a 3- Em XVII 4 Department at Ener Washington DC 20535 9y Of ce of the Sccr i ry of Defense UM-em l 1991 Chief RDD ESD was 4 Belem Authority E0 13526 Dcclassify Deny in Full Declassify in Part I 7 MEMORANDUM FOR BG JOHN GORDON Reason i' 233% NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUBJECT Nuclear Warhead Diemantlement Deetruction Attached is the paper on Nuclear Warhead Diemantlement Deetruction Issue 6 as requested in your October 4 1 991 Nuclear Initiatives Work Plan An earlier draft of the paper was circulated for interagency comment and revisions as discussed in the FCC Subcommittee on November 1991 have been incorporated Acting Director Office'of Arms Control Defense Programs new co Douglas Graham Office of Secretary of Defense MG Roland LaJoie - Joint Chiefs of Stef Robert Walpole Department of State 3 al 35 a radley Gor Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Central Intelligence Agency um Richard Dev National Security Council 35 9 newsman IN PART Autl'lonty EO 13526 i chief mamm m 1 g- I - Data Department of Energy Document Review 7 Plum1PM To E01 3526 rs lemming nnOE 4 Cunnlinal_cw11h- - u s D chus 'ml - v rimmed mm m - i mummy no 1 1 3 warez 7 7705 NSC Nuclear Initiatives Work Plan Issue 5 Nuclear Warhead Diemantlement Destruction 1- 2232935 - On September 27 1991 President Bush proposed beginning discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation _in three areas one of which is that we should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage transportation dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads On October S 1991 in his response to the President's initiative Gorbachev stated Soviet readiness to enter into a detailed dialogue with the United States on the development of a secure and ecologically sound technology for the storing and transportation of nuclear warheads the means of using nuclear weapons and the raising of nuclear security While the specific topic of I'warhead diamantlemant and destruction was not addrased by Gorbachev Soviet response to President Bush's Initiatives included expressions of willingness to discuss all the issues proposed Unofficial Soviet statements suggest that detailed dialogue in the area of warhead dismantlement could facilitate an otherwise difficult task which could only be carried out over a very long period of time In response to NSC'taskingj this included in the warhead dismantlement and destruction area and addresses how the U S should organize efforts to pursue bilateral discussions in this area Because of extensive commonality between the topics and objectives of the two papers this paper should be read and discussed in the context of the NSC tasked paper on Implementation of Initiative on Safety and Security Issue 5 new 1 While the U S routinely dis tl done so since'about the mid-19503 warheads having there is no 9 also the case Thi for U S warheads prior to about l954 when it was recognized as being necessary to disassemble retired warheads and recover the nuclear materials for recycling and reuse in new warheads The procedure available for dismantlemen U S now has well exercised safe secure and environmentally z 1 3 395 AM so 13526 MAR 0 7 2015 21 71 2 In - - responsible capabilities for nuclear warhead dismantlement including pre-disassembly staging and post-disassembly material and component recycling storage and waste disposition In the context of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives discussions on warhead dismantlement and destruction the u s should pursue as its overall objective the facilitation of Soviet warhead dismantlement and appropriate disposition of the disassembled parts or materials It is very much in U S interests that Soviet warhead dismantlement activities be accomplished in a timely fashion and that they are consistent with responsible safety security and environmental standards Exchanges of information about these activities in some cases may enable the Soviets to accomplish some dismantlement operations sooner than otherwise would have been possible It is assumed in this joint technical cooperation that each side would accomplish its own dismantlement and destruction operations according to a schedule of its own choosing and without direct involvement of representatives of any other party If one or more Republics should require that nuclear warheads be dismantled or destroyed at facilities other than those located in the Russian Republic additional problems must be addressed An essential precondition for effective implementation of the initiative is that any discussions must not provide to the sealers or subnationai group -- information on or access to sensitive data technologies or procedures that could improve their military capabilities readiness posture or ability to compromise the reliable operation of U S nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons and materials production processes are of special concern because of the associated nuclear proliferation risks To ensure full protection of such data technologies and procedures each topic selected for possible discussion with the Soviets must be unclassified or declassified and subjected to thorough red teaming before tabling with the Soviets During the initial technical discussions the following topics might be discussed with mutual benefit in understanding