r ' ' b 1 b 3 b 6 v I Access Controlled by CIA History Staff ------ ---r CO p y -------T2-o f -------- 2 I OFFICIAL'HISTORY OF THE 'BAY OF PIGS OPERATION VOLUME I AIR OPERATIONS MARCH 1960 - APRIL 1961 pages 1-302 Dcr-8 September 1979 copy of 2 PERMANENT HISTORiC l DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY 0' APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-Jul-2011 _------------ oo o ' o o o o D b 1 b 3 History staff I copy UL 1 t 1 1 I' j 'II I li I OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION I Io I i 1 VOLUME I AIR OPERATIONS MARCH 1960 - APRIL 1961 PHOTOS pages 507-541 DCI 8 September 1979 I I I Copy 1 of 2 APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-Jul-2011 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY ________ - -- - ------ -- ---- ----- -------- - - _ oJ --_ _-_ _ - I -- -I I I I I I I I I I I I VOLUME I Contents Photos Figures 1-23 - Air Training Base Retalhuleu Guatemala Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 Figure 11 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figur-e 14 Figure 15 Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18 Figure 19 Retalhuleu Control Tower Retalhuleu Service and Maintenance Area o Retalhuleu Service and Maintenance Area Retalhuleu Service and Maintenance Area o o o o Retalhuleu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker Retalhuleu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker Retalhuleu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker B-26 Spare Parts Inventory at Retalhuleu o o o o o o Retalhuleu Mess and Kitchen Area Retalhuleu Outdoor Living Retalhuleu Barracks - Exterior View Retalhuleu Barracks - Interior View Retalhuleu Barracks - Interior View Retalhuleu Barracks - Interior View Retalhuleu Supply Area o o Retalhuleu Supply Area o o B-26 Practicing Low Level Attack at Retalhuleu o B-26 Practicing Low Level Bomb Run at Retalhuleu B-26 Practicing Low Level Bomb Run at Retalhuleu o 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 o 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 Figure 20 Figure 21 Figure 22 Figure 23 B-26's Practicing Leader Wing-man at Reta1hu1eu o o o 526 Paradrop Practice at Reta1hu1eu o o o o 527 Paradrop Practice at Reta1hu1eu o o o o o 528 Paradrop Practice at 529 Reta1hu1eu o o o o o o o o o Figures 24-33 - Photos of Forward Operations Base Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua Figure 24 Figure 25 Figure 26 Figure 27 Figure 28 Figure 29 Figure 30 Figure 31 Figure 32 Figure 33 C-46 and C-54 Parked Off Runway at Puerto Cabezas o o o o o o Puerto Cabezas View of Air Strip o o o o o o o o o o o o Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to Air Strip o o o o Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to A r Strip o o o Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to Air Strip o Puerto Cabezas Armed B-26 o o o Puerto Cabezas Armed B-26 o o o Puerto Cabezas Underwing Detail Brigade B 26 o o o o o o o o o Puerto Cabezas Underwing Detail Brigade B 26 o o o oo o o o Puerto Cabezas PBY Air-Sea Rescue o o o o o o o o o oo o 530 o 531 o 532 533 o 534 o 535 o 536 o 537 o 538 539 Figure 34-35 - Photos of Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba Figure 34 Fiqure 35 Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba o 540 541 qmzmambw smmom 2mm I - 1 II- mquswiku a I FIGURES 1-23 AIR TRAINING BASE RETALHULEU GUATEMALA mmzom Aom zou a mmbUHm il 4 v41 4 ugh rifill 3611 Kieh m II FIGURE 2 RETALHULEU SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE AREA - - - - - _ -- __ L' - _ - - _ __ _- __ _1lL-_ _ _ - - -_ _ c 94 qub mm y 5 0 v FIGURE 4 RETALHULEU SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE AREA 1 $ ---- --- ------ -- --- - - - FIGURE 5 RETALHULEU MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE AREA AND FUEL BUNKER -' 'cc oo ' _ --' o e - ' ' ' _ - c c ---' __ o_ - d nr -bW --Fe U1 I-' N FIGURE 6 RETALHULEU MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE AREA AND FUEL BUNKER o __ __ o _ _ _ oo _ ooo o 0 __ ooo I --'-- ' ' t 't ' j' C ''''' o I '-'l ' - '1 ' -' 'j FIGURE 7 RETALHULEU MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE AREA AND FUEL BUNKER - o------'- S_i '--- L r '' - - --L- ' to F l Ul I--' -l I r tf f - _r _ FIGURE 8 B-26 SPARE PARTS INVENTORY AT RETALHULEU -_- - ' '_ __ _ _- J f 'i ' - ' -'r'# MI w ' 't' - - - - - '- '- J 3 55 92 mmDOHm 515 I OH --- Jl f-' - J - FIGURE 11 RETALHULEU BARRACKS - EXTERIOR VIEW o -- -- - '--- --_ _ _ o _ -_ v i i U1 I-' CXJ FIGURE 12 RETALHULEU BARRACKS - INTERIOR VIEW r'I 1 1 o o o o o i rXl H p 0 H p rXl 8 CtJZ 1'1 rXl Ii i H I p prJ I I i I I O He l' p t p rXl l I l t 8 rXl p 519 III II II II II 1111 II II - - - Ul IV i o J II ' ' I 1 i FIGURE 14 RETALHULEU BARRACKS - INTERIOR VIEW 1 II A A tfkr n 4 Hm wmabmeHLMC mCHuHurw mmd W mmbm KmmuHquH Bmm SEW EZS FIGURE 17 PRACTICING- LOW LEVEL ATTACK AT RETALHULEU 4' in I A i to U1 1'0 j FIGURE 18 B-26 PRACTICING LOW LEVEL BOMB RUN AT RETALHULEU NOTE BOMB BAY OPENS FROM FIGURE 18 to FIGURE 19 _ oooo __ _ _0 t- 1 lIi IIif tJl tv tJl FIGURE 19 B-26 PRACTICING LOW LEVEL BOMB RUN AT RETALHULEU NOTE BOMB BAY OPENS FROM FIGURE 18 TO FIGURE 19 FIGURE 20 B-26's PRACTICING LEADER WING-MAN INSTRUCTOR-OBSERVER AIRCRAFT TO RIGHT A T RETALHULEU 3 151 A i 4 p r441 110 3 50 FRO DH 9- 0 ct 32 1 04 528 -T l umFIGURE 22 PARADROP PRACTICE AT RETALHULEU 'mwuw a w-A A QT-Y u vun - Amww lax U mm HuwaHHOm 6 - but FIGURES 24-33 PHOTOS OF FORWARD OPERATIONS BASE PUERTO CABEZAS NICARAGUA A 9 t JPYiflliiJi Jf 'ri ' l' In W o JJIt FIGURE 24 C-46 AND C-54 PARKED OFF RUNWAY AT PUERTO CABEZAS ' -- -'-- -' ' -- - - - -- - --- -- Of '65' -''-' --- -o -'---' ' --- -- - --- --- - ------ -- ----- ______ 1 _ L o 111 W f-' ' _1 - _ r ' ' r - ' o '- ' ' _ o - _ ' kl o ' ' 0 0 _ _ _ o o ' JPYA Zr 't ' - o o ' ' _-- o o' ' tI _ M o fJ ' ' ' _ ' ' ooor - '1 _ ' 5 - oo _ _ ' J ' ' ' o _ - J - -' oo - - ' -- FIGURE 25 PUERTO CABEZAS VIEW OF AIR STRIP PHOTO SHOWS NOSE OF THE PBY AND 3 PARKED B-26's C-46 ON RUNWAY mH OB Ezmo hm muzom m Nmm U Olly A r gh'rs II in I'Dt l Vch EES dwwao WHdem MQ ObWMme wozw Udzw HO meHw o t -r Ul w r - ' C t -l ' _ 00- - ' I - ' f ' ' ' ' 'ti - jf 'V ' II oo o ' PUERTO CABEZAS 'r- ' - - FIGURE 28 BOMB DUMP ADJACENT TO AIR STRIP o 1 A' o ' t o IJl W IJl o ' iffCrt 1' 7 It FIGURE 29 PVERTO CABEZAS ARMED B-26 SIGNS OF BATTLE DAMAGE VISIBLE ON FUSELAGE BELOW COCKPIT AND ON BOMB BAY DOOR NOTE SOLID 8-GUN NOSE 833' ' ' 4 'liIr 1 FAR lJl W 01 - - ' FIGURE 30 PUERTO CABEZAS B-26 TAIL ASSEMBLY DETAIL CUBAN INSIGNIA FAR AND TAIL NUMBERS IDENTICAL TO CASTRO'S B-26's ' V1 W -- J I I I it I' - - o I ' C#8 'III I'll'l ' ' ' - -' l ' - GBP FIGURE 31 PUERTO CABEZAS UNDERWING DETAIL BRIGADE B-26 PYLON FUEL TANK ROCKETS WIDE BLUE BAND AROUND WING TO DISTINGUISH FROM CASTRO B-26's ----_ __ _--- _ ---- -_ -- - - ' ' '- --- - ' ' - _ J '-' _ _---oo - 0 ' U1 W co FIGURE 32 PUERTO CABEZAS UNDERWING DETAIL BRIGADE B-26 PYLON FUEL TANK ROCKETS WIDE BLUE BAND AROUND WING TO DISTINGUISH FROM CASTRO's B-2S Y s Junta Qrt i 3 Si In mya nrwIngrw rv Hdem mm wdmwao Owame ww bHWIme wmmogm w FIGURES 34-35 PHOTOS OF AIR STRIP AT PLAYA GIRON CUBA ftE-U orl '101 U j c Io Tft' f' lJpf 6 J fI - tA -7 A IfE-I D CUBA COCHINOS BAHIA DE 22 05 N 81 08 w SEE NEW AIRSTRIP AND CONSTRUCTiON ON SOUTHEAST COAST OF BAY CONFIDENTIAL 2 31 FOR SIMILAR VIEWS SEPT 60 453036 FIGURE 34 AIR STRIP AT PLAYA GIRON CUBA CIA 453C 2 J 4 o J-' --' -I' C I A -' - C -' - J --' CUBA COCHINOS BAHIA DE 22 05 N 81 08 W NEW AIRSTRIP AND CONSTRUCTION ON SOUTHEAST COAST OF BAY 453036 FOR SiMILAR COVERAGE SEPT 1960 CONFIDENTIAL CIA 45393 2 453 0 34 2 31 CIA 453035 SEE J lt _ ' 'C ' r ' $ - FIGURE 35 t rR STR IP AT FLAYA GIRON CUBA --- - -- - - - -' - mp Access Controlled by CIA History Staff -- -- --I ml ill lil 1II 255 A AA I b 1 I b 3 y CIA History Staff I copy I at 2 I OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION VOLUME I AIR OPERATIONS MARCH 1960 - APRIL 1961 pages 303-506 RET DCI-8 September 1979 Copy 1 of 2 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-Jul-2011 VOLUME I Contents Part IV Where Cuba A B C D E F Was Lost 303 Over the Beach -- 17 April 1961 303 Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 338 Four for A Cause -- 19 April 1961 352 Bitter Recriminations The Navy CAP 19 April 1961 362 Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope 390 Retrospective View of Air Operations 395 Appendixes 1 US Government's Anti-Castro Program 406 2 Memorandum for Chief JMARC from Lt Col George Gaines Jr sub JMARC Tactical B-26 Capability 418 3 Anti-Castro Propaganda Leaflets for Air Drop Operations o 420 4 Letter of Instruction for G rfield M Thorsrud 24 March 1961 5 6 Final Instructions for Air Commander JMTIDE 425 429 Cable Traffic on Results of D-2 Air Strike o o 432 442 7 D-Day Target List 8 Logistics Support Plan for Operation Plan 60 AD- 5 445 9 Possible Publicity About Flyers Killed at the Bay of Pigs 447 Source References Part I Initiation of Air Activity Part II Acquisition and Training of Air Crews 455 467 Part III Initiation of Combat Air Operations o 479 Part' IV Where Cuba Was Lost 491 Tables 1 2 B-26 Take-Off and Arrival Times 19 April 1961 o Estimated Radar Intercept Ranges USS Essex and Brigade B-26's 380 385 Charts 1 2 Chain of Command JMATE Air Operations Following page 22 Table of Organization JMADD September 1960 Following page 107 Area of Air Activity June 1960 19 April 1961 Frontispiece Area of Combat Air Operations l5-I9 April 1961 Following page 206 Part IV Where Cuba A Was Lost Over the Beach -- 17 April 1961 Even prior to the cancellation of the second strike Sunday 16 April 1961 had been full of surprises for the air operations people at JMTIDE When the day started there were 11 priority targets scheduled for attack By 2250Z however prior to the decision to cancel the second strike the target list had been cut back to four specific targets -- the San Antonio Air Base the Campo Libertad Air Base and the naval bases at Batabano and Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines The Managua Military Base where the large tank park had been observed photographed and scheduled for napalm attack other airfields and commo facilities were deleted from the target list The number of B-26's then to be involved in the D-Day strikes had been cut back from 15 to 5 aircraft -- two each going to the two airfields and the fifth aircraft scheduled to hit the two naval bases The a-rmament in each case was to be armament red -light bombs 260 lb rockets and machine guns 1 - 303 - One area of the air operation which did present a problem for D-Day planning and which has caused reflective thinking among various JMATE participants in subsequent years was the question of time over target At one point the operational messages corning from TIDE to BELL on 16 April indicated that of ten B-26's then scheduled for the D-Day attack throughout the day the target list was being juggled four of the aircraft had secondary missions to provide ground support from 1100 to 1200Z -- an hour's time in addition to attack time on the targets An eleventh air- craft a spare to be held in reserve until the initial strike force had been airborne for two hours was to be over the beach at 1200A and according to the cable Can loiter until 1430 hours Additionally Two aircraft assigned napalm NBR 4 mission will make quick turn around and with 230 gal bomb bay tank installation plus reinstalled externals will have capability to loiter 3 1 2 hours over beach Estimated time arrival over beach these two A C 1815Z This leaves no air cover over beach 1330Z to 1815Z 4-45 hours la It would appear that the loiter time for the airshould read can loiter until 1330 hours not '1430 hours Otherwise the final sentence which specifies both hours e g 1330Z to 1815Z and total time with no air cover e g 4 hours and 45 minutes is in error born spare - 304 - There is no doubt that if there had been more JMATE aircraft and more aircrews constant air cover could have been possible The real booger factor which both John F and Robert Kennedy chose to ignore however was that the denial and cancellation of additional B-26 strikes at Castro's airfields meant that attempts by the Brigade air force to provide ground support for the invasion would be exposed to Castro's T-JJ's and Sea Furies It was a no-win situation Another of the White House staff who after stating that he had not participated in the Bay of Pigs discussions or planning then proceeded to comment on the air operation was Theodore Sorensen His naive description of the highly controversial affair stated Thus while the lack of ammunition led directly to disaster Castro's control of the air had led directly to the lack of ammunition The landing plan had not neglected to provide for air control There had been on the contrary unanimous agreement that the Castro Air Force had to be removed But confusion persists to this day about the President canceling the air cover that u S jets were to have provided Actually no U S Air Force jet participation had ever been planned much less canceled Nor was there any cancellation of any other combat air cover over the battle front Instead the plan was to destroy Castro's air force on the ground before the battle began and then to provide air support with an -anti-Castro Air Force consisting of' some two dozen surplus planes flown by Cuban exiles That plan failed lb What Sorensen chose to ignore was that that plan footnote continued on following' page - 305 - Following the stand-down of Brigade aircraft forced by the cancellation of the D-Day strike Thorsrud and other air operations planners at JMTIDE immediately had to revise their plans for 17 April 1961 Beginning at 0830Z and running through 2230Z 8 pairs of aircraft were launched on support missions over Cuba -- a total of 4 aircraft between 0830Zand 0845Zi 4 at 1200Zi 4 between 1500Z and 1630Z 2 at 1940Z and 2 between 2200Z and 2230Z As previously noted even had there been no disruptions or interruptions there was no way with the limited number of aircrews and aircraft that B-26's could have been on station over the beach throughout the whole time period lei The Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria how- ever was ready and waiting for an attack by the invading force They had been alerted by the 15 April strike and there had been no stand down FAR's basic became a casualty to political expediency at the White House level That the Castro Air Force was ready was clearly indicated by the Notice to Airmen NOTAM issued by the air control center in Havana and received by the FAA on 17 April The NOTAM read For security reasons all flights over the Cuban territory and in the vicinity of Cuba cancelled immediately until further notice footnote continued on following page 6r T TOP -- problem on the morning of 17 April 1961 was the lack of ready aircraft The evidence indicates that at daybreak at San Antonio de Los Banos there were available three Sea Furies and two B-26 aircraft One B-26 aircraft reportedly was an instructor model on which only 6 of the 8 guns were operational and the other a standard B-26 bomber model The first flight which took off at 0530 Cuban time consisted of two Sea Furies and one B-26 With roughly a 15-20 minute flight from San Antonio de Los Banos to Playa Giron the aircraft proceeded to put the Houston -- the troop and supply vessel for Red Beach at the north end of the Bay of Pigs -- out of action In the attack on the Houston Enrique Carrerras Rojas flying one of the Sea Furies was aided by Gustavo The message was either picked up or forwarded to the JCS which in turn forwarded a note to President Kennedy's military aide Brig Gen C V Clifton The JCS forwarding memo indicated that Operations Military Policy Matters J3 J5 Directorates was in the dark concerning reasons for the restriction and said they planned to check with State re the air space restrictions Id Jacques Lagas one of the FAR pilots stated that both of the instructor model B-26's were lost in the 15 April strike - 307 - Bourzac also in a Sea Fury and Luis Alfonso Silva Tablada in the B-26 Together their rockets forced the ship which had been trying to flee south to the open sea to ground on the west side of the Bahia de Cochinos at its northern end In addition to their rockets the aircraft also machine gunned the two LCI's the landing craft and the other supply vessels that had brought the Brigade into the Bahia de Cochinos The attack on the shipping was done at the direct command of Fidel Castro who had called the Commandant of San Antonio de Los Banos Air Base and insisted that FAR's initial air strikes be directed toward sinking the ships that had invaded Cuban waters Following this initial mission against the Brigade fleet the FAR pilots returned to San Antonio for refueling rearming and maintenance another flight was in the air by 0800 Cuban time This flight marked the beginning of the end for the Brigade's air operations because the first of the three T-33's which The Houston was left where i t ran aground until the late 1970's Verde Olivo Havana 17 April 1977 pp 35-36 ran an article about the dismantling and cutting pp of the vessel for scrap The propeller part of the stack and some other items were being saved for museum pieces - 308 - were used by FAR between the 17th and 19th of April got into the air By 0900 the plane piloted by Alberto Fernandez had shot down the first of the B-26's that were to fall to the T-birds This Brigade B-26 was piloted by Matias Farias and it crash landed on the airstrip at Playa Giron killing Eddy Gonzalez the navigator Farias survived the crash and eventually would be air lifted out by the only Brigade aircraft which successfully landed at the Playa Giron air strip use of which was basic to the air operations plans as revised to meet the demands of Secretary of State Dean Rusk Captain Alvaro Prendes Quintana of Castro's Air Force claimed that FAR had only two T-33's operable during the course of the invasion but the photo intelligence report prepared for this history indicates that there were three T-33's operating out of San Antonio de los Banos between 17-19 April 1961 The PI report also shows a fourth T 33 at the field but it apparently did not change its position between 15 and 20 April lei Hugh Thomas author of the most definitive history of Cuba unfortunately has erred a number of times in his story of the invasion including wLth reference to the air strike on D-Day that Castro had two T-33 jet trainers quite forgotten by the U S planners I f l The T-33's of course were the aircraft of greatest concern to the air operations planners at JMTIDE and to the pilots Cuban and American who would have to contend with them - 30'9 - Once his Sea Fury had been refueled repaired and rearmed Carreras Rojas again appeared over Playa Giron and this time with his rockets he hit the Rio Escondido which was deck loaded with among other things aviation gasoline Within a very short time the Rio went up with a bang and down like a rock and to top his day off during the course of the second sortie Carreras also claimed to have dropped a Brigade B-26 into the sea 2 The question of the exact number of B-26's lost over the beach on 17 April is still somewhat in doubt The Cubans claimed that 5-6 were shot down but the Agency records indicate that four actually were shot down and that four others made emergency landings two at Boca Chica and two at Grand Cayman Island Of the 16 aircraft from JMTIDE which participated in the first day's air activities between dawn and early evening only six may have been without damage and even this appears doubtful Of the four B-26's of the Brigade which were positively identified as shot down Strangely enough there were no casualties among the crew of the Rio Escondido The survivors were taken aboard the LCI Blagar - 310 - during the first day's alr operation the only survivor in ddition to Matias Farias was Dimitrio Perez who was a navigator for Raul Vianello Hit by a FAR T-33 probably piloted by Alvero Prendes Quintana their plane became a flamer but Perez managed to bailout He was picked up at sea by a US destroyer where he not only posed as a defector from Castro's Cuba but stuck to this story until he received word that the Brigade invasion had collapsed 1 A third Brigade B-26 flown by Osvaldo Piedra and Jose A Fernandez blew up when attacked by a T-33 flown by Rafael del Pino Diaz and both airmen were killed Eddy Ferrer presented a particularly touching though somewhat suspect -- story of the loss of one of the Brigade B-26's which had been attacked over Cuba by both a T-33 flown by Rafael del Pino Diaz and a Sea Not only did Perez stick to his story but he played ' by the games ln response to requested lnterrogatlon Navy regarding the status of the Cuban airfields supporting the T-33's and Sea Furies additionally he also reported a heavy bombing e g 4 500 Ibs of bombs on the Cienfuegos airfield Fortunately Perez's games did not result in the loss of any of his compatriots but his failure to identify himself to th USN could have had tragic consequences 3a - 311 - Fury piloted by Douglas Rudd Mole The T-33 attack was unsuccessful but the Sea Fury apparently hit an engine on the B-26 before being forced to break off the attack by the intervention -- without firing -- of two unmarked jets from the US carrier Essex As the Brigade B-26 struggled toward the Nicaraguan coast Ferrer in a C-46 returning to TIDE from an air drop picked up the distress signals from the plane piloted by Jose A Crespo and navigated by Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo Ferrer wrote that for a matter of roughly two hours he was in contact with the crippled aircraft trying to locate it to lead it to land went into the sea covered Unfortunately he failed and the plane Neither Crespo nor Lorenzo were re- The saving grace according to Ferrer was that Padre Carrero the Chaplain for the Brigade Air Force was aboard Ferrer's aircraft and was able to hear a last confession from the two B-26 fliers prior to the time that they plunged to their death -5 There is no question that Crespo and Lorenzo were lost following the attack on their B-26's by the FAR T-33 and Sea Fury Beyond that the author suspects that Ferrer has exercised considerable literary license in his version of the episode He pictured his C-46 as laboring to get into the air and make the flight the B-26 which was to escort him to Playa Giron was forced to abort and in violation of all procedures footnote continued on following page - 312 - Eddy Ferrer also touched on another of the tragic stories of air operations on 17 April 1961 Garcia and his navigator Juan M Gonzalez Crispin had been scheduled to join another B-26 for one of the last missions over Blue Beach on 17 April When the second aircraft had to abort very shortly after take off because of mechanical difficulties Garcia continued alone and Gonzalez In maintaining the patrol of the beach area by himself Garcia ran low on fuel Rather than return to Nicaragua he put down at Boca Chica Naval Air Station NAS in Key West for refueling prior to returning to JMTIDE and he was scheduled to leave the Florida base at 1740 hours Florida time -hours Nicaragua time 1640 61 He had flown into Boca Chica with aircraft #940 but for whatever reason when Garcia was ready to depart Boca Chica he took off in B-26 #933 which he took the priest aboard on a combat mission Moreover the available records do not support Ferrer's claim that he -- or any of the other transport pilots -- flew a second mission on the 17th The records do show that Ferrer was scheduled to land supplies at Playa Giron on Tuesday 18 April but that he was forced to abort because of the presence of Castro's fighters Sal ' - 313 - had put down in Boca Chica on 15 April following the D-2 strike at Campo Libertad more problems with Apparently there were Garcia's aircraft than he realized at the time that he put down The fact of the switch in aircraft was confirmed by a cable to Headquarters from JMWAVE which noted that aircraft #933 had departed on 18 April 1961 at 0248Z for TIDE On 19 April at 0433Z in an OPIM cable TIDE advised Headquarters that B-26 #933 had not arrived and asked for the location of the aircraft and the pilot Garcia At l032Z on 19 April TIDE went to Headquarters again specifying that #933 had not arrived and recommended a check with Boca Chica to determine if it had actually departed TIDE requested full details if the plane was still missing On 21 April at 0031Z TIDE again went to Bell requesting information about the aircraft and the crew and came up with the interesting suggestion that if Garcia and his navigator had re-defected they were in possession of an aircraft which could approach TIDE with no trouble at all and do serious damage The follow up from Headquarters indicated that the whereabouts of the aircraft and the pilot - 314 - were not known but that there had been no indication apparently in COMINT of a re-defection and Headquarters noted that traces would be made The case apparently was dropped at this point insofar as the Bay of Pigs operation was concerned on 2 November 1961'1 However Icabled Headquarters Armed B-26 with Cuban markings number FAR 933 found deep in jungles Jinotega Department few miles from Bocay River Remains of two men in aircraft aid that he was about to depart for the crash site with General Somoza and if it turned out that the aircraft was in fact a Castro aircraft Somoza was considering laying the case before the OAS If not a Castro aircraft wanted instruc- tions regarding disposition of the remains At this point Security Officer James Wright and another Agency employee were sent to Ni9aragua to become involved in establishing the identity of the bodies JMWAVE which had been requested to provide the identities of the crew which flew aircraft 933 out of Boca Chica was unable to penetrate the alias identification under which the mission crews had operated - 315 - The additional cable traffic which followed concerned the status of the deceased vis a vis both the Government of Nicaragua GON and also the families The GON represented by General Somoza preferred that the bodies quietly be buried in Nicaragua and nothing more to be said of the matter In discussions with Jose Miro Cardona he also indicated that his preference was for a quiet burial inasmuch as the Cuban families probably had already given up on the possibility of their family members still being alive and that if it were revealed that the bodies had been found in the crash he could forsee all kinds of difficulties including resurrection of discussions of the April invasion The following paragraphs taken from an 8 November cable after Jim Wright and Jake Durnin had visited the crash site indicates what had happened to Garcia and Gonzales Plane apparently' crashed approximately midnight 17 or 18 April 61 Directional gyro indicated impact possibly on heading 155 Plane hit side of 1 000 foot steep incline in almost impenetrably dense jungle From almost totally demolished condition estimate AIC in high speed dive Wreckage strewn over path about 200 yards down 45 degree incline on heading 210 From -position of fuel selector possibly on - 316 - one engine Added to crash damage locals have scavenged many pieces of airframe and equipment To complete destruction party obliterated few remaining identifiable markings and insignia Of crew found only three shoes parts of parachutes and one sheath knife scabbard bearing bugle tooled in leather Local who buried remains states bodies headless limbless barely recognizable as human remains No clothing or identity papers except few items investigating party will return to Headquarters Remains are buried at crash site Deterioration animals and insects have all contributed to total destruction any identifiable remnants Have arranged through I Ihave Catholic missionary in area hold appropriate religious rites Have photographed entire crash site Will hand carry film on return Unless otherwise directed plan leave 8 November via PAA flight 506 Trying to establish the identity of the second man in the cockpit with Capt Crispin Garcia proved to be something of a task The Mission Review Summary prepared by Gar Thorsrud identified the second man as Nabel -- a name which did not appear on any of the membership rolls of the Cuban Brigade or among the lists of air trainees pilots or navigators nor were any of the heirs to those killed in the course of Project JMATE identified with anyone named Nabel Similarly the cable traffic concerning this episode failed to make any mention of the name of the co-pilot with Crispin Garcia By processes of elimination of those killed in action against Air Force Registers for the Brigade pilots and crewmen it was established that the second man in the cockpit was Juan M Gonzalez and this was subsequently confirmed by Eduardo Ferrer's book -Operacion Puma References for this episode are listed in Source 7 - 317 - FAR made additional claims of downed aircraft as a result of the fighting above the beach on 17 April but these claimed kills in fact turned out to be credits for the four aircraft which made emergency landings at Grand Cayman and Boca Chica The record should also show that Lady Luck was riding with the FAR pilots on 17 April Alvaro Prendes Quintana for example reported that shortly before D-Day he had been on infantry detail in the Escarrbray for three months and that prior to 17 April 1961 he had done no recent flying until he took off in a T-33 Gustavo Bourzac who was flying one of the Sea Furies with Enrique Carreras Rojas in attacking the Houston noted that this was the first time that he had ever fired the machine guns on an aircraft Douglas Rudd Mole had been stationed at the Mariel base but hadn't flown for five months He was recalled after the strike on 15 April and was transferred to San Antonio to fly a Sea Fury FAR did not escape completely unscathed onDDay Capt Silva Tablada with a crew of three aboar a B-26 was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the vessels in the Playa Giron area and the - 318 - plane crashed into the sea with no survivors Carlos Ulloa a Nicaraguan flying for Castro's Cuba went into the ocean in his Sea Fury and there are two claimants to responsibility for this -- those who were aboard the Brigade ships at Playa Giron claimed that it was their machine gun fire which caught the Sea Fury but there are others who say it was a C-46 returning from a paradrop that so skillfully evaded the Sea Fury by dropping close to the ocean that the Sea Fury overshot misjudged and crashed into the sea These however were the only combat losses suffered by Castro's Air Force The bad luck of the Brigade Air Force didn't end however with the close of daylight on 17 April It continued through the night of the 17th and through the early morning of the 18th Of six air- craft scheduled to bomb the airfields at San Antonio The pertinent references of the discussion of Air Operations on 17 April 1961 are listed in Source 8 It might also be noted that Raul Curbelo Morales who was Chief of the Revolutionary Air Force claimed that on 17 April three enemy planes were destroyed and two were damaged and we don't think they reached their base Curbelo was partially correct One of the n maged aircraft did go down at sea but there were four other damaged aircraft which made successful emergency landings -- #933 was subsequently lost but this was not a direct result of the air combat - 319 - and Libertad five did not drop any ordnance and the one which did drop some ordnance in the San Antonio area missed the targetJfor haze and blackouts had obscured the San Antonio field from the sight of God man and the Brigade Air Force In fact following the D-2 airfield strike the only other airfield hit by a Brigade aircraft was Cienfuegos and this was hit only as an alternative target One of these B-26's put down at the Naval Air Station at Boca Chica Florida on 18 April at 0049 hours local time because the crew was exhausted Alvarez Cortina the pilot and Salvador Miralles the navigator were on their second mission from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba in less than 24 hours having already participated in the early morning action on D-Day 9 It was not until the author's request for a photo interpretation study in connection with this history that the bomb damage to the Cienfuegos Airfield turned up 10 Grayston Lynch in his after action report on operation PLUTO for the Taylor Committee indicated that the ordnance was dropped on Cienfuegos during the afternoon of 17 April According to Lynch one of the two B-26's which were flying cover for the beach had a loosened wing tank and when his gas reserve went down the pilot requested permission to drop his ordnance on Cienfuegos and Lynch reported that This permission was given and he departed Results unknown 11 The inference is that Lynch gave permission for-the attack on Cienfuegos but this is doubtful Cienfuegos undoubtedly was the designated alternative target for the B-26 piloted by Antonio Soto - and in addition Lynch could not communicate footnote continued on following page - 320 - ET In addition to the air combat operations as reported by flight personnel there are some other aspects of the air operation on D-Day that require comment Less than an hour after the message that the D-Day air strike had been cancelled there was a strange Emergency cable from Headquarters to TIDE at 0702Z stating 1 Change to operation plan dictated by unserviceability of landing beach airstrip 2 Maximum effort being made to make this serviceable 3 Upon receipt of information strip serviceable strategic air attacks will be resumed This may be received as early as mid-day 17 April 13 Originated in DPD by stan Beerli the message was signed off on by Jake Esterline and it appears to have advanced a rationale which would be more satisfactory to TIDE officers than the fact of cancellation of the strike for political reasons directly with the B-26's The mission is reflected in Gar Thorsrud's mission summary report Antonio Soto was listed as the pilot and his navigator as Eduardo Rodriguez In addition to dropping bombs according to Thorsrud's report they also strafed the airfield with rockets and then either because of damage or the shortage of fuel were forced to land at Grand Cayman 12 - 321 - The Playa Giron airstrip was in fact serviceable The only difficulty as has already been pointed out concerned an unidentifiable strip across the width of the runway that appeared on the photography and this turned out to be simply a dark strip of repaving Thorsrud himself in a subsequent cable some 10 hours after the message just reported stated that the airstrip appeared serviceable at the beachhead 14 In addition specific plans were made for the loading and unloading of a motor grader aboard the Lake CharZes for clearing the airstrip 15 The next message concerning the Playa Giron airstrip was sent by George Gaines on 17 April 1961 at 1720Z 1220 Cuba time In view of the fact that the Houston and particularly the Rio Escondido had been sunk nothing was said about using the strip to launch As early as 1 April 1961 Thorsrud had requested that personnel needed for operating the air strip at Playa Giron be flown in by C-46 with the C-46 crew first overflying the air strip to make sure it was serviceable but Headquarters insisted that personnel must be physically on the strip to determine condition strip 14a The Thorsrud message referred to in the text had been preceded by about two and a half hours at 1433Z by an-OPIM message from the BZagar to Headquarters for TIDE reading Pass to tactical air command Airstrip Playa Giron ready to be used 14b - 322 - strategic strikes challenging comment Gaines however made a rather After noting that any Brigade B-26's forced to land in Grand Cayman must be considered total loss he went on to suggest that aircraft should use Playa Giron airstrip as emergency alternative 16 Could he really have believed that an aircraft would have survived on that airstrip with FAR controlling the air Giving an Air Situation Report as of 1930Z on 17 April Gar Thorsrud made the following interesting observation Twelve sorties conducted with no aircraft shot down Most aircraft returning with majority ordnance Time consumed by covering ships and beachhead due urgency their request Pilots all state little or no ground targets Most recent report stated 5 ships together about 30 miles off shore Observed one ship sunk Probably by T-33 or Sea Fury hitting ammo stores 18 Although there is a discrepancy between Thorsrud's estimates of the number of sorties that had been The photo intelligence report that was prepared for this history shows the Rio Escondido burning at 0930 Cuban time and within a matter of minutes the ship exploded 17 See Figures 35-36 for photos of trre airstrip at Playa Giron - 323 - flown without loss at the time of the above situation report and his Mission Summary report the major oversight was that the B-26 piloted by Farias had already been shot down crash landing on the Playa Giron air strip What seems incredible considering the hazards faced was that any of the aircraft would have returned with their ordnance intact It was perhaps for this reason -- the lack of initiative for independent action -- that led to Thorsrud's continued appeal for permission to use the contract US crews which were available to him at the JMTIDE base and to push for authorization for strikes to be flown by these crews on the night of the 17th against the Cuban air bases But even as he was making these requests his cable ended with the fateful comment that Info just received and not confirmed that T-33 shot down one of our B-26's Red Beach 19 In addition to the B-26's which were flying beach support there were also missions of C-46's carrying paratroops to the blocking positions that had been established for the infantry Brigade The initial drop_was carried out in five C-46's and the first report based on a debriefing of the C-46 crews was - 324 - like that from the crews of all aircr ft engaged in drop operations whether bombing or personnel that their drops were right on target It was also re- ported that Two men only injured when static line cable broke on one C-46 Both returned TIDE with aircraft 20 Unfortunately it was found later that the paratroops for drop zone #1 had missed the zone and had lost most of their equipment -- and were themselves an ineffective force and soon out of the action Contrary to Gray Lynch's promise to Eddy Ferrer that Brigade aircraft would be protected by blond blue-eyed non-Spanish speaking 'Cubans ' flying the latest model jet fighters the transports found no such help over the beach on 17 April 20a As mentioned earlier i t was one of the C-46's returning from the troop drop which when attacked by a Castro Sea Fury jinked its way down to sea level but the Sea Fury either overshooting its target or being shot out of the air by the anti-aircraft fire from the Brigade ships crashed into the sea for one of the two combat air losses suffered by Castro's forces In addition to the C-46's used for troop - 325 - drops one C-54 also was used It was the crew of this C-54 which reported that the airstrip at Playa Giron was usable and it was this information that Thorsrud had cabled back to Headquarters 21 There is one other air operation which may have occurred on the afternoon of 17 April and although it cannot be verified i t has been reported by both pro and anti-Castro Cuban forces In the story which has already been told of the death of Crespo and Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo as they attempted to return to the TIDE base the pro-Castro version of the story is that the B-26's of Crespo and Piedra were spotted between the beach at Playa Larga and the Central Australia Military Headquarters by FAR pilots Alvaro Prendes and Rafael del Pino in T-33's and Douglas Rudd in a Sea Fury As the Brigade aircraft were attacking a convoy moving down the road toward Playa Larga Red Beach with l apalm rockets and machine guns they were then driven off by Castro's fighters 22 Eddy Ferrer's version is that the Brigade planes were attacking a column of roughly 70 vehicles consisting of jeeps trucks and automobiles which was carrying the members of the 339th Battalion from the - 326 - Castro Headquarters at the Central Sugar Mill Australia down to the area of Playa Larga Ferrer too says that the attack launched by the two Brigade B-26's consisted of napalm rockets and machine guns and he paints a scene of carnage with some 500 casualties -- implying in fact that the 500 were killed 23 All that Thorsrud's Mission Summary Report shows in the way of operations over the Red Beach Playa Larga area on 17 April is the morning action where six trucks were knocked out but not by either of the B-26 crews which were mentioned by Ferrer The possibility that there was at least some sort of air strike which caught the 339th Battalion on the road down to Playa Larga is further substantiated in the most authoritative Cuban work on the Bay of Pigs Playa Gi on De ota del Imperialismo One of the wounded Battalion members who specified that he had been wounded in an air attack and in fact he suffered three 50 caliber slugs which caused the removal of one of his arms - 24 In-four volumes There is little likelihood Havana - 327 - Ediciones R 1961-1962 however that the degree of damage from the attack was as severe as specified by Ferrer A more important question regarding the reported attack on the 339th Battalion concerns the use of napalm on that Monday afternoon 17 April 1961 It has already been noted that the debates over the possible use of napalm had been going on at least since the last part of 1960 but even though there was training in the use and rigging of make-shift napalm bombs at MADD the official authorization for the use of napalm was not granted until Tuesday 18 April It is also known how- ever that at 0206Z on 17 April -- after the D-Day strike had already been officially cancelled -- Thorsrud had two napalm equipped B-26's which he planned to use to hit Castro's tanks at Managua Because they were also equipped with long range tanks Thorsrud recommended that after hitting Managua they could then provide beach support 25 The possibility does exist that these two aircraft were flown by Brigade pilots and that napalm was employed against the rules on Monday 17 April 1961 The message of the 18th authorizing This probably was without Thorsrud's permission for he has subsequently stated in a discussion about the use of napalm that the rules were strictly followed 26 - 328 - the use of napalm set very specific limits This message authority to use napalm on military targets to protect beachhead area repeat beachhead area only Utmost caution mandatory to avoid friendly troops 27 Among the survivors of the operations at the Bay of pigs on 17 April 1961 Grayston Lynch one of the two Americans who helped mark the beach for the Brigade landing probably had the closest and longest continuing look at the operations of the Sea Furies T-33's and B-26's of Castro's FAR After marking the beach Lynch returned to the LCI BZagar which was 'under attack by FAR aircraft off and on until late afternoon of the 17th Among his other responsibilities Lynch also was in charge of the guns aboard the LCI There were eleven 50 caliber machine guns and two 75mm recoilless rifles among other armament and although he had an American crew - some of whom were supposed to be members of gun crews -- the Yankees were merchant seamen and they all disappeared when the firing started According to Lynch the Cubans and he operated all the guns aboard the vessel and there is little question that Lynch was thoroughly disenchanted with the merchant crews that had been put aboard the ship in lieu of trained military personnel - 329 - When push came to shove Lynch said that he found two Americans hiding in the walk-in ice box aboard the Blagar 28 As for the aircraft overhead Lynch had problems not only with Castro's aircraft but the Brigade B-26's also made life difficult for him Of the Brigade air- craft on D-Day Lynch said We sent a message very early on the first morning down there -- a Monday morning just after daylight -- to Puerto Cabezas and told them to tell those planes to stay away from us because we couldn't tell them from the Castro planes We ended up shooting at two or three of them We hit some of them there because when they came at us it was a silhouette that was all you could see Now there were blue rings painted around those planes actually a blue stripe around the wings exterior of the motors but I saw only one aircraft all day long where I actually saw the blue rings and that was after he passed over me They were impossible to see when they were coming at you Our planes were a little nosey and they wanted to take a look at the action They wanted to take a look at the ships and they would come from over the water straight at us fly directly above it at the same altitude that the Castro planes did The only type of rings that would have helped there would have been this brilliant international orange that the Air Force uses or something of that nature 29 Of the Castro aircraft Lynch was even more express-ive - 330 - ----------------------- ----------- --- We were under almost constant attack there I would say absolutely constant with one bird coming right after the other Usually a single plane You just can't unload supplies and man antiaircraft guns at the same time So while we were under attack all unloading activities ceased Then it took some time after the planes had departed before we could get the people back get them back into unloading -- so we weren't getting anywhere At the beginning of that Monday morning they FAR were pretty sloppy and haphazard but the one thing which was worrying me badly was the fact that they kept improving as the morning wore on o They were getting bolder they were getting closer and they were now using rockets That's what hit the Rio Escondido That was a lucky hit for them but there was a clear danger as far as I was concerned that we could lose both of those ships -- the Atlantico and the Caribe -- in the same manner that we lost the Rio Escondido By a rocket setting them on fire If we stayed where we were we stood a very good chance of losing both ships I wasn't worried about B 26's or the Sea Furies I was worried about the T-33's because we had no defense against them I'll explain to you why The Sea Fury and the B-26 always came to us directly from the shortest route from Havana from the NW We could see them at great disstance They came straight at us usually one at a time sometimes two They would be at about 5 000 feet They would get directly above the ships and they would circle and then they would dive on us They gave us all the opportunity in the world to get ready for them and we were - 331 - RET able to bring very effective fire on them The T-33's were a different breed of cats They came inland got to the east of us up into the sun and the sun at that time of the year down there was a monstrous ball looking to the east You just didn't even look in that direction They came out of that sun We had no radar to detect them no warning The first warning we had that the T-33's are at you was when we heard the rockets Then he made one pass -- very fast -- at you By the time that you realized that he was there he was out of range He would disappear over to the west and would go inland again -- get back in the sun -- and make another attack About 10 minutes apart or 5 minutes apart You would never ever be prepared for it You couldn't see it coming out of that sun and they were so fast that I actually shot at only one of them all day long My tracers were missing him by a good hundred yards It was pathetic 30 Speculating on what might have been had the situation been different Lynch noted Those guns were not put aboard the Blagar until we got down there Puerto Cabezas The reason why they were not armed more than that was the fact -- we go back again to the air -- that we weren't supposed to have anti-aircraft guns up there because we were not supposed to be hit by enemy planes If they had not cancelled those air raids we would not have been hit by enemy planes The only aircraft that we were really interested in -- the only -aircraft that would have really mattered down there -- was the T-33 If they had - 332 - destroyed those T-33's they could have left the Sea Furies and others untouched and we would have got by Those aircraft would eventually have been shot out of the air by ships by ground fire -- because we did shoot down one Sea Fury and two B-26's But if there had been no T-33's the Sea Furies and the B-26's would have given us a hard time But eventually by attrition we would have gotten all of them o Even our own aircraft could have taken care of them They the B-26's never pushed an attack -- except one time when we shot this one down He pushed it and made a mistake He found out that going straight in was not the way to do it We shot him down and he in fact hit the water and bounced over the top of our ship -- cleared it by about 20 feet With the small amount of antiaircraft we did have -- 50 calibers -if there had been no T-33's there we would never have left the bay We would have stayed there because we could take care of that The T-33's were going after us but they weren't hitting us but it was the potential of those planes that I was pointing out It was a fact that we could not stop them We couldn't hit them at all In other words as far as the T-33's were concerned we were absolutely defenseless Now the others fine we could take care of them First they were slower and secondly their method of attack You see they didn't get up in the sun and dive on us like the T-33's did They came at us in the open and we always had plenty of -time With just the two vessels that we had there -- the big ships the - 333 - 2 LCI's and the 2 LCU's -- we had over forty 50 calibers firing on them 31 On 17 April 1961 almost immediately upon receipt of the news that the Houston and the Rio Escondido had been sunk plans began to be made for a re- supply air drop as well as possible re-supply by water for the forces on the beach Because of sheer cowardice -- there is no other explanation possible on the part of the crews of the Atlantica and the Caribe resupply by sea proved to be impossible Consequently such resupply efforts as were attempted were exclusively by air drop Drops were planned for the night of 17 April for both Playa Larga and Playa Giron At Playa Larga the instructions called for the drops to be made parallel to the coast and over the town area at Playa Giron the supplies were to be dropped on the airstrip 33 It was also planned that on 18 April Tuesday a C-46 would attempt to land with supplies at the airstrip at Playa Giron Whose B-26's were in the air at any given time was confusing not only to Lynch but also confused Castro's FAR pilots and his ground troops Jacques Lagas one of the FAR pilots noted that on numerous occasions beginning with the 15th of April Brigade aircraft were mistaken for FAR aircraft and he said that by 18 April the troops on both sides fired on any B-26 that was within range - 334 - Another interesting aspect of air operations on 17 April that was revealed in the subsequent reports of FAR pilots was the great dissatisfaction with the armament of their planes particularly the B-26's and the T-33's Many of the FAR pilots as well as other observers from Castro's ground forces reported armament on the Brigade B-26's that never existed and attacks by US jet aircraft that never took place Enrique Carreras Rojas one of Castro's pilots who participated heavily in the initial action reported that a Brigade B-26 opened fire on him with its tail guns -- which were non-existent -- and other of the FAR pilots were also spooked by the Brigade B-26's Jacques Lagas complained that he was going to have to go in combat in his B-26 against another B-26 that had three times the armament of his aircraft Lagas was apparently under the assumption that the Brigade B-26's had both the tail and the dorsal turrets and was unaware of the fact that the mounting was eight nose guns Cedrick Belfridge a British novelist critic and newspaper man who had been deported from the United states during the McCarthy period perhaps hit the jackpot in identifying not only the B-26's - 335 - of the Brigade but also claiming that B-29's and F-86's were shooting up Cuba 34 The air action on D-Day also presented an international relations problem because of the number of B-26's that had made emergency landings on Grand Cayman the way to get the crews and or the aircraft out of Grand Cayman The exact number of B-26's that were forced to land at Grand Cayman was probably three although in the earlier reporting a claim was made that there were five B-26's down on the airstrip It was suggested to I I that he might emphasize that unless the aircraft were removed the possibility was that Cuba and other nations might believe that Grand Cayman was being used as the launch base in the In an Oral History interview with the author James A Cunningham Jr the Administrative Officer for DPD at the time of Project JMATE suggested that one of the reasons so many emergency landings were recorded was because the B-26 was a marginal airc aft for the job intended Cunningham emphasized that only through the exercise of extreme fuel discipline could the aircraf qo from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba perform a combat mission and get back to Nicaragua It was a discipline that most of the Cuban pilots had not mastered 34a - 336 - effort against Castro That such pressure was actually applied is doubtful and in any event all of the downed crews and aircraft were recovered from Grand Cayman without any great difficulty One final disquieting note to conclude the story of 17 April 1961 concerns the return of Allen Dulles from his speechmaking in Puerto Rico Dick Drain C OPS WH4 had been directed to meet Mr Dulles at Friendship Airport on the night of 17 April and brief him on the Cuban situation Drain did so in the course of returning Dulles to his home and Drain reported that Dulles asked few questions Moreover Dulles seemed to be more interested in the I I than in the problems of the increasingly tenuous air support that was available for the anti-Castro effort then being made in Cuba 36a As a matter of fact a Southern Air Transport C-46 was scheduled to land at Grand Cayman at 0400Z on 17 April 1961 to pick up the two crews that had been forced to land there following the D-2 strike 36 See footnote p 272 - 337 - B Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 As previously mentioned the attempts on the night of 17-18 April to destroy the remainder of Castro's Air Force at San Antonio de los Banos failed because of extremely poor weather conditions Jacques Lagas the FAR pilot from Chile reported a rather cornie opera situation at San Antonio when one of the Brigade B-26's apparently passed rather close to the field Lagas said that there was practically a panic on the ground and that when the aircraft disappeared various of the Castro heroes were pointing to bullet holes here and there claiming that these were fired by the Brigade aircraft According to Lagas however there had been a fusillade of 45's Garands 12 7rnm machine guns and FAL automatic rifles by the FAR pilots who shot in every direction including into their own compound 37 From that note of comic re- lief attention can now be focused on events of 18 April the only reasonably successful day experienced by the Brigade Air Force -- success being measured as no aircraft or crews lost With the troops on the beach in need of crnmunition resupply and the naval vessels unable to corne in - 338 - close enough to off-load for fear of attacks by the T-33's and Sea Furies air drops offered the only hope for getting materiel to the ground troops Be- tween the evening of 17 April and dark on 18 April between five and nine transport aircraft were loaded with tank ammunition mortar shells small arms ammunition machine gun ammunition heavy weapons ammunition hand grenades and other supplies and rigged for airdrop at Playa Giron and Playa Larga It was sub- sequently reported that on the night of 17 18 April seven C-54 loads were rigged and launched from TIDE Three loads were kicked out at Blue Beach and one at Red Beach with three aircraft failing to complete the mission because of the return of daylight and the enemy air activity Each of these aircraft carried approximately 12 000 Ibs of ammunition so that 48 000 Ibs was actually airdropped for the forces on the beach A C-46 carrying 8 000-10 000 lbs of ammuni- tion also dropped its load at the Playa Giron airfield on the morning of 18 April but a second C-46 which was scheduled either to land at the Playa Giron airstrip or make a drop failed to do either because of the presence of enemy aircraft - 339 - Like the C-54's which had not unloaded the C-46 carried its cargo back to the base at TIDE 38 Even as the supply drops for 18 April were being completed additional resupply missions were This information from DPD was submitted to the Taylor Committee on 26 May 1961 but it shows some discrepancies from that of Gar Thorsrud who was actually in charge of air operations at TIDE Thorsrud's summary of operations agrees that three C-54's made successful drops at Blue Beach with a fourth C-54 being turned back because of enemy aircraft Thorsrud's report also shows that a C-46 aborted because of the presence of enemy aircraft but there is no indication of additional C-54's that were loaded and failed to drop nor of an additional C-46 such as mentioned in the DPD summary There is however some internal contradiction within Thorsrud's own reporting for he showed that one of the C-54's Mission 54-31 which made a successful drop -- the plane being piloted by Cereceda according to the Ops'Summary -- had dropped at Red Beach but in his later summarization of the total air supply activity he also showed this mission as one of the three successful drops at Blue Beach Possibly the plan called for Cereceda to make drops to both Red and Blue beaches 39 Eddie Ferrer in one of the relatively few instances in an otherwise apparently accurate story of the air activity got carried away in telling the story of his own role on the 18th He tells a suspenseful tale of being picked as one of the three chief pilots for C-54's which were to participate in the resupply effort and he goes on at some length indicating the problems of choosing his crew and the hazards of making a successful drop at the Playa Giron area 40 In fact it appears that Ferrer drew the more hazardous assignment of landing a C-46 on the Playa Giron airstrip with supplies The mission was aborted because of reports of enemy air activity 41 - 340 - scheduled to begin on the night of 18-19 and to continue through Wednesday 19 April The C-46 which had been scheduled to land at Playa Giron on the 18th was being rescheduled to try and land at the air strip on the 19th with ammunition medical supplies and food The C-54's were being scheduled for the night drops on 18-19 and all aircraft were warned to fly low close to sea level The C-54's were instructed to have an observer in the astrodome at low level to observe potential incoming attacks from Castro's fighter aircraft After outlining the airdrop sched- ule Headquarters closed one message with the optimistic note that The other side is hurt so hang on -- at TIDE they knew better There was a brief interval of optimism at TIDE during the afternoon of the 18th when the expectation was that US Navy A4D's flying off of the Essex would provide air cover for the B-26'Si and in addition four P-51's supposedly equipped for long range flight acquired from President Somoza of Nicaragua would be made available to escort Brigade aircraft over Cuba As will be noted later the P-51' s never were employed in a combat role and the question of Navy air cover - 341 - even late on 18 April was an off-again-on-again proposition with a cable to TIDE from Headquarters on 18 April at 2006Z stating Possibly Navy activities may be restricted Therefore hold C-54 until after dark Launch C-46 with warning exercise max precaution Plans were being made on the 18th for a resupply airdrop on the night of 19-20 April by the USAF Such missions would free Brigade C-46's which might land at Playa Giron during the night of 18-19 for the purpose of evacuating wounded to TIDE At TIDE the Cuban air crews would be relieved and American air crews would take the C-46's with their wounded up to Boca Chica Naval Air Station in Key West Neither the C-46 evacuation flights nor the airdrop of some 60-90 000 lbs from three C-130's took place As Jim Cunningham of DPD pointed out General Cabell also had asked me about why we had been unable to load and dispatch the four C-130 aircraft from Kelly Air Force Base on 18 April I told him that there had not been time to rig the approximately 90 000 pounds of cargo in the time allotted with the insufficient The subject of US Navy air support is discussed separately in Section D of this Chapter - 342 - number of riggers on hand I did advise him that I land six PDO' s riggers had flown from Missoula Montana to I lin a chartered airplane and ha the beach not been lost the afternoon of the 19th the C-130's would have been ready to go that night 42 The anticipated support from the US Air Force and the freeing of the Brigade transport aircraft also interjected another desperate measure into the planning that was going on at Headquarters for late on the 18th of April the following message went to TIDE from Headquarters Authority now granted for use cargo aircraft to deliver improvised napalm bombs to isolated air strips Targets should be in order San Julian Air Base Santiago Air Base San Antonio Air Base Managua Nueva Gerona Air Base Caution crews to avoid residential areas 44 In addition to the C-130's which were scheduled to make the direct airdrops on the strip at Playa Giron there were three Air Force C-124' s which wer scheduled to land at Managua on 19 April and take off for TIDE after dark to off-load resupplies for the beach 43 The reader may recall that during the late stages of the training period at both JMADD and JMTIDE experiments were being conducted with homemade napalm bombs being pushed out of C-54's and C-46's -- not with a great deal of success This was an exceedingly strange priority listing of targets San Antonio was the principal field of operations for Castro's fighters from 17-20 April 1961 The author finds no rationale for placing San Julian as the primary target On the Headquarters priority list at 04l8Z on 18 April San footnote continued on following page - 343 - By this time the ban on napalm which according to both Col Hawkins and Gen Cabell had been an Agency decision because its use would cause concern and public outcry had gone by the board in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces 46 In addition to the anticipated air transport support from the USAF on the 18th this also was the best day for the Brigade B-26's -- there were no aircraft losses su ffered that day and an effective strike was made against a Castro column which was moving south from Playa Larga to Playa Giron It also was quite fortuitous that no Brigade B-26's were lost for according to Castro eight FAR pilots had flown 20 sorties that day Apparently FAR operated two T-birds two B-26's and two Sea Furies out of the San Antonio de los Banos airfield 47 For this reason TIDE con- tinued to request restrikes at San Antonio following the failure of the mission early in the morning of 17-18 April Not only was Thorsrud's request for Julian was placed ninth on a list of ten priority targets 45 It was principally a helicopter base but there1 s no evidence of hel icopter activity until 20 April - 344 - restrike granted but in addition he was also given permission on the 18th to use American contract crews for beachhead support This would relieve the Cuban crews of the necessity for undertaking both the beachhead missions during the day and the attempted strikes on the airfields during the late night and early morning hours There was however a warning issued to Thorsrud concerning the Americans It read as follows American contract crews can repeat can be used B-26 strikes beachhead area and approaches only Emphasize beachhead area only Cannot attach sufficient importance to fact that American crews must not fall into hands enemy In event this happens despite all precautions crews must state hired mercenaries fighting communism etc US will deny any knowledge 48 Apparently within a matter of minutes following the clearances to use the American contract crews Headquarters cabled to TIDE the following Immediately upon receipt this message launch fifty percent B-26 strike Aircraft armed your discretion destroy tanks and vehicles on approaches beachhead Conserve Cuban crews for max effort night attacks target One San Antonio airfield US Navy Air Cap over beachhead area will provide fighter cover your aircraft 49 Of this mission Connie Seigrist who was one of the two US participants and the flight leader recalled - - 345 - I asked Gar if I could take a flight of B-26's and support the ground troops at the Bay of Pigs I just could not feel right in letting them down Gar said O K - Doug Price also wanted to go Gar said also there had to be a Cuban B-26 and crew to go along with each American pilot and B-26 Price and I each flew a B-26 with a Cuban observer My observer was a Cuban Air Security Chief Four other B-26's were flown with Cuban volunteers The flight was to seek and search targets in support of our ground troops We were sure Castro should have a convoy headed to the Bay of Pigs as he had four days to organize one This is the basic reason that we were not interested in airfields -- but to help our troops We did not encounter Castro aircraft on this mission but they arrived over target one minute after our departure from target It has been a long time but I would estimate at least eight light tanks and 15 to 20 trucks with troops advancing on our troops only a couple of miles from contact We bombed strafed rocketed and napalmed all our stores in about five or six minutes and left the convoy badly messed up We never learned our exact damage 50 According to Eduardo Ferrer Operacion Puma p 208 Gustavo Villodo was Seigrist's right seat companion and Alberto Perez Sordo rode with Price Mr Seigrist had placed the initial strike at Castro's airfields on D-3 rather than D-2 eigrist indicated that the Cuban Air Force Commander and the Director of Flight Operations DFO for the Brigade had prohibited the Cuban pilots from footnote continued on following page - 346 - The Mission Summary for the raid which Seigrist led on the afternoon of the 18th indicated that there were as many as 15-20 tanks and 20 trucks in the convoy coming down the coastal road and the report stated that each of the six B-26's made several passes inflicting heavy damage to the trucks and to the tanks The more detailed Mission Summary of 20 April shows that 9 000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition 8 napalm bombs 50 rockets and 20 fragmentation bombs presumably 260 lb frags were expended against this convoy The report in this later Mission Summary was that the target was partially destroyed -- partially destroyed were 1-4 tanks and several trucks 51 Col Jack Hawkins on the other hand in his Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba made the following comments about the air flying any more -- except as volunteers -- as early as Tuesday 17 April He also said that after the mission of 18 April described above even the Cubans who had volunteered for the mission were threatened by the other pilots who were following the directions of the DFO Ferrer however indicates that it was not until Wednesday 19 April after the loss of the American crews that the standdown of the Cubans was order d by Luis Cosme Operacion Puma page 215 - 347 - strike on the afternoon of 18 April In the afternoon a highly successful attack was launched by six aircraft two flown by Americans against a 20 mile long truck and tank column approaching Blue Beach from the west Several tanks and about twenty large troop-laden lorries were destroyed by napalm bombs rockets and machine gun fire It is noteworthy that an enemy report intercepted on this date indicated that he had already suffered 1 800 casualties mostly from air attack 52 On at least two occasions Castro himself and the other members of Castro's armed forces claimed that the strike against the convoy on the afternoon of 18 April was made by US Sabre jets rather than by B-26's As pointed out earlier in the course of combat those under attack reported seeing many different types of aircraft -- none of which actually appeared in the course of the air operations Castro and others admit that there were many casualties among personnel in the convoy but no detailed figures have ever been surfaced on the number killed and wounded 54 The author has been unable to recover this frequently referenced intercept Hawkins also claimed that during the night this convoy was reattacked by six B-26's but this can neither be confirmed nor is it believed In view of the limited activity of the Brigade B-26's -including the strike in question -- the 1 800 casualty figur is believed an exaggeration 53 There were no Sabre jets aboard the Essex but there were A4-D's that did fly the Navy CAP - 348 - As already noted four P-5l's had been acquired from the Nicaraguan Air Force for possible use as B-26 escorts During the course of 18 April what had been initially regarded as a 50 minute job to sterilize and paint the aircraft dragged on through the day and the mission of the P-5l's was to be expanded to escort the C-46's from Puerto Cabezas to the airstrip at Playa Giron The plan was to deliver avgas in drums to the Playa Giron airstrip and fly both support and tactical missions from that strip Before the end of the day it had become apparent that use of the P-5l's was going to be more of a problem than had been anticipated Buck Persons one of the transport pilots who according to his story had P-5l experience during the course of WWII was tapped to train four or five Cubans who were to fly the P-5l's -- pilots who presumably hap had some fighter training experience Persons painted a dim picture of the qualifications of the five Cubans who were assigned to learn the ropes of the P-5l Strongly suggesting that they were somewhat less than enthusiastic candidates for the task at hand Persons did not plan to be in the forefront of the P-5l flight if it took off for Cuba 55 - 349 - Eddie Ferrer also had some comments to make about the possibilities of using the P-51 Mustangs which had been acquired from the Government of Nicaragua Like Persons Ferrer pointed out that it was really after the fact by the time they got around to trying to get the P-51 program organized and the planes into the air Ferrer noted that Capt Antonio Boscaro one of the Cuban pilots who had been assigned to the P-51's took one up for the first time and immediately realized that it was going to be a one way trip from JMTIDE to the airstrip at Playa Giron because of the limited fuel capacity of these particular aircraft Furthermore according to Capt Boscaro the navigation equipment was inadequate for the flight that was being contemplated but where Persons suggested that the potential P-5l pilots were less than enthusiastic about joining their comrades in combat in Cuba Ferrer says that Capt Boscaro volunteered to follow a B-26 mother plane to Cuba where he would either land at the Playa Giron airstrip -- which of course was When President Somoza authorized use of the P-51's he cautioned that they could not make the round trip to Cuba without refueling 55a - 350 - what Thorsrud had anticipated -- or if his fuel supply fell short and he couldn't reach the landing strip then the Cuban Captain allowed as how he would bailout and head for the Brigade fighting on the ground What he would do if he ran out of fuel over the ocean was not spelled out In any event despite Somoza's best effort to insure the success of the Brigade air operation his P-51's never got into combat over Cuba 56 As 18 April drew to a close it was planned to continue the air activity through the night with B-26's recycling over the San Antonio airfield at approximately 2 hour intervals making passes from various headings toward all the parking areas for the T-33's and Sea Furies that were still operable The C-54's and C-46's were to be loaded and dispatched as fast as possible and Thorsrud planned to use American pilots to back up Cuban crews on the transport runs to Cuba from TIDE Additionally it was anticipated that both the B-26 aircraft and their crews which were still down in Grand Cayman would be returned to the TIDE base before the morning of 19 April 57 - 351 - C Four for A Cause -- 19 April 1961 In an attempt to meet the needs of the Brigade on the beach on 19 April two C-46's were scheduled to make air drops in the Playa Giron area -- one drop to be on the airstrip and the other in the city area and a C-54 was supposed to make a drop over Blue Beach itself It was reported that all three missions either aborted or were recalled because of the presence of Castro aircraft in the target areas but examination of the cable traffic and other available information indicates that the aircraft did not abort but for one reason or another all of the drops went astray Mes- sages indicated that the attempted drops at the airstrip had been blown away and that the C-54 drops at the beach had gone into the sea The only successful resupply mission on 19 April resulted from appeals by the ground force commander Jose Perez San Roman Pepe San Roman for a C-46 to land at the Playa Giron air field with supplies and to evacuate Brigade wounded A C-46 flown by Manuel Navarro with Jose E PelIon and Robert H Hofbuck as co-pilot and navigator respectively put down at the airstrip and discharged 8 500 Ibs of - 352 - assorted ammunition medicines radio gear and other items needed by the Brigade Although he talked to the Brigade medical doctor Dr Juan Sordo and was told that the Brigade wounded could be brought from a hospital to the aircraft in an hour or two Navarro made the difficult decision to fly the C-46 out of Cuba before the FAR fighters destroyed it on the ground The only person to be evacuated was Matias Farias the B-26 pilot who had survived the shoot down and crash landing at the Playa Giron airstrip on D-Day 59 In addition to outlining the program for resupply of the Brigade Gar Thorsrud also forwarded to Headquarters the plans for tactical air operations in support of the Brigade ground forces on 19 April The B-26's were going to go out in pairs every two hours to work-over the roads leading into the beachhead area and a C-54 was being loaded with 55 gallon drums of napalm in an attempt to provide additional attack capability on the roadways Thorsrud also in- formed Headquarters that American crews were going to Hofbuck is the alias for a North American contract whose participation in this episode has not yet been made public 58 navi ator - 353 - be employed on all missions because the Cuban crews were nearly exhausted Five or six stalwarts remain among Cuban B-26 crews that we can count on They are Ponzoa Herrera Zuniga Rene Garcia Soto and Varilla Others nearly finished May fly but would abort or make quick pass in target area Cuban C-46 and C-54 crews holding up well C-54 napalm run not launched no spotting charges for igniters 59a The Chief of TIDE's air operations also expressed great concern about the need for effective USN air cover On the 18th according to Thorsrud the B-26's were not being met by Navy air until they reached the 12 mile limit -- either inbound or outbound Addition- ally Beach reports enemy aircraft made passes on beach while Navy aircraft remained at high altitude If this procedure used in the morning 19 April Headquarters can expect to lose some American crews 60 The first of the B-26's to take off from Puerto Cabezas for Cuba on 19 April was flown by Gonzalo A few hours after sending this message Thorsrud's concern was borne out when he reported Cuban crews depleted and either refuse to fly or are exhausted Two Cuban crews have just aborted on take-off 59b - 354 - Herrera one of the truly dedicated pilots of the Brigade Air Force The record indicates that Herrera departed between 0600Z-0700Z putting him over the target area about 0930Z-1000Z 0430-0500 Havana Washington Between 0845Z and 0900Z four or five B-26's flown by US pilots headed for Cuba and these were followed at 1045Z by two or three additional US piloted B-26's The Americans who piloted the B-26's were Billy J Goodwin Dalton H Livingston Thomas W Ray Riley W Shamburger and Joseph L Shannon of the Alabama Air National Guard and Doug Price and Connie Seigrist of the Agency's Far East proprietary CAT Two additional Americans from the Alabama ANG Leo The question concerning the exact number of US piloted B-26's on 19 April arises from a difference between the Mission Summary Report prepared for the Taylor Committee in April 1961 and Thorsrud's revision of that Mission Summary Report in 1968 when he reviewed Persons's book Bay of Pigs The question was whether Doug Price flew as a co-pilot with Connie Seigrist -- as indicated in the early summary -- or flew a B-26 himself as indicated by the later report Based on the need for B-26 pilots and the fact that non-pilot personnel -- Wade Gray a navigator and Leo Baker a radio operator -- were riding the second seats it is