CASE STUDY SERIES The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Susan J Koch Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University 5 Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University DR JOHN F REICHART Director DR W SETH CARUS Deputy Director Distinguished Research Fellow Since its inception in 1994 the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Center has been at the forefront of research on the implications of weapons of mass destruction for U S security Originally focusing on threats to the military the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security The center's mandate includes research education and outreach Research focuses on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning effective responses thereto The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated the center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint professional military education system Education programs including its courses on countering WMD and consequence management enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy programs technology and operations As a part of its broad outreach efforts the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors Visit the center online at www ndu edu WMDCenter Cover President George H W Bush announces the Presidential Nuclear Initiative in a televised address to the Nation on September 27 1991 Photo courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library Hie Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1 99 1 1 992 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 by Susan J Koch Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Case Study 5 Case Study Series General Editor Paul I Bernstein National Defense University Press Washington D C September 2012 Opinions conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government Cleared for public release distribution unlimited Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission provided that a standard source credit line is included NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews First printing September 2012 NDU Press publications are sold by the U S Government Printing Office For ordering information call 202 512-1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents U S Government Printing Office Washington D C 20402 For the U S Government On-Line Bookstore go to www access gpo gov su_docs sale html For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies consult the National Defense University Web site at www ndu edu Contents Introduction 1 The Context 2 A Determined President 3 A Willing National Security Team 5 Crafting the Package 7 The September 27 Announcement 10 The Soviet Response 14 The Path to PNI II 17 PNI II 18 The Russian Response 19 Conclusion 21 Appendix A Text of Presidential Nuclear Initiative Announcements 23 Appendix B Summary of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 40 Bibliography 47 Notes 51 About the Author 57 vii Introduction1 On the morning of September 28 1991 then-Colonel Frank Klotz witnessed an historic moment at Grand Forks Air Force Base North Dakota As he and other senior officers from the base bomber and missile units watched the crews for the B-1 strategic bombers that had been on alert that day climbed into their cockpits started the planes and taxied one after another away from the alert aircraft parking area 2 That scene was repeated at all 11 Strategic Air Command SAC bases in the United States By the end of the day there were no U S bombers on alert for the first time in over 30 years Although the numbers varied over time a significant portion of U S strategic bombers had been on continuous alert since 1957 fully fueled loaded with weapons with crews in a special nearby area--ready to launch in a few minutes On September 28 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney signed an Execute Order to end that practice immediately 3 It has never resumed The termination of strategic bomber alerts was only one of many major changes to U S nuclear forces and practices that President George H W Bush announced to the Nation in a primetime television address on September 27 1991 Known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives PNIs the measures were described as unilateral reciprocal That is the United States intended to act on its own but also challenged the Soviet Union to take comparable steps President Bush declared additional PNI actions in his State of the Union address on January 28 1992 The Soviet and Russian responses came in dedicated television addresses by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on October 5 1991 and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 29 1992 4 President Bush's first PNI announcement was unprecedented on several levels First in its scope and scale it instituted deeper reductions in a wider range of nuclear weapons systems than had ever been done before Second the PNIs were primarily unilateral--not to be negotiated but instead implemented immediately While Soviet Russian reciprocity was encouraged it was not required for most of the U S measures Third the decisions announced on September 27 1991 were prepared with a speed and secrecy that had never been seen before in arms reduction and have yet to be duplicated The PNIs were developed in just 3 weeks and involved very few people In contrast most arms control measures before and after the PNIs required months and often years of interagency and international debate and negotiation by scores of military and civilian officials Why did this happen and how was it possible This case study discusses the general context in which the PNIs were developed the concerns and goals that motivated them and the national and international processes that led to them The focus is on the initial announcement 1 WMD Center Case Study 5 by President Bush because it was the pathbreaker The three subsequent declarations by the Soviet Union United States and Russia are also addressed but in less detail The Context Although the specific PNI decision process took less than a month the context began to emerge nearly 2 years before with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 That momentous event marked the beginning of the end of the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and eventually of the Soviet Union itself Six months after the Wall fell President Bush announced significant changes to planned tactical nuclear forces in Europe--cancelling the Follow-On to Lance short-range ground-launched missile as well as modernization of nuclear artillery warheads deployed in Europe At the same time he called for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Summit in summer 1990 to launch a wide-ranging NATO strategy review for the transformed Europe of the 1990's 5 The result was the Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the NATO Summit in London on July 6 1990 The London Declaration went beyond President Bush's May 1990 statement by calling for the elimination of short-range nuclear artillery in Europe Still that would apply to just a portion of tactical nuclear weapons and occur only pursuant to a U S -Soviet arms control agreement 6 Slightly over a year later the PNI went much further On the strategic forces side Secretary Cheney had directed in November 1989 a comprehensive review of the Single Integrated Operational Plan SIOP the U S nuclear war plan--or more accurately series of plans reflecting a range of nuclear strike options The SIOP Review was completed in April 1991 in the same time period as the dramatic changes in Europe Concluding that the United States had far more strategic nuclear weapons than required for robust deterrence of the Soviet Union the SIOP Review gave the President and his defense advisors confidence that they could reduce nuclear forces significantly without military risk The Review made clear that U S security interests would be well protected under the Strategic Arms Reduction START Treaty signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on July 31 1991--and under even greater reductions 7 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty signed in 1987 was the first U S -Soviet nuclear arms control agreement to provide for real reductions and intrusive on-site verification In fact it eliminated an entire class of weapons The START Treaty did not eliminate any weapons classes or types but it did provide for real reductions and intrusive verification START reduced accountable strategic warheads to 6 000 and deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1 600 on each side Meanwhile change within the Soviet Union and Central Europe was accelerating The Warsaw Pact effectively ceased to function after the fall of the Berlin Wall and finally dissolved 2 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 officially on March 31 1991 Ukraine and the Baltic States pressed ever more strongly for independence from the Soviet Union On June 12 1991 Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Republic in the first democratic election in Russian history Beginning in January 1991 Gorbachev oversaw the preparation of a so-called New Union Treaty in an effort to salvage the Soviet Union by reorganizing it into a confederation Eight republics were to sign the Treaty on August 20 1991 But that signing was cancelled after a hard-line group instituted a coup against Gorbachev on August 19 The plotters could not accept even a weakening of the Soviet structure let alone its dissolution Their efforts collapsed quickly ending on August 21 Yeltsin's courageous opposition to the coup went far to ensure its failure and greatly raised his national and international standing The huge changes in the political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union are shown in the transcripts of President Bush's telephone conversations with Yeltsin on August 20 and with Gorbachev on August 21 The President clearly viewed Yeltsin as a leader along with Gorbachev and stressed his desire to move forward with the relationship after the failure of the coup 8 The stage for the PNIs was set A Determined President All those involved in the initial U S PNI decision process who were interviewed for this case study agreed that President Bush was the driving force One official remarked that in decades of public service he had observed no comparable case in which a President led the way for such sweeping decisive actions in the military sphere 9 In the words of then-National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft The President wanted to take the initiative in arms control I'm clear up to September 1991 and the dramatic move on tactical nuclear weapons together with a strategic arms control proposal Those were all done basically in the White House by a President who wanted to stay out in front and who saw intuitively that there was a new world forming and didn't want to be behind the power curve and be driven either by the Congress and the budget or by the Pentagon's resistance 10 Several different but complementary factors motivated the President and other principal players to pursue the PNI First they reportedly had been seriously concerned about the reliability of Soviet nuclear command and control during the failed coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991 That concern remained after Gorbachev's 3 WMD Center Case Study 5 reinstatement given the obvious weakness and questionable future of the Soviet center and led directly to one little-noticed element of the PNI on nuclear command control and security 11 Perhaps even more important was the specter of nuclear weapons in Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan by September 1991 it was clear that each was poised to become independent in the very near future in the process inheriting the Soviet nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles on their territories Further President Bush saw dramatic nuclear reductions as both reflecting and accelerating the changed relationship with the Soviet Union If there was to be any chance of reciprocity those reductions had to be decided upon quickly while there were still known Soviet and Russian leaders in Gorbachev and Yeltsin The START negotiations completed in July 1991 had lasted for almost a decade President Bush appeared to see a repeat of long drawn-out negotiations as unnecessary and indeed counterproductive in view of both the new U S -Soviet relationship and the uncertainties about the future of the Soviet Union and its leaders 12 Although they differ on some details all senior participants who have written about the genesis of the PNI agree that it was directed by President Bush at a National Security Council NSC meeting on September 5 1991 13 President Bush and Scowcroft have reported that they discussed possible tactical and strategic nuclear arms reductions over the Labor Day weekend in Kennebunkport Maine the Bush family summer home The initial ideas for tactical reductions came from Scowcroft but were immediately adopted and pressed by the President 14 Three days after Labor Day the President chaired the NSC meeting to discuss future strategy toward the Soviet Union in the wake of the failed coup against Gorbachev and in light of the very real possibility that the Soviet Union could break up in the near term Then-Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates describes the discussion The President finally moved to the real agenda--how to respond to the dramatic events of the preceding two weeks He had resolved late in August after the coup attempt to propose a whole new series of initiatives to reduce arms further He had run into doubts from Cheney about going further at this point Now in this meeting he asked if there was anything we could do militarily to save money and to signal that we recognized there was a new world out there The President concluded by urging a dramatic statement of initiatives that would give the United States the offense in global perceptions of the changes under way An intensive effort to develop such initiatives culminated three weeks later in a presidential address to the nation 15 4 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 A Willing National Security Team The concept of making significant changes to the Nation's tactical nuclear capabilities was not a new one inside the Department of Defense DOD Ideas for doing so had been circulating for some time especially among senior military officers Still it is questionable if such changes would have come to anything without Presidential leadership At a minimum it seems clear that Presidential direction was critical to the scope and scale of the initiative and the speed and decisiveness with which it came to fruition It became evident to all involved in shaping the initiative that No was not an option because of the President's clear intent It helped of course that senior DOD leaders both uniformed and civilian either shared the President's vision or were at least willing to accept the changes desired by the Commander in Chief Many senior Navy officers hoped for an end to all naval nuclear weapons except for submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs One key participant has argued that the Navy saw nuclear weapons on surface ships as an obstacle to its freedom of movement a barrier to their being--and being seen as--globally dominant 16 The presence of nuclear weapons on board complicated and constrained port visits and entailed procedural requirements that commanders viewed as onerous and out of proportion to the weapons' value Another former official has noted concerns that deployment of nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles TLAM-N on the decks of surface ships could be vulnerable to terrorist attack 17 As for ground-launched weapons Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell had long favored a major reduction in the Army's nuclear mission In the spring of 1991 Powell raised with Cheney a proposal to eliminate small artillery-fired nukes because they were trouble-prone expensive to modernize and irrelevant in the present world of highly accurate conventional weapons At the time the four Service Chiefs Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary Cheney all opposed the idea 18 By September the time had come for those proposals to be revived and even expanded National Security Advisor Scowcroft was if anything even more interested than was President Bush in arms reductions without agreements That interest had been well demonstrated in 1989 when President Bush and Scowcroft successfully pressed both within the U S Government and in NATO to propose dramatic cuts in U S and