reductions in terms of dismantlement of nuclear warheads WW These general topics are suggested as initial information important for understanding how the 0 8 manages its nuclear dismantlement operations This along with comparable characterizations of Soviet procedures and decision making processes would be shared as general information on each other's weapon dismantlement complex facility and weapons safety processes safety standards and criteria security 3 3 A 2 DECLASSIFIED lN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Racotds a Dacha DIV WHS MAR 7 2015 _H_and components 55 an vr - a standards modes of transportation and safety analysis methodology - Roles and responsibilities of Department of Defense DOD Department of Energy DOE Nuclear Weapons Council NWC - Key surety groups committees Nuclear Explosives Safety Study Group - Details on the Department of Energy Personnel Assurance Program PAP program for critical duty personnel This area would be the same as that described for NSC Issue Paper Five on Joint technical cooperation on nuclear safety storage security and transportation Unless there are different technical and policy experts involved there would be no need to repeat this discussion 1 The term 5 as used here should only be construed as dismantlement referring to those activities necessary to retire warheads so completely that they could not ordinarily be reassembled into efabrication of materials without extensive detonable warhea Warheads are disassembled and the subassem lies base materials or waste materials are disposed of in componen s a roved safety securi and environmental ways which dards Any nuclear parts rema ng from dismantlement of Center or Republic nuclear warheads not destroyed should be afforded especially strict safety and security protection to prevent diversion for unauthorized uses Non-nuclear parts removed from Center or Republic dismantled nuclear warheads should be destroyed Since dismantlement of large numbers of warheads is a process requiring years rather field demilitarization of tactical nuclear weapons held by the and the Republics may be a most important option Demilitarization is discussed more fully in the November 7 1991 Alessi memorandum on Strawman Measures for Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons The following areas may be important in discussions with appropriate technical experts from the Center and the Republics 1 Technology and Processes 3 5 3 25 IN PART mewmwao1mna MAR a 7 2015 DOE Seam-3 052 4 General description of U S warhead disassembly and disposal Safety specifications for component and subassemhly containers Specifications for gravel gerties disassembly areas at the DOE Pantex Plant Dismantling operations involving high explosives' - Disposition or long-term storage of waste high explosive light metallic compounds low level radioactive waste heavy metals in slurry or solution asbestos tritium and mixed waste radioactive' plus other hazardous waste materials - Disposition and storage of recovered special nuclear materials plutonium and enriched uranium including necessary environmental protection measures 2 Physical Security and Safety Arrangements - Safety Orders -- Safety standards and implementation ' safdty ris assessment methodology as used in-U S nuclear weapon dismantling facilities - Radiation safety and standards High explosive safety and standards Environmental monitoring technology - Physical security standards and integration of security procedures Security force - Soviet observers at unclassified portions of Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group studies of weapon studies would be most conducive to unclassified discussions since the issues are treated in a generic fashion 3 Nuclear Control Arrangements Two person concept Custodial responsibilities from retirement until completed disassembly 4 assess DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WH-S Data 7 aw-m - U S National Environmental Protection Act NEPA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act RCRB and Clean Air Act Activities Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Assessment procedures at U S nuclear weapon dismantling and material storage facilities C - pg The following are potential steps which may be implemented if initial discussions are assessed as mutually beneficial and both sides agree that further cooperation would be useful These discussion topics represent yet an increased level of detail and in some cases involve more sensitive technologies if sharing such information were Judged to be necessary to accomplish the U S objective of timely responsible and safe Soviet warhead dismantlement - Specific safety issues associated with weapon dismantlement including transportation to disassembly facility - Emergency response capabilities for security safety and environmental incidents -- expand any information exchange and assistance provided during the Chernobyl episode including use of the U S Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ARAC - Observation of emergency response exercises - - Joint exploration of plutonium dispersal contamination and exposure concerns and diapersal consequence mitigation concepts - JOint Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group NESSG safety studies Visits to restricted areas of warhead dismantlement facilities and