Record of the Main Content of the Consultations Between A A Obukhov and R Bartholomew October 7 1991 10 00AM-6 00PM A A Obukhov I propose that we continue the issues on the agenda R Bartholomew It seemed to us that in President Gorbachev’s statement there was no answer to one of the initiatives proposed by President Bush Specifically our proposal to begin dialogue on command and control of strategic nuclear weapons A A Obukhov In M S Gorbachev’s television statement it was said that “we express our willingness to enter into a substantive dialogue with the United States on developing safe and ecologically responsible technologies for storing and transporting nuclear warheads methods of using nuclear charges and raising nuclear securi ty ” Likewise it was announced that “with the goal of raising the reliability of control over nuclear weapons we are combining under a single operational management all strategic nuclear forces and including the strategic defensive systems into a single branch of the armed forces ” In this way I get the impression that the Soviet side gave an exhaustive response to the U S proposal Along with that because the American side pays special attention to the issue relating to control systems over strategic nuclear forces we would like to hear additional thoughts from your side about what exactly is meant by that R Bartholomew In President Bush’s speech about this possible measure on perfecting command and control systems were mentioned which would prevent the possibility of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons J Shalikashvili We would particularly like to discuss the following issue technical measures related to the existing system of command and control over strategic nuclear forces that would prevent the possibility of unauthorized use of these weapons the procedures making up the integral part of the strategic weapons’ chain of command which would prevent the possibility of launching ICBMs as a result of accidental or intentional actions I’d especially like to mention the fact that the American side isn’t proposing to engage in an in-depth exchange of opinions on this issue in such a way that would touch upon topics related to state secrets and interests of national security R Bartholomew In thi s context I’d like to mention that at the very top of the chain of command of strategic arms of the US are civilians not military personnel A A Obukhov The strategic nuclear forces control system available in the Soviet Union provides reliable use of nuclear weapons and guarantees against its unauthorized use As in the US in our country the supreme commander is civilian the President of the USSR We have listened in the most attentive manner to the thoughts of General Shalikashvili about what is meant in discussing the issue of the command system of strategic arms It’s becoming clear that we’re talking about developing procedures that will provide stronger guarantees against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons without penetrating into the field related to national security interests We will recommend to our leadership that as part of future contacts with the American side these issues be reflected In particular they could be touched upon at the upcoming discussion with the USSR Minister of Defense E I Shaposhnikov R Bartholomew We will undoubtedly use your advice S M Rogov Several questions related to this Do the US proposals mean that naval strategic forces of the US would be placed under the authority of the Strategic Air Command Do you mean to install a PAL system on American SLBMs Doesn’t the American side believe that it would be expedient to place warheads in air-launched tactical nuclear weapons under the authority of the Strategic Air Command as well J Shalikashvili The questions asked by Mr Rogov illustrate the possible agenda for Soviet-American consultations on this issue R Hanmer Couldn’t the Soviet side share with us its thoughts on specific methods of physical elimination of nuclear charges Likewise we are interested in specifying the term “raising nuclear security ” under which the American side has specific “mechanical” methods of ensuring greater safety of nuclear charges A A Obukhov The questions asked by Ambassador Hanmer will also allow the clarification of the possible frame of Soviet-American dialogue on the aforementioned issue The Soviet side is basically in favor of cooperating with the United States exchange expertise and gain use out of it by solving issues related to the security of nuclear charges Consultations renewed after a brief break A A Obukhov Allow me to inform you that the important conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR B D Pankin and Ambassador Bartholomew has just concluded The results from the expert-level discussion were reviewed The Minister wished Mr Bartholomew successful work from USSR President M S Gorbachev who is closely following the negotiations and is pleased by the positive reaction of President Bush to his televised statement R Henmer In President Gorbachev’s speech he stated that you intend to “unite under a single operational command all strategic forces ” likewise “to include the strategic defensive systems in a single branch of armed forces ” Two questions on this topic Specifically which strategic armaments will enter the new strategic command What is meant by the inclusion of strategic defensive systems under a single branch of the armed forces B A Omelichev All strategic armaments particularly Strategic Missile Forces naval strategic forces and heavy bombers land and space warning systems and also the Moscow ABM would be united into a single branch of the armed forces R Henmer Do you intend to include anti-aircraft systems in this branch of armed forces first of all fighter interceptors F I Ladygin The events mentioned by General Omelichev are taken by us in the context of ongoing military reform At the current time the final decisions on reform parameters have not yet been made At the same time air defenses particularly fighter interceptors probably will not be included in this new branch of armed forces S Hadley I’d like to state that the explanations from the Soviet si de are extremely useful to us A A Obukhov I suggest that we give attention to the problem discussed by Minister Pankin and Ambassador Bartholomew I am referring to the decision by the USSR to declare that th from October 6 of this year there will be a one-year moratorium on conducting nuclear experiments