Diractor 0f Central Intamganca PART Chill I Dada-I Uh WHE 22 2315 - I 1 1 Er le Elanapact -- W43 - 'g I agrees-andu dalmmumnrandum-Jg - II 1 i i iE-I'a- I Busy - IT 53 - - - - 3 5m -- 0 - gr' h y- o - Bqn muln ufEnergr Dun-lent Mm whim-1cm mm-n El AMI Mm m Ema Cum- u - Date m r a 5' Decla ify Deny in Full mam undamin in Part - Reason - 3 3 Eh f'l f3 511 3 MDR- 4 1- 152 B m m Sung my 1'93 510% M95 703 1 CW 114 Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev's Nuclear Pledges Impact Motivations and Next Steps - - If Gorbachev s unilateral initiatives to reduce tactical nuclear warheads are carried out almost 75 percent of Moscow s inventory of these warheads will be destroyed or placed in central storage - Il' Gorbachev s reciprocal proposals are implemented all of the Soviet inventory of tactical nuclear warheads will be destroyed or placed in central storage - The elimination process will take at least several years - - Soviet arms control positions probably are not fully worked out but in the future Soviet negotiators are likely to become more exible and abandon most old agenda items with the exception of dual- capable aircraft and the nuclear weapons of other countries - 1 C DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13528 Chief Records 8 Dudes DIV WHS MAR 2 2 2016 i Secret- NM 91- 10006 November 7991 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Secret AWEO13526 MAR 2 2 2015 Key Judgments oso f315- c The Potential Impact of Gorbachev's Proposals The withdrawal of many Soviet units from Eastern Europe and reductions in the size and number of units within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone that have occurred over the past two years already have caused a sharp decline in the number of tactical nuclear systems in Soviet forces opposite NATO President Gorbachev s 5 October proposals if implemented further ad- vance that process We estimate that unilateral measures will lead to the destruction of between 4 000 and 9 000 warheads or more than half the tactical nuclear warheads in Moscow s inventory From 1 300 to 2 800 tactical naval nuclear warheads will be moved to central storage A unilateral reduction on this scale will - Eliminate the nuclear capability of Soviet Ground Forces - Increase the amount of time the Soviet Navy will require to arm its ships submarines and aircraft with nuclear munitions - Take at least several years to implement Reciprocal measures preposed by Gorbachev would if implemented - Eliminate the tactical nuclear capability of the Soviet Navy 0 Limit the air forces' quick-reSponse tactical nuclear capability by placing warheads in central storage - Motivations Behind the Proposals The Speed and content of Gorbachev s response to President Bush s initiative of 27 September reflect the high priority Soviet of cials place on nuclear security - Elimination of all nuclear artillery projectiles and short-range ballistic missile SRBM warheads will remove most of the tactical nuclear warheads located in non-Russian republics - Gorbachev is using the US proposal to reassert himself as a reliable and credible negotiating partner but his capability to ful ll completely his own proposals is questionable The Future of Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Negotiating Positions Dismantling and destroying nuclear warheads is a complex and time- consuming process and any new union therefore is likely to retain a tactical nuclear capability for the foreseeable future - IN PART Authorlty so 13526 Chief Records a Boolean DIV ms MAR 22 2016 Because of continuing improvements in conventional weapon systems the senior Soviet leadership has probably concluded that tactical nuclear warheads can be eliminated or stored without signi cantly compromising the war- ghting capabilities they will require - The Soviets probably have not had enough time to think out fully their ne- gotiating positions We believe the Soviets are likely to 0 Be less insistent on old agenda items and display considerable exibility while trying to preserve the option to revisit issues eSpecially those affected by evolving relations between the center and the republics - Maintain a low-key approach to further negotiations to avoid kindling the interest of republic leaders in becoming full players in formal talks Carryovers from the old Soviet agenda however will include concern about US dual-capable aircraft and inclusion of other countries in discussions of tactical nuclear systems This posture may re ect a greater concern about proliferation to the south and on the continent than about the United Kingdom and France At a minimum the Soviets will seek a process of consultations during all phases of the implementation of US and Soviet reductions They probably will also seek technical and perhaps nancial aid in dismantling and