presumed that Price -- who had flown a B-26 during the attack on the Castro convoy on the 18th -- was piloting an aircraft not riding as a copilot 611 Moreover it seems probable that if Price had been-flying with him on 19 April Seigrist would have remembered this and so specified in his correspondence with the author F Baker and WadeC Gray flew as observers for Ray and Shamburger respectively 62 All of these American airmen were volunteers and all recognized the risk posed by the FAR T-33's and Sea Furies Of the B-26's that flew on 19 April Herrera engaged a Castro convoy heading for Playa Giron from Playa Larga Ferrer claimed that Herrera destroyed three tanks three armored trucks killed 83 and wounded 14 and left the convoy in a shambles Herrera's B-26 with 37 bullet holes in it 61 and The validity of the number of killed and wounded is open to question and if Thorsrud's Mission Summary for the Taylor Committee were the only other evidence available the claims for Herrera would be in considerable doubt since the summary shows only that 'Herrera encountered considerable opposition from AAA and aircraft A message from TIDE on the 19th however stated that in an attack on a car-truck convoy some 7-8 miles northwest of Playa Giron presumably on the coast road a single B-26 had partially destroyed In addition to those listed the following members of rh Alabama Air National Guard flew as B-26 crew members on 19 April 1961 Eldon Cross Charles Hayden Carl Sudano and James Vaughn Neither Cross nor Sudano had been recruited for overflights 62a - 356 - the convoy with two napalm bombs eight rockets and 2 160 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition The plane had also decommissioned a tank 4 miles west of Playa Giron In all probability this was Herrera's work 65 Of the nine Americans who took off for the at- tacks against Cuba on 19 April 1961 four were killed in action when two B-26's were shot down The cable To the author's knowledge the number of killed and wounded in any given strike except for that on D minus 2 has never been revealed by Castro Despite the fact that Ferrer also reported that Don Gordon e g Doug Price and Herrera were both involved in strikes on convoys an assortment of gremlins apparently limited Price's ordnance to seven of his eight rockets -- neither napalm nor machine guns functioned In fact both Ferrer and Persons tell'that Price landed with one armed rocket hanging half loose after it had failed to discharge properly 66 In addition there is considerable confusion regardipg Price's actual time of departure but it is more probable -- certainly in view of the plan to fly the B-26's in pairs -- that it was about the same time as Herrera's rather than at 1030Z as Thorsrud indicated in the revision of his Mission Summary the 1968 review of Persons's book Also according to Seigrist all of the 1030Z flight was recalled before reaching the target I don't recall how many B-26's departed in flight with me later in the morning of 19 April 1961 to support our troops but we were recalled just before we were arriving on target I do not recall how we received the message nor who sent it 67 Price as noted had expended his rockets on targets and it does not appear that he could have been with this later group - 357 - T traffic detailed the loss of Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray as follows 1 Regret report Riley W Sibbets Riley Shamburger shot down by enemy T-33's on dawn attack east Blue Beach At time Sibbets flying wing for Joe Safranek Joe Shannon 2 T-33's attacked out of sun No Navy air cover witnessed at anytime Riley called Joe advising We've been jumped Both took evasive action turning into the attacks Joe observed T-33 almost flying wing with Riley and sliding out on overshoot of his final pass White smoke trailing from Riley's aircraft He last reported on fire was observed headed for the ocean dropped external tanks and ditched about 3 miles off shore 20 miles east Blue Beach Long plume in the water and then a larger splash Slim possibility may have survived Have asked Navy BAYY for air-sea rescue but do not have faith they will effect rescue PBY enroute with orders not proceed in beyond 12 mile limit on pickup unless Navy provides cover 68 The information on the shoot down on Shamburger and Gray had been picked up by two of the Brigade B-26's -- probably Herrera and Price -- which had been in the beach area from 1010Z-1130Z and were en route back to TIDE l150Z The time of Shamburger's loss was given as The FLASH message from TIDE to BELL further repor-ted - 358 - No repeat no Navy aircraft in area at that time In light of above incident TIDE cannot repeat not provide air support Brigade until effective air cover can be provided 69 Thomas Pete Ray and Leo Baker had been flying in the northwest sector of the combat area and had made at least one strafing pass at the Central Australia sugar mill -- the Cuban command center for the area -- when they were hit by ground fire occurred then is still subject to What speculation The initial messages from TIDE to Headquarters on the shoot down stated that Havana reported that an American -- reported variously as Berliss Berles and Berllins -- had been captured and TIDE first speculated that he had parachuted from the disabled B-26 70 The Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces Medi- cal Corps Major Oscar Fernandez Mel however was at the Australia sugar mill on 19 April 1961 when the B-26 was hit and he reported that the plane made a crash landing in a cleared cane field Major Fernandez Mel stated that one charred body was found and that two others in the plane jumped out but were later He-adquarters quickly cabled 'TIDE to PIs send names of US pilots who went down Who was with Berliss Baker 70a - 359 ' ound in an orange grove about 4 or 5 kilometers from the place where the plane crashed 71 Con- sidering that Havana radio so quickly reported on the identification of Baker it seems clear that he rather than Ray died in the crash That there was a third person in the B-26 with Ray and Baker can only be attributed to the imagination of excited ground observers and there seems no reason to doubt that the pilot of the B-26 Pete Ray survived the crash landing and attempted to escape According to Cubans who were involved in the search for the survivor of the crash he was armed with a pistol hand grenades and a knife and he was killed in a gun fight when resisting capture One Cuban re- port of 23 April 1961 also stated that no identification was found on the flyer killed in the gun fight and to the author's knowledge the Government of Cuba has never publicly acknowledged Ray's identity Some of those who were involved in the air operations believed that both Ray and Baker were murdered in cold blood by the Cuban militiamen Both Gar Thorsrud and Sid Stembridge reported seeing a picture taken from a Havana newspaper which showed two bodies believed to be Ray and Baker which showed single bullet holes in their foreheads and no other apparent bodily injuries This would suggest of course that the two had been footnote continued on following page - 360 - In addition to the Americans and Bonzalo Herrera Eddy Ferrer's book claimed that Mario Zuniga another murdered Persons also gives some credence to this theory too even though his version of the story has Ray being found in the plane and Baker jumping out pistol in hand and fighting to his death 73 The author of this history does not subscribe to the murder theory but believes that the story as told in the text above is probably an accurate reflection of what happened Peter H Wyden wrote the Director of Central Intelligence that during his 1978 visit to Cuba he was informed that Cuban authorities are still holding in a morgue the body of one of the four Alabama Air National Guard pilots who were killed on a combat mission for the CIA on the morning of April 19 1961 73a In the true spirit of an American patriot Mr Wyden ho was writing a book on the Bay of Pigs and had long bedeviled the Agency for access to its files also wrote I would be willing to make all the above and other information available in return for reasonable cooperation with my own research needs 73b This offer was in the same tenor as one Mr Wyden made to the author of this history on 30 Decembe 1975 when he Wyden telephoned to inquire about this author's failure to respond to a Wyden letter of 6 December 1975 requesting assistance in his research efforts When told that his proposal for a meeting was of no interest to this writer Wyden then IItried to butter me up by telling me of a considerable amount of 'interesting' material he was acquiring through his interviews and after indicating some consideration of the 'ethics' of the problem said he would be willing to make the material available to me I told him that I was completely uninterested in anything he could offer It 73c In his recent book Bay of Pigs Wyden wrote that an official of the Cuban Foreign Ministry told him that the body in the morgue was Baker's 73d On 5 September 1979 however it was reported that the FBI had identified the body as that of Rayon the basis of fingerprints which had been sent to Washington by IICu ban officials ' ' 73e Wyden' s book-also carries the photos following p l60y-Qfthe bodies of Ray and Baker and it has a much more detailed story of the Ray-Baker crash as told by Dr Oscar Fernandez Mel than the physician soldier gave at the time of the footnote continued on following page - 361 - of the truly dedicated Cuban pilots with the Brigade also flew a B-26 on 19 April Ferrer listed Manuel Villafana the Brigade's Air Chief as Zuniga's copilot Ferrer apparently confused the missions for the Mission Summary Report shows that Zuniga -- who had flown the B-26 deception plane on D minus 2 and had been over the beach on the 17th -- and Villafana flew in the strike against the Castro convoy on the afternoon of the 18th 74 D Bitter Recriminations 1961 The Navy CAP 19 April The loss of four American fliers on 19 April 1961 precipitated an immediate and on-going controversy trial of the Brigade members The author of this history finds the enlarged version too hard to swallow especially when the story is told that Ray having pulled the pin on a grenade was then machine gunned down from two yards dj stance by a Cuba militiaman and no mention is made of the grenade exploding or wounding others 73e Details of the litigation surrounding verification of the deaths of the four ANG flyers are omitted from this history but extensive records are available in the files of Air Branch SOG f Details of the posthumous awarding of the CIA Dlstlnguished Intelligence Cross -- the Agency's highest award for valor -- are closely held by the Office of Personnel and the General Counsel's office of CIA but some of the p anning for possible publicity on the awards is given in Appendix 9 I - 362 - between the Navy and the Agency which has not been resolved to this day Whether it can be resolved at this point will be left to the reader's judgment Review and reconstruction of the messages memoranda and other pertinent information indicate that USN planning for Operation BUMPY ROAD the Navy s identification of CIA's anti-Castro program had begun on 25 March 1961 with authorization from the JCS On 1 April Rules of Engagement had been issued for surface shipping and air patrols and on 17 April the USN Task Group got its first orders to provide Early Warning EW for the Brigade ships from Castro aircraft 74a It was also on 17 April 1961 that a Memorandum for Record from Captain J Scapa USN the Agency liaison officer with the JCS set forth the Rules of Engagement drafted by General Cabell for the United States Navy These were- spelled out as follows 1 Carrier shall operate no closer than 50 miles to Cuban territory 2 Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory 3 Not more than 4 aircraft on station at one time 4 U S aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by - 363 - opening bomb bay doors when headed toward ship to be protected or starts a strafing run on it Attacks will not be made by U S aircraft under any other condition 5 No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory 6 u s aircraft shall not corne up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it 7 If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has taken place 75 It has been noted that beginning on the 17th of April Navy aircraft were in evidence within the terms of the rules of engagement and did on at least one occasion assist Brigade B-26 pilot Jose Crespo to escape in his crippled B-26 when it was under attack by a Sea Fury There also are other reports of high- cover being flown on both the 17th and the 18th beyond the 12 mile limit but the USN jets made no effort to deter the FAR aircraft particularly on the 18th in their attacks against the invasion troops in the Playa Larga and Playa Giron areas with the losses the Brigade aircraft suffered on the 17th the call from TIDE was almost immediate for support from aircraft aboard the carrier Essex -- the flagship of Task Group 81 8 standing in international waters off Cuba - 364 - Before noon on 18 April both Gar Thorsrud and McGeorge Bundy were urging their respective chiefs to authorize direct action by Navy aircraft from the Essex Thorsrud's contention to Headquarters was that since the USN was already accused of being involved in the anti-Castro operation they should be turned loose on Combat Air Patrol to protect the Brigade aircraft 75a At the White House level Mr Bundy prepared a Memorandum for the President reading as follows I think you will find at noon on 18 April that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good The Cuban armed forces are stronger the popular response is weaker and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped Tanks have done in one beachhead and the position is precarious at the others The CIA will press hard for further air help -- this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid crescendo because we are up against a formidable enemy who is reacting with military know-how and vigor The immediate request I would grant because it cannot easily be proven against us and because men are in need but the real question is whether to re-open the possibility of further intervention and support or to accept the high probability that our people at - 365 - best will go into the mountains ln defeat In my own judgment the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force by neutrally-painted u s planes if necessary and then let the battle go its way 75b Neither of the requests for closer air support from the Navy was acted on immediately and when authorization for assistance from the carrier task force was granted it was minimal It was not until the very early hours of 19 April Schlesinger says shortly after 1 00 a m Washington time that the President during a meeting with his high level advisers authorized one hour of air cover for the Brigade B-26 s by six unmarked jets from the Essex Among the other caveats the Navy aircraft would neither seek air combat nor attack ground targets 75c Once this decision was made known a FLASH PRECEDENCE message went from Headquarters at 0804Z on 19 April to the Air Commander TIDE stating In addition to himself and the President Schlesinger wrote that the other attendees at the meeting were the Vice-President McGeorge Bundy Secretaries Rusk and McNamara Walt Rostow General Lemnitzer Admiral Burke and Mr Bissell as the lone CIA representative Here agai one might wonder whether the presence of the DCI would have led to a more realistic role for the USN CAP than emerged from this meeting 1 positive aggressive Navy air support and cover granted for one hour 1130Z and 1230Z 19 April 2 All enemy forces on approaches leading into Playa Giron airfield should be attacked 3 Supply aircraft will also receive escort for this period 4 Main purpose is hope to catch enemy aircraft in area 5 Follow-on air strikes as indicated in your message TIDE 879 desired 6 Please advise plan 7 Essential make best use opportunity this one hour period 8 Small boat will be resupplying beach avoid attack 76 l But even as this announcement of authorization for one hour combat air patrol was being flashed to TIDE TIDE was sending an EMERGENCY message through Chief JMATE told the Taylor Committee that there was a stipulation included in the grant of permission for the CAP requiring an Am rican -- and apparently recommending Colonel Frank Egan -- to go into the Blue Beach area and assess the situation during the hour of air cover Esterline indicated that he was enraged at this and refused to order Egan to go Instead he put the matter up to Lynch and Robertson and although both volunteered nothing came of it because the catamaran which was to be used for the run-in run-out to the each had been lost 76a There was no follow-up concerning the rationale for this survey in either the Taylor Committee or Inspector General investigations of the BOP operation - 367 - Headquarters at 0 15Z 0215 Nicaragua time or 0315 Washington time to the Commanding Officer of the carrier Essex reading as follows B-26's flying continual sorties for close support beachhead Imperative continual air CAP be provided at repeat at Blue Beach not repeat not at the 12 mile limit Your pilots should stand by 121 5 megacycles Also C-46's air landing at airfield will be sitting ducks without your help These are American boys Respectfully Air Commander TIDE 77 Within half an hour 0334R Washington time after the message was sent to Gar Thorsrud confirming the one hour CAP for 19 April JCS sent a FLASH message to Carrier Task Group CTG 81 8 Exclusive to Admiral Dennison Commander of the Task Group and to Rear Admiral Clark Commanding Officer of the Essex message read as follows 1 TG-81 8 to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF Cuban Expeditionary Force forces during period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack Do not attack ground targets Pilots carry as little identification as practicable If necessary to ditch ditch at sea 2 CEF transport aircraft to include C-46 C-54 and possibly C-130 types are -scheduled to air drop supplies to CEF forces in beachhead from 190630R OMEO - 368 - This to 190730R Friendly B 26's are scheduled to attack Castro tanks and forces in vicinity of beachhead during same period 78 The message to the Task Group went on then to make the following interesting comment CEF very short of supplies and are being requested by other Agencies to break out from beach as soon as practicable either as organized force or in small bands of guerrillas If this is not possible i t may become necessary to evacuate CEF forces as last resort Should this be necessary will probably use CEF ships but have Phibron 2 in position about 30 miles from beach by 191300R prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach or other designated beach at 191700R using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily identified on beach If evacuation by US ships ordered furnish air cover to protect landing craft and keep amphibious shipping not less than 5 miles from beach so as not to indicate US ships are involved 80 At 1128Z 0628R on the 19th a FLASH message to TIDE from the Task Force vip Headquarters reported that the Essex aircraft had been launched and then went on to say Because Essex embroiled activity support you do not anticipate formal reply present time to TIDE cable 887 They EQuardo Ferrer claimed that the message said that two rather than six jets from the Essex would fly cover for the B-26's 79 - 369 - advise their aircraft unable operate 121 5 Am monitoring 'all TAGBAR freqs in event we able assist air-sea rescue Mallard not yet aboard 81 The almost unbelievable aspect of this last Task Force message was the reference to the inability of the Task Force aircraft to operate on 121 5 megacycles That this was not discovered until the third day of USN operations off Cuba and then not reported until three hours after the request specifying this frequency be used would seem to indicate a degree of carelessness not generally associated with the operation of a United States Marine Col Frank J Mallard was to be the Agency liaison aboard the Essex during the course of the air operations in support of the Brigade activity According to his testimony before the Taylor Committee on 28 April 1961 Mallard said that he and a radio operator boarded the Essex on 14 April and this is supported by a message rom the Task Force noting that on 14 April Mallard was welcomed aboard and will remain Essex 81al The author has been unsuccessful in attempts o determine where Mallard might have been if he was no longer aboard Gar Thorsrud was extremely critical of Mallard claiming that despite many messages he sent to Mallard the responses usually said in effect that the Navy was acting on orders from Washington 821 The TAGBAR net referred to in the above cable-referred to the communications network operating among the vessels in the Brigade leet the beach and Headquarters - 370 - aircraft carrier At 1144Z 0644R a quarter of an hour after the message regarding the inability of its aircraft to monitor the Brigade air force's radio frequency the Task Force sent another FLASH message through Headquarters for TIDE's attention We will be changing our position to about 50 miles west of yesterday's location No objection friendlies flying near us going in No objection flying out provided do not fly directly over us and that distinct pattern made when approaching to signify friendly Otherwise you in danger as we on alert 83 Shortly after 0900 Cuban time -- at 1414Z -following the shoot down of Shamburger's B-26 TIDE sent the following EMERGENCY message to the Carrier Task Force 1 Aircraft shot down by enemy between 1030Z-1200Z 0530-0700R Where is your aggressive air support 2 Downed pilot American is at 2201N 8050W Urgently request you effect rescue 84 Gar Thorsrud informed the author that the 121 5 megacycle guard channel could not have been reached if the A4D's of the Essex were on the 243 0 m c UHF channel The degree of alertness on the part of the CAP subject to question for at 1405Z on 19 April Headquarters sent the following message for the Essex Report from the Barracuda e g the Barbara J that your air cover forced two CEF Brigade aircraft to retire to southwest 83a woul seem - 371 - There then followed the series of previously noted cables from TIDE describing the shoot down of Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray with the nub of the matter contained in Thorsrud's FLASH message of 1626Z to Headquarters Today's American crews dispatched as last resort confidant of Navy cover per Headquarter's guidance will not send any more B-26's from this base under present conditions 85 Headquarters however didn't seem to be getting the message or was on another frequency for at 1638Z the following message went to TIDE 1 Complete Navy protection has been granted for the maximum number of B-26 strikes upon receipt this message until darkness tonight Request you mount the maximum number sorties for this period 2 Entire B-26 force is to concentrate upon support beachhead Friendly Task Force at Blue Beach throughout afternoon 86 Then forwarded through Headquarters to TIDE there was another message from the Navy CTG which could only have confirmed the fears previously expressed by the TIDE Air Commander that his request that the Navy conduct a thorough search for Shamburger and Gray would come to naught 1 pilot The CTG message read Air recco will search for downed However instructions here prohibit - 372 - pick up unless further from shore than position in ref 2 Must understand Navy must be authorized by higher Headquarters Everyone willing here but must obey orders received 871 As previously noted Thorsrud had anticipated difficulty in getting support for the attempted airl sea rescue and had ordered TIDE's PBY to seqrch the area 881 Unlike the US Navy the PBY crewed by American contracts ignored Thorsrud's orders about staying 12 miles off shore and went in as close as one mile to the Cuban shore They flew as low as 200 feet in their search pattern from one mile to six miles off the coast Unfortunately all they spotted was what was believed to be one of the wing tanks from Shamburger's plane As Thorsrud put it Above search conducted without benefit of Navy air cover Sighted destroyer 5 miles off shore and 5 miles west Wish make matter of record this heroic effort entire PBY crew 89 Each of the seven men making up the PBY crew earned a bonus of $1 450 for the PBY flights of 15 17-19 April 1961 of a total of roughly $20 000 in bonuses paid contract air crews for flights during the period 15-19 April 1961 The PBY crew earned a total of $10 150 The seven PBY crewmen were Don Teeters Philip Gibbony Philip Ingoglia John S Lewis Joel footnote continued on following page - 373 - Shortly after noon Washington time 1707Z Thorsrud indicated that air support for the beachhead was completely out of our hands effort extended us to the limit This morning's He went on to suggest To save what is left of beachhead suggest C-130's air land for evad at Blue Beach airfield covered by Air Force or Navy aircraft No other course open 92 There is no indication that any serious consideration was given to the possibility of air evacuation off the Playa Giron air strip but in a meeting in the DCI's office on the morning of 19 April evacuation by sea -- which apparently had received some consideration during the President's very early morning meeting -- was discussed by the DCI McGeorge F Kilgore Harry P Rahm and Joe N Skipper Kilgore Skipper and Rahm had not been recruited for overflight operations 90 The Navy apparently had made some concession to reality for at 1901Z on the 19th a message from CTG 81 8 reported that Air Search area ref failed locate pilot but saw artillery impacting one half mile off beach