C- Of ce of the Scaetary of Defense 5 552' Chief R00 1350 WHS Date uthority E0 526 Dedassif'y my in Full Declassify in Part NUCLEAR COMMAND CONTROL President's Nuclear Initiative - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA Reason Wi a Unauthori7cd disclosure sui'ticcl to TASK 4 Third Draft - 8 Nov Earnest M1 support of the President's Nuclear Initiative this paper outlines the possible scape objectives and modalities of potential discussions with representatives of the current central Energy Act 1954 DECLASSIFIED Ill FULL Authority E013526 MM Chief Records a Declass Div WHS mu 4 DEC 2015 U In his 27 September Nuclear Initiative the President proposed beginning discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cmperation in three areas pertaining to nuclear weapon safety security and command and control Regarding the latter the President stated that We should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unautho zed or accidental use of nuclear weapons SJ orbachev's proposals are made against a backdrop of continuing change as the former Union s republics strive for a more democratic form of government political independence and economic Stability At a minimum some of the republics also seek a voice in the decision to use Soviet nuclear weapons particularly those stationed on their soil These dramatic changes have raised a number of questions relating to the control of these weapons and the degree of success the republics may have in achieving their political and economic aims as the Soviet NC2 system adjusts to these changes The following are questions raised during and after the failed August coup that will remain important as the NC2 system evolves iIWe administrative and crunmai sanctions Handle as ReSIrictcd Data on tor-high dissemination Scetton I Mb Atomic 2 0 Who has political authority over the use of nuclear weapons and can that authority be circumvented Cl Who has technical authority over the use of nuclear weapons and does it correspond to our understanding of political authority 0 What is the role of a republic in a decision on nuclear release that is to say is it a shared responsibility with a central government oversight function What circumstances could disrupt political or technical authority in a manner that would increase the risk of unauthorized use DECLASSIFIED FULL to ecor 3 class Div Nuclear command and control N02 encompasses a wide range of disciplines For the purposes of this paper only a portion of NC2 will be included Issues such a security physical and personnel and environmental safety and health problems will be addressed by the other papers tasked under the N803 Nuclear Initiatives Work Plan Speci cally this paper will deal with the lawful exercise of authority and direction over the use of nuclear weapons and the means to assure and to assure against an unlawful intervention into that amass This paper will not address such issues as use control sludges personnel reliability or safety programs although the paper does address their over-arching policies criteria and standards that provide the overall framework for NCZ Likewise this paper will not deal with speci c control situations such as transportation storage and dismantlement of warheads and because the potential for accidental use stems mainly from scenarios involving warning measures dealing with authorized use of nuclear weapons based on erroneous attack warning data a false alarm will be dealt with in another paper l Em l _ AfOur ability to in uence changes in the Soviet nuclear command and control system -- about which our knowledge is incomplete -- is probably as limited as our ability to in uence the transformation of the Soviet Union itself Command and control is an extremely sensitive subject for both the US and the Soviets The Soviets have offered few details on how it works the US may have reservations about discussing certain details of NC2 because of concerns over revealing potential vulnerabilities Clearly we should take steps to protect sensitive aspects of US command and control the disclosure of which could injure our national security We may also need to protect aspects of the Soviet NC2 from disclosure to third parties At the same time we should ensure that the republics know how their system works Without question NC2 enjoys a high priority on both sides The Soviet have voiced and demonstrated their interest in assuring very tight control Indeed Soviet controls are possibly tighter than US controls making it dif cult for anyone including the United States to lecture the Soviets on how to create a better system We must ensure that their technical capability to assure authorized use and to assure against unauthorized use is maintained as the central Soviet government evolves and shares power and the control of nuclear weapons in a peaceful fashion with the republics What said the US may have some leverage however particularly in dealings with republic leaders to help ensure that changes in Soviet NC2 do not increase the risk of unauthorized use The overall objective should be to support any initiative that would enhance US security To that end the following are speci c US objectives for our discussions on command and control with appropriate Soviet and republic of cials Sr-Encourage the peaceful development and maintenance of a reliable responsible system of collective control with appropriate checks and balances CI Meek to preserve the technical system of controls that is centrally managed but moved under the collective inter-republic authority CI Collective control responsibilities over nuclear weapons should extend to their development production deployment tactical use and retirement Cl Encourage greater civilian control providing for independent analysis and review of military matters in general and issues in particular While the Soviet