No Ob ection To Declassf c t' n' _12_ an ull 2013 02104 NLC 24 9 3 3 NATIONAL SECURITY March 5 1979 3 t 3 7 MEMORANDUM FOR zsIGNIrw I - FROM ROBERT PASTOR ff SUBJECT U S Pclicy to Argentina 3 Attached at Tab a is the report on Argentina which I mentioned in a recent evening report item After reading it both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina From October December 1977 we voted no on loans to Argentina in the IFI's We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation Such improvement has not occurred and Vance and Christo her now believe that we should vote no in the ecoaction Assessment The report was prepared by INR -not ss and it is a sobering document The human rights situation in is the worst in the hemi ere an esp te repeated promises i gen ine government it has not improved Let me summarize the report -- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military and a smaller group is being rehabili- tated There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number 5 Physical and torture apparently remain standard treatment The Red Cross estimated that 50% of the political prisoners are tortured and some are executed 5 -- Disappearances probably by security units continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978 Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month while earr- 62 le CL as R Pas nr use 53 Fm 03M 5 0 1 Authority 5 m3 3 HmLoaa r m No Objection To Declassifica on in Full 20130304 the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month Embassy estimates 55 Increasingly the people who disappear have vague associations with the po itical left rather than with terrorists Both international and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15 000 disappearances in the past 3 4 years Illegal invasion of the home including theft by security units -- remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent S The justification for official terrorism is tenuous even using the Argentine government's statistics Argentina s Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978 and even Vidsla has admitted that the war is over INR concludes that the army poli cs Policg While I think the assessment is quite accurate I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt I understand that Vance and Uhristopher approach - the issue as a legal one Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violationsIr and the law requires that we vote no on non-basic human needs loans Laws on x M and OPIC provide more flexibility The law only requires that we I'oppose such loans and opposition has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility S In deciding what approach to take I believe we should address two questions What is the most approach to Argentina to encourage than to improve the human rights situation 5 2 What approach will permit us to sustain in the 0 5 our overall human rights policy When we take punitive steps toward Argentinar we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues we also arouse the business sector and the media in the 0 5 This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required but it does suggest that we should move carefull and ggplain oun position to a wide-range audience before tak 9 any steps least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy An Effective Policy What is the most effective approach Argentina is a big proud and subtle country We have an impact on Argentine government 5% No Objection oDecIasgi catIon -u decisions but it's never as direct or as much as we want This is the case of our human rights policy The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons 1 our historical reasonably close relationship the U S under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute ththE idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate and such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U S ll through lobbying and propaganda in the U 5 they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy and 2 they have taken baby steps in the human rights area at home I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could he I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina and it would cause us serious problems in the 0 5 S In short I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encour ge them to clean up their act They will continue to try to lure high-levEI visitors and we should resist that until progress is evident But even if you believe as Vance and Qhristopher do that we should take the negative steps outlined above I would encourage delay One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months what will several more months do Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer The Argentinewgovernment has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months now that it's quiet they have the opportunity to move 2 Several of Argentina s most hard-line Generals have been transferred and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before 3 Argentina's Ambassador has just told thy that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months And 4 the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report That may mean a delay of six months or more RECOMMENDATION Vance has apparently decided to change our policy I therefore recommend_you call him and ask him to re-consider I remains convinced you may want to ash him to delay a decision pending the IAHRC report Approve Disapprove - No Objection To Declassi cation in ull 2013 02 04 cc Jeanine Mathews Views Bah is right that our primary concern should be whet will work with Argentina Our policy of the past year abstention certainly hasn't worked and I have little expectation that prolonging it Will Ch nae anything despite the feet that the Beagle Chanel dispute is over On the other hand a tougher posture probably won't work either I suspect that in the nee tern nothin will work until end Videle gets much more secure or in Argentine public opinion However there in one importent consideration mis ing here namely the relationship of Argentina to the rent of our Human rights policy is Bob points out the situation in Argentina in the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the peat year at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers While it is impossible to compare events in any Argentina and Indonesia we do have to struggle to make the policy eoneietent insofar as we ten and by these etendard there in a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer etenn toward the GOA If neither posture is likely to he nnoh nor successful vin e vie the GOA we should pick the one that in more consistent vith the human rights policy returning to the tougher no vote position L15 A1 M won teewa I