This is a unilateral measure taken by us with the goal of encouraging other states to join us The Soviet specialists present here can probably fetch a serious argumentation in favor of our proposal Both the Soviet leadership and Russian leadership are in support of decisive actions aimed at ending nuclear experiments I’m asking the American side to comment on this Soviet proposal S Hadley Unfortunately I have little to say on the given matter We understand the difficulties with which the Soviet nuclear testing program is faced and also those issues which can be raised in relation to nuclear tests We try to take into full account the ecological problems related to the nuclear testing program in the United States The Soviet and American presidents have discussed issues of the safety of nuclear arsenals many times These questions predetermine our position relating to nuclear tests As long as we possess nuclear weapons a modest but effective nuclear test program will be necessary for ensuring the safety and reliability of the available nuclear armaments A A Obukhov I think there is an urgent need of continuing the Soviet-American dialogue on this important topic Some authoritative experts believe that ending nuclear tests is an attainable goal even with the condition of keeping nuclear arsenals Halting the tests would allow us to vigorously accelerate the “Disarmament Race ” Such a step also would protect humanity from the harmful effects of underground nuclear explosions I’d like to note that the Soviet community actively speaks out for ending nuclear experiments This is the position expressed repeatedly by the Soviet and Russian leadership With this I’d ask the American side to carefully review this issue again F I Ladygin The decision made by us to make certain adjustments to the Soviet announcement of unilateral measures related to taking 503 ICBMs off alert The total number of warheads on these armaments will be increased in comparison to the earlier announcement by 60 units The specific plan will eliminate 326 RS-10 ICBMs 40 RS-12 ICBMs 37 RS-16 ICBMs 90 RS-18 ICBMs and 10 RS-20 ICBMs S Hadley These are good news A A Obukhov Could you please comment on the Soviet proposals of terminating the production of fissionable material for weapons production on a mutual basis likewise we call on all nuclear states to declare a no-first-use policy regarding their weapons S Hadley The issue of no-first- use of nuclear weapons isn’t new We certainly have to look at it from the angle of a new international situation Nevertheless we continue to believe that this new situation merely confirms the correctness of our approach As must be known to the Soviet side the US has declared that it won’t use its armed forces – be it nuclear or conventional arms – in any situation except for defense purposes As for the the Soviet proposal of terminating the production of fissionable material I think that we must take a fresh look at this issue accounting for the seriousness with which the Soviet side proposed it We will study this proposal of yours Now allow us to comment on issue of the non-nuclear limited missile defense system D Graham The SDI program was first thought of as a large-scale missile defense system which would ensure defense from a significant number of nuclear weapons Deploying such a system was meant to be carried out in phases This concept of SDI came together during an era of confrontation and was calculated for a global Soviet-American nuclear conflict In the 90s we are faced with a different military-strategic situation Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons are being reduced Moreover a trend has been observed of such weapons being built in other countries The process of their improvement is ongoing Under influence of these trends the United States has adopted a new military doctrine which is focused not on a global Soviet-American conflict but on regional threats to peace In accordance with this new doctrine the SDI program is being reoriented with the goal of developing a defense system against limited strikes The Corresponding decisions were made by the President of the United States in the beginning of 1991 and have developed into his th initiative of September 27 According to the new SDI concept the antimissile defense system must ensure protection from limited strikes shelter American armed forces in various regions of the world US territory its friends and allies At the same time such a system should not ensure protection from a massive nuclear attack and therefore wouldn’t undermine the effectiveness of the Soviet deterrent capability According to our estimates there are currently 15 governments in possession of ballistic missiles and by 2000 that number will rise to 20 Besides that there is a tendency to proliferate weapons of mass destruction – nuclear chemical and biological and also advanced conventional technology weapons It’s necessary to account for the factor of political instability The United States for example is concerned by the unreliability of the command systems related to ballistic missiles in third-world countries Experience shows that in conditions of political instability modern weapons may be used against American armed forces in various regions of the world In this way the problem of proliferation of ballistic missiles is a global problem affecting the USSR and the US The US Armed Forces as well as allied territory is currently under threat of a missile attack The same thing pertains to the territory of the Soviet Union In the future such a threat will increasingly affect the national territory of the United States Ballistic missiles are viewed as the most “valuable” kind of weapon in third -world countries Leaders of several third-world governments have demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons To date hundreds of ballistic missiles have been used in the Iran-Iraq War hundreds – in Afghanistan 86 missile launches were registered as part of Operation Desert Storm in 1986 Libya made two unsuccessful missile launches against an American facility in the Mediterranean Sea The fact that in the Iran-Iraq War both sides possess ballistic missiles is worrisome and this didn’t stop them from using such missiles W eapons of mass destruction have been used in regional conflicts although until now missiles weren’t used as means of delivery The United States undertook numerous measures in order to prevent the proliferation of the aforementioned weapons – diplomatic