Ms NO OBJECTION T0 FULL ELEASE n I E0 13526 11 Portion redacted by DIA per E0 13526 Refer to NGA OSD and State for review Declassify subject to DIA redaction noted and results of NGA OSD and State review JDC 21 Aug 13 DIM 212-91 5 October 199 ETURNED TO ORIGINATING AGENCY Dog 3 Wran- Defense Intelligence Memorandum Analysis of Soviet President Gorbachev s Responses to President Bush s Initiatives U ey udgments Q MThe Soviets have quickly agreed to several proposals that will have minimal impact on their overall strategic nuclear capabilities and day-to-day operations ii'hese proposals include removing heavy bombers and older silo-hosed intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs from alert status and holding bilateral discussions on nuclear sical security and command and control 31 While the center is eager to pursue new negotiations to reduce weapons levels it is not prepared to accept agreements that might prove injurious to the security of a revamped union In contentious areas such as President Bush s proposal to eliminate all land-based ICBMs equipped with independenili tarietable reentri vehiclesi TS Gorbachev s response indicates the Soviets are ready to discuss limited nonnuclear antiballistlc missile defenses This represents a shift from the previous Soviet position of discussing only strengthening the antihallisilc missile treaty to constrain further antibaliistie missile development and deployment It is not yet clear however how this shift in the Soviet position will substantively affect their position on the antibalilstic missile treaty The Soviets will seek to carry the current arms control momentum into future as otiations s 5455 IN PART MW so 13526 shiatenoomsmormm Scenes MAR 2 3 2015 -Setret- DECLASSIFIED IN PART DIM 2 1 2-9 1 Authority 50 13528 Chlet Records a madam on was Date Introduction MAR 2 3 2015 SM President Gorbachev responded directly to President Bush's 5 with a set of similar unilateral and bilateral preposals The response's tone was 1 very positive and indicated a serious Soviet desire to respond in kind and signal greater exibility re ected in the decision to unilaterally cut 1 000 warheads below limits mandated under START This exibility also was evident in other areas such as agreeing to discuss antiballistic missile systems The Soviets did not accept ali of the Bush proposals such as elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles equi ed with multi le inde endently targetable reen vehicles Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces Strategic Rocket Forces WRemoval of ICBMs from Alert Status Further Soviet clari cation since Gorbachev's Speech indicates that the proposal to remove 503 missiles from alert status is based on their Strategic Arms Reducuon Talks START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding MOU declaration In addition they clari ed earlier statements that the number of MlRVed to be removed from alert 2 '3 5 D19 See-net - Malta DIMEIZ 91 status 15 I37 vice 134 including 37 38-175 at Yedrovo 90 SS-l9s robab deployed at Derazhnya in the Ukraine and 10 -S iFa-For single warhead ICBM systems the Soviets will remove from alert 326 SS-lls according to the Soviets 126 of these missiles probably at Olovyattnaya and Teykovo have alread been taken off alert and 40 sin le warhead missiles at Yoshkar Ola Elimination of MlRVed ICBMs Despite Soviet steps to reduce the number of ballistic missiles on alert the Soviets did not respond directly to the 11 53 proposal to eliminate all According to the US delegation the Soviet reaction to the US pr0posal of no ICBMs was a uniform strong negative Comments included the impression that the US was seeking to gain strategic advantage and that since the US has most of its MlRVed missiles at sea submarine-launched ballistic missiles should be included in such a deal Such proposals would link deep reciprocal reductions to the Soviet concept of strategic stability while maintaining the core of their strategic force WResrricn an 0 Mobile ICBM to Their Bases Authorlty 50 Chief Records 3- 0m '8 Date MAR 2 3 2015 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority so 13526 anus Soviet mobile ICBMs are launch ca able whether eld de lo ed or in arrison team Some Soviet of cials characterized deployment of the rail-mobile ICBM as a securit hazard to the ublic and su ested that such de lo ments should CIR we WModernizarion of President Bush called upon the Soviets to terminate all programs for future ICBMs and to limit ICBM modernization to a single warhead missile system Soviet ICBM development programs currently include the 88-24 follow on and the 58-25 follow-on Gorbachev announced that the rail-mobile ICBM program would not be modernized however a new design version of the 88-24 missile is under wa and robabl intended for silo dc loyment Gorbachev stated that design work on