Broadcasting Board of Governors Home Page http www bbg gov accessed 25 October 2011 7 John S D Eisenhower Agent of Destiny The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott New York The Free Press 1997 245-6 8 The Smith-Mundt Act is still in effect to include the requirement not to target U S audiences with any number of interpretations on what U S government organizations it pertains to The current information environment with ubiquitous world-wide digital outlets satellite communications and real-time reporting makes it difficult to target foreign audiences without exposing U S audiences to the message however…a fact not envisioned in 1948 when the act became effective 9 David E Kaplan Hearts Minds and Dollars U S News and World Report April 25 2005 25 27 10 Senior Officials Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs linked from U S Department of State Homepage http www state gov misc 19232 htm accessed 25 October 2011 11 Executive Order 13584 Federal Register Vol 76 No 179 September 15 2011 http www carlisle army mil dime documents Executive%20Order%2013584 pdf accessed 25 October 2011 12 QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication 3 13 Robert Gates Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication Washington DC December 2009 1 14 U S Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Robert T Hastings Principles of Strategic Communication memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments et al Washington DC August 15 2008 15 U S Joint Forces Command Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy Norfolk VA Joint Warfighting Center June 24 2010 III-6 This manual indicates that eight combatant commands are either employing or transitioning to this model 16 QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication 2 17 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Operations Joint Publication 3-13 Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff February 13 2006 I-13 18 Harry R Yarger Toward a Theory of Strategy Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model U S Army War College Guide to National Strategy and Policy June 2006 107 19 The author has attended numerous briefings by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs where this has been stated 20 The definition of Information Operations recently changed Notably the core capabilities formally included in the definition fell out 17 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 8 Back to Table of Contents Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations This section addresses the evolving nature of cyberspace specifically focusing on its influence on and implications for all instruments of national power It also addresses the need for continued development of theory organization and mission for cyberspace operations related to national security The section was added as part of the AY10 edition and each subsequent version includes significant new material based on policy and strategy changes during the year 1 Introduction a Definition DoD defines cyberspace as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers 1 and it can be argued this should also include their operators In a broader sense cyberspace is a new strategic common analogous to the sea as an international domain of trade and communication 2 b History--Enduring vice Modern Cyberspace In a simple form the cyberspace process consists of elements within the three dimensions of the information environment – cognitive information and physical sometimes called cognition content and connectivity 3 For example someone generates a thought cognitive which they enter into a communication device physical where it becomes a systematic representation of data information possibly represented digitally using electromagnetic means Next the data travels through physical lines of communication e g telephone cable fiber optic radio etc where it exits through a communication device for cognitive uses or perhaps to perform kinetic operations e g turn on a light open a valve etc Cyberspace then is the total of all elements required for cyberspace processes to occur The fundamental structure of the cyberspace process is enduring but the configuration of cyberspace itself transforms when specific elements of the basic process transform Consider the development of the telegraph as an early example of the cyberspace process evolution In the mid-twentieth century the process was transformed with electronic transistor-based data processing devices One could argue that modern cyberspace emerged due to the convergence of three events--the introduction of the personal computer circa 1975 the Internet circa 1982 and the worldwide web protocol circa 1989 4 c Cyberspace as a Global Common When considered as a strategic commons or global commons cyberspace has at least five unique characteristics First the cost of entry and access to cyberspace is low—basically the cost of a laptop and Internet café fee Second cyberspace offers a degree of anonymity that challenges efforts to detect track and target a specific user who desires to hide in the common Third cyberspace provides the ability to initiate a variety of physical effects across vast distances at almost instantaneous speeds Fourth cyberspace is an ever-growing common mostly owned and operated by private individuals and corporations it expands with every new computer server or Internet-capable mobile device Finally cyberspace does not have traditional dimensions of height depth 19 Back to Table of Contents and length but it does have unique metrics that can be used to map its boundaries and operations 2 Dynamic Nature of Contemporary Cyberspace Evolution a Connectivity Innovations in computer technology have greatly enhanced the ability of the average citizen to operate freely in cyberspace Data processing speeds and digital storage media continue to grow exponentially with competitive markets that drive sales prices down In early 2009 China first surpassed the U S in number of Internet users 253 million vice 220 million the gap has grown significantly and in June 2011 China reached 485 million users compared to 245 million in the U S Together they account for over 34 percent of the over 2 1 billion users worldwide the top 20 countries account for over 75 percent of all Internet users 5 With 216 countries or territories having Internet access 101 of which have at least one million users 6 it is becoming difficult to find any place in the world not affected by cyberspace It is not surprising that industry and government leverage the ability of cyberspace-based remote access to control infrastructure Usually called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA systems these control processes increase effectiveness and efficiency for systems such as electric power oil gas transportation and telecommunications 7 Often older SCADA devices were designed without regard for security and most new SCADA systems use the Internet to pass control information As the population of Internet users pushes well beyond two billion it is wise to pursue better security for any physical systems accessible via cyberspace b Threats In general attacks in cyberspace involve activities that disrupt deny degrade or destroy information Attacks may be overt or covert with kinetic or non-kinetic effects The damage inflicted varies greatly--from defaced websites to multi-million-dollar financial losses and even to actual physical damage to equipment connected to cyberspace Perpetrators differ in attitudes and actions regarding ideology e g political or religious monetary gain attribution knowledge sharing and destruction of societal structures All but the most extreme individuals e g anarchists have a vested interest in the preserving cyberspace infrastructure—the domain from which they derive power Cyberspace wrongdoers may interact for mutual benefit and may exploit law-abiding operators There are documented cases where cyber-terrorists employed cyber-criminals to steal credit card information and support drug traffickers all toward the goal of funding terrorist operations Another lucrative business is the marketing of botnets virtual armies of compromised computers that can be controlled remotely over the Internet by a botmaster Botnets may exploit hundreds of thousands of computers usually without the owners' knowledge 8 An adversary with such capability could achieve swarming attacks and defenses—in cyberspace as well as other strategic commons—that challenge the traditional mass- and maneuver-oriented approaches to conflict 9 What is less clear is how state and nonstate actors are using cyberspace to pursue strategic goals For example the Conficker botnet was first launched in 2008 and morphed into at least four variants in 2009 its design was so sophisticated that analysts conclude it is either backed by organized crime or a nation-state Industry estimates claim as many as 12 million computers may have been infected of which several million remain as a stable botnet with an unrevealed objective 10 Another high-profile enigma is Stuxnet a worm designed with the popularly reported purpose of attacking the control systems of Iran's nuclear program 11 According to the Symantec Corporation Stuxnet first appeared in June 2009 and it targeted five Internet domains in three waves of attack Often called a precision cyberspace weapon by September 2010 Stuxnet actually had infected over 100 000 systems in more than 25 20 Back to Table of Contents countries indicating that it had significant collateral damage due to its propagation method 12 Among these potential state adversaries China's emerging capabilities in cyberspace reflect an asymmetrical approach consistent with the classical Chinese strategic thinkers 13 In 2009 a Report to Congress stated that the People's Liberation Army PLA views computer network warfare as both a key enabler of modern warfare and a critical new spectrum of conflict in its own right The guiding PLA operational concept called Integrated Network Electronic Warfare advocates employment of traditional electronic warfare elements e g jammers coordinated with computer network attack Employment of the cyber forces may use small groups with specialized skills and tasks such as reconnaissance breach and collection teams Attacks attributed to China include exfiltration of several terabytes of data related to design and electronics systems of the F-35 Lightning II an advanced U S multiservice fighter plane which will also serve in many allied countries 14 The November 2010 Report to Congress concluded that China Internet users continue to hack into American networks as well as those of foreign entities and governments Recent high-profile China-based computer exploitations continue to suggest some level of state support The report also identifies three emerging trends of concern penetrators' methods use more sophisticated techniques leverage social networking tools and exploit malicious software tied to the criminal underground— both to distance themselves from attribution and to strategically cultivate a climate of uncertainty '' Several incidents in early 2010 demonstrate that regardless of whether Chinese actors actually intended to manipulate U S and other foreign Internet traffic China's Internet engineers have the capability to do so For example in April 2010 a large number of routing paths to various Internet Protocol addresses were redirected through networks in China for 17 minutes giving the network server operators the ability to read delete or edit e-mail and other information sent along those paths by U S government military and business sites This and other incidents raise questions about whether China might seek to leverage these abilities intentionally to assert some level of control over the Internet even if only for a brief period 15 3 Cyberspace and Instruments of National Power a Diplomatic How should countries interact in cyberspace Does this new common require entirely new standards of conduct As independent governments countries have an international obligation to act in good faith and settle disputes with other states by peaceful means If conflict should occur the right of using proportional force in self-defense is a cornerstone of international security Legal experts argue that it now seems almost universally accepted that a considerable body of international law does indeed apply to the use of force by states in CyberSpace 16 However the widely distributed nature of cyberspace does not necessarily recognize national boundaries and new provisions to address this reality seem prudent A successful example is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime a formal agreement among countries to better combat cybercrime by harmonizing national laws improving investigative abilities and boosting international cooperation The convention which began in 1997 was opened for signature on 23 November 2001 and has been ratified by at least 32 countries Its provisions include definition of criminal offenses in four categories fraud and forgery child pornography copyright infringement and security breaches as well as methods to address these crimes 17 The U S Department of Justice has arrested and convicted domestic and international individuals and small groups committing cyberspace-related crimes since 1998 The department determines whether the crime targeted a private individual or corporation or a government agency as well as whether the crime posed a threat to public health or safety i e power grids air traffic control etc 18 The attackers include citizens from China 21 Back to Table of Contents Russia Estonia Moldova Kazakhstan Israel and the United Kingdom In some cases extradition requests were pursued per the Convention on Cybercrime 19 A July 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office identifies at least 15 major existing cyberspace governance bodies that require State Department involvement 20 In December 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review QDDR which among other global threats addressed the cybersecurity risk that comes from our dependence on technology and online networks The same technologies that promote global prosperity and the free flow of information also create new vulnerabilities This dual-nature of cyberspace efforts--opportunity and vulnerability—is a consistent thread throughout the report It goes on to state We need to defend our information networks and critical infrastructure against attacks from cyberspace and protect our government institutions and businesses against cybercrime and espionage The report revealed the creation of a State Department Coordinator for Cyber Issues whose duties include leading the Department's diplomatic engagement on cyber issues with international Allies and partners 21 In May 2011 Secretary Clinton released the International Strategy for Cyberspace with the goal to promote a cyberspace environment that is open interoperable secure and reliable based on norms of responsible behavior The document is divided into three approaches for the future—diplomacy defense and development—and supported by seven policy priorities The strategy promulgated the need for coordinated activities that address all instruments of national power—diplomatic information military and economic The strategy reiterated the need to develop and maintain partnerships with other countries as well as private sector noting that no single institution document arrangement or instrument could suffice in addressing the needs of our networked world It also includes an explicit call to actively engage the developing world in terms of support for universal freedoms as well as access to technological advancements 22 b Information How can information be stored safely in cyberspace The U S government views information technology IT as one sector of the nation's critical infrastructure and has tasked the Department of Homeland Security DHS to direct its protection In turn DHS created a National Cyber Security Division in June 2003 to serve as a focal point for cybersecurity issues Working to avoid information sharing failures that contributed to the September 2001 terrorist attacks DHS conducted 16 major cyber exercises between 2004 and 2008 which included participants from federal state and local governments as well as ones from private industry academe and foreign governments 23 DHS continues to improve its efforts toward national cybersecurity In October 2009 DHS Secretary Napolitano opened the new National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center NCCIC a 24-hour center to identify and mitigate risks to critical U S cyberspace infrastructure 24 The February 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review QHSR Report identified Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace as one of its five missions with goals to create a safe secure and resilient cyber environment and to promote cybersecurity knowledge and innovation 25 To facilitate better coordination DHS released an interim version of a new National Cyber Incident Response Plan in September 2010 which includes appendices that define roles and responsibilities for several departments e g defense state justice for state local tribal and territorial authorities and for the private sector 26 The NCCIC and the new response plan were tested later that month in exercise Cyber Storm III which included participation from 12 international partners and 60 private sector companies 27 The July 2011 exercise final report identifies five key findings 1 the NCIRP is a good foundation that needs further maturing 2 publicprivate interaction is improving but still lacks sufficient shared situational awareness 3 a 22 Back to Table of Contents cyber common operating picture COP across the community is a critical requirement 4 the National Cyber Risk Alert Level NCARL intended to inform preparedness and decisionmaking requires further refinement and 5 the government private and public sectors rely on public and strategic communication to manage network threats 28 At the Executive level President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 in January 2008 better known as the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI Originally a classified document three of the CNCI major public priorities support the access points data traffic and security protocol for information traversing U S government agencies' computer networks 29 On 29 May 2009 President Obama announced the completion of a 60-day comprehensive 'clean slate' review to assess U S policies and structure for cybersecurity In December 2009 Howard Schmidt was appointed as the first White House Cybersecurity Coordinator and a member of both the National Security Staff and the National Economic Council 30 Several months later Mr Schmidt announced the revised classification of the CNCI to include an unclassified description of 12 initiatives for anyone to download 31 In May 2010 the new National Security Strategy included a subsection on Secure Cyberspace that identified our digital infrastructure as a strategic national asset and protecting it—while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties—is a national security priority Further it emphasized investing in people and technology along with strengthening partnerships—government private and international—as means by which we will deter prevent detect defend against and quickly recover from cyber intrusions and attacks 32 In July 2010 Mr Schmidt released a Progress Report on Cybersecurity that provided examples of work accomplished toward the CNCI and Cyberspace Policy Review actions such as the deployment of EINSTEIN network intrusion detection technology to 12 of 19 federal agencies 33 In April 2011 the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace was released with its stated vision of Individuals and organizations utilize secure efficient easy-to-use and interoperable identity solutions to access online services in a manner that promotes confidence privacy choice and innovation The realization of this vision is the user-centric Identity Ecosystem described in the strategy that is designed to securely support transactions that range from anonymous to fully-authenticated and from low- to high-value 34 In May 2011 Mr Schmidt announced that the 10 near-term actions of the Cyber Policy Review were complete although a dedicated document for the Cyber Research and Development Framework has still not been released 35 c Economic The costs to industry of cybersecurity breaches are high The 2010 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community estimates total cyber-related business losses in 2008 to be 42 billion dollars for the U S and 140 billion dollars globally as well as possibly one trillion dollars worth of intellectual property lost globally 36 Determining when an attack occurs in business is difficult and it is challenging to measure the cost of attacks However the 2011 World Threat Assessment estimates that the volume of malicious software malware on American networks has more than tripled from 2009 and that twothirds of U S firms report cybersecurity incidents 37 The Commerce Department launched the Internet Policy Task Force in April 2010 to identify and address the Internet's most pressing policy issues and to recommend new policies The Task Force was directed to look at establishing practices norms and ground rules that promote innovative uses of information in four key areas where the Internet must address significant challenges enhancing Internet privacy improving cybersecurity protecting intellectual property and encouraging the global free flow of information In June 2011 Commerce Secretary Gary Locke released a green paper status of the task force The report notes that industry estimates that the Internet global network helps to facilitate $10 trillion in online transactions 23 Back to Table of Contents every single year —influencing over 13 percent of the total estimated world value $74 5 trillion —without a doubt the Internet is a player in the world economy Unfortunately the report is a work in progress with no details for when policy and guidance will be formally developed let alone implemented 38 The trends of economic cybercrime continue with increased sophistication of targeting and extraction techniques employed by thieves Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn put this perspective by writing every year an amount of intellectual property many times larger than all the intellectual property contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks maintained by U S businesses universities and government agencies Such sustained losses erode the U S ability to compete in the global economy 39 Fortunately the FBI is working with international partners to dismantle cyber criminal organizations For example they led the take-down of a Russian-led organization which penetrated over 300 financial institutions worldwide including the Royal Bank of Scotland where the actors coordinated the withdrawal of nearly $10 million in less than 24 hours from more than 2 100 ATMs in 280 cities around the world 40 In April 2011 the FBI shut down the Coreflood botnet which had stolen 190 gigabits of banking passwords and other sensitive data from over 413 000 infected systems 41 d Military How are traditional military organizations embracing operations in cyberspace In his January 2009 testimony before Congress Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged the extent of the threat With cheap technology and minimal investment current and potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DoD's vast information grid—a system that encompasses more than 15 000 local regional and wide-area networks and approximately 7 million IT devices 42 The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review QDR Report includes operate effectively in cyberspace as one of the six key DoD missions The report listed four steps DoD is taking to strengthen its capabilities in cyberspace Develop a comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace Develop greater cyberspace expertise and awareness Centralize command of cyberspace operations Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments 43 Recent events provide insight regarding the approach offered in the QDR In April 2007 the Estonian governmental commercial and private organizations endured three weeks of cyber attacks Responding to an historic request by a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO in defense of its digital assets the U S sent computer security experts to Estonia to help with recovery efforts 44 The aftermath of this attack included the creation of two new cybersecurity organizations At the operational level the Cyber Defence Management Authority CDMA was established in Brussels Belgium 45 At the strategic level the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence CCD CoE was established at Tallinn Estonia to enhance the cooperative cyber defence capability of NATO 46 In August 2008 the movement of Russian tanks into Georgia coincided with distributed denial of service attacks on Georgian websites While there may be no conclusive evidence proving the cyber attacks were carried out or sanctioned by the Russian government their timing with the conventional attacks cannot be ignored 47 Also in 2008 DoD suffered a compromise of classified military computers when a malicious code on a flash drive in U S Central Command created what amounted to a digital beachhead from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control The U S response to counter the attack named Operation Buckshot Yankee marked a turning point in U S cyberdefense strategy 48 More recently in October 2011 there were press reports of computer viruses potentially threatening the reliability of the drones during combat as well as operational security before missions 49 Indeed the U S Air Force confirmed that malware was detected on a stand-alone mission support network but further clarified that the detected 24 Back to Table of Contents and quarantined virus posed no threat to our operational mission and that control of our remotely piloted aircraft was never in question 50 On 23 June 2009 Secretary Gates directed the development of a new national strategy for cybersecurity as well as the establishment of U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM as a subordinate unified command under U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM He specified a structure which includes Service components as well as support from the Defense Information Systems Agency DISA Also it has Title 10 and Title 50 responsibilities using a dual-hat structure with the commander USCYBERCOM also serving as director National Security Agency NSA The former Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations JTF-GNO and Joint Functional Component Commander-Network Warfare JFCC-NW were disestablished and their missions subsumed into USCYBERCOM 51 On 31 October 2010 USCYBERCOM achieved Full Operational Capability with its mission to direct operations and defense of DoD networks conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations and ensure U S and Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to adversaries 52 In July 2011 the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was publically released as the first DoD unified strategy for cyberspace and officially encapsulates a new way forward for DoD's military intelligence and business operations 53 The strategy is built upon five strategic initiatives 1 Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize train and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential 2 Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems 3 Partner with other U S government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-ofgovernment cybersecurity strategy 4 Build robust relationships with U S allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity 5 Leverage the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation 54 These initiatives mesh well with the tenets of the June 2010 NATO Policy on Cyber Defence which provides a solid foundation from which Allies can take work forward on cyber security emphasizing prevention resilience and non-duplication The Cyber Defence Programme includes a NATO Computer Incident Response Capability NCIRC planned to be fully operational in 2012 55 In his testimony before Congress in June 2011 Secretary of Defense nominee Leon Panetta reiterated the importance of DoD support of national security efforts in cyberspace I have often said that there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack that cripples our power systems our grid our security systems our financial systems our governmental systems 56 4 Cyberspace Operations Issues 57 a Cyberspace Operations in the Joint Operating Environment JOE The 2010 JOE provides an intellectual foundation to build concepts for future force development which includes the continuing trend of cyber-related technologies changing how military operations are conducted at the tactical operational and strategic levels The January 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations CCJO further elaborates on the changing nature of cyberspace in joint operations providing broad precepts and assertions to help guide the development and employment of future joint forces Figure 1 provides a summary of many of the key concepts of cyberspace operations espoused within the JOE and CCJO One overarching concept is the envisioned emergence of cyberspace as a global common that demands freedom of maneuver at the strategic level as well as localized domain superiority as a requisite for successful future expeditionary operations Also there is a consistent expectation that future conflict will not only include cyberspace operations but also that the 25 Back to Table of Contents cyberspace common itself may become a main front in both irregular and traditional conflict 58 Figure 1 Levels of Cyberspace Operations b War in Cyberspace As cyberspace becomes a contested global common will this require new definitions for war and deterrence No consensus answer to this question has emerged yet There is no internationally accepted definition of when hostile actions in cyberspace are recognized as attacks let alone acts of war However scholars are making progress in this area such as the application of an analytical framework developed by Professor Michael Schmitt that attempts to determine if a cyber attack equates to the use of force in accepted terms of the United Nations UN The Schmitt Analysis considers the intensity of damage in each of seven areas severity immediacy directness invasiveness measurability presumptive legitimacy and responsibility to provide a composite assessment of the effects of the cyber attack see Figure 2 59 A 2009 study by the National Research Council of the National Academies recommends a basic framework for the legal analysis where potential cyberattack events should be judged primarily by the effects of an action rather than its modality Further it addresses implications of such a framework using Article 51 of the UN Charter for attacks prior to acknowledged armed conflict and the standard law of armed conflict LOAC criteria for acknowledged conflict Current U S military doctrine is developing along philosophical lines that distinguish between the warfighter Title 10 role of cyberattack and the intelligence Title 50 role of cyberexpolitation Terminology to describe cyberspace operations in general as well as specific concepts of attack defense and the electromagnetic spectrum still varies among Services 60 Completion of the new Joint Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations and USSTRATCOM's Cyberspace Joint Operating Concept should enhance unity of effort 61 26 Back to Table of Contents Figure 2 Cyber Event Assessment and Escalation Continuum Factors c Cyberspace Theory Development In general theory provides the overarching abstract thought and philosophical foundation necessary to analyze a given concept with appropriate rigor Given the models of cyberspace as both an operational domain and a global common what is the best approach to develop its theory of operation A valuable analogy is that of traditional i e Mahan naval theory part of which involves the difference between naval operations in the littoral area—the brown water —versus those in the broad ocean area— the blue water Simply put when one connects the major ports in the brown water to other ports in the world sea lines of communication emerge that have strategic importance based on many factors including geography and volume of traffic 62 Similarly cyberspace can be mapped using techniques that clearly show its cyber lines of communication and critical nodes with tactical operational and strategic implications for their control perhaps even choke points—the blue water cyberspace equivalent of the Straits of Malacca 63 The security of these critical nodes—some may be physical others informational—should interest anyone attempting to protect or exploit cyberspace Thus it may be prudent to evolve from a perimeter-defense strategy to a defense-in-depth strategy where we provide higher levels of security to more valuable mission-critical resources and consider the possibility that we may have to sacrifice less critical assets or even networks during an attack 64 Indeed the new DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace has employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems as one of its five strategic initiatives A more holistic approach to cyberspace defense has been offered by DHS based on the concept of a cyber ecosystem similar to a healthy and resilient human body where participants and devices in cyberspace work together to prevent cyber attacks 27 Back to Table of Contents limit the spread of attacks across participating devices minimize the consequences of attacks and recover to a trusted state 65 d Deterrence in Cyberspace The CNCI establishes an initiative to define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs…aimed at building an approach to cyber defense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace Our allies also recognize the rising danger of cyber attacks and the November 2010 Lisbon summit's new NATO Strategic Concept calls for a full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat among which is the requirement to develop further our ability to prevent detect defend against and recover from cyber-attacks including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities 66 Developing cyberspace deterrence is a complex and challenging task still in its infancy Traditional Cold War deterrence experience should be studied but its model of assured retaliation may have limited application in cyberspace given the capabilities of nonstate actors as well as the possibility of cyberattacks originating from co-opted servers in neutral countries 67 The U S International Strategy for Cyberspace includes the existing principle that consistent with the United Nations Charter states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace The section on defense of cyberspace does not mince words stating when warranted the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country Further the U S will reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic informational military and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law in order to defend our Nation our allies our partners and our interests These words send a serious deterrent message to potential adversaries without limiting the type of U S response 68 e The Future of Cyberspace Three initiatives in the CNCI call for expanded and integrated approaches for the U S future in cyberspace—coordinating research and development efforts expanding cyber education and developing enduring leap ahead technologies The CNCI assesses ongoing efforts as good but limited in focus and in need of unity of effort An example of innovation is the National Cyber Range program developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency basically a model of the Internet that will allow the testing of cyberdefense capabilities before fielding them 69 Even these efforts only scratch the technological surface of the complexities of future cyberspace organizations 5 Conclusion Cyberspace is a modern embodiment of an enduring process accelerated by technology that combines cognitive physical and information elements Cyberspace has significant influences on and implications for all instruments of national power The national security aspects of cyberspace are still evolving and the release of national strategies for diplomatic informational and military instruments of U S power has provided an initial foundation for unity of effort DoD continues to work toward a more holistic security approach organized within a new subunified command as part of a greater team of government private and international partners However much work remains in the practical definitions of war and deterrence in cyberspace as well as the development of fundamental cyberspace theory Strategic leaders should study and embrace implications of the growing roles of cyberspace operations in future conflict Such operations currently fulfill supporting roles but in time may become a main front of war itself Jeffrey L Caton Associate Professor of Cyberspace Operations U S Army War College 28 Back to Table of Contents Endnotes 1 U S Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England The Definition of 'Cyberspace' memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Washington DC May 12 2008 2 Arthur K Cebrowski Transformation and the Changing Character of War Transformation Trends June 17 2004 http www afei org transformation accessed 27 March 2009 3 Daniel T Kuehl From Cyberspace to Cyberpower Defining the Problem Chapter 2 in Cyberpower and National Security Washington DC National Defense University Press and Potomac Books 2009 24-42 4 Jeffrey L Caton What do Senior Leaders Need to Know about Cyberspace in Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation Interactions and Innovations among People Organizations Processes and Technology ed Derrick Neal et al Washington DC National Defense University 2009 5 Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users Internet World Stats http www internetworldstats com accessed 31 March 2009 and 24 October 2011 As of 30 June 2011 the top 20 countries in order are China United States India Japan Brazil Germany Russia United Kingdom France Nigeria Indonesia Korea Iran Turkey Mexico Italy Philippines Spain Vietnam and Argentina 6 Country Comparisons—Internet Users The World Factbook Washington DC Central Intelligence Agency 2009 https www cia gov library publications accessed 24 October 2011 7 Samuel G Varnado SCADA and the Terrorist Threat Protecting the Nation's Critical Control Systems Washington DC U S House of Representatives October18 2005 See also Experiment Showed Grid Vulnerability to Cyber Attack – Flaws Fixed Energy Assurance Daily Washington DC U S Department of Energy September 27 2007 The DoE reported on recommended changes to power generation facilities resulting from a DHS experiment in March 2007 The test demonstrated the ability to cause catastrophic physical damage to an industrial turbine via commands sent through its SCADA system 8 Clay Wilson Botnets Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress CRS Report for Congress RL-32114 Washington DC Congressional Research Service January 29 2008 9 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt The Advent of Netwar Revisited in Networks and Netwars Santa Monica RAND 2001 12 10 Mark Bowden The Enemy Within The Atlantic June 2010 and Worm The First Digital World War New York Atlantic Monthly Press 2011 11 Gross Michael Joseph Stuxnet Worm A Declaration of Cyber-War Vanity Fair April 2011 12 Nicolas Falliere Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien W32 Stuxnet Dossier Version 1 4 Cupertino CA Symantec Corporation February 2011 13 Timothy L Thomas Decoding the Virtual Dragon Critical Evolutions in the Science and Philosophy of China's Information Operations and Military Strategy Fort Leavenworth KS Foreign Military Studies Office 2007 14 2009 Report to Congress of the U S -China Economic and Security Review Commission Washington DC U S Government Printing Office November 2009 167-180 15 2010 Report to Congress of the U S -China Economic and Security Review Commission Washington DC U S Government Printing Office November 2010 16 Walter G Sharp CyberSpace and the Use of Force Falls Church Aegis Research 1999 29 Back to Table of Contents 17 Kristin Archick Cybercrime The Council of Europe Convention CRS Report for Congress RS21208 Washington DC Congressional Research Service September 28 2006 Convention on Cybercrime Status of Signatures and Ratifications Council of Europe October 24 2009 http conventions coe int Treaty Commun ChercheSig asp NT 185 CM DF CL ENG accessed October 24 2011 Note that in addition to the 32 countries that have ratified the convention 15 additional countries are non-ratified signatories 18 Department of Justice Computer Crime Cases Washington Department of Justice http www cybercrime gov cccases html accessed 24 October 2011 The U S Department of Justice claiming jurisdiction for cyberspace crimes with physical impacts on U S individuals and organizations is not the same as suggesting there is a U S cyberspace boundary 19 Department of Justice U S Attorney Sally Quillian Yates Northern District of Georgia International Hacker Arraigned after Extradition Elaborate Scheme Stole over $9 4 Million from Credit Card processor Washington DC Department of Justice 2009 http www cybercrime gov tsurikovArraig pdf accessed 24 October 2011 20 U S Government Accountability Office United States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and Governance GAO 10-606 Washington DC GAO Office July 2010 21 U S Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Leading Through Civilian Power The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Washington DC U S Department of State December 2010 22 Barack Obama International Strategy for Cyberspace Prosperity Security and Openness in a Networked World Washington DC The White House May 2011 23 U S Government Accountability Office Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise GAO-08-825 Washington DC GAO Office September 2008 24 Department of Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano Opens New National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Press Release Washington DC DHS October 30 2009 25 U S Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland Washington DC U S Department of Homeland Security February 2010 54-58 77 26 U S Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Incident Response Plan Interim Version Washington DC Department of Homeland Security September 2010 27 U S Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet Cyber Storm III Washington DC Department of Homeland Security 28 Department of Homeland Security Office of Cybersecurity and Communications National Cyber Security Division Cyber Storm III Final Report Washington DC DHS July 2011 29 Brian Lake CyberThreats A Cultural Change of Combating Threats Homeland Defense Journal 6 no 7 December 2008 14-16 30 Macon Phillips Introducing the New Cybersecurity Coordinator Washington DC The White House Blog December 22 2009 31 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI Washington DC The White House March 2 2010 32 Barack Obama National Security Strategy Washington DC The White House May 2010 27-28 33 Howard Schmidt Progress Report on Cybersecurity Washington DC The White House Blog July 14 2010 Also see GAO report Executive Branch is Making Progress Implementing 2009 Policy Review Recommendations but Sustained Leadership is Needed Report GAO-11-24 Washington DC U S Government Accountability Office October 2010 34 Barack Obama National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace Enhancing Online Choice Efficiency Security and Privacy Washington DC The White House April 2011 30 Back to Table of Contents 35 Fact Sheet The Administration's Cybersecurity Accomplishments Washington DC The White House Blog May 12 2010 36 U S Director of National Intelligence Dennis C Blair Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Washington DC Director of National Intelligence February 25 2009 37 U S Director of National Intelligence James R Clapper Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Washington DC Director of National Intelligence February 10 2011 38 Cybersecurity Innovation and the Internet Economy Washington DC Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force June 2011 39 U S Deputy Secretary of Defense William F Lynn III Defending a New Domain The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy Foreign Affairs 89 no 5 September October 2010 100 40 National Security Council Cybersecurity Progress after President Obama's Address Washington DC The White House July 14 2010 41 McAfee Threats Report Second Quarter 2011 Santa Clara CA McAfee 2011 8 42 U S Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates Submitted Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee Washington DC U S Senate January 27 2009 8 43 U S Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates Quadrennial Defense Review Report Washington DC Department of Defense February 1 2010 2 37-39 44 Kenneth Geers Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare Report IST-076 RSY-017 Tallinn Estonia Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2008 45 Rex B Hughes NATO and Cyber Defence Mission Accomplished Atlantisch Perspectief 1 no 4 46 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Mission and Vision Tallinn Estonia Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence http transnet act nato int WISE TNCC CentresofE CCD accessed March 30 2009 47 Marching off to Cyber War The