STAMP 0R PRINT oecmssIFIED IN PART - 9 5 - 3520 5 SWGIWDE M m MR 2 3 on Deparlmenl of Energ Declaesl callnn Review 1 to 1' Illumination Circle OBJECTION TO FULL 1- gm tnlz lmgm To ELEASE a mum I 5 33357311 Duck-tad lot 8 A Ihol lly DD DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED MSG NBR DATE AND TIME RECEIVED TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTOR FROM DOUGLAS PHONE NBR 693-7371 SUBJECT Implementation of Initiative on Safety Security U PAGES 3 HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS LEI IMMEDIATELY NOTE FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY TRAN SMIT TO AGENCY INDIVIDUAL NAME OFFICE ROOM NBR PHONE NBR WHITE HOUSE BG John Gordon Craig Chellis NSC '336 395-3330 STATE Robert Walpole PM 7325 NS 647 9024 ACDA Bradley Gordon NS 647 3466 CIA Douglas Macadam - DOE Victor Alessi Tony Czajkoweki OAC 43014 Forree tal lama Inn JCS MG Roland Laj delivered via other means REMARKS 1C5 1-3 FORM 6 3 JAN 34 OSI - LIE 3 51 9 E0 13526 3 5 c REQU ESTIRECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION STAMP OR PRINT 3-107-34 17 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-2600 EVIEWED AND RETURNED T0 - mum 000 INTERNATIONAL NO DBJECTION TO FULL In reply refer to RELEASE 1-91 24349 MEMORANDUM FOR MR ROBERT WALPOLE MR BRADLEY GORDON MR DOUGLAS MACEACHIN I A E0 13526 3 5 0 SUBJECT Implementation of Initiative on Safety and Security U TEL Attached for your review is the joint paper on implementation of the President s initiative in the area of safety and security as requested by BG John Gordon s memorandum of October 4 1991 OSD POC for this paper is Mr Leo Michel 703 695- 0931 KDWQ 2900 1391 uglas R Graham Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Strategic Defense Space and Veri cation Policy Attachment als 0 Copy to DECLASSIFIED IN PART r J MED 13520 Dr Alessr emu Rama BMW MG Lajoic MAR 2 3 2015 a t Iuis ducumchl wearers mull ul o 'n W Department Of Energy Washington DC 20585 UL 1' 9 199 05 REVIEWED AND RETURNED TO DOD OBJECTION TO FULL RELEASE MEMORANDUM FDR Mr Robert Walpole Department of State Mr Bradley Gordon Arms Control and Disarmament Agency C I Pi E0 13526 3 5 c 5 SUBJECT Implementation of Initiative on Safety and Security Attached for your review is the Joint Department of Energy and Defense paper on implementation of the President's Initiative in the area of safety and security as requested by BC John Gordon's memorandum of October 4 1991 Please forward an comments to DOE-and DOD by close of business Friday November 1 1991 The DOE point of contact is Dorothy Donnelly 202-586-1616 at - 3 nemumnemeonePART if' fix 6 4 cremati momm FUCHJ owsigi on MR 2 3 2015 Acting Director Office of Arms Control Defense Programs Attachment cc Douglas R Graham Office Secretary of Defense MG Roland LaJoie Joint Chiefs of Staff as fees Page CYI Sell 05B DOS REVIEWED AND RELEASE IMPLEMENTATION OF INITIATIVE 0N SAFETY AND SECURITY 1 PURPOSE OSD 2 3 blt CL TS On September 27 President Bush proposed beginning discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas one of which is existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these might be enhanced On October 5 in his response to the President s initiative Gorbachev stated Soviet readiness to enter into a detailed dialogue with the United States on the development of a secure and ecologically sound technology for the storing and transportation of nuclear warheads the means of using nuclear weapons and the raising of nuclear security In response to NSC tasking this paper outlines topics that might be included in the physical security and safety area and how the US should organize efforts to pursue bilateral discussions in this area CIA II BACKGROUND E0 13526 A serious incident involving the loss theft or accidental detonation of a Soviet nuclear weapon would have potentially dire human political and military consequences affecting US interests The Soviet armed forces and internal security services are believed to have in place substantial sical and manpower intensive securi safe ards and procedures the past in discussing weapon security and safety issues the physical security of Soviet nuclear weapons in the current circumstances of nationalist unrest and agging military morale apparently has been of concern at high levels of the Soviet political and military leadership 39 In the discussions on physical security and safety the US should pursue as its overall objective the improvement of the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons Its near-term objective should be the reduction of the risks of a nuclear weapon-related accident or loss of control in the USSR involving their existing stockpile The US will not negotiate agreements or understandings that commit the sides to incorporate in their respective physical security and safety regimes any of the information exchanged The discussions however could involve providing non-sensitive information to facilitate Soviet ability if the Soviets in fact identify de ciencies and are willing to address them to safely transport and store their nuclear weapons either as part of their response to the President s initiatives or their efforts to maintain centralized control over those weapons the latter may include eventual removal of those weapons to the Russian Republic TS As its longer-term