material and component storage facilities - Conceptual discussion of access control and delay system features for storage facilities including th car 5 on 'n technology contraband detection and passive active barrier combinations 1v Organizing U S Efforts For the 0 5 the management technical and operational expertise for warhead disassembly and subsequent reuse or 'disposition of components and materials including long term However because pre-disassembly 1 g zf storage resides within DOE DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authonty EO 1352B Chief Records a Declare Div WHS 11 7 2015 I 0 storage and staging is a joint DOD and DOE effort and because of the close interaction between DOE and DOD on all matters pertaining to nuclear weapons these two Departments would work together to refine the list of issues for possible discussion recommend their prioritization develop draft presentations for the Soviets and I'red team those presentations to ensure full protection of u s sensitive data technologies and procedures venue for such meetings options include washington Geneva and Moscow Geneva may have the disadvantage of its association with traditional arms control negotiations While meetings in Moscow would be difficult from the point of view of administrative support for the 0 8 side there may be advantages in Soviet flexibility to engage in technical dialogue As a To preserve the exploratory technical and non-negotiating thrust of the President's initiatives to avoid creating expectations of major breakthroughs or agreements and to protect against any efforts to exploit these discussions to obtain sensitive information the following approach should be adopted 0 at the next Bartholomew-abukhcv meeting the U s would propose a small working group meeting on warhead dismentlement and destruction issues for about a week in early December and suggest 1-2 icebreaker topics weapons dismantlement issues and an overall description of U S dismantlement operations U S presentations and follow-on discussions would not go beyond those materials cleared in advance by Don and DOE Soviet requests for further information would simply be taken for consideration by the U s at a later date a backstopping mechanism would not be appropriate or necessary while bilateral meetings are in progress because of the technical details involved and the necessity for thorough time consuming security and technology transfer review of information to be exchanged and 0 based on each meeting each side could propose topics through the Bartholomewyobukhov channel As a rule every effort should be made to keep the size of the 0 5 team small and largely technical in composition bringing only those technical and policy experts necessary for discussion of the pro-agreed topic s limit the bilateral meetings to one or two weeks spaced apart sufficiently to permit internal reviews of results and effective preparation for any 'follcw on and limit topics for discussion to one or two issues If required and appropriate the working group see case per meeting LECLASSIFIED FULL EO 13526 might be provided carefully controlled visits to certain areas of dismantlement facilities in the U S and USSR of relevance to its discussions v Exchange of Information It is assumed that the discussions of topics presented under the headings Initial Explorations and Follow-on Steps would be parts of mutual exchanges of information This does not necessarily mean that the sides would be expected to match detail for detail information provided however in many of these technical areas if the U S is to be able to assist the Soviet '1 processes frank discussions including relatively unconstrained - dialogue within the previously authorized bounds will be necessary It would be a mistake to assume a priori that the Soviets have nothing of technical value for the U S In non-weapons science and technology the Soviet approach has shown significant differences from that of the US The Soviets in many cases show an excellent intuitive approach to provide guidance instead of over reliance on computer models and predictions Because of the chronic shortages in their system they also tend to make efficient and innovative use of materials and components The Soviet system may be more austere but their technical people can 3 bani-ca while we must carefully review all information which is to be a 1 discussed with the Center and the Republics we should recognize Tj - that these are not normal times In order to be effective the - I i U S response may need to consider a more expeditious method of processing and transferring safety security transportation 1 storage and dismantlement information and technologies In the case of Restricted Data and Sensitive Use Control Information there is presently no intention to discuss topics requiring exchange of Restricted Data or Sensitive Use Control Information i regarding U S nuclear weapons Sensitive information which has been published in open literature without approval of U S gr government authorities would not be releasable in these discussions unless a specific decision to do so were made as a result of thorough review However discussion of weapon design may be necessary and will require U S administrative or legislative action to permit U S representatives to discuss such information 1 DECLASSIFIED FULL Authority 5013526 