Economist print edition December 4 2008 48 Lynn 97 49 Bradley Axmith American Drones Compromised by Virus Digital Journal October 9 2011 http www digitaljournal com article 312544 accessed on October 25 2011 50 Flying Operations of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Unaffected by Malware Public Affairs Release Number 021011 Peterson Air Force Base CO Air Force Space Command October 12 2011 51 U S Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U S Cyber Command Under U S Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Washington DC June 23 2009 52 U S Cyber Command Fact Sheet Fort Meade MD U S Cyber Command Public Affairs October 2011 http www stratcom mil factsheets Cyber_Command accessed on October 25 2011 53 DOD Announces First Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace DoD News Release No 608-11 Washington DC DoD July 14 2011 54 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace Washington DC DoD July 14 2011 55 Defending the Networks The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence Brussels Belgium NATO Public Diplomacy Division June 2011 56 Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Hon Leon E Panetta to be Secretary of Defense Washington DC U S Senate Committee on Armed Services June 9 2011 25 31 Back to Table of Contents 57 DoD defines cyberspace operations as The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in and through cyberspace Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid This also includes combatant commander consideration to use cyberspace operations as a means to achieve strategic or tactical objectives with effects in any domain See Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James E Cartwright Definition of Cyberspace Operations action memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington DC September 29 2008 endorsed as approved on October 15 2008 58 Joint Operating Environment JOE Suffolk VA U S Joint Forces Command 3 44 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations CCJO Version 3 0 Washington DC Department of Defense January 15 2009 26 31 Note that Figure 1 consists of summarized excerpts from the JOE and CCJO 59 James B Michel et al Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual International Software and Applications Conference Dallas TX Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers November 2003 60 See Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 Fort Monroe VA U S Army Training and Doctrine Command February 22 2010 and Cyberspace Operations Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12 Maxwell AFB AL LeMay Center July 15 2010 61 Major General Rhett Hernandez USA Statement of Incoming Commanding General U S Army Forces Cyber Command Before the House Committee on Armed Services Washington DC U S Congress September 23 2010 62 A T Mahan The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 Mineola NY Dover 1987 reprint p 30 The geographical position of a county may not only favor the concentration of its forces but give the further strategic advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against its probable enemies Also see p 31-32 63 Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin Atlas of Cyberspace Harlow UK Pearson Education Limited 2001 Also see K Claffy et al Internet Mapping from Art to Science San Diego CA Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis Joint Operating Environment JOE 27 China's energy security is dependent on freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca through which travels 80% of their oil imports 64 Major General Richard E Webber USAF Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats Washington DC U S Congress September 23 2010 65 Enabling Distributed Security in Cyberspace Building a Healthy and Resilient Cyber Ecosystem with Automated Collective Action Washington DC DHS March 23 2011 66 Active Engagement Modern Defence Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon Lisbon Portugal NATO November 19 2010 67 Lynn 99 See also Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U S Policy Washington DC The National Academies Press 2010 68 International Strategy for Cyberspace 14 69 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI 3 4 and Lynn 105 32 Back to Table of Contents II STRATEGIES GUIDANCE DOCTRINE This section includes • National Strategy and Guidance • Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance • Joint Doctrine • Service Doctrine 33 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 34 Back to Table of Contents National Strategy and Guidance This section includes the • U S International Strategy for Cyberspace • National Framework for Strategic Communication 35 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 36 Back to Table of Contents U S International Strategy for Cyberspace The White House Cybersecurity Coordinator released the International Strategy for Cyberspace along with this factsheet on 16 May 2011 The full strategy can be found at http www whitehouse gov sites default files rss_viewer internationalstrategy_cyberspace pdf INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE Prosperity Security and Openness in a Networked World The U S International Strategy for Cyberspace outlines our vision for the future of cyberspace and sets an agenda for partnering with other nations and peoples to realize it We live in a rare historical moment with an opportunity to build on cyberspace's successes and help secure its future—for the United States and the global community Digital infrastructure is increasingly the backbone of prosperous economies vigorous research communities strong militaries transparent governments and free societies The reach of networked technology is pervasive and global To realize fully the benefits that networked technology promises the world these systems must function reliably and securely Assuring the free flow of information the security and privacy of data and the integrity of the interconnected networks themselves are all essential to American and global economic prosperity security and the promotion of universal rights Strategic Approach The United States' approach to international cyberspace issues is founded on the belief that networked technologies hold immense potential for our Nation and for the world The United States will pursue an international cyberspace policy that stokes the innovation that drives our economy and improves lives here and abroad Our strategic approach builds on successes recognizes the challenges to our national and economic security and is always grounded by our unshakable commitments to fundamental freedoms of expression and association privacy and the free flow of information The Future We Seek The cyberspace environment that we seek rewards innovation and empowers entrepreneurs it connects individuals and strengthens communities it builds better governments and expands accountability it safeguards fundamental freedoms and enhances personal privacy it builds understanding clarifies norms of behavior and enhances national and international security This cyberspace is defined by four key characteristics • Open to innovation • Interoperable the world over • Secure enough to earn people's trust • Reliable enough to support their work To realize this vision we will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide states' actions sustain partnerships and support the rule of law These norms include • • • • • Upholding Fundamental Freedoms Respect for Property Valuing Privacy Protection from Crime Right of Self-Defense • • • • • Global Interoperability Network Stability Reliable Access Multi-stakeholder Governance Cybersecurity Due Diligence 37 Back to Table of Contents To realize this future the United States will combine diplomacy defense and development to enhance prosperity security and openness so all can benefit from networked technology Diplomacy Strengthening Partnerships The United States will work to create incentives for and build consensus around an international environment in which states – recognizing the intrinsic value of an open interoperable secure and reliable cyberspace – work together and act as responsible stakeholders Through our international relationships and affiliations we will seek to ensure that as many stakeholders as possible are included in this vision of cyberspace precisely because of its economic social political and security benefits Distributed systems require unified action because no single institution document arrangement or instrument could suffice in addressing the needs of our networked world From end-users private- sector hardware and software vendors and Internet service providers to regional multilateral and multi-stakeholder organizations – all are important in helping cyberspace meet its full potential Defense Dissuading and Deterring The United States will along with other nations encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems thereby dissuading and deterring malicious actors while reserving the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate The United States will continue to strengthen our network defenses and our ability to withstand and recover from disruptions and other attacks For those more sophisticated attacks that do create damage we will act on well-developed response plans to isolate and mitigate disruption to our machines limiting effects on our networks and potential cascade effects beyond them When warranted the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country We reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic informational military and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law in order to defend our Nation our allies our partners and our interests In so doing we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy seeking broad international support whenever possible Development Building Prosperity and Security We believe the benefits of a connected world are universal The virtues of an open interoperable secure and reliable cyberspace should be more available than they are today and as the world's leading information economy the United States is committed to ensuring others benefit from our technical resources and expertise Our Nation can and will play an active role in providing the knowledge and capacity to build and secure new and existing digital systems The United States' capacity-building assistance is envisioned as an investment a commitment and an important opportunity for dialogue and partnership As countries develop a stake in cyberspace issues we intend our dialogues to mature from capacity- building to active economic technical law enforcement defense and diplomatic collaboration on issues of mutual concern 38 Back to Table of Contents Policy Priorities This strategy is an invitation to other states and peoples to join us in realizing this vision of prosperity security and openness in our networked world It is a call to the private sector civil society and end- users to reinforce these efforts through partnership awareness and action It is also a roadmap allowing the United States Government's departments and agencies to better define and coordinate their role in our international cyberspace policy to execute a specific way forward and to plan for future implementation The United States Government organizes its activities across seven interdependent areas of activity each demanding collaboration within our government with international partners and with the private sector Taken as a whole they form the action lines of our strategic framework Economy Promoting International Standards and Innovative Open Markets To ensure that cyberspace continues to serve the needs of our economies and innovators we will • • • • • • • • • Sustain a free-trade environment that encourages technological innovation on accessible globally linked networks Protect intellectual property including commercial trade secrets from theft Ensure the primacy of interoperable and secure technical standards determined by technical experts Protecting Our Networks Enhancing Security Reliability and Resiliency Because strong cybersecurity is critical to national and economic security in the broadest sense we will Promote cyberspace cooperation particularly on norms of behavior for states and cybersecurity bilaterally and in a range of multilateral organizations and multinational partnerships Reduce intrusions into and disruptions of U S networks Ensure robust incident management resiliency and recovery capabilities for information infrastructure Improve the security of the high-tech supply chain in consultation with industry Law Enforcement Extending Collaboration and the Rule of Law To enhance confidence in cyberspace and pursue those who would exploit online systems we will • • • • • • • • • • Participate fully in international cybercrime policy development Harmonize cybercrime laws internationally by expanding accession to the Budapest Convention Focus cybercrime laws on combating illegal activities not restricting access to the Internet Deny terrorists and other criminals the ability to exploit the Internet for operational planning financing or attacks Military Preparing for 21st Century Security Challenges Since our commitment to defend our citizens allies and interests extends to wherever they might be threatened we will Recognize and adapt to the military's increasing need for reliable and secure networks Build and enhance existing military alliances to confront potential threats in cyberspace Expand cyberspace cooperation with allies and partners to increase collective security 39 Back to Table of Contents Internet Governance Promoting Effective and Inclusive Structures To promote Internet governance structures that effectively serve the needs of all Internet users we will • • • • • • • • • Prioritize openness and innovation on the Internet Preserve global network security and stability including the domain name system DNS Promote and enhance multi-stakeholder venues for the discussion of Internet Governance issues International Development Building Capacity Security and Prosperity To promote the benefits of networked technology globally enhance the reliability of our shared networks and build the community of responsible stakeholders in cyberspace we will Provide the necessary knowledge training and other resources to countries seeking to build technical and cybersecurity capacity Continually develop and regularly share international cybersecurity best practices Enhance states' ability to fight cybercrime – including training for law enforcement forensic specialists jurists and legislators Develop relationships with policymakers to enhance technical capacity building providing regular and ongoing contact with experts and their United States Government counterparts Internet Freedom Supporting Fundamental Freedoms and Privacy To help secure fundamental freedoms as well as privacy in cyberspace we will • • • • Support civil society actors in achieving reliable secure and safe platforms for freedoms of expression and association Collaborate with civil society and nongovernment organizations to establish safeguards protecting their Internet activity from unlawful digital intrusions Encourage international cooperation for effective commercial data privacy protections Ensure the end-to-end interoperability of an Internet accessible to all These ideals are central to preserving the cyberspace we know and to creating together the future we seek Updated November 2011 40 Back to Table of Contents National Framework for Strategic Communication The National Framework for Strategic Communication was published in March 2010 pursuant to a requirement by Congress to provide a comprehensive interagency strategy It is clear however that this document is appropriately named That is it is a framework that outlines what strategic communication means to the Obama administration and how the executive branch of government organizes for and conducts the process that is strategic communication The executive summary of the framework is presented below The entire report can be found at http www carlisle army mil dime documents National%20Strategy%20for%20Strategic%20Co mmunication pdf Purpose of Report The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the President to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication Executive Summary Across all of our efforts effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout the government We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes opinions grievances and concerns of peoples – not just elites – around the world Doing so is critical to allow us to convey credible consistent messages develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be perceived Our study has revealed the need to clarify what strategic communication means and how we guide and coordinate our communications efforts In this report we describe strategic communication as the synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences We also explain the positions processes and interagency working groups we have created to improve our ability to better synchronize words and deeds and better coordinate communications and engagement programs and activities These changes are already producing visible results however we still have much ground to cover We recognize the need to ensure an appropriate balance between civilian and military efforts As a result a process has been initiated to review existing programs and resources to identify current military programs that might be better executed by other Departments and Agencies This process includes an interagency working group tasked to develop short- medium- and long-term options for addressing issues pertaining to budgets personnel and future programs and activities Updated October 2011 41 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 42 Back to Table of Contents Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance This section includes the • DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace • DoD Report on Strategic Communication • DoD Principles of Strategic Communication • DoD Directive DoDD 3600 01 Information Operations 43 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 44 Back to Table of Contents DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace The following is an excerpt from the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace July 2011 The full strategy can be found at http www defense gov home features 2011 0411_cyberstrategy docs DoD_Strategy_for_Oper ating_in_Cyberspace_July_2011 pdf DoD's Strengths and Opportunities in Cyberspace As does the nation as a whole DoD relies on a secure and reliable cyberspace that protects fundamental freedoms privacy and the free flow of information In support of both U S core commitments and national security DoD has significant strengths and opportunities in cyberspace The U S military's ability to use cyberspace for rapid communication and information sharing in support of operations is a critical enabler of DoD missions More broadly DoD's depth of knowledge in the global information and communications technology sector including its cybersecurity expertise provides the Department with strategic advantages in cyberspace Cyber Threats The global scope of DoD networks and systems presents adversaries with broad opportunities for exploitation and attack DoD must address vulnerabilities and the concerted efforts of both state and non-state actors to gain unauthorized access to its networks and systems In developing its strategy for operating in cyberspace DoD is focused on a number of central aspects of the cyber threat these include • • • • external threat actors insider threats supply chain vulnerabilities and threats to DoD's operational ability Potential U S adversaries may seek to exploit disrupt deny and degrade the networks and systems that DoD depends on for its operations DoD is particularly concerned with three areas of potential adversarial activity • • • theft or exploitation of data disruption or denial of access or service that affects the availability of networks information or network-enabled resources and destructive action including corruption manipulation or direct activity that threatens to destroy or degrade networks or connected systems Strategic Initiative 1 DoD will treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize train and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential Though the networks and systems that make up cyberspace are man-made often privately owned and primarily civilian in use treating cyberspace as a domain is a critical organizing concept for DoD's national security missions This allows DoD to organize train and equip for cyberspace as we do in air land maritime and space to support national security interests Furthermore these efforts must include the performance of essential missions in a degraded cyber environment As directed by the National Security Strategy DoD must ensure that it has the necessary capabilities to operate effectively in all domains- air land maritime space and cyberspace At all levels DoD will organize train and equip for the complex challenges and vast opportunities of cyberspace To this end the Secretary of Defense has assigned cyberspace mission 45 Back to Table of Contents responsibilities to United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM the other Combatant Commands and the Military Departments Given its need to ensure the ability to operate effectively in cyberspace and efficiently organize its resources DoD established U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM as a sub-unified command of USSTRATCOM The establishment of USCYBERCOM reflects DoD's need to • • • Manage cyberspace risk through efforts such as increased training information assurance greater situational awareness and creating secure and resilient network environments Assure integrity and availability by engaging in smart partnerships building collective self defenses and maintaining a common operating picture and Ensure the development of integrated capabilities by working closely with Combatant Commands Services Agencies and the acquisition community to rapidly deliver and deploy innovative capabilities where they are needed the most Strategic Initiative 2 DoD will employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems The implementation of constantly evolving defense operating concepts is required to achieve DoD's cyberspace mission today and in the future As such DoD has established a 5-step plan to form an adaptive and dynamic defense of DoD networks and systems • • • • DoD is enhancing its cyber hygiene best practices to improve its cybersecurity To deter and mitigate insider threats DoD will strengthen its workforce communications workforce accountability internal monitoring and information management capabilities DoD will employ an active cyber defense capability to prevent intrusions onto DoD networks and systems DoD is developing new defense operating concepts and computing architectures Strategic Initiative 3 DoD will partner with other U S government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy The challenges of cyberspace cross sectors industries and U S government departments and agencies they extend across national boundaries and through multiple components of the global economy Many of DoD's critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets including Internet Service Providers ISPs and global supply chains over which DoD has no direct authority to mitigate risk effectively Therefore DoD will work with the Department of Homeland Security DHS other interagency partners and the private sector to share ideas develop new capabilities and support collective efforts to meet the crosscutting challenges of cyberspace DoD will continue to support the development of whole-of-government approaches for managing risks associated with the globalization of the information and communications technology sector Many U S technology firms outsource software and hardware factors of production and in some cases their knowledge base to firms overseas Additionally increases in the number of counterfeit products and components demand procedures to both reduce risk and increase quality Dependence on technology from untrusted sources diminishes the predictability and assurance that DoD requires and DoD will work with DHS and its interagency partners to better identify and address these risks The global technology supply chain affects mission critical aspects of the DoD enterprise along with core U S government and private sector functions and its risks must be mitigated through strategic public-private sector cooperation 46 Back to Table of Contents Strategic Initiative 4 DoD will build robust relationships with U S allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity In support of the U S International Strategy for Cyberspace and in collaboration with its interagency partners DoD will seek increasingly robust international relationships to reflect our core commitments and common interests in cyberspace The development of international shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence By sharing timely indicators about cyber events threat signatures of malicious code and information about emerging actors and threats allies and international partners can increase collective cyber defense Cyberspace is a network of networks that includes thousands of ISPs across the globe no single state or organization can maintain effective cyber defenses on its own Strategic Initiative 5 DoD will leverage the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation The defense of U S national security interests in cyberspace depends on the talent and ingenuity of the American people DoD will catalyze U S scientific academic and economic resources to build a pool of talented civilian and military personnel to operate in cyberspace and achieve DoD objectives Technological innovation is at the forefront of national security and DoD will foster rapid innovation and enhance its acquisition processes to ensure effective cyberspace operations DoD will invest in its people technology and research and development to create and sustain the cyberspace capabilities that are vital to national security Conclusion National security is being redefined by cyberspace In addition to opportunities DoD faces significant cyberspace challenges The Department's military intelligence and business operations all depend upon cyberspace for mission success The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace assesses these challenges and opportunities and sets a strategic approach for DoD's cyber mission The Department's five strategic initiatives offer a roadmap for DoD to operate effectively in cyberspace defend national interests and achieve national security objectives Each initiative is distinct yet necessarily connected with the other four Across the strategy activities undertaken in one initiative will contribute to DoD's strategic thinking and lead to new approaches in the others By pursuing the activities in this strategy DoD will capitalize on the opportunities afforded to the Department by cyberspace defend DoD networks and systems against intrusions and malicious activity support efforts to strengthen cybersecurity for interagency international and critical industry partners and develop robust cyberspace capabilities and partnerships This strategy will guide the Department's defense of U S interests in cyberspace so that the United States and its allies and partners may continue to benefit from the innovations of the information age Updated October 2011 47 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 48 Back to Table of Contents DoD Report on Strategic Communication The Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication was published in December 2009 pursuant to a requirement by Congress Congress directed that the Secretary of Defense would report to the congressional defense committees on the organizational structure within the Department of Defense for advising the Secretary on the direction and priorities for strategic communication activities including an assessment of the option of establishing a board composed of representatives from among the organizations within the Department responsible for strategic communications public diplomacy and public affairs and including advisory members from the broader interagency community as appropriate for purposes of 1 providing strategic direction for Department of Defense efforts related to strategic communications and public diplomacy and 2 setting priorities for the Department of Defense in the areas of strategic communications and public diplomacy The entire report can be found at http www carlisle army mil dime documents DoD%20report%20on%20Strategic%20Communic ation%20Dec%2009 pdf Extract from the report This report describes how DoD understands strategic communication offers DoD views on the appropriate DoD role in strategic communication and public diplomacy explains existing DoD processes and organizations that support effective strategic communication and describes some potential future avenues for improvement and change including an assessment of the option of establishing a strategic communication board within DoD Defining Strategic Communication for DoD The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02 defines the phrase strategic communication for the Department as Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs plans themes messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power However this recitation of a dictionary definition does not explain how this term is interpreted and implemented Emergent thinking is coalescing around the notion that strategic communication should be viewed as a process rather than as a set of capabilities organizations or discrete activities In its broadest sense strategic communication is the process of integrating issues of audience and stakeholder perception into policy-making planning and operations at every level Other sections address DoD's role in strategic communication the DoD strategic communication process and key players and organizations involved in DoD strategic communication specifically at the national strategic level Updated October 2011 49 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 50 Back to Table of Contents DoD Principles of Strategic Communication The following is an excerpt from a 15 August 2008 memo which introduced the DoD Principles of Strategic Communication signed by Robert T Hastings Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Strategic Communication has been viewed as an emerging and extremely pertinent joint concept in recent years Several important review panels have addressed Strategic Communication SC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated Strategic Communication as one of the CICS Special Areas of Emphasis for joint education in 2007 and 2008 Despite the interest and attention Strategic Communication is still a developing concept Contributing to the challenge is the lack of approved policy and doctrine As part of a larger DoD Strategic Communication education initiative the Department held the first Strategic Communication Education Summit in March 2008 at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk Va One of the most significant outcomes was the development of Principles of Strategic Communication to help standardize Strategic Communication education until policy and doctrine are published Through the collaborative efforts of DoD State Department and civilian educators and practitioners the Principles initially developed in the Strategic Communication Education Summit have been refined into this guide The purpose of this publication is to provide a tool to assist dialogue and instruction promoting understanding Strategic Communication As the Strategic Communication concept continues to mature these Principles will be reviewed every two years until they are incorporated into formal doctrine Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication 51 Back to Table of Contents Principles of Strategic Communication Definition of a principle A fundamental tenet a determining characteristic an essential quality an enduring attribute Strategic Communication SC has been described as the orchestration and or synchronization of actions images and words to achieve a desired effect yet there is more to understanding the concept As the joint force and agencies of the U S Government have begun executing Strategic Communication processes common fundamentals have emerged Through the collaborative efforts of DoD State Department civilian educators and Strategic Communication practitioners those common fundamentals have been consolidated and refined into nine principles of SC described below These principles are provided to assist dialogue and instruction promoting understanding of Strategic Communication Figure I below lists the nine principles of SC with a short description of each A more detailed explanation of each principle follows The principles are not listed in any order of precedence Leadership-Driven Leaders must lead communication process Credible Understanding Perception of truthfulness and respect Deep comprehension of others Dialogue Pervasive Multi-faceted exchange of ideas Every action sends a message Unity of Effort Results-Based Integrated and coordinated Tied to desired endstate Responsive Continuous Right audience message time and place Analysis Planning Execution Assessment Figure 1 Principles of Strategic Communication Leadership-Driven Leaders must decisively engage and drive the Strategic Communication process To ensure integration of communication efforts leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do Successful Strategic Communication - integrating actions words and images - begins with clear leadership intent and guidance Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization command or joint campaign plan The results are actions and words linked to the plan Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence Credible Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy truthfulness and respect Actions images and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained educated and attentive communicators Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible 52 Back to Table of Contents Understanding Deep comprehension of attitudes cultures identities behavior history perspectives and social systems What we say do or show may not be what others hear or see An individual's experience culture and knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute but are relative to the individual's societal and cultural narrative Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them thus what we say do or show may not be what they hear or see Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences Understanding subjective impacts of culture language history religion environment and other factors is critical when crafting communication strategy for a relevant population Building relationships and collaboration with the interagency coalition host nation academic non-profit and business communities can facilitate better understanding of audiences Dialogue Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties It involves active listening engagement and the pursuit of mutual understanding which leads to trust Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place U S policies and actions in context prior to operations or events Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight relationships take time to develop and require listening respect for culture and trustbuilding Pervasive Every action image and word sends a message Communication no longer has boundaries in time or space All players are communicators wittingly or not Everything the 10int Force says does or fails to do and say has intended and unintended consequences Every action word and image sends a message and every team member is a messenger from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander All communication can have strategic impact and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment therefore leaders must think about possible Nth order communication results of their actions Unity of Effort Integrated and coordinated vertically and horizontally Strategic Communication is a consistent collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels and horizontally across stakeholders Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility areas of influence and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes Recognizing that your agency organization will not act alone ideally all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration Results-Based Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated endstate Strategic communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined endstate Communication processes themes targets and engagement modes are derived from policy strategic vision campaign planning and operational design Strategic communication is not simply another tool in the leader's toolbox but must guide all an organization does and says encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results 53 Back to Table of Contents Responsive Right audience right message right time and right place Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions images and words to support policy overarching strategic objectives and the longer term big picture Acting within adversaries' decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result An organization must remain flexible enough to address specific issues with specific audiences often at specific moments in time by communicating to achieve the greatest effect All communication carries inherent risk and requires a level of risk acceptance within the organization Leaders must develop and instill a culture that rewards initiative while not overreacting to setbacks and miscues While risk must be addressed in the form of assumptions in planning it should not restrain leaders' freedom of action providing it has been taken into consideration appropriately Continuous Diligent ongoing research analysis planning execution and assessment that feeds planning and action Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis planning execution and assessment Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action Strategic Communication supports the organization's objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change The SC process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries Updated October 2011 54 Back to Table of Contents Department of Defense Directive DoDD 3600 01 Information Operations The following is an excerpt from Department of Defense Directive DODD 3600 01 Information Operations 14 August 2006 Change 1 incorporated 23 May 2011 The full directive can be found at http www dtic mil whs directives corres dir html Purpose DoDD 3600 1 is the fundamental document for both understanding and employing Information Operations IO As such it should be the starting point for all study of Information Operations as undertaken by U S practitioners This directive establishes IO policy definitions and responsibilities in the Department of Defense DOD to support the objective of making IO a core military competency It also directs the coordination and deconfliction of information gathering activities in support of IO and Human Intelligence HUMINT and other intelligence activities within the Combatant Commands Information Operations IO Definition The definition included in this directive has been superseded by the SecDef Memo 12401-10 25 January 2011 The following shows both the original and updated definitions additions – underline and deletions – strike through The integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare EW Computer Network Operations CNO Military Information Support Operations MISO Military Deception MILDEC and Operations Security OPSEC in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own IO Policy IO shall be employed to support full spectrum dominance by taking advantage of information technology maintaining U S strategic dominance in network technologies and capitalizing upon near real-time global dissemination of information to affect adversary decision cycles with the goal of achieving information superiority for the United States Core IO Capabilities IO employs five core capabilities to achieve desired Combatant Commander effects or prevent the enemy from achieving his desired effects EW CNO MISO MILDEC and OPSEC They are operational in a direct and immediate sense they either achieve critical operational effects or prevent the adversary from doing so They are interdependent and increasingly need to be integrated to achieve desired effects Supporting Capabilities See Glossary for definitions • • • • • • Counterintelligence CI Human Intelligence HUMINT Physical kinetic attack Physical Security Information Assurance IA Combat Camera Related Capabilities See Glossary for definitions • • • Public Affairs PA Civil-Military Operations CMO Defense Support to Public Diplomacy DSPD 55 Back to Table of Contents Intelligence Support Intelligence will be developed consistent with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to provide data about adversary information systems or networks produce political-military assessments conduct human factors analysis and provide indications and warning of adversary IO including threat assessments Other Human-Derived Information Gathering Activities Provide atmospherics in support of IO and include polling surveys opinion research spot reports and consolidation of other information relevant to prevailing moods attitudes and influences among a population These activities for atmospherics in support of IO planning and execution shall be coordinated and deconflicted with the Intelligence Community IC All contracts to support human-derived information gathering activities shall have proper USG oversight and undergo a policy review Responsibilities The following officials commands and agencies are tasked with the specific responsibilities indicated Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD I • • • • • • Serve as the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for IO Develop and oversee DOD IO policy and integration activities Assess performance responsiveness of DOD and Military Intelligence activities to support IO Serve as the DOD lead within the IC regarding IO issues and provide guidance for the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT and related intelligence activities and other human-derived information gathering activities Coordinate oversee and assess the efforts of the DOD Components to plan program develop and execute capabilities in support of IO requirements Establish specific policies for the development and integration of CNO MILDEC and OPSEC as core IO capabilities Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics USD AT L • • • Establish specific policies for the development and integration of EW as a core IO capability Develop and maintain a technology investment strategy for development acquisition and integration of EW capabilities Invest in and develop the science and technologies needed to support IO capabilities The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD P • • • Provide DOD oversight of IO planning execution and related policy guidance including the establishment of an OSD review process to assess IO plans and programs Lead interagency coordination exclusive of the IC and international cooperation involving planning and employment of IO capabilities Establish specific policy and oversight for development and integration of MISO as a core IO capability and DSPD as a related capability The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness USD P R • • Develop policy and procedures on matters pertaining to the establishment and management of an IO career force in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the USD P the USD I and others as appropriate Provide training policy and oversight as it pertains to the integration of all IO capabilities into joint exercises and joint training regimes 56 Back to Table of Contents The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration DOD Chief Information Officer ASD NII DOD CIO will • • Establish specific policy for the development and integration of IA and Computer Network Defense CND as related to CNO as a core IO capability Oversee and assess the efforts of the Heads of the DOD Components to plan program develop and field IA and CND capabilities in support of CNO Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs will • • • Establish specific policy for the relationship of PA to IO Oversee PA planning and coordination efforts as related to IO within DOD Oversee the development and conduct of appropriate training and education that defines PA's relationship to IO for public affairs and visual information personnel at the Defense Information School Commander U S Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM • Integrate and coordinate DOD IO core capabilities that cross geographic areas of responsibility or core IO areas Commander U S Special Operations Command CDRUSSOCOM • • • Integrate and coordinate DOD MISO capabilities to enhance interoperability and support USSTRATCOM's information operations responsibilities and other combatant commanders' MISO planning and execution Support the other Combatant Commanders though joint employment of MISO and other special operations force IO capabilities Employ other special operations force IO capabilities as directed The Secretaries of the Military Departments and CDRUSSOCOM • Develop IO doctrine and tactics and organize train and equip for IO for their Title 10 U S Code and Major Force Program responsibilities The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff • • • • Serve as the principal military advisor to the President