objective the discussions might explore possibilities of providing non-sensitive information that could be used by the Soviets to improve the physical security and safety of their future stockpile While not a major US objective the US NEW DECLASBIFIED IN PART mac 13526 MAR 2 3 2m would be open to learning about Soviet techniques and or procedures that potentially could enhance U S nuclear surety Care would be needed in the discussions to ensure that it is not unfairly perceived as an effort to exploit either side s possible shortcomings An essential precondition for effective implementation of the initiative is that any discussions must not provide to the Soviets -- or through them to any other state or subnational group -- information on or access to sensitive data technologies or procedures that could improve their military capabilities readiness posture or ability to defeat U S nuclear weapon safety and security measures To ensure full protection of such data technologies and procedures each topic selected for possible discussion with the Soviets must be based on unclassified or declassified sources and subjected to thorough red teaming before tabling with the Soviets In addition it should be recognized that the proposed discussions may not have a near-term impact in improvements to the physical security and safety of Soviet nuclear weapons since incorporating certain of the concepts andlor technologies mentioned below likely would be a complex time consuming and in some cases expensive effort The longer term impact however could be very signi cant depending on the information owing from the discussions and eventual decisions by Soviet central authorities or possibly by independent republics to incorporate such information into their security and safety approach TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION TS An initial survey has identi ed the following illustrative list of topics on physical security and safety of nuclear weapons that pending the results of red teaming may be suitable for discussion with the Soviets A Nuclear Weapons Management In beginning discussions on the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons it would be useful to describe the long-established and carefully integrated structure designed to assure proper oversight of the safe design of weapons and the procedures to ensure conformity with U S guidance on the physical security of nuclear weapons 1 Roles and responsibilities of DOD DOB Nuclear Weapons Council and Soviet counterparts 2 Key surety groups Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group and Nuclear Weapon Safety Study Group and Soviet counterparts 3 Primary U S and USSR guidance on nuclear weapon physical security and safety DECLASSIFIED IN FULL stream a ecordsaDeelaachv WHS I MAR 2 3 2016 B Physical Security 1 Prevention of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons at xed sites a Personnel Reliability Program stockpile inventory procedures Weapon Access Delay System in conceptual terms other weapon security and storage systems 2 Prevention of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons in transit Note Although transportation is included in the initiative on weapon dismantlement and destruction it may be more appropriate to address it in the physical security and safety context -- General transport and handling policies and criteria and -- Methods of transportation and associated requirements C Nuclear Weapon Safety 1 Safety risk assessment methodologies -- standards and scenarios 2 Prevention of accidental detonation occur insensitive high explosives 3 Storage safety -- storage concepts -- limits on hazardous materials and -- regulations and criteria for storage sites or plutonium dispersal should an accident re resistant plutonium pits enhanced nuclear detonation safety and safety procedures for handling assembled weapons and test devices DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13528 Chief Records Declaas Div WHS Dale 2 3 usemssmeom PART 4 4 ReSponse to nuclear incidents accidents Date MAR 2 3 2015 -- emergency search for lost or stolen weapons or terrorist devices procedures not technical capabilities -- nuclear accident incident agreements and C I E0 13526 -- dearming recovery render safe groups TS One option would be to expand the safety category to include discussions on environmentally-safe nuclear testing test containment This would be a useful area for discussion and c00peration because while Soviet containment problems do not directly threaten U S national security interests they remain a sensitive issue for several U S allies and friends in particular the Nordic states and could pose health risks to U S teams carrying out on site measurements necessary for effective verification of the Soviet containment failures also could lend themselves to exploitation by governments and or private groups opposed to nuclear testing anywhere regardless of the containment record of other states that conduct nuclear testing On the other hand such discussions may be viewed by some as an inadequate reSponse to the declared USSR moratorium on testing If a decision were made to pursue this option an additional tOpic for discussion could be 05D 3 303 1 D Containment of Nuclear Explosions horizontal and vertical emplacement -- review of successful and