Special Analysis E0 13526 E0 13526 35 9 4 DenyinFu -M- 3'1 3 Of ce of the Secretary of Defense got 33-11 Chief ROD BSD WHS Date unk Authority E0 13526 Declassify in Part Reason- iv Dedassif'y MDR l3 Gorbachev s Response to US Nuclear Initiative Gorbachev s nuclear arms control proposals would constrain Soviet nuclear capabilities and are intended to increase the pressure for further withdrawals of US nuclear weapons deployed along the Soviet periphery His ability to reSpond quickly indicates that both republic and central authorities strongly support radical reductions in nuclear weapons Gorbachev s preposals emphasize his role in national security decisionmaking at a time when his authority is in doubt His preposal for an early summit is meant in part to enhance his domestic standing The proposals apparently have the su port of the Defense Ministry and the Russian Republic leadershiph Gorbachev s proposed elimination of Ground Forces nuclear munitions will reduce the Soviet tactical nuclear stockpile by half His emphaSIS on reciprocity in the withdrawal of tactical air and naval nuclear weapons indicates the Soviets still hope to draw Washington into negotiations on the timing and modalities of such reductions If fully realized these prOposals would remove all US nuclear weapons from EurOpe and eliminate the threat of sea-based tactical systems In the short term however the center will use any followup discussions with the US primarily to press the republics to agree to relocate nuclear weapons to Russia Gorbachev s announcements on future missile modernization affect ICBM programs known to be in development ut it is not clear which road-mobile to ram he was cancelin Soviet negotiators yesterday clari ed Gorbachev s offer to remove 503 ICBMs from alert status claiming it includes 366 older single- warhead missiles and 13' older MlRVed missiles These apparently do not include some 86 operational in Ukraine a fact that indicates central military authorities still plan on deployments there Gorbachev s pronounced willingness to discuss US proposals for nonnuclear ABM systems is the rst of cial show of exibility on this issue and marks a breakthrough The Soviets probably would be receptive to proposals for joint programs that entail sharing US technology they might try to inv ern 'onal organizations in overseeing such programs CIA 55 35a 3 5a DECLASSIFIED IN PART - Authonty so 13526 3 3234l9l Chief Records a Declass Div WHS m MAR l 2016