political and military In particular we even ran to such methods as threatening a retaliatory attack tried to destroy ballistic missile launch systems as part of the Gulf War and also went on the path of deploying a limited SDI system based on the Patriot system All of this brought us to the conclusion that it is necessary to create a more effective antimissile defense system Such a system we believe could consist of ground-based and spacebased sensors which would fixate the missile launches monitor them allow us to distinguish between real or false warheads non-nuclear interceptors that are ground or space-based The last element of the system would be control The entire system would ensure the interception of anywhere between 10 to 200 heads at any given moment It wouldn’t assume deploying “directed energy weapons ” war instead it would be based upon means of direct interception The actual space echelon of the antimissile defense would consist of two types of interceptors to destroy missiles in the boost phase of their trajectory before dividing into multiple entry vehicles and to destroy the warheads themselves The system would simultaneously be capable of intercepting 20-25 ballistic missiles during the boost phase of their trajectory A A Obukhov Does the American proposal provide for exchange of technology D Graham Currently we are not proposing exchanging technology With that we would be willing to exchange information on these issues We welcomed with interest the Soviet proposal on measures of cooperation in developing a joint ballistic missile launch early warning system In the final stage we suggest to agree on a new regime which would weaken the limitations installed by the ABM Treaty and allow the deployment of limited ABM systems The American side formally proposed this last week in Geneva A more important element of these American proposals is the US agreement of installing such limitations on defense systems which would be compatible with the goal of ensuring protection from a limited attack but not undermining the effectiveness of a deterrent potential S Hadley I’d like to remind you that earlier the American side insisted that both the USSR and US withdrew from the ABM Treaty but didn’t install any limita tions on deploying defense systems We attach great importance to the USSR President’s announcement about the Soviet side being prepared to discuss the issue of deploying non-nuclear ABM systems We could agree on what forums such an exchange of views would take place at A A Obukhov Would this ABM system ensure shelter for all of the US territory or would this be an ABM of specific regions or facilities D Graham If the ABM system which I described was deployed in full capacity it would provide protection for the entire territory of the US A A Obukhov What about the territory of US allies and also American forces abroad D Graham These tasks would be carried out with the help of tactical ABM systems such as Patriot or similar naval-based systems as well as space vehicles A A Obukhov In this way the conversation is about deploying a tactical ABM D Graham Yes that is so Consultations were continued after a break at 4 00PM A A Obukhov Do Soviet representatives have additional questions to the American side relating to information about the ABM system for protection against limited nuclear strikes S M Rogov Judging by the message from the American side the conversation is about deploying an ABM system with a complicated architecture Such a system would consist of space elements ground stations and mobile bases The “limited” character of the system is ensured by the deployment of a relatively small amount of nuclear systems What guarantees can the American side present that this deployment would not continue during a crisis situation In other words in what way would assurance be ensured that the “limited” ABM would not turn into something else R Bartholomew Both sides would take onto themselves the corresponding obligation in establishing an international legal form Evidently it would be expedient to complete such an agreement with a package of predictability measures in the area of ABM The limits on capabilities of the ABM system would be ensured and determined by technological limits Ultimately a factor such as internal American legislation would be involved budgetary constraints Deploying a large-scale ABM system requires establishing new architectures of such a system of substantial additional funding All of this cannot be implemented without Congressional approval S M Rogov By our assessments the amount of funds requested by the administration for Fiscal Year 1992 to implement an ABM system to protect against limited nuclear strikes would be enough to ensure the procurement of missile defense for intercepting a significantly larger number of warheads than what was indicated here by the American side S Hadley The questions asked by Mr Rogov are well founded The exchange of ideas must be a subject of Soviet-American dialogue on that account Also in the opinion of the American side the administration’s request for SDI for Fiscal Year 1992 cannot ensure funding for the scope of work required for deploying a large-scale ABM system E T Agayev As far as I understand the American side is putting forward the issue of deploying a limited ABM system mainly due to concerns of missile and missile technology proliferation If the American proposals were to assume transferring the corresponding technology then I would without a doubt recommend to the Russian leadership to accept this gift But according to Mr Graham’s statement the American side is not prepared for such a step The topic is merely of exchanging information It’s no secret that in these conditions deploying an ABM system if only on a limited scale would require the Soviet Union to attract significant additional funds to this goal Isn’t it better considering these ci rcumstances to take additional steps which would reliably block access of third-world countries to weapons of mass destruction and modern delivery vehicles R Bartholomew I share your ambition to spend less money on defense I do not accept however that reducing the defense budget assumes a decrease in the scope of funding of each military program On the contrary under the conditions of the transforming international relations with account of emerging new realities and threats may demand priority financing for certain military programs which in our opinion refers to ABM as well