Soviet conventional forces in Europe 19 Further Scowcroft saw in September 1991 an opportunity to solve a number of tactical nuclear weapons questions at the same time In Europe for example the unification of Germany rendered short-range nuclear weapons undesirable since they would detonate on German territory In 5 WMD Center Case Study 5 connection with its efforts to engage North Korea South Korea was suggesting the removal of the US nuclear weapons located there We did not wish to make such a move solely in Korea concerned that the North might take our actions as the beginning of a US withdrawal The Navy's problem was different A number of countries were reluctant to allow our warships carrying nuclear weapons into their ports In addition these were no longer the preferred weapon against submarines The sum of all these issues led me to suggest that we unilaterally declare we were getting rid of all tactical nuclear weapons except air-delivered ones 20 The views of Chairman Powell and Navy leaders on tactical nuclear weapons were strengthened substantially by the seismic strategic changes of 1989-1991 First were the end of the Cold War and the progressive diminution of the Soviet threat Second was the emergence of new zones and forms of conflict--highlighted by Operation Desert Storm in 1991 against Iraq--in which U S conventional military force would have primary and growing importance Further advances in conventional weaponry led the U S military to conclude that conventional forces could now accomplish many missions that earlier required nuclear weapons As a result of those changes many military leaders came to view both ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons as impediments to conventional superiority and military dominance rather than as assets The Secretary of Defense and his staff were less eager than the military leadership to reduce dramatically--still less to eliminate--ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons Unlike the military they considered forward deployment of those weapons to be essential for extended deterrence and allied reassurance However they also recognized growing pressures to reduce tactical nuclear weaponry U S ground-launched nuclear forces in NATO required modernization to enhance their safety reliability and effectiveness The NATO Allies were increasingly resistant and had begun discussing withdrawal of those forces after the fall of the Warsaw Pact 21 Those changing Allied views led directly to President Bush's May 1990 decision to cancel Follow-On to Lance and nuclear artillery warhead modernization and to the July 1990 NATO Summit call for a negotiated elimination of short-range nuclear artillery in Europe Political and budgetary realities also were important factors behind several strategic force elements of the September 1991 PNI There was much public discussion at the time of a peace dividend Earlier in September 1991 the U S Senate had voted against funding the mobile versions of the Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM and Small ICBM as well as the advanced Short-Range Attack Missile SRAM II On September 27 the President an- 6 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 nounced the cancellation of all three programs as well as cancellation of the theater-delivered version of the SRAM-II 22 At the September 28 press conference to explain the PNI details Secretary Cheney stressed that those actions would not entail significant savings in the short term but would do so in the long run He estimated life-cycle savings for the three cancelled programs at $20 2 billion 23 Retaining strategic bombers on continuous alert appeared unnecessary and too expensive with the diminution of the Soviet threat Moreover ending the practice could send a positive message to the Soviet Union about U S hopes for a changed relationship Deactivating Minuteman II ICBMs would not save any money in and of itself but would send a positive political message at no military cost The Minuteman II force was scheduled to be eliminated under the START Treaty signed in July 1991 accelerating that process once START was ratified would save funds over the longer term Crafting the Package The process leading to the first PNI announcement was very closely held The specific measures were developed by a small number of military and civilian officials in the Department of Defense endorsed by the four military Service Chiefs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President Arms control staff in the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA were not involved in preparing the package Experts from the Central Intelligence Agency CIA were asked for data on Soviet nuclear forces but were not told the reason for the request or included in the decision process 24 Immediately after the NSC meeting on September 5 1991 Chairman Powell tasked the Director of the Joint Staff Lieutenant General Henry Vicellio USAF to prepare a list of possible unilateral measures to meet the President's guidance Vicellio turned to then-Brigadier General Gary Curtin USAF who had been the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the START negotiations until July 1991 and was now Deputy Director for International Negotiations Joint Staff J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Curtin convened a meeting with his military Service counterparts on the morning of September 6 The military Service representatives initially advocated a fairly traditional arms control approach to the task wanting to retain U S options for future trades with the Soviet Union However Curtin conveyed that Chairman Powell wanted options for the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Cheney to implement immediately The group was directed to formulate realistic and forward-leaning options for immediate consideration by the Joint Chiefs 25 7 WMD Center Case Study 5 The Curtin group then developed a wide-ranging ambitious package in just a few days There was little discussion of motives or goals instead the group was simply ordered to devise proposals As Major General Curtin has described it development of the PNI was a bizarre process for those accustomed to traditional arms control negotiations 26 Another departure from normal arms control policy practice concerned the interaction-- or more accurately the absence of interaction--between the military and civilian staffs in DOD Under standard procedures the Joint Staff would have coordinated its proposals with Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD Policy offices For the PNI however the Curtin group proposals went directly to Chairman Powell through the Director Joint Staff J5 Major General Ed Leland USA and Lieutenant General Vicellio without discussion with OSD staff The Curtin group was surprised when Powell endorsed all its recommendations 27 It appears that Chairman Powell then took the package to Secretary Cheney In turn Cheney sent it to the OSD Policy staff for its review Only a few OSD officials were involved The main players were Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Stephen Hadley his Principal Deputy J D Crouch Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy Frank Miller and Director of the Strategic Forces Policy Office Gil Klinger 28 Within a few days this group presented its recommendations to Secretary Cheney In general the OSD staff supported the Joint Staff package but with some significant differences They concurred with the removal from deployment of all ground and naval tactical nuclear weapons However they proposed to keep in storage a significant portion of both types of weapons allowing for their redeployment if required Secretary Cheney staked a middle ground on this question in the proposal he presented to the President 29 On September 27 President Bush announced that all U S ground-launched--but only many naval--tactical nuclear warheads would be destroyed On September 28 Chairman Powell specified that many meant about one-half 30 Additionally and importantly the OSD officials who worked on developing the PNI wanted to challenge the Soviet Union to reciprocate The White House the Joint Staff and the military Services had all thought only in terms of unilateral U S actions though they certainly hoped for some comparable actions by Moscow OSD staff added the explicit challenge for Soviet reciprocity and Cheney repeatedly used that word in the September 28 press conference 31 Even though the desire for Soviet action became an important aspect of the PNI there was no advance consultation even in the most general of terms with Soviet or Russian officials until the day of the announcement The call for Soviet reciprocity was driven primarily by concern over the security of Soviet nuclear warheads Tactical nuclear warheads were a particular worry given that they were wide- 8 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 ly dispersed smaller and easier to transport than weapons associated with strategic systems In that view reciprocity in tactical nuclear elimination and central storage of the remaining weapons would be especially welcome--even as Secretary Cheney and his staff agreed that the U S PNI measures could be taken unilaterally In addition they welcomed the PNIs' separation of arms reductions from negotiations and treaties They considered formal arms control as unduly time-consuming and counterproductive with each side freezing weapons inventories to avoid any unilateral concessions 32 Despite the addition of the reciprocity challenge all concerned with the development of the PNIs emphasize that the U S Government was fully prepared to implement them unilaterally 33 As discussed below the only U S PNI elements to require reciprocity were the proposals for U S -Soviet dialogues and for a formal agreement that became START II At some points in the process General Lee Butler commander in chief SAC and then the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the package 34 It appears that the Joint Chiefs discussed the initial Joint Staff proposals before Chairman Powell submitted them to Secretary Cheney and likely formally approved the final package after Secretary Cheney's compromise decision on groundand sea-launched tactical weapons Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell then submitted the proposals to the President who approved them without change There is no public record of any formal NSC meeting to discuss the package A small number of State Department and ACDA officials were brought into the process a few days before the initiative was announced to help execute it That included the preparation of pre-announcement communications to Moscow and some other capitals and diplomatic communications to circulate background information worldwide immediately after the announcement To underscore that this was a White House initiative the briefings to State and ACDA officials took place in the White House complex even though they were given by Frank Miller of OSD By that time the substance of the initiative was set 35 The Soviet Union and close allies of the United States were apprised of the PNI only at the most senior level and just hours before the announcement Presidential letters outlining the initiative were delivered to selected heads of government and the NATO Secretary-General at their opening of business on September 27 Beginning shortly after 7 00 a m in Washington President Bush followed up with telephone calls to French President Francois Mitterrand British Prime Minister John Major German Chancellor Helmut Kohl Gorbachev and Yeltsin National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft called NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner 36 It is not known how many other heads of government were informed in advance of the PNI but the number appears to have been small 9 WMD Center Case Study 5 The President asked Gorbachev Yeltsin Major Mitterrand and Kohl for their reactions to the initiative before his announcement Still the last-minute nature of his written and telephonic communications with them demonstrates that he was not seeking a detailed consultation We do not know what would have happened if any of the leaders had objected to one or more PNI elements However it appears there were no objections Yeltsin Mitterrand and Kohl warmly welcomed the proposals without qualification Major raised two issues but does not seem to have opposed the package 37 The President's conversations with Gorbachev and Yeltsin are particularly noteworthy First it was both unusual--and a sign of White House expectations for the future--that President Bush telephoned Yeltsin on a foreign and defense policy matter Second Bush told Gorbachev he would be doing so the Gorbachev call occurred about 3 hours before the call to Yeltsin The Yeltsin conversation lasted just 3 minutes the one with Gorbachev for 30 minutes Gorbachev was positive but somewhat cautious and had several questions about what would and would not be included in the PNIs Alone among the leaders with whom President Bush spoke Gorbachev said that he had asked experts in his government for their initial reactions Bush and Gorbachev engaged in some speech-drafting working out what the President would say on television that night about the Soviet leader's reaction According to the Memorandum of Conversation the exchange was as follows resident Gorbachev George thank you for those clarifications Since you're urging P that we take steps I can only give an answer in principle--since there is much that must be clarified--and that answer is a positive one e President I understand How about if I say that I've consulted with Mikhail Th Gorbachev and although he has had no time to study my initiative that I am inclined to believe his response will be positive President Gorbachev I think that will be very good 38 In his speech that night President Bush used virtually the same words Today I consulted with President Gorbachev And while he hasn't had time to absorb the details I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive 39 The September 27 Announcement President Bush announced the PNI in a rare televised address at 8 00 p m on Friday September 27 1991 He gave such prime-time speeches only a few times and never before or after on arms control issues This despite the fact that his administration saw the signature 10 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 of an unprecedented number of major arms control treaties START START II the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Conventional Forces in Europe CFE Treaty The following afternoon Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell explained the PNI details in a Pentagon press conference The first PNI is remembered primarily for tactical nuclear reductions While those were dramatic the September 27 announcement also included several important unilateral measures on strategic nuclear weapons and proposals for new U S -Soviet cooperation 40 At the same time President Bush Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell all stressed the importance of retaining a strong nuclear deterrent and developing and deploying defenses against ballistic missiles They emphasized that the PNI would not significantly affect air-launched tactical nuclear weapons in Europe the ballistic missile-carrying submarine SSBN force or the nonmobile versions of the Peacekeeper and small ICBM All of that was destined to change to varying degrees over the next few months Tactical Nuclear Forces Under the September 27 PNI all U S ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons--about 1 000 artillery rounds and 700 Lance surface-to-surface missile warheads--would be removed from Europe Those and another 400 nuclear artillery and Lance warheads in the United States would all be destroyed 41 All nuclear weapons would be removed from surface ships attack submarines and landbased naval aircraft Those included 100 nuclear TLAM-N that were routinely deployed Mark 57 and Mark 61 naval nuclear bombs and nuclear depth bombs associated with land-based nuclear naval P-3 aircraft and carrier-based S-3 aircraft All in this latter category--approximately half of the total naval tactical nuclear stockpile--would be destroyed The remainder including all TLAM-N would be put in storage 42 The Department of Defense put notable public emphasis on the intention to retain the ability to redeploy TLAM-N--considered an important element of the U S nuclear umbrella for Asian allies 43 The September 27 PNI included only one element that concerned air-launched tactical nuclear forces in Europe the cancellation of the SRAM-T or Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile-- TASM