destroying warheads - Disarray in Moscow and evolving political relations will complicate the negotiating process for some time Elements in the military may still be red calcitrant and the republics especially Russia Kazakhstan and Ukraine want a greater say in the Kremlin s nuclear decisionmaking oso Discussion President Gorbachev s response to President Bush's nuclear initiatiVe affects all Soviet nuclear forces but its emphasis on elimination of tactical nuclear muni- tions gives it a particularly sweeping effect on tactical nuclear forces At the same time it cuts through months of fencing on the nature and sc0pe of negotia- tions that were intended to achieve some of the same ends that each side has now pledged to reach unilater- ally This paper examines the impact of Gorbachev s reSponse on tactical nuclear forces the motivations behind his action possible future proposals and our ability to track Soviet implementation of Gorbachev's promises Tactical Nuclear Forces Tactical nuclear forces include short-range weapon systems of the Soviet ground air and naval forces Most of the weapon systems involved are dual capable that is capable of using both conventional and nuclear munitions 1 Because of their dual capabils ity these weapon systems are integrated into the general purpose or frontal forces of the Soviet Union - In number breadth and depth Soviet tactical nucle- ar forces reached their zenith in the mid to-late 19805 Since then cutbacks in Soviet general purpose forces resulting from unilateral force reductions the As used in this paper the term tactical nuclear forces includes short-range ballistic missile and rocket systems eld artillery systems capable of ring nuclear projectiles atomic demolition munitions tactical aircraft including light and medium bombers capable of using nuclear bombs or air-to-surfaee missiles and naval nuclear torpedoes antiship cruise missiles surface-to-alr missiles depth charges and mines These weapons are also capable of delivering chemical munitions 'The number of nuclear-capable systems in this paper include all items of equipment in the inventories capable of performing a nuclear mission regardless of the availability of warheads trained crews or maintenance of the system for a nuclear role In each case smaller numbers of delivery systems than counted here would actually be assigned nuclear missions withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the downsizing of Soviet forces within the Atlantic-to- the-Urals ATTU zone in anticipation of Convention- al Armed Forces in Europe CFE Treaty provisions have resulted in a signi cant decline in the number of tactical nuclear-capable weapon systems in active unit inventories However since nuclear delivery missions would not be assigned to all technically capable weapons these 'ctions have not significantly re- duced Soviet capability to deliver tactical nuclear warheads Modernization programs to improve these systems have continued but the uncertain future most of these programs faced before the abortive August coup is even more open to question in its aftermath Soviet Ground Based Tactical Nuclear Forces These forces comprise short-range ballistic missile SRBM systems artillery systems and atomic demo- lition munitions See table on page i l Ground- based nuclear-capable systems are integrated with the ground forces and are found in all the current and former Soviet republics The largest concentrations are assessed to be in Russia Ukraine and Byelorus- sia Some tactical nuclear-capable systems remain with Soviet forces in Germany and Poland but we believe their nuclear munitions have been returned to the former USSR - The SRBM force currently consists of some l 600 Scud and FROG launchers of which l 200 are in the active unit inventory This gure represents a decline of 20 percent of the I989 SRBM force in active units Of the over 300 FROG and Send launchers removed from the active unit inventory through unit disbandments about two-thirds have been placed in storage the other third has been oso -S'ecret- destroyed None of the more modern SS-21 systems have been removed from the active unit inventory For the most part SRBM systems are organized into independent brigades although the older FROG sys tem and some 88-21 battalions remain in maneuver divisions The Soviets have some 9 000 nuclear-capable artillery pieces in active units with another 4 200 in storage Most of these are 52-min cannons with smaller numbers of 203-mm cannons and 240-mm mortars Some 4 500 of these nuclear-capable artillery pieces were moved east of the Urals in anticipation of the signing of the CFE Treaty Nuclear capable artillery systems are found in front artillery divisions army artillery brigades and in the artillery regiments of virtually all maneuver divisions We believe the Soviets have