of the United States the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense on IO Validate capability-based IO requirements through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Develop and maintain joint doctrine for core supporting and related IO capabilities in joint operations Ensure all joint education training plans and operations include and are consistent with IO policy strategy and doctrine Updated October 2011 57 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 58 Back to Table of Contents Joint Doctrine Joint Information Operations Doctrine Key doctrinal documents • • • • • • • Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations 13 February 2006 Joint Pub 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare 25 January 2007 Joint Pub 3-13 2 Psychological Operations 07 January 2010 Joint Pub 3-13 3 Operations Security 29 June 2006 Joint Pub 3-13 4 Military Deception 13 July 2006 Joint Pub 3-57 Civil-Military Operations 08 July 2008 Joint Pub 3-61 Public Affairs 25 August 2010 Joint Pubs available at http www dtic mil doctrine s_index html and at https jdeis js mil jdeis index jsp Joint Information Operations doctrine is set down in Joint Publication 3-13 This section extracts the publication's executive summary below EXECUTIVE SUMMARY JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 • Discusses the Information Environment and Its Relationship to Military Operations • Discusses the Information Operations IO Core Capabilities Necessary to Successfully Plan and Execute IO to include Supporting and Related Capabilities in a Joint Multinational Environment • Aligns Joint IO Doctrine with the Transformational Planning Guidance as Specified by the Department of Defense IO Roadmap for Achieving Information Superiority on the Battlefield • Provides an Organizational Framework for Integrating Deconflicting and Synchronizing IO Planning and Execution Activities for Supporting and Supported Combatant Command Staffs National Intelligence Agencies and Other Federal Agencies as Applicable • Outlines Planning Considerations for Developing an IO Career Force through Joint Education Training Exercises and Experimentation NOTE The definition included in this publication has been superseded by the SecDef Memo 12401-10 25 January 2011 The term psychological operations PSYOP has been replaced by military information support operations MISO The following shows both the original and updated information additions – underline and deletions – strike through 59 Back to Table of Contents Military Operations and the Information Environment To succeed it is necessary for US forces to gain and maintain information superiority Information is a strategic resource vital to national security and military operations depend on information and information systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities Information operations IO are described as the integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare EW Computer Network Operations CNO Military Information Support Operations MISO Military Deception MILDEC and Operations Security OPSEC in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint force commanders JFCs and their staffs guidance to help prepare plan execute and assess IO in support of joint operations The principal goal is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies The information environment is the aggregate of individuals organizations and systems that collect process disseminate or act on information The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions physical informational and cognitive Core Supporting and Related Information Operations Capabilities Core capabilities Supporting capabilities Related capabilities IO consists of five core capabilities which are PSYOP MISO MILDEC OPSEC EW and CNO Of the five PSYOP MISO OPSEC and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries In this modern age they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO Together these five capabilities used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences TAs by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance IA physical security physical attack counterintelligence and combat camera These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities but can also serve other wider purposes There are three military functions public affairs PA civil military operations CMO and defense support to public diplomacy specified as related capabilities for IO These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting Information Operations capabilities However their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO For this reason the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in 60 Back to Table of Contents close coordination with the IO planning staff Intelligence and Communications System Support to Information Operations Successful planning preparation execution and assessment of information operations IO demand detailed and timely intelligence Before military activities in the information environment can be planned the current state of the dynamic information environment must be collected analyzed and provided to commanders and their staffs This requires intelligence on relevant portions of the physical informational and cognitive properties of the information environment which necessitates collection and analysis of a wide variety of information and the production of a wide variety of intelligence products Nature of IO intelligence requirements In order to understand the adversary or other TA decision-making process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to achieve operational objectives commanders and their staffs must have current data This includes relevant physical informational and cognitive properties of the information environment as well as assessment of ongoing IO activities Intelligence considerations in planning IO Intelligence Resources are Limited Commanders and their intelligence and operations directorates must work together to identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure that they are given high enough priority in the commander's requests to the intelligence community IC Collection Activities are Legally Constrained The IC must implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law Additionally intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other sources Intelligence Support to IO Often Requires Long Lead Times The intelligence necessary to affect adversary or other TA decisions often requires that specific sources and methods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct the required analyses Information Environment is Dynamic Commanders and their staffs must understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions of the information environment Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence Collection of physical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity Commanders and their staffs must have an appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature 61 Back to Table of Contents Responsibilities and Command Relationships Joint Staff Combatant commands Components The Chairman's responsibilities for IO are both general such as those to establish doctrine provide advice and make recommendations and specific such as those assigned in DOD IO policy The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff J-3 serves as the Chairman's focal point for IO and coordinates with the other organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO specific advice and advocate Joint Staff and combatant commands' IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with other organizations and individuals on behalf of the Chairman Commander United States Strategic Command's USSTRATCOM's specific authority and responsibility to coordinate IO across area of responsibility AOR and functional boundaries does not diminish the imperative for other combatant commanders to employ IO These efforts may be directed at achieving national or military objectives incorporated in theater security cooperation plans shaping the operational environment for potential employment during periods of heightened tensions or in support of specific military operations It is entirely possible that in a given theater the combatant commander will be supported for select IO while concurrently supporting USSTRATCOM IO activities across multiple theater boundaries Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and execution of IO IO planned and conducted by functional components must be conducted within the parameters established by the JFC At the same time component commanders and their subordinates must be provided sufficient flexibility and authority to respond to local variations in the information environment Component commanders determine how their staffs are organized for IO and normally designate personnel to liaise between the JFC's headquarters and component headquarter staffs Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of joint Subordinate joint force operations Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of commanders relationship with the parent joint force IO staff as the Service and functional components Subordinate JFC staffs may become involved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree to include making recommendations for employment of specific capabilities particularly if most of the capability needed for a certain operation resides in that subordinate joint task force Organizing for joint IO Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for Information Operations to the J-3 When authorized the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning coordinating integrating and assessing joint force IO The J-3 normally designates an Information Operations cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the combatant command staff and that IO 62 Back to Table of Contents aspects of such processes are coordinated with higher adjacent subordinate and multinational staffs To integrate and synchronize the core capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and appropriate staff functions the IO cell chief normally leads an IO cell or similarly named group as an integrated part of the staff's operational planning group or equivalent The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance Planning and Coordination IO planning follows the same principles and processes established for joint operation planning Planning considerations The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish JFC objectives Uncoordinated IO can compromise complicate negate or harm other JFC military operations as well as other USG information activities JFCs must ensure Information Operations planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process assigning them to the joint targeting coordination board in order to ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts Other USG and or coalition allied information activities when uncoordinated may complicate defeat or render DOD IO ineffective Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JFC IO staff planning coordination and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts in the AOR to effectively synergize and integrate IO capabilities IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC's campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of not an addition to the overall planning effort IO are used in all phases of a campaign or operation The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence the amount of effort required for the remaining phases The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to preclude other conflicts requires an ability to integrate Information Operations capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy through the establishment of information objectives that in turn are integrated into and support the JFC's overall mission objectives The combatant commander's theater security cooperation plan serves as an excellent platform to embed specific long-term information objectives IO planning requires early and detailed preparation Many Information Operations capabilities require long lead-time intelligence preparation of the battlespace IPB IO support for IPB development differs from traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time and may have expanded collection production and dissemination requirements Consequently combatant commanders must ensure that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priority intelligence requirements PIRs and requests for information RFIs As part of the planning process designation of release and execution authority is required Release authority provides the approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation of 63 Back to Table of Contents specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority Execution authority is described as the authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and or place Normally the JFC is the one execution authority designated in the execute order for an operation IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval Commander's intent and information operations The commander's vision of IO's role in an operation should begin before the specific planning is initiated A commander that expects to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO related PIRs and RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis in order for the intelligence products to be ready in time to support operations At a minimum the commander's vision for IO should be included in the initial guidance Ideally commanders give guidance on Information Operations as part of their overall concept but may elect to provide it separately Measures of performance MOPs gauge accomplishment of Information Operations tasks and actions Measures of effectiveness MOEs determine whether IO actions being executed are having the desired effect toward mission accomplishment the attainment of end states and objectives MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace results IO MOPs and MOEs are crafted and refined throughout the planning process Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness Multinational Considerations in Information Operations Every ally coalition member can contribute to IO by providing regional expertise to assist in planning and conducting IO Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts and some have thorough and sophisticated doctrine procedures and capabilities for planning and conducting IO The multinational force commander is responsible to resolve potential conflicts between each nation's IO programs and the IO objectives and programs of the coalition It is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into IO planning as early as possible so that an integrated and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning process Integration requirements include clarification of allied and coalition partner's IO objectives understanding of other nations' information operations and how they intend to conduct IO establishment of liaison deconfliction procedures to ensure coherence and early identification of multinational force vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to adversary attempts to exploit them Information Operations in Joint Education Training Exercises and Experiments A solid foundation of education and training is essential to the development of IO core competencies The development of IO as a core military competency and critical component to joint operations requires specific expertise and capabilities at all levels of DOD At the highest professional levels senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are the capstone to American military power The Services United States Special Operations Command and other agencies develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law 64 Back to Table of Contents policy and lessons learned At each level of command a solid foundation of education and training is essential to the development of a core competency Professional education and training in turn are dependent on the accumulation documentation and validation of experience gained in operations exercises and experimentation IO education considerations The IO career force should consist of both capability specialists EW PSYOP MISO CNO MILDEC and OPSEC and IO planners Both groups require an understanding of the information environment the role of IO in military affairs how IO differs from other information functions that contribute to information superiority and specific knowledge of each of the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO into joint operations IO planners are required at both the component and the joint level Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive level knowledge of the information environment and the role of IO in supporting DOD missions IO training considerations Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine to prepare joint forces and or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent with the joint assignment process Joint IO training focuses on joint planning- specific skills methodologies and tools and assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training The Services determine applicable career training requirements for both their IO career personnel and general military populations based on identified joint force mission requirements CONCLUSION This document JP 3-13 provides the doctrinal principles for DOD employment of IO It has been designed to provide overarching guidance in the planning and execution of IO in today's joint multinational security environment Its primary purpose is to ensure all of the capabilities comprising IO are effectively coordinated and integrated into our nation's warfighting capability against current and future threats Updated October 2011 65 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 66 Back to Table of Contents Service Doctrine This section includes the • Army Information Doctrine • Marine Corps Information Doctrine • Navy Information Doctrine • Air Force Information Doctrine 67 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 68 Back to Table of Contents Army Information Doctrine Key doctrinal documents FM 6-0 Mission Command June 2011 Army Doctrine Publication ADP and Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP 6-0 Mission Command TBP and FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities TBP Army forces conduct unified land operations in populated areas that require them to contend with the attitudes and perceptions of many audiences within and beyond their area of operations Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command June 2011 established the new Mission Command warfighting function MC WfF and launched the Army's evolution of information operations to Inform and Influence Activities IIA These activities support and enhance current joint information operations doctrine that by definition remains focused on adversaries and potential adversaries only Inform and Influence Activities focus on all audiences within the information environment which include domestic foreign friendly and neutral adversary and enemy It is also in line with the new definition for IO and emerging joint doctrine as it also enables commanders with multiple information-related capabilities and allows them to evaluate and use available internal and request external resources to inform or influence selected populaces actor or audiences as desired to support his or her mission objectives They do this through Inform and Influence Activities—the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes messages and actions with operations to inform U S and global audiences influence foreign audiences and affect adversary and enemy decision making FM 6-0 Two mission command warfighting function tasks replaced the Army's previous five information tasks information engagement command and control warfare information protection operations security and military deception The commander's task is to lead Inform and Influence Activities which includes collaborating with the staff subordinate commanders and unified action partners establishing themes and messages and personally engaging key target audiences and individuals The staff task is to conduct Inform and Influence Activities This single category activity is solely focused on integration both horizontally and vertically among the staff elements to assist the commander with developing and synchronizing themes and messages with actions to support operations Ultimately this supports the commander's efforts to shape the operational environment as well as to avoid message contradiction or such perception which could lead to information fratricide and thus undermine the operation Commanders employ informationrelated capabilities within their areas of operation to inform audiences build trust and confidence promote support for Army operations and ultimately persuade and influence perceptions and behavior Information-Related Capabilities are tools and techniques utilizing a dimension s within the Information Environment which can be used to generate an end s End s is an outcome s that results because of the way capabilities are applied Joint Staff 69 Back to Table of Contents All assets and capabilities at a Commander's disposal have the capacity to inform and influence to varying degrees Most are information-centric in mission and purpose and are designed trained and resourced to inform influence or both Commanders and staffs however are not limited to these information-related capabilities when planning operations Inform and influence activities recognize that success depends on effectively employing ALL assets in order to shape the information environment as depicted in the figure below so that themes messages and actions are synchronized with each other and with operations In addition to the informationrelated capabilities the Commander can designate other capabilities not solely designed to inform or influence such as maneuver forces engineers medical units and other assets to achieve mission objectives Information-Related Capabilities within Inform and Influence Activities include • • • • • • • • • • Public Affairs Military Information Support Operations Soldier and Leader Engagement Combat Camera Military Deception Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Electronic Warfare Computer Network Operations Network Operations Information Security Operations Security Civil Affairs Operations Special Technical Operations Commander designated enablers other 70 Back to Table of Contents Inform and influence activities has two lines of effort the inform line of effort and the influence line of effort These two lines of effort enable commanders to achieve the mission command objectives and maintain statutory requirements The inform line of effort provides accurate and factual information to domestic and foreign audiences Maintaining transparency and credibility is critical within this line of effort The inform line of effort includes public affairs at home and abroad military information support operations abroad and Soldier and leader engagement at home and abroad The influence line of effort activities serve to effectively change attitudes beliefs and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly neutral adversary and enemy populaces and target audiences to support operations The goal is to guide others to make decisions or act in a way that supports the commanders' objectives The influence line of effort integrates actions designed to extend influence among foreign partners and the local populace within the unit areas of operation It includes military information support operations Soldier and leader engagement and military deception activities Although each line of effort has a different task and purpose multiple information-related capabilities could employ to support the same objectives in a reinforcing manner Public Affairs Public Affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime conflict and war FM 46-1 Public Affairs communicate with internal and external Army publics about Army operations and responsibilities to enhance public understanding and garner U S as well as global support for the Army It fulfills the legal mandate to inform the American people about the Army's mission and goals – to communicate to the public what the Army does Public Affairs synchronization with other information-related capabilities helps the commander shape the information environment and counter enemy propaganda and disinformation It assists the commander in the development of themes and messages and collaborates with other information-related capabilities to protect operational security and avoid information fratricide Public Affairs participates in the information integration process within the Inform and Influence Activities Element in a number of ways • • • • • • • • • Assists the commander to develop themes and messages Prepares and rehearses the commander and other leaders to conduct press conferences or interviews Servers as the commander's spokesperson when required Conducts ongoing media assessments to determine the degree and nature of media coverage takes steps to correct misinformation or propaganda Conducts ongoing background research in order to provide accurate context and information Ensures public affairs planning from the outset of operations Seeks to leverage other information-related capabilities such as combat camera or civil affairs to provide greater accuracy and breadth of information Cultivates relationships with the media and engages them candidly and consistently Ensures coordination with other information-related capabilities to avoid information fratricide For additional guidance on Public Affairs see FM 46-1 Public Affairs Operations 71 Back to Table of Contents Military Information Support Operations Military Information Support Operations is the commander's primary dedicated capability to inform and influence foreign populations within the operational area Military Information Support Operations is conducted to induce or reinforce specific attitudes and behaviors that are favorable to U S military objectives When Military Information Support Operations is integrated properly across the range of military operations the risk to U S forces is lessened and collateral damage and expenditures of assets are significantly reduced Military information support MIS forces are organized trained and equipped to plan resource and conduct Military Information Support Operations They support Soldier and leader engagement as well as military deception as required or tasked They also advise commanders and their staffs on the cognitive and psychological effects of military operations as well as unintended psychological impacts of actions and recommend effective messages and actions for delivery to achieve the commander's intent through influence Military Information Support Operations participates in the information integration process within the Inform and Influence Activities Element in a number of ways • • • • • • • • • Advises the commander and Chief of Mission COM on the psychological effects of military actions and country team or host partner nation HN PN information programs in the operational areas and on targeting to maximize effects and minimize adverse impact and unintended consequences Influences foreign populations through relevant and credible messages activities and actions targeting select individuals and populations to affect decision making and subsequent behavior changes in support of U S national and military objectives This includes by use of Military Information Support Operations Military deception and Soldier leader engagement Delivers information to target audiences to inform influence and direct Plans coordinates and employs Military Information Support Operations unilaterally and in conjunction with allies coalition partners host partner nation HN PN and friendly indigenous personnel Trains advises and assists government organizations and security forces to establish host partner nation HN PN information capabilities through unified action and security assistance measures to facilitate interoperability and host partner nation HN PN selfsustainment Disseminates public service information during civil support and humanitarian assistance operations to reestablish or reinforce legitimacy ease suffering and maintain or restore civil order Assesses information delivered to gain and hold the initiative to support the narrative Assesses adversary information including information for effect IFE misinformation disinformation and propaganda in conjunction with the G2 S2 G7 Inform and Influence Activities Officer and Public Affairs Officer to determine the source intent intended target and effects analyze and assess the feasibility necessity and best method s to counter the effects and as required develop and deliver timely counter-information to hold the initiative and convey friendly intent and actions Collects relevant information to enhance the commander's understanding of the operational environment and to facilitate his decision-making in applying military actions through direct and indirect observations and insights into the attitudes perceptions and behaviors of target audiences For more information on Military Information Support Operations see FM 3-05 30 and FM 305 301 72 Back to Table of Contents Soldier and Leader Engagement Soldier and leader engagement broadly describes interactions that take place among Soldiers leaders and audiences or individuals within the area of operations Soldier and leader engagements can occur as dynamic impromptu or chance face-to face encounters on the street or as deliberate scheduled meetings Such engagements can also employ other means such as phone calls video-teleconference or other media Soldier and leader engagement is a component of a larger engagement strategy that includes public affairs engagements especially with the media civil military operations or civil affairs engagements such as medical civil action programs MEDCAPs and civil-military engagements such as those in support of security force assistance efforts Given its importance to Inform and Influence Activities and current lack of doctrine regarding Soldier leader engagement a more comprehensive overview of this information-related capability is provided in FM 3-13 Chapter 5 Combat Camera Combat Camera provides commanders with a directed imagery capability in support of operational and planning requirements through the full range of military operations Combat Camera forces perform unique and highly specialized missions with Video Documentation capabilities supporting all phases of an operation or campaign Combat Camera teams are trained and equipped to access events and areas unavailable to other VI personnel or media representatives Combat Camera personnel maintain qualifications enabling them to operate with airborne forces air crew special operations forces SOF and military divers Their capabilities range from aerial photography to underwater photography Furthermore Combat Camera teams have a technological capability for the timely transmission of images during fastmoving operations and support forward-operating maneuver elements Army COMCAM units are under the operational control of US Forces Command FORSCOM until they are deployed Army capabilities include the following • • • • Tactical Digital Media Editing capabilities Transmission for conventional non-conventional and airborne operations High Definition Camera equipment Combat Camera participates in the information integration process within the Inform and Influence Activities Element in a number of ways • Provides real-time imagery to support the commander's messaging efforts • Accurately portrays U S forces in action in order to reinforce other inform capabilities • Documents operations and provides imagery that counters misinformation or propaganda • Provides media outlets with imagery that would otherwise be difficult if not impossible to obtain • Provides documentation in support of assessment and investigation • Provides imagery in support of Public Affairs public and command information efforts particularly the Army expanding online presence For more information on Combat Camera see FM 3-55 12 Military Deception Military deception involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military paramilitary or violent extremist organization VEO decisionmakers thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 73 Back to Table of Contents friendly mission Military deception does not fall under the direct purview of the G-7 S-7 but is considered an enabling capability to Inform and Influence Activities Counterdeception contributes to situational understanding by protecting friendly human and automated decisionmaking from adversary deception Counterdeception's goal is to make Army commanders aware of adversary deception activities so they can formulate informed and coordinated responses Deception in Support of Operations Security DISO A DISO is a military deception activity that protects friendly operations personnel programs equipment and other assets against foreign intelligence security services FISS collection The intent of DISO is to create multiple false indicators to confuse or make friendly force intentions harder to interpret by adversary or enemy intelligence gathering apparatus limiting the ability to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces Tactical deception TAC-D TAC-D consists of deception activities planned and conducted to support battles and engagements TAC-D is planned and executed by and in support of tactical-level commanders to cause foreign entity actions that are favorable to the U S commanders' objectives TAC-D is conducted to influence immediate combat operations in order to gain a tactical advantage over an adversary to mask vulnerabilities in friendly forces or to enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces TACD is usually nested within other operations as part of the JFC's or JTF's Annex C-3-A Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Cyber Electromagnetic Activities seize retain and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum enabling Army forces to retain freedom of action while denying freedom of action to enemies and adversaries Cyber Electromagnetic Activities is divided into two lines of effort the cyberspace operations line of effort and the electronic warfare line of effort Within these two lines of effort are the six subcomponents cyber network operations cyber warfare electronic attack electronic protection and electronic warfare support and electromagnetic spectrum operations Although Inform and Influence Activities and Cyber Electromagnetic Activities are individual staff tasks under the Mission Command warfighting function integration of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities resides in the Cyber Electromagnetic element of the Mission Command cell and through the Cyber Electromagnetic Activities and Inform and Influence Activities working groups Cyber Electromagnetic Activities is able to provide messaging venues and other messaging effects through cyber network operations and electronic warfare attack and support activities to influence enemy target audiences and individuals For more information on Electronic Warfare Operations see FM 3-36 Army Cyber Command and CAC Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate CDID are currently working on the FM 3-XX Cyber Electromagnetic Activities initial draft TBP Operations Security Operations security is the process by which the Army protects human and automated decisionmaking in peacetime and in conflict It is a commander's responsibility The objective of operations security is to enhance the probability of mission success by preserving the advantages of initiative secrecy and surprise Operations security is a force multiplier It includes reducing predictability and eliminating indicators of operations Operations security countermeasures are used to deny adversary knowledge of friendly operations requiring him to expend more resources to obtain the critical information needed to make decisions 74 Back to Table of Contents Operations security must be considered for all phases of planning and execution The operations security process will be used to determine critical information which must be protected analyze the adversary's ability to collect intelligence on our forces and identify vulnerabilities Commanders will ensure that an operations security process is incorporated into all plans for all phases of the operation Commanders should use an established operations security process for inclusion into operational planning Additionally Operations security countermeasures will be employed to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities and indicators in order to reduce risk to soldiers U S forces and operations The commander will approve the unit's critical information list CIL and ensure that it is circulated to all members of the command Critical information is the answer to questions regarding essential elements of friendly information This information is deemed critical because if elements are compromised it would significantly degrade or prevent mission success Critical information should be disseminated as required to support the mission in a manner that it is accessible to all elements associated with the mission For more guidance on Operations Security see FM 3-37 Counterintelligence Counterintelligence serves to deny degrade disrupt or mitigate Foreign Intelligence and Security Services FISS and International Terrorism Organizations ITO ability and capability to successfully execute intelligence collection targeting U S or friendly force interests Counterintelligence focuses on countering FISS and ITO intelligence collection activities targeting information or material concerning U S or friendly force personnel activities operations plans equipment facilities publications technology or documents either classified or unclassified Counterintelligence does this without official consent of designated U S release authorities for any purpose that could cause damage or otherwise adversely impact the interests of national security of the U S ability to fulfill national policy and objectives Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect identify track exploit and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of adversaries It is a key intelligence community contributor to protect U S interests and equities Counterintelligence elements are instrumental in contributing to situational awareness in the area of influence It may corroborate other intelligence discipline information as well as cue other intelligence assets through its core competencies and counterintelligence technical services Within Inform and Influence Activities the counterintelligence role consists of countering adversarial human intelligence HUMINT targeting of U S Inform and Influence Activities and providing threat analysis for counter-Signals Intelligence SIGINT analysis pertinent to Inform and Influence Activities Information provided by counterintelligence elements can assist the commander and staff in developing an engagement strategy with the ability to counter deter neutralize exploit or at least mitigate the adversary's information operations efforts For more information on counterintelligence see FM 2-0 Civil Military Operations Civil Affairs Operations Civil military operations support mission objectives by providing commanders a way to establish maintain influence or exploit relations between military forces governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace in a friendly neutral or hostile operational area Civil military operations typically include infrastructure support activities or human support functions by military forces that are normally the responsibility of local regional or national governments These activities can occur prior to during or subsequent to other military operations Civil military operations may be performed by 75 Back to Table of Contents designated civil affairs by other military forces or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces FM 1-02 Civil Affairs are the designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized trained and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs activities and to support Civil Military Operations Often these Civil Affairs personnel have unique skills doctors veterinarians urban planners wastewater engineers etc They bring these skills often from civilian job experiences to the combat zone to help friendly forces handle similar problems with the civilian populace The identifying characteristic of Civil Military Operations Civil Affairs that differentiates it from Inform and Influence Activities is one of purpose focus and specialization Civil Military Operations Civil Affairs is focused squarely and only on the local populace and on the creation of favorable civil considerations in which military operations can occur In fact any military operation that involves interaction with the civilian population can be considered Civil Military Operations By specialization Civil Affairs forces focus on issues such as infrastructure governance agriculture health and human services and finance In contrast Inform and Influence Activities is an integrating function focusing on all audiences influencing the operational environment It recognizes the power of Civil Military Operations to contribute to the commander's overall inform and influence effort and harmonizes this contribution in with other capabilities such as Military Information Support Operations Public Affairs and Soldier and leader engagement Put another way all Civil Military Operations inform and influence the local population in some manner but not all Inform and Influence Activities efforts are Civil Military Operations For more information on Civil Affairs Operations see FM 41-10 Special Technical Operations The Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations IJSTO process is an option when addressing Inform and Influence Activities problem sets identified by the staff A staff submits an ISTO request when traditional information-related capabilities will not successfully accomplish the desired end state The staff will request assistance through established staff channels and procedures for planning Currently Special Technical Operations billets exist in Division and higher echelons in order to support these planning and execution requests and attempt to fill the gap between traditional information-related capabilities and special problem sets When requesting Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations support it is important to focus on the problem end state and not specific capabilities or desired effects Because of the sensitive nature of Special Technical Operations capabilities the staff needs to keep in mind that Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations support is a complicated and thorough process The Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations process involves many agencies to develop the concept of operations and acquire authorization and typically requires an average of ninety days Unless concepts and authorizations are already established staffs of Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations should not typically consider such requests for time-sensitive event planning Commander designated Capabilities other Commander designated capabilities other are determined during the operations process The operations process aids the commander and staff to decide what other capabilities not specified as an information-related capability could be used to support inform and or influence lines of effort The Commander's Role The operational environment yields a high and often decisive impact to the side which best leverages the information environment Success requires commanders to focus attention to inform and influence activities throughout operations Commanders incorporate cultural 76 Back to Table of Contents awareness relevant social and political factors and other informational aspects related to the mission in their understanding and visualization of the end state and throughout operational design Commanders clarify effects they intend to achieve through their guidance and intent Commanders ensure the IIA officer and staff identify those relevant audiences and actors and then integrate and synchronize themes messages and actions to achieve the desired perceptual or behavioral effects for each Finally commanders understand the advantages of building partner capacity in this critical mission area through their promotion of informational activity and capability by with and through host-nation forces Updated October 2011 77 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 78 Back to Table of Contents Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine At the time this primer was released several key USMC IO documents were under review revision or development Marine Corps Order 3120 10A Marine Corps Information Operations Program Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40 4 MAGTF IO and the USMC IO Concept of Operations All documents are projected to be signed during FY 2012 Key documents • Marine Corps Order 3120 10 Marine Corps Information Operations Program MCIOP 30 June 2008 • Marine Corps Information Operations Center Concept of Operations for Information Operations Support to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 19 June 09 Key doctrinal documents • MCWP 3-40 4 MAGTF Information Operations 9 Jul 2003 • MCWP 3-40 6 Psychological Operations April 2005 Beginning revision in Nov 2011 • Other documents • Marine Corps Order 3432 1 THE MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SECURITY OPSEC PROGRAM • Marine Corps Bulletin 5400 CH1 CMC Washington DC CDI TFSD 122025Z AUG 11 