the tactical version of the SRAM II No PNI measures would affect currently deployed air-launched tactical nuclear warheads in Europe That changed less than a month later In its final communique from its October 17-18 1991 meeting in Taormina Italy the NATO Nuclear Planning Group NPG announced In addition to the elimination of ground-launched nuclear systems under the PNI the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO's European stockpile 11 WMD Center Case Study 5 will be greatly reduced 44 Press reports indicated that the NPG decided to cut deployed airdelivered tactical nuclear warheads by 50 percent from about 1 400 to 700 gravity bombs 45 Strategic Nuclear Forces As discussed above the foundation for the September 27 PNI measures concerning U S strategic forces was laid by the 1989-1991 SIOP Review Many of the PNI strategic elements were also driven by budget considerations and the desire to send positive political signals to the Soviet Union Those appear to have been the two primary motives behind the decisions to end strategic bomber alert cancel the SRAM II program and accelerate the elimination of Minuteman II ICBMs after entry-into-force of the START Treaty The same two factors were important motivators for the cancellations of the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM development programs along with the growing recognition that mobile ICBM deployment in the United States would almost certainly never be feasible politically One PNI measure affecting strategic forces was purely symbolic removal from alert of all the Minuteman II ICBMs slated for elimination under the START Treaty That action could be reversed as quickly and easily as it had been implemented 46 A final PNI measure on strategic forces addressed the organization of DOD President Bush announced that SAC would be replaced by a joint command the United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM responsible for all three legs of the U S strategic nuclear triad Several military leaders had been interested in this concept for some years and Congress had recommended it in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 47 Further the SIOP Review made clear the need for a single command able to develop requirements as well as targeting plans for the entire strategic force 48 Calls for Reciprocity While all of those measures for U S nuclear forces were unconditional the President called on the Soviet Union to take reciprocal actions He offered several specific ideas suggesting that the Soviet Union 12 e liminate all its ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear forces including nuclear artillery nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles and air-defense missiles and nuclear land mines r emove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines withdraw nuclear weapons for land-based naval aircraft destroy many naval tactical warheads and consolidate the rest in central storage areas limit ICBM modernization to one single-warhead system The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 e nd all programs for future ICBMs with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles MIRVs confine mobile ICBMs to garrison The calls for reciprocity recognized the differences between U S and Soviet nuclear forces For example Soviet strategic bombers were not routinely kept on alert while the United States had no mobile ICBMs Therefore a logical Soviet corollary to the U S termination of bomber alerts was to end movement of mobile ICBMs To eliminate all their ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons both sides would have to destroy nuclear artillery and short-range ballistic missile warheads but the Soviets would also have to eliminate systems the United States no longer had nuclear landmines and nuclear warheads for air defense Calls for Cooperation President Bush further proposed to the Soviet Union important new forms of cooperation First he suggested that the two governments explore cooperation on safe and secure nuclear warhead command and control storage transport dismantlement and destruction President Bush acknowledged in his speech that this proposal built on an earlier one by French President Mitterrand but it also went further The idea reflected the strong concerns of the time about Soviet nuclear command and control the need to consolidate as many nuclear weapons as possible in Russia and the hope for major Soviet warhead reductions 49 President Bush also proposed U S -Soviet cooperation on practical steps to allow limited ballistic missile defenses beyond those permitted by the Antiballistic Missile ABM Treaty This led in early 1992 to the so-called Ross-Mamedov talks led by Dennis Ross director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and Georgiy Mamedov Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Some observers believe the Ross-Mamedov talks held promise of a productive outcome but they were cancelled by the new Clinton administration in early 1993 50 They were immediately replaced by talks between Mamedov and Strobe Talbott then Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States however those were not focused on missile defense Finally President Bush suggested that the United States and Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBMs with multiple warheads He described what apparently would be a very simple perhaps informal agreement under which the sides would agree on a timetable to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs through missile destruction and or warhead downloading and use START Treaty procedures to implement it This was the first serious public proposal to emerge from a longstanding U S concern about the dangers that MIRVed 13 WMD Center Case Study 5 ICBMs posed to strategic stability U S civilian and military experts worried that there would be a strong temptation to launch MIRVed ICBMs preemptively in a crisis given their vulnerability to attack and the potential loss of many warheads to only one or two enemy weapons The eventual outcome of the September 27 proposal was the START II Treaty signed in January 1993 START II was more detailed and formal than envisioned when the de-MIRVing idea was first raised but it met the same U S strategic goals However the treaty never entered into force The Soviet Response At midday on October 5 1991 a U S interagency team led by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Reginald Bartholomew arrived in Moscow The team intended to meet with Soviet counterparts to explain the September 27 PNI more fully and to urge a positive Soviet response However shortly after arriving Bartholomew was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and provided a copy of the television speech that President Gorbachev would give that evening The Soviet response was faster wider-ranging and more positive than even the most optimistic U S official would have predicted A few of the measures proposed by Gorbachev were long-standing ritual demands that the Soviet Government knew the United States would never accept e g calls for a universal pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and for withdrawal of all U S nuclear weapons from Europe However most were very much in the spirit of the U S initiative and demonstrated the Soviet President's willingness--even eagerness--to reduce military forces and advance a new relationship with the United States and NATO Tactical Nuclear Forces Gorbachev committed to sweeping reductions of tactical nuclear weapons most of which followed the U S measures and calls for reciprocity He announced that the Soviet Union would eliminate all nuclear artillery short-range missile nuclear warheads and nuclear mines The proliferation potential of the large number of ground-launched Soviet tactical nuclear weapons still deployed outside Russia and especially in Ukraine and Belarus undoubtedly provided a powerful motive for this Soviet commitment Non-Russian republics might be loath to allow the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from their territory if they thought they would simply add to the Russian arsenal Their attitude toward those transfers would be far more positive if the weapons were to be destroyed and if the action was part of a unilateral reciprocal arrangement with the United States 51 Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union like the United States would remove from deployment all tactical nuclear weapons for surface ships submarines and land-based 14 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 naval aircraft He stated that some of those naval weapons would be eliminated and the remainder placed in central storage The Soviet Union did not at the time specify what portion of its tactical air defense or naval nuclear warheads would be destroyed however Yeltsin did so in January 1992 The practical consequences of removing Soviet weapons to central storage are unclear Many U S observers concluded that the weapons would be stored in a few sites well away from operational bases but that does not appear to be the case Instead central storage seems to have been--and to remain--only an organizational concept specifying that the warheads would be under the control of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense 12th GUMO rather than the navy army or air force The concept has no locational implications 52 Strategic Nuclear Forces Gorbachev also echoed many of the U S measures for strategic nuclear forces and responded at least somewhat positively to one of President Bush's calls for reciprocity He announced that the Soviet Union would remove from alert 503 ICBMs including 134 MIRVed ICBMs and all strategic bombers The last was essentially meaningless because Soviet bombers were not routinely on alert Like President Bush Gorbachev stated that his government would cancel development of its mobile small ICBM and short-range nuclear missile for bombers He partially met U S reciprocity calls by announcing that the Soviet Union would not increase or modernize its rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM and would confine that system to garrison No such commitments were made regarding the road-mobile SS-25 ICBM--whether on numbers modernization or deployment patterns Further Gorbachev emulated President Bush in announcing that the Soviet Union would create a single operational command over all strategic nuclear weapons including strategic defensive systems That decision appears never to have been implemented Responsibility for the three legs of the Russian triad remains with the Strategic Rocket Forces ICBMs navy and air force In some respects Gorbachev's October 5 response went beyond President Bush's September 27 measures on strategic forces He announced that the Soviet Union would remove three SSBNs from active duty in addition to three that had already been removed He also declared that the Soviet Union would reduce its total accountable strategic warheads to 5 000 1 000 below the START ceiling by the end of the treaty reduction period Both actions simply reflected previously planned changes to Soviet strategic forces The SSBNs were slated for elimination to meet START limits and it seemed clear that the Soviet Union would not be able to sustain the 6 000 accountable warheads allowed under the treaty Finally Gorbachev announced a 1-year unilateral moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing hoping to achieve the comprehensive cessation of nuclear testing He had instituted previous 15 WMD Center Case Study 5 testing moratoria from August 1985 to October 1987 and from November 1989 to October 1990 The last acknowledged Soviet or Russian test was in October 1990 53 In their telephone conversation about the PNI on September 27 Gorbachev urged President Bush to consider moves on testing to accompany the reductions in numbers and types of nuclear weapons President Bush replied that the United States was reluctant on testing but that the sides would need to consult on that 54 Calls for Reciprocity Gorbachev proposed two measures on tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union would take only if the United States reciprocated Both were longstanding Soviet proposals that the leadership probably expected to fail That was certainly the case with one proposal to withdraw from combat units on frontal aviation all nuclear weapons and place them in centralized storage sites This was code for the removal of all U S nuclear weapons from Europe--a position that was unacceptable at the time to the United States and most if not all NATO Allies The second reciprocity proposal--to eliminate fully all tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces --would as discussed above be positively received by many in the U S Navy However there appeared to be no U S interest in reopening that issue after Secretary Cheney's compromise decision allowing for only partial elimination of such weapons Almost 19 years would elapse before the DOD decided to retire the TLAM-N Gorbachev made two references to multilateralizing the PNI The USSR calls other nuclear powers to join in these far reaching Soviet-American steps with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and we sincerely hope that in the final analysis other nuclear powers will actively join the efforts of the USSR and the United States Two obvious targets of those statements were the United Kingdom and France They reprised a favorite Soviet theme--for years the Soviet Union insisted in the INF Treaty negotiations that any equal limits apply to the Soviet Union on one side and to the United States UK and France combined on the other But Gorbachev did not stress the issue in his October 5 speech instead these references appear to have been a ritual nod to hard-line Soviet positions In any case the idea was a nonstarter for the United States President Bush did not mention third-party nuclear forces in his September 27 address the first point he made to both Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand in their conversations that morning was that the PNIs were completely separate from British and French nuclear force decisions 55 Gorbachev's third multilateral proposal on October 5 was for a joint declaration of all nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons Here the major target appears to have been 16 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 the United States a step of the American side in this direction would be an important milestone on the path toward establishing a durable structure of mutual security Whether the proposal was for bilateral or multilateral declarations it would be ignored by the United States--as Gorbachev and his advisers no doubt understood Calls for Cooperation Gorbachev accepted President Bush's proposals for U S -Soviet discussions on missile defense and nuclear warhead safety security and command and control On missile defense he added a proposal to discuss possible development of joint early-warning systems He was less forthcoming on nuclear warhead safety and security appearing to want to limit discussion to relevant technologies rather than to venture into more sensitive areas of nuclear weapons practice and procedures 56 Gorbachev did not respond to President Bush's call for an agreement to eliminate U S and Soviet MIRVed ICBMs Instead he proposed that the sides negotiate immediately after START entry-into-force a new treaty that would reduce each side's strategic forces by about one-half Gorbachev also proposed an agreement to end U S and Soviet fissile material production There is no evidence that the George H W Bush administration followed up on that idea but President Bill Clinton proposed a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty FMCT in September 1993 The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has had the issue on its agenda ever since without being able to agree to begin negotiations The Path to PNI II Immediately after the Gorbachev speech the U S interagency team that had come to Moscow to urge Soviet PNI reciprocity turned its attention to implementation The U S and Soviet teams discussed how each government planned to implement its unilateral commitments and agreed to inform each other of progress through periodic implementation reports They also set up initial discussions on missile defense concepts of strategic stability and nuclear warhead safety and security which occurred later that fall Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stressed to the U S group the importance of the proposal for deep strategic reductions after the START Treaty he was convinced that Russia would have to accept major cuts if it was to