two types of atomic demolition munitions nuclear land small enough to be man portable and one so large that its emplacement requires engineering equipment The man-portable mines are associated with spetsnaz brigades the larger ones with special construction troops We estimate the Soviets have a total of 50 to 200 atomic demolition munitions Air Force Tactical Aviation Excluding heavy bombers the Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces have some 6 700 nuclear-capable air- craft in their active unit inventories These are orga- nized into medium and light bomber ghter-intercep- tor ghter-bomber ground support and reconnaissance regiments See table 2 on page 11 These regiments are based in most republics of the former the largest concentrations are in Rus sia Ukraine and Byelorussia Another 1 000 nuclear- capable tactical aircraft are in fiyable storage CFE mandated reductions combined with unilateral withdrawals basing adjustments and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have led to changes in the disposi- tion structure and subordination of tactical aviation but not to a signi cant reduction in the size of the force since the late 19805 About 400 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft were removed from the ATTU zone and another 650 were resubordinated from the Soviet Air Force to Soviet Naval Aviation SNA Naval Forces Currently 158 surface ships 224 submarines and about 1 370 aircraft in SNA active units are capable of using tactical nuclear weapons About 500 SNA aircraft are in yable storage See table '3 on page 13 The tactical weapon systems with which these ships submarines and aircraft are equipped include nuclear torpedoes antiship cruise missiles surface-to- air missiles depth charges and mines The number of ships and submarines with nuclear-capable weapon systems has declined in recent years this decline will continue as construction slows and scrapping of older ships and submarines accelerates Because newly commissioned ships and submarines can carry signi - cantly more nuclear-capable missiles however the at- sea nuclear capability of the Navy has remained relatively constant Nuclear Warhead The Soviet inventory is assessed to contain some 7 500 to 15 000 tactical nuclear warheads The warheads are stored in 146 locations in the former Soviet Union Almost 60 percent of these sites are in the Russian Republic most of the others are in Ukraine and Byelorussia See table 4 on page 15 These locations include i 18 Direct Support Sites that store warheads for particular combat units and 28 National Stockpile Sites that are larger repositories for a wide variety of munitions disposition entiy relate to withdrawals of nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe and areas of civil unrest in the former USSR Impact of Gorbachev s Response Unilateral Steps The steps Gorbachev promised to undertake unilater- ally would substantially cut Soviet tactical nuclear capability The promised destruction of warheads To avoid confusion between delivery means and nuclear muni- tions this paper uses warhead rather than weapon to refer to all speci c nuclear munitions oso 13351 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority so 13526 Chief Records 8 Dachau Div WHS MAR 2 2 2016 Tactical Nuclear War-beads A 'eeted by Soviet Proposals System Community Soviet Pro- Estimate posal Unilateral Steps 2 500 to Elimination 6 000 Nuclear artil- 1 500 to Elimination lery 3 000 Atomic demo- 50 to 200 Elimination lition muni- tions ABMs Tactical ship- l 000 to Withdrawal borne naval 2 000 centralized weapons at storage par- tial elimina- tion Naval Avia 300 to 800 Centralized tion storage par- tial elimina tion Steps Conditioned on Reciprocity Tacticai avia- 2 000 to Reciprocally tion 3 500 agreed with drawal and centralized storage Tacticai naval See above Complete weapons elimination upon mutual agreement Total About 7 500 to i5 000 II includes nuclear torpedoes snrface-to-air missiles anti ship cruise missiles depth charges and mines would reduce the estimated stockpile of tactical nu- clear warheads by more than half that is by 4 000 to 9 000 nuclear warheads - Elimination of all nuclear warheads for artillery and mines would remove entirely the nu- clear capability of the Soviet Ground Forces - Withdrawal to centralized storage and partial elimi- nation oi warheads for tactical naval systems would not eliminate the Navy s tactical nuclear capability but it would reduce its reSponsiveness Current Soviet practice is to load tactical nuclear warheads onto some nay ips and all submarines performing routine peacetime patrol The unilateral withdrawal of tactical naval warheads to central storage would involve an estimated l 300 to 2 800 warheads - Cancellation of a developmental air-launched short-range nuclear missile