Two DO's now headed to three mile limit Blue Beach and have been given -authority to return any fire pick up survivors 91 - 374 - Bundy General Cabell Mr Bissell Hawkins Drain Esterline Scapa Gaines and Beerli During the course of this discussion Bundy apparently called the President to request the use of Navy aircraft to engage ground targets and FAR planes but the President refused to go beyond the hour exemption that had been granted for the morning sorties 93 Before three o'clock in the afternoon Washington time on 19 April a message went from Headquarters to Puerto Cabezas saying Stand down all air activity pending further advise sic Prepare deploy aircraft personnel and material sic Destination and or further instructions will be provided ASAP Gaines 94 This heretofore unpublicized reference to a last minute appeal to President Kennedy through McGeorge Bundy was discovered among the personal notes of the Chief of Operations for WH 4 This probably was the last opportunity that the United States had to become involved in the anti-Castro operation while there was still a gray area available for such an operation According to one generally reliable source the assignment of six USN jets was considerably less than what Richard Bissell and Arleigh Burke had attempted to get from JFK on the night of 18 19 April Hugh Thomas quotes Bissell as saying that when it was appa ent that the Brigade was about to go down the drain that he Bissell wanted USN air intervention even full scale US intervention -- to defeat Castro 93a - 375 - The further instructions to TIDE were for C-54 drops of survival gear into the area on the west side of the Bahia de Cochinos in the hope that the materiel would be recovered by Brigade members who fled into the swamps to escape capture Insofar as it is known however none of the materiel that was air dropped was recovered 94a The recriminations against the United States Navy by JMATE principals particularly those involved with the planning and conduct of Air Operations linger to the present day In the messages from the field to Headquarters between 17-19 April there were repeated complaints about the failure of the Navy CAP even within the limits specified prior to 19 April to get down on the deck where they might have been more useful in terms of protecting the Agency B-26's The real sore point however concerns the failure of the Navy CAP to be in the air when the Brigade B-26's were nearing their CIP on the morning of the 19th even if the planes from TIDE were earlier than scheduled CIP - Coast in Point - 376 - In his testimony about the Bay of Pigs invasion before the Taylor Committee Admiral Clark the Commanding Officer of the carrier Essex stated that his orders were for a CAP from 0630R-0730R and that he had ordered the CAP to be on station one half hour early 0600R in the event that the CEF aircraft made the trip quicker than they had anticipated However they carne over our ship one hour early and consequently we launched our aircraft immediately We arrived over the beach area 40 minutes before 0630R e g 0550R However by that time the CEF aircraft had already made their strikes and left 95 Gar Thorsrud who was Chief of Air Operations at TIDE has had relatively little to say about the time problem In his testimony to General Taylor in re- sponse to the question of whether there was some confusion as to the time the Navy Air CAP was to be provided Thorsrud's terse answer was There was no confusion of the time I received a message that Navy air CAP would be provided 96 On this critical question of timing the author wonders why if the Navy CAP was launched and over the beach at the time specified by Admiral Clark the message transmitted from the Task Force to TIDE via Headquarters at 1128Z see p 369-370 made no mention of the Brigade B-26's having been in the area If the message at 1128Z represented the approximate time of launch of the Essex's CAP then Admiral Clark's time sequence in the above testimony was grossly in error - 377 - In an earlier discussion of Thorsrud's Mission Summary Report of 26 April 1961 for the Taylor Committee it was noted that TIDE launched either four or five B-26's between 084SZ and 0900Z Estimating the minimum time of arrival over the target for these aircraft to be two and a half hours one of the aircraft could have been oveT the target area as early as 0430R two at 06lSR and two at 0630R The first arrival clearly was outside of the time assigned for USN protection The other four would have been well within the time OSSOR that Admiral Clark testified his CAP was over the beach area In any event the two B-26's which were lost clearly were within the specified period 0630R-0730R period when the CAP was scheduled to provide protection The question of the number of aircraft concerns the approximate time of departure for Joe Shannon's B-26 In the Mission Summary for the Taylor Committee See Table 1 on p 380 The two and a half hour flight time from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba probably errs on the side of a higher average airspeed 230 mph than was operationally feasible e g 190-200 mph - 378 - prepared in 1961 launch time was given as 1030Zi but when Thorsrud reviewed Persons's 1968 book The Bay of Pigs Shannon's launch time appeared as 0900Z Based on the messages that TIDE sent to Headquarters on 19 April reporting the shoot down of Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray by a T-33 Shannon must have launched at 0900 too inasmuch as Shamburger was his wing man when he was killed The time of departure from TIDE and the approximate time of arrival over Cuba for the B-26 aircraft on 19 April are listed in Table 1 97 Col Stanely Beerli the Acting Chief of DPD throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation and Jake Esterline Chief of WH 4 the overall Project Chief for JMATE were most bitter in their recollection of the miss between the Navy air CAP and the Brigade B-26's on 19 April In discussing the ques- tion of the air CAP Beerli was most positive as to who was at fault You're damn right I was involved I was there down at the task force Tanle 1 follows on p 380 pp 354-358 of this volume - 379 - Also see discussion RET TABLE 1 B-26 TAKE-OFF AND ARRIVAL TIMES 19 APRIL 1961 Mission Surmary 26 April 1961 Pilots Crew 1968 Revision of Mission Surrmary of 26 April 1961 Take-off Estimated Take-off Estinated time miniIm lffi arrival tiIre minimum arrival time over tine over target 575 s m 230 target 575 s m 230 nph mph Herrera 0700 0700 0930 1115 0615 0845 1115 1115 0845 1115 0615 0855 1125 0930 0430 Livingston Goodwin 0845 0845 0615 RaY Baker 0900 1130 0630 0430 0615 0625 Shamburger Gray 0900 1130 0630 Shannon 1030 0900 1300 1130 IHII Seigrist Price 1030 recalled 1300 0700 0930 0900 1130 0900 1130 0630 1030 1300 1030 1300 O710 o orn O1110 0630 800 800 ZEBRA Z time except tirres in parenthesis are Eastern Standard Tine e g Havana and Washington D C - 380 - Headquarters Bissell was there Arleigh Burke was there Bissell had obtained the clearance for that air CAP support and there was some discussion as to what the Navy would do and what they would provide -- jets etc It was decided that we could launch our strike The Navy would give us air cover for one hour O K and then the question is what time do you want it Bissell turned to me and said Stan what time do you want it What we want to do is get it in there as soon as possible given that support What we finally wanted to do was get the B-26's in there to help knock out anything that Castro was putting down the road Castro was coming down the road with tanks and everything else It was a perfect target for B-26's I blame him Admiral Arleigh Burke for this because it was a time mixup I kind of felt afterwards in my own mind -- but I had no way to cross check i t -is that maybe they never even flew the damn things because in my opinion he Burke was not enthusiastic about giving us support I kind of got the feeling that he wanted to keep his hands off as much as possible There was a lot of damned professional jealousy in that thing the BOP operation -- in the military at higher levels -- because the Agency was rUNning it and I have no qualms about saying that How are you ever going to prove that o But you can kind of tell by their reluctant tone Anyway he was there and he said Well what time do you want it I said Six and then I said afterwards I thought you know there are a - lot of six o'clocks around in different places in the world and I said Six o'clock Zebra time I forget if it was six o'clock but I remember telling him what time we wanted a specific time in Zebra time and that's the time our air troops arrived Anyway I converted it to Zebra time I think it went back it was either three or four hours difference e g the difference between Romeo time and Zebra time is five hours and I gave it to him in Zebra time I remember that specifically so that it would work out locally for that time -6 30 to 7 30 I remember as he started out the door -- I remember him going out -- and I said Remember Zebra time But he was kind of in a -- might have been in a kind of a preoccupied mood It wasn't typewritten down on a piece of paper and given to him -- maybe that's it He went back and said Be there at 6 30 to 7 30 and they just weren't there And that is where the damn thing went o But I blame him for that tieup because our people were there at the time it was specified I just think there was the foul up Not getting that z time back to the Navy 98 At another point during the course of the author's oral interview with Col Beerli- he stated On Wednesday on the 19th the Americans were shot down and that is when I mentioned that Arleigh Burke was the guy that left with the word on the time Ire-checked with our people who were there with us twice to be sure that we had the same time so when he said Z well we said z time -- we were on a cornmon basis so there to me it was clear - it spelled out there was a goof on their USN part on Wednesday 99 footnote continued on following page - 382 - Col Beerli's strong feelings about the failure of the Navy to get the time period for the CAP correct are obviously subjective but there is less speculative evidence which adds credence to Agency's contention that the Navy clearly was at fault on 19 April 1961 -- regardless of whether the B-26's arrived an hour earlier than scheduled As noted previously see p 377 Admiral Clark implied that the Essex was unaware of the approaching Brigade B-26's until they flew past the carrier Clark further told the Taylor Committee that by the time he launched his CAP and Beerli's suspicion that the six USN jets may never have flown on 19 April once the B-26's had passed is unwarranted but it is interesting to note that Hugh Thomas also claimed the Essex jets never set off at all 99a The question of time zones between Cuba and Washington and Cuba and Nicaragua might have presented problems for the US Navy even if the Bay of Pigs operation were being planned as late as 19701 The author found that the 1970 edition of the US Naval Oceanographic Office's Standard Time Zone Chart of the World 21st ed Oct 1968 Revised 6 1 70 erroneously showed a one hour time difference between Washington and Cuba and a two hour time difference between Cuba and Nicaragua Washington and Cuba are in the same time zone and Nicaragua is one hour behind Cuban time The same error also appeared on the National Geographic's map of The World December 1970 ed - 383 - got them over Cuba the B-26's had made their strikes and left 100 At no time did any of the USN per- sonnel testifying before the Taylor Committee including Admiral Burke of the Committee indicate that the incoming B-26's had been picked up by radar on the Essex or on the radar of the escorting destroyers Estimates based on the intercept ranges for the radars installed on the Essex as of November 1960-June 1961 indicate that B-26's flying at a speed of 230 mph between altitudes of 500' and 5 000' could have been intercepted between 45 and 113 statute miles This would have provided the carrier with an advance warning of roughly 12-30 minutes 101 See Table 2 Although it cannot be determined accurately at what height any of the Brigade's B-26's actually were flying Gar Thorsrud is of the opinion that they probably would have been cruising at 8 000'-10 000' for the early part of the trip dropping down to 2 000' when approximately 15 miles off the target by which time they would have been well past the Essex It would appear reasonable to suggest that Table 2 follows on p 385 - 384 - TABLE 2 ESTIMATED RADAR INTERCEPT RANGES USS ESSEX AND BRIGADE B-26's 19 APRIL 1961 Height of Aircraft Feet Intercept Range Statute miles Time Required B-26's to reach ESSEX Minutes 100 28 7 200 32 8 500 45 12 1 500 68 18 2 000 76 20 3 000 90 23 5 000 113 30 154 40 10 000 - Source Department of the Navy Sea Systems Command 24 April 1979 SEA 62X EFW Ser 81 U Estimated average speed 230 mph the carrier's intercept should have been made at approximately 100 miles or 25 minutes' warning time of the approaching aircraft 102 Equally difficult to understand is Admiral Clark's statement that by the time his jets were launched and to the target area the B-26's had made their strikes and departed As noted earlier in this discussion based on the take-off times out of TIDE as many as five B-26's -- those flown by Ray Shamburger Shannon Goodwin and Livingston -- could have been in the air at the time that the Essex planes arrived Herrera -- and possibly Price -- in the first two B-26's to arrive in the target area might have been in and out prior to the arrival of the carrier jets but according to Buck Persons Doug Price was intercepted by one of the USN jets as he was en route back to TIDE Even though he had no radio contact with the jet pilot Price was able to direct the Navy aircraft back toward the beach where Joe Shannon still faced possible attack by the T-33's which had just downed his wing man Shamburger 103 seem o This would raise some question about the credibility of Admiral Clark's comments to the Taylor Committee - 386 - Stan Beerli also has criticized the failure of the Navy radar to pick up the B-26's and in addition he felt very strongly that if the Navy had been serious about its obligation to support Project JMATE they would have had reconnaissance aircraft up well before the B-26's appeared Even if the recce aircraft had failed to catch the incoming B-26's Beerli's contention was that the carrier's radar surely should have spotted them 104 Captain Lionel Krisel USNR Ret who for a number of years has been working intermittently on a history of naval operations including the Bay of Pigs operation at the instigation of Admiral Arleigh Burk has claimed that the carrier did have a recon- naissance aircraft up and that the Essex CAP got off within a few minutes of a radar pick-up In context Krisel's comments implied that -the carrier's radar and not the recce aircraft picked up the incoming B-26's 105 If Krisel's version is correct and the The April 1979 estimate by the Navy of the capability of the radar gear carried by the Essex between November 1960 and June 1961 certainly confirms Beerli's belief that-the radar capability was there See Table 2 p 385 This makes even more incredible Admiral Clark's contention that the Essex was first aware of the B-26's when they overflew the carrier - 387 - Essex even with a radar warning alert could not get its jet aircraft launched in time to catch any of the Brigade B-26's before they completed their strikes the question of the efficiency of US carrier operations would appear to have been one of a number of significant questions ignored by the Taylor Committee Investigation There also were other problems with reference to the CAP from the Essex that were indicative of considerably less than top performance Thorsrud as reported previously had urged the Navy aircraft to operate at lower altitudes if they were to be of any use for protecting the Brigade aircraft IOSc Based on Captain Krisel's claims that in his discussions with some of the Essex's pilots who flew the CAP he was told that they had no orders to fire it would have made no difference at what height the A-40's operated IOSd In his discussions with Stan Beerli Captain Krisel apparently did not indicate that there was any radar pickup of the B-26's IOSa In one of his conversations with the author of this history Krisel stated that the A-40's from the Essex did not carry radar and had to be vectored by the carrier to any aircraft which they could not sight visually IOSb The author told Krisel that this was an unbelievable story since the purpose of the CAP was to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack Krisel reported that the pilots claimed that the Rules of Engagement must have been changed and the pilots were either unaware of the change or were not briefed The concern of the Agency air operations people of course was the fact that four Americans were lost in the shoot down of two B-26's While it is true that on 19 April only oneB-26 was lost to Castro's aircraft -- Shamburger and Gray's plane the point is that had the Navy CAP functioned as had been intended for one hour the remaining fighter aircraft in Castro's Air Force might have been eliminated Although Pete Ray and Leo Baker were lost to antiaircraft fire the possibility must be considered that that situation too might have been altered had the CAP been in place In addition to finding cause to fault the Navy's performance it should be remembered that by D-Day military considerations had gone by the board in favor of political expediency as determined at the White House On 22 April 1961 when President Kennedy was asked by ex-President Eisenhower about the role of Navy air He JFK said that in the first instance they were so anxious to keep the United States hand concealed that they accorded no such support and when they finally did Bet word of its need it was too late The situation was complicated by the fact that all communications went out I understood - 389 - that the communications equipment was on the ship that sank but this is hard to believe because each unit carries some light communications equipment including the ability to send radiograms to a distance of some fifty to a hundred miles IOSe If President Kennedy was unaware that the effort against Castro was in trouble from the opening of air operations on D-Day when the first B-26's went down then he truly listened to the wrong advisers As already notedMc- George Bundy was well aware of the air problem What JFK failed to do was to authorize US intervention -particularly Navy air -- when there was still time to salvage some if not all of the Brigade By the time such action became necessary the hand of the United States had already been exposed E Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope With the failure of the USN air CAP the only other way in which the domination of Castro's Sea Furies and T-33's might have been negated would have been to let jet aircraft -- T-33's -- be flown by American contract pilots to protect the Brigade B-26's The reader may recall that when the air operations program was being formulated consideration had been given to the need for fighter cover to protect the B-26's but - 390 - as George Gaines had pointed out those who planned the operational strikes anticipated that anything that could get in the air out on the ground w th a gun would be knocked Although Gaines indicated that it was not until after cancellation of the D-Day strike that the need for fighter escort really came up for discussion this is not quite true On 12 April 1961 two of the Alabama Air National Guard pilots James Harrison and Ulay Littleton were at Birmingham with authorization from Gen Reid Doster the Commander of the Alabama Air National Guard and the B-26 Tactical Air Chief at TIDE to pick up a T-33 and deliver it to Miami 106 Following the disaster suffered by the B-26's on 17 April a call came from the field for jet aircraft cover -- first from the Navy and then for T-33's to be assigned to the Brigade On 18 April shortly after 1600 hours Washington time Headquarters notified Eglin Air Force Ba e that four T-33's would be arriving from Luke Air Force Base in Arizona in a fighter-trainer configuration with a possible arrival at Eglin of late evening 18 April weather conditions permitting The message to Eglin also indicated that - 391 - high USAF levels had ordered the Air Proving Ground Command APGC to provide all the support that would be required for the jet operation -- maintenance personnel ground power equipment and whatever was needed to get the T-33's ready to move to TIDE Even at this late date Headquarters continued to express great concern over plausible denial -- ordering the painting out of identify ng insignia on the aircraft which might be involved in operations against Cuba Once again the blue stripe was to be painted around the wing and also around the fuselage immediately forward of the vertical stabilizer As a last resort however Headquarters did suggest that silver overpainting of identifying marks would be permitted The cable notifying Eglin of the imminent arrival of the four T-33's also indicated that the duration of their stay at Eglin would be short because it was anticipated that Avon Park would be opened up by higher authority as a contingency strike base from which the T-33's would operate against Cuba 107 Avon Park the site of a former USAF operation is located midway between Vero Beach and Brandenton in SoutQ Central Florida As early as 1 April 1961 however when the contingency base idea was being considered the operational plan was concerned only with the B-26 aircraft 107a - 392 - Although the initial plan for use of the Avon Park Air Force Base in Project JMATE was as an emergency base in the event that President Somoza ordered the Nicaragua base to close down by the time that the USAF and DOD decided to make the base available to the Agency there no longer was any need for use of the field as the strike base for T-33 operations George Gaines in trying to recall the planned air operations for the T-33's thought that the T-33's were to be armed at Avon Park take off and fly their strikes against Cuba and then continue on to JMTIDE for any subsequent operations but this appears unlikely in view of the distances involved particularly following a combat operation Billy Campbell on the other hand was of the opinion that the T-33's would use the base at Avon Park not only as a launch site 'but also as a return base for rearming and continued strike action against Cuba In neither event -- the procurement of the T-33's or the acquisition of the Avon Park Air Force Base -did the DOD or the USAF exert any particular effort or indicate any particular concern about the anti- '- Castro effort being conducted in support of US policy - 393 - To the contrary Stanley Beerli C F Welch Chief Materiel Staff DPD Gar Thorsrud and George Gaines all indicated difficulties with USAF representatives in terms of support for JMATE Although not as vehement as Stan Beerli in his criticism Gaines did note the following It took too long for the decisionmaking process in the Air Force and DOD after we asked for the air cover We needed jets -- any kind of jets to keep the T-33's off the B-26's and once we made that request the decision making process the staffing the risks that had to be weighed took too long The beachhead was lost before we could get it implemented except for the Essex fiasco I think that normal time was used when the situation called for an emergency reaction and I don't think that the normal military forces were aware of the urgency of the situation They saw no great reason at that time now of course we can all look back o but at that time they saw no great reason for not knocking off at 5 or 5 30 and going horne and taking i t up tomorrow morning o But Col John Van Dyne was sympathetic to our cause and was trying to get the Air Staff moving unfortunately they didn't view it as urgently as we did 108 One interesting sidelight on the acquisition of jet aircrFft that might be rnAntioned here is that in the course of the author's discussion with Gar Thorsrud Thorsrud mentioned that he thought that the possibility footnote continued on following page - 394 - Connie Seigrist the most experienced of all of the American pilots who participated in the JMTIDE operation pointed out that it would have made little difference if the T-33's had arrived That by the time they got around to completing the negotiations for them it was too late or as Seigrist put it We had lost by then The Cuban Director of Flight Operations had refused to let his pilots fly anymore missions But they could volunteer which some did After a mission with Price and I on the afternoon of 18 April those Cuban volunteers who flew with us on the afternoon of 18 April were threatened by the others who were following the Cuban DFO's decision to stop flying Anyway to have flown the T-33's at this time would have been futile regardless 110 F Retrospective View of Air Operations The question of what if looms largest perhaps about the conduct of air operations at the Bay of Pigs of acquiring F86H aircraft from the Puerto Rican Air National Guard might have been'introduced at the time by the Bay of Pigs however he was uncertain as to whether it had been at the time of the Bay of Pigs or whether it was during the missile crisis This of course would have been a far superior aircraft to either the AT-33's which were being sent in from Luke Air Force Base or the T-33 models that were being flown by FAR Thorsrud's recall proved to be excellent - In the cable traffic of 19 April from TIDE to BELL one of the pieces of information that TIDE passed on to Headquarters was that Air National Guard F-86H aircraft were based in Puerto Rico 109 - 395 - than about any other aspect of the project There had been more B-26 1 s and