persuade Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear forces on their soil 57 As the Kozyrev discussion shows the few months between the Bush-Gorbachev PNI announcements in September-October 1991 and the Bush-Yeltsin ones in January 1992 were dominated by the prospect and then the reality of the fall of the Soviet Union The process moved with astonishing speed By December 1 all the Soviet republics had declared their independence 17 WMD Center Case Study 5 On December 8 Russia Ukraine and Belarus meeting in Minsk Belarus declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States The same basic points were made by 11 republic heads in the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21 58 On December 25 Gorbachev submitted his resignation as President of the Soviet Union and the Russian tricolor flag was raised over the Kremlin in place of the hammer and sickle The United States was active during this period in seeking to help ensure a peaceful transition to establish productive relationships with the new republics to keep on track U S -Soviet arms reduction agreements whether formal or informal and to work to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation On December 12 just a few days after the Minsk Declaration President Bush signed into law the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 creating the Nunn-Lugar program In mid-month Secretary of State James A Baker III led an interagency team to Moscow Alma-Ata Bishkek Kyrgyzstan Kiev Ukraine and Minsk to discuss the future U S relationship with the independent republics nuclear weapons issues were a major but not exclusive focus of his talks In mid-January 1992 Under Secretary of State Bartholomew led another interagency team to Moscow Alma-Ata Kiev and Minsk for the first of many detailed discussions of Russian weapons reductions Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan denuclearization and potential Nunn-Lugar assistance in both areas Finally Russian President Yeltsin was invited for talks with President Bush and his senior advisors on February 1 1992 at Camp David PNI II It was in this context that President Bush presented additional PNI measures--often referred to as PNI II --in his State of the Union address on January 28 1992 On September 27-28 President Bush Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell had stressed the importance of retaining strong nuclear forces Thus the administration stated that it would move forward with production of the silo-based Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 strategic bomber and with development of the silo-based small ICBM No changes would be made to the strategic submarine force or to U S air-delivered tactical nuclear forces beyond the cancellation of SRAM-T Nevertheless as we have seen reductions in air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons were announced just a few weeks later By late January it was the turn of several strategic programs There does not appear to have been a dedicated process to develop a PNI II package--or at least not one that was comparable to the September effort Instead most of the PNI II decisions seem to have emerged from preparation of the President's budget request for Fiscal Year 1994 There was strong pressure at the time to maximize the peace dividend resulting from the fall of the Soviet Union and the development of a new partnership with the Russian Federation 18 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 While the first PNI is remembered mainly for its tactical nuclear reductions PNI II concerned strategic forces exclusively The President cancelled the silo-based small ICBM program ended production of the Peacekeeper ICBM capped production of B-2 strategic bombers at 20 aircraft and terminated procurement of additional advanced cruise missiles Further the President announced an end to production of new W-88 warheads for the Trident II D-5 SLBM 59 The PNIs are renowned for being unilateral reciprocal--arms control without agreements But one of the most important elements of PNI II was a proposal for a de-MIRVing treaty that built on--but was much more detailed than--the one in the PNI package of September 27 President Bush announced that he had told President Yeltsin that if Russia eliminated all its MIRVed ICBMs the United States would eliminate all Peacekeeper ICBMs download all Minuteman ICBMs to one warhead reduce deployed SLBM warheads by about one-third and convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use Those few words outlined the core of what became the START II Treaty Compared to the PNIs the process leading to START II was more of a traditional negotiation involving interagency teams on both sides Still it moved much faster than the preceding U S -Soviet arms control agreements It could do so in part because of the changed political environment and in part because it relied on many START I provisions including verification The Russian Response While Gorbachev learned of the September 27 1991 PNI just hours before it became public it appears that Yeltsin was given more advance notice of President Bush's January 1992 proposals President Bush noted in his State of the Union address that he had informed Yeltsin of the de-MIRVing proposal and Yeltsin offered his PNIs in considerable detail in a television address the very next day Yeltsin's speech reaffirmed many elements announced by Gorbachev on October 5 but also included new unilateral commitments and proposals for reciprocal or joint action with the United States With respect to tactical weapons Yeltsin reaffirmed that nuclear warheads for groundlaunched short-range missiles nuclear artillery shells and nuclear land mines would be eliminated He added without explanation that measures in this direction have already been taken 60 Going beyond Gorbachev's announcement Yeltsin was more specific on plans to eliminate other tactical nuclear weapons types He stated that Russia would destroy one-half of all air-defense nuclear warheads and one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear warheads Even more important he announced a new commitment to eliminate one-half of Russian air-launched 19 WMD Center Case Study 5 tactical nuclear weapons Gorbachev had offered no measures on such weapons other than the proposal for reciprocal withdrawal to central storage With respect to strategic forces Yeltsin added substantially to the measures put forth earlier by Gorbachev Much of what he announced may have been motivated at least in part by a desire to improve relations with the United States and NATO The most important considerations however probably were the severe economic difficulties facing Russia and the recognition shared with Gorbachev that unrestrained military spending was not possible if the country was to be modern democratic and fiscally stable Yeltsin announced an end to production of the Backfire and Blackjack bombers current air-launched cruise missiles ALCMs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles SLCMs He also committed not to produce new types of SLCMs Further Yeltsin declared a goal of reaching the START Treaty limit of 6 000 deployed warheads by 3 years after entry-into-force--4 years before the end of the treaty reduction period Yeltsin also introduced changes to expensive military practices There would be no more military exercises with over 30 bombers and SSBN combat patrols had been halved and will be reduced further Finally Yeltsin appeared to reaffirm several of the Gorbachev statements about early preparations for START reductions 61 Yeltsin also made several proposals for U S -Russian reciprocal steps One repeated Gorbachev's proposal to place all remaining air-launched tactical nuclear weapons in central storage The others were new to eliminate all existing long-range nuclear SLCMs foreswear production of new ALCM types end SSBN combat patrols and eliminate existing antisatellite weapons ASATs None of these was in any way acceptable to the United States Two Yeltsin proposals for negotiations were also nonstarters for the United States one aimed at an ASAT ban and one at further limits on nuclear testing His repetition of Gorbachev's proposed bilateral agreement to end fissile material production was much less objectionable but again there was no reported follow-up during the remaining year of the Bush administration Yeltsin also proposed a new treaty to reduce accountable strategic warheads to 2 000-2 500 warheads on each side That was farther than the United States was willing to go at the time the final START II limit was 3 000-3 500 62 Yeltsin added his hope that China France and the UK would join the nuclear reduction process but he implied that would be in a later stage of the arms control process 63 The Bush administration may have seen the most promise in Yeltsin's expression of willingness to continue discussion without prejudice of the U S proposal for limiting non-nuclear ABM 20 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 systems Potentially even more important was the statement that we are ready jointly to work out and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI the U S Strategic Defense Initiative The aforementioned Ross-Mamedov talks began shortly thereafter Conclusion The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives instituted the most sweeping nuclear arms reductions in history Between December 1990 months before the first PNI announcement and December 1994 when the START Treaty entered into force the U S nuclear stockpile of active and inactive warheads fell by 50 percent from 21 392 to 10 979 No other period in U S nuclear history witnessed such a large reduction--whether measured in numbers or as a percentage of the total--in such a short time 64 The speed and decisiveness of the decision processes involved were equally unique The PNI were inspired--and made possible--by an extraordinary confluence of factors a U S President who was fully expert in and placed a high priority on national security issues who enjoyed historically high approval ratings and who had a vision of the international future a national security team at Cabinet level and below that shared or at least accepted the President's vision and could work together effectively orld-changing developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union w whose pace was astonishing--and accelerating t he decisive U S victory in Operation Desert Storm that underscored the strength of U S conventional military capabilities eclining support among the NATO Allies and in the Congress for nuclear weapons d modernization Of these the most critical factors were the President's leadership and the geopolitical changes in Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union Those changes did not permit long deliberation or great caution They demanded--but also allowed--rapid dramatic action The President and his team saw in them both a need and an opportunity that they were prepared and able to seize The PNIs were universally welcomed when they were announced but their implementation proved disappointing to many Serious concerns developed within just a year or two about the extent to which Russia was fulfilling its PNI commitments The sides exchanged detailed implementation reports at the beginning but the Russian submissions grew progressively less 21 WMD Center Case Study 5 informative over time until finally the report exchanges ceased The question of Russian PNI obligations is a tricky one given that the PNIs are not legally binding Nevertheless in 1991- 1992 both governments considered their unilateral measures to be firm political commitments The United States continues to hold that view but the Russian Government apparently does not In recent years several Russian Government officials have denied that the PNIs remain a political obligation Many reportedly see the PNIs as an unpleasant reminder of the time when the dying Soviet Union and newly independent Russia were weak 65 Those major doubts about Russian implementation of the PNIs have led many observers to conclude that the initiatives were failures It is noteworthy that no one interviewed for this case study who was officially involved in the U S PNIs shares that negative judgment All emphasize that they view the PNIs as a success First the President and the DOD leadership were completely willing at the time to implement the PNI measures unilaterally Second the United States did not expect that the Soviet Union would take up the reciprocity challenge as quickly and fully as it did Under those circumstances these officials see even incomplete Russian implementation as far better than nothing involving significant reductions Twenty years later the issues of U S and Russian tactical nuclear weapons and their potential reduction are once again at the forefront On December 22 2010 the U S Senate by a vote of 71 to 26 consented to ratification of the New START Treaty One of the Senate conditions required the President to certify that the United States would seek negotiations with Russia to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in an equitable verifiable manner 66 In doing so the Senate made clear that it would not favor a revival of the unilateral reciprocal methods of the PNIs Still there remains some interest in arms control without agreements both within and outside the U S Government While the outcome is at best uncertain it appears clear that the political and strategic environment in both the United States and Russia has changed too much for a return to unilateral reciprocal measures of the scope and scale of 1991-1992 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and their decision processes were unique at the time and will almost certainly remain so 22 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Appendix A Text of Presidential Nuclear Initiative Announcements President George H W Bush The White House Friday September 27 199167 Good evening Tonight I'd like to speak with you about our future and the future of the generations to come The world has changed at a fantastic pace with each day writing a fresh page of history before yesterday's ink has even dried And most recently we've seen the peoples of the Soviet Union turn to democracy and freedom and discard a system of government based on oppression and fear Like the East Europeans before them they face the daunting challenge of building fresh political structures based on human rights democratic principles and market economies Their task is far from easy and far from over They will need our help and they will get it But these dramatic changes challenge our Nation as well Our country has always stood for freedom and democracy And when the newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with forming their new governments they looked to the United States They looked to American democratic principles in building their own free societies Even the leaders of the U S S R Republics are reading The Federalist Papers written by America's founders to find new ideas and inspiration Today America must lead again as it always has as only it can And we will We must also provide the inspiration for lasting peace And we will do that too We can now take steps in response to these dramatic developments steps that can help the Soviet peoples in their quest for peace and prosperity More importantly we can now take steps to make the world a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age A year ago I described a new strategy for American defenses reflecting the world's changing security environment That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years--the prospect of a global confrontation Instead it concentrated more on regional conflicts such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf I spelled out a strategic concept guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas to respond effectively in crises to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed 23 WMD Center Case Study 5 We are now moving to reshape the U S military to reflect that concept The new base force will be smaller by half a million than today's military with fewer Army divisions Air Force wings Navy ships and strategic nuclear forces This new force will be versatile able to respond around the world to challenges old and new As I just mentioned the changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago have greatly accelerated The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe launched with little or no warning is no longer a realistic threat The Warsaw Pact has crumbled In the Soviet Union the advocates of democracy triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of repression The reformers