Activation of the MARCOR Information Operations Center MCIOC Phase Two and Three Fundamental changes in the global environment have created conditions in which the traditional military activity of Information Operations IO will serve a critical role in achieving operational and tactical level objectives that have potential to impact our military strategy and national security objectives The Marine Corps IO Program MCIOP will build the Marine Corps' capability and capacity to plan execute and access IO in order to create an operational advantage for the commander by affecting relevant target audiences Tasks outlined in the MCIOP support a desired end state that IO will be an essential part of routine operations in the expeditionary and joint environments IO actions will be integrated and synchronized across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force MAGTF Command Element CE MAGTF Major Subordinate Elements MSEs other USMC discreet capabilities Fires EW Cyber etc as well as higher and adjacent headquarters 79 Back to Table of Contents Principles • IO is an integral function of the MAGTF • MAGTF IO is focused on the objective • The MAGTF commander's intent and concept of operations determine target audiences and objectives • MAGTF IO must be synchronized and integrated with those of the higher and adjacent commands • MAGTF IO is supported by the total force • A coherent IO concept of operations integrates all of the MAGTF's capabilities and activities • Intelligence support is critical to the planning execution and assessment of IO Information Operations in Support of the Expeditionary Middle-weight Force Marine Corps IO support maneuver warfare through the integration coordination and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a target audience's behavior in order to create an operational advantage for the commander Information operations enhance the ability of the MAGTF to project power during peace and war They complement and facilitate the traditional use of military force and in some instances may obviate the need for application of kinetic capability if synchronized correctly IO supports the integration of situational awareness operational tempo influence and power projection to achieve advantage IO is a critical integrating function that augments the warfighting functions of command and control C2 fires maneuver logistics intelligence and force protection IO is not simply another arrow in the MAGTF commander's quiver it is an overarching philosophy that makes the bow stronger Current DOD and USMC doctrine expands the traditional list of informationrelated capabilities to include any and all MAGTF capabilities that have effects in the physical information and cognitive dimensions of the information environment IO conducted by MAGTFs support battle space shaping force enhancement and force protection activities MAGTFs will execute IO to enable and enhance their ability to conduct military operations consistent with the Marine Corps' capstone concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare EMW Future development and integration of IO in the USMC will focus on integrating discreet capabilities in an amphibious and austere environment to achieve the commander's desired end state IO capability will also be shaped to allow the MAGTF access to national level resources and other service components when necessary IO can increase strategic agility by utilizing the reach back capability via MAGTF and Amphibious C4I systems thus allowing the MAGTF to draw upon information sources outside its area of operations IO can extend operational reach through informational and media activities that unify power projection with influence projection IO can increase tactical flexibility by providing the MAGTF commander with a range of both lethal and nonlethal options Finally IO can enhance support and sustainment by enabling power projection against distant targets without increasing the MAGTF's footprint ashore Staff Responsibilities • The G-3 S-3 is responsible for IO The future operations FuOps section in conjunction with the MAGTF Fires and Effects cell is responsible for overseeing the planning and coordination of the IO effort The MAGTF IO officer within G-3 S-3 FuOps is responsible for • The broad integration and synchronization of IO efforts • Responding directly to the G-3 S-3 for MAGTF IO 80 Back to Table of Contents • • • • • • Participating as a member in the operational planning team OPT during all phases of planning to ensure coordinated operations Preparing the IO appendix to the operation order OPORD Directing the efforts of core IO cell personnel as well as liaisons from external agencies Ensuring that all IO matters are coordinated within the MAGTF staff higher headquarters and external agencies Coordinating and supporting IO activities of subordinate commands Providing direct input to both the targeting and intelligence cycles established by the staff Information Operations Cell The IO cell is a task-organized group established within a MAGTF and or higher headquarters to integrate information-related capabilities A fully functioning IO cell will plan for monitor the execution of and assess the effects of IO across all MAGTF operations The cell will accomplish this through extensive planning and coordination among all the elements of the staff i e IO working group The size structure and placement of the IO cell within the staff are tailored to meet the mission and commander's intent Intelligence and Information Operations Integration of intelligence into the Information Operations Cell is critical to the planning execution and assessment of IO This critical integration must begin at the earliest stage of the planning effort Information operations planners must understand that limited intelligence resources legal constraints long lead times and the dynamic nature of the information environment have an effect on integration timelines Successful execution of IO requires an in-depth understanding of the information environment physical information and cognitive dimensions as well as socio-cultural awareness of the operating environment The intelligence needed to affect adversary or other target audience decisions often requires specific sources and methods to be positioned and employed over a long period of time to collect and analyze the needed information In order to effectively engage the intelligence system the IO staff should clearly articulate intelligence requirements so that the G-2 S-2 staff can effectively work on behalf of the IO staff The IO staff should establish relationships with the G-2 S-2 staff that will facilitate successful IO planning and execution initiatives Information-related Capabilities IO is an integrating function across the entire MAGTF capability set Some of the elements of IO are more offensive defensive or informational in nature but it is their integration into the overall concept of operations that ensures successful employment of IO in support of the MAGTF USMC IO doctrine does not seek to own each capability instead it seeks to integrate and coordinate each of the capabilities when their synchronized effects provide an operational advantage Summary MAGTF Commanders and Marines naturally understand IO are important in today's operating environment and are frequently aware of the second- and third-order effects of their actions and the perceived messages those actions may convey It is the goal of the MCIOP to enhance this understanding with knowledge to support MAGTF commanders and Marines on the ground with the appropriate personnel equipment and resources and to integrate and synchronize Marine actions information and communications to accomplish the MAGTF mission For more information contact Mr James McNeive at 703-784-5826 DSN 273 or email at jmcneive@mcia osis gov Updated October 2011 81 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 82 Back to Table of Contents Navy Information Operations Doctrine Key doctrine and tactics techniques and procedures • • • • • NWP 3-13 Navy Information Operations June 2003 in revision NTTP 3-13 1 Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning April 2008 NTTP 3-13 2 Navy IO Warfare Commander's Manual May 2006 in revision Other key TTP • NTTP 3-51 1 Navy Electronic Warfare Feb 06 • NWP 3-53 Navy Psychological Operations • NTTP 3-54 MCWP 3-40-9 Operations Security Mar 09 • NTTP 3-58 1 Multi-Service Military Deception Planners Guide April 2007 • NTTP 3-58 2 Navy Military Deception April 2009 • NTTP 3-51 2 Multi-Service Reprogramming at Sea of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems January 2007 in revision • NWP 3-63 Navy Computer Network Operations Vol 1 April 2008 • NWP 3-63 Navy Computer Network Operations Vol 2 Sep 2008 • NTTP 3-13 6 Countering Counter Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Targeting in development • NTTP 3-51 3 Communications Electronic Attack in development • TM 3-01 1-07 Integrated HardKill and Softkill Tactics in Antiship Missile Defense • NTTP 2-02 1 Strike Group and Unit Level Cryptologic Operations NWPs NTTPs TACMEMOs and CONOPS are available at the Navy Doctrine Library System link http www nwdc navy smil mil Summary of Navy Information Operations Doctrine and Concepts • • • NWP 3-13 Navy Information Operations is in revision The effects of the establishment of USCYBERCOM and the supporting FLEET CYBER COMMAND are not currently reflected in Navy IO TTP and CONOPS and are not addressed in this summary When NWP 3-13 is completed the new document can be found at the Navy Doctrine Library System link http www nwdc navy smil mil Introduction The United States has experienced a shift from strictly symmetric or force-on-force warfare to more asymmetric warfare and military operations Many of today's adversaries rely primarily on operations such as terrorism disinformation and propaganda campaigns to circumvent or undermine U S and allied strengths and exploit friendly vulnerabilities Future Navy forces will continue to face adversaries outside the generally accepted force-on-force environment of the past Naval forces are challenged by asymmetric operations in all domains—surface subsurface air ground and cyberspace—and must therefore defend against defeat deny or negate the capabilities that will be used to prevent U S freedom of access Information 83 Back to Table of Contents Operations IO is applicable across the range of military operations e g supporting major combat operations global war on terrorism etc in support of the Navy operating concept Furthermore the Navy must provide IO capabilities organizational structures planning processes and personnel to maritime headquarters MHQs joint force maritime component commanders JFMCCs engaged in theater security cooperation plans TSCPs and or combat operations that enable our forces to engage in the asymmetric domain Rapid advances in information technology provide today's military with unparalleled abilities to collect process and disseminate information Technological advances have also increased the commander's vulnerability as a target for adversary information collection shaping and attack IO will continue to play a key role by allowing the Navy and its partners to dominate warfare in the maritime domain Operations within this domain include controlling the sea conducting operational maneuvers throughout the world deterring aggression through forward presence and influence operations in peacetime responding to crisis conducting major combat operations and complementing other instruments of national power by projecting power from the sea directly and decisively influencing events ashore Core Capabilities of Information Operations IO was established as a warfare area within the Navy with the goal of affecting accuracy usability timeliness completeness or relevance of information used in guiding and conducting operations IO includes electronic warfare EW computer network operations CNO military information support operations MISO military deception MILDEC and operations security OPSEC Supporting capabilities of IO include physical attack physical security information assurance public affairs PA combat camera visual information civil-military operations legal affairs meteorology intelligence and oceanography This is Navy IO at its most fundamental level and could consist of a wide almost unbounded array of weapons within the core supporting and related capabilities above IO is an integral part of the Navy planning and targeting process that continues through the range of military operations see Figure 1 From guiding effects-based planning in the earliest stages to the weaponeering assessment phase of the targeting cycle IO planners can assist in determining the right mix of maneuver and kinetic nonkinetic weapons that will produce the commander's desired effect In addition to offering nonkinetic options to traditional strike warfare IO plans often require the use of strike group maneuvers concentration of forces and presence kinetic strikes and special operations warfare to deny disrupt destroy or degrade information systems to attain overall campaign objectives While each capability of IO includes a specialized planning process and can be applied to military operations individually their coordinated application maximizes friendly advantages 84 Back to Table of Contents Information Operations Fundamentals Figure 1 Range of Military Operations Integrating IO Information Superiority Information superiority embodies the ability to collect process and disseminate the correct information to the right person at the right place and time in the right form while denying an adversary the ability to do the same Network-centric operations can foster information superiority by networking sensors decisionmakers and shooters The goal of using networkcentric operations is to increase mission effectiveness in order to achieve an increased state of readiness This superiority contributes to the ability to project maritime power forward from the sea and ultimately in all warfighting domains IO supports information superiority by corrupting deceiving delaying denying disrupting degrading or destroying one of the dimensions of information before it is presented to the adversary's commander while protecting the same friendly information dimensions Enabled through FORCENet discussed later information superiority is achieved through effects-based approach to operations maritime power projection maritime influence target development and environmental awareness and shaping EAS All echelons and warfare areas strive for and plan to achieve and maintain information superiority through coordinated efforts among the operations intelligence and command control communications and computers C4 and knowledge management Effects-Based Approach to Operations An effects based approach to operations focuses on improving the commander's ability to affect an adversary's behavior and or capabilities through the integrated application of select instruments of national power diplomatic information military economic Effects are created to achieve objectives and are characterized as the physical and or behavioral state of political military economic social infrastructure and information systems An effects-based approach seeks to develop a commonly shared understanding of the operational environment to provide the commander with a more comprehensive picture of the challenges and the best balance of capabilities to shape the environment The three main elements within an effects-based approach to operations are as follows 85 Back to Table of Contents 1 Visualizing the operational environment beyond the traditional military battlespace as an interconnected system-of-systems comprised of friends adversaries and the unaligned 2 Integrating military actions with those of other instruments of national power 3 Assessing system behaviors and capabilities and effects attainment in addition to task accomplishment Maritime Power Projection No one can predict with certainty the future security environment but emerging trends require that the Navy focus on littorals and the land beyond The Navy must remain expeditionary in nature controlling the sea and moving around the globe to support U S national interests The vision for the future is a Navy and Marine Corps team that will maintain a robust and credible forward presence These forces provide a framework that complements other instruments of national power to build stability and favorably shape areas overseas Forward presence combined with knowledge superiority within the environment will achieve the ultimate objective—maritime power projection—projecting U S power and influence from the sea directly and decisively influencing events ashore Maritime Influence Naval forces deployed or stationed in areas overseas demonstrate our national resolve strengthen alliances and dissuade potential adversaries IO provides significant support to maritime influence operations during the phases of planning and assessment U S naval forces will protect and use information to influence adversaries advance friendly objectives and shape the operating environment to our advantage With an effects based approach to operations maritime influence coordinates the employment of maritime activities to affect the attitudes and behaviors of an intended audience in support of commander objectives With the goal of advancing U S interests maritime influence activities may include actions to deter adversaries reassuring allies and friends sending signals of U S interest and fostering good will Target Development Warfighters win engagements and wars when the adversary makes a decision—based on knowledge derived from true or perceived information—to surrender due to an inability to obtain desired objectives A comprehensive assessment of the adversaries and friendly abilities and functions within the operational environment provide the first step into developing targets Friendly forces design all campaign plans to influence the adversary to make such a decision The people and systems that comprise the information grids filter and process the information upon which the commander bases decisions and therefore require defending as part of IO planning Target development includes nodes that have an impact on the adversary decision making process which may include command and control systems communications and weapon systems and other situation awareness tools Environment Awareness and Shaping EAS describes the functions performed by organizations to ensure that despite the wide range of nonlethal and lethal means at the disposal of adversaries or potential adversaries friendly forces are consistently capable of conducting decisive operations and achieving desired results at a minimal loss to friendly forces The commander uses EAS to identify protect and leverage critical information systems emissions transmissions and operational indicators to achieve and maintain information superiority Environment awareness equates to knowledge of the operational environment This knowledge resulting from the fusion of key elements of information allows the commander and staff to correctly anticipate future conditions assess changing conditions establish requirements and priorities and exploit emerging opportunities while mitigating the impact of unexpected adversary actions Environment shaping is the conscious action of molding the environment to prevent conflicts or placing U S interests in a favorable position It involves the continual process of developing evaluating and revising the 86 Back to Table of Contents force operational profile within the environment providing all warfare commanders with critical planning and execution support to ensure that missions are conducted with the least risk to friendly assets Navy Information Operations Employment Concept Sea Power 21 describes future naval operations that will use information superiority and dispersed networked force capabilities to deliver effective offensive power defensive assurance and operational independence to joint force commanders To support Sea Power 21 the Navy's focus is to integrate and align IO to support all levels of operations At the strategic level national leadership and regional commanders will use IO to achieve national theater shaping and influencing objectives Regional commanders will integrate Navy IO capabilities with other services other U S government departments and agencies and partner nations as part of their theater security cooperation plans TSCP At the operational level IO supports campaign major operational objectives by providing information superiority through shaping and controlling the information environment At this level the focus of IO is control of adversary lines of communication logistics information command and control and related capabilities and activities while protecting the friendly information environment At the tactical level Navy IO will make full use of the core capabilities to dominate the information environment for the commander At this level IO will be used to tactically influence adversaries or deny destroy or degrade systems critical to the adversary's conduct of operations The following key organizational concepts are being implemented to affect the operational model summarized in Figure 2 • Maritime Headquarters IO Cell References NTTP 3-32 1 Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center NTTP 313 1 Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning April 2008 The MHQ IO Cell contributes to the shaping of the environment to enable tactical units to successfully execute assigned tasks The IO Cell coordinates with the other maritime headquarters staff cells i e horizontally and with the IO cells of the other components and other government agencies through the joint force commander's IO staff i e vertically The IO cell works with elements of both the current operations cell the future operations FOPS cell and the Plans cell Emphasis has been placed on the flexibility and scalability of Navy maritime headquarters MHQs with maritime operations centers MOC designed to perform normal and routine operations Fleet commanders will establish global MHQ-MOC's to serve geographic areas of responsibility and may have additional JFMCC responsibilities The MHQ-MOC performs the fleet management and command and control C2 role at the Navy operational-level of command across the range of military operations ROMO More importantly the MHQ-MOC performs the roles of planning directing monitoring and assessing the integration and synchronization of Joint Maritime Force operational missions as outlined in the Navy operating concept The MHQ-MOC organizes staff roles and responsibilities by integrating warfighting functions C2 intelligence movement and maneuver fires sustainment and protection across staff functions Thus the assessment and long-range planning functions are joined in a future plans center and short term planning is performed in the future operations and current operations cells of the operations center A MHQ-MOC is able to integrate staff actions horizontally and vertically simultaneously conducting service and joint operations through the MOC and the fleet management functions by leveraging specialized fleet management staff elements The MHQ-MOC has the capability to fulfill various roles including Commander Joint Task Force 87 Back to Table of Contents CJTF Joint Force Maritime component commander JFMCC and naval component commander NCC Both the MOC and fleet management elements of the staff are supported by a third component consisting of shared support elements that provide personnel processes and systems that affect operations and fleet management functions • Strike Group Level - The IO Warfare Commander IWC The IO Warfare Commander IWC assigned to each strike group is responsible for the protection of assigned forces against hostile information information systems and electronic attacks as well as hostile propaganda and deceptive techniques The IWC maintains the tactical IO picture and is responsible to the force commander for establishing force posture for emissions control EMCON information conditions INFOCON spectrum management and maintaining a favorable tactical situation TACSIT The IWC supports all force plans and evolutions while coordinating with theater and joint task force JTF IO planners Levels of Operations Strategic National and Theater National Security Strategy Objectives to Support Goals Include… Application of Navy IO Include… Implementation of longterm national and theater shaping and theater security cooperation plans TSCPs Influence nations potential adversaries decision makers globally or in a specific region s Support diplomacy stabilize regions and assure allies Deter war Support intelligence preparation of the environment and shape environment to U S advantage CCDR MHQ and JFMCC when assigned will use IO to support TSCPs through presence coordination with public affairs port calls multination exercises peace operations and support to strategic communications Demonstrate that the U S is engaged in the region and can project power Decisively defeat adversary ability to control forces Shape and control information environment Use spectrum of IO core capabilities to conduct or support force application deny adversary intelligence surveillance reconnaissance ISR and command control communications computers C4 Support information superiority Protect friendly information environment and physical domain The MHQ use IO in continuing strategic roles plus applying Navy IO capabilities and weapons to engage adversary C4 and ISR and MISO to influence adversary forces and populations Directly support conduct of joint or maritime operations power projection Support information superiority for the joint force commander Control information environment and physical domain by influencing disrupting or corrupting adversarial human and automated decisionmaking Strike Group commander effectively using forces to achieve commander's assigned tasks Coordinated use of EW MISO MILDEC CNO OPSEC capabilities embedded in Navy forces Control tactical information environment and physical domain Disrupt adversary operations Undermine adversary ability and will to fight Disrupt adversary C4 ISR and defensive systems Protect the naval joint battle force During initial phases of a campaign Navy strike groups may have the preponderance of tactical IO assets Strike Group commander via the IO warfare commander will use IO to support MHQ objectives and other tactical operations Achieve maintain decision superiority control tactical information environment and physical domains achieves operational objectives of the MHQ and tactical objectives of the strike group commander Key Goals Include… National Guidance Military Strategy Theater Strategy Campaign Plans Operational Subordinate Campaign Plans Major Operations Tactical Operational Orders and OPTASKS Battles Engagements Impact of Navy IO… Demonstrate that the U S military can project power anywhere in region Prepare intelligence baseline for future ops Shape positive perception of U S actions Figure 2 Operational Model Updated October 2011 88 Back to Table of Contents Air Force Information Operations Doctrine Key doctrinal documents AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations 15 July 2010 AFDD 3-13 Information Operations 11 January 2005 AFDD 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare Operations 5 November 2002 AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations 23 December 2010 AFDDs are available at http www e-publishing af mil Information below is valid as of September 2011 However at the time of printing the Information Operations Primer for AY12 Air Force doctrine documents are being revised which may result in some changes to Air Force Information Operations doctrine This section reflects the currently published doctrine Excerpts of Air Force Doctrine - AFDD 3-13 Forward The Air Force recognizes the importance of gaining a superior information advantage—an advantage obtained through information operations IO fully integrated with air space and cyberspace operations Today gaining and maintaining information superiority are critical tasks for commanders and vital elements of fully integrated kinetic and nonkinetic effects-based operations Information operations are conducted across the range of military operations from peace to war to reconstitution To achieve information superiority our understanding and practice of information operations have undergone a doctrinal evolution that streamlines the focus of IO to improve the focus on warfighting The framework of information operations groups the capabilities of influence operations electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations according to effects achieved at the operational level Each of these capabilities are separate and distinct capabilities that when combined and integrated can achieve effects greater than any single capability Integrated Control Enablers ICE is a term used to define what was formerly expressed as information-inwarfare or IIW As our understanding of IO has advanced we have come see that ICE are not IO but rather the gain and exploit capabilities that are critical to all air space and information operations This framework reflects the interactive relationship found between the defend attack and the gain exploit capabilities in today's Air Force 89 Back to Table of Contents Foundational Doctrine Statements Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which AFDDs are built • • • • • • • • • • Information operations IO are integral to all Air Force operations and may support or be supported by air space and cyberspace operations The thorough integration of kinetic and nonkinetic air space and information capabilities provides the Air Force with a comprehensive set of tools to meet military threats The Air Force defines information superiority as the degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect control exploit and defend information without effective opposition Decision superiority is about improving our capability to observe orient decide and act OODA loop faster and more effectively than the adversary Decision superiority is a relationship between adversary and friendly OODA loop processes The three IO capabilities—influence operations electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations—while separate and distinct when linked can achieve operationally important IO effects Effective IO depends on current accurate and specialized integrated control enablers ICE to provide information from all available sources Information operations conducted at the operational and tactical levels may be capable of creating effects at the strategic level and may require coordination with other national agencies IO should be seamlessly integrated with the normal campaign planning and execution process There may be campaign plans that rely primarily on the capabilities and effects an IO strategy can provide but there should not be a separate IO campaign plan IO applications span the spectrum of warfare with many of the IO capabilities applied outside of traditional conflict IO may offer the greatest leverage in peace pre-conflict transition-to-conflict and reconstitution Air Force IO may be employed in non-crisis support or military operations such as humanitarian relief operations HUMRO noncombatant evacuation operations NEO or counterdrug support missions where Air Force elements are subject to asymmetric threats that could hinder operations or place forces at risk IO presents additional challenges in effects-based planning as there are many variables Many of these variables have human dimensions that are difficult to measure may not be directly observable and may also be difficult to acquire feedback 1 – The Nature of Information Operations General Information operations are the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence operations electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations in concert with specified integrated control enablers to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own Information operations provide predominantly nonkinetic capabilities to the warfighter These capabilities can create effects across the entire battlespace and are conducted across the spectrum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace Information superiority is a degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect control exploit and defend information without effective opposition Information superiority is a critical part of air space and cyberspace superiority which gives the commander freedom from attack freedom to maneuver and freedom to attack Information operations are integral to all Air Force operations and may support or be supported by air space and cyberspace operations IO therefore must be integrated into air space and cyberspace component operations in the same manner as traditional air space and cyberspace capabilities 90 Back to Table of Contents Warfare in the Information Age Warfare in the information age has placed greater emphasis on influencing political and military leaders as well as populations to resolve conflict Information technology IT has increased access to the means to directly influence the populations and its leaders IT has distributed the process of collection storage dissemination and processing of information The Air Force goal is to leverage this technology to achieve air space cyberspace and information superiority and to be able to operate in a faster decision cycle decision superiority than the adversary Decision superiority is a competitive advantage enabled by an ongoing situational awareness that allows commanders and their forces to make better-informed decisions and implement them faster than their adversaries can react Decision superiority is about improving our ability to observe orient decide and act OODA loop faster and more effectively than the adversary Joint Vision 2020 describes it as better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react or in a non-combat situation at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission Decision superiority is a relationship between adversary and friendly OODA loop processes Decision superiority is more likely to be achieved if we plan and protect our OODA loop processes in conjunction with analyzing influencing and attacking the adversary's The Information Environment The information environment can be modeled as the interaction of the physical information and cognitive domains as shown below This model provides a means to understand the IO environment It also provides a logical foundation for the IO capabilities of influence operations network warfare operations and electronic warfare operations All activities in the physical environment have effects in the cognitive environment Electronic warfare operates in the electromagnetic spectrum although it creates effects across the range of the IO operating environment Network warfare operations are focused on the information domain which is composed of a dynamic combination of hardware software data and human components Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders groups or entire populations The means of influencing can be physical informational or both The cognitive domain is composed of separate minds and personalities and is influenced by societal norms thus the cognitive domain is neither homogeneous nor continuous 91 Back to Table of Contents Societies and militaries are striving to network this information domain with the objective of shortening the time it takes for this distributed observe orient decide and act process to occur It also allows us to automate certain decision processes and to build multiple decision models operating simultaneously In essence the information domain continues to expand New technology increases our society's ability to transfer information as well as an adversary's opportunity to affect that information Information operations are not focused on making decision loops work IO focuses on defending our decision loops and influencing or affecting the adversary's decisions loops This integration of influence network warfare and electronic warfare operations to create effects on OODA loops is the unifying theme of IO Whether the target is national leadership military C2 or an automated industrial process how the OODA process is implemented provides both opportunities and vulnerabilities The three IO capabilities—influence operations electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations—while separate and distinct when linked can achieve operationally important IO effects In addition effective IO depends on current accurate and specialized integrated control enablers ICE to provide information from all available sources The thorough integration of kinetic and nonkinetic air space cyberspace and information capabilities provides the Air Force with a comprehensive set of tools to meet military threats Influence Operations Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders groups or entire populations Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors protect operations communicate commander's intent and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary's decision cycle which aligns with the commander's objectives The military capabilities of influence operations are military information support operations MISO military deception MILDEC operations security OPSEC counterintelligence CI operations counterpropaganda operations and public affairs PA operations Public affairs while a component of influence operations is predicated on its ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences Network Warfare Operations Network warfare operations are the integrated planning employment and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected analog and digital network portion of the battlespace Network warfare operations are conducted in the information domain through the combination of hardware software data and human interaction Networks in this context are defined as any collection of systems transmitting information Examples include but are not limited to radio nets satellite links tactical digital information links TADIL telemetry digital track files telecommunications and wireless communications networks and systems The operational activities of network warfare operations are network attack NetA network defense NetD and network warfare support NS Electronic Warfare Operations Electronic warfare operations are the integrated planning employment and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the electromagnetic domain in support of operational objectives Electronic warfare operates across the electromagnetic spectrum including radio visible infrared microwave directed energy and all other frequencies It is responsible for coordination and deconfliction of all friendly uses of the spectrum air land sea and space as well as attacking and denying enemy uses For this reason it is an historically important coordinating element in all operations especially as current and future friendly uses of the electromagnetic spectrum multiply The military capabilities of electronic warfare operations are electronic attack electronic protection and electronic warfare support 92 Back to Table of Contents Integrated Control Enablers Information operations like air space and cyberspace operations are reliant on the integrated control enablers ICE ICE includes intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR network operations NetOps predictive battlespace awareness PBA and precision navigation and timing PNT Information operations are highly dynamic and maneuverable The transition between the find fix track target engage and assess F2T2EA phases can be nearly instantaneous The ICE components support this interactive relationship and strive to provide commanders continuous decision-quality information to successfully employ information operations 2 – Influence Operations General Influence operations are employment of capabilities to affect behaviors protect operations communicate commander's intent and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain They should influence adversary decision-making communicate the military perspective manage perceptions and promote behaviors conducive to friendly objectives This is accomplished by conveying selected information and indicators to target audiences shaping the perceptions of target decision-makers securing critical friendly information protecting against espionage sabotage and other intelligence gathering activities and communicating unclassified information about friendly activities to the global audience Military Information Support Operations Focused on the cognitive domain of the battlespace MISO targets the mind of the adversary In general MISO seeks to induce influence or reinforce the perceptions attitudes reasoning and behavior of foreign leaders groups and organizations in a manner favorable to friendly national and military objectives MISO supports these objectives through the calculated use of air space cyberspace and IO with special emphasis on psychological effects-based targeting Military Deception Military deception capabilities are a powerful tool in military operations and should be considered throughout the operational planning process Military deception misleads or manages the perception of adversaries causing them to act in accordance with friendly objectives Operations Security Operations security is an activity that helps prevent our adversaries from gaining and exploiting critical information OPSEC is not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation it is a methodology that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to the adversary Critical information consists of information and indicators that are sensitive but unclassified OPSEC aims to identify any unclassified activity or information that when analyzed with other activities and information can reveal protected and important friendly operations information or activities Counterintelligence The Air Force Office of Special Investigations AFOSI initiates conducts and or oversees all Air Force counterintelligence investigations activities operations collections and other related CI capabilities Counterintelligence is defined as information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage other intelligence activities sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof foreign organizations or foreign persons or international terrorist activities AFOSI supports influence operations through CI operations designed to detect destroy neutralize exploit or prevent espionage activities through identification manipulation deception or repression of the adversary Public Affairs Operations Commanders conduct PA operations to assess the information environment in areas such as public opinion and to recognize political social and cultural shifts Public affairs operations are a key component of informational flexible deterrent options and 93 Back to Table of Contents build commanders' predictive awareness of the international public information environment and the means to use information to take offensive and preemptive defensive actions in Air Force operations Public affairs operations are the lead activity and the first line of defense against adversary propaganda and disinformation Falsehoods are easily identified when the truth is well known Public affairs operations are accomplished through four core tasks media operations internal information community relations and strategic communication planning Counterpropaganda Operations The Air Force defines counterpropaganda operations as activities to identify and counter adversary propaganda and expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces situational understanding They involve those efforts to negate neutralize diminish the effects of or gain an advantage from foreign psychological operations or propaganda efforts Supporting Activities Influence operations are most successful through the seamless integration of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities Influence operations may be supported and enhanced by physical attack to create or alter adversary perceptions Influence operations require support from many Air Force capabilities to include tailored ISR combat camera operations and cultural expertise 3 – Network Warfare Operations Network warfare operations NW Ops are the integration of the military capabilities of network attack NetA network defense NetD and network warfare support NS The integrated planning and employment of network warfare operations along with electronic warfare operations EW Ops influence operations and other military capabilities are conducted to achieve desired effects across the information domain Network Attack Network attack NetA is employment of network-based capabilities to destroy disrupt corrupt or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks Networks include telephony and data services networks Additionally NetA can be used to deny delay or degrade information resident in networks processes dependent on those networks or the networks themselves A primary effect is to influence the adversary commander's decisions Network Defense Network defense NetD is employment of network-based capabilities to defend friendly information resident in or transiting through networks against adversary efforts to destroy disrupt corrupt or usurp it NetD can be viewed as planning directing and executing actions to prevent unauthorized activity in defense of Air Force information systems and networks and for planning directing and executing responses to recover from unauthorized activity should it occur Network Warfare Support Network warfare support NS is the collection and production of network related data for immediate decisions involving NW Ops NS is critical to NetA and NetD actions to find fix track and