crews What if There had been the recommended D-Day strike as initially planned The American contract pilots had been used in B-26 1 s from the beginning of the air operations been no D-2 air strike to alert Castro CAP had gone as planned to the US pilots There had The Navy T-33 1 s had been available It goes on ad infinitum but one might look at the statement that Fidel Castro himself made less than a week after the surrender of the Brigade when in his TV speech he said that Our pilots acted with extraordinary bravery Moreover if the fight had lasted five days longer not one pilot would have been alive Why Because they were falling -- fighting against superior force a larger number of planes They killed the enemy but they also were falling 111 Castro also was surprised that the Brigade Air Force flying out of Nicaragua was able at least on D-Day to keep so any planes in action over his country 112 David L Phillips propaganda chief for JMATE and later Chief WH Division told the author that Maurice Halperin the first American to talk to Castro after the Bay of Pigs said that Castro told him that lack of air support was the principal weakness of the invas on force 113 - 396 - It should be emphasized with regard to the air operations however that at the time of the Taylor Conunittee investigation -- except for the cancellation of the D-Day strike -- most of the critical questions concerning air operations were either touched on so lightly or so cavalierly disregarded as to make a mockery of the Committee's work Whether this was the result of the Committee's political orientation rather than its inability shall be a moot point in this volume Whatever else may be said about the air operation one thing that is certain is that following the cancellation of the D-Day strike the Cubans and Americans who flew the B-26's C-46's and C-54's to Cuba from 17-19 April 1961 -- getting their ass shot off by superior aircraft as Gar Thorsrud put it were brave men So too were the handful of pilots from Castro's FAR who by any standards were poorly trained badly equipped and fully conscious of the Considering the great interest which Congress has displayed in recent years in investigating the Agency perhaps if a committee could be persuaded to study the wprk of the Taylor Committee on the Bay of Pigs the Agency's image might be less tarnished - 397 - risk that they took in even leaving the ground So significant did Castro regard FAR's contribution to the defeat of the invasion that the seven pursuit pilots and the one bomber pilot who survived were proclaimed Heroes of the Revolution The 17th of April was officially designated as a Dia de la Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria 114 The unanswerable iffy questions notwithstanding the reflective views of some of the CIA principals concerning the air operations for the Bay of Pigs provided useful considerations for concluding this volume George Gaines the Headquarters Chief for JMATE Air Operations Gar Thorsrud the Chief of Air Operations at the strike base at JMTIDE and Billy Jacques Lagas indicated that of the eight pilots six were Cubans one was a Nicaraguan and one himself a Chilean Lagas incidentally departed the Castro fold by 1964 Following his return to Chile he pubI1shed h1S book Memor as de un Capitan RebeZde in which he severely criticized FAR not for its lack of bravery but basically for its communist orientation Lagas claimed that even at the time of the Bay of Pigs communism was becoming all pervasive and making for gross inefficiency in FAR operations In fact in a 1967 Havana publication concerning air operations over the Bay of Pigs Lagas s story was carefully omitted from among those by other of the FAR pilots 115 I -- - 398 - Campbell the Chief of Air Operations at the JMADD training base are all of the opinion that there were adequate numbers of aircraft and crews to do the job the way it had originally been planned This opinion was expressed by both Gaines and Thorsrud at the time of the Taylor Committee investigation in May and June of 1961 -- it was an opinion firmly restated by both Gaines and Thorsrud in February of 1976 Also each of the three flyers in his own way was particularly critical of the fact that operational planning was being modified on the basis of decisions that were being made by individuals who were ignorant of the full impact that their decisions would have on the operation itself There was also criticism that decisions concerning changes in the operational air plan were not being adequately protested by those who should have known better --specifically General Cabell the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who was an experienced USAF officer 116 The most extensive criticism concerning the failure of the air operations however has come from Stanley Beerli who was the Acting Chief of DPD the Agency's air arm and from Richard Bissell who - 399 - was the Deputy Director for Plans In hindsight Bissell has been particularly hard on himself for his own failure to insist that there should have been a much larger force of B-26's and trained B-26 crews than was initially planned -- the 17 planes and crews were insufficient to conduct operations of the type that were -laid on ln the anti-Castro program As noted earlier Bissell concluded that simple arithmetic should have indicated to him that this number of planes and crews would have required perfect and ideal conditions of operations to conduct the missions that had been scheduled While he willingly admits his own failure in terms of the estimate of numbers of aircraft Bissell does not entirely excuse either Beerli or Jack Hawkins who was in charge of the overall PM action for not being alert to the problem of the numbers of aircraft 117 But like Beerli Bissell is most severe in his criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their failures to properly evaluate the critical role that the Brigade Air Force would play in the success or failure of the anti-Castro project On this subject it is believed worth reporting in some detail the comments that - 400 - Bissell has made He pointed out for example that not only was the Brigade Air Force to destroy Castro's Air Force on the ground but We were also counting on it very heavily as in effect the artillery of the ground forces No one ever thought that the Cuban Brigade could hold Castro's armies off unless you had favorable terrain which we did and unless you could call in very strong air support It's been clear to me ever since that this was a serious miscalculation and I think that I should have foreseen this and I think that others should have foreseen it It is for this reason among others that I have always been unwilling to say that if the President hadn't called off that air strike the operation would surely have been a success I am about 90 percent certain that the Joint Chiefs never commented on this inadequacy Inneed I don't remember the Joint Chiefs ever making this simple analysis I think that the communication in the last two months before the operation and during it was excellent I think the Chiefs had the communications mechanism as a result of Kennedy's action This had not been the case previously But with that Review Committee under General Gray they had the means of keeping themselves continuously informed and yet just as a comment on government procedures they were able to do so without any improper interference with the activity of the people who had the line responsibility I also feel that they had every opportunity to state specific objections -because they could either make any objections or comments directly to us through - 401 - Gen Gray or if they'd wished to do so face to face or the Chairman could have made any objections that he thought it important to make directly to the President and the whole circle of the President's advisors 118 Bissell also was extremely critical of the Joint Chiefs for their failure to emphasize the absolute essentiality of air cover to an amphibious operation noting as follows There was one interesting and alarming occasion at one of the sequence of policy meetings in the White House Before the meeting started those of us who were to participate in it were talking outside the Cabinet Room which was still occupied by a preceding meeting I was told I think it was by Gen Gray the Chairman of this Joint Chief's Review Committee who shared I may say our view on the essentiality of air cover something of a discussion that had taken place the preceding day in the meeting of the Joint Chiefs In that discussion two of the three Chiefs present had said they weren't at all sure the operation really had to have air cover that it had a good chance of success without air cover I relayed this view to the military director of the operation Col Jack Hawkins who was also there in the group he had heard something of the same thing and was again absolutely horrified He said if the Commandant of the Marine Corps had been at that particular meeting of the Joint Chiefs he felt sure there would have been a rather different tone taken - 402 - Let me make clear in none of those meetings did Lyman L Lemnitzer or Arleigh Burke who was Acting Chief when Lemnitzer was away nor did the Chairman of the JCS Review Group General Gray say to the President We don't believe that air cover is absolutely vital for this operation As to General Gray I don't think he believed any such thing and of course the Joint Chiefs I'm sure would have all agreed that effective air cover enhanced the chances of success Nevertheless I don't exclude the possibility that the President became aware one way or another that the Chiefs placed less emphasis on preinvasion air strikes to knock out the Castro Air Force than did those in charge of planning the operation And I may say that as a civilian with no military experience I was put in a very odd position to know that at the level of the Chiefs themselves there was a real question about the doctrine that the Colonel reporting to me regarded as so essential with hindsight I think one is not justified in saying that given adequate air cover the operation would surely have been a success I've never thought that one could be at all certain of that I do think you could pretty well say however that without air cover it didn't have a chance The representatives of the Chiefs there in meetings with the President didn't take this position strongly You see a great many of the policy questions that kept arising in those planning meetings with the President had to do with whether you really have to have these air strikes I'm sure that in advance of the event both he JFK and Secretary Rusk were more - worried about the effect on world opinion of the air operations than they were about the landing itself 119 - 403 - Stan Beerli's severe castigation of the US Navy over the matter of the combat air patrol on the 19th of April has been reported but in addition Beerli also had some strong opinions about the JCS failure to support the need for absolute control of the air and he stated There was a great deal in my opinion of reservation on the whole part of the JCS on this operation If you asked me if I felt personally that they had given it their wholehearted support and enthusiastic desire to see it succeed I would have said No In fact I felt that there was a lot of negative feeling in the Defense Department That they hoped that the whole damned thing would backfire in CIA's face I couldn't prove it to you But in talking to officers o even like Fletch Prouty there was always that uppity tone o well you non-experts are in something that we should be in and you are going to have trouble I think a lot of the senior military officers felt that by not getting too involved they couldn't be blamed This is a real frank talk but I feel that is exactly the case ' They gave it the minimum of scrutiny and therefore hoped that they'd have the minimum amount of having to step up and say We were part of it They did o just what was necessary and nothing more So I feel that they did not provide if you said a real hard look as if it was one of their own operations but they didn't do that at any time 120 Although there is no gainsaying that the CIA was in charge of the Bay of Pigs operation the records - 404 - cited in this volume demonstrate that in its attempts to meet its obligations in support of the official authorized policy of the US Government -- to bring about the outster of Fidel Castro -- the Agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House Secretary of State Rusk the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the US Navy The changes modifications distortions and lack of firm positive guidance related to air operations -- the key to the success or failure of US policy vis-a-vis Castro make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility When President Kennedy proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept - 405 - TO CRET APPENDIX 1 US ANTI-CASTRO PROGRAM 1 MARCH 1960 u06 TOP ET APPENDIX 1 This document is our basic policy paper It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960 I I - 407 - APPKmIX 1- 16 March 1960 A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1 Objective The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U S in such a manner is to avoid any appearance of U S intervention Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce support and so far as possible direct action both inside and outside of Cuba by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U S before the covert action program has accomplished its objective every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U S to act in a crisis 2 Summary Outline The program contemplates four major courses of action a The first requirement is the creation of a responsible appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan Restore the - 408 - Revolution to develop a political position consistent with that slogan and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro This vocal opposition will serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations b Tab A So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility probably to be located on Swan Island The target date for its completion is two rrlOnths This will be supple- mented by broadcasting from U S commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country Tab B c Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the exile opposition Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days Its role will be to provide hard - 409 - intelligence to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed d Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U S so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight In the meanwhile a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial - operation in another country 3 Leadership It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the - 410 - opposition Accordingly every effort will be made to have an eminent non-ambitious politically uncontentious chairman selected The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract control and lead the several forces As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent the senior leader must be selected U S support focused upon him and his build up undertaken 4 Cover All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will of course be explained as activities of that entity insofar as the actions become publicly known at all The CIA will however have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and to protect these will make use of a carefully screened group of U S businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition nd channel for guidance and support to the will act as al They directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions be documented as representatives of this group CIA personnel will In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition $100 000 has already been pledged from U S sources At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council as an obligation on future Cuban government to raise an additional $2 000 000 5 Budget It is anticipated that approximately $4 400 000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program On the assumption that it wilt not 411 - reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 mon hs from now the estimated requirements for FY -1960 funds is $900 000 with the balance of 3 500 000 required in FY -1961 The distribution of costs between fiscal years could of course be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations 6 Recommendations Tab C That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5 from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies -- 412 -- Tab A THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION 1 CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups the Montecristi Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance i e they are for the revolution as originally conceived- -many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist dornination and possible ultimate enslavement These groups therefore fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of Restore the Revolution 2 An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto The following points are suggested as a few possibilities a The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence b Cuba is entitled to an honest democratic government based on free elections There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression 413 - c A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect d Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated e Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council - 414 - Tab B PROPAGANDA L Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun Private opposition broadcasts i e purchase of commercial time by private individuals have occurred in Miami medium wave and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts short wave and Florida broadcast band have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from 1 1 and CIA has furnished support to these efforts 1 _ through encouragement negotiating help and providing some broadcast material 2 As the major voice of the opposition it is proposed to establish at least one gray U S -controlled station This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power The preparation of scripts will be done in the U S and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting After some experience and as the operation progresses it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba most especially the Havana region Such an additional facility might be installed on aU S base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid gray broadcasting from Florida ' I_' - 415 - 2 3 Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future Avance a leading Cuban daily Zayas' paper has been confiscated as has El Mundo another Cuban daily Diario de la Marina -- one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana is having difficulty and may have to close soon Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U S for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis As other leading newspapers are expropriated publication of exile editions will be considered 4 Inside Cuba a' CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba 5 Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America will be followed by others of equal calibre They The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro Controlled Western Hemisphere assets press radio television will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel - 416 - Tab C FINANCIAL ANNEX 1 Political Action FY -1960 FY -1961 150 000 800 000 Radio Operations and Programming including establishment of transmitters 400 000 700 000 Press and Publications 100 000 500 000 200 000 1 300 000 50 000 200 000 900 000 3 500 000 Support of Oppos ition Elements and other Group Activities II Propaganda III Paramilitary In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training IV Intelligence Collection Totals These figures are based on the assu mption that major action will not occur until FY -1961 If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control the action program should be accelerated additional funds will be required ' - 417 - TOP CRET APPENDIX 2 JMARC TACTICAL B-26 CAPABILITY - 418 - TOP ET COpy JMC - 0800 8 September 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR Chief JMARC ATTENTION J D ESTERLINE SUBJECT J ffiRC Tactical B-26 Capability 1 In reply to your request of 2 September the following chart extracts of capability for the B-26B aircraft are submitted B-26 Empty 22 362 Ibs Fuel Int 900 gal plus 2 pylons of 46D gal 1360 gal 8 160 Ibs Load Eight nose guns 12 ea 5 rockets 8 ea 250 lb bombs 5 000 Ibs T O Weight T O Roll Landing Roll 35 000 Ibs over 50' obstacle Approx 35 000 Ibs 3 450 ft 4 500 ft TAS 5 000 ft Radius of Action ' rime over Target Reserve over Base Maximum T O Weight 2 210 750 20 260 K NM Min Gal 39 921 Ibs We can finish further details if you so desire SIGNED GEORGE GAINES JR Lt Colonel USAF Chief JMCLEAR Distribution Orig 1 - Addressee 1 - JMC Ops 1 - JMC Chrono - 419 - TOP CRET APPENDIX 3 LEAFLETS FOR AIR DROP OPERATIONS u20 TO CRET SAlVOCONDUCTO 1- A TODOS LOS COt AN OS PATnIOTAS - Para unirse a ' las Fuerzas de LiberQci6 c be 1 ser scguidas con toda pre- cisi6n y excctitud las ins' ruccio 1cs siguientes 1 - En el momento d'J Clpro dmarse a nuestros puestos de c vigilancia usted va a SCI' interrogado pOI' nuestros cen7 tinelas Siga las instrucciones que los centinelas Ie den EXACTAMENTE 1 2 - Cuando Ie ordene accrcarsc hagalo con ambos manos f v levantadas sobre su cabeza L1eve esta hoja suelta en If su mano derecha Avance muy despacio Si tiene un I' arma lIevela colgando de su cinto 0 de su hombro DE f J NINGUN MODO LA lLEVE EN SUS MANOS r 1'1 3 - Si forma parte de un grupo no se acerquen juntos a men os de 50 metros del centinela A partir de esta disi - tancia debe avanzar uno a uno 1 '- i 7 4 - Para su major segurid ld uno de los que forman el grupo I debe lIevar ' ondear una bandera blanca en un palo largo facilmente visible a una considerable distancia que sea z L' 5 - No debe fratar de penctrar en nuestras lineas en las horas de oscuridad Tampoco debe tratar de unirsenos en el p curso de una botalla a no ser que forme parte de las J fuerzas enemigas y desee rendirse 6 - Una vez dentro de nuestro line 1s debe obcdecer tadas las 6rdenes rapida y correetamente Para evitar las J i traiciones sera necesario registrarlo y retirarle sus armas 1- 1 Cuando sea bien $C1bido que usted es un verdad3ro ' -J patriota usted sera uno de los nuestros '1 GUARDE ESTA HOJA c SU PASAPORTE 0 3 DUCTO A LA LIBERT I D SALVOCON- ' '5 J SAFE CONDUCT PASS GIVES INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO SURRENDER WARNS AGAINST CARRYING ARMS IN HANDS OR CROSSING LINES DURING NIGHT - 421 li' 'j J ' -_ '- - f1 r I _ r ' ' ' ' r- t' JI' -- - ' - - - - t r ' 7 - ' ' ' j f i ' C ' J ' t _ ' r 4 I _ i ' A ' oo ' ' ' ' o l ' ' S r f' ' ' i ' - 1 l o ' ' ' ' - J ' ' ' - -_ ' 10 1 1 i o - - ' PROPAGANDA SHEET TO ACCOMPANY ARMS DROP SAYS TiME TO FIGHT COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IS NEAR BE READY TO USE ARMS AND DO NOT LET THEM FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS 422 - - o - f I - o i ' r-- FISH SYMBOL OF RESISTENCE SHEETS WERE PERFORATED SO SINGLE COPIES COULD BE USED ' r -i-1 1 o _ - 423 - j - ---- I ------------------------------------ -- 6 t-W- 1 r t z- 1- Uo- iz- 3 - -- 2 1t' A 1 TEN PESO NOTE WITH MESSAGE PRINTED ON BACK I YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE YOUR OWN PIEC C OF LAND FIGHT FOR IT AGAINST I N R A - PEASANTS 424 - APPENDIX ur LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR GARFIELD M THORSRUD 2Q March 1961 u25 TOP RET APPENDIX 4 MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Letter of Instruction Lts - _J l c ' tt 24 March 1961 Gar M TEEGEN ce -fi t l l -- 1 1 1' et Ll 0 If C l l l o j ' iC 'CC o1o J - i'I - _ c r - -'11 ' '0_ '-J i 'd- ' 1 ' 1 J _ l _' ' '_v Jr v - i-' oo 1 o 1 '- ' C '1 or t J i 'Li ij re' ' ' F ' 0 ' e 0f ' iG ' ' ' l ' ' tic ' - T 11 ''-'' _ tt C I lC __ o 1 - - o - _ r' i i i1G C d f J1 J 'D F ir in yo- r nbcc ce lC'U ' r5 11 cr tcl' C llQ YlG J l l c u t ' G cj I L1i y b 0C ' 1 c iu 1 in C 1 1 i U Ct o r r 0uJ d be r s cC 1 1 tf nt 5 11 ecr it l C sj 1 i15 ty tE c 'ic r r J 5 s Gttt' i- 11 -Y L -l Lt cr ' ity r Y' 1 1 ' ' 1 15 c -J ill l c r t 1_ l - r 1 to i i 1 i J rt1 1cr J lcc of --C'lli 1 ' t -t s is C' 't i l lt11in t11C f ' oi' J I l F t j C G ill your i 'ca t r '1 tD1c1cr lircct iv J r'' ' l l C'_Y r c ia f 'oT 1 c 2 lr - 'c r i rOtt r5 J 1 b ' ' IC ' c1 'ity O- c ll j t C'l 50n ncl Cl1cl c 'icl 1 - i ViJ tl t tiir c c r iO lS l Ol 'tian of the JJ J' ' i 'Z I'roject You - i11 utilize 0 ' r J - t ricl fuc liticG cDd l ' l jc GO c s to enDure the rnst e iJ cti 'c t c c i tl ' -- c t Ji 3 1 '1 t iC OI - ' li3 1 nt of the J U' j ir d ssion A ' l i r rc pcnsibiJ it r -ill be ' i ' hlS e G lr r t rs C- ' v i ca of fhe claily t atuo or C il'Cl t f' t Crf l J lc i tic SU1 11 C t end c n y ctllcr f c_ctor's p 'fcct inG jjOUl co p bility to cCC Jl lis l %' 1C ail' l _lGsicn 1 ' C J ou r 'C itl o c r ll C11t' ' 'Ge of' t 'te c J tire eil' r rl csion c r ld h 8 c O'v0l'Hll rC 1 0 1sildli' icz you C C J $O Ll 'c 'Yc ed thc c-ut hority required to c c- cl 3 sh t IC ' ' c 1r iljili tics At U'Jt i1J 0 'D P lQ J i ID thCl' - ill be n C' - icf of l' GC 2' Cs 0 3il le for 1 r c 1 r l 1 1n J licl on 1ritll J1C t C U l y nu Dolitical L ' -C - D I t vil1 'be ur 2 Gl onsibili ty t o e 'G CC thut p ruc '1cl cz iLJ1cd toQ yo' t confolTl to t lC policics cnu 6 ircctiv2S es'Gc blished by the C iCl of ' -i' C id til lho you rill be 1o or in Ycu vill be rCG c sib1e to C lie r J 1CIj f 3 i10 in turn is j l OYl- 5iole to C 1ief J ATE G'1 i cting Chief C' h - r 11 GBP' ir