are now starting to fashion their own futures moving even faster toward democracy's horizon New leaders in the Kremlin and the Republics are now questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security and more of a burden As a result we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on our own some on their own some together--we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war Now is the time to seize this opportunity After careful study and consultations with my senior advisers and after considering valuable counsel from Prime Minister Major President Mitterrand Chancellor Kohl and other allied leaders I am announcing today a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces on land on ship and on aircraft I met again today with our Joint Chiefs of Staff and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each of these steps I'll begin with the category in which we will make the most fundamental change in nuclear forces in over 40 years non-strategic or theater weapons Last year I cancelled U S plans to modernize our ground-launched theater nuclear weapons Later our NATO allies joined us in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe as soon as short-range nuclear force negotiations began with the Soviets But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems while we engage in lengthy negotiations Last month's events not only permit but indeed demand swifter bolder action I am therefore directing that the United States eliminate its entire world-wide inventory of ground-launched short-range that is theater nuclear weapons We will bring home and destroy all of 24 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads We will of course ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe That is essential to NATO's security In turn I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons not only their nuclear artillery and nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles but also the theater systems the U S no longer has systems like nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles and nuclear land mines Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U S ships and submarines as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers The bottom line is that under normal circumstances our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons Many of these land and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and destroyed Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available if necessary in a future crisis Again there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our actions by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from its ships and attack submarines by withdrawing nuclear weapons for land-based naval aircraft and by destroying many of them and consolidating what remains at central locations I urge them to do so No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than those in our strategic arsenals The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START which President Gorbachev and I signed last July was the culmination of almost a decade's work It calls for substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification Prompt ratification by both parties is essential But I also believe the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes First to further reduce tensions I'm directing that all United States strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture As a comparable gesture I call upon the Soviet Union to consign its mobile missiles to their garrisons where they will be safer and more secure Second the United States will immediately stand down from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START Rather than waiting for the treaty's reduction plan to run its full 7 year course we will accelerate elimination of these systems once START is ratified I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same Third I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM as well as the mobile portion of the small ICBM program The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only 25 WMD Center Case Study 5 remaining ICBM modernization program I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBMs with more than one warhead and to limit ICBM modernization to one type of single warhead missile just as we have done Fourth I am cancelling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear shortrange attack missile for our strategic bombers Fifth as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments that I've just outlined the United States will streamline its command and control procedures allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces As the system works now the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent while the Air Force commands the bomber and land-based element But as we reduce our strategic forces the operational command structure must be as direct as possible And I have therefore approved the recommendation of Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to consolidate operational command of these forces into a U S strategic command under one commander with participation from both services Since the 1970's the most vulnerable and unstable part of the U S and Soviet nuclear forces has been intercontinental missiles with more than one warhead Both sides have these ICBM's in fixed silos in the ground where they are more vulnerable than missiles on submarines I propose that the U S and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventory all ICBM's with multiple warheads After developing a timetable acceptable to both sides we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems under procedures already established in the START agreement In short such an action would take away the single most unstable part of our nuclear arsenals But there is more to do The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles Some 15 nations have them now and in less than a decade that number could grow to 20 The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the time has come for strong action on these growing threats to world peace Accordingly I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes whatever their source without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces And we will intensify our efforts to curb nuclear and missile proliferation These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing To foster cooperation the United States soon will propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning Finally let me discuss yet another opportunity for cooperation that can make our world safer 26 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 During last month's attempted coup in Moscow many Americans asked me if I thought Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate control I do not believe that America was at increased risk of nuclear attack during those tense days But I do believe more can be done to ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons Therefore I propose that we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas First we should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage transportation dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads Second we should discuss existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these might be enhanced And third we should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons My friend French President Mitterrand offered a similar idea a short while ago After further consultations with the alliance and when the leadership in the U S S R is ready we will begin this effort The initiatives that I'm announcing build on the new defense strategy that I set out a year ago one that shifted our focus away from the prospect of global confrontation We're consulting with our allies on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with the new postcold war strategy and force posture that we've developed in NATO As we implement these initiatives we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds We expect our bold initiatives to meet with equally bold steps on the Soviet side If this happens further cooperation is inevitable If it does not then an historic opportunity will have been lost Regardless let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary In addition regional instabilities the spread of weapons of mass destruction and as we saw during the conflict in the Gulf territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants still require us to maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to honor commitments to our allies Therefore we must implement a coherent plan for a significantly smaller but fully capable military one that enhances stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain We can safely afford to take the steps I've announced today steps that are designed to reduce the danger of miscalculation in a crisis But to do so we must also pursue vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the same purpose We must fully fund the B-2 and SDI program We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both 27 WMD Center Case Study 5 sides to make them smaller safer and more stable But the United States must maintain modern nuclear forces including the strategic triad and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent Some will say that these initiatives call for a budget windfall for domestic programs But the peace dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security In the near term some of these steps may even cost money Given the ambitious plan I have already proposed to reduce U S defense spending by 25 percent we cannot afforded sic to make any unwise or unwarranted cuts in the defense budget that I submitted to Congress I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and implement the decisions that I have outlined tonight Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this country as Ambassador to the United Nations I once talked about the vision that was in the minds of the U N 's founders how they dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would cooperate in peace as they had as allies in war Today I consulted with President Gorbachev And while he hasn't had time to absorb the details I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive I also spoke with President Yeltsin and he had a similar reaction positive hopeful Now the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy burden of a dangerous and costly nuclear arsenal which has threatened world peace for the past five decades They can join us in these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security Tonight as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the globe perhaps we are closer to that new world then sic every sic before The future is ours to influence to shape to mold While we must not gamble that future neither can we forfeit the historic opportunity now before us It has been said Destiny is not a matter of change It is a matter of choice It is not a thing to be waited for It's a thing to be achieved The United States has always stood where duty required us to stand Now let them say that we led where destiny required us to lead to a more peaceful hopeful future We cannot give a more precious gift to the children of the world Thank you good night and God bless the United States of America 28 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 President Mikhail Gorbachev Saturday October 5 199168 Dear compatriots a week ago US President Bush put forward an important initiative on nuclear weapons This initiative confirms that a new way of thinking has been widely supported by the world community George Bush's proposals are a worthy continuation of the drive started in Reykjavik This is my principled opinion I know that Boris Yeltsin and leaders of other republics share this opinion In this statement I will announce our reciprocal steps and countermeasures First with respect to tactical nuclear weapons the Soviet Union will take the following steps ll nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical rockets shall A be eliminated uclear warheads for air defense missiles shall be withdrawn from the troops and conN centrated in central bases and a portion of them shall be eliminated All nuclear mines shall be eliminated ll tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from surface ships and multi-purpose A submarines These weapons as well as nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation shall be stored in central storage sites and a portion shall be eliminated In this fashion on the basis of reciprocity the Soviet Union and the United States will take essential steps aimed at the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons The procedures and timing for carrying out these measures could be agreed on between the sides through consultations 69 Moreover we propose that the United States eliminate fully on the basis of reciprocity all tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces In addition on the basis of reciprocity it would be possible to withdraw from combat units on frontal tactical aviation all nuclear weapons gravity bombs and air-launched missiles and place them in centralized storage bases The USSR calls upon other nuclear powers to join in these far reaching Soviet-American steps with respect to tactical nuclear weapons Second together with the US we are in favor of the quickest possible ratification of the historic START treaty signed in Moscow this summer As president of the USSR I intend to present this issue at the first session of the Supreme Soviet in its new composition Taking into account the unilateral measures on strategic offensive arms declared by President Bush we are undertaking the following actions 29 WMD Center Case Study 5 Our heavy bombers just as the American ones shall not be on alert status while their nuclear arms shall be placed in storage with military units We are stopping the development of the modified nuclear short-range missile for Soviet heavy bombers e are stopping the development in the USSR of the small mobile intercontinental W ballistic missile e number of rail-mobile ICBM launchers will not be increased above the current Th number and such missiles will not be modernized In this fashion the number of our mobile MIRVed ICBMs will not be increased All our rail-mobile ICBMs will remain in their permanent basing areas s a reciprocal step the Soviet Union will remove from alert status 503 ICBMs includA ing 134 MIRVed ICBMs e Soviet Union has already decommissioned three nuclear missile submarines with Th 44 launchers of SLBMs and will decommission an additional three submarines with 48 launchers Third we have decided on deeper reductions of strategic offensive arms than provided for in the START treaty As a result at the end of the seven-year period of reductions the number of strategic nuclear warheads on our side will be 5 000 rather than the 6 000 required by the treaty We would of course welcome a similar approach from the US side We propose to the US that immediately after the ratification of the START treaty we begin intensive negotiations on further radical reductions of strategic offensive arms by approximately one-half We are ready to discuss the US proposal on non-nuclear ABM systems We also propose to the US side to examine the possibility of developing joint early warning systems of nuclear attacks with land- and space-based elements Fourth with a view to giving new impetus to nuclear disarmament we announce the introduction beginning today of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for one year hoping to achieve the comprehensive cessation of nuclear testing We are for reaching agreement with the United States on the verified cessation of the production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials Fifth we express our readiness to enter into a substantive dialogue with the United States on the development of safe and ecologically sound technologies for the storing and transportation of nuclear warheads methods of recycling nuclear weapons devices and enhancing nuclear security 30 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 With the aim of enhancing the reliability of control over nuclear weapons we will unite under a single operational command all strategic nuclear forces We will include strategic defensive systems in a single military service Sixth we sincerely hope that in the final analysis other nuclear powers will actively join the efforts of the USSR and the United States A joint declaration of all nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons could play an exceptionally useful role in the strengthening of