assess both adversaries and friendly sources of access and vulnerability for the purpose of immediate defense threat prediction and recognition targeting access and technique development planning and execution in NW Ops 4 – Electronic Warfare Operations General Electronic warfare EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to manipulate the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary The Air Force describes electronic warfare operations EW Ops as the integrated planning employment and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the electromagnetic domain in support of operational objectives The EW spectrum is not merely limited to radio frequencies but also includes optical and infrared regions as well EW assists air and space forces to gain access and operate without prohibitive interference from adversary 94 Back to Table of Contents systems and actively destroys degrades or denies opponents' capabilities which would otherwise grant them operational benefits from the use of the electromagnetic spectrum Electronic Warfare Operations EW is a key contributor to air superiority space superiority and information superiority The most important aspect of the relationship of EW to air space and information operations is that EW enhances and supports all operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict Air Force EW resources and assets may take on new roles in support of operations as the electronic warfare operation mission evolves The three military capabilities of EW operations are electronic attack EA electronic protection EP and electronic warfare support ES All three contribute to air and space operations including the integrated IO effort Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is gained by protecting friendly systems and countering adversary systems Electronic attack EA is the division involving the use of electromagnetic directed energy DE or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel facilities or equipment with the intent of deceiving disrupting denying and or destroying adversary combat capability It also deceives and disrupts the enemy integrated air defense system IADS and communications as well as enables the destruction of these adversary capabilities via lethal strike assets Electronic protection EP enhances the use of the electronic spectrum for friendly forces Electronic protection is primarily the defensive aspect of EW that is focused on protecting personnel facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or adversary employment of electronic warfare that degrade neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability Electronic warfare support ES the collection of electromagnetic data for immediate tactical applications e g threat avoidance route selection targeting or homing provides information required for timely decisions involving electronic warfare operations 5 – Information Operations Planning and Execution Information operations are integral to military operations and are a prerequisite for information superiority IO supports and may also be supported by air space and cyberspace operations and needs to be planned and executed just like air operations IO should be seamlessly integrated with the normal campaign planning and execution process There may be campaign plans that rely primarily on the capabilities and effects an IO strategy can provide but there should not be a separate IO campaign plan One of the commander's priorities is to achieve decision superiority over an adversary by gaining information superiority and controlling the information environment This goal does not in any way diminish the commander's need to achieve air space and cyberspace superiority but rather facilitates efforts in those areas and vice versa The aim of information superiority is to have greater situational awareness and control than the adversary Effective use of IO leads to information superiority The effort to achieve information superiority depends upon two fundamental components an effects-based approach and well-integrated IO planning and execution accomplished by IO organizations Effects-Based Approach The ability to create the effects necessary to achieve campaign objectives whether at the strategic operational or tactical levels is fundamental to the success of the Air Force An effect is the anticipated outcome or consequence that results from a particular military operation The emphasis on effects is as crucial for successful IO as for any other airpower function Commanders should clearly articulate the objectives or goals of a given military operation Effects should then flow from objectives as a product of the military operations designed to help achieve those objectives Based on clear objectives planners should design specific operations to achieve a desired outcome and then identify the optimum capability for achieving that outcome It is important to realize that operational assessment may 95 Back to Table of Contents be more challenging in IO because the effects are often difficult to measure IO may also be based upon common sense a rule of thumb simplification or an educated guess that reduces or limits the search for solutions in domains that are difficult or poorly understood For example psychological effects are not only difficult to measure they may also not manifest themselves until later in time There are also second-order and third-order effects that should be taken into consideration and again these may not manifest themselves until much later IO presents additional challenges in effects-based planning as there are many variables Many of these variables also have human dimensions that are difficult to measure may not be directly observable and may also be difficult to acquire feedback At all times objectives must be set and effects must be analyzed from the point of view of the culture where operations are being conducted Information Operations Organizations A number of Air Force organizations contribute to effective IO The following discuss several of the key organizations employed in information operations Information Warfare Flight IWF IO can be conducted throughout the spectrum of peace and conflict In peacetime the major command numbered air force MAJCOM NAF IWF is the operational planning element for IO and may coordinate IO actions when an air operations center AOC has not been activated When the AOC is activated a portion of the IWF is established as an IO team and integrates into the warfighting divisions within the AOC Strategy Plans ISR Combat Operations etc The IO team provides the IO expertise to plan employ and assess IO capabilities prior to the initiation of hostilities transition to conflict and reconstitution EW Ops Organizations Electronic warfare is conducted by units with capabilities ranging across the electronic attack protect and support functions EW operations require attention before during and after military operations A joint EW coordination cell EWCC is the necessary planning and execution organization to orchestrate the activities of units to achieve EW objectives of the campaign plan Network Defense and Network Operations Organizations NetD and NetOps organizations provide the JFC with critical capabilities to realize the effects of information and decision superiority Collectively these organizations provide varying degrees of NetD and NetOps support They provide commanders with real-time intrusion detection and perimeter defense capabilities network management and fault resolution activities data fusion assessment and decisions support During employment the organizations are arranged into a three-tiered operational hierarchy which facilitates synchronized application of their collective capabilities in support of the DOD's defense-in-depth security strategy 6 – Integrated Control Enablers Information operations are dependent on integrated control enablers The integrated control enablers are critical capabilities required to execute successful air space and information operations and produce integrated effects for the joint fight These include intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR network operations NetOps predictive battlespace awareness PBA and precision navigation and timing PNT Network Operations and Information Assurance NetOps encompasses information assurance IA system and network management and information dissemination management The Air Force and joint community have come to recognize these pillars as information assurance and network defense enterprise service management network management and content staging information dissemination management respectively NetOps consists of organizations procedures and functionalities required to plan administer and monitor Air 96 Back to Table of Contents Force networks in support of operations and also to respond to threats outages and other operational impacts Information assurance comprises those measures taken to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability integrity authenticity confidentiality and nonrepudiation ability to prove sender's identity and prove delivery to recipient IA spans the full lifecycle of information and information systems IA depends on the continuous integration of trained personnel operational and technical capabilities and necessary policies and procedures to guarantee continuous and dependable information while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute these vital services following disruptions of any kind whether from an attack natural disaster equipment failure or operator error In an assured information environment warfighters can leverage the power of the information age Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Global integrated ISR is cross-domain synchronization and integration of the planning and operation of ISR assets sensors processing exploitation and dissemination systems and analysis and production capabilities across the globe to enable current and future operations ISR is a critical function that helps provide the commander the situational and battlespace awareness necessary to successfully plan and conduct operations Commanders use the intelligence information derived from ISR assets to maximize their own forces' effectiveness by optimizing friendly force strengths exploiting adversary weaknesses and countering adversary strengths Predictive Battlespace Awareness Effective IO depends upon successful PBA As a maturing concept PBA is the understanding of the operational environment that allows the commander and staff to correctly anticipate future conditions assess changing conditions establish priorities and exploit emerging opportunities while mitigating the impact of unexpected adversary actions Air Force Pamphlet 14-118 PBA results from combining intelligence preparation of the operational environment IPOE ISR planning and synchronization and ISR management into a coherent framework that maximizes the capabilities of ISR assets in all environments IPOE is the analytical process used by intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the commander's decisionmaking process It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment describing the impact of the operational environment evaluating the adversary and determining adversary courses of action Precision Navigation and Timing Precision navigation and timing provided by space-based systems enable IO by providing the ability to synchronize and guide IO force application to create effects across the battlespace Note End of AFDD 3-13 extract Updated September 2011 97 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 98 Back to Table of Contents III ORGANIZATIONS This section includes a description of the following organizations • Department of State • National Agencies • Department of Defense • Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions • Service Information Operations Organizations 99 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 00 Back to Table of Contents Department of State Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs The Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Ann S Stock leads America's public diplomacy efforts which seek to better understand inform and influence foreign publics The Department of State's wide-ranging outreach activities include communications with international audiences cultural programming academic grants educational and professional exchanges and U S government efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism These functions are indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy Public diplomacy field operations are carried out by more than 1000 public diplomacy officers based in over 200 embassies consulates and other missions abroad The Office of the Under Secretary has defined five strategic imperatives for 21st Century Public Diplomacy 1 2 3 4 5 Shape the narrative Better inform policy making Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships Deploy resources in line with current U S government foreign policy priorities Combat violent extremism The Under Secretary directly supervises three bureaus International Information Programs Educational and Cultural Affairs and Public Affairs Within the Under Secretariat the Office of Policy Planning and Resources focuses on the Department of State's long-range public diplomacy strategic policy planning and management of resources A Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications was created in 2010 as an interagency collaboration to counter violent extremist propaganda The Under Secretary also is the Administration's voting representative on the Broadcasting Board of Governors the executive agency that directs American civilian international broadcasting Voice of America RFE RL Radio Marti Radio Sawa Al Hurra and other radio and television programming aimed at foreign audiences 1 Office of Policy Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs R PPR Reporting directly to the Under Secretary R PPR provides long-term strategic policy planning and coordination within the Department and with the interagency community for public diplomacy and public affairs programs It also advises the Under Secretary on the allocation of resources appropriated by Congress for the conduct of public diplomacy and public affairs in order to focus those resources on the most urgent national security objectives 2 Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications R CSCC With support from DoD the Intelligence Community and other interagency partners the State Department established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications CSCC The CSCC is housed within the Under Secretariat reporting directly to Acting U S Stock It coordinates orients and informs U S government-wide communications regarding 101 Back to Table of Contents terrorism and violent extremism with international audiences to counter the al-Qaida narrative and radicalization of at-risk communities 3 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs ECA ECA fosters mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries It does this in close cooperation with embassies and consulates abroad through academic cultural and professional exchanges as well as presenting U S history society art and culture in all of its diversity to overseas audiences The bureau manages the prestigious Fulbright Scholars program as well as the International Visitor Leadership Program Many alumni of these programs have gone on to become heads of state heads of government government ministers and leaders in their fields Youth exchanges English teaching programs work-study exchanges and university-to-university linkages are other programs that reach out to the next generation of leaders and promote mutual understanding and support for U S foreign policy ECA awards millions of dollars in grants to American organizations for specific initiatives while public diplomacy officers in the field have authority to grant funds to host nation institutions NGO's and individuals in support of strategic imperatives 4 Bureau of International Information Programs IIP By providing international strategic communications for the foreign affairs community IIP informs engages and influences international audiences about U S policy and society to advance America's interests IIP programs move beyond policy dissemination and broadcasting to meaningful sustained interaction with audiences around the world through social media foreign language websites publications new technologies and subject matter experts who are recruited to interact with foreign audiences through digital video conferences in-country speaking engagements lectures and face-to-face discussions The bureau runs six regional outreach offices to provide training in new media and packaged content for overseas posts IIP also supports over 700 American Spaces around the world ranging from the traditional American Center to its newest high-tech media platform The bureau is prohibited from disseminating its products to the U S domestic audience by the SmithMundt Act and amendments 5 Bureau of Public Affairs PA PA helps Americans understand U S foreign policy and the importance of foreign affairs by responding to press inquiries holding press briefings hosting town meetings and other conferences around the United States arranging local regional and national newspaper radio television and social media interviews with key Department officials and providing audio-visual products and services The bureau coordinates closely with press offices in the National Security Council Department of Defense and other agencies to ensure consistency in public affairs messages on foreign policy and conducts a daily press briefing for U S and international media accredited to the Department Transcripts are posted daily The bureau includes the office of the Department's spokesperson who usually accompanies the Secretary of State on travel The bureau also maintains the State Department public website at http www state gov and a telephone information line 202-647-6575 for public inquiries In addition the Office of the Historian provides historical research and advice for the Department of State and publishes the official documentary history of U S foreign policy Website http www state gov r Updated October 2011 102 Back to Table of Contents The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications CSCC was established in September 2010 to coordinate orient and inform government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations with particular focus on al-Qa'ida and associated movements CSCC is based in the Department of State and operates under the broad policy direction of the White House with interagency personnel and support CSCC Coordinator Ambassador Richard LeBaron reports to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and works closely with the Secretary of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism S CT other Department of State bureaus and other government agencies Staffed by officers from multiple government agencies and the military CSCC is comprised of two interactive components The Integrated Analysis component leverages the Intelligence Community academics and other substantive experts to provide context and feedback for communicators The Plans and Operations component leverages this input to devise effective ways to counter terrorist narratives and misinformation in collaboration with U S embassies and consulates interagency partners and outside experts CSCC's operations also include the work of the CSCC Digital Outreach Team DOT which challenges and counters extremist messages online in Arabic and Urdu including through original video content The DOT will add capacity in Somali in the near future In her speech in New York marking the 10th anniversary of 9 11 Secretary Clinton highlighted the mission of CSCC noting that it is tightly focused on undermining the terrorist propaganda and dissuading potential recruits The center is housed at the State Department but is a true whole-of-government endeavor It has a mandate from the President And as part of this effort a group of tech savvy specialists – fluent in Urdu and Arabic – that we call the Digital Outreach Team are contesting online space media websites and forums where extremists have long spread propaganda and recruited followers With timely posts often of independent news reports this team is working to expose al-Qa'ida's and extremists' contradictions and abuses including its continuing brutal attacks on Muslim civilians President Obama on September 9 2011 signed Executive Order 13584 that assigns specific responsibilities and functions to the Center in order to reinforce integrate and complement public communications efforts across the executive branch that are 1 focused on countering the actions and ideology of al-Qa'ida its affiliates and adherents and other international terrorist organizations and violent extremists overseas and 2 directed to audiences outside the United States This collaborative work among executive departments and agencies brings together expertise capabilities and resources to realize efficiencies and better coordination of U S Government communications investments to combat terrorism and extremism In addition the Executive Order established an interagency steering committee to provide advice to the Secretary of State on the operations and strategic orientation of CSCC and to ensure adequate support for it The Executive Order also created a temporary support office as 103 Back to Table of Contents a mechanism to facilitate the development of CSCC as it further implements whole-ofgovernment public communications activities directed at audiences abroad through personnel with relevant expertise detailed from other agencies assistance services and other support Updated October 2011 104 Back to Table of Contents National Agencies National Security Agency NSA National Security Agency Central Security Service NSA CSS Introduction The National Security Agency Central Security Service NSA CSS is the home to America's codemakers and codebreakers The National Security Agency has provided timely information to U S decision makers and military leaders for more than half a century The Central Security Service was established in 1972 to promote a full partnership between NSA and the cryptologic elements of the armed forces NSA CSS is unique among the U S defense agencies because of our government-wide responsibilities NSA CSS provides products and services to the Department of Defense the Intelligence Community government agencies industry partners and select allies and coalition partners In addition we deliver critical strategic and tactical information to war planners and war fighters Executive Order No 12333 dated 4 December 1981 as recently amended July 2008 describes the responsibilities of the NSA CSS in more detail The resources of the NSA CSS are organized for the accomplishment of two national missions The Signals Intelligence SIGINT mission allows for an effective unified organization and control of all foreign signals collection and processing activities of the U S The NSA CSS is authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with the objectives and priorities established by the Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Foreign signals collection is a Title 50 United States Code USC authority given to the Director NSA CSS The Information Assurance IA mission provides the IA and Computer Network Defense CND solutions services and conducts Defensive Information Operations DIO in order to protect information processed by U S national security systems The intent is to measurably improve the security of critical operations and information by providing know-how and technology to our suppliers partners and clients when and where they need them The NSA CSS's IA mission is authorized by National Security Directive 42 The NSA CSS is America's cryptologic organization It produces foreign signals intelligence and performs highly specialized activities to protect U S Government national security information systems A high technology organization the NSA CSS is on the frontiers of communications and data processing It is also one of the most important centers of foreign language analysis and research within the U S Government It is said to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the U S and perhaps the world Its mathematicians design cipher systems 105 Back to Table of Contents that search for weaknesses in adversaries' systems codes and that protect the integrity of U S systems SIGINT is a unique discipline with a long and storied past Its modern era dates to World War II when the U S broke the Japanese military code and learned of plans to invade Midway Island This intelligence allowed the U S to defeat Japan's superior fleet The use of SIGINT is believed to have directly contributed to shortening the war by at least one year Today SIGINT continues to play an important role in keeping the United States a step ahead of its enemies The IA mission becomes increasingly more challenging as the world becomes more technologyoriented IA professionals go to great lengths to make certain that Government systems remain impenetrable The NSA CSS supports the highest levels of the U S Government to the war fighter The NSA CSS conducts one of the U S Government's leading Research and Development R D programs Some of the Agency's R D projects have significantly advanced the state of the art in the scientific and business worlds The NSA CSS's early interest in cryptanalytic research led to the first large-scale computer and the first solid-state computer predecessors to modern computing The NSA CSS also made ground-breaking developments in semiconductor technology and remains a world leader in many technological fields Technology and the world change rapidly and great emphasis is placed on staying ahead of these changes with employee training programs The National Cryptologic School is indicative of the Agency's commitment to professional development The school not only provides unique training for the NSA workforce but it also serves as a training resource for the entire Department of Defense DoD The NSA CSS sponsors employees for bachelor and graduate studies at the Nation's top universities and colleges and selected Agency employees attend the various war colleges of the U S Armed Forces Most NSA CSS employees both civilian and military are headquartered at Fort Meade Maryland centrally located between Baltimore MD and Washington DC Its workforce represents an unusual combination of specialties analysts engineers physicists mathematicians linguists computer scientists researchers as well as customer relations specialists security officers data flow experts managers administrative officers and clerical assistants SIGINT Mission The NSA CSS collects processes and disseminates foreign SIGINT The old adage that knowledge is power has perhaps never been truer than when applied to today's threats against our nation and the role SIGINT plays in overcoming them The NSA CSS's SIGINT mission protects the nation by Providing information in the form of SIGINT products and services that enable our government to make critical decisions and operate successfully Protecting the rights of U S citizens by adhering to the provisions of the 4th amendment to the Constitution and Using the nation's resources responsibly according to the best management processes available Other Intelligence Community IC agencies are responsible for other types of intelligence Central Intelligence Agency CIA - Human Intelligence HUMINT Defense Intelligence Agency – HUMINT and Measurement and Signature Intelligence MASINT and National Geospatial Agency NGA – Imagery Intelligence These different yet complementary disciplines give our nation's leaders a greater understanding of the intentions of our adversaries 106 Back to Table of Contents The NSA CSS's SIGINT mission provides our military leaders and policy makers with intelligence to ensure our national defense and to advance U S global interests This information is specifically limited to that on foreign powers organizations or persons and international terrorists The NSA CSS responds to requirements levied by intelligence customers which includes all departments and levels of the U S Executive Branch of Government The prosecution of the SIGINT mission has evolved from the relatively static industrial age Cold War communications environment to the ubiquitous high speed multi-functional technologies of today's information age The ever-increasing volume velocity and variety of today's communications make the production of relevant and timely intelligence for military commanders and national policy makers more challenging than ever As much as modern telecommunications technology poses significant challenges to SIGINT the many languages used in the nations and regions of the world that are of interest to our military and national leaders require the NSA CSS to maintain a wide variety of language capabilities Successful SIGINT depends on the skills of not only language professionals but those of mathematicians analysts and engineers as well The nation is indebted to them for the successes they have won IA Mission IA is one of the two core missions of the NSA CSS The Information Assurance Directorate IAD is dedicated to providing IA solutions that will keep U S national security systems safe from harm IA refers to the measures intended to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability integrity authentication confidentiality and non-repudiation This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection detection and reaction capabilities The IAD's mission involves detecting reporting and responding to cyber threats making encryption codes to securely pass information between systems and embedding IA measures directly into the emerging DoD's Global Information Grid GIG It includes building secure audio and video communications equipment making tamper protection products and providing trusted microelectronics solutions It entails testing the security of customers' systems providing Operations Security OPSEC assistance and evaluating commercial software and hardware against nationally set standards to better meet our nation's needs The IAD's mission has evolved through three very distinct stages Communications Security COMSEC Information Systems Security INFOSEC and IA Following World War II and the Korean War efforts focused primarily on cryptography i e designing and building encryption devices to provide confidentiality for information COMSEC is defined as the measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications COMSEC includes cryptographic security transmission security emission security and physical security of COMSEC material In the 1980s the introduction and widespread use of computers created new demands to protect information exchanges between interconnected computer systems This demand created the Computer Security COMPUSEC discipline However the community recognized that stand-alone COMSEC and COMPUSEC activities could not protect information during storage processing or transfer between systems This recognition gave rise to the term INFOSEC and the information protection mission took on a broader perspective INFOSEC is defined as the protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information whether in storage processing or transit and against the denial of service to 107 Back to Table of Contents authorized users including those measures necessary to detect document and counter such threats In the 1990s IA emerged and focused on the need to protect information during transit processing or storage within complex and or widely dispersed computers and communication system networks IA also includes a dynamic dimension where the network architecture is itself a changing environment including the information protection mechanisms and features that detect attacks and enable a response to those attacks IA measures protect against the exploitation or penetration efforts routinely conducted by sophisticated adversaries but also protect against hackers or criminals from creating havoc across layered domains Today IA incorporates more than just the need for confidentiality achieved through the use of encryption products that the NSA CSS produces or certifies IA also includes the DIO elements that protect and defend information and information systems The Director of the National Security Agency Central Security Service a four-star military position is dual-hatted as the Commander U S Cyber Command Contact Information NSA Visiting Professor U S Army War College 717 245-4727 Website http www nsa gov Updated October 2011 108 Back to Table of Contents Department of Defense This section includes a description of the following organizations • Under Secretary of Defense – Policy USD P • Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Communication Planning and Integration CPI • Department of Defense Chief Information Officer DoD CIO • Defense Information Systems Agency DISA • Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center IATAC 109 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 10 Back to Table of Contents Under Secretary of Defense – Policy USD P Mission The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is to consistently provide responsive forward-thinking and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense in alignment with national security objectives USD Policy PDUSD P Principal Deputy ASD International Security Affairs ASD Asian Pacific Security Affairs ASD Homeland Defense Americas' Security Affairs ASD Global Security Affairs ASD SO LIC Interdependent Capabilities The responsibilities of the USD P include but are not limited to the following • • • • Represent the Department of Defense as directed in matters involving the National Security Council NSC the Department of State and the other Federal Departments Agencies and inter-Agency groups with responsibility for national security policy Serve as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee serve as a member of the Deputies Committee for Crisis Management and advise the Secretary of Defense on crisis prevention and management including contingency planning for major areas of concern Develop DoD policy guidance provide overall supervision and provide oversight of planning programming budgeting and execution of special operations activities including civil affairs and psychological operations and of low-intensity conflict activities including counter-terrorism support to insurgency and contingency operations Develop policy and provide oversight for emergency planning and preparedness crisis management defense mobilization in emergency situations military support to civil authorities civil defense and continuity of operations and government Develop policy and coordinate DoD participation in and exercise staff supervision over special activities special access programs sensitive support to non-DoD agencies and the joint worldwide reconnaissance schedule The roles and responsibilities of the Principal Deputy and the five Assistant Secretaries are described below Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – Provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national security policy military strategy and defense policy The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs – Serves as the principal advisor to the USD P and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the Middle East and Africa their governments and defense establishments and for oversight of security cooperation programs and foreign military sales programs in these regions 111 Back to Table of Contents The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs – Serves as the responsible official for U S security and defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs – Oversees the operations of the following offices • • • Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Defense Support to Civil Authorities DSCA Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Crisis Management and Mission Assurance The responsibilities of the ASD for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs and these three offices can be found at http policy defense gov hdasa index aspx The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs – Oversees the operations of the following offices • • • • Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict – Serves as the principal civilian advisor to the USD P and the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters The ASD SO LIC 's principal duty is the overall supervision to include oversight of policy and resources of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities These core tasks according to USSOCOM's 2007 Posture Statement include counterterrorism unconventional warfare direct action special reconnaissance foreign internal defense civil affairs information and psychological operations and counter-proliferation of WMD In addition to policy oversight for special operations and stability operations capabilities ASD SO LIC has policy oversight for strategic capabilities and force transformation and resources This includes oversight of capability development to include general-purpose forces space and information capabilities nuclear and conventional strike capabilities and missile defense As such ASD SO LIC after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary will be the principal official charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the senior management of the Department of Defense The following offices fall under the ASD for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities • • • Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism DASD SOCT Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations Based on a front-end assessment ordered by the Secretary of Defense USD P assumed the functions of the Principal Staff Advisor PSA to the Secretary for information operations IO in early 2011 In addition USD P undertook an expanded role in DoD's strategic communications 112 Back to Table of Contents SC policy As a result of this realignment and expansion the following actions have taken place • • The personnel and resources that support DoD IO activities have moved from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD I to the USD P This resulted in the establishment of a new IO Directorate under the DASD SOCT who reports to the ASD SOLIC Through the Senior Director of the IO Directorate the USD P will exercise oversight of all DoD IO activities USD I continues to support IO as the SecDef's PSA for intelligence counterintelligence and security The USD P now co-chairs the Global Engagement Strategic Communications Committee GESCC with the ASD for Public Affairs The GESCC is the Department's SC coordination body that reviews DoD activities for consistency with national directives and represents DoD on Interagency SC matters Website http policy defense gov Updated October 2011 113 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 14 Back to Table of Contents Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration CPI Background Overview The rapid pace of evolution in the global information environment requires the Department of Defense DoD in conjunction with other U S Government USG departments and agencies to develop and constantly improve strategic communication SC processes particularly by exploring innovative approaches and cross-agency integration of best practices and what works At its most basic SC is the orchestration of actions images and words to achieve desired effects SC is the process of coordinating horizontally across DoD and the USG as well as with international partners when appropriate and vertically up and down the chain of command to • • • • • Close the say-do gap Consider information and communication as part of strategy planning and policy development from the very beginning Assess communication impacts of actions before taking actions Consider soft power capabilities equally with more traditional DoD kinetic capabilities when determining the optimum course of action and Integrate issues of audience and stakeholder perception into policy-making planning and operations at every level SC planning goes beyond a single operation or bilateral engagement focusing on the region operating environment and globe It's also less about sending a message and more about engagement More than ever efforts to listen to and understand different perspectives and cultures must be deliberately planned and integrated into the decision cycle of all diplomats and joint force commanders to ensure America's future success Doctrine SC comprises the focused processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and strategic objectives by coordinating actions and information synchronized with other elements of national power Revised definition submitted for inclusion in JP 5-0 update SC is a natural extension of strategic direction and supports the President's strategic guidance the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy SC planning establishes unity of US themes and messages emphasizes success accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals This is an interagency effort which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships JP 5-0 The USG uses SC processes to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations but SC is addressed throughout the planning process at all levels – from strategic to tactical – to align regional or functional end states with broader policy goals SC is an enabling function that guides and informs actions within organic processes e g Joint Operational Planning imbedded within existing structures Within the Pentagon the primary functions involved in the SC synchronization process include Strategy and Plans Policy Information Operations IO Military Information Support Operations MISO Defense Support to Public Diplomacy DSPD Military Diplomacy MD Public Affairs PA Civil Affairs CA Legislative Affairs and Operations with many supporting components – all working together to accomplish military objectives that support national objectives Public diplomacy is the purview of the Department of State DoS but DoD provides direct support through DSPD and MD and most DoD's efforts and activities overseas have direct diplomatic and public diplomacy impacts Both Pentagon and combatant command COCOM 115 Back to Table of Contents staffs coordinate continually with DoS and U S embassies around the world to ensure that DoD and DoS efforts are integrated mutually supportive and achieve national objectives DSPD and MD encompass a wide variety of activities and engagement programs that influence opinions and perceptions of foreign publics and militaries Some examples of DSPD include Military Information Support Teams MISTs that provide direct support to US embassies and news and informational websites in target audience native languages in several theaters Additionally planned humanitarian assistance programs as well as disaster relief operations have public diplomacy impacts Examples of MD include formal bilateral programs between DoD and the Ministry of Defense of another nation DoD civilian and military senior leader engagement with their counterparts in other nations and mil-to-mil engagement and joint training programs between U S units and foreign military units Note DoS does not use SC as an overarching concept but rather recognizes SC as parallel and sometimes synonymous to Public Diplomacy PD The Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs have generally used Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication or SC and PD Mission CPI formerly known as DASD JC was created in December 2005 to assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs ASD PA in shaping DoD-wide processes policy doctrine organization and training of the primary communication supporting capabilities particularly public affairs and visual information CPI has assumed many of the strategic communication planning responsibilities and functions previously performed by the Strategic Communication Integration Group SCIG Secretariat disbanded in early 2008 CPI leads communication planning and integration on strategic issues and mid- to long-range efforts to ensure that communication plans and strategies are coordinated and synchronized across the Department and with other USG agencies and that ASD PA equities are represented to maximize DoD's capability to communicate in an aggressive and synchronized manner Communication planning and integration activities focus on issues trends and objectives of broad scope and importance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS the COCOMs the Military Services and other government departments CPI facilitates vertical and horizontal coordination integration and synchronization of planning efforts across DoD and among USG departments It also focuses on how best to inform educate and persuade key audiences on significant issues Finally it aims to capture aggregate and share knowledge developed by COCOMs and others CPI is the principal advisor to the ASD PA on and representative to the Building Partnership Capability Portfolio Management BP CPM process especially Joint Capability Area JCA Tier 2 Communicate and communication-related issues in the Quadrennial Defense Review QDR Composition CPI consists of a group of strategic planners each with responsibility for support to a number of COCOMs and or Services the office works in direct coordination with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy OUSD P and with the Joint Staff primarily the office of the Deputy Director for Information and Cyberspace Policy under the Director Strategic Plans and Policy J-5 DDICP Representatives from these offices plus the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence OUSD I and others regularly convene as a Global Engagement Strategy Coordinating Committee