program Steps Conditioned on US Reciprocity The additional steps Gorbachev proposed conditioned on US reciprocity would further reduce Soviet tacti- cal nuclear capability They would eliminate the Navy's tactical nuclear capability and the nuclear capability of the tactical air forces would be circum- scribed in reSponding immediately to a crisis by withdrawal of warheads to central storage If consoli- dation of warheads in central storage were extended to tactical air forces an estimated 2 000 to 3 500 warheads would be involved - The effect of these steps on capabilities depends in part on the meaning of central storage if the Soviets mean consolidation away from the Direct Support Sites presumably at the National Stockpile Sites and perhaps only at those in the Russian Republic nuclear munitions would be placed at a considerable distance from the ports and air elds of most of the units that might employ these warheads This step in combination with the elimination of all ground-baSed nuclear munitions would limit a Soviet quick-reSponse tactical nuclear capability It is not clear if Gorbachev meant that warheads to be placed 050 CL DECLASSIFIED IN PART Audiorlty 0 13526 Chief Records a Declaae Div WHS 98 MAR 22 2016 in central storage would be moved to the National Stockpile Sites it is also not clear that these sites would have the capacity to them Motivations Gorbachev's response probably was not motivated principally by military considerations More likely Gorbachev saw a political need to respond in a comprehensive and forthcoming way to President Bush s initiative and to growing concerns about the security of Soviet tactical nuclear warheads in the various republics - Soviet of cials almost certainly welcomed the Bush initiative as a means of curbing republic nuclear ambitions and reasserting the need for central control of nuclear weapons Even before the US announce- ments nuclear security had become a t0p priority of the leadership Had there been no US initiative the center almost certainly would have held out the prospect of talks with the United States on tactical nuclear forces as one more reason why nuclear weap- ons had to remain under central control The center will continue to portray the control of tactical nuclear forces as an arena in which it must take the lead The content of the US initiative encouraged the Soviets to respond with a parallel focus on warheads rather than delivery systems but concerns about nuclear security may also have pushed them in that direction Indeed Gorbachev s plan to eliminate nu- clear artillery projectiles and SRBM warheads will remove a substantial portion of the most accessible nuclear warheads located in the non-Russian repub- lics Concern about the nuclear status of the republics may have accounted in part for the decision to eliminate all nuclear artillery projectiles and SRBM warheads rather than only a portion of them The Soviets had been reluctant to take this step because they hoped to trade their substantial numerical superiority in ground-based systems for cuts in Western dual-capa- ble aircraft DCA In circumstances where leaders of both Ukraine and Kazakhstan had made clear their resentment of Russian acquisition of all nuclear war- heads the leadership may have hoped to appeal to non-Russian republics by calling for complete elimi- nation of artillery and SRBM nuclear munitions There may also have been some concern about the security of tactical nuclear warheads in Russia- The center almost certainly also welcomed the US initiative as a chance to reassert itself as a reliable and credible negotiating partner Soviet and Russian of cials strongly support the US message on the need for a single voice on issues of nuclear security They undoubtedly expect to use US concerns in their domestic discussions of future defense structures Gorbachev s response also re ects a perception among key military and political leaders of the diminished utility of tactical nuclear forces in the changed strate- gic circumstances Previously assigned nuclear mis- sions were predicated on large-scale offensive opera- tions deep into Western EurOpe With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the enunciation of a defen- sive doctrine emphasizing defense of Soviet territory tactical nuclear forces lost much of their relevance in theater planning The Future of Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces The future of these forces like everything else in the former Soviet Union is subject to great uncertainties Tactical nuclear capabilities will remain for the fore- seeable future The complexities of warhead disman- tlement and destruction mean that there will be no quick denuclearization even for those systems for which warheads are to be eliminated Some nuclear planning options probably will remain for