stability and mutual trust The USSR has already firmly adhered to this principle for a long time I am convinced that a step of the American side in this direction would be an important milestone on the path toward establishing a durable structure of mutual security Seventh we note with satisfaction the plans of the US Administration to reduce the American armed forces by 500 000 men in the next few years In this connection we intend to reduce the Soviet armed forces by 700 000 men In conclusion I want to emphasize the following Acting in this fashion in one case unilaterally in a second on a compromise basis in a third through negotiations nonetheless we are resolutely furthering the disarmament process thereby approaching the goal which was proclaimed back at the beginning of 1986 toward a nuclear-free world There is much work here for governments experts agencies We have here a new stage of strengthening strategic stability and creating durable general security Evidently the question also arises of a new USSR-US summit I have been speaking to US President George Bush I told him about our countersteps in connection with his initiative At the same time I voiced proposals for a summit meeting There was a good exchange of views He gave me a positive assessment of our proposals and stated his satisfaction with how we are acting and addressing some of the most major issues in world politics 31 WMD Center Case Study 5 President George H W Bush Excerpts from State of the Union Address January 28 199270 Two years ago I began planning cuts in military spending that reflected the changes of the new era But now this year with imperial communism gone that process can be accelerated Tonight I can tell you of dramatic changes in our strategic nuclear force These are actions we are taking on our own because they are the right thing to do After completing 20 planes for which we have begun procurement we will shut down further production of the B-2 bombers We will cancel the small ICBM program We will cease production of new warheads for our sea-based ballistic missiles We still stop all new production of the Peacekeeper missile And we will not purchase any more advanced cruise missiles This weekend I will meet at Camp David with Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation I've informed President Yeltsin that if the Commonwealth the former Soviet Union will eliminate all land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles I will do the following We will eliminate all Peacekeeper missiles We will reduce the number of warheads on Minuteman missiles to one and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based missiles by about onethird And we will convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use President Yeltsin's early response has been very positive and I expect our talks at Camp David to be fruitful I want you to know that for half a century American presidents have longed to make such decisions and say such words But even in the midst of celebration we must keep caution as a friend For the world is still a dangerous place Only the dead have seen the end of conflict And though yesterday's challenges are behind us tomorrow's are being born The Secretary of Defense recommended these cuts after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff And I make them with confidence But do not misunderstand me The reductions I have approved will save us an additional billion over the next 5 years By 1997 we will have cut defense by 30 percent since I took office These cuts are deep and you must know my resolve This deep and no deeper To do less would be insensible to progress but to do more would be ignorant of history We must not go back to the days of the hollow army We cannot repeat the mistakes made twice in this century when armistice was followed by recklessness and defense was purged as if the world were permanently safe I remind you this evening that I have asked for your support in funding a program to protect our country from limited nuclear missile attack We must have this protection because too 32 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 many people in too many countries have access to nuclear arms And I urge you again to pass this Strategic Defense Initiative SDI There are those who say that now we can turn away from the world that we have no special role no special place But we are the United States of America the leader of the West that has become the leader of the world And as long as I am President I will continue to lead in support of freedom everywhere not out of arrogance not out of altruism but for the safety and security of our children This is a fact Strength in the pursuit of peace is no vice isolationism in the pursuit of security is no virtue 33 WMD Center Case Study 5 President Boris N Yeltsin January 29 199271 Respected citizens of Russia My address today is devoted to an issue of vital significance It is a matter of practical measures by Russia in the sphere of the limitation and reduction of weapons Our fundamental position is the following Nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in the world must be eliminated Of course this must be done gradually and on an equal basis In this vitally important matter we are open to cooperation with all states and international organizations including within the framework of the United Nations The measures I will speak about today have been prepared on the basis of constant interaction among member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS and in accordance with the accords reached at the meetings of their leaders in Minsk Alma-Ata and Moscow Russia considers itself the legal successor to the USSR in terms of responsibility for carrying out international obligations We confirm all of our obligations with regard to the bilateral and multilateral accords in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament which were signed by the Soviet Union and are in operation at the current time The Russian leadership confirms its adherence to the course of radical reduction of nuclear weapons guaranteeing the maximum security of nuclear weapons and guaranteeing the security of all of the facilities connected with the development production and operation of such weapons Russia is proposing an initiative on the creation of an international agency to ensure the reduction of nuclear arms During the subsequent stages this agency could gradually take under its control the whole nuclear cycle from the mining of uranium and the production of deuterium and tritium to the storage of waste The measures we are taking in the disarmament sphere in no way undermine the defense capabilities of Russia or the CIS states We are talking specifically about a reasonable minimum sufficiency of nuclear and conventional arms This is our main principle in building the armed forces Implementing it will make it possible to save considerable funds These funds will be directed for civilian purposes for social issues and the implementation of reforms Conditions are prime today making it possible to take a number of new major steps in arms reduction We are undertaking a proportion of these unilaterally and others on a reciprocal basis 34 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 We have done and intend first and foremost to do the following First in the area of strategic offensive weapons We will submit for ratification to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation the treaty on strategic offensive weapons The process of ratifying this treaty has also begun in the United States I believe that the implementation of this vital document including its approval by Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine should be carried out as promptly as possible Even before the treaty on strategic offensive weapons comes into force Russia will take a whole range of major steps aimed at cutting the strategic arsenal About 600 land and seabased strategic ballistic missiles or almost 1 250 nuclear warheads have been removed from operational readiness A total of 130 intercontinental ballistic missile launch silos have been destroyed or are being prepared for destruction Six nuclear submarines have been prepared for the dismantling of their missile launchers Programs for the development or modernization of several types of strategic offensive weapons have been halted Strategic nuclear arms deployed on the territory of Ukraine are to be dismantled sooner than planned The appropriate accords have been reached Let me stress that this is not a case of our unilateral disarmament Parallel steps are being taken by the United States as a goodwill measure Now however we can and need to advance significantly further along this path Recently the following decisions have been made The production of TU-160 and TU95Ms heavy bombers has ceased We are stopping the production of air-launched long-range cruise missiles of the existing types We are prepared to renounce the creation of new types of such missiles on a reciprocal basis with the United States The production of the existing types of sea-based long-range nuclear cruise missiles is ceasing New types of such missiles will not be created At the same time we are prepared on a reciprocal basis to eliminate all existing sea-based long-range nuclear cruise missiles We are renouncing the holding of exercises with the participation of large numbers of heavy bombers This means that not more than 30 of them may be involved in one exercise The number of atomic submarines with ballistic missiles--submarinelaunched nuclear ballistic missiles--which are on combat patrol has been halved and will be reduced further We are prepared to renounce altogether the practice of combat patrol with the aid of such submarines on a reciprocal basis Russia will reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons on operational readiness to the agreed number within a three-year period instead of seven years Thus we will arrive four years earlier at the level that is envisaged by the relevant treaty Given that there is mutual understanding with the United States we could proceed in this 35 WMD Center Case Study 5 direction even faster We are in favor of the strategic offensive weapons retained by the United States and Russia after the reduction not being aimed at Russian and US targets respectively Important talks with leaders of Western countries are to take place in the forthcoming days Proposals have been prepared on new in-depth several-fold cuts in strategic offensive weapons up to 2 000 to 2 500 strategic nuclear weapons on each of the sides In doing so we hope that other nuclear powers like China Britain and France will join the process of real nuclear disarmament Second tactical nuclear weapons Major measures concerning their reduction have already been undertaken simultaneously with the United States During the recent period production has been stopped of nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles and also production of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines Stocks of such nuclear devices will be eliminated Russia is eliminating one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and one-half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles Measures in this direction have already been taken We also intend to halve stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions The remaining tactical air-launched nuclear armaments could on a reciprocal basis with the United States be removed from combat units of the frontline tactical air force and place d in centralized storage bases Third antimissile defense and space Russia confirms its adherence to the ABM treaty It is an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world We are ready to continue discussion without prejudice of the US proposal for limiting non-nuclear ABM systems Our principle is known If it strengthens strategic stability in the world and Russia's security we will support this approach I also announce that Russia is ready on the basis of reciprocity with the United States to eliminate the existing anti-satellite systems and to work out an accord to ban completely the weapons which have been specially constructed to hit satellites We are ready jointly to work out and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI Fourth the testing of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of fissile materials for arms purposes Russia is resolutely in favor of a ban on all nuclear arms testing We are faithful to the annual moratorium on nuclear explosions announced in October 1991 and we hope that other nuclear powers will likewise refrain from carrying out nuclear testing A climate of mutual restraint would facilitate the attainment of accords on not carrying out such tests altogether possibly curtailing the number of tests gradually In the interests of resolving this task once and for all we propose to the United States that bilateral talks on further limiting the testing of nuclear arms be resumed 36 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Russia intends to continue fulfillment of the program for ending the production of weapons grade plutonium Industrial reactors for making weapons grade plutonium will be stopped before the year 2000 and several of them will be stopped in 1993 under an accelerated timetable We confirm the offer to the United States that agreement be reached on a controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons Fifth the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery Russia confirms its obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty including those as a depository We are counting upon the treaty being joined as quickly as possible as non-nuclear states by Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine and also other CIS member states Russia states its full support for the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and is in favor of the effectiveness of its guarantees being intensified We are taking additional steps to prevent our exports leading to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Work is now being conducted aimed at bringing Russia in line with the principles of an all-embracing IAEA guarantee as a condition of our peaceful nuclear exports Russia in principle intends to join the international regime of nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology as an equal participant We support the efforts of the so-called Australia Group for control over chemical exports The Russian Federation plans to adopt domestic legislation regulating the export from Russia of dual use materials equipment and technology that could be used to create nuclear chemical and biological weapons or combat missiles A government system to control such exports is being established We are going to establish very close cooperation and coordination between all participating CIS states on these matters Russia supports the guiding principles on the arms trade approved in London in October 1991 Sixth conventional weapons A motion to ratify the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe has been tabled in the Russian parliament The other CIS member states whose territory is covered by this treaty likewise attach importance to its ratification Russia reaffirms its intention--along with the other members of the Commonwealth--to cut the actual numbers of the former USSR armed forces by 700 000 Russia attaches great significance to the talks currently under way in Vienna on personnel reductions and confidence-building measures and also to the new talks on security and cooperation in Europe The latter could become a standing pan-European forum for seeking ways of creating a collective pan-European security system In cooperation with Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Russia will press to reach an accord with China at talks regarding cuts in armed forces and armaments in the border region 37 WMD Center Case Study 5 A decision has been made not to hold major exercises in 1992 involving more than 13 000 men--and not just on the European part but also on the Asiatic part of CIS territory We also hope that there is a possibility in the near future to sign a treaty on the open skies issue Seventh chemical weapons We are for the speediest possible conclusion in 1992 of a global convention banning chemical weapons This is essential in order to securely close the paths leading to the possession of chemical weapons without detriment to the legitimate economic interests of the signatories to the convention Russia adheres to the agreement with the United States on the non-production and elimination of chemical weapons signed in 1990 However the