unsuccessful containment and -- survey siting standards procedural checks and closure mechanisms IV ORGANIZING U S EFFORTS For the U S the management technical and operational expertise required to address all of the above-noted topics resides in DOD and DOE Following approval of the overall concept for implementing this initiative DOD and DOE would work together to re ne the list of issues for possible discussion recommend their prioritization develop draft presentations for the Soviets and red team those presentations to ensure full protection of U S sensitive data technologies and procedures It is dif th to estimate how long an effective red teaming effort would take for all of the suggested topics but initial surveys within DOD and DOE suggest that some subjects -- storage and transit containers personnel reliability programs stockpile inventory procedures and containment of nuclear tests might be adequately red teamed and ripe for initial discussion in 30-60 days Other subjects -- response to nuclear incidents accidents under Nuclear Weapon Safety above -- could require longer to identify and work around potential security problems depending on the detail authorized for discussions SEGREF DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authodty E013526 Chief Records a Useless Div WHS Smear 23 ms 5 To preserve the exploratory technical and non-negotiating thrust of the President s mitiatives to avoid creating expectations of major breakthroughs or agreements and to provide added protection against any Soviet efforts to obtain sensitive information the following approach should be adopted at the next Bartholomew-Obnkhov meeting the U S would propose a small working group meeting on physical safety and security issues for about a week in early December and suggest 1-2 icebreaker topics general presentations on nuclear weapon management and transportation safety issues -- the U S side would be headed by an appropriate policy community of cial and deputy to provide oversight and continuity to the working group's discussions and to encourage greater civilian involvement possibly including representatives of the republics on the Soviet side The U S side would include a small number 3 5 of DOD and DOE experts and as appropriate no more than one representative from other policy agencies -- U S presentations and follow-on discussions would not go beyond those materials cleared in advance by DOD and Soviet requests for further information would simply be taken for consideration by the U S at a later date Le a backstOpping mechanism would not be appropriate or necessary while bilateral meetings are in progress and -- based on each meeting each side could propose further discussions on these or other topics through the Bartholomew-Obukhov channel As a rule every effort should be made to keep the size of the U S team small and largely technical in composition bringing only those experts necessary for discussion of the pre agreed topic s limit the bilateral meetings to one or two weeks spaced apart suf ciently to permit internal reviews of results and effective preparation for any follow on and limit topics for discussion to one or two issues per meeting As required and appropriate the working group might visit facilities in the U S and USSR of relevance to their discussions As a venue for such meetings options include Washington Geneva and Moscow Geneva may have the disadvantage of its association with traditional arms control negotiations Holding meetings in Moscow would be difficult from the point of view of administrative support for the U S side V OTHER CONSIDERATIONS In implementing the President s initiative in this area the U S might consider characterizing safety and security discussions at the outset as the Administration s response to its next steps commitment Alternatively the U S may decide not to make that connection explicit preferring instead to answer any questions about next steps by noting that the President s initiative is a response to very real and time urgent concerns about nuclear weapon-related issues and in that context could be viewed as an appropriate next step In support of either approach it could be noted that the Administration study of next steps was evolving toward discussion of c00perative measures regarding nuclear weapon security safety and test containment in lieu of negotiation of further testing limits The US of course could not prevent the Soviets from seeking to use the working group forum to press their agenda for further testing limits indeed if leadership of the Soviet team fell to the MFA the US might expect at least Soviet reference to their hopes for negotiating further testing limits On the other hand the US would be in a strong position to respond that in addition to its refusal on national security grounds to negotiate further testing limits the issue of possible xrther limits clearly is not as urgent as addressing the physical security and safety agenda 13 Finally to further understanding of and support for the U S approach toward implementing this initiative prior consultation with key members of Congress and allies especially the U K and France would be essential Of ce of the Secrets of Defense Chief RDD ESD was 5 0 Date sometime Authority 5033526 Deny in Full Declass' in 1%er Reason '3fb gl 4- 3 51 MDR- I 3 AL