GESCC at the DoD level and key members also participate in the SC Interagency Policy Committee IPC at the NSC level Reporting Responsibilities CPI supports the OUSD P in operational and interagency matters and represents and reports to the ASD PA Updated October 2011 116 Back to Table of Contents Department of Defense Chief Information Officer DoD CIO Overview The DoD CIO is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on information technology which includes national security systems NSS information resources management IRM command and control C2 communications radio frequency spectrum information systems information assurance IA cyber security and positioning navigation and timing PNT Vision To deliver agile and secure information capabilities to enhance combat power and decision making Mission Information is one of our Nation's greatest sources of power The first and greatest goal of the DoD CIO is to deliver that power to enable the achievement of mission success in all operations of the Department warfighting business and intelligence Responsibilities and Functions The DoD CIO will a Develop DoD strategy and policy on the operation and defense of all DoD IT and information systems b Serve as the Agency Chief Information Officer for the Department of Defense with the responsibilities duties and qualification pursuant to section 11315 of title 40 United States Code U S C Reference c and the additional responsibilities pursuant to section 2223 of title 10 U S C Reference d c Serve as the Chief Information Officer for the Department of Defense with the responsibilities pursuant to section 3506 of title 44 U S C Reference e related to Federal Information Policy d Serve as DoD lead for DoD defensive cyber security operations e Lead and oversee strategic human capital planning for the DoD IT and information assurance defensive cyber security workforce f Serve as DoD lead for DoD communications and information networks g Direct manage and provide policy guidance and oversight for the C2 and communications needs of the President and national security leadership h Serve as DoD lead for DoD spectrum management i Serve as DoD lead for positioning navigation and timing PNT requirements j Serve as DoD lead for Command and Control C2 k Lead core IT infrastructure and enterprise-wide IT initiatives Headquarters The headquarters for the DoD CIO organization is in the Pentagon with staff elements both in the Pentagon and in nearby office buildings in Arlington VA Website http cio-nii defense gov Updated October 2011 117 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 18 Back to Table of Contents Defense Information Systems Agency DISA Mission DISA a Combat Support Agency engineers and provides command and control capabilities and enterprise infrastructure to continuously operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support to joint warfighters National level leaders and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations Vision Leaders enabling information dominance in defense of our Nation DISA – An Operational Focus DISA is a Combat Support Agency with an operational focus providing joint and combined warfighting information technology capabilities The agency's priority is to operate a core information infrastructure of networks computing centers and enterprise services Internet-like information services that connect 4 300 locations reaching 90 nations supporting Department of Defense and national interests Engineering acquisition testing and contracting functions support the incremental and modular improvements to this infrastructure as well as day-to-day maintenance and sustainment requirements Responsive and effective delivery of information solutions capabilities is dependent upon on a cohesive lifecycle management process – a single execution arm accountable for all aspects of design engineering acquisition implementation sustainment and operation This tightly coupled integration results in improved interoperability reliability availability expandability and recoverability of the enterprise infrastructure reducing costs at the same time as capability and capacity are increased Currently DISA is that execution arm synchronizing this continuous lifecycle and feedback process to deliver mission critical capabilities to the Department of Defense Agency Core Missions • • • • • Global Communications Services – Terrestrial Satellite transport and voice video data Enterprise Computing Services – Hosting Joint Applications Enterprise Services Defense Enterprise Services – Internet-like information services e g discovery and collaboration Mission Assurance Services – Protection of Infrastructure Information Command and Control Information Sharing – Situational awareness decision making Agency Special Missions • • • • • • Enterprise Wide Systems Engineering – Making the GIG work end to end White House Communications – Information support to the President Joint Testing – Interoperability and operational testing Defense Spectrum – National and Department of Defense Solutions Joint Staff Support Center – Information support to National Military Command Center NMCC and Joint Staff leadership Defense IT Contracting – IT contracting and procurement services 119 Back to Table of Contents • National Senior Leadership and Nuclear Command Control and Communications – Wired and wireless transport with voice video and services Overview of DISA's 2011-12 Campaign Plan http www disa mil About Our-Campaign-Plan Organizational structure http www disa mil about organization index html Website http www disa mil Updated September 2011 120 Back to Table of Contents Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center IATAC http iac dtic mil iatac IATAC is an Information Assurance IA Center of Excellence that is your one-stop shop for free products and services We offer a free four-hour Technical Inquiry TI research service free research materials and other products and services IATAC is also a contract vehicle that allows all Department of Defense DoD and federal agency customers to sponsor organizationspecific critical IA Research and Development R D efforts In its history IATAC has performed IA and cybersecurity R D on over 400 DoD and federal contracts The resulting scientific and technical information from these contracts is shared and reused among the Defense Technical Information Center DTIC customers through DTIC Online Access Control DOAC - http www dtic mil dtic announcements DOAC html where DTIC customers can perform their own independent research Mission The Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center IATAC is one of ten Department of Defense Information Analysis Centers IACs sponsored by DTIC - http www dtic mil dtic a field operating agency under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering ASD R E - http www acq osd mil chieftechnologist index html The other IACs provide similar products and services in their functional areas IATAC's mission is to provide DoD a central point of access for IA and cybersecurity to include emerging technologies in system vulnerabilities R D models and analysis to support the development and implementation of effective defense against information warfare attacks Free Products and Services All of the following products and more are available for free from the IATAC web site via a simple product request form an email iatac@dtic mil telephone call 703-984-0775 or via subscription • • • A free four-hour Technical Inquiry research service to answer authorized users' most pressing IA cybersecurity questions To answer these and other critical IA cybersecurity questions IATAC relies on its extensive Subject Matter Expert SME network which includes retired senior military leaders leading academic researchers and industry executives who have contributed significantly to the advancement of IA and cybersecurity Our SME's can help find answers to your particularly difficult questions Past inquiries have included have there been any interesting developments in balancing information sharing with information security requirements what is Google Voice how is it used and why is or why is it not better than other similar products what database security tools are currently used across the federal government and are there any government or defense organizations that use Ruby on Rails Free State of the Art Reports SOARs on the following IA topics Security Risk Management for the Off-the-Shelf Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Measuring Cybersecurity and Information Assurance IA Insider Threat and Software Security Assurance Also available is a tools report database that contains information on a wide range of intrusion detection vulnerability analysis firewall applications and anti-malware tools 121 Back to Table of Contents • • A quarterly newsletter IAnewsletter that provides timely IA and cybersecurity articles and An IA and cybersecurity early-bird called the IADigest What is an Authorized User Any DoD or federal government employee with a mil or gov email address and industry academia or contractor staff that register with DTIC Where is all this information Register for DOAC Additional IA and cybersecurity information and information from the other nine DoD IACs that is available through DTIC via registration includes millions of scientific and technical documents across a wide spectrum of topics from DOAC http www dtic mil dtic announcements DOAC html as well as standard wiki collaboration and information from DoD Techipedia - https www dodtechipedia mil dodwiki Registration is extremely easy for users possessing a Common Access Card CAC Management and Direction of IATAC Operations IATAC operates under the direction of DTIC with technical assistance provided by a government Executive Steering Committee The committee is made up of 17 Senior IA and cybersecurity professionals from government academia and the DoD R D community They include representation from the Department of Homeland Security DHS Office of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Information Assurance Program DIAP U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM National Security Agency NSA Naval Postgraduate School NPS and other OSD offices to name a few The Executive Steering Committee meets once a year and provides recommendations to the IATAC Contracting Officer Representative COR and the DoD IAC Program Management Office PMO regarding IATAC's operations particularly the information management collection analysis and dissemination efforts Additionally the Executive Steering Committee analyzes which IA topics are of greatest interest to the IA community and makes recommendations on topics for SOARs and technical reports that IATAC researches and produces based on these analyses Background On 14 July 2011 the Honorable William J Lynn III Deputy Secretary of Defense gave a speech at the National Defense University outlining the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace He stated Because cyberspace is composed of many interwoven networks that perform many different functions ensuring its peaceful use will require efforts on many fronts The men and women of the military other government agencies our allies the private sector and indeed the citizens of cyberspace must all play a role Since its inception IATAC has facilitated the sharing of IA and cybersecurity information across these groups in an effort to advance cyberspace protection The United States is vulnerable to information events and even information warfare activities and this is exacerbated by the prolific use of information systems and computing networks across all four elements of power—economic diplomatic political military and informational As a result IA and cybersecurity professionals must be cognizant of the tenants of IA and cybersecurity—confidentiality integrity availability authentication and non-repudiation Recent advances in information technology have made information systems easier to use less expensive and more available Often ease of use comes at the expense of security so we must be proactive in our security approach Technologies such as cloud computing and mobile communications coupled with the unknowns in the supply chain related to the products services and components of all hardware and software only compound the already overly complex environment Throw in the diverse nature of all federal government DoD organizations state and local organizations and the many 122 Back to Table of Contents industry and academic partners interfacing with all of these and the situation demands a central information resource IATAC is that resource The protection of DoD information systems and the automated systems that further our national objectives are of supreme importance to our national interest IATAC provides a central repository for a wide range of IA and cybersecurity data methodologies models and analyses of emerging technologies relating to the five tenants of IA and cybersecurity—confidentiality integrity availability authentication and non-repudiation Our focus is R D for the warfighter and we work closely with the PEO PM and acquisition communities as well as others IATAC's analysis extends across policy doctrine and strategy development to R D science and technology engineering and architecture as well as operations and training This spectrum of activities ensures that management collection analysis and dissemination of a broad and growing library of scientific and technical information STI related to IA and cybersecurity and the reuse of available STI to authorized users will continue IATAC serves to help synchronize the IA and cybersecurity communities' efforts across the full spectrum of IA activities Location and Contact Information IATAC 13200 Woodland Park Road Herndon VA 20171 Phone 703 984 0775 FAX 703 984 0773 E-mail iatac@dtic mil Website iac dtic mil iatac Updated October 2011 123 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 24 Back to Table of Contents Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions The section includes a description of the following organizations • Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations DDGO • Joint Spectrum Center JSC • Joint Public Affairs Support Element JPASE • Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC • U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM • U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM • U S Special Operations Command USSOCOM • Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program • Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School 125 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 26 Back to Table of Contents Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations DDGO J39 Mission The Deputy Director for Global Operations DDGO J-39 is responsible to the Director for Operations DJ-3 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS for providing expertise and advice in coordinating joint global operations to include information operations IO The DDGO is responsible for IO activities developing joint IO policy and doctrine and coordinating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense SecDef combatant commands Services Defense Agencies other staff directorates the Intelligence Community and interagency on IO issues actions In addition the DDGO is the focal point for all Special Technical Operations STO As of 1 October 2011 The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC became a Chairman-controlled activity CCA under the supervision of the DJ-3 CCAs are specialized organizations designed to address unique areas that are of joint interest The JIOWC supports the Joint Staff and combatant commands in DOD efforts to integrate joint information-related capabilities The Director JIOWC reports to the DJ-3 via the J-39 Organization The DDGO contains five IO focused divisions The Computer Network Operations Division CNOD advises the SecDef and CJCS through the DJ-3 on Computer Network Operations Additionally CNOD provides analyses and recommendations for the integration and synchronization of global cyberspace operations including defense exploitation and attack network operations NETOps and information assurance cyber security CNOD also supports Combatant Commands COCOMS to meet Combatant Commander requirements and interfaces with the U S Government Interagency on operational employment and deconfliction of military CNO Specific CNOD activities include • • • • • • Provides operational expertise and operational assessments for Joint Staff issues relating to CNO Represent Joint Staff on the Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Response Coordination Group and other interagency efforts Planning and integration of CNO to support COCOMs through the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System JOPES Representing the Joint Staff at DoD and Interagency working groups as necessary Providing On-call support to the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center and NMCC for Cyberspace issues Providing input and oversight to exercises on the CJCS Exercise List and other major DoD and Interagency exercises with significant CNO activities 127 Back to Table of Contents The Information Operations Division IOD facilitates and coordinates special capabilities and electronic warfare EW for the Chairman in support of all COCOMs SecDef and select interagency partners Additionally IOD educates operators to better plan and employ military Information Operations Some of the tasks performed by IOD are • • • • • • • • • Support to COCOM requirements in EW and STO Coordinate integrate and support COCOM efforts with SecDef and USG policies plans and actions Advocate IO related COCOM issues to the interagency Serves as Joint Staff Advocate for Subject Matter Expert SME for Social Science Modeling Serve as Joint Staff SME for Counter Threat Finance Develop and coordinate Joint IO policy doctrine Coordination w OSD on IO issues and directives IO career force oversight Coordinates joint Operational Security OPSEC requirements Provide OPSEC support to joint force commanders IOD consists of the following branches Combatant Command Support Plans Support Electronic Warfare Intelligence Community Liaisons Strategic Multi-layer Analysis Management IO Policy and Doctrine The Military Information Support Division MISO provides expertise and advice on MISO employment to achieve national strategic and theater military objectives It develops and provides guidance to and coordinates with COCOMs and Services reviews COCOM OPLAN requirements develops concepts and prepares MISO plans develops and coordinates Joint MISO doctrine publishes Joint MISO doctrine and publishes MISO Supplements to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and staff deployment orders Some of the tasks performed by MISO are • • • • Prepare staff and transmit MISO specific execute orders deployment orders and MISO program approval Provide MISO SME to CJCS Joint Staff DoD and United States Government USG Strategic Communication Assist in the development of joint MISO doctrine Serve as National Representative to NATO PSYOP working group MISO consists of the following branches Geographic Combatant Command Support and Program and Doctrine The Special Actions Division SAD has primary responsibility for MILDEC and will work directly with JIOWC Mission Support Division and with the Defense MILDEC Program Office as primary stakeholders to ensure community wide equities are maintained and synchronized The SAD performs the following tasks • • • Develop and coordinate MILDEC joint doctrine publications Serve as the Joint Staff focal point office for the Defense Sensitive Support Program Coordinate all Defense Sensitive Support requirements between OSD and other Government agencies with the Services and Combatant Commanders SAD is composed of the Support Activities Branch and the Tactical Security Branch 128 Back to Table of Contents The Joint Information Operations Center assists the Joint Staff in improving DoD ability to meet COCOM information-related requirements improves development of information related capabilities and ensures operational integration and coherence across COCOMs and other DoD activities • • • • • • Provide combatant commands with the assessment tools and processes needed to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of IO Provide operational support to the Joint Staff military services and DoD agencies to assist in coordinating and integrating DoD IO operational support for joint commanders Facilitate sharing of IO best practices across the joint force Assist in the development of a joint IO force development strategy Support IO Integration and Assessment functions with tailored IO intelligence Support mission activities conducted within special access programs and under alternative compensatory control measures as direct by the Joint Staff The Reconnaissance Operation Division is also in the Information Operations Division with a mission to recommend policy establish procedures and coordinate Secretary of Defense and Presidential approval for Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations worldwide RDO is not an IO focused organization within DDGO Location The DDGO is located in the Pentagon Website http www jcs mil Updated October 2011 129 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 30 Back to Table of Contents Joint Spectrum Center JSC Challenge Military spectrum is a finite resource The high tempo of global military operations and subsequent logistical support strain the already overcrowded spectrum bands Satellite communications and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR platforms including Unmanned Aerial Systems consume large amounts of available spectrum The increased need for added capacity in voice data and video communications create a demand for deliberate and synchronized spectrum operations across the Department of Defense The Joint Spectrum Center is at the forefront of spectrum operations and supports the warfighter by providing complete one-stop spectrum-related services to the military departments and combatant commands Mission To enable effective and efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and control of electromagnetic effects in support of national security and military objectives Major Responsibilities • • • • • • Provide operational support in spectrum matters to the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands for contingencies operations exercises and otherwise as requested Conducts research and development into spectrum efficient technologies to improve the Department's use of spectrum Facilitates global spectrum information exchange by developing protocols standards applications information systems and by influencing national and international spectrum regulations Develops maintains and distributes spectrum engineering and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects E3 analysis models simulations software and data Develops distributes and conducts E3 and spectrum management training courses for DoD Components Provides technical E3 and spectrum engineering support to minimize interference collateral impacts detection or operational restrictions for DoD components JSC Functional Components J3 Operations Division – Provides remote and or deployed spectrum management training and support to the Joint Staff Combatant Commands joint force commanders and intelligence community Spectrum management support consists of spectrum-planning guidance vulnerability analysis environmental analysis and interference resolution Support is available for wartime and contingency operations joint training exercises and for operations other than war such as disaster relief operations J5 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects E3 Engineering Division – Provides E3 engineering support services to ensure optimal performance of military equipment systems and platforms in the operational electromagnetic environment without unacceptable mission 131 Back to Table of Contents degradation Ensure that E3 control and spectrum supportability are addressed during the acquisition process in military standards through training and awareness and the development of analytical tools Provide joint-service ordnance engineering services in the areas of ordnance testing EMI surveys and investigations and participation in joint exercises J8 Applied Engineering Division – Provides technical E3 and spectrum engineering analysis and test support on a customer-funded basis This includes support to DoD and other Federal Government organizations to the private sector when it is in the interest of national defense per 10 U S C 2539b and to foreign entities when authorized by the Foreign Military Sales Process through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency JSB Defense Spectrum Relocation Management Activity DSRMA – Provides technical analysis support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Networks and Information Integration related to the relocation of DoD spectrum-dependent devices out of the 17101755 MHz frequency band DSRMA initiatives include a portal and analysis capability to handle requests from commercial Advanced Wireless Service providers seeking early access to this frequency band and two other projects the Spectrum Management Technology Initiative SMTI and the Spectrum Technology Testbed Initiative STTI The SMTI is focused on improving the mathematical algorithms used by spectrum managers to nominate frequencies to fit new spectrum-dependent devices into increasingly congested spectrum environments especially for systems being relocated The STTI is a federation of spectrum management simulation tools used to test the viability of proposed relocation solutions in a realistic operational environment JSC Operational Support Services and Products Warfighting Unified Combatant Commands and Joint Task Force JTF Commanders services include • • • • • Review of operations plans for spectrum supportability upon request Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution JSIR support through analysis and deployment teams as necessary SPECTRUM XXI software training and joint exercise support Liaison and coordination support to Information Operations IO and Joint Information Operations Center organizations Engineering support to the Joint Staff in Navigational Warfare and CIED matters Communications-Electronics C-E Planning products and services are provided to the Joint Staff Unified Commands JTFs Military Departments Defense Agencies and directly to the warfighter including • • • • • • • • • • • SPECTRUM XXI Frequency Nomination Assignment Allotment Electronic Warfare EW deconfliction Joint Restricted Frequency List JRFL creation and analysis Interference Analysis Propagation Predictions MF-EHF Communication System Performance Prediction Radar Target Acquisition Coverage Prediction Electromagnetic Compatibility Analyses in Support of Frequency Planning Topographical Analyses Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction Planning Preparation Electromagnetic Environment Definition 132 Back to Table of Contents JSIR services are structured to have interference incidents resolved at the lowest possible level of the DoD component chain of command using component organic resources to resolve interference incidents where possible Interference reports are entered and available at www intelink sgov gov sites jsir Those incidents that cannot be resolved locally are referred up the chain of command with resolution attempted at each level If the interference incident cannot be resolved by the affected DoD Component or the service engineering agency responsible for spectrum interference resolution then it is referred to the JSC JSIR office for resolution The JSC JSIR office will analyze and attempt to recommend corrective action for reported interference problems by first using JSC databases and analytical tools and then if needed by providing personnel and equipment to perform on-site direction finding equipment test and problem solution If the assistance is requested for electronic attack incidents the JSC JSIR office will coordinate analysis collection and field support activities with the appropriate agencies The objective of the JSIR Team is to assist with the resolution of recurring EMI The three-step resolution process for EMI events includes 1 Identification verification characterization and reporting 2 Geolocation analysis developing courses of action and corrective recommendations 3 Implementation and notification to user s and final closure reporting action The deployable interference resolution teams have the capability to • • • Identify – through an analytical process using spectrum monitoring equipment man portable and or vehicle mounted capable of capturing frequencies up to 40 GHz Locate – by means of cutting edge Radio Frequency Direction Finding RDF technology utilizing portable mobile and space based systems Analyze - through investigation provided by a multiple resource reach back capability for research by many different RF disciplines to analyze DOD communications systems while providing situational awareness Command and Control C2 -Protect services are provided through each of the following activities • • • • • Provision of databases on friendly force C2 system location and technical characteristics data for use in planning C2-protect The databases cover DoD US government and civil communications as well as radar navigational aids broadcast EW and identification systems The databases are available on a quick reaction basis in a variety of formats and media to meet the needs of IO planners and spectrum managers Assistance to the EW or IO officer in the development of the JRFL The JSC provides an automated tool SPECTRUM XXI to assist in the development and management of the JRFL The JSC has Unified Combatant Command support teams that deploy to the combatant command or JTF The teams are available to prepare the JRFL or provide training and assistance in JRFL preparation These teams are also available to provide assistance in spectrum management matters Assistance in the resolution of operational interference and jamming incidents through the auspices of the JSIR Program Provision of data on communications frequency and location data Production of country studies JSC Country Studies are published on the JSC website in support of Unified Combatant Command requirements Each study provides information on civil telecommunications including frequency management broadcasting telephone data communications aeronautical communications maritime communications and 133 Back to Table of Contents transmission systems Frequency allocations assignments histograms and site location maps are also included The frequency assignment data is provided in a spreadsheet compatible format and in vertical Standard Frequency Action Format SFAF compatible with SPECTRUM XXI Spectrum Regulatory Support services address the growth of commercial wireless services such as Personal Communications Services and has greatly increased the demand for spectrum and increased pressure for the government to relinquish portions of the spectrum to commercial interests Continuing pressure to reallocate portions of the spectrum requires that the DoD have the ability to quickly assess the operational and economic impact of proposed reallocation legislation in order to defend critical DoD spectrum access The JSC draws upon a collection of databases and experience with spectrum management to respond to ad hoc inquiries In addition the JSC is positioned to develop in-depth assessments of various reallocation proposals that will provide all levels of government with the information needed to make responsible reallocation decisions Leadership The command billet of the center O-6 rotates between the Army Air Force and Navy The JSC Commander reports to the Director Defense Spectrum Organization who in turn reports to the DISA Vice Director NIPR Website http www disa mil jsc NIPR email operations@jsc mil SIPR Website http jsc disa smil mil SIPR email JSCOperations@disa smil mil JWICS Website http jsc ic gov JWICS email operations@jsc ic gov Updated October 2011 134 Back to Table of Contents Joint Public Affairs Support Element JPASE Mission The Joint Public Affairs Support Element JPASE trains and maintains a public affairs professional capability to rapidly deploy as a team to assist the combatant commanders The operational teams help to properly disseminate information to the public The goal is for these professionals to provide counsel operational planning and tactical execution of communication strategies as a function of joint military operations in support of national objectives JPASE is located in the Joint Coalition Warfighting Center in Suffolk VA It is a subordinate command of U S Transportation Command's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command JECC JPASE Mission Statement The Joint Public Affairs Support Element JPASE provides a ready rapidly deployable joint public affairs capability to facilitate establishment of joint force headquarters and to bridge capability gaps in response to developing crises or contingency operations JPASE also provides joint public affairs training through participation in the Joint Exercise Program to better enable joint force commanders and their staffs to successfully meet evolving public affairs and information challenges in their respective theaters of operation JPASE is organized to provide direct support to specific combatant command requirements It replaces the former ad hoc method of assembling teams to provide support This new organization facilitates concentration on the particular aspects of geography culture and organization of a specific command while gaining proficiency and understanding of the common operating tools and practices each command employs On order JPASE deploys to the regional Combatant Commands in support of emergent joint operations as a trained equipped and ready joint public affairs force Its first deployment was during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and it has deployed teams to support joint operations twenty times since Twenty three of JPASE's 25 military and civilian personnel drawn from all services are designated to support expeditionary operations Organization JPASE is organized around two objective areas 1 Global Response Force Operations • JPASE provides rapidly deployable scalable equipped and trained Joint Public Affairs capabilities to support emergent joint requirements 2 Training and Education • JPASE provides PA training to enable Joint Force Commanders and their staffs to successfully meet continuously evolving information environment challenges in their respective theaters of operations Reserve Components Capability A reserve joint public affairs unit JPASE-R supports and augments the active duty JPASE organization It is trained and equipped to provide training and support for the active JPASE force during day-to-day operations and when it is deployed in support of emergent and contingency operations Updated October 2011 135 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 36 Back to Table of Contents Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC Mission The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center supports the Joint Staff in improving the Department of Defense's ability to meet combatant command information-related requirements improving development of information-related capabilities and ensuring operational integration and coherence across combatant commands and other DOD activities Functions • Joint IO Assessment • Joint IO Force Development • Joint Operations Security • Joint Military Deception • Coordinate and integrate DOD IO operational support for joint commanders Capabilities • Provides IO Subject Matter Experts with special emphasis on Military Deception and Operations Security • Maintains a cadre of intelligence professionals tightly focused on the IO problem set • Maintains a habitual working relationship with the IO staffs of the combatant commanders and service elements • Provides focused and tailored IO planning products History and Subordination The Joint Electronic Warfare Center JEWC was established by the Secretary of Defense in October 1980 and reported to the Joint Staff In September 1994 the mission was expanded and the organization was renamed the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center JC2WC In 1998 as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative DRI the JC2WC was realigned from the Joint Staff to US Atlantic Command The JC2WC mission was further expanded and resulted in redesignation as the Joint Information Operations Center JIOC In October 1999 the JIOC was realigned as a subordinate command of USSPACECOM On 1 October 2002 the JIOC was realigned as a subordinate command to USSTRATCOM In 2006 the JIOC was renamed the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command JIOWC and focused on operational IO planning and operations Subsequently the JIOWC was renamed the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center On 1 October 2011 the JIOWC was reassigned under the Joint Staff as a Chairman's Coordinating Activity The JIOWC Director reports to Joint Staff J3 through the Deputy Director Global Operations J39 DDGO Leadership The Director of the JIOWC is a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service position that is filled by a competitive civil service selection process Location The JIOWC is co-located with the Air Force Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Agency and components of 24th Air Force at Lackland AFB TX in San Antonio TX SIPR Website http www jiowc smil mil Updated October 2011 137 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 38 Back to Table of Contents U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM is one of nine combatant commands in the Department of Defense It is located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha Neb General C Robert Kehler commands USSTRATCOM and serves as the senior commander of unified military forces from all four branches of the military assigned to the command He is responsible for the global command and control of U S strategic forces to meet decisive national security objectives USSTRATCOM provides a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the President and Secretary of Defense USSTRATCOM integrates and coordinates the necessary command and control capability to provide support with the most accurate and timely information for the President the Secretary of Defense other National Leadership and geographic combatant commanders and serves as steward and advocate of the nation's strategic capabilities The mission of the U S Strategic Command is to detect deter and prevent attacks against the United States and our allies - join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail The priorities of the Command are 1 2 3 4 5 Deter nuclear attack with a safe secure effective nuclear deterrent force Partner with the other COCOMS to win today Respond to the new challenges in space Build cyberspace capability and capacity Prepare for uncertainty The Secretary of Defense directed the joint force to reorganize development and management of IO by assigning proponency for joint IO to the Joint Staff Individual capability responsibility of Computer Network Operations and Electronic Warfare remain assigned to USSTRATCOM The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganized elements of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC previously assigned to USSTRATCOM The JIOWC's Joint Electronic Warfare Division remains assigned to USSTRATCOM and the remaining elements of the JIOWC were aligned with the Joint Staff The Command including components employs more than 2 700 people representing all four services including DoD Civilians and contractors who oversee the command's operationally focused global strategic mission The command is organized under a modified J-code structure as follows J0 The office of the Commander and the staff support agencies - establishes the goals mission vision and leadership of the command To help the commander the immediate staff also includes the deputy commander in chief and a group of special advisors 139 Back to Table of Contents J1 Manpower and Personnel - provides the United States Strategic Command with manpower and personnel advice support and execution of Command policies and procedures to ensure maximum readiness and sustainability of the total force as both a supporting and supported Command J2 Intelligence - delivers all-source intelligence while enabling the execution of assigned strategic deterrence space and cyberspace operations and Joint mission enablers directs all intelligence-related support for the Commander ensures unity of intelligence effort across the Command and advocates for Command intelligence requirements J3 Global Operations - coordinates the planning employment and operation of DoD strategic assets and combines all current operations global command and control and intelligence operations Subdivisions within the J3 include Combat and Information Operations Intelligence Current Operations Logistics Joint Exercise and Training and C4 Systems J4 Logistics - provides integrated logistics capabilities enabling USSTRATCOM and components to achieve desired global effects J5 Plans and Policy - develops and refines strategies policies concepts guidance and plans to focus and synchronize USSTRATCOM planning across the command's mission areas in collaboration with the command's staff and components other combatant commanders the Joint Staff OSD and other US Agencies With a global perspective develops commander's estimates intent strategic themes actions and responses and policy positions to ensure command operations and activities are integrated with other combatant commands and elements of national power to accomplish USSTRATCOM's global missions and provide synchronized support to combatant commands and agencies J6 C4 Systems - provides and assures global-integrated Command Control Communications and Computer Systems C4 capabilities for US Strategic Command to execute support of full spectrum global strike space and information operations Responsible for management of over $20B of on-orbit communications assets Translates DoD and JCS policy into capabilities Directorate consists of 457 military civilian contractors and a $103M year budget J7 Joint Exercises and Training - manages USSTRATCOM Commander's Joint Training Program and Exercise Program in order to ensure readiness to perform the Command Missions Provides modeling and simulation support for exercises and training events to the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS Combatant Commands and other Major Commands MAJCOMs Manages the Joint Lessons Learned Program Augments the battle staff during a crisis J8 Capability and Resource Integration - identifies analyzes and advocates for capabilities and resources to accomplish US Strategic Command's assigned missions of strategic deterrence global strike space operations information operations integrated missile defense combating weapons of mass destruction and global command control intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance Develops and manages current and future year financial plans J9 Mission Assessment and Analysis Directorate - conducts operational and strategic assessments and leverages industry academia US Government agencies and Allies to improve USSTRATCOM's warfighting ability The Assessments Division leads command operational and strategic assessment activities that inform 140 Back to Table of Contents Commander's decision-making regarding his assigned Unified Command Plan UCP missions and progress toward achieving Guidance for Employment of the Force GEF end states USSTRATCOM exercises command authority over various task forces and service components in support of the command's mission During day-to-day operations service component commanders retain primary responsibility for maintaining the readiness of USSTRATCOM forces and performing their assigned functions Their primary function is to provide organized trained and equipped forces for employment when called upon to support USSTRATCOM's global mission As the Department of Defense's key advocate for global capabilities the command has extensive ties with defense agencies the Department of Energy's national laboratories and other sources of support Through its many contacts and interagency relationships the command facilitates planning enhances information sharing between the military and other government agencies and streamlines decision making USSTRATCOM Functional Components Service Components Task Forces and subunified Command USSTRATCOM exercises command authority over three joint functional component commands JFCCs responsible for day-to-day planning and execution of primary mission areas Strategic Deterrence Nuclear Operations and Space Operations a subunified command for the Cyberspace Operations mission area as well as performing a global synchronization role in 141 Back to Table of Contents Missile Defense Surveillance and Reconnaissance and combating weapons of mass destruction United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM - plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and prepare to and when directed conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains ensure US Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries USCYBERCOM is a subunified command of USSTRATCOM JFCC Global Strike JFCC GS - optimizes planning integration execution and force management of assigned missions of deterring attacks against the U S its territories possessions and bases and should deterrence fail by employing appropriate forces JFCC Integrated Missile Defense JFCC IMD - develops desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense Plans integrates and coordinates global missile defense