a mo e com act-Size will be sto ed and the plan discontinued '35 DIM 212-91 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles f S iF-i Dismantlemem of Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines The announced removal from active duty of 3 nuclear missile submarines with 4-4 re ects the dismantlement since the tember 1990 Soviet President also announced he will remove an additional 3 submannes with 48 SW SLBM Modernization The Gorbachev counterpro sa did not include any constraints on their SLBM modernization program Authority ED 1 ohm Records a modem DIV WHB 5 -S13'c're1 93 MR 2 3 2015 DECLASSIFIED IN PART gammfgodaseDlv WHS DIM 212-91 MAR 2 3 21115 Long-Range Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and Sea-Based Tootical Nuclear Weapons Gorbachev s proposal to remove tactical naval nuclear weapons appears to be a reciprocal response to President Bush's offer to remove sea-based nuclear weapons including sea-launched cruise missiles from shiis and submarines sass Removing short-range antiship cruise missiles range less than 600 kilometers which the Soviets initially refused to include in the politically binding agreement associated with the START accord reached on will reduce the quick reaction escalatoi threat iresented bi nuclear weapons at sea Strategic Bombers U Removal of Heavy Bombers From Alert Status On 30 September 199 the Soviets announced that their bomber alert status had been reduced In the 5 October 1991 speech Gorbachev reiterated the earlier Soviet announcement and also stated that heavy bomber nuclear weapons would be stored in military depots and a modi ed short-range nuclear missile development program for Strategic bombers would be canceled Defensive Forces ' S tle Antt mt ssile Defense Systems Missile Warning Systems Gorbachev state that the Soviets are prepared to consider re 5315 from the United States on nonnuclear antimissile defense stems Previously the Soviets had resisted any anges to the ABM Treaty advocating that it should be strengthened J-l E0 13523 Declass DIV HAR 2 3 2015 DEGLASSIFIED ll Pl Chief Race mm Data '3 -Set ret DIM 212-91 43% Missile Warning Centers missile attack warnin stem had be in London Gorbachcv's proposal for a joint en earlier broached durin the Jul 199 3-7 thtegic Def ease Missiles Gorbachev responded positively to President Bush's initiative on eliminating nuclear warheads for air defense surface- to-air missile units Gorbachev announced that this class of nuclear weapon would be withdrawn from the air defense troops and consolidated in central sites However he indicated that onl a ortion of them would be eliminated Reduction to 5 000 Weapons Under WGorbachev stated that force reductions would result in a de lo ed START force of only 5 000 weapons rather than the accountable 6 000 limit W e Soviet force structure 1990s through a combination of furthe ICBMs downloa g an be reduced to 5 000 weapons by the late cuts in their nuclear submarine force and and reentry vehicle Nuclear Security Security and Command and Control The a positive response to President Bush's initiative on bilateral nuclear security talks encompassing physical security and command and control issues In his speech Gorbachev further supported this response The Soviets appear willing to engage in discussions and data exchanges with the United States on how security is ensured and maintained in their nuclear forces Soviets quickly issued 3 s MUD Home 9 5 20 39 30 a 200mm uman 039 0m 54 2 ONE mgomn DIM 21291 French and British Nuclear Forces The Soviet s initial response indicates they are particularly concerned with includin Fr British nuclear forces in a new round of arms reductions START II GSIN-FQ-Gorbachev proposed that future negotiations on strategic forces should achieve reductions of about 50 percent This preposal signals continued Soviet interest in moving quickly into negotiations for reductions beyond START The 50-percent gure is similar to other Soviet state represent only a minor modi cation to their revious policy Gorbachev did not 8 cif however period for such reductions Outlook lm-Russian President Yeltsin and his advisers developed their own disarmament plan Rather than contradicting Gorbachev's recent proposals the Yeltsin plan mirrors Gorbachev s and calls for larger cuts in some areas post START force reductions of two-thirds instead of one-half and unspecified more far reaching unilateral measures to remote termination of ssile material for nuclear wea ons DECLASSIFIED IN PART '53 Dale 2 3 DIM 21 9 TS 1 4003 0 SD 5 U S C 552 '5 ilo use Mm DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aumodty E0 13526 Chlaf Records a Dadaoa DIV WHS m MAR 2 3 2015 DIR 5 use 552 3 w Of ce of the Secretary of Defense Chief RDD BSD 5 03 -L Date Authority E0 13526 Declassify 4 Deny in Full Declassify in Part Reason S-FU S C- LI MDR '3 3 1 33