u- - cyfr-u are l in- NATIONAL ssousm' COUNCIL 3h 7 M57 1m no 20505 5915 VP October 10 1991 3 MEMORANDUM FDR AMBASSADOR momma BARTHOLOMEW 52 MR STEPHEN Hanna gang 5 MR VICTOR ALESSI m DOUGLAS moancsm LTG JOHN SHALIKASVILI gap at AMBASSADOR READ HANMER a g Mo FROM JOHN screwy Egg- mgh SUBJECT Nuclear Initiatives Discussion Paper we plan to meet this afternoon at 3 00 pm to discuss where we go in response to the new initiatives presented by President I have drafted a short paper attached outlining the specific Soviet proposals and a few of the considerations that Gorbachev should bear on how we respond At our meeting I would like to briefly discuss each element and decide how to proceed on each iNet Deolassi oation Review so 13526 acumen IDECLASSIFY IN PART Discussion Paper by Mary Hanan on 12222014 Department at Energy Document Review l' m ch Dclmuinoliun Circle WW I I Classifmubn Remind Anatomy 1mm Denver I'nunContains No DOE Clnm cd Info 4 thlinme With all cw r I S 4 lusui cd Info Bluc o u its Of ce Of the Secretary Of Defense 5 0 5L 55 Chief RDD BSD WHS 6-- Date as Am 3912 Authority 15013526 Dcclassify DenyinFull Deolassify in Part Reason 6 1 MDR 1% gage At tern 145W NSC - 55 le 7 2 Ca 2 Saw 3 21 09 05D sort-t Prone-Il- Section 6 2 LWW President Gorbachev proposed that on a reciprocal basis the two sides destroy all navalatactical nuclear weapons There are three obvious options for the 0 3 -- stick by our original position to destroy a portion or those removed agree to the Soviet proposal or find some middle ground we plan to retain onl the Under the original v 3 initia aroma and B-Sls gravity bombs It would seem that there is little to be gained by seeking an intermediate option destroying a greater percentage of these weapons we would not have met the Soviet initiative would not have saved much money and would seem to be a niggling response Before deciding between the other two options we need to answer the following questions What is the role we envisage for the stored weapons What weapons and in what numbers are the Soviets likely to retain What is their military potential -- If we say no to this Soviet proposal how will we articulate the need to retain these weapons in the face of the Soviet offer to do away with the entire class magnum President Gorbachev proposed that on a reciprocal basis all air- delivered tactical weapons be stored at centralized locations away from combat units This seems to be a workable proposition one at least worth consideration for a positive response It would bring the Soviet weapons under potentially better control and store them away from their aircraft At the same time the Soviets have given air delivered nuclear weapons in Europe a new legitimacy Some would argue that the Soviet offer in itself gives US air- delivered forces in Europe a new legitimacy DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aughority E0 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date 2 5 w-LnEu '3 Llshould anotgagt'ea to veri cation That unilateral policy statement to the effect that it is not US - polioy to produce additional fissile materials for use in nuclear sweapons 4 Wmemma We Should be willing to talk to the soviets about this it 13 a more specific proposal or the President's statement in his speech that orum may also be another place to speak to stability strategic balance MIRVB and the like The United States-has not enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 -- we anticipate an excess or some 170 metric tons over the nest several years and plan to use the majority of the excess to naysl power reactor fuel There is also a signiricanc exceSs plutonium and planned weapons returns will more than mgxauup for the requirements for new production provided we can proces- 'material VThis-sppears-to'be a step we can sign up to but we is our step should be a we will have to make clear that this does not limit our operation of tritium production reactors which have the inherent capability of producing plutonium and that it does not limit our ability to produce the plutonium isotope used by NASA in space power systems We will need to detine what we want to do in terms of openness and transparency but we do not want to get into a veritication swamp It is clear from earlier work that we cannot hope to verify the quantity of already existing Soviet material The 0 5 position and name's has long been that all should disavow'the first use of all military force We see no reason to change at this time In fact we may be in an extremely strong position with the reformists in the Soviet Union to get them to sign up to our formulation DEOIJISSIFIED IN FULL Aulhonty 0 13526 11 Chief Records a Baclass DIV HHS