o per2 ions pcrson l 1 -ill l c lc cr J ou r co d O o uty ssic-n-' C 11ts -2Tri Sl' pYOrt of J Ch Sl l ' you 1e 33 n c2ss r for ecco 'iJlisr r nt of tIle T '2 ssion 44 -2- 0 p o - tding you hc Ci ic f of' 13- ' 30 t ' t J1 ' DD Clld JUl'IDE is renJ onsible for D 1 J t ' lid tii7Jcly c o ' JX'dcetions to accor plish your oPcra- tion01 j Lon In -the c -- n't tIle co c n ce tions system provided is not t c unte fer O '121'L' tloi1a1 ne c s you wiJ inform Chief' JT1CLEP R indicating b Arfc irs of pri ' s ry iqporto 1cc or crcat urGcncy v lich in your j dc ' nc Ghou ld be brO'J Olt at Ol ce to the nttcntion of' Chief' J1 jCLEf-u'l viII be tr ' lsr itted IJcrsone l Attention of C llie f Jl'Nill arId or C'nief' Jj 1CLEI R 6 Travel Pcrsor lel assigned to the air operations unit Luct dcpDrt only vrith your specific kno r1ed ge end aJ proval 1 J IDE Security You Qt'e specifically charged w-ith the operational Gecurity of in aCCOrc fillce with established procedures An air r c lrity G pcch- list rill be assigned to you to acsist in the discharge ot t rts responsibility Security of aircraft end crews is not to be confused -r1th p lysicel Gecurity of the installation on which you l'x y operate wich is the responsibility of the Cldef of Baoe c rcre 't 8 Q '1d crCrfS Special In3trnctions a ot Per Diem 4 for quarters and Per diem of $18 00 per day will apply with deductions 45% for three meals at such time t 'lat quarters and rnea s are available b Overtime Overtime for contract personnel under your st 1 ervision ' -'ill be in accordance with terms of the contract Effective February 1961 overtime pollcy 'for staff' employees permits 60 hours maximum overtime for any fou ' week pay period through GS-lO ll0 overtime is allowed for 08-11 or above except as identified by approved production positions c Premium Peyl PremiUIl1 pay a plies at the rate 0 $965 per annum for 08-11 throu gh 08-15 effective 8 January 1961 d Dif'ferentlal Di fferentie l o'f 251 may be applied a fter the 42nd day of duty e Clothing Allowance C10thing allo-wance Tr GBP y be rrade in view at the nature of the ass1g nment provided a ppropriate clothing 1s not othervise available -3- ------l Distribution Orig - Addressee-F1L 1 - AC DPD 1 - ASST CH DPD '-4 1 - JHOLEA q - - It c i i 1 - J jC Chrono - 7-1 c j - - __ I - - TL u f _ C Dc '- i - 428 - 1 TOP CR ET 5 FINAL INSTRUCTION FOR AIR COMMANDER JMTIDE 5 April 1961 G T f NSMITTAL SLI OOATE ' 5 Apr 61 TO A DDP A ROOM NO I OUILOING REMARKS Attached are DPD final instructions to the Air Commander at TIDE These instructions have been handcarried to Chief JMATEI Air at TIDE 6LJd iv SWB FROM ROOM NO rORM NO I fEB 55 241 AC DPD I 4207 IOUILOING REPLACES rORM 36-1 WHICH MAY BE USED EXTENSION ' OPO o 1751 -0 -419H5 - 430 - i TO t Air Commander Attn TEEGEN Project JMGLOW This Directive i being dispatcbed te reaffirm a responsibility and rer tate tho policy in reference to target ansignmcnt to 13-26 Aircraft Commandcr I camtot overemphasize tho importance of insuring that each miaclon cOJ nn andcr known exactly whnt pl r02aUvea he n1 ay exercise in rolation to attacl inz targots No rCi at E 2 targets other than specifically clearod by Hcadquarton may bo ttacked_ This doos not include thoso tactical close 6u pport targets aooiencd by tho Brigado Commander how'over tho Dri ado Commandor vlill e limited to thane targets that dlroctly affcct tho movement of hiG operation_ Roconnai canco routo6 are defined as those military targots of opportunity along hiShwa yz or roads ovm - which enemy military Bupport may travel to the task force landin3 area Hcadquartero clcal'anco Ol this typo miacion i not required Aircraft Commanders will bo inGh'uctcd to attack only clearly rocognizablo milital y targetD when on thia type miGQion You may wonder why I havo zono into c uch detail on this matter A wl ong or carclcna n'love by any Aircraft Commander could jeopardize the entire operation Innocent victims o ' non-tactical tarect destruction can bring world reaction and or intorvontion aga inst thiG effort Evory effort must expended to insure this contin3cncy it kept to the minimum Mission flimaicn Aircraft Commander instructions houlq bo specific and thoroughly undorstood - All quentiona Llhould bo answered prior to exocution Il there 10 doubt in y our mind on your interpretation ot thin Directive contact mo immediately be I havo compl to confidence in your leadership and can only wioh you Godspeed in your task L- - 431 - I - ----' TOP CR ET APPENDIX 6 CABLE TRAFFIC ON RESULTS OF D-2 AIR STRIKE 15 APRIL 1961 - 32 TOP ET - ' - '- ' ''''-'' h ' - rt rl I- ' o ' '-' o ' J ' r' s ttE LJ L'1 ' '''' 317 1 1 A t 2 I i I JDE cIoffi APR 15 1 16z 61 1-2 3 o ccl 4 Del 6 3 lL o C BELL 13-20 cOP c 'Jri 5-6 COP 7 8 hW i 21 OjOC 22-23 U C fl o 9-1 sIc 24 IN ERG GLOW A I fC '1T-26-1 FURY TIDE G I S OKE '' S GBPNT R XOLA CIT TI E 3568 605 FOXTROT 15 12Z CAUSED gy 30 13 CON IR D 1 DA AGE OSS 9L TARGET 03LITERATED ON ACCURATE AAA SURPRISED BUT FIR D 2 T-33S XLY AFTER FIRST PASS D 3ELI EVE 75 PERC' T EFFECTIV 7 i i I 433 _ ' _ ' r ' ' i _ ' ' u ' _ - ' o o - - - t CR2t% 314 1 APR 61 2 3 LL I I' t $ 6 APR 1 1639Z 61 C C 1-2 3 o ocr 4 DCI C LL 13-20 DO c 'WH 5-6 o oe 21 7 cOP 8 c nfo ll sic 24 AfX P A 22-23 9-12 IN - v_ Y 3 A T ZRDITCH J ZI gKDA 3573 I Tnr- o _-1_ Z SAL - --- - - A ' l ooo ALPXA TrD 151355Z ZV YTHING TRCYED J 3Y RCCX TS 1 T-33 203A3LY 3GBPL VE S EFA E YEJ 2J S 1 1 RF I E l J O LGBPTE L Y JESTROYED AFIRE 5HI 1 -I5 ALERT TO TARGET 3Y 9L NXER EARLIGBPR TOT OULD HAVE ' DESTROYGBP BY 53 B-26 C L A D S OF SA T AGO 3AY 2 3A3 Y AAA p aVIDE9 434 - - -- - '- V y H AVY BETTER A C DET R r ED CO DITION5 - 6 4 JMTIOGBP a o A 15 1641Z 61 C CPO 2 T'1 OCI J 3 o ccr 4 COP 5-6 COP 7 AOO A 8 c r O 9-1 cjSGBPLL 13-20 c Wti 21 ofoc 22-23 BEU sfc 24 IN ERG GLO INFO O I I Y 3 A T ZRDITCH J ' ZIP QXDA'd 1 A T-26-1 Tl GBP c 75 PERCENT OF FIELD CITZ 7 639 Z RUSAL i I FURY ECHO 151415Z 1 D STROYGBPD T-33 ON AlGBP T EXPLODED BLDG DESTROYED ' ATIO S H AVY D LA 3516 AAA AP EARSD SHT AAA ALE T I PITS ' - 435 - f ft ' ' - t ' o ' ' Jr 313 1 J I i C cPO 1-2 D l 3 D OCf 4 CDP 5-6 CO t ' C 6ELL APR- 15 1644z 61 7 AOOP A 8 13-20 C 21 O OC' 22-23 IN 3577 ' GLOW I FO O I RIM KOLA crrs T10GBP 610 Y BAT Z DITCH J ZI 1KnA Z ERUSAL A T-26-3 FU Y 3 AVO 3 II 151430Z c TA GGBPT CO PL TELY D ST OYED ERATI NS ELJG DEST OYED 5 AAA OSITrc s DSS1 OYED C tA IGE AI RC2AFT A G20U ' iEVER LA DED WITHOUT D INTENSIVE P I RCRAFT RE GBPATEDL Y S CHANG D FIRE TH AAA POSITIONS UNTIL AAA CEASED 1tJ- 1EROUS HOLES CD '1 LETGBP CO SIDERABLGBP 10KE AND FIRE AIRCRAFT RGBPTU NED ASE WITH HYDRAULIC FAILURE ANn 1 HUNG ROCKET nJC DENT AAA V RY HEAVY AND ON AL RT TOT TO EARLY AlP TOO CL AR o - - ' - - 436 - p _ ' _ - i - 1 0 I 6 Jl T I CGBP 3 I OPERAT 'ONAL I GBP0 IAn IN CLC i ern 3628 TruE 621 2 Y BAT JMZIP CKDAWN 7- 1-1 ISSIG R ' PORT Jr G n A n 1507412 TOT 1510552 c ATPa O 1 IA Cr 1511t 142 GBP xpz zr o 50 CAL ZSUl 7S F U -iA7 nl Sr OY D G INTERCEPTIONS H AAA T J W 10 260 L3 F AGS 7 G aV L7S 1500 RDS PARTIALl Y DESTROYE 2 o LOCATIO SOP r- B 7 DUE TO HAZE NUMBER AIRCRAFT 1'ESnOYU UNKNOYN NO JE 'POSITIONS AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED vrS AL OBS VATIO 1 noops 2 AIRCRAFT -3 SHIP NONE NONE NONE 2D1hA XS f 437 i O J 07 SO I OIVIDUAL AIRC AFT- ON BOrm RUNS v r rs AS SHO N ON PHOT t TIiEY IF AlaaAFT tiERi wtRGBP DESTROYED CREAT DEAL 3UCK S - OKE liAS OnS RV ON R VETr ENTS AFTER BOMB RUN PIL 7 L$O l- An 2 STRAFlr G nuus DESTROYING AT LEAST 3 AIRCRAfT Om wAS CAL AA WAS NOT NTn OF FI LD ITHER 3EUEV 7' TO 80 EfFECTIVE BUT HEAVY ONE CUN PASS THRU DESTROYED OR DAMACED TWO AIRCRAFT PILOT PERCENT OF ALL AIRCRAFT ON FIELD WEP E DESTROYED o o ' ' ' ' - - -' - - '1 7 ' ' ' ''' ' o '-i i I 4 ' ' iJ ' i - ' ' ' _----'----- _ _--------- -- _ _- ----- q - ' ' 'to ---- l f t I l C DPO 1-2 ' s APR 5 2152Z 61 o J O J OOP cJ H 17l Y - 1' tELL -JPYe- I' OPGBPRAT IONAL JHGBPDIATGBP OCI I - IN 3629 1 CLOt eIrE TIDE 617 '- ---------- ' ISSIO 1EPORT JUG SO l nR 7 ' - ' - - T-25-2 ATt o _' TOT -5 t-' 15 'J7 33Z - ' -' A 15 1 532 15 1ls157 ' - j RES JLTS J'- - --r il - J ' ' _ _ o o 1 o ' TI s i opr hCO S h - - A 7 - vl I1rZ AI ' - HO ' _ i ' f ' r uo - a _ _ ' J o ' - o 1v C S o --7 u _ C ' T _ - J ''''' n IS _ v 1 1 c ' o - - o j o o o o 1 y ir oo _ - -' oo T I ' - - _GBP -c t AS J ' ' I r - -r' V -- - I ' o u _ _ 1 o 1 -''''' I'''' oJ ' -- - 1 TJO - or o - --l C'''S u T J -'t ' U 4 t' W4 -10C' r I ' p AS$ l PA5S S AA STILL CA ' ooo _- oo J OF iOSPITAL A'J 7 I LAl ln n AX IS ItiTELl 11 0 JAS r CCl InAT 1 17ICULAl1LY PI1 0T SUGGGBPST5 ro TALKIJIG ' n f G n TG7 o PIL07 FOLLouzn B 1Ir 7 D FLIGHT PLAit o LO '1AIl oo i - o WEAT En lAS 1 AS BRIEFED ' - '- l - T r 1 ' - f L S U o z vATI ot S THE' o- - - ' i 'T T ' 'r I' f o _ L oooo ooo - t 1 O f ' t ' r t - ' ' 7F C7-IVZ L - ' - ' '- ' r ' V - - s ' _ ' - J _ _ - _ _ _ _ 't k _ ' o 'i' t 'o 1 1 i I _ GBP o I oo _ o o o -_ o _ o F 4 '_ I I k t 1 - ' Cj' 1 ' ' v DO Z- ' OP t ' J1 S1 ' i t _ C t ' ' ' t ' ' f A 'U 20 l Sf r -'i - - to C OFO 2 ' J OFtPAfi' i W 0 RET APPENDIX 7 TARGET LIST H42 TOP CRET APPENDIX 7 D-DAY TARGET LIST 0001 Hours 16 April 1961 1 2 3 4 5 SA San Atnonio Base 2252N 823UJ 2 B-26 Armament Red Campo Libertad Air Base 2305N 8227W 2 B-26 Armament Red Santiago de Cuba Air Base 19571'1 7551W 2 B--26 Arr ' amen-t Re I Managua Military Base 2258N 8218W 2 B-26 Armament Green Santa Clara Air Base Camaguey Air Base 21241'1 7752 1'1 22291'1 7955W 1 B--26 6 6A 7 7 7- 8 8A Playa Baracoa Air Base San Julian Air Base 23021'1 8235W 22051'1 8411W 1 B-26 Armament Red Cienfuegos Air Base Jaime Gonzales Cienfuegos Naval Station Gunboats only 2209'1'1 8025vJ 2208301'1 802740W 1 B-26 Armament Red Nueva Gerona Batabana Naval Station 21551'1 8248W 22421'1 8218W 1 B-26 Armament Red - 443 - 9 10 1 J o Havana Power Light Companies 2 Power Plants 2309N 8321W 1 B-26 Armament Blue Bauta International Broadcasting 2259N 82321i1 1 B-26 Armament Blue Topes de Collantes 21551'1 800HJ 1 B-26 Armament Blue Armament Red Armament Green Armament Blue Full 50 caliber load rockets and light 260 lb bombs Full 50 caliber load rockets and napalm Full 50 caliber load rockets and heavy 500 lb bombs - 444 - TOP CRET APPENDIX 8 LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN FOR OPERATION PLAN 60 HHS TOP RET APPENDI Logistics Support Plan for Operations Plan 60 AD-S HQ Retalhuleu IC' lHQl Office of Special Operations Dept of Defense Other Sources Office 1 LOg tics ---7----7---7----- r---- ---- - - - - -- - -7 - ------4 Note Requisition Line Supply Line No ordnance items will be handled through Eglin AFB - 446 - HQ USAF TOP APPENDIX 9 POSSIBLE PUBLICITY ABOUT AT THE BAY OF PIGS uu7 i APPENDIX 9 17 r l2 rcll MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant to DCI for Public Affairs FROt1 Bruce T Johnson Assistant for Information DDA SUBJECT possible Publicity About at the Bay of Pigs Flye s 1973 Killed 1 On Sunday and Monday 19 and 20 March Gary Breneman of the Office of General Counsel will be in Alabama tb present posthumous medals to the families of three of the pilots killed at the Bay of Pigs Al though -le believe that -le have arranged things in such a manner that no publicity will attend the private ceremony we do know that a relative of one of the families works for the Birmingham News and must recognize the possibility that public notice -Jill be given to the event In order that you may be prepared for such an eventuality we offer the attached publishable information for your use only if there s_an inquiry 2 The paragraph contains the name of Pete Ray about whom publicity is most likely The other two names are also provided in case they become the subject of inquiries A fourth medal will be given out at a later date but not in Alabama hence the reference to four pilots 3 More details about the circumstances about Ray's death will be conveyed orally to hi family Because of their interest in recovering his body from Cuba and because they perceive that publicity linking Ray to the CIA would not facilitate their efforts we expect that they will take the information provided as private and privileged and will not put it in the pUblic domain Should some of the details come out and lead in turn to questions of your office we will endeavor to provide you with additional materials with which to satisfy those questions tGBPJi -- Bruc6 T Johnson At t a s - 448 - On 20 Harch 1978 l seTnor official of t he C8n r2_l Intelligence Agency visited Alabama to bestow on behalf of a grateful Government the Distinguishec Intelligence Cross on the 'i vidmv and family of Nr Thomas ' illard Ray killed during combat operations at the Bay of Pigs Mr Ray an experienced pilot working with the Cuban brigade volunteered to fly in aerial support of the brigade and was killed when his plane was shot down on 19 April 1961 Mr Ray was one of four American pilots killed at that time honored pos-thumously by the Government Also Riley W Shamburger Jr 'Jade C Gray I - 449 - DDA 78-1174 17 March 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR Chief Special Operations Group DDO FROM Bruce T Johnson Assistant for Info mation SUBJECT Information for the Daughter of Thomas Ray 9 ' 1 On Sunday and Monday 2 and 2-1 March Gary Breneman of the Office of General Counsel will visit Alabama to present medals to the families of three of the Americans killed at the Bay of Pigs Previous discussion with the daughter of Thomas Ray supplemented by a series of written questions led to a commitment to try to provide the daughter with a few more details about how her father died Attached is a blind memo which will be used by Breneman in an effort to satisfy the daughter's curiosity The memo will be retained by Breneman not passed to Ray's daughter 2 Also attached is a statement to be filed with the Public Affairs Office to be used in the unlikely event that the presentation of the medals results in publicity leading in turn to an inquiry about the Agency's involvement Written to refer to Ray the statement also includes the names of the other two recipients of the medals so it can be used to respond to questions involving any of the three families Attachments a s - 450 - Following his recruitment early in 1961 Thomas Ray served as a B-26 instructor pilot There was a general understanding on the part of the B-26 pilots that there might be an opportunity for voluntary participation in combat operations On 19 April 1961 Ray was one of several Americans who volunteered to fly B-26's in strikes against targets in cuba Leo Baker normally a radio operator on transport aircraft accompanied Ray as his observer Because of the emergency conditions which prevailedjwith B-26's being refueled rearmed repaired and returned to action as rapidly as possible there is no clear record of the tail number of the plane Ray vas flying at t he time of his death As tf e - c was some w t1 of the other B-26's Ray's aircraft was operati g independently when he began his attack on a sugar mil near the Bay of Pigsjwhich was being used as the Cuban military headquarters The only information on what happened to Ray comes to us from Cuban sources primarily monitored radio messages At about 8 00 a m a single aircraft bombed and strafed the sugar mill_area On its second or third pass it was shot down by antiaircraft fire It came down on or near the E-2 H1PDET CL BY 003564 grass airstrip which served the sugar mill was found in the wrecl age Only one body the other Crei VIna n Has reported to have jumped from the wreck and run for cover At about 11 00 a m Havana radio reported that the dead airman found in the plane was an American whom they identified with an alias known to have been used by Leo Baker In a story which appeared in the Cuban press on 23 April 1961 the above reference to Leo Baker was repeated In addition the Cuban report attributed to Cuban Major Fernandez Mel stated that the airman who had survived the crash had been killed in a fight to escape capture This fight reportedly took place in an orange grove 4-5 kilometers from the crash site There were no identification papers found on the body but it was claimed that the dead man had been armed with a pistol knife and hand grenades Considering that the Cubans quickly announced the identity of the American found in the wrecked aircraft as Leo Baker it is assumed that Thomas Ray was the one killed in the fight with his pursuers The scene of this action was roughly 28 miles NNW 22 30 'N 81D 09 'W of the beach at Playa Giron well behind Castro's lines It is believed that a Cuban photo of an aircraft showing tail No 935 must be Ray's plane The only other B-26 known to have landed on Cuban soil carried the No 915 this plane crashed at the Playa Giron airstrip on 17 Apr l 1961 Att Photo - 2 - 452 - - - 4_ ' ' - -' _- _ - ' _ _ ' 6 - _' - - ' - - The Revohttionary Air Force and the anti-airCTcjt arti eryshot dOttm se-veral B-26 mercenary planes The l me kc n-made o oomo' T planes were fully eqllipped with wec p01 3 as 3hcr 1m below i _ - - - - - - _ _ _ - On 20 March 1978 a senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency visited Alabama to bestow on behalf of a grateful Government the Distinguished Intelligence Cross on the widow and family of Mr Thomas Willard Ray killed during combat operations at the Bay of Pigs Mr Ray an experienced pilot working with the Cuban brigade volunteered to fly in aerial support of the brigade and was killed when his plane was shot down on 19 April 1961 Ray was one of four American pilots killed at that time honored posthumously by the Government Also Riley W Shamburger Jr Wade C Gray - 454 - Mr Source References Part I Initiation of Air Activity A 1 Organization and Management Office memo from E A Stanulis 29 Mar 60 sub Estimates of Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62 Memo for Chiefs of Support Clandestine Services Divisions and Staffs from S M Hines 1 Mar 60 sub Estimates of Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62 Memo for E Stanulis from Adolf J Lium 16 Mar 60 sub Estimates for Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62 2 Memo for C T Barnes from F M Hand 28 Jun 60 sub Gen Cabell's NSC Briefing 22 Jun 60 TS WH 4 PM PM Daily Log 5-7 Jul 60 MR from John F Mallard 25 Jul 60 sub with DPD Air Support forJ RC Meeting 3 Memo for Chiefs Air Proprietary Administrative Materiel and Operations Branch from Stanley W Beerli 18 Jul 60 sub Assignment of DPD Responsibilities for Development of Tactical Air Capability for JMARC JMC-2-60 4 Ibid 5 Memo for All Sections from George Gaines Jr 18 Jul 60 sub Assignment of Cryptonym to DPD JMARC Project JMC-1-60 Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET Copies of or notes from all sources cited are filed under HS CSG 2632 - 455 - Memo for Acting Chief DPD from Charles F Quinette 18 Jul 60 sub Personnel for JMARC DPD 5606-60 6 MR from John F Mallard 25 Jul 60 Ope cit WH 4 PM PM Daily Log 7 Jul 60 7 MR from John F Mallard 25 Jul 60 Ope cit 8 MR from Col F Mallard William E Eisemann and Lt Col George Gaines Jr 10 Aug 60 sub Weekly JMARC-JMCLEAR Coordination Meeting JMC-0029 9 Ibid 10 Memo for Chief WH 4 from J Hawkins S Oct 60 sub Study on Organization and Command Relationships of Task Force JMARC for Air Operations S Eyes 11 Memo for Chief WH 4 from Richard M Bissell Jr 12 Oct 60 sub Organization and Command Relationships JMARC and DPD C 12 MR from John F Mallard 6 Sep 60 sub with Mr Tracy Barnes 13 Oral History Interview Richard M Bissell Jr by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 Tape 1 pp 8-10 14 Oral History Interview $tanley W Beerli by Jack B Pfeiffer 2 Feb 76 Tape lA pp 2-7 15 Ibid Tape lA pp 3-4 16 Ibid p 5 17 Ibid pp 6-7 18 Ibid Tape lA pp 3-6 Tape 3B pp 57-58 Meeting Tnis and all other Oral History Interviews all conversations and all correspondence conducted by Jack B o Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED - 456 - 19 Oral History Interview Jacob D Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Tape 6 p 79 20 Ibid Tape 7 p 92 21 Oral History Interview Richard D Drain by Jack B Pfeiffer 8 Jan 76 Tape lA pp 11-12 22 Ibid Tape IB p 23 23 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 2A p 40 24 Oral History Interview George Gaines Jr by Jack B Pfeiffer 9 Feb 76 Tape lA p 1 25 Ibid p 2 26 Ibid Tape 2B pp 3-4 27 Oral History Interview Billy B Campbell by Jack B Pfeiffer 15 Jun 76 Tape lA pp 6-7 28 Ib id p 9 29 Memo for Acting Chief DPD from Richard M Bissell Jr 12 Aug 60 sub Tactical Air Requirements Project JMARC 30 Memo for Mr Bissell from C Tracy Barnes 6 Oct 60 sub JMARC and DPD Relationships 31 Memo for DDP from Rudolph E Gomez 20 Sep 60 sub Air Support of JMARC S Eyes 32 Memo for Chief WHD from Startley W Beerli 23 Nov 60 sub JMCLEAR Budget Estimates JMC-0204 33 Oral History Interview William E Eisemann by Jack B Pfeiffer 14 Nov 75 Tape 3 p 32 I 38 B Acquisition of Combat Aircraft Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 16 Jul 60 sub J ffiRC Progress Report for 13-15 July S Eyes - 457 - Daily Log - WH 4 PM 13 Jul 60 39 Special Group Meeting Cuba 21 Jul 60 MR from Edward H Hinkle 15 Jun 60 sub with Defense Representative 40 40a S Eyes Meeting Conversation between Sidney Stembridge and Jack B Pfeiffer 12 May 76 sub BOP Cable to Director from Guatemala 30 Jul 60 GUAT 965 IN 31262 41 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 28 Jul 60 sub B-26 Aircraft from JMARC DDP 0-3942 41a MR from Stanley W Beerli or George Gaines Jr n d sub Meeting with Col Egan Col J F Mallard USMC Cmdr Norman Imler and Sidney Stembridge Job 73-767 Box 1 JMG MR's 42 Cable to MASH from Director 28 Jul 60 DIR 42259 OUT 51849 43 Memo for Asst to the SecDef Spl Ops from James A Cunningham Jr 29 Jul 60 sub Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH JMC0013-60 44 Memo for ADDP A from Jacob D Esterline 1 Aug 60 sub B-26 Aircraft for JMARC 45 Daily Log - WH 4 PM 28-29 Jul 60 47 Memo for Director of Materiel Management USAF from Lt Col George Gaines 11 Aug 60 sub B-26 Aircraft Configuration JMC-0043-60 48 Memo for DDP CIA from Leroy F Prouty 9 Aug 60 sub Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH _ JMC-OO 41 - 458 - 49 Memo for DDP CIA from Jerry D Page 26 Aug 60 sub Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH DPD 6643-60 50 Memo for Asst to SecDef Spl Ops from Stanley W Beerli 19 Sep 60 sub Aircraft Support for Project CROSSPATCH JMC-0098-60 50a Daily Progress Reports WH 4 Support 23-26 Sep 60 Cable to Director from MADD 1 Oct 60 MADD 0121 IN 21225 51 Memo for DDP from Jerry D Page 31 Aug 60 sub Project CROSSPATCH DPD 6776-60 Ibid 12 Oct 60 DPD 7758-60 Memo for Asst to SecDef from DDP 19 Aug 60 sub DOD Support of Project CROSSPATCH-26 JMC-0038 52 Memo for DDP CIA from Leroy F Prouty 16 Jan 61 sub Aircraft Support of Project CROSSPATCH 53 Memo for Asst to SecDef OSO from Jacob D Esterline 19 Jan 61 sub Requirement for Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH 54 Memo for Director of Logistics from C F Welch 30 Mar 61 sub Maintenance Supply Support Project CROSSPATCH DPD-2116-61 54a Memo for Chief JMCLEAR from Charles F Quinette 9 Feb 61 sub I IB-26's for JMCLEAR DPD 0640-61 MR from B E Reichardt 31 Mar 61 sub Briefing 31 Mar 61 DPD 55 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA p 12 56 Ibid Tape 2B p 40 57 Oral History Interview Garfield M Thorsrud by Jack B Pfeiffer 6 Feb 76 Tape IB p 24 - 459 - 58 Ibid 59 Ibid Tape 2A p 26-27 60 Beerli-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape IB p 21 61 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 2B p 40 62 Letter from C W Seigrist to Jack B Pfeiffer 20 May 76 63 Cable to MADD from Director 25 Nov 60 DIR 13327 OUT 96176 63a Cable to Director from MADD 26 Nov 60 MADD 0643 IN 47941 64 Cable to MADD from Director 30 Nov 60 DIR 14000 OUT 97713 65 Ibid' 3 30 Nov 60 DIR 14105 OUT 97992 Ltr from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 66 MR from William E Eisemann and George Gaines Jr 7 Sep 60 sub Weekly JMARC JMCLEAR Coordination Meeting JMC-0077 Memo for DDP et all froml 7 Oct 60 sub Activities Program LCost of HBILKA Aircraft JMC-0134-60 DDP 0-5259 67 Ltr from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 op cit 67a MR from William R Koehler and I 4 Nov 60 sub I I Mo n t h I y- ----cPrTa y m e n t 's'--- JMC-0185 67b Memo for Chief WRD from Stanley W Beerli 12 Oct 60 sub DPD Support of JMARC JMC-0147 67c Memo for Directorate of Plans Deputy Directorate nf War Plans Rq USAF form Stanley W Beerli 2 Nov 60 sub Loss of C-54G S N 45-592 DPD8042-60 - 460 - 67d Memo for Chief WH 4 0ps from John F Mallard 27 Oct 60 sub DPD Memo JMC 0147 12 Oct 60 67e Memo for Asst to the SecDef Spl Ops from Stanley W Beerli 26 Oct 60 sub Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH JMC-0170 67GBP Memo for Richard Bissell from Brig Gen Lansdale 28 Oct 60 sub Aircraft 68 I MR from William Koehler and 4 Nov 60 sub J 'MCTCo n -tr-h --rI y p'- a- -ym -Cec-nc-- t'--s -- JMC-0185 o ' ' 1 Ii Memo for DDP from Stanley W Beerli 4 Oct 60 sub Attached Document JMC-0132-60 JMC-0049 ' I Memo for DPD Maintenance Section from William H Koehler 7 Nov 60 sub Cover of Helios for Support of JMCLEAR JMC-0189 69 Memo for Chief WH 4 Air DPD from J D Esterline 6 Dec 60 sub Estimated Requirements for Transport Aircraft Support of JMARC Paramilitary Activities JMC-0227 Memo for Chief WH 4 PM from 28 Nov 60 sub Air Tr anspor t a t - 1 -- o - n S '- u p p -o r-'-t-- o f'------the Strike Force in Lodgment I 70 Memos for Record from James A Cunningham Jr sub Acquisition and Equipping Constellation Model as follows To DDP 17 Jan 61 OXC-124l MR 23 Jan 61 OXC-1250 To Chief Contract Branch DPD 6 Feb 61 OXC 1291 71 Memo for DDP from J D Esterline 14 Sep 60 sub Dissent tol 1- SALA Contractual Agreement DDP 0-4761 AA 7 I MR from f 15 Sep 60 sub Explanation of SALA Ma1 ntenance Costs JMC-0092-60 I M -Pov- O JP fY6- 5-1illlth ey OI ' l ia t 11 r1 Fvnd h cf - 461 - I I lv t3' vl L ocTGo Sf bi I Jfl rc J l o 72 Summary Sheet on Air Operations Companies and Facilities