operations and support sea land air and space-based for missile defense JFCC Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR JFCC ISR - plans integrates and coordinates intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations and strategic deterrence Tasks and coordinates ISR capabilities in support of global strike missile defense and associated planning JFCC Space JFCC Space - optimizes planning execution and force management as directed by the commander of USSTRATCOM of the assigned missions of coordinating planning and conducting space operations USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction SCC- WMD plans advocates and advises the commander USSTRATCOM on WMD-related matters Provides recommendations to dissuade deter and prevent the acquisition development or use of WMD For More information please visit www stratcom mil Updated October 2011 142 Back to Table of Contents U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM On June 23 2009 the Secretary of Defense directed the Commander of U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM to establish USCYBERCOM The command achieved Initial Operational Capability IOC on 21 May 2010 and attained Full Operational Capability FOC on 31 October 2010 Formal Command Name U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM or CYBERCOM Commander General Keith B Alexander Mission USCYBERCOM plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and prepare to and when directed conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains ensure US Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries Focus USCYBERCOM will fuse the Department's full spectrum of cyberspace operations and will plan coordinate integrate synchronize and conduct activities to lead day-to-day defense and protection of DoD information networks coordinate DoD operations providing support to military missions direct the operations and defense of specified DoD information networks and prepare to and when directed conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations The command is charged with pulling together existing cyberspace resources creating synergy that does not currently exist and synchronizing war-fighting effects to defend the information security environment USCYBERCOM will centralize command of cyberspace operations strengthen DoD cyberspace capabilities and integrate and bolster DoD's cyber expertise Consequently USCYBERCOM will improve DoD's capabilities to ensure resilient reliable information and communication networks counter cyberspace threats and assure access to cyberspace USCYBERCOM's efforts will also support the Armed Services' ability to confidently conduct high-tempo effective operations as well as protect command and control systems and the cyberspace infrastructure supporting weapons system platforms from disruptions intrusions and attacks Organization and Forces USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to USSTRATCOM Service elements include • • • • USA – Army Cyber Command ARFORCYBER 2nd Army USAF – Air Force Cyber Command AFCYBER 24th AF USN – Fleet Cyber Command FLTCYBERCOM 10th Fleet USMC – Marine Forces Cyber Command MARFORCYBER Point of Contact U S Cyber Command Public Affairs 301 688-6584 http www defense gov cyber Updated October 2011 143 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 44 Back to Table of Contents U S Special Operations Command USSOCOM USSOCOM is one of the nine U S unified commands under DOD It organizes trains equips and provides special operations forces to Geographic Combatant Commanders American Ambassadors and their country teams USSOCOM commands and controls all US-based SOF from all four services It also develops SOF-specific tactics techniques procedures and doctrine and conducts research development and acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment USSOCOM ensures its forces are trained and ready to respond to the call from the President Secretary of Defense and the geographic combatant commanders as necessary Mission USSOCOM provides fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests Synchronizes plans and planning of global operations against terrorist networks Special operations are operations conducted in hostile denied or politically sensitive environments to achieve military diplomatic informational and or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement These operations often require clandestine or discreet capabilities Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by with or through indigenous or surrogate forces Special Operations Forces Core Operations • Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction CWMD - actions taken to locate identify seize destroy or capture recover and render such weapons safe • Counterinsurgency COIN - those military paramilitary political psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency • Counterterrorism CT - measures taken to prevent deter and respond to terrorism • Foreign Internal Defense FID - providing training and other assistance to foreign governments and their militaries to enable the foreign government to provide for its country's national security • Stability Operations - military missions tasks and activities conducted outside the U S in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government services emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief • Unconventional Warfare UW - operations conducted by through and with surrogate forces that are organized trained equipped supported and directed by external forces • Support to Major Operations and Campaigns - operations in support of conventional forces as part of a GCC operation or campaign involving major combat forces economic 145 Back to Table of Contents Special Operations Forces Core Activities • Civil Affairs Operations CAO - activities that establish maintain or influence relations between U S forces and foreign civil authorities and civilian populations to facilitate U S military operations • Direct Action DA - short-duration strikes and other small scale offensive actions taken to seize destroy capture recover or inflict damage in denied areas • Hostage Rescue and Recovery - sensitive crisis response missions that include offensive measures taken to prevent deter preempt and respond to terrorist threats and incidents including recapture of U S facilities installations and sensitive material • Military Information Support Operations MISO - operations that provide truthful information to foreign audiences that influence behavior in support of U S military operations • Security Force Assistance SFA - unified actions by joint interagency and the multinational community to sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority • Special Reconnaissance SR - acquiring strategic and operational information concerning the capabilities intentions and activities of an enemy • Activities specified by the President or Secretary of Defense IO Core and Related Capabilities within USSOCOM Purview • Military Information Support Operations MISO A vital part of the broad range of U S political military economic and information activities used by the U S government to secure national objectives MISO disseminates truthful information to foreign audiences in support of U S policy and national objectives Used during peacetime contingency operations and declared war these activities are not a form of force but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often violent environments Persuading rather than compelling physically they rely on logic fear desire or other mental factors to promote specific emotions attitudes or behaviors The ultimate objective of U S military information support operations is to convince target audiences to take action favorable to the United States and its allies The importance and effectiveness of military information support operations has been underscored during OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM • Civil Affairs CA CA units support military commanders by working to minimize the effect of civilians in the battle space and by coordinating with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander's area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace contingency operations and declared war Civil Affairs forces support activities of both conventional and SOF and are capable of assisting and supporting the civil administration in their area of operations Long after the guns have fallen silent the men and women of Civil Affairs continue to provide assistance to foreign governments and to stabilize regions in turmoil Components USSOCOM has four component commands and one sub-unified command 1 U S Army Special Operations Command USASOC Located at Ft Bragg North Carolina USASOC's mission is to organize train man equip educate maintain combat readiness and deploy assigned active duty and National Guard units of the Army 146 Back to Table of Contents Special Operations Force Their mission is to accomplish special operations military information support operations and civil affairs operations Their forces include 4th MISO Group Airborne 4th MISOG 8th MISO Group Airborne 8th MISOG 95th Civil Affairs Brigade Airborne United States Special Forces Command Airborne John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 75th Ranger Regiment United States Army Special Operations Aviation Command • 160th Special Operations Regiment Airborne 8 528th Sustainment Brigade Airborne 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 Naval Special Warfare Command NAVSPECWARCOM Located at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado CA The mission of NAVSPECWARCOM is to organize train man equip educate maintain combat readiness and deploy assigned forces in support of joint and fleet operations worldwide SEAL Teams are maritime multipurpose combat forces organized trained and equipped to conduct a variety of special operations missions in all operational environments and threat conditions SEAL mission areas include direct action counter-terrorism special reconnaissance foreign internal defense information warfare security assistance counter-drug operations and hydrographic reconnaissance 3 Air Force Special Operations Command AFSOC Located at Hurlburt Field FL It provides Air Force Special Operations Forces to conduct and support global special operations missions AFSOC's contribution to Information Operations is specifically in the form of the 193d Special Operations Wing Air National Guard The wing operates the EC 130 Commando Solo which can broadcast television and radio programs directly to foreign audiences 4 Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command MARSOC Located at Camp Lejuene NC Activated February 2006 its primary mission is to organize man train and equip Marine Special Operations Forces The MARSOC subordinate elements provide training to foreign militaries conduct specified special operations missions like special reconnaissance engage in direct action provide intelligence support coordinate supporting fires and provide logistical support to special operations task forces 5 Joint Special Operations Command JSOC A sub-unified command of USSOCOM JSOC provides a joint headquarters to study special operations requirements ensures interoperability and equipment standardization develops joint special operations plans and tactics and conducts joint special operations exercises and training Location Address and Contact Information Headquarters United States Special Operations Command HQ USSOCOM Headquarters USSOCOM 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base FL 33621 Public Affairs Office 813 826-4600 Website http www socom mil Updated October 2011 147 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 48 Back to Table of Contents Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program The Joint Forces Staff College JFSC was established in 1946 to better equip personnel from all of the services to function in the modern joint and combined warfare environment It pre-dates the creation of the unified Department of Defense and is the successor of the Army and Navy Staff College established in 1943 for the same purpose The college is located at the U S Naval Base Norfolk VA IO Education at JFSC Department of Defense Instruction DODI 3608 12 Joint Information Operations IO Education 4 November 2005 specifies that Joint Forces Staff College will develop and conduct a Joint IO planners course to prepare students to integrate IO into plans and orders on joint warfighting staffs The College also offers a Joint IO orientation course Both are conducted by the Information Operations Division of the Joint Command Control Information Operations School JC2IOS and are outlined below 1 Joint IO Orientation Course JIOOC A one week course with the objective to educate and train U S Government USG personnel in the military grades of Lieutenant Captain O-3 to Captain Colonel 0-6 and civilian equivalents in the basics of joint Information Operations IO Primary emphasis is at the Combatant Command level The course focuses on teaching joint IO doctrine and DoD IO policy guidance as they apply to the operational level of joint warfare It is particularly relevant to those serving in support of IO cells and other staff positions that require a basic knowledge of Joint IO If IO planning skills are desired then the student should take the Joint Information Operations Planner's Course JIOPC JIOOC gives students a common baseline of IO knowledge upon which to build practical skills and abilities to employ IO tools and techniques In this one-week course students are exposed to four blocks of instruction Strategy Intelligence support IO Capabilities Core Supporting and Related and Organization Training and Equipping Each block of instruction includes a combination of instructor lecture guest speaker presentations guided discussions and or panel discussions 2 Joint Information Operations Planner's Course JIOPC A four-week course for the purpose of establishing a common level of understanding for IO planners and IO capability specialists between the ranks of 0-4 through 0-6 and DoD Civilian equivalents who will serve in joint operational-level IO billets This course is required for Joint IO Career Force personnel assigned to a combatant command or JTF staff See CJCSM 1630 01 Joint Information Operations Force 16 March 09 The objective of the JIOPC is to educate and train to plan integrate and synchronize IO into joint operational-level plans and orders The school accomplishes this through class presentations guest lectures case studies and practical exercises in a joint seminar 149 Back to Table of Contents environment Students will be assigned to a working group consisting of approximately eight to ten individuals led by a faculty mentor The course focuses on the following learning areas • • • • Joint Operational Planning Process JOPP Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment JIPOE Information Operations IO Planning Interagency Planning Coordination Throughout the course the students use traditional planning methodologies within the joint planning community The course is based upon joint doctrine that is reinforced when necessary by a compilation of various tactics techniques and procedures from throughout the department of defense The JIOPC is only taught in residence at the Joint Forces Staff College The JC2IOS Division of JFSC also offers Mobile Training Teams MTT's to commands needing orientation training MTT's are funded by the host For information regarding the JFSC Information Operations Division contact JC2IOSIO@jfsc ndu edu or at 757-443-6336 6333 DSN 646 Web Site http www jfsc ndu edu Reviewed October 2011 150 Back to Table of Contents Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School The Naval Postgraduate School NPS is located in Monterey CA and is the successor to the Postgraduate Department of the US Naval Academy established at Annapolis MD prior to World War I Congress established the school as a full degree-granting institution in 1945 and it moved to its present location in 1951 The present student body numbers approximately 1 800 with representatives from all service branches and the services of more than 25 allied nations It grants degrees at the master's and doctorate levels Information Operations Center for Excellence The President NPS was tasked by Department of Defense Instruction DoDI 3608 12 Joint Information Operations IO Education dated 4 November 2005 to Establish the DoD IO Center of Excellence The IO Center for Excellence IOCfE functions under the sponsorship of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to inform and support the development of innovations in IO related policy technology research and education The IOCfE exists to • • • advance the goal of information operations as a core military competency support the DOD commitment to transform our military capabilities provide avenues for research for information operations irregular warfare and unconventional thought Information Operations Education at NPS 1 Doctor of Philosophy in Information Sciences Curriculum 474 The Department of Information Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate School will award the Doctor of Philosophy in Information Sciences degree as a result of meritorious and scholarly achievement in a particular field of information sciences IS This program includes course work scholarly socialization written and oral examinations research and a written dissertation A candidate must exhibit scholarly application to the entire course of study achieve a high level of scientific advancement and establish ability for original investigation leading to the advancement of fundamental knowledge IS broadly encompasses the design implementation use promotion and evaluation of organizations processes and systems associated with knowledge information data and communication It includes areas of concentration in information systems information technology information warfare information operations and command and control The Ph D in Information Sciences prepares scholars to conduct original research that contributes new knowledge in the domain of information systems information technology information warfare information operations or command and control With such ability to conduct original research and contribute new knowledge the IS Ph D helps to prepare scholars also to teach effectively 151 Back to Table of Contents Website Information on Naval Postgraduate School's PhDIS can be obtained at the following site http www nps edu Academics GeneralCatalog 414 htm#o435 2 Master of Science in Joint Information Operations Curriculum 698 The Joint Information Operations curriculum educates military personnel and civilian officials in the strategic and operational dimensions of information and its use as an instrument of statecraft Graduates will be able to employ information in support of full-spectrum dominance by exploiting the growing worldwide dependence on information systems and by capitalizing on near realtime global dissemination of information to affect adversary decision cycles with the goal of achieving information superiority for the United States The curriculum is designed for both the specialist who will be assigned to an information operations position and the generalist who will be assigned to an operations directorate The curriculum includes a core of military art and operations the human dimension of warfare psycho-social analytical methods and a customized elective sequence designed for each student Additionally each student will have an elective sequence designed to further develop an in-depth understanding of joint information operations Finally each student will write a thesis relevant to the field of information operations Website Information on the JIO Curriculum can be obtained at the following site http www nps edu Academics GeneralCatalog 414 htm#o425 3 Master of Science in Information Systems and Operations Curriculum 356 This curriculum offered through the Information Sciences Department is a war-fighter oriented inresidence MS degree program that will provide fundamental graduate education to integrate information technologies command and control processes and IO methods and elements into innovative operational concepts for Information Operations in the context of Network Centric Warfare • • • • • • The Information Systems Operations graduate will be able to Innovatively create IO strategies and policies Establish agile organizational structures and decision processes responsive to real time mission and situation requirements Understand information technology and systems as enabling the acquisition of information and knowledge superiority leading to effective development and performance of information operations Integrate technology organization policy and strategy into an Information Operations framework useful in both deliberate and crisis planning across the range of military operations Identify and solve significant information operations problems and communicate the results in written reports and command briefings Website Information on Naval Postgraduate School's ISO program can be obtained at the following site http www nps edu Academics GeneralCatalog 414 htm#o429 4 Master of Science in Information Warfare Systems Engineering Curriculum 595 Graduates of this curriculum are thoroughly knowledgeable in Information Operations IO and Information Warfare IW They receive a Master of Science in Information Warfare Systems Engineering MSIWSE degree that provides the services with officers who are well versed in the technical theoretical and operational aspects of interdisciplinary IO IW as they relate to joint mission objectives in modern warfare This curriculum is sponsored by Commander Naval Network Warfare Command Information Operations Directorate 152 Back to Table of Contents Website Information on Naval Postgraduate School's MSIWSE program can be obtained at the following site http www nps edu Academics GeneralCatalog 414 htm#o436 5 Master of Science in Cyber Systems and Operations Curriculum 326 In response to a rapidly changing operational environment NPS under the guidance of Navy N2 N6 has developed a new curriculum in Cyber Systems and Operations CSO The objective of this curriculum is to provide the services with officers able to address the broad range of cyberspace operations computer network attack defense and exploitation cyber analysis operations planning and engineering and cyber intelligence operations and analysis The CSO degree is comprised of eighteen courses all of which are intended to provide a coherent logical sequence of educational objectives associated with operations in the Cyber domain This program will complement the Information Systems Operations which focuses on operations in the Information Domain 6 Information Systems and Operations ISO Academic Certificate Program NPS offers this certificate program in an asynchronous online mode It is a part of its Master of Science MS degree in Information Systems and Operations ISO offered through the Information Sciences Department The certificate program consists of four courses given via Distributed Learning DL These four courses are SS3011 - Space Technology and Applications IO3100 - Information Operations IS3502 - Computer Networks Wide Area Local Area Intro to Information Systems Networks CC3000 - Intro to Command Control Communication Computer and Intelligence Systems in DoD ISO Academic Certificate Website http www nps edu DL Cert_Progs ISO asp Information Operations Research Conferences Publications and other Activities at NPS In addition to the certificate and degree programs above faculty and students at NPS conduct unclassified and classified research and field experimentation in technologies and concepts that are related to information operations information-related capabilities often in partnership with other academic institutions national and regional research institutions and laboratories defense industry and military commands Since 2005 NPS has held or led a series of conferences and other activities dealing with the nature of operations in the post-9-11 world and the role information plays in this world Subjects have run from Cyber Conflict International Cooperation and Deterrence and Understanding Terrorist Networks and Organizations to NPS-Salinas Counter-gang Collaboration to Information Operations and Force Transformation Sponsors for these conferences include OSD SOCCENT and RRTO among others NPS faculty author and NPS supports publication of relevant scholarly books and articles in the information strategy and warfare arena Updated August 2011 153 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 54 Back to Table of Contents Service Organizations This section includes a description of the following organizations • Army Cyber Command • Army – 1st Information Operations Command 1st IO Cmd • Army Reserve Information Operations Command ARIOC • United States Army Information Proponent Office USAIPO • Marine Corps Information Operations Center • Navy Information Operations Organizations • Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency • Headquarters 24th Air Force • 624th Operations Center • 67th Network Warfare Wing • 688th Information Operations Wing • 689th Combat Communications Wing 155 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 56 Back to Table of Contents Army Cyber Command 2nd Army With the establishment of Army Cyber Command on 1 October 2010 the Army brings unprecedented unity of effort and synchronization of all Army forces operating in cyber-space U S Army Cyber Command is the Army's service component in support of U S Cyber Command a sub-unified command under U S Strategic Command Mission U S Army Cyber Command plans coordinates integrates synchronizes directs and conducts network operations and defense of all Army networks when directed conducts cyberspace operations in support of full spectrum operations to ensure U S Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and to deny the same to our adversaries Roles Army Cyber Command is the Army's proponent for cyberspace operations to improve all aspects of Army doctrine organization training materiel leadership personnel and facilities related to cyberspace operations • • • • • • • • Serve as service component to US Cyber Command Train organize and equip - Provide trained ready forces Defense of all Army networks Proponency for Army Cyber … develop requirements Develop Army cyberspace capabilities and capacities Integrate cyberspace into planning and exercises Prepare to act as a cyber Joint Task Force Commander Operationalize cyber for the Army Organization U S Army Cyber Command has more than 21 000 Soldiers DA Civilians and Contractors working across the globe conducting a full range of cyberspace operations 24 7 365 Army Cyber Command is a unified operations center responsible for all Army networks supported by • • • U S Army Network Enterprise Technology Command NETCOM U S Army Intelligence and Security Command INSCOM 1st Information Operations Command Land 157 Back to Table of Contents Army Cyber Command Organization Chart Army Cyber Vision 2020 A Professional team of elite trusted precise and disciplined warriors defending Army networks providing a full range of dominant effects in and through cyberspace enabling Mission Command and ensuring a decisive global advantage The Army must fundamentally transform cyber in order to meet the challenges of the 2020 strategic environment By 2020 the Army will need to have achieved three critical thresholds for cyber • • • Integrated Cyber Capabilities • Army Cyber Warriors — integrated in cyber organizations staffs • Full range of cyber operations are routine and pervasive • Nested with Joint Global Expeditionary Cyber Constructs Achieve Cyber Domain Superiority • Cyberspace ops —seize retain exploit the initiative • Seek the same level of freedom to operate that Army forces achieve in the Land domain Ensure Mission Command • Mission Command is enabled by cyber-space capabilities • Cyberspace Ops Mission Command are inherently linked • Integrating construct for cyber-related ops capabilities Army Cyber 2020 Strategic Plan The Army Chief of Staff directed ARCYBER to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Army cyber operations This assessment led to the Army Cyber 2020 Strategic Plan consisting of three Lines of Effort and three Enabling Activities Line of Operation #1 - Operationalize Cyber Army Cyber Command will leverage and integrate current and future capabilities across the physical informational and cognitive dimensions of the information environment ensuring optimal effects in the cyberspace domain as well as enabling effects in the air land sea and space domains 158 Back to Table of Contents • Major Objectives • Conduct Cyberspace Operations to Ensure Mission Command • Improve Intelligence Support to Cyberspace Operations • Conduct Intelligence Driven Integrated Cyberspace Operations • Streamline Army Cyberspace Command and Control • Build and Operate a Defensible Enterprise Network • Expand Army Critical Infrastructure Protection into the Cyber Domain • Change the Cultural View of Cyberspace Operations to that of a Contested Operational Domain • Develop a World-Class Cyber Opposing Force • Integrate Cyberspace and Information Operations into All Plans and Exercises • Enhance IO Support to Warfighters Line of Operation #2 - Grow Army Cyberspace Capacity and Capabilities As the Army's force modernization proponent for cyberspace operations Army Cyber Command's proponent office will define the required force structure develop critical doctrine and concepts and integrate cyberspace operations into the Army's institutional processes in order to ensure superiority in the new cyberspace domain • Major Objectives • Determine and Prioritize Cyberspace Requirements for TAA and POM • Integrate Cyberspace Operations into Institutional Training • Develop the Future Cyber Force • Develop Capstone Cyberspace Doctrine and Concepts • Develop a World-class Cyberspace Proponent Line of Operation #3 - Recruit Develop and Retain Cyber Professionals While technology plays an important role in the cyberspace domain it is the cyber professionals not the technology that will win on the 21st century's battlefields • Major Objectives • • • Determine and Prioritize Cyberspace Personnel Requirements Develop the Future Cyber Warrior Integrate Reserve Component Cyberspace Professionals into Total Army Solutions Enabling Activities • • • People as a Priority Strategic Communications Build Headquarters Functional Capacity Location U S Army Cyber Command is located at Fort Belvoir Va with staff at Fort Meade MD Army Cyber Command 2nd US Army 8825 Beulah Street Room GF10 Fort Belvoir VA 22060-5246 www arcyber army mil Updated October 2011 159 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 60 Back to Table of Contents Army – 1st Information Operations Command 1st IO Cmd Mission 1st Information Operations IO Command Land provides IO support to the Army and other Military Forces through deployable IO support teams IO reachback planning and analysis and the synchronization and conduct of Army Computer Network Operations CNO in coordination with other CNO and Network Operations stakeholders to operationally integrate IO reinforce forward IO capabilities and to defend Cyberspace in order to enable IO throughout the Information Environment Tasks 1 Organize train equip and deploy mission capable IO Support Teams to provide IO planning and execution support or to conduct IO assessments as directed 2 Provide IO planning plus operational technical and intelligence analysis reachback support to deployed IO support teams and supported commands 3 Provide specialized IO and Cyber training support to LCCs Army Commands other Service Commands Joint Forces Agencies Activities Allies and Partners as directed 4 Plan and conduct IO support to Army and Joint Cyberspace Operations in coordination with Cyberspace Operations stakeholders to defend Cyberspace and to enable other Information Operations as directed 5 Operate the Army's World Class Cyber OPFOR to provide supported commanders an expert agile interactive adversary during exercises training and leader development 6 Provide IO support for the assessment of force readiness and capabilities of Land Component Forces to accomplish their assigned missions as directed 7 Develop and promote processes and procedures to ensure IO interoperability with Joint Forces other Services Inter-agencies Allies and Partners 8 Operate and maintain the Army's Operations Security OPSEC Support Element 9 Provide IO support team training and evaluation standards to the Theater IO Groups As the single Army Active Component organization dedicated to IO 1st IO Cmd is responsible for providing IO support to the warfighter in planning synchronizing de-conflicting executing and assessing IO The Command supports warfighting and other commanders in conflict other contingency operations garrison and in field training exercises and experiments 1st IO Cmd operates with and across each of the IO competencies to gain an advantage through coordinated use of multiple capabilities to affect the Information Environment 1st IO Cmd deploys IO Support Teams that provide IO planning World Class Cyber OPFOR support vulnerability assessments OPSEC awareness specialized training Cyberspace Operations planning support and specialized technical support Additionally 1st IO Cmd provides IO reachback capability to deployed teams and to the operational and tactical staffs of deployed forces as directed 161 Back to Table of Contents Subordination 1st IO Cmd is a major subordinate command to the U S Army Intelligence and Security Command INSCOM but is under the Operational Control and tasking of Army Cyber Command 2d US Army Leadership The Commander of 1st IO Cmd is an Army Colonel who is qualified as a functional Area 30 Information Operations Officer Battalion Commanders and key Brigade and Battalion staff are a mixture of FA-30 FA-53 Military Intelligence Signal Corps and other Branches and Functional Areas that represent the diverse skills and multi-component nature of the Command and its missions Location The 1st IO Cmd is located at Ft Belvoir VA within the INSCOM HQs building 1st IO Cmd has liaison positions established at the Pentagon NSA CAC USAIOP EWP Joint Information Operations Warfare Center Air Force IO Command US Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg USCENTCOM and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center 1st IO Cmd provides man train and equip support to Army Cyber Command's six Regional Computer Emergency Response Teams RCERTs which are collocated with each of the Army Service Component Commands Website http www 1stiocmd army mil Updated October 2011 162 Back to Table of Contents Army Reserve Information Operations Command ARIOC Mission On order ARIOC conducts Computer Network Operations CNO in support of Army and Joint Commands to achieve information superiority of cyberspace Tasks • Organize train equip and deploy mission support teams MST to conduct planning intelligence support and analysis synchronization and integration of Army CNO capabilities into full spectrum operations ARIOC conducts cyber counterreconnaissance cyber-strategic reconnaissance incident handling response and computer defense and assistance program CDAP augmentation in support of the 1st IOC L Army Computer Emergency Response Team ACERT and Regional Computer Emergency Response Team RCERT SWA mission The command monitors the Defense Research and Engineering Network DREN deploys Vulnerability Assessment Teams VAT and supports the Army Net Risk Assessment Mission • Operates the secure stand-alone ARIOC Cyber range This network is used for CNO analysis doctrine development exercise support training certification and validation of cyber warrior skill sets This network facilitates ARIOC participation in Joint level exercises with the JFCOM Joint IO Range • Develops promotes policies procedures and processes to integrate cyberspace operations CO into operations of the Army Reserve reserve components of other services inter-agencies and allies • The Army Reserve IO Command ARIOC applies the civilian acquired IT skills knowledge and abilities of its citizen-soldiers to support Army and Joint Cyberspace requirements of the 21st century ARIOC deploys experienced skilled IO teams and individuals to augment Army Joint capabilities in full spectrum operations Subordination The ARIOC is a subordinate unit of the U S Army Reserve Joint Special Troops Support Command USARJSTSC Fort Douglas UT ARIOC receives its operational tasking through the Army G-3 Director of Operations Readiness and Mobilization and Forces Command FORSCOM Leadership The Commander of the ARIOC is an Army Reserve Colonel O-6 Location ARIOC HQ is in Adelphi MD at the Army Research Lab Phone S3 - 301 394 1190 or DSN 290-1190 DCDR - 301 394 1144 or DSN 290-1144 Updated October 2011 163 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 64 Back to Table of Contents United States Army Information Proponent Office USAIPO The U S Army Information Proponent Office USAIPO is charged to develop the capabilities and capacity across Army Doctrine Organizations Training and Education Materials Leadership Personnel and Facilities DOTMLPF that leverage the power of information to achieve mission success across the unified land operations As the U S Army Proponent Chief the Commanding General US Army Combined Arms Center CG CAC established the IPO as a directorate within CAC Capabilities Development Integration Directorate to serve as his executive agent for accomplishing this critical mission CAC-CDID is now subordinate to the Mission Command Center of Excellence MC CoE which was formally established on 15 September 2010 The major responsibilities of IPO are derived from CG CAC's and MC-CoE priorities Mission of High Headquarters • CAC Mission Provides leadership and supervision for the leader development and professional military and civilian education institutional and collective training functional training training support doctrine lessons learned battle command and specified areas designated by CG TRADOC • MC CoE Mission Develops and integrates Mission Command DOTMLPF solutions at all levels of command in order to prepare leaders and their units to successfully conduct Unified Land Operations in a JIIM environment USAIPO Mission and Key Tasks The mission and key tasks vision were approved by Director CDID in October 2009 • Mission As directed CAC CDID-IPO integrates capabilities and capacity across DOTMLPF to meet the Army's requirement for the successful planning integration and execution of Information Operations in full spectrum operations • Key Tasks • • • • • Provide CAC Commander and CDID IO expertise and input to facilitate concept requirements and force modernization development as required Manage the U S Army's qualification courses for FA30 Officers Active and Reserve Component Monitor access and integrate IO instruction within the Army's PME system Execute U S Army personnel life cycle management for FA30 officers IAW AR 600-3 Develop IO doctrine and TTPs to support operational efforts 165 Back to Table of Contents USAIPO is organized as follows to accomplish this mission IPO Task Organization Director Deputy Director Operations Operations Officer Operation Assistant Military Analyst Communications IMO Sec Mgr Doctrine Personnel Proponency Chief Doctrine Writer Chief Personnel Manager Assignments Mgr HRC LDE T Chief OES LDE Analyst WOES NCOES CTR SPT CTR SPT Integration Chief Senior Military Analyst Military Analyst RD CBA Military Analyst RD FA30 QC Director Course Administrator Sem Leader Sem Leader Sem Leader Sem Leader Sem Leader Sem Leader Sem Leader RC FA30 QC Director Public Website http usacac army mil cac2 IPO index asp Updated October 2011 166 Back to Table of Contents Marine Corps Information Operations Center Established 15 July 2009 the Marine Corps IO Center MCIOC is the Marine Corps' executive agent for the Marine Corps IO Program MCIOP MCO 3120 10 and the centralized repository of USMC IO expertise The MCIOC augments the deployed MAGTF with scalable missiontailored IO Planning Teams IOPTs and Expeditionary MISO Detachments Teams EMD T during contingency operations which require support that exceeds the MAGTF's organic IO capabilities Additionally the MCIOC directly supports Marine Forces during all phases of operations by providing training mission planning reach-back support and coordination of USMC Joint Coalition and Interagency capabilities from the beginning of the planning cycle through completion of post deployment activities The MCIOC also enables the development and integration of IO capabilities and doctrine throughout the Marine Corps Milestones Recent MCIOC milestones include reaching full operational capability FOC in January 2011 and Command Designation in August 2011 Mission The Marine Corps Information Operations Center MCIOC provides operational support to the MAGTF and provides IO subject matter expertise in support of USMC IO advocates and proponents IOT enable the effective integration of IO into Marine Corps operations Marine Corps IO Center Support to the USMC 1 Perform the duties of Executive Agent for the Marine Corps Information Operations Program 2 Form train equip and deploy IO and MISO planning teams to augment supported unit organic staffs 3 Form train equip and deploy tactical MISO delivery teams in support of deployed MAGTFs 4 Maintain a single fused and continuously accessible Marine Corps IO reach-back capability that is fully integrated with relevant information and analysis sources 5 Support the Marine Corps Advocate and Supporting Establishment in the development of IO and MISO personnel equipment and fiscal resources 6 Sponsor the training education and retention of IO planners and MISO personnel in order to manage the USMC IO subject matter expertise 7 Support DC CD I the development of IO doctrine and DC PP O with the development of IO policy 8 Maintain functional relationships with all Joint OSD USG and partner nation IO-related organizations 167 Back to Table of Contents Marine Corps IO Center Organization The MCIOC recently re-structured the organization to maintain three deployable IO Planning Teams IOPTs four Expeditionary MISO Detachments EMDs and a task-organized Regional Reach-back Element RRE to support operational MAGTF requirements • MCIOC IOPTs will be capable of simultaneously supporting up to one deployed MEFsize element and one deployed MEU or three deployed MEUs IOPTs will provide IO Planning SMEs to augment supported MAGTF IO cells IO SMEs will support mission analysis and staff integration across IO core supported and related capabilities in support of the commander's end state to include analysis of the information environment threat and nodal analysis regional IO target expertise measures of effectiveness development and analysis and special technical operations planning • MCIOC EMDs will be capable of supporting up to a single MEF or three deployed MEUs with a tactical MISO delivery capability EMD HQ will assist in mission analysis and COA development at the Brigade Regiment-level while EMTs will do the same at the battalion level EMTs will execute MISO series advise the commander on the effects of their operations on the target audience and provide focused tactical MISO support to the maneuver commander • MCIOC Regional Reach-back Element will establish communications internally develop products and leverage external resources to satisfy requests for information RFIs and disseminate timely accurate and relevant information in order to support the MCIOC mission of providing IO support to the Marine Corps Joint Forces and Coalition Partners The RRE will task organize to provide prioritized support to deployed MAGTF IO cells other USMC units and other DoD Joint IO activities upon request The MCIOC S-2 Intelligence Division provides • Regional IO Intelligence Sections will integrate focused regional culture media political and threat intelligence into IO and MISO planning efforts and support the RRE and deployed IOPTs and EMD Ts • The Intelligence Request Support Section will provide trans-regional terrorist expertise to support IO planning efforts and create enhance and leverage targeting packages for Target Audiences High Value Targets HVTs and High Value Individuals HVIs in the Information Environment • The Technical Analysis Section will support planning of Computer Network Operations and Electronic Warfare through development or enhancement of technical targeting packages Subordination The Marine Corps IO Center is subordinate to Deputy Commandant for Plans Policies and Operations DC PP O IOPTs and EPD Ts will in most cases be attached to supported MAGTFs during operational deployments including pre-deployment exercises via an established Request For Forces RFF process that is vetted and approved by DC PP O Leadership The leadership of MCIOC consists of the Commander a Colonel O-6 the Chief of Staff a GS-15 and the Senior Enlisted Advisor a Sergeant Major E-9 Location The IO Center is located aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico VA For more information contact jmcneive@mcia osis gov Mr James McNeive at 703-784-5826 or email at Updated October 2011 168 Back to Table of Contents Navy Information Operations Organizations This section presents brief descriptions of selected U S Navy Information Operations organizations • The planned revision to NWP 3-13 Navy Information Operations have been placed on hold awaiting JP 3-13 ongoing revisions • When NWP 3-13 is completed the new document can be found at the Navy Doctrine Library System link http www nwdc navy smil mil Fleet Cyber Command The mission of Fleet Cyber Command is to direct Navy cyberspace operations globally to deter and defeat aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives in and through cyberspace