tactical naval forces whose warheads are to be consolidated in central storage Moreover restrictions on the tactical air forces nuclear capabilities will primarily occur through negotiated agreements OSD 1 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority 0 13528 Chief Records a Boolean Div WHB MR 2 2 2015 Even with the removal or elimination of nuclear munitions these forces will retain important nonnu- clear capabilities including the delivery of chemical munitions Modernization programs are under way that will signi cantly enhance the conventional capa- bilities of these systems For the most part these programs aim at improving the accuracy range lethality and survivability of delivery systems At the same time these improvements will increase the nuclear capability of systems whose warheads are not being eliminated and will add to the potential nuclear capability of other systems if decisions to eliminate warheads are reversed Since the mid-l9805 the Soviets have asserted that emerging conventional weapons were equivalent to battle eld nuclear munitions in their destructive ef- fects Some theorists new question the military utility of nuclear weapons because of their destructive collat- eral damage e 'ects and the inability to control escala- tion The Soviets note that emerging conventional weapons are more responsive produce less collateral damage and pose far less risk of escalation Conse- quently the senior Soviet leadership has probably concluded that tactical nuclear warheads can safely be removed from the Ground Forces inventory with- out signi cantly compromising their war- ghting ca- pabilities Against the backdrop of economic collapse efforts to convert defense industries to civilian production and uncertainties about future commitment of resources to research and development and procurement how- ever the future of modernization programs for tacti- cal systems is open to serious question To the extent that they can in uence resource decisions military leaders are likely to push for the cheaper near-term programs that emphasize improvements to existing systems Whatever the fate of the modernization programs tactical nuclear-capable forces will shrink in size over the next few years This smaller force will be more modern with a higher percentage of newer weapon systems because reductions will be achieved by destroying older systems rst Secrot CIR Cb Soviet Policy and Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Reductions The combined impact of postcoup realities and Presi- dent Bush s initiative has sharply altered the environ- ment in which the Soviets assess their goals for tactical nuclear forces This change will lead the Soviet leadership to assess priorities against a back- drop of new uncertainties The US initiative put considerable pressure on Soviet leaders to respond quickly yet they probably have not had time since the events in August to reassess fully a policy line that even then was in evolution In this atmosphere it seems likely that the Soviets will be less insistent on some previous agenda items and will display consider- able exibility on other matters but they will also seek to preserve the option to revisit issues as center- republic relations are resolved Developing a New Agenda The center probably will want to be engaged in ongoing discussions with the United States on tactical nuclear forces to reinforce its own status and may seek to portray future talks on parallel reduction technical issues as negotiations the Soviets will probably main- tain their low-key approach and seek to get technical discussions a priority for both the center and the republics under way quickly The new environment may substantially alter atti- tudes toward some of the traditional questions related to tactical nuclear forces Gorbachev s proposals pro- vide an opportunity to revisit these issues once the initial work of denuclearizing republics and newly independent states has been accomplished - oso infants i ECLASSIFIED IN PART Au 'lorlty 50 13526 Chief Rename a Dodson Div WHS i 39 MAR 2 2 2016 Gorbachev s inclusion of proposals to consider reduc- tions in air-delivered nuclear munitions suggests that to some degree the importance of capturing US dual- capable aircraft has carried over from the old short- range nuclear forces SNF negotiating agenda Moreover Russian Foreign Minister Koz rev aised even those of cials most disposed to large-scale unilateral reductions in their nuclear arsenal view Western air capabilities as a threat At the same time the prospect of additional unilateral cuts in their own forces may prompt the Soviets to be less protective of their own assets and more willing to sustain deep cuts in air and conventional capabilities to capture US systems Inclusion of a reference to the tactical nuclear sys term of