Undated Origin unknown S Eyes 1 C Relations with OSO DOD and the Air National Guard 73 MR from John F Mallard 15 Sep 60 sub Conference with DPD Regarding Status of USAF Personnel 74 Memo for Ch WH 4 from E A Stanulis 12 Sep 60 sub Policy Approval for the Use of DOD Personnel in Project JMARC 75 Memo for DDcr from J C King 19 Oct 60 sub Opalocka Air Base S Eyes 76 MR from John F Mallard 15 Sep 60 sub Meeting with OSO Reps 77 Memo for Mr Earman from Stanley J Grogan 8 Nov 60 sub Telegram from Andrew Berding to George Beebe U Weekly Memo for the Director from Stanley J Grogan 8 Nov 60 sub Knight Newspapers Questions on Opalocka Naval Base Memo for C JMCLEAR from J D Esterline 2 Nov 60 sub Cover Story for Use of Opalocka Marine Corps Air Station 78 Memo for Acting Chief DPD from J D Esterline 12 Oct 60 sub Vessels Required for Search and Rescue Purposes Memo for Chief JMARC from Stanley W Beerli 15 Sep 60 sub Vessels for Search and Rescue JMC-0081 79 MR from John F Mallard 30 Nov 60 sub Conference with Capt Burns W Spore USN Rep of OSO DOD 80 Ibid - 462 - 81 Memo for Asst to the SecDef Spl Ops from Deputy Director Plans 29 Nov 60 sub DOD Support of Project CROSSPATCH DPD-8539-60 82 Memo for Ch WH 4 from George Gaines Jr 21 Dec 60 sub JMCLEAR Personnel Requirements from DOD JI' 1C -C Memo for Ch WH 4 from Stanley W Beerli 25 Apr 61 sub DOD Support for JMGLOW Activities JMG-0367 83 Memo for Ch WH 4 from Stanley W Beerli 25 Apr 61 Ope cit 84 Memo for DDP EMB from Jacob D Esterline 6 Dec 60 sub Four JMARC Problems for 8 Dec Meeting of Special Group S Eyes MR from Thomas A Parrott 8 Dec 60 sub Minutes of Special Group Meeting 8 Dec 60 S Eyes Memo for Ch WH 4 Support from Richard D Drain 12 Dec 60 sub ZI Bases for Supply Missions MR from I with Amnassador Wlllauer I 23 Dec 60 sub Meeting 85 MR from James A Cunningham Jr 30 Dec 60 sub USAF Personnel Withdrawal Plan Project CROSSPATCH JMC-0241 86 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA p 4 Stembridge-Pfeiffer conversation 12 May 76 Ope cit 87 MR from Sidney Stembridge Jr 17 Aug 60 sub Recruitment of Air National Guard Personnel JMC-0037 88 Job 73-767 Box 8 Folder ANG Participation BOP Two summary sheets State Representation and Overflight Crews 89 ampbell-Pfeiffer OH 90 Cable to MAnD from Director 2 Dec 60 DrR 14519 OUT 98842 nt - 463 - Ope cit Tape IB pp 12-13 91 Memo for Chief JMCLEAR from Sidney Stembridge Jr 9 Jan 61 sub ANG Personnel to Replace USAF Personnel JMC-0250 92 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 1 Mar 61 sub Utilization of US Military Personnel by Project CROSSPATCH S Eyes Memo for Act Ch DPD from James A Cunningham Jr 1 Mar 61 sub Status of Military Manning at Eglin AFB JMC-0300 93 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Tape lA p 1 I D Initial Planning for Air Operations 94 MR from Casimiro Barquin 8 Apr 60 sub Meeting Held on 6 April at PIC to Discuss Photographic Coverage of Cuba DPD 2875 S Eyes 95 Memo for Acting Chief DPD from George Gaines Jr 2 Aug 60 sub Photo Coverage of Target Country JMC-0017 S Eyes 96 Minutes of Special Group Meeting Cuba 20 Oct 60 S Eyes MR from Thomas A Parrott 12 Oct 60 Discussion between Mr Merchant and Gen Cabell 97 MR from John F Mallard 28 Sep 60 sub U-2 Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba S Sen 98 Minutes Special Group Meeting Cuba ' 27 Oct 60 S Eyes 98a 99 100 Memo for A DDP A from Richard M Bissell Jr 24 Oct 60 sub Overflight Procedures MR from Donald E Songer 3 Apr 61 sub of Take-Cuba IDEA 0242 Handling Memo for DPD from J D Esterline 13 Aug 60 sub Air Support Requirements Project JMARC S Eyes - 464 - 101 Ibid 102 Ibid 103 Ibid 104 MR from William E Eisemann and George Gaines Jr 7 Sep 60 sub Weekly JMARC JMCLEAR Coordination Meeting JMC-0077 Merna for Deputy Chief WH 4 from J Hawkins 13 Oct 60 sub Data on Air Strips and Seaplane Stations etc 105 Merna for Director Office of Logistics from Rudolph E Gomez 14 Sep 60 sub Logistical Support of JMARC Paramilitary Operations S Eyes 106 Ibid Att 1 107 Memo for Major General James H Walsh from Allen W Dulles 23 Aug 60 sub Status of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force ER 6656 A 108 USIB Ad Hoc Committee 9 Feb 61 sub Buildup in Cuba OCI 0592 61-C 109 Merna for Major General James H Walsh from Allen W Dulles 23 Aug 60 op cit 110 Not used Ill Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape IB p 15 112 Beer1i-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 2A p 28 113 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape IB p 17 114 Merna for Maj Gen James H Walsh from Allen W Dulles 23 Aug 60 op cit 115 Armament of the Lockheed T-33 Jet Trainers in the Cuban Air Force COG Files Taylor Committee Vol II Item W 1 16 May 61 - lJ65 - Military USAF Staff Message Division Incoming Message AFIN 33631 31 Dec 60 R WGS C 116 Taylor Committee MR's of PM study Group Meetings 3rq meeting 25 April 61 p 9 U 117 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 2B p 50 Tape 3A p 53 118 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 2A p 9 119 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 6 May 61 sub Conversation between General Taylor and Mr Thorsrud p 3 U 120 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 7 p 93 121 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 16 Dec 60 sub Thoughts on JMATE Memo for DDP EMB from Jacob D Esterline 6 Dec 60 sub Four JMARC Problems for 8 Dec Mtg of Spl Group 122 Memo for A DDP A from Jacob D Esterline 28 Dec 60 sub Your Memorandum Dated 16 Dec 60 123 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 28 Dec 60 sub Main Issues re JMARC 124 MR from Jacob D Esterline 8 Feb 61 sub Injunctions from General Cabell Stemming from JCS Meeting on 7 Feb 61 - 466 - T Source References Part II Acquisition and Training of Air Crews A 1 Basic Plan for Flight Training Memo for DDP from Stanley W Beerli 15 Sep 60 sub Transmittal of Air Support Annex to Paramilitary Operations Plan No 1 JMC-0083 Annex I Air Support Annex to Paramilitary Operations Plan No 1 Operations Plan 60 AD-5 p 2 2 Ibid Appendix J Concept of Operations to Operations Plan 60 AD-5 p 1 3 Ibid Ops Plan 60 AD-5 pp 7-9 Appendix C Supporting Forces to Ops Plan 60 AD-5 pp 2-5 Appendix H Logistics Support to Ops Plan 60 AD-5 Appendix K Administration 4 Ibid Appendix L Tab 1 B-26 Movement and Utili- zation Tab 2 B-26 Training Syllabus 5 Ibid Appendix L Tab 2 p 3 6 Ibid p 4 II 7 B Trainers and Trainees Persons Albert C Bay of Pigs Birmingham 1968 U 8 DPD Contract Records Job 73-767 Box 2 5x8 cards 9 Ibid 10 Memo for DDS from James A Cunningham Jr 22 Oct 59 sub Temporary Quarters Allowance - OSTIARY Contract Employees DDS Chrono files Nov 59 Job 65-97 Box 1 All subsequent references to commercial publications books magazines and newspapers are UNCLASSIFIED Ferrer Eduardo Opex'aaionPuma Miami International Aviation Consultants Inc 1975 p 49 Campbell-Pfeiffer OHInt Ope ait Tape 2A p 34 11 MR from F W Barkley 12 Aug 60 sub pilots T ained at Perisacola Cuban MR from FrancisW Barkley 11 Aug 60 sub Remarks of Adm Arleigh 'Burke at JCS Briefing S Eyes ' Bureau of Budget Route Slip to Gordon Gray from R M Macy 7 Mar 60 sub Transmittal of Memo on Cuban MAP C Dwight n Eisenhower Library Clean up Files Box 6 Cuba DAH 11 74 ' - - l 1 ttI l 12 Ferrer Ope ait pp 33-38 13 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope ait TapelA pp 1-3 14 Ferrer Ope ait pp 44-46 15 Ibid p 46 l5a II Conversation between Garfield M Thorsrud and Jack B Pfeiffer 28 Oct 77 sub Review of Vol I BOP History Air Operations C Air Training Base Retalhtileu Guatemala Cable to JMADD Guatemala from DireCtor 12 Jan 61 CLEAR 6623 OUT 80202 ' C 17 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope ait TapelB p 13 - 468 - WH 4 PM PM Daily Log 12 Aug 60 18 Persons Ope cit pp 19-25 Cable to Eglin Air Force Base from Director 10 Feb 61 CLEAR 7683 OUT 82974-C Cable to Eglin from Director 13 Feb 61 CLEAR 7756 OUT 83176-C No author 18a Undated Info on Eglin APB S Eyes Same as Source 15a above 19 Ferrer Ope cit pp 51-64 20 Ibid p 61-62 21 Ibid p 63 22 Ibid p 72 23 Ibid 24 Ib id p 73 25 Ibid pp 73-74 26 Ibid pp 74-75 26a Ibid pp 75-76 27 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA p 4 28 Ferrer Ope cit pp 85-92 29 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Tape IB pp 13-14 30 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int Tape 2 p 29 31 ab1e to Director from MASH 21 Sep 60 MASH 0772 IN 16238 - 469 - Cable to Director from JMADD 22 Sep 60 11ADD 0089 IN 16675 Cable to Director from Guatemala 24 Sep 60 GUAT 315 IN 17871 32 Memo for Chief CI Staff from Stanley W Beerli 22 Sep 60 sub Disposal of Cuban Air Crew Members JMC-Ol05 Memo for Chief CI Staff from J D Esterline 16 Nov 60 sub Disposal of Cuban Air Crew Members 33 Memo for Chief Security Section DPD from James A Cunningham Jr 6 Dec 60 sub Termination and Disposal of Unsatisfactory JMCLEAR Air Crew Members JMC 0219 Memo for Assistant Chief DPD from William J Cotter 16 Dec 60 sub Termination and Disposal of Unsatisfactory JMCLEAR Air Crew Members JMC0229 34 Ferrer Ope cit p 105 35 Cable to MADD from Director 11 Dec 60 DIR 16050 OUT 52021 36 Cable to Director from MADD 13 Dec 60 MADD 0811 IN 16457 37 Ibid 26 Nov 60 MADD 0644 IN 47942 29 Nov 60 MADD 0662 IN 48901 38 Ibid 14 Dec 60 MADD 0818 IN 16985 39 Ferrer Ope cit pp 105-107 39a Cable to MADD from BELL 11 Jan 61 BELL 0419 OUT 6326 - 470 - 40 Cable to BELL from JMADD 20 Mar 61 MADD 2125 IN 4133 Cable to BELL from JMWAVE 25 Mar 61 MADD WAVE 2210 IN 4964 Cable to BELL from JMADD 20 Mar 61 MADD 2123 IN 4135 Cable to BELL from JMADD 31 Mar 61 MADD 2373 IN 0974 Cable to BELL from JMv-lAVE 13 Apr 61 WAVE 5579 IN 3122 41 Ltr from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 42 Cable to BELL from IN 3122 43 Ltr from Seigrist to Pfeiffer Ope cit 44 J 1vJAVE 13 Apr 61 WAVE 5579 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape lA p 8 ADD 45 Cable to Director from 1ADD 27 Dec 60 IN 22711 0926 46 Memo for Acting Chief DPD from George Gaines Jr 31 Oct 60 sub Debriefing of Several Personnel Returned from TDY to JMADD - 27 Oct 60 47 Ibid 48 Cable to BELL from Guatemala City 12 Feb 61 GUAT 960 IN 4728 49 Cable to JMADD from Director 2 Mar 61 CLEAR 8370 OUT 84924-C 50 Cable to BELL from JMADD 8 Mar 61 MADD 1907 _ IN 2596 51 Cable to Eglin AFB from Director 17 Nov 60 DIR 11993 OUT 93298 - 471 - 52 I Memo for Gar M Teegen GarfieldM Thorsrud from I Stanley W Beerli 24 Mar 61 sub Letter of Instruction 53 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape lA p 8 54 Cable to BELL from MADD 15 Jan 61 MADD 1110 IN 1877 55 Ibid 56 Cable to Eglin AFB JMADD from Director 7 Nov 60 DIR 10279 OUT 89703 57 Cable to BELL from TRAV 12 Feb 61 TRAV 0333 IN 4711 58 Memo for DDP EMB from Jacob D Esterline 1 Sep 60 sub Air and Maritime Support of Clandestine Paramilitary Operations S Eyes Minutes of Special Group Meetings - Cuba 1 Sep 60 from T A Parrott S Eyes Memo for DCI from J C King 6 Sep 60 sub Clandestine Air Support of Paramilitary Operations DDP-04628 S Eyes Memo for Chief 20 Sep 60 sub JMC-0097 RC from George Gaines Jr Cover Story for C-46 Overflights MR from Francis W Barkley 22 Sep 60 sub ing on Proposed Air Operations S Eyes Brief- 59 Memo for A DDP A et al from Richard M Bissell Jr 24 Oct 60 sub Project J RC Overflights S Eyes 60 Memo for C WR 4 Prop et al from Richard D Drain 12 Dec 60 sub Overflights 61 -Memo for DCI from J C King 9 Nov 60 sub Propaganda Air Drops over Cuba - 472 - 62 Cables to MADD from Director 22 Nov 60 DIR 12731 OUT 94995 17 Nov 60 DIR 12093 OUT 93511 63 Cables to Director from Guatemala City 23 Nov 60 GUAT 593 IN 47010 to MADD from Director 25 Nov 60 DIR 13296 OUT 96103 to MADD from Director 3 Dec 60 DIR 14760 OUT 99253 to Director from MADD 11 Dec 60 1ADD 0777 IN 15374 64 Cables to Director from MADD 5 Dec 60 MADD 0727 IN 12156 to Havana from Director 6 Dec 60 DIR 15063 OUT 99989 65 Cable to Director from MADD 11 Dec 60 IN 15373 66 Cables to Director from MADD 12 Dec 60 MADD 0796 IN 15274 to MADD from Director 17 Dec 60 DIR 17084 OUT 54275 67 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape lA p 5 68 Memo for Chief WH 4 from J Hawkins 4 Jan 61 sub Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operation Against Government of Cuba 69 Richard D Drain Personal Notes 5 Jan 61 70 Verde Olivo Havana 1ADD 17 Apr 77 p 31 0771 U 70a Cables to MADD from Director 15 Feb 61 CLEAR 7829 OUT 83372 to BELL from MADD 18 Feb 61 MADD 1578 IN 0476 71 Cable to BELL from MADD 18 Feb 61 IN 0476 72 Cable to MADD from Director 15 Feb 61 CLEAR 7829 OUT 83372 1ADD 1578 72a Background paper on Propaganda for Taylor Committee No date no author Presume prepared May-June 1960 -by WH 4 Propaganda - 473 - 73 Merna for Assistant Deputy Director Plans from Stanley W Beerli 17 Mar 61 sub Analysis of JMCLEAR Missions through 7 Mar 61 JMC-0320 Cable to MADD from Director 11 Mar 61 CLEAR 8674 OUT 85806-C 74 Cables To BELL from MADD 4 Mar 61 MADD 1842 IN 2155 tal Ifrom Director 61 DIR 28242 OUT 80QSS to Director 8 Mar 61 DIR 28614 OUT a from Director 24 Mar 61 DIR OUT Ferrer op cit p 135 75 MR from I of Tr i p 'C o K e y urrw' 'eC 's' 'C NT7A S - 21 Mar 61 sub Report 75a Cables to I Ifrom Director 22 Nov 60 DIR 12860 OU1'-' 9 'S---C2r' 2 U 24 Nov 60 DIR 13262 OUT 95872 25 Nov 60 DIR 13424 OUT 96355 26 Nov 60 DIR 13547 OUT 96604 and 24 Feb 61 DIR 26698 OUT 76764 rT Merna from I - - - - 4 Nov 60 I - - - - - - - - - Merna for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 6 Jan 61 sub Jr4ATE Progress Rept for 3-6 Jan 61 Cable for Director froml IN 47929 I 20 Feb 61 ______I 75b Richard D Drain Personal Notes 24 Mar 61 76 Cable to BELL from MADD 28 Mar 61 MADD 2276 IN 0351 77 Cable to Eglin JMADD JMTIDE GUATEMALA from CLEAR 29 Mar 61 CLEAR 9251 OUT 87539-C 77a Cable to BELL from JMADD 29 Mar 61 MADD 2320 - IN 0621 78 Cables to BELL from MADD 21 Mar 61 MP DD 2138 IN 4244 22 Mar 61 MADD 2161 IN 4465 - 474 - 79 Cable to BELL from MADD 22 Mar 61 MADD 2161 IN 4465 80 Cables to BELL from MADD 29 Mar 61 MADD 2335 IN 0663 30 Mar 61 MADD 2343 IN 0736 30 Mar 61 MADD 2362 IN 0913 Cable to BELL from Guatemala City 8 Apr 61 GUAT 1233 IN 2348 II D JMTIDE Strike Base Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua 81 MR from James A Cunningham Jr 1 Dec 60 sub Conversation with DDS on 1 Dec 60 regarding acquisition of COB for JMTIDE 82 Cables to Guatemala City from Director 10 Dec 60 DIR 15939 OUT 51680 10 Dec 60 DIR 15940 Out Burwell James Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba March 1960-0ctober 1961 DDS Historical Series OL-7 Apr 71 I l MR from 30 Jun 69 sub Prog re s sc--TR 'e p o 'r t -----'J- l 'lrrr'I 'I--'-DTl E JMC- 0 274 MR from W E Eisemann 1 Mar 61 sub JMTIDE 83 Memo for Gar M Teegen from 24 Mar 61 Ope cit 84 Memo for Acting Chief DPD from Lt Col Charles F Quinette 18 Ju1 60 sub Personnel for JMARC DPD-6506-60 85 Cable to DD from Director 23 Mar 61 CLEAR 9076 OUT 87056 86 Ibid 87 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2B p 37 - 475 - I - - - - - - - - - - 88 MR from George Gaines Jr 3 Feb 61 sub Approval for Use of Brig Gen Doster as Tactical Element Chief JMTIDE JMC-0249 89 Cable to BELL from MADD 26 Mar 61 ffiDD 2240 IN 0131 90 Cable to BELL from TIDE 31 Mar 61 TIDE 135 IN 1062 Personal Notes R D Drain 6 Mar 61 91 Cable to BELL from MADD 13 l1ar 61 1ADD 1990 IN 3218 92 Cable to BELL from TIDE 31 Mar 61 TIDE 136 IN 1064 93 Cables from Director to MADD 22 '1ar61 CLEAR 9027 OUT 8692 to JMADD Eg1in 28 Mar 61 CLEAR 9194 OUT 87450 to J DD JMTIDE 30 Mar 61 GLOW 9318 OUT 87785G to Managua 31 Mar 61 GLOW 9375 OUT 87930-G to Havana 24 Oct 60 DIR 07754 OUT 84606 to Havana 9 Nov 60 DIR 10607 OUT 90529 From TIDE to Eglin AFB 14 Apr 61 TIDE 521 IN 3269 to BELL 14 Apr 61 TIDE 546 IN 3322 o From ADD to BELL 13 Apr 61 MAnD 2576 IN 3178 From Havana to Director 19 Nov 60 HAVA 6948 IN 44801 94 Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int -op oit Tape 2B pp 35-36 95 Cables from Director to JMTIDE J ADD 29 Mar 61 CLEAR 9241 OUT 87529-C to Eglin AFB 29 Mar 61 CLEAR 9242 OUT 87530-C to JMADD JMTIDE Eg1in AFB 30 Mar 61 GLOW 9365 OUT 87880-G Cables to BELL from TIDE 1 Apr 61 TIDE 141 IN 1101 1 Apr 61 TIDE 143 IN 1123 to BELL from MADD 31 Mar 61 MADD 2383 IN 1003 ab1e 96 Ferrer Ope cit 97 Cables to BELL from Managua 2 Apr 61 MANA 3524 IN 1289 from TIDE 4 Apr 61 TIDE 212 IN 1541 98 Cable to BELL from TIDE 6 Apr 61 TIDE 288 IN 1975 99 Ferrer Ope cit 142-144 p 134 100 Ibid p 144 101 Cables to Eglin AFB from Director 7 Apr 61 GLOW 9618 OUT 88755-G to BELL from TRAV 8 Apr 61 TRAV 0657 IN 2377 to BELL from MADD 12 Apr 61 MADD 2565 IN 3035 to MADD from Director 16 Apr 61 GLOW 9891 OUT 89582-G 102 Bissell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 1 p 12 103 Cables to BELL from TIDE 5 Apr 61 TIDE 244 IN 1703 from r DD 26 Mar 61 MADD 2241 IN 0132 and 10 Apr 61 MADD 2528 IN 2712 from WAVE 5 Apr 61 WAVE 5264 IN 1845 and 7 Apr 61 WAVE 5378 IN 2279 104 Cables to BELL from TIDE 5 Apr 61 TIDE 247 IN 1735 6 Apr 61 TIDE 288 IN 1975 10 Apr 61 TIDE 403 IN 2664 Cable to GLOW from MADD 15 Apr 61 MADD 2598 IN 3624 105 Cable to BELL from TIDE 10 Apr 61 TIDE 403 IN 2664 106 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 26 107 Ibid p 27 108 _Cables to BELL from Eglin AFB 15 Apr 61 EGLI 3559 IN 3594 13 Apr 61 EGLI 3549 IN 3248 from TIDE 14 Apr 61 TIDE 555 IN 3390 13 Apr 61 TIDE 500 IN 3139 - 477 - Cable to Eglin JMTIDE from GLOW 10 Apr 61 GLOW 9667 OUT 88923-G 109 Cable to TIDE EGLI MADD from GLOW 8 Apr 61 GLOW 9635 OUT 88813-G 110 Cables to BELL from TIDE 12 Apr 61 TIDE 470 IN 3024 TSi 14 Apr 61 TIDE 556 IN 3399 111 Cable to TIDE Eglin from GLOW 10 Apr 61 GLOW 9663 OUT 88918-G Cable to BELL from TIDE 12 Apr 61 TIDE 457 IN 2975 - 478 - Source References ' ' Part III Initiation of Combat Air Operations A 1 _ _- - D minus 2 Memo for Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs M from C Tracy Barnes 17 Jan 61 sub Joint Planning Co ittee - Cuba lVf 'i C ' I'ov Vb' A lJf l J pee - I ti-- C'7 I' I 't I l3 -ry A' u Y 7i f7 lf Ir J - DOD Staff Study 16 Jan 61 sub Evaluation of possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba TS Memo for SecDef from JCS 3 Feb 61 sub Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan JCSM-57-61 TS Briefing paper from Richard M Bissell Jr 11 Mar 61 sub Proposed Operation Against Cuba TS Memo from Richard M Bissell Jr 15 Mar 61 sub Revised Cuban Operation TS 176622 Memo for SecDef from JCS 15 Mar 61 sub Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts CIA Para-Military Plan Cuba JCSM-166-61 TS Briefing paper for Richard M Bissell Jr 12 Apr 61 sub Cuban Operation TS 2 MR from R D Drain 4 Jan 61 sub A DDP A S Eyes Meeting with Memo for A DDP A from Jacob D Esterline 28 Dec 60 sub Your Memorandum Dated 16 Dec 60 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 16 Dec 60 sub Considerations Concerning Project JMATE 3 MR from Col J Hawkins 5 May 61 sub Record of PM Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba pp 21-22 I r 4 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy 15 Mar 61 sub Meeting on Cuba 4 p m Mar IS 1961 TS 206273 JFK Ly Natl Sec Files Countries Box 35 Cuba Gen'l Vol I 5 61 - 479 - Questions for Richard M Bissell from Jack B Pfeiffer 23-24 Mar 77 5 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy 15 Mar 61 Ope cit Sa MR from David W Gray 9 May 61 sub Summary of White House Meetings Taylor Committee papers Part III Item 16 5b Ibid 5c MR from David W Gray 4 May 61 sub Briefings of JCS on BUMPY ROAD TS Taylor Committee papers Part III Item 13 p 4 5d R D Drain Personal Notes 5-7 April 1961 6 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape IB pp 19-21 7 Beerli-Pfeiffer 8 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape IB p 17 9 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp Tape lA pp 4-5 34 35 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA pp 9-12 10 11 I 12 OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp 36-38 Memo for Air Commander Attn TEEGEN Thorsrud from I Stanley W Beerli 5 Apr 61 sub Project JMGLOW JMG-0345 o Cable to BELL from TIDE 12 Apr 61 TIDE 450 IN 2969 TS Cable to TIDE from GLOW 11 Apr 61 GLOW 9727 OUT 89091-G Playa Giron 3 Derrota del Imperialismo Habana Ediciones R 1961 Hereinafter cited as Playa Giron I 450 453 13 Cables to BELL from TIDE 12 Apr 61 TIDE 469 IN 3031 13 Apr 61 TIDE 471 IN 3133 TS 14 Cable to JMWAVE from JMGLOW 12 Apr 61 GLOW 9754 OUT 89191-G TS 15 Cable to TIDE from GLOW 14 Apr 61 GLOW 9825 OUT 89439-G - 480 - 16 Cable to TIDE from Director 14 Apr 61 GLOW 9826 OUT 89440-G TS 17 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 1B p 20 18 Cable to BELL from TIDE 13 Apr 61 TIDE 508 IN 3165 TS Cable to TIDE from Director 16 Apr 61 GLOW 9898 OUT 89596-G TS Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA p 3 19 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape IB p 26 20 Cable to BELL from TIDE 13 Apr 61 TIDE 508 IN 3165 TS 21 Cable to BELL from TIDE 13 Apr 61 TIDE 519 IN 3197 TS 22 Ferrer Ope cit pp 149-153 23 Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 Ope cit 24 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 3A p 53 25 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings Third Meeting 25 Apr 61 p 9j Fourth Meeting 26 Apr 61 p 7 U 25a Taylor Committee Final Report Memo No 3 p 3 U 26 Cable to TIDE from Director 12 Apr 61 GLOW 9753 OUT 89190-G TS 27 Office Memorandum for INBINDER from JMATE Headquarters 11 Apr 61 sub Plans for D-2 Deception Operation S Eyes I MR froml 6 Apr 61 sub tion Op -rL arTc--'I-'oTTI'-l -------- Air Decep- 28 Office Memo to INBINDER 11 Apr 61 Ope cit 29 Ibid 30 Phillips David A The Night Watch New York Atheneum 1971 pp 105-106 31 Office Memo to INBINDER 11 Apr 61 Ope cit 32 Memo for Chief WH 4 Security froml 18 Apr 61 sub JMFURY Deception b p e r a t l o n ----- 33 Ferrer Ope cit pp 153-154 34 Cable to BELL from TIDE 14 Apr 61 TIDE 560 IN 3361 TS 35 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2B pp 43-44 35a Chronology of Bay of Pigs Operation submitted to Taylor Committee 23 Apr 61 TS 35b R D Drain Personal Notes 14 and 23 Apr 61 36 Beer1i-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 38 37 Ibid Tape 2A p 28 38 Memo for DCI from I I 29 Nov 73 sub Photographic tuay or tne Bay or Pigs Operation pp 1-2 IAS RSD-556 73 39 Ibid p 2 40 MR from Stane1y W Beerli 15 Apr 61 sub Combat Mission Report TS 41 Cab e 3834 JMGLOW to BELL from TIDE 16 Apr 61 TIDE 682 IN TS 42 Memo for DCI from Ope cit Table 1 43 PZaya Giron Ope cit I 453 '485 1 _History of an Aggression Havana ceremos 1964 p 243 - 482 - 1 29 Nov 73 Ediciones Ven- 44 Memo or DCI from --I-- -rc --- Ope c t pp 1-3 Table I III B I 2 9 Nov 7 3 Post' Strike Contretemps 45 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2B p 48 46 Cable to BELL fromMADD 15 Apr 61 MADD 2596 IN 3604 Conversation between Garfield M Thorsrud and Jack B Pfeiffer 28 Oct 77 47 Cable to BELL from TIDE 15 Apr 61 TIDE 616 IN 3618 48 Gaines-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape IB pp 9-11 15-16 49 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 34 50 Playa Giron Ope cit I 451-452 Memo for DCI from I I 29 Nov 73 Ope cit Table I 51 Lagas Jacques Memorias de un Capitan Rebelde p 98 52 Playa Giron Ope cit III 388-389 I 26-28 35-36 42 53 Ferrer Ope cit pp 161-162 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 33 54 55 56 Thomas Cuban Revolution Ope cit p 578 MR from James A Cunningham Jr 28 Apr 61 sub Conversation with Mr D B Schobinger and Mr Chester Emerick Regarding JMGLOW B-26 Aircraft JMG-0370 Ferrer Ope cit pp 161-162 Cable to BELL from WAVE 15 Apr 61 WAVE 5659 IN 3600 - 483 - T 57 Cable to BELL from WAVE 15 Apr 61 WAVE 5679 IN 3600 58 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 sub Transmittal of Documents Att C TS 59 Playa 60 MR from I Giron op cit I 45-77 I 16 Apr 61 sub Deceptio n O p e r a t 1 o n --rS 7 Eyes Playa Giron I op JMFURY cit 449-450 61 MR from I 16 Apr 61 op cit 62 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 2A p 35 63 Cable to BELL from TIDE 20 Apr 61 TIDE 654 IN 3752 TS 64 Cable to TIDE from Director 16 Apr 61 GLOW 9904 OUT 89616-G 65 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 710 IN 3903 TS 66 Ferrer op 67 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape 2B p 48 68 Taylor Committee MR's of PM study Group Meetings 18th Meeting 19 May 61 p 4 U 69 Ibid 17th Meeting 18 May 61 pp 9-11 70 Ibid 12th Meeting 8 May 61 p 33 71 Ibid lOth Meeting 4 May 61 p 3 cit p 155 U U S Eyes 71a Ibid p 9 71b -secretary of State Dean Rusk Briefing of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on World Situation ' 16 Jan 63 p 87 - 484 - 71c Mosley Leonard Dulles N Y Dial Press James Wade 1978 p 470 U Giron op cit I 76-77 72 Playa 7 2a 1 1 19 May 61 sub Reaction wi thin euoa tne Attempt to Overthrow Castro Regime C 73 Playa Giron History of An op cit I 368-373 454-455 Aggression op cit p 265 74 Conversation between Clarence F Welch and Jack B Pfeiffer 13 Jan 76 75 Ferrer op cit pp 144-147 III 76 C The Stevenson Story and the Second Strlke MR from Jacob D Esterline 8 Feb 61 sub tions from General Cabell MR from R D Drain 31 Jan 61 sub briefing of JCS Representatives 77 Injunc- JMATE PM Schlesinger Arthur M Jr A Thousand Days Boston Houghton Mifflin 1965 p 271 U 77a WH 4 Propaganda Notes for 15 Jul 61 pacS 77b Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 11 Apr 61 sub JMATE Progress Report for 4-10 Apr 61 Par 2a 78 Halperin Maurice The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro Berkley 1972 p 98 79 Murphy Charles Cuba The Record Set Straight Fortune Sep 61 p 228 80 Bunt E Howard Give Us This Day New Rochelle N Y Arlington House 1973 p 147 - 485 - 81 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Lyman B Kirkpatrick Jr 28 Apr 76 82 Memo for Gordon Mason from C Tracy Barnes 12 May 64 sub The Invisible Government S Eyes 83 Ibid 84 Cable to BELL from TIDE 1 Apr 61 TIDE 162 IN 1247 84a Cable to BELL from TIDE 13 Apr 61 TIDE 508 IN 3165 85 Travel Voucher T O