to organize and direct Navy cryptologic operations worldwide and support information operations and space planning and operations as directed to direct operate maintain secure and defend the Navy's portion of the Global Information Grid to deliver integrated cyber information operations cryptologic and space capabilities and to deliver global Navy cyber network common cyber operational requirements Commander Tenth Fleet The mission of Tenth fleet is to serve as the Number Fleet for Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational control of assigned Naval forces to coordinate with other naval coalition and Joint Task Forces to execute the full spectrum of cyber electronic warfare information operations and signal intelligence capabilities and missions across the cyber electromagnetic and space domains Navy Cyber Forces Command Navy Cyber Forces Command CYBERFOR mission is to organize and prioritize training modernization and maintenance requirements and capabilities of command and control architecture networks cryptologic and space-related systems and intelligence and information operations activities and to coordinate with Type Commanders to deliver interoperable relevant and ready forces at the right time at the best cost today and in the future Navy Cyber Forces is the Type Commander for Navy's global cyber workforce of more than 14 000 Sailors and civilians With a headquarters staff of nearly 600 located at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story CYBERFOR provides ready forces and equipment in cryptology signals intelligence cyber electronic warfare information operations intelligence networks and space 169 Back to Table of Contents Naval Network Warfare Command Naval Network Warfare Command NNWC directs the operations and security of the Navy's portion of the Global Information Grid GIG NNWC delivers reliable and secure Net-Centric and Space war fighting capabilities in support of strategic operational and tactical missions across the Navy Navy Information Operations Command Norfolk Navy Information Operations Command NIOC Norfolk the Navy's Center of Excellence for IO is responsible for providing operationally focused training planning support and augmentation from the tactical to the strategic level developing IO doctrine tactics techniques and procedures advocating requirements in support of future effects-based warfare conducting experimentation for evaluating emerging or existing IO technologies and doctrine providing and managing IO data for fleet operations Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command The Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command NCDOC coordinates monitors and oversees the defense of Navy computer networks and systems including telecommunications and is responsible for accomplishing computer network defense CND missions as assigned by NAVNETWARCOM and USCYBERCOM Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group NCWDG serves as Navy's IO innovation center and functions as the principal technical agent for research and development of prototype IO capabilities NIOC Suitland supports the development capabilities encompassing all aspects of IO attack protect and exploit maintaining an aggressive program to acquire and analyze stateof-the-art technologies software and hardware evaluate fleet applicability and prototype developmental capabilities NCWDG maintains a collaborative relationship with Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems Center San Diego to provide efficient and effective technical expertise in command control communications computers and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance and information operations NCWDG also supports development coordination between Fleet Cyber Command Cyber Forces Command OPNAV NIOC Norfolk systems commands IO technology center and the commercial industry Fleet Information Operations Center Four regionally aligned Fleet Information Operations Centers provide IO planning and targeting support to their respective fleet commanders and strike group staffs Updated October 2011 170 Back to Table of Contents Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency The Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency with headquarters at Lackland Air Force Base TX was activated 8 June 2007 Formerly known as the Air Intelligence Agency the new Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency is aligned under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance as a Field Operating Agency Mission Vision The agency's mission is to deliver decisive advantage by providing and operating integrated cross-domain ISR capabilities in concert with service joint national and international partners Our vision is to be the preeminent ISR Enterprise providing the right ISR to the right person at the right time Personnel The agency has almost 20 000 active Reserve and Guard military and civilian members serving at 72 locations worldwide Organization The 480th ISR Wing 70th ISR Wing 361st ISR Group National Air and Space Intelligence Center and the Air Force Technical Applications Center are aligned under the Air Force ISR Agency The agency is the Air Force's Service Cryptologic Element and is also responsible for mission management and support of signals intelligence operations for the 24th Air Force's 67th Network Warfare Wing and 688th Information Operations Wing as well as the 12th Air Force's 55th Wing In addition the agency provides guidance to two Air Force Reserve and 22 Air National Guard units with ISR responsibilities The Air Force ISR Agency further supplies mission management and support for specific intelligence operations within all of these organizations Mission support includes organizing training and equipping the service's cryptologic elements 480th Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing The 480th ISR Wing at Joint Base Langley-Eustis AFB VA is the Air Force lead for developing timely and relevant ISR from a variety of platforms 24 hours a day year round in direct support of combat operations Air Force leaders key Coalition partners and combatant commanders worldwide Capabilities include global command and control for the collection processing exploitation and dissemination of ISR data from the U-2 Dragon Lady RQ-4 Global Hawk MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper in addition to numerous other ISR platforms using the Air Force Distributed Common Ground System weapon system The wing also conducts real-time cryptologic and signals intelligence in direct support of combat operations and combatant commanders worldwide The wing was activated 1 December 2003 171 Back to Table of Contents 70th Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing The 70th ISR Wing at Fort George G Meade MD integrates Air Force capabilities into global cryptologic operations directly supporting national-level decision makers combatant commanders and tactical warfighters The wing works closely with the National Security Agency Central Security Service leveraging the net-centric capabilities of a worldwide cryptologic enterprise to conduct national missions and enable national-tactical integration for joint and combined Air Force combat operations around the world The effect on battlespace is immediate high-impact and decisive The wing includes six intelligence groups in the U S Pacific and European theaters National Air and Space Intelligence Center NASIC The National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson AFB OH is the primary Department of Defense producer of foreign air and space intelligence NASIC supports warfighters force modernizers and national policy makers with world-class predictive intelligence products that integrate all available sources of intelligence data The center analyzes the characteristics and performance of foreign weapons systems assesses the capabilities and intent of potential adversaries and serves as a national node for the processing exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data from around the world NASIC has four intelligence analysis groups and eighteen squadrons all located in its main complex at Wright-Patterson AFB 361st Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group The 361st ISR Group at Hurlburt Field FL is the premier provider of specialized ISR capabilities to the Air Force Special Operations Force community They train equip and present more than 250 Airmen to provide specialized SOF ISR forces for worldwide employment Air Force Technical Applications Center AFTAC The Air Force Technical Applications Center at Patrick AFB FL performs nuclear treaty monitoring and nuclear event detection AFTAC provides national authorities quality technical measurements to monitor nuclear treaty compliance and performs research and development of new proliferation detection technologies to enhance or assist treaty verification to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to preserve our nation's security AFTAC has been performing its nuclear event detection mission since its inception in 1973 Point of Contact Air Force ISR Agency Commander's Action Group 102 Hall Blvd Ste 104 San Antonio TX 78243-7089 DSN 969-4016 or 210 977-4016 Updated September 2011 172 Back to Table of Contents Headquarters 24th Air Force The 24th Air Force 24 AF is the Air Force's operational warfighting organization responsible for conducting the full range of Cyber operations 24 AF establishes operates maintains and defends the Air Force provisioned portion of the DoD network to ensure the Joint Warfighter can maintain the information advantage while prosecuting military operations Specifically the 24 AF mission is to Extend operate and defend the Air Force portion of the DoD network and to provide full spectrum capabilities for the Joint warfighter in through and from Cyberspace The 24 AF is subordinate to Air Force Space Command AFSPC AFSPC was assigned the Cyber mission transferred from Air Combat Command when 24 AF was established on 18 August 2009 AFSPC is 24 AF's Organize Train and Equip entity which advocates for personnel funding training and equipment to support the mission areas to enable 24 AF to meet operational mission requirements AFSPC also provides administrative support audit and inspections financial management manpower and organization operational analysis research and development and training and education support to 24 AF Through its Joint chain 24 AF presents Cyber forces to US Strategic Command which has delegated operational control to US Cyber Command USCYBERCOM in Mod 9 to Operational Order 10-01 21 May 10 Twenty-Fourth Air Force receives operational taskings through USCYBERCOM which establishes 24 AF operational mission requirements Additionally 24 AF presents combat communications forces The Commander 24 AF is also designated as the Air Force Network Operations Commander AFNetOps CC with responsibility for the defense of the Air Force network AFNetOps CC authority is delegated through the AF administrative chain from the Secretary of the AF and grants the 24 AF CC command authority of over 100 network control centers NCCs at AF bases and sites world-wide NCCs are administratively assigned to AF squadrons however the 24 AF CC issues them daily operational orders through the AFNetOps command and control structure for the daily defense and operation of the AF network The 24 AF is located at Lackland AFB TX and has three subordinate wings the 67th Network Warfare Wing 67 NWW located at Lackland AFB TX the 688th Information Operations Wing 688 IOW also located at Lackland AFB TX and the 689th Combat Communications Wing 689 CCW at Robins AFB Georgia and the 624th Operations Center at Lackland AFB TX The 24 AF oversees 5 400 Airmen to conduct or support 24-hour operations involving Cyberspace operations including 3 337 military 775 civilian and 1 364 contractor personnel In addition more than 10 000 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel are aligned to support the 24AF and AFSPC mission 173 Back to Table of Contents Organization Point of Contact 24th Air Force Public Affairs 467 Moore Street Bldg 2167 Lackland AFB TX CML 210-3957020 DSN 969-7020 Updated October 2011 174 Back to Table of Contents 624th Operations Center The 24 AF executes command and control over the AFNet and AF Cyber forces through the 624 Operations Center The 624 OC is the single inject point for operational Cyber taskings for the AF The 624 OC's organizational structure is aligned with its operational counterparts AOCs to facilitate integration of 24 AF capabilities into the supported CCDR's existing structure The 624 OC consists of the following four divisions • Strategy Division SRD Formulates the overarching campaign guidance strategy through the Cyber Operations Directive CyOD …analogous to the AOC's Air Operations Directive…to align the 24 AF CC's priorities in support of HHQ directives objectives The related timeline for SRD issues is 72 hours SRD hands off the strategic guidance to the Combat Plans Division to enable planning and execution • Combat Plans Division CPD Works with its AOC counterpart to synchronize the employment of 24 AF full spectrum cyber capabilities with the AOC's Air Tasking Order ATO and Airspace Control Order ACO The timeline for CPD actions is the next 24-48 tomorrow's war 624 OC CPD produces the AF Cyber Tasking Order AF CTO … analogous to the ATO…the Cyberspace Control Order CCO …analogous to the ACO…and related Special Instructions SPINS are handed off to the Combat Operations Division for execution during the following day's operations • Combat Operations Division COD Monitors the execution of the AF CTO and CCO maintains up-to-date situational awareness of the defensive posture of the Air Force Information Network AFIN and is the focal point of all communications into and out of the 624 OC Adjusts tasking real-time if possible based on asset availability • Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Division ISRD Focuses on the near fight – defines potential threats to AFIN operations in the 72 hour AF CTO time frame crisis adaptive planning operations The 624 OC conducts adaptive and crisis action planning As a result of that planning process the 624 OC issues orders on behalf of the 24 AF CC These Cyber orders have been adapted from the AOC process mirroring similar orders from the Space Operations Center and theater AOCs The 624 OC also concentrates all of the authorities established in the United States Code required to perform Cyber operations As events occur in Cyberspace and operators respond ambiguity can arise as to whether a situation is most appropriately handled by law enforcement Title 18 counter-intelligence Title 50 or armed forces Title 10 If additional information becomes available which indicates a change in the most appropriate authority crucial time could be lost while operators contact counterparts and perform handoff Instead 24 AF has developed relationships with Title 18 and Title 50 counterparts which perform duty on the 624 OC floor If a situation transitions from one authority to another the 624 OC can react appropriately in real-time 24 AF and 624 OC also rely heavily on the Air Reserve Component for operational capacity and includes Title 32 capabilities in the 624 OC as well Updated October 2011 175 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 76 Back to Table of Contents 67th Network Warfare Wing The 67th Network Warfare Wing 67 NWW executes the integrated planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve the desired effects across the interconnected analog and digital portion of the Battlespace—Air Force Network Ops The Wing's Cyber Warriors conduct network operations through the dynamic combination of hardware software data and human interaction that involves time-critical operational-level decisions that direct configuration changes and information routing The 67 NWW headquartered at Lackland AFB TX is the Air Force's only Network Warfare Wing The wing employs 2 500 military and civilian Air Force Space Command personnel in 25 locations worldwide As the 24 AF's execution arm for AF Net Ops the wing readies and employs Airmen to conduct network defense and full spectrum network ops and systems telecommunications monitoring for AF and combatant commanders The wing consists of the 67th Network Warfare Group 26th Network Operations Group and 690th Network Support Group Activated in 1947 the wing conducted Tactical Reconnaissance and later was the only wing of its type in Korea during the Korean War The wing later trained Air Force and other countries' aircrews in the RF-4C Phantom One squadron of the wing saw combat action during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM In 1993 the Wing was redesignated as the 67th Intelligence Wing and was the largest wing in the Air Force at the time In 2000 the wing was assigned the mission of Information Operations becoming the Air Force's first IO Wing In July 2006 the wing became the Air Force's first and only Network Warfare Wing executing the Cyber portion of the Air Force mission to Fly Fight and Win in Air Space and Cyberspace Updated October 2011 177 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 78 Back to Table of Contents 688th Information Operations Wing The 688th Information Operations Wing 688 IOW is located at Lackland AFB San Antonio TX The wing's mission statement is Deliver proven Information Operations and Engineering Infrastructure capabilities integrated across air space and cyberspace domains The wing was formally designated on 18 August 2009 The 688 IOW was originally activated as the 6901st Special Communication Center in July 1953 and became the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center in 1975 Air Force successes in exploiting enemy information systems during Operation Desert Storm led to the realization that the strategies and tactics of command and control warfare could be expanded to the entire information spectrum and be implemented as information warfare In response the Air Force Information Warfare Center AFIWC was activated on 10 September 1993 combining technical skill sets from the former Air Force Electronic Warfare Center AFEWC with the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center's Securities Directorate and intelligence capabilities from the former Air Force Intelligence Command On 1 October 2006 AFIWC was re-designated the Air Force Information Operations Center AFIOC The name was changed to better reflect the center's continued advancements in network warfare electronic warfare and influence operations missions AFIOC was redesignated as the 688 IOW on 18 August 2009 and aligned under 24th Air Force The wing is composed of two groups the 318th Information Operations Group IOG at Lackland AFB and the 38th Cyberspace Engineering Group CEG at Tinker AFB The 318 IOG explores new cyberspace technologies to engineer next-generation weapons capabilities for operational warfighters It has a test squadron for developmental and operational test and evaluation a tactics squadron to optimize IO tactics techniques and procedures for weapon systems a school house to arm the next generation of cyber warriors with the most up-to-date information and an assessment squadron to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities on AF systems The 38 CEG is the Air Force's premier Engineering and Installation group providing systems telecommunications managers to every Combatant Command Major Command and Air Force base worldwide The unit provides communications infrastructure installations and services to include cable and antenna systems electronic systems specialized engineering electromagnetic interference testing radio frequency and radiation Hazard surveys and highaltitude electromagnetic pulse protection verification Additionally the 85th EIS is the AF's only Designed Operations Capability DOC tasked Engineering and Installation rapid response force The wing's team of more than 1200 military and civilian members is skilled in the areas of engineering installation weaponeering operations research intelligence communications and computer applications Updated September 2011 179 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 80 Back to Table of Contents 689th Combat Communications Wing The 689th Combat Communications Wing 689 CCW is located at Robins Air Force Base Warner Robins Georgia The 689 CCW's mission statement Deliver combat communications for the joint coalition war fighter supporting combat operations and Humanitarian Relief Operations…anytime…anywhere The unit traces it linage to the 1931st Airways and Air Communications Squadron which was originally designated in 1948 It was later re-designated as the 1931st Communications Squadron in 1961 Then in 1969 the squadron grew and was again re-designated as the 1931st Communications Group The 1931st would go through several more re-designations due to the demands of the Air Force before finally being de-activated on 26 September 1991 During its lifespan the 1931st served with distinction in the Alaskan Communications region Air Force Communications Command 21st Fighter Wing The distinguished service of the 1931st was recognized with the award of the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award eight times The wing resumed its history and was reactivated and redesignated on 5 October 2009 as the 689 CCW under 24th Air Force and Air Force Space Command The 689 CCW has brought together as one cohesive team several active and reserve subordinate units with their own storied histories and over 150 major awards Active Duty units include the 3rd Combat Communications Group and the 5th Combat Communications Group Air National Guard partners consist of the 162nd 201st 226th 251st 252nd 253rd 254th and 281st Combat Communications Groups and the 224th and 290th Joint Communications Support Squadrons Air Force Reserve units include 23rd Combat Communications Squadron 35th Combat Communications Squadron 42nd Combat Communications Squadron and 55th Combat Communications Squadron The Wing current has a war time projection force of more than 6 000 skilled Airmen 1 500 AD 4 500 ARC armed with over $600 million dollars worth of materiel who provide tactical communications computer systems navigational aids and Air Traffic Control ATC services anywhere in the world to meet the Air Force Department of Defense and other US Commitments Total Force Team members including DoD civilians and contractors are trained to deploy more than 150 mission systems providing initial services to deployed customers at various units under hostile conditions in austere locations where communications and ATC capabilities are not established Updated October 2011 181 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 82 Back to Table of Contents Glossary Most terms are taken from the Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8 November 2010 as amended through 15 September 2011 Area of interest AOI - That area of concern to the commander including the area of influence areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission JP 1-02 Civil affairs CA - Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized trained and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations JP 1-02 Civil military operations CMO - The activities of a commander that establish maintain influence or exploit relations between military forces governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace in a friendly neutral or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local regional or national government These activities may occur prior to during or subsequent to other military actions They may also occur if directed in the absence of other military operations Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs by other military forces or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces JP 1-02 Combat Camera COMCAM - The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during joint exercises JP 1-02 Command and control C2 - The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel equipment communications facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning directing coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission JP1- 02 Command and control system - The facilities equipment communications procedures and personnel essential for planning directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned JP 1-02 Computer network attack CNA - Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt deny degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and networks themselves JP 1-02 Computer network defense CND - Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect monitor analyze detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks JP 1-02 Computer network exploitation CNE - Enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks JP 1-02 Computer network operations CNO - Comprised of computer network attack computer network defense and related computer network exploitation enabling operations JP 1-02 Computer security COMPUSEC - The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access and exploitation of friendly computer systems JP 1-02 183 Back to Table of Contents Counterdeception - Efforts to negate neutralize diminish the effects of or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations JP 1-02 Counterintelligence - The information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage other intelligence activities sabotage or assassination conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof foreign organizations or foreign persons or international terrorist activities JP 1-02 Counterpropaganda - Army Programs of products and actions designed to nullify propaganda or mitigate its effects FM 3-13 Cyber counterintelligence - Measures to identify penetrate or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology as well as foreign intelligences service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions JP1-02 Cyberspace - A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers CJCS CM-0363-08 JP 1-02 Cyberspace operations - The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace JP 1-02 Deception action - A collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation JP 1-02 Deception concept - The deception course of action forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review as part of the combatant commander's strategic concept JP 1-02 Deception course of action - A deception scheme developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decision-making At a minimum a deception course of action will identify the deception objective the deception target the desired perception the deception story and tentative deception means JP 1-02 Deception event - A deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation JP 1-02 Deception means - Methods resources and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target There are three categories of deception means a physical means Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power b technical means Military materiel resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power c administrative means Resources methods and techniques to convey or deny oral pictorial documentary or other physical evidence to a foreign power JP 1-02 Deception objective - The desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and or location JP 1-02 Deception story - A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception JP 1-02 Deception target - The adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective JP 1-02 184 Back to Table of Contents Defense support to public diplomacy DSPD - Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government JP 1-02 Desired perception - In military deception what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objectives JP 1-02 Disinformation - Army Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence United States decisionmakers United States forces coalition allies key actors or individuals by indirect or unconventional means FM 3-13 DOD - Department of Defense JP 1-02 DODD - Department of Defense directive JP 1-02 Electromagnetic pulse EMP - The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse most commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges JP 1-02 Electromagnetic spectrum - The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands JP 1-02 Electronics security - The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of non communications electromagnetic radiation e g radar JP 1-02 Electronic warfare EW - Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy Electronic warfare consists of three divisions electronic attack electronic protection and electronic warfare support • • • electronic attack EA - Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy directed energy or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires electronic protection EP - Division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability electronic warfare support ES - Division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an operational commander to search for intercept identify and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition targeting planning and conduct of future operations JP 1-02 Global Information Grid GIG - The globally interconnected end-to-end set of information capabilities associated processes and personnel for collecting processing storing disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters policy makers and support personnel The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services software including applications data security services other associated services and National Security Systems JP 1-02 Global information infrastructure GII - The worldwide interconnection of communications networks computers databases and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users The global information infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment including cameras scanners keyboards facsimile machines computers 185 Back to Table of Contents switches compact disks video and audio tape cable wire satellites fiber-optic transmission lines networks of all types televisions monitors printers and much more The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the global information infrastructure JP 1-02 High-payoff target HPT - A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action High-payoff targets are those high-value targets identified through war-gaming that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission JP 1-02 High-value target HVT - A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest JP 1-02 Human factors - The psychological cultural behavioral and other human attributes that influence decision-making the flow of information and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups JP 1-02 Influence operations - Air Force Employment of capabilities to affect behaviors protect operations communicate commander's intent and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary decision cycle which aligns with the commander's objectives AFDD 3-13 Information - 1 Facts data or instructions in any medium or form 2 The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation JP 1-02 Information assurance IA - Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability integrity authentication confidentiality and nonrepudiation This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection detection and reaction capabilities JP1-02 Information environment - The aggregate of individuals organizations or systems that collect process or disseminate information JP 1-02 Information management IM - The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information JP 1-02 Information operations IO - The integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own JP 1-02 IO capability specialist - A functional expert in one or more of the IO core capabilities They serve primarily in their specialty areas but may also serve as IO planners after receiving IO planner training DODI 3608 11 IO career force - The military professionals that perform and integrate the core IO capabilities The IO Career Force consists of IO Capability Specialists and IO Planners DODI 3608 11 IO planner - A functional expert trained and qualified to execute full spectrum IO They usually serve one or more tours as an IO capability specialist prior to assignment as an IO planner and may hold non-IO positions throughout their careers DODI 3608 11 186 Back to Table of Contents INFOCON - Information Operations Condition JP 1-02 Information security INFOSEC - The protection of information and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information whether in storage processing or transit and against denial of service to authorized users JP 1-02 Information superiority - The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same JP 1-02 Information systems - The entire infrastructure organization personnel and components for the collection processing storage transmission display dissemination and disposition of information JP 1-02 Intelligence - The product resulting from the collection processing integration evaluation analysis and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity JP 1-02 Interagency coordination - Within the context of Department of Defense involvement the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective JP 1-02 Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment JIPOE - The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment describing the impact of the operational environment evaluating the adversary and determining adversary courses of action JP 1-02 Joint restricted frequency list JRFL - A time and geographically-oriented listing of TABOO PROTECTED and GUARDED functions nets and frequencies It should be limited to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish objectives • • • Taboo frequencies - Any friendly frequency of such importance that it must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces Normally these frequencies include international distress CEASE BUZZER safety and controller frequencies These frequencies are generally long standing However they may be time-oriented in that as the combat or exercise situation changes the restrictions may be removed JP 1-02 Protected frequencies - Those friendly frequencies used for a particular operation identified and protected to prevent them from being inadvertently jammed by friendly forces while active electronic warfare operations are directed against hostile forces These frequencies are of such critical importance that jamming should be restricted unless absolutely necessary or until coordination with the using unit is made They are generally time-oriented may change with the tactical situation and must be updated periodically Guarded frequencies - Enemy frequencies that are currently being exploited for combat information and intelligence A guarded frequency is time-oriented in that the guarded frequency list changes as the enemy assumes different combat postures These frequencies may be jammed after the commander has weighed the potential operational gain against the loss of the technical information Joint targeting coordination board JTCB - A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information providing targeting guidance and priorities and refining the 187 Back to Table of Contents joint integrated prioritized target list The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff all components and if required component subordinate units JP 1-02 Measure of effectiveness MOE - A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state achievement of an objective or creation of an effect JP 1-02 Military deception MILDEC - Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities intentions and operations thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission JP 1-02 Military information support operations MISO - Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions motives objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations groups and individuals The purpose of military information support operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives JP 1-02 Network Operations NETOPS - 1 Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information Grid JP 1-02 2 The DOD-wide operational organizational and technical capabilities for operating and defending DOD information networks NETOPS includes but is not limited to enterprise management net assurance and content management JP 3-0 Nongovernmental organization NGO - A private self-governing not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering and or promoting education health care economic development environmental protection human rights and conflict resolution and or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society JP 1-02 Operations security OPSEC - A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to a identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems b determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries and c select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation JP 1-02 Perception management - Army Actions to convey and or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions motives and objective reasoning and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator's objectives In various ways perception management combines truth projection operations security cover deception and psychological operations FM 3-13 Physical destruction - Army The application of combat power to destroy or neutralize adversary forces and installations It includes direct and indirect forces from ground sea and air forces Also included are direct actions by special operations forces FM 3-13 Physical security - 1 That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel to prevent unauthorized access to equipment installations material and documents and to safeguard them against espionage sabotage damage and theft 2 In communications security the component that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment material and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons JP1-02 Priority national intelligence objectives - A guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national 188 Back to Table of Contents security policy They are compiled annually by the Washington Intelligence Community and flow directly from the intelligence mission as set forth by the National Security Council They are specific enough to provide a basis for planning the allocation of collection and research resources but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements JP 1-02 Propaganda - Any form of adversary communication especially of a biased or misleading nature designed to influence the opinions emotions attitudes or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly JP 1-02 Psychological operations PSYOP - This term has been replaced by Military information support operations MISO Public affairs PA - Those public information command information and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the DOD JP 1-02 Public diplomacy PD - 1 Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad 2 In peace building civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts rule of law and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community JP 1-02 Public information - Within public affairs that information of a military nature the dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for release JP 1-02 Reachback - The process of obtaining products services and applications or forces or equipment or material from organizations that are not forward deployed JP 1-02 Strategic communication SC - Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs plans themes messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power JP 1-02 Target audience TA - An individual or group selected for influence JP 1-02 The Dictionary of Military and Associated http www dtic mil doctrine dod_dictionary Terms is available on line at Updated November 2011 189 Back to Table of Contents This Page Intentionally Blank 1 90 Back to Table of Contents Information Operations Cyberspace and Strategic Communication Related Websites The appearance of hyperlinks to civilian enterprises does not constitute endorsement by the U S Army of the web site or the information products or services contained therein Also be aware that for other than authorized activities such as military exchanges and Morale Welfare and Recreation sites the U S Army does not exercise any editorial control over the information you may find at these locations These links are provided as a reference for the readers of the IO Primer United States Army War College DIME – Information as Power - http www carlisle army mil DIME United States Army War College Information as Power Blog Site http www carlisle army mil DIME blog default cfm blog dime Information Operations and Cyberspace Related Websites Air Force Institute of Technology Center for Cyberspace Research http www afit edu en ccr index cfm Air University Cyber Space and Information Operations Study Center - http www au af mil infoops index htm Army 1st Information Operations Command Land http www inscom army mil MSC Default1st aspx text off size 12pt Army Chief Information Officer G6 - http ciog6 army mil Army Combined Arms Center Electronic Warfare Proponent Office EWPO http usacac army mil cac2 cew index asp Army Communicator U S Army Signal Regiment's professional magazine http www signal army mil ArmyCommunicator AC aspx Center for Technology and National Security Policy - http www ndu edu ctnsp Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency http csis org files media csis pubs 081208_securingcyberspace_44 pdf Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures - http cve mitre org cve index html Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar RAND Report by Martin C Libicki 2009 http www rand org pubs monographs MG877 Cyber Power by Joseph Nye Jr May 2010 - http belfercenter ksg harvard edu files cyber-power pdf Cyberspace High Frontier - The Journal for Space and Missile Professionals May 2009 http www afspc af mil shared media document AFD-090519-102 pdf Cyberspace Sciences and Information Intelligence Research - http www ioc ornl gov DHS National Cyber Security Division - http www dhs gov xabout structure editorial_0839 shtm DHS National Infrastructure Advisory Council http www dhs gov files committees editorial_0353 shtm DoD High Performance Computing Modernization Program - http www hpcmo hpc mil index html DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace July 2011 http www defense gov news d20110714cyber pdf Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2012 Georgia Tech http www gtisc gatech edu doc emerging_cyber_threats_report2012 pdf Global Trends 2025 A Transformed World National Intelligence Council http www dni gov nic PDF_2025 2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report pdf Information Warfare Monitor – Tracking Cyberpower - http www infowar-monitor net 191 Back to Table of Contents IO Journal official publication of the Information Operations Institute Association of Old Crows http www crows org the-io-institute io-journal html Journal of Electronic Defense official publication of the Association of Old Crows http www crows org jed jed html Long War Journal - http www longwarjournal org National Cyber Security Research and Development Challenges Related to Economics Physical Infrastructure and Human Behavior 2009 http www thei3p org docs publications i3pnationalcybersecurity pdf National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Computer Security Division - Computer Security Resource Center - http csrc nist gov National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Information Technology Lab http www nist gov itl National Vulnerability Database - http web nvd nist gov view vuln search execution e1s1 Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence - http www nrl navy mil aic Reviewing the Federal Cybersecurity Mission Statement to the U S House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cybersecurity and Science and Technology 10 Mar 2009 http csis org files media csis congress ts090310_lewis pdf Technology Policy Law and Ethics Regarding U S Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities - http www nap edu catalog php record_id 12651 U S Computer Emergency Readiness Team US-CERT - http www uscert gov control_systems csthreats html U S House of Representatives Subcomittee on Emerging Threats Cybersecurity and Science and Technology - http homeland house gov subcommittee-3 U S International Strategy for Cyberspace May 2011 http www whitehouse gov sites default files rss_viewer internationalstrategy_cyberspace pdf Strategic Communication Related Websites American Forces Press Service DoD Website - http www defense gov news COMOPS Monitor - http comops org monitor Consortium for Strategic Communication - http www comops org Defense Information School The Center of Excellence for Visual Information and Public Affairs http www dinfos osd mil Joint Forces Staff College - Strategic Communication Bibliography http www jfsc ndu edu library publications bibliography strategic_communication asp Kaboom A Soldier's War Journal archived - http kaboomwarjournalarchive blogspot com Public Diplomacy Alumni Association - http www publicdiplomacy org South East European Times - http www setimes com The News Views of the Maghreb - http www magharebia com cocoon awi xhtml1 en_GB homepage The Washington Institute for Near East Policy - http www washingtoninstitute org templateI01 php Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs - http www state gov r UPENN Annenberg School for Communication - http www asc upenn edu USC Annenberg School for Communication - http annenberg usc edu USC Center on Public Diplomacy - http uscpublicdiplomacy org 192 Back to Table of Contents Wisdom and Strength for The Future Not to promote wet but to preserve