other countries is also a holdover from the earlier SNF agenda The driving force for such a marker however may now re ect Soviet concern- about nuclear proliferation both in nations to the south and on the continent rather than merely an effort to limit British and French capabilities Never- theless the center is unlikely to press for expanding the talks to include third-country systems at this time while its docket is dominated by the overwhelming need to ensure nuclear security in the republics Gorbachev s cancellation of a deveIOpmental air- launched short-range nuclear missile program pre serves the nominal right to modernize systems at a later date a hedge that may have been merely a concession to the military s near-term concerns for maintainini a broad spectrum of future defense 0p- tions Soviet views on reduction in components of tactical nuclearforces other than munitions that is delivery systems probably are also still under deveIOpment Even in the less uid environment before the abortive coup the Soviet view of the right unit of account for tactical nuclear discussions remained unde ned - a range of options including cuts in SRBM missiles and launch- ers for concessions on DCA from the United States offers for reciprocal reductions in warhead holdings and even a zone-based or range-cap approach to negotiating certain systems A near-term move to place launchers and thus their conventional capabil- ity on the block may come about only because of the center's concern over thinking among the republics about their own defense requirements Over the long- er term the center may still try to use its SR BM force as a bargaining chip but of cials almost certainly recognize that a lack of nuclear tential will dimin ish its value in negotiationsiI Next Ste 3 Moscow will seek a thorough consultation process during all phases of projected US and Soviet unilateral actions The extent to which the Soviets will want to move beyond this approach particularly while center-republic de fense issues are being sorted out will depend in large part on their assessment of European desires for a more formal process The Soviets probably will re- main interested in and receptive to proposals for such con dence-building measures as information ex- changes on dismantlement and destruction timetables both to track US actions and possibly to build trust 'among the republics as new security relations develOp Center of cials probably will press for further details on technical and perhaps nancial aid for dismantle- ment and destruction programs The results of the 1 5 i 3i West European Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe NA T0 members enthusiastically support the US and Soviet unilateral proposals to eliminate ground- and sea based tactical nuclear warheads as a way to reduce the threat to countries and the East Europeans They are opti- mistic that these measures will reinforce central control over Soviet tactical nuclear warheads and hope that speedy destruction of these warheads will lessen the risk of nuclear proliferation in the republics Most Allies supported the unilateral nature of the US announcements but they proba bly will advocate continued US consultations with Moscow and the republics as well as within the Alliance on tactical nuclear forces The Allies support US intentions to maintain a nuclear presence in Europe even if there is little support for the deployment of new air-delivered nuclear systems on the continent We believe most Allied governments will resist Soviet initiatives further to reduce or eliminate NA TO's remaining dual capable aircraft and aithdelivered nuclear weapons The US and Soviet initiatives may encourage Allies to continue to argue for a lower pro le for nuclear weapons in NA TO's strategic concept and of forfurther dista mm the old strate exible response follow-on talks seem to demonstrate that the thinking of the Soviets on procedures coordination between republics or indeed on whether they have the infra- structure needed to dismantle and destroy warheads is still in its earl stages DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority E0 13526 Chtai Records 8 Declasa Div WHS Date gr MAR 2 2 2016 Soviet of cials may also raise issues related to tactical nuclear forces in the I992 Helsinki review conference and its preparatory talks as well as in the future Security Forum of 38 nations The Soviets could try to use these multilateral forums to build pressure on the United States for further reductions in the re maining tactical nuclear arsenal in EurOpc particu- larly in DCA Of cials are probably already uatching EurOpe and Germany in particular for signs of growing anti-nuclear sentiment and may move quick- ly to exploit such attitudes to gain greater understand- ing of remaining Western nuclear capabilities oso