Moreover it’s no secret that in the Soviet Union funding for antimissile development is carried out without that at a very high level I do not presume to give you advice but the American side is of the opinion that a significant part of this money is going to the wrong programs Therefore implementing the proposal of our idea of deploying limited ABM systems apparently would not require exorbitant additional expenditures from the Soviet side And a few more thoughts about this In my opinion – and the developing situation in the world confirms this – policy in the area of missile and missile technology nonproliferation can be effective only with the condition that it will be complemented with deploying a limited ABM system I cannot imagine that a responsible American politician would make the decision in the current situation to refrain from deploying a limited ABM system and in this way leave the US vulnerable to a possible missile strike from some small country with an unstable political regime I cannot imagine how your people can exercise patience in the given situation A A Obukhov I thank you for your explanations I think that the focus of the questions by asked the Soviet representatives about the American idea of deploying a “slim” ABM system demonstrates our excessive concern over the high cost of the corresponding measures and also that efforts by both sides in the area of security don’t lead to underminin g strategic stability These concerns are completely legal We are also still concerned about the fate of the ABM Treaty which during several decades ensured strategic stability I think that the American side must consider the value of the ABM Treaty in the same manner The considerations which were expressed by both sides undoubtedly predetermine the continuation of the dialogue that we began S M Rogov Please allow me to share a few thoughts about the Soviet proposal about establishing a common missile attack early warning system Both sides apparently have an interest that the EWS systems of the USSR and US be extremely reliable especially under the condition of the huge remaining nuclear weapons arsenals With eliminating the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station facing the Pacific Ocean our EWS system currently doesn’t ensure the necessary opportunities Such a situation I think should be a cause for concern for the Americans In the Arctic Ocean the NORAD system crosses with our EWS system which suggests the possibility of problems rising in this geographic region We could think about establishing a means of warning each other about a missile attack which would complement the existing American and Soviet means This could be created jointly and launched by Soviet-American satellites to monitor the northern part of the Pacific Ocean Atlantic Arctic and Indian Oceans We could think about the possibility of installing “black boxes” in locations where ABM systems are deployed to locate missile launches Another element of guaranteeing against unauthorized attack would be the installation of self-destruct systems in START Everything mentioned above would allow us to enhance stability during a crisis Establishing a joint system missile attack warning system would ensure the flow of information about what is happening in third-world countries allow to warn about possible provocations meant to provoke the Soviet-American conflict R Bartholomew I accept what Mr Rogov said I don’t think that everything th at was talked about is practicable but there is are areas in which it is possible and we will bring forward our thoughts A A Obukhov Allow me to summarize Our discussions were conducted in a constructive friendly manner and this is a good sign The dialogue was defined by the counterinitiatives of the Presidents of the USSR and US The information that we exchanged I think will contribute to implementing the aforementioned initiatives We also outlined the direction of future dialogue that will allow us to accelerate the disarmament process R Bartholomew I’d like to express to the Soviet side my appreciation for their traditional hospitality In my approach to security issues of the United States come from the assumption that times of confrontation between our countries have remained in the past In the military-technical area our armed forces are reducing so as to remove the potential for a sudden attack In the political area recent events in your country – the decisive breakthrough toward democracy – predetermine our firm determination to help you in every way We need different armed forces that will reflect greater extent than they do now the mutual relations between the USSR and US the new situation in the world The discussions we’ve held strengthened my belief that we have laid a solid foundation for continuing dialogue In the nearest future I intend to contact you about a schedule of subsequent discussions V E Belashov I’d like to express my appreciation to the American side for expressing your interest in exchanging ideas on the matter of nuclear weapons with representatives of the republics I am grateful to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the provided opportunity of participating in the working Soviet- American consultations The fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine must be solved with account of the opinion of the Ukrainian people Ukraine intends to constructively participate in resolving issues pertaining to its interests and territory A A Obukhov In conclusion please allow me to thank all the participants in this consultation from both sides Participants in the consultations -From the Soviet side Deputy Minister Obukhov Georgiy Mamedov MFA Yuriy Nazarkin MFA General Omelichev General Ladygin Sergey Rogov USA and Canada Institute G M Yevstaf’yev MFA Andrey Kolosovskiy RSFSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Belashev Ukrainian MFA Andrey Sannikov Belorussian MFA Rustem Kurmanguzhin Kazakh Permanent Representation -From the American side Undersecretary Bartholomew John Gordon NSC Steven Hadley OSD Lt Gen John Shalikashvili JCS Victor Alessi DOE Doug McEachin ACIS Reed Hanmer ACDA James Timbie T Douglas Graham OSD John Ordway EUR SOV Notetaker Dmitriy Arensberger interpreter The conversation was recorded by First Secretary of the US and Canada Desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M V Berdennikov Translated for by Tal Solovey for The National Security Archive Donated to the National Security Archive by William Potter