military and the current Soviet central government may not understand the US system of independent civilian review of military matters we must show the republic leaders the virtues of an effective system of civilian and military checks and balances U Explore possible cooperative means of improving command and control arrangements to provide more protection against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons U If discovered identify areas in which we might offer improvements to the Soviets on their system and adapt helpful Soviet innovations to the US system U Gain further insight information gathering into current Soviet command and control arrangements and how they might evolve with the ongoing transformation of the Soviet political and military structure U Foster Soviet con dence in the US of NC2 with the hape of gaining similar feelings on the Soviet's ability to control their nuclear forces thus increasing stability in a mis' Authori E0 Chief Rtgcords Declass DIV WHS Date 2 4 zeta U To preserve the exploratory nature of the initial discussions to avoid creating expectations of major breakthroughs and to protect against any efforts to exploit these discussions but at the same time to take advantage of the window of opportunity to enhance US national security the discussions should begin soon but proceed cautiously on the prioritized list StUd DJU i F9130 sun 92981 03 alumnus lillid NI am ssapau t3 spruce of topics below Based on the success of the rst two ice breaker steps discussions could matted scenar 4 proceed further Because of the potential for the window to close we should not attempt to pursue an area of discussion that the Soviets are reluctant to talk about The following are potential areas for discussions hrs-dle Will '13 30a 0M 13 no r uranium pal-Iiqu twill- Juliana I It'll-clam anal ammo sauna anticommunist Milena to summon b3 Us 521- nned 030 Section 6 2 Cl Mexican on Command Control Terminology Both sides could exchange such a list of definitions to aid in understanding each sides' command and control process The second objective would be to establish a basis for translations El Overview of US and Soviet Command Structures Both sides could describe in general terms the authorities and procedures for making and implementing decisions on nuclear release including -- in very general terms - provisions to ensure continuity of constitutional government Perhaps these discussions could begin with reciprocal visits to each side's national command centers the US National Military Command Center to establish a solid information base for further discussions The US could begin using Col Pavlov's visit to the US as a basis Col Pavlov briefed members of Congress inter alia on Soviet recently 183 Command Control Oversight The US could describe the role and mission of entities such as the NC2 Support Staff and Fail-safe and Risk Reduction Advisory Group This could be used to encourage oversight of Soviet NC2 from outside the General Staff and to learn of any past Soviet NC2 reviews El Command 8 Control Assessments The US could describe the means by which our NC2 system is exercised inspected and assesse El mse Control Policies Standards The sides could conduct a restricted discussion on standards policies design philosophy selection process and effectiveness assessment procedures with the goal of increasing each side's con dence in the other's nuclear command and control system CI Momma Command and Control The US could describe in general terms how it relates to its NATO partners in melting decisions on nuclear policy command and control and deployments This could allow us to probe on center and republic intentions concerning the control of Soviet weapons and perhaps to provide tacit encouragement to the republics to seek involvement in a collective nuclear decision making process The US will consult with the Allies before this occurs 0 lain Senior US decision makers will need to dete how far we want to go in informing the republics on US control procedures vpecxl reward Cl 139'- Risk Reduction Measures We might explore possible indicators that would reveal whether or not the command and control link extending from the legal authority to the weapon is intact El Communications We might also explore a means of improving communications or noti cation procedures between the two defense establishments or the US defense establishment and authorities from the independent republics Mailed Coup Seek to determine if the Soviets made any changes to their system as a result to correct any de ciencies as a result of the coup Soviets have indicated in one forum or another various subjects that they have an interest in discussing Some of these concepts such as joint launch control are clearly not in the US interest Two possible venues for these discussions are a DOD-lead interagency working group or ii an NSC-lead interagency working group Since one of our objectives is to encourage additional checks and balances we will need to consider whether and how to involve republic authorities in these discussions How and to what extent we educate republic leaders on nuclear command and control will depend on broader US objectives concerning the future of the Soviet Union and regarding whether we decide to provide tacit encouragement to the republics to seek greater involvement in nuclear decision making With respect to timing discussions could begin once the areas for discussion are thoroughly vetted and red-teamed expeditiously to ensure they are suitable for discussion without harming US national security interests Emmi 0m IN PART Authority E013526 OSD TBD Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Section 6 2 Date 2 4 DEC 2015 Potential Attachments l Background Paper on Soviet NC2 IC will furnish JS 1 4 9 2 Characteristics of an Ideal NC2 System ISP will furnish not to a