Secret- DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority 50 13528 Chief Records Declacs Div WHS Date MAR 2 2 2016 Potential Complications Continued Central Authority the speed with which Gorbachev delivered his re- aponse to President Bush suggests he can mobilize the Soviet negotiating behavior in arms control forums since the attempted coup suggests that the disarray in the formal power structures in Moscow has not yet caused policy paralysis but there is evidence that military recalcitrance continues Soviet delegations have returned to all arms control and securit forums _ Somc new positions indicate that they have receive changes in instructions At the same time military elements in Moscow continue to resist progressive arms control positions Role of the Republics The extent of the republics' roles in formulating Gorbachev's reponse is unclear Commentary from republic leaders on the tactical nuclear portions of Gorbachev s preposals has been Sparse Even Russian of cials who called for deeper reductions in strategic forces than those proposed by Gorbachev have not taken exception to those portions of his response dealing with tactical warheads Rus- sian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in meetings with US of cials showed no signs of disagreement with the proposal on tactical nuclear warheads In fact he highlighted the need for a Western response to Gorba- chev's suggested moves on air-delivered nuclear weap- ons raised the prOSpect of future negotiations on tactical nuclear-capable forces and emphasized the 1 importance of further measures to restrict prolifera- tion among the republics Kozyrev explicitly declined to be seen as negotiating for the center but on these issues he and Gorbachev seem to agree - Greater input from the republics especially Rus- sia almost certainly will nudge the center toward more exible positions These may focus on actions that reduce the defense burden and respond to domes- tic concerns about environmental degradation and nuclear safety Over the longer term however as republics contemplate their own defense needs they may become less couperative on nuclear-capable sys- tems If they continue to regard Russia as a potential enemy some may see value in a limited nuclear deterrent or at least in retaining the conventional capability of tactical nuclear delivery systems Ukraine and Kazakhstan have quali ed the nuclear- free stance they adopted immediately after the August coup attempt Both are now actively engaged in de ning their defense needs and their role in the control of nuclear weapons in the former USSR The center s ability to implement pledges on tactical nuclear weapons will depend heavily on military cooperation among the key republics These relation- ships remain uid and the climate that results from the resolution of questions concerning defense coOpern ation will determine whether implementation can be accomplished OSD 'J 3 stc 63cm 05 1 1155 0 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Reverse Stank Am 50 13523 Chief Rm 5 Div W8 Dam MAR 2 2 2015 Table Disposition of Soviet Ground-Based Nuciear-Capabie Dciivery Systems October 1991 Total Force Russia Ukraine Moldova Byelorussia Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan 1 ath Short-range ballistic 1 210 401 612 180 192 200 30 0 84 21 46 0 24 0 24 0 32 0 missile launchers my Scud 460 135 232 80 96 50 12 0 30 5 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 SS-21 298 36 70 35 76 0 18 0 54 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FROG 452 230 310 65 20 150 0 0 11 15 34 0 12 0 12 0 20 0 Nuclear-capable ar 4 470 3 555 1 358 49 96 0 598 1 60 0 76 0 60 0 608 38 tiilcry piece 152 mm 8 368 2 901 4 150 2 255 1 250 42 96 0 550 1 60 0 76 0 60 0 203 mm 446 574 200 567 102 7 0 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 24 0 240 mm 174 735 120 733 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 2 Table 2 Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Aircraft October 19913 Total Force Russia Ukraine Byeiorossia Georgia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmeniya Uzbeki Aircraft 6 672 1 006 2 959 513 898 19 519 15 205 0 82 0 453 188 208 269 Back re 179 0 90 0 34 0 3'1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Badger 123 213 60 50 20 16 15 15 0 0 0 0 10 132 0 0 0 0 Blinder 120 0 0 0 40 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fenccr 958 0 300 0 1 248 0 125 0 58 0 40 0 35 0 5 mag 0 35 0 510 124 250 68 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 56 0 0 0 0 Fittcr 627 93 350 78 30 0 11 0 41 0 0 0 40 0 55 15 _flankcr 524 0 285 0 40 0 21 0 32 0 0 0 a 31 0 Fioucr 2 223 501 150 3 56 0 40 0 0 0 200 0 108 179 0 0 Foxbat 150 0 35 0 14 0 50 0 0 0 12 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 Program 409 115 150 0 34 0 85 0 0 0 30 0 15 0 0 15 so L