7 i Records a Div st MR 0 7 2015 a 3' 53 77 seesa Appendix 1 Program of work for First Discussions 12 November DOD-DOB meet to establish terms of reference and drafting responsibilities for 0 5 presentation at midnnecember U S - Soviet Experts Working Group EWG on Warhead Dismantlement and Destruction -- Presentation possibly along the lines of an overview of U S methodology regarding warhead dismantlement including general discussions about demilitarization would be designed as an ioebreaker -- Intention would be to elicit Souietudiscussion of their_epproach_ and i they are prepared to identify problem areas where they might be interested in possible is U technical assistance 25 November DOD-DOE review red teaming of draft presentation and list of questions to pose to Soviets on their practices late November At Bartholomew Chekhov meeting - U S would at Formally agree to establishment of ENG if required -- Propose mid-December experts meeting one week in Washington i -- Identify head of 11 3 and - provide general description of v 5 team senior experts on warhead dismantlement and destruction 1 1 8 will need to resolve this issue in the near future 8 I - FULL 7 3 2-5 Chief Records 6 Div WHS MAR 07 2015 -- Describe proposed agenda see 5 above and urge Soviets to send appropriate experts Suggest Soviets give thought in advance to specific areas where they might be seeking U S technical assistance early December U S experts preview presentation to Steering Group - mid December U S -Soviet ENG meeting takes place 6%214 2 Warhead Dismantlemant and Destruction In order to gain an appreciation for the dismantlement and destruction process one must have an understanding of the components involved -- the nuclear warheads and the associated packaging bodies firin sets etc Most U S warheads consist of contain radioactive materia an consi arable risk to the environment safety and health of personnel involved in operations associated with these weapons cm HG D05 9 M j z oso Section 6 2 Data ma 0 7 2016 - 9503 3 bx 1 050 Section 6 2 Loss of any of these components to third world coun as to other subnationalist groups could have extremely adverse consequences 61 4 Conventional high explosives are used to initiate chain reaction Ex losives surround the rim nuclear need for extreme care and strict adherence to safety pra during the removal of the high explosives cannot be overstated Overall a nuclear warhead regardless of size is a complex device containing many potentially lethal components Its handling during assembly subsequent storage and transportation must be accomplished by specially trained and experienced personnel and demands Mishandling invites the potential for the most severe and catastrophic consequences thus the requirement for safety is of paramount importancePART Assumeouwm MAR 07 2015 6 61A 4 Dismantlement and Destruction Process The dismantlement and destruction process can be thought of in terms of six steps not including the transportation of weapons or warheads to interim storage facilities awaiting dismantlement 0 Removal of RV or warhead compartment from delivery system This would be the removal of reentry vehicles or the warhead compartments from missiles or separation of the warhead from the gravity bomb or ZZET artillery shell In some weapons the warhead is an integral part of the weapon and diamantlement would not include this step 'This step would normally be accomplished at a military facility whose normal mission is the maintenance of deployed weapons - 5 'sa aratE Ef EEd E tioh from weapon - This step would be accomplished a a mili ary facility whose normal mission is the maintenance of deployed weapons or at the DOE Pentax Plant Amarillo r Texas 0 Removal of nuclear explosive package from warhead l' section aeroshell The remaining components of the Weapon Electrical System would be separated and any This step and all following steps are performed in the 0 5 at the DOE Pentax Plant Amarillo Texas unless 1 otherwise indicated Separate explosive 3 p j 1 I'm 'ar 4 1 P I I - WIL- I Remove high explosive from primary pit 0nce the electronics are removed from the nuclear weapon the high explosive must also be quickly removed with a minimum of movement and transportation to reduce the potential for an accident because the detonators are still present Nuclear warhead dismantlement and destruction in this context assumes that disassembly is accomplished in such a way that the components could not ordinarily be reassembled into a detonable warhead with extensive refabrication of materials and components Presently however such reprocessing of plutonium accomplished in the U s and it is necessary to reuse 1 fully fabricated plutonium components recovered from disassembled warheads Certain other high value nonnuclear materials are recovered and reused while those materials of relatively low inhwasta streams These waste streams are carefully managed to ensure that maximum protection is afforded the environment as well as protection of the health and safety of personnel Because the 1 future supply of plutonium and HEU is expected to exceed warhead production requirements arrangements for the safe and secure I- long term storage of these materials are being made D35 56'ch p 26 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Assumeoumm 3' MAR 07 2015 12 5 325 'l Ra-59o- ler i