timescale envisaged therein for the destruction of such weapons requires certain amendments All of the chemical weapons of the former USSR are on the territory of Russia who takes responsibility for their destruction We are preparing an appropriate state program We are open for cooperation in this matter with the United States and other interested countries Eighth biological weapons Russia favors the rigorous implementation of the 1972 convention banning biological weapons and the creation of an appropriate mechanism on a multilateral basis for monitoring the implementation of measures for building confidence and openness Considering that there is a lag in implementing the convention I can now state that Russia is renouncing that section of provisos concerning the possibility of the retaliatory use of biological weapons These provisos were made by the USSR under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war Ninth the defense budget Russia will continue to make substantial reductions in its defense budget imparting a social orientation to this area In 1990 and 1991 defense expenditure was already reduced by 20 percent in terms of comparable prices including a 30 percent reduction for purchases of weapons and equipment In 1992 we intend to reduce military expenditure by another 10 percent in terms of 1991 prices The volume of weapons purchases this year will be reduced by approximately half compared with last year Tenth conversion Russia welcomes international cooperation in the area of conversion of military production Russia favors faster work in this regard On our part we will encourage this cooperation by creating a most favored treatment system and by establishing tax benefits for relevant joint projects Esteemed citizens of Russia I have just set out a plan of action for the Russian Federation concerning the issues of arms reductions and disarmament I hope it will meet with your support and with understanding on the part of all CIS peoples I am convinced that it is fully in 38 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 keeping with the interests of our country and other states of the world If it is possible to implement it our life will not only become more calm and secure but also qualitatively better Several hours ago US President Bush addressed the US people and proposed cuts of nuclear potential We are constantly engaged in mutual consultations on these issues in preliminary terms We are engaged in a dialogue on the practical implementation of this line and the initiatives that have been proposed The closeness of the positions of both sides is noteworthy Therein lies a guarantee of success on the path of reducing offensive nuclear arms Thank you for your attention 39 WMD Center Case Study 5 Appendix B Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Summary Bush 9 27 91 Groundlaunched nonstrategic nuclear weapons NSNW Sea-launched NSNW 40 Gorbachev 10 5 91 Bush 1 28 92 oG roundo Eliminate Launched Nonnuclear artillery Strategic Nuclear munitions Weapons nuclear mines NSNW and tactical rocket warheads oC all on Russia to do same as o Consolidate well as eliminate nuclear air other grounddefense launched NSNF missile nuclear e g air defense warheads in and land mines central sites and eliminate a portion oR emove nuclear o Remove tactical o End production weapons from nuclear weapons of long-range surface ships and from surface sea-launched attack submaships and mulcruise missiles rines Withdraw tiple-purpose SLCMs No nuclear warsubmarines Put new types of heads associated in central storsuch missiles with land-based age along with will be created naval aircraft nuclear weapons o Prepared on a on land-based oD estroy many reciprocal basis naval aircraft Place remaining to eliminate all Eliminate a in central storage portion existing longrange nuclear oC all on Soviets o Propose that the SLCMs to remove all U S eliminate NSNF from o Eliminate onefully on the ships and subbasis of reciproc- third of seamarines withbased tactical ity all tactical draw nuclear nuclear weapons nuclear weapons weapons for of naval forces land-based naval aircraft destroy many and consolidate rest at central locations Yeltsin 1 29 92 o Production ended of landbased tactical missiles nuclear artillery and nuclear mines o Eliminate one-half of air defense missile nuclear warheads The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Gorbachev 10 5 91 oC ancel o On the basis program to of reciprocity modernize it would be tactical version possible to of short-range withdraw attack missile from all SRAM-T or combat units TASM on battlefield aviation all nuclear charges and place them in centralized storage sites Bush 9 27 91 Air-launched NSNW Bush 1 28 92 Yeltsin 1 29 92 oH alve stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions Remaining on a reciprocal basis with the U S could be placed in central storage 41 WMD Center Case Study 5 Gorbachev Bush 1 28 92 10 5 91 Intercontinental o R emove from oR emove oC ancel small ballistic alert all ICBMs from alert ICBM program missiles to be eliminat503 ICBMs ICBMs ed under Straincluding 134 o S top new Peacekeeper tegic Arms Rewith multiple duction Treaty independently- production START Actargetable celerate elimireentry nation once vehicles START ratified MIRVed Call on Soviets nd to do the same o E development oE nd developof small mobile ment of mobile ICBM small ICBM oD o not inand mobile crease or Peacekeeper modernize rail Retain only mobile ICBMs small singlewarhead ICBM Keep rail mobile ICBMs program in permanent basing areas oC all on Soviets to limit ICBM modernization to one single warhead system and end all programs for future MIRVed ICBMs Bush 9 27 91 oP ropose U S - Soviet agreement to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs 42 Yeltsin 1 29 92 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Bush 9 27 91 Strategic Bombers oC ancel pro- gram to replace nuclear short-range attack missile SRAM oE nd bomber alert Ask Soviets to reciprocate by confining mobile ICBMs to garrison Gorbachev 10 5 91 oE nd development of nuclear short-range missile for bombers oE nd bomber alert Bush 1 28 92 Yeltsin 1 29 92 oE nd B-2 oE nd Backfire oE nd purchase oE nd production at 20 bombers of advanced cruise missiles and Blackjack production production of current ALCMs oP repared to renounce creation of new air-launched cruise missile ALCM types on reciprocal basis oE nd exercises Submarinelaunched ballistic missiles SLBMs oR emove from active duty 3 ballistic missile submarines SSBNs with 48 launchers oE nd production of new SLBM warheads with more than 30 bombers oF urther reduce SSBN combat patrols oP repared on reciprocal basis to end combat patrols 43 WMD Center Case Study 5 Bush 9 27 91 Strategic General oC reate U S Strategic Command Gorbachev 10 5 91 oR educe warheads below START limits to 5 000 by end of reduction period Would welcome U S reciprocity oP ropose negotiating strategic cuts up to a factor of two after START entryinto-force oC reate single operational command over all strategic nuclear weapons including defensive 44 Bush 1 28 92 Yeltsin 1 29 92 oM eet START deployed warhead level in 3 years oP ropose strategic reductions up to 3 000-2 500 on each side Hope other nuclear powers will join process The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Gorbachev Bush 1 28 92 10 5 91 oC all on Soviets o C all on all other o I f Russia to join in imnuclear powers eliminates mediate practo join measures all MIRVed tical steps to against tactical ICBMs allow limited nuclear weapons eliminate all ABM defenses Peacekeepers oD iscuss U S download all oE xplore U S ABM proposal Minutemen to Soviet coopone warhead ropose examieration on safe o P reduce SLBM nation of poswarhead storwarheads by sible groundage transport about onedismantlement and space-based third and joint early and destrucconvert a warning system tion Discuss substantial existing arportion of oU nilateral rangements heavy bombers nuclear test and possible to primarily moratorium enhancements conventional Note this oP ropose proposal led to U S -Soviet START II agreement on ending weapons-grade fissile material production Bush 9 27 91 Other oR eady to dia- logue on technology for nuclear warhead storage transport command and control and enhancing security oP ropose joint declaration by all nuclear powers on nofirst-use oR educe Soviet military by 700 000 men Yeltsin 1 29 92 oC onfirm re- sponsibility for all Soviet arms control accords oP ropose inter- national agency to ensure nuclear reductions would gradually take control of nuclear cycle oC ontinue dis- cussion of U S proposal for limiting ABM oR eady jointly to create and operate a global defense system in place of SDI oR eady with U S to eliminate existing ASATs and to agree to ban dedicated ASATs oR esume U S - Soviet talks on further limiting nuclear testing oE nd pro- duction of weapons-grade plutonium by 2000 Confirm offer for agreement on end to production of fissile material for weapons 45 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Bibliography Official Texts Cheney Dick and Colin Powell Press Conference Nuclear Weapons Reductions September 28 1991 Department of Defense C-Span video at www c-spanvideo org program 21624-1# George Bush Presidential Library and Museum Memorandum of Telephone Conversation President Boris Yeltsin December 23 1991 8 08 a m -8 31 a m at http bushlibrary tam edu r5esearch pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-12-23--Yeltsin pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Prime Minister Jim Bolger of New Zealand Saturday September 28 1991 4 27-4 31 p m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-28--Bolger pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Boris Yeltsin President of the Republic of Russia September 27 1991 12 23-12 36 pm at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Yeltsin pdf This memorandum and the memorandum of Bush's conversation with Kohl on the same date see below state that the two conversations occurred at the same time It is unknown which is correct _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany September 27 1991 12 23-12 36 pm at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Kohl pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Francois Mitterrand President of France September 27 1991 7 13-7 20 a m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Mitterrand pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev President of the Soviet Union December 25 1991 10 03-10 25 a m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-12-25--Gorbachev pdf 47 WMD Center Case Study 5 _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev President of the USSR September 27 1991 9 22-9 50 am at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Gorbachev pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the UK September 27 1991 7 45-7 57 a m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Major pdf _____ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner September 27 1991 11 25-11 37 am at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Woerner pdf _____ Public Papers - 1990 - May The President's News Conference 1990-05-03 at http bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers php id 1842 year 1990 month 5 _____ Public Papers - 1990 - August Remarks at the Aspen Institute symposium in Aspen Colorado 1990-08-02 at http bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers php id 2128 year 1990 month 8 _____ Public Papers - 1991 - September Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons 1991-09-27 at http bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers php id 3438 year 1991 month 9 _____ Public Papers - 1992 - January Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union 1992-01-28 at http bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers php id 3886 year 1992 month 1 Gorbachev Mikhail President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev televised announcement October 5 1991 in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament London Oxford University Press 1992 87-88 NATO Ministerial Communique Nuclear Planning Group Taormina Italy October 17-18 1991 Final Communique at www nato int doc comm 49-95 c911018a htm NATOOfficial Text Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council The London Declaration at www nato int cps en SID-2690DF86-9DC09412 natoolive 48 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 official_texts_23693 htm Treaties 111th Congress 2009-2010 111-5 at thomas loc gov cgi-bin Thomas U S Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review Report Washington DC April 2010 U S Department of State Fact Sheet Increasing Transparency in the U S Nuclear Weapons Stockpile May 3 2010 Yeltsin Boris President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin record of televised statement January 29 1992 Excerpts in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament London Oxford University Press 1992 89-92 _____ Statement on Disarmament by Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin on 29 January Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Central Eurasia FBIS-SOV-92-019 January 29 1992 Books and Articles Bush George and Brent Scowcroft A World Transformed New York Alfred A Knopf 1998 Butler Pat Rocky Flats Site History Events Leading to the Creation of the Weapons Complex and Events at the Rocky Flats Site from the 1930s to Present n d 2002 at rockyflats apps em doe gov references 199-Rocky Flats History Thru 1-2002 pdf Cheney Dick with Liz Cheney In My Time A Personal and Political Memoir New York Simon and Schuster 2011 Command Historian's Office United States Strategic Command History of the United States Strategic Command June 1 1992-October 1 2002 Offutt Air Force Base Nebraska January 2004 at www stratcom mil files History pdf Fieldhouse Richard Nuclear Weapon Developments and Unilateral Reduction Initiatives in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament London Oxford University Press 1992 65-84 49 WMD Center Case Study 5 Gates Robert M From the Shadows The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War New York Simon and Schuster 1996 Medalia Jonathan Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Background and Current Developments Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL 35548 January 6 2010 The Missile Plains Frontline of America's Cold War Historic Resource Study Minuteman Missile National Historic Site South Dakota Prepared for United States Department ofthe Interior National Park Service Midwest Regional office 2003 at www cr nps gov history online_books mimi hrst htm Pifer Steven NATO Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 7 Washington DC Brookings Institution July 2011 Pomper Miles A William Potter and Niklolai Sokov Reducing and Regulating Tactical Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies December 2009 Powell Colin L with Joseph E Persico My American Journey New York Random House 1995 Scowcroft Brent Interview November 12-13 1999 George H W Bush Oral History Project Miller Center University of Virginia at web1 millercenter org poh transcripts ohp_1999_111_scowcroft pdf Shoumikhin Andrei Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense The Emerging Accommodation Comparative Strategy 21 no 4 2002 311-336 50 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Notes 1 General note on sources Interviews with key participants in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives decision and implementation processes were an invaluable part of the research for this case study Where possible the sources are identified by name The offices noted are those that they held in the fall of 1991 Where the information was provided on a background basis the source is simply noted as interview with the date Interviews were conducted with current and former U S Government officials who had been in the following agencies in 1991-1992 White House National Security Council NSC staff Department of State Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD Joint Staff Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA and Central Intelligence Agency CIA 2 Lieutenant General Frank Klotz USAF Ret former Commander 321st Operations Group Missile Wing Grand Forks Air Force Base interview by author September 1 2011 3 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 C-Span video Nuclear Weapons Reductions September 28 1991 Department of Defense at www c-spanvideo org program 21624-1# 4 See appendix A for the texts of the U S Soviet and Russian PNI announcements 5 George Bush Public Papers - 1990 - May The President's News Conference 1990-05-03 at bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers php id 1842 year 1990 month 5 6 NATO-Official Text Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council The London Declaration at www nato int cps en SID 2690DF86-9DC09412 natoolive official_texts_23693 htm 7 Franklin C Miller former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy interview by author January 30 2012 8 Memoranda of telephone conversations at bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-08-19--Yeltsin pdf and bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-08-21--Gorbachev pdf 9 James Timbie Department of State interview by author August 31 2011 10 Brent Scowcroft interview November 12-13 1999 George H W Bush Oral History Project Miller Center University of Virginia 77-78 at web1 millercenter org poh transcripts ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft pdf 11 Major General Gary Curtin USAF Ret former Deputy Director for International Negotiations Joint Staff J-5 interview by author September 22 2011 Douglas MacEachin former Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control and Chief Arms Control Intelligence Staff interview by author September 22 2011 and Miller interview August 18 2011 12 See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft A World Transformed New York Alfred A Knopf 1998 540-547 also interview September 19 2011 and Miller interview August 18 2011 13 Attendees at the meeting are uncertain Then-Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates described it as a session in the Oval Office of the Gang of Eight but did not clearly identify the members It appears likely that they were the President Scowcroft White House Chief of Staff John 51 WMD Center Case Study 5 Sununu Secretary of State James A Baker III Secretary Cheney Chairman Powell Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard Kerr and Gates See Robert M Gates From the Shadows The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War New York Simon and Schuster 1996 529 14 Bush and Scowcroft 545 15 Gates 530 See also Bush and Scowcroft 539-547 Colin L Powell with Joseph E Persico My American Journey New York Random House 1995 541 Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney In My Time A Personal and Political Memoir New York Simon and Schuster 2011 232-233 16 Interview September 19 2011 17 Miller interview August 18 2011 18 Powell My American Journey 540 19 Gates 461-464 and interview September 19 2011 20 Bush and Scowcroft 545 21 Miller interview August 18 2011 22 The theater version of the SRAM II was known as SRAM-T or Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile TASM 23 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 24 Timbie interview August 31 2011 Douglas MacEachin former Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control and Chief Arms Control Intelligence Staff interview by author October 3 2011 and Ronald F Lehman II former Director U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency interview by author November 3 2011 25 Curtin interview September 22 2011 26 Ibid 27 Ibid 28 Miller interview August 18 2011 See also Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 29 Miller interview August 18 2011 30 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 31 Ibid 32 Interview by author September 19 2011 and Miller interview August 18 2011 33 Interview by author September 19 2011 Curtin interview September 22 2011 MacEachin interview October 3 2011 Miller interview August 18 2011 and Timbie interview August 31 2011 See also Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 34 Curtin interview September 22 2011 35 Timbie interview August 31 2011 36 Memoranda of Conversation on the telephone calls are at bushlibrary tamu edu research memcons_telcons php The memoranda on the calls to Mitterrand Kohl Gorbachev Yeltsin and 52 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 Woerner have been released in full Only the memorandum on the Major telephone conversation has been redacted 37 Memoranda of Conversation at bushlibrary tamu edu research memcons_telcons php Because parts of the memorandum of the Major conversation remain classified the two issues that the Prime Minister raised have not been publicly identified There are a few possibilities including U S support for the United Kingdom UK Trident ballistic missile-carrying submarine SSBN force the future of TASM which the UK hoped to deploy but the PNI canceled the implications for UK airdelivered nuclear weapons deployed in Germany and or the future of the UK nuclear-certified units for which the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons 38 Memorandum of Conversation Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev President of the USSR September 27 1991 9 22-9 50 a m at bushlibrary tamu edu research memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Gorbachev pdf 39 See appendix A All quotations in this paper from the Bush speeches of September 27 1991 and January 28 1992 the Gorbachev speech of October 5 1991 and the Yeltsin speech of January 29 1992 are from the texts at appendix A 40 See appendix B for a chart summarizing the U S and Soviet Russian PNI commitments in 1991-1992 41 The numbers of ground-launched weapons to be withdrawn and destroyed were provided by Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell in their September 28 1991 press conference They also specified that three types of nuclear artillery warheads were involved W-33 8 W-79 8 and W-48 155 mm Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell U S Department of Defense Washington DC September 28 1991 42 Ibid 43 Over time the capability to redeploy TLAM-N deteriorated until the Department of Defense decided in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to retire the system U S Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010 28 44 NATO Ministerial Communique Nuclear Planning Group Taormina Italy October 17-18 1991 Final Communique at www nato int doc comm 49-95 c911018a htm 45 Richard Fieldhouse Nuclear weapon developments and unilateral reduction initiatives in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament London Oxford University Press 1992 65 46 Klotz interview September 1 2011 The dealerting process was a simple and speedy one involving removal of the physical code units from each Minuteman II Launch Control Facility LCF That took about 1 hour at each LCF and could be done simultaneously at several of the 15 Minuteman II LCFs This action known as dissipating launch codes meant that the missiles could no longer launch No funds were saved because missile crews still had to be on duty at each LCF as long as any of its silos retained missiles and warheads Although the dealerting process was readily reversible that never happened No Minuteman II missiles were returned to alert status before the entire force was eliminated under the START Treaty Instead the Air Force began in late 1991 to implement the much more time-consuming deactivation process of removing the Minuteman II warheads and missiles Minuteman II system elimination was completed in 1997 which was 4 years before the end of the 7-year 53 WMD Center Case Study 5 START Treaty reduction period The Missile Plains Frontline of America's Cold War Historic Resource Study Minuteman Missile National Historic Site South Dakota Prepared for United States Department of the Interior National Park Service Midwest Regional office 2003 at www cr nps gov history online_books mimi hrst htm 47 Command Historian's Office United States Strategic Command History of the United States Strategic Command June 1 1992-October 1 2002 January 2004 14-17 48 Miller interview January 30 2012 49 U S -Soviet meetings in fall 1991 on nuclear safety and security issues were disappointing with the Soviet side reluctant to discuss its practices However in the next several years these issues formed central elements of the Nunn-Lugar initiative that entered into law in December 1991 The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program included important work between the United States and Russia in nuclear storage and transport security as well as on the denuclearization of Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan and facilitation of Russian warhead dismantlement 50 See for example Andrei Shoumikhin Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense The Emerging Accommodation Comparative Strategy vol 21 2002 311-336 51 MacEachin interview October 3 2011 52 See Miles A Pomper William Potter and Nikolai Sokov Reducing and Regulating Tactical Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies December 2009 9 See also Steven Pifer NATO Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 7 Washington DC Brookings Institution July 2011 14 53 Over the years concerns have been expressed by several observers that Russia has repeatedly violated the moratorium by conducting low-yield nuclear tests at its Novaya Zemlya test site However those allegations have not been publicly proven or acknowledged See for example Jonathan Medalia Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Background and Current Developments Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL 35548 January 6 2010 5 54 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev President of the USSR September 27 1991 9 22-9 50 am at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Gorbachev pdf The George H W Bush administration did not take the initiative on a nuclear-testing moratorium Instead the Congress imposed one in September 1992 under the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1993 Although the administration opposed the amendment the President did not veto the bill The last U S nuclear weapons test to date a Los Alamos National Laboratory test codenamed Divider was conducted on September 23 1992 55 The President There are several points that I would like to make I could not and would not lock British forces into the old argument that they have to be included in our proposals We will support the difference in these forces Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the UK September 27 1991 7 45-7 57 a m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Major pdf The President My first point is we don't want to cause any problem for French nuclear forces French forces and their modernization are separate from what we're proposing Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Telcon with Francois Mitterrand President of France September 27 1991 7 13-7 20 54 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 a m at http bushlibrary tamu edu research pdfs memcons_telcons 1991-09-27--Mitterrand pdf 56 we express our readiness to enter into a substantive dialogue with the United States on the development of safe and ecologically sound technologies for the storing and transportation of nuclear warheads methods of recycling i e dismantling nuclear weapons devices and enhancing nuclear security 57 MacEachin interview October 3 2011 58 The Alma-Ata Declaration was signed by Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine and Uzbekistan The government of Kazakhstan changed the name of Alma-Ata to Almaty in 1993 59 The W-88 decision made a virtue out of necessity The warhead was produced at the Rocky Flats plutonium processing plant in Colorado The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Environmental Protection Agency raided the facility in June 1989 for environmental violations and nuclear weapons production there ceased in November 1989 It never resumed See Pat Butler Rocky Flats Site History Events Leading to the Creation of the Weapons Complex and Events at the Rocky Flats Site from the 1930s to Present n d 2002 at rockyflats apps em doe gov references 199-Rocky Flats History Thru 1-2002 pdf 16-18 60 In a somewhat confusing statement Yeltsin noted that production of all those systems had ended during the recent period It would make little sense for production to have continued after Gorbachev's October 5 announcement--if the Soviet Union intended from the outset to fulfill his commitments One positive interpretation is that the recent period could mean immediately after October 5 even though that was almost 4 months before Yeltsin's speech 61 We say appeared because the Gorbachev and Yeltsin PNI speeches did not present the information in identical ways Yeltsin claimed that about 600 ICBMs and SLBMs with almost 1 250 warheads had been taken off alert 130 ICBM silos had been destroyed or were being prepared for destruction and 6 SSBNs had been prepared for SLBM launcher dismantlement 62 In 1997 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the 2 000-2 500 deployed strategic warhead limit would be part of a START III Treaty START III was never fully negotiated but subsequent U S -Russian strategic arms reduction agreements featured even lower levels 1 700-2 200 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty and 1 550 under the 2010 New START Treaty 63 Proposals have been prepared on new in-depth severalfold cuts in strategic offensive weapons up to 2 000 to 2 500 strategic nuclear weapons on each of the sides In doing so we hope that other nuclear powers like China Britain and France will join the process of real nuclear disarmament 64 See U S Department of State Fact Sheet Increasing Transparency in the U S Nuclear Weapons Stockpile May 3 2010 The yearly stockpile totals do not include retired warheads awaiting dismantlement Therefore many of the warheads noted as reduced had been moved from the active inactive stockpile to the dismantlement queue Actual dismantlement took considerably longer 65 See Pomper Potter and Sokov 2 also Timbie interview August 31 2011 66 Treaties--111th Congress 2009-2010 111-5 at thomas loc gov cgi-bin Thomas 67 Text at bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers 68 Text in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 87-88 69 Sentence included in official text but not delivered in televised speech 55 WMD Center Case Study 5 70 Text at bushlibrary tamu edu research public_papers Text in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Central Eurasia FBISSOV-92-019 January 29 1992 Also major excerpts are available in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 89-92 71 56 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 About the Author Dr Susan J Koch is an independent consultant specializing in policy issues regarding arms reduction and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction She is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University and an associate faculty member in the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at Missouri State University She also serves on the Department of Defense DOD Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and the Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Task Force of the U S Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group From 1982 until 2007 Dr Koch held a series of senior positions on the White House National Security Council Staff Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of State and U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency focused on nonproliferation and arms reduction policy Dr Koch began her government career in the Directorate of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency studying West European political issues Dr Koch has received the Presidential Distinguished Executive Award Presidential Meritorious Executive Award DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Medal five times Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Distinguished Honor Award and Department of State Meritorious Honor Award Before her government service she taught international and comparative politics at Mount Holyoke College and the University of Connecticut Dr Koch received a B A from Mount Holyoke College and an M A and Ph D in political science from Harvard University 57 Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Case Study Series Case Study 1 President Nixon's Decision to Renounce the U S Offensive Biological Weapons Program by Jonathan B Tucker and Erin R Mahan October 2009 Case Study 2 U S Withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty by Lynn F Rusten January 2010 Case Study 3 The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction by Paul I Bernstein and Jason D Wood April 2010 Case Study 4 U S Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by Jonathan B Tucker December 2011 For additional information including requests for publications and instructor's notes please contact the Center directly at WMDWebmaster@ndu edu or 202 685-4234 or visit the Center Web site at www ndu edu wmdcenter