Fulcrum 849 0 260 0 160 0 50 0 34 0 0 0 45 0 30 0 60 0 includes Sovict Air and Air Defense Forces 3 '1 DECLASSIFIED 111 PART 6 Authority 50 13526 c1861 Records 8 06018118 um MAR 2 2 2016 1 1 Sana-1 In active uni inventory in storage Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmeniya 1120 1091 Tajikistan Lithuania Latvia Germany Poland 24 0 32 0 24 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 12 0 4 0 4 0 102 0 3 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 3 0 20 0 12 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 12 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 608 388 21 0 322 116 13 0 0 0 120 0 13 0 3 0 1 020 101 90 0 60 0 560 336 21 0 324 116 0 0 22 0 13 0 3 0 1 020 101 90 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 2 0 0 24active mm Inventory in yabie storage 1 5 Turkmeniya Uzbekistan Lithuania Latvia Estonia WG Germany Poland 208 269 218 0 40 0 50 2 191 0 151 0 540 0 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 24 0 81 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 15 62 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 15 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 65 0 108 179 0 0 11 0 50 2 130 0 115 0 195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 12 0 0 15 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 30 11 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 Page determmeu 10 no Unclassi ed Reviewed Chief IAW 0 13526 Section 3 5 am MAR 22 2111s Table 3 Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Naval Forces October 1991 Total Force Russia Ukraine Moldova Byelorussia Latvia Estonia Subroutines 224 198 Ill 0 0 16 l Akula-class SSN 1 1 0 0 0 0 Sierra-class SSN 3 3 0 0 0 0 Victor-class SSN Yankee Notch-class SSN Foxtrobclass Kilo-class Tango-class SS 18 I 0 0 0 Whiskey-class SS I 0 0 0 0 Charlie-l-elass SSGN 9 0 0 0 0 0 Charlie-ll-class SSGN 5 5 0 0 0 0 Echo-lI-class SSGN Modi ed SSGN 0 I0 0 0 0 0 Julietl-class 550 8 2 0 0 6 Oscar-class SSGN 8 0 0 0 0 Delta-class Typhoon-class Yankee-class SSBN Yankee-class SSGN 0 0 0 0 Surface ships ISB 120 Baku-class CVHG 0 0 0 0 Kiev-class CVHG 3 3 0 0 0 0 Moshe-class CH6 Kirov-class CON 3 3 0 0 0 0 Kara-class Kresla-l-class Kynda-class CG 3 0 0 I Slave-class CG 3 2 0 0 0 Kashin DDG 0 6 0 0 Modi ed Kashin DDG 2 0 0 0 Sovremenyy-class DDG Udaloy-class DDG Krivak-l-class Krivak-ll-class Nnnuchka-l-class P66 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records Declaes Div WHS 13 secret MAR 22 2015 Table 3 continued Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Naval Forces October 1991 I Total Force Russia Ukraine Moldova Byelorussia Latvia Estonia 1 Naval aviation in ctive unit inventory 1 360- 846-860 390-412 33 0 0-5 107 39 0 30 0 in yable storage 1 373 489 160 222 Back re 151-120 0 mas 4 0 0 05 2 0 0 0 0 Badger 143 205 130 142 13 58 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 i Blinder 27 4 0 3 27 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fencer 1 12 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 30 0 Fishbed 0 28 0 15 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fitter 120 160 126 0 44 130 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 1 Flanker 24 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Flogger 38 10 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 Frogl oot 102 16 70 0 32 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fulcrum 111 0 0 0 48 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Bear 55 0 53May 46 0 33 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 1 Mail 96 0 67 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Helix A 124 0 105 0 19Hormone A 103 0 44 0 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 Haze A 82 0 45 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I DIA holds 45 Foxtrots in the inVentory CIA identi es only 25 Foxtrots active 1' One regiment of approximately 20 Back re aircraft now used as trainers at a Ukrainian naval airbase is expected to transfer permanently to a Northern Fleet airbase in Russia in the near future 4- oso 3 5-22 IN PART MI 13525 A 5 mums I Table 4 Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites Serving Tactical Nuclear Forces October 1991 Total Force Russia Ukraine Moldova Byelorussia Georgia Aroma Direct support nuclear storage sites 1135 63 21 2 10 4 i __ upporting ground forces 54 23 12 6 Supporting tactical aviation forces Supporting tactical naval forces Supporting submarines and surface ships Supporting naval aviation 16 I 3 0 0 National stockpile sites 050 necmsalneoaggm Aumorlty ED 1 Chief Renault a Dada Div MAR 2 2 2016 15 -SeoI et - domain Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmeniya Uzbekistan Lithuania Latvia DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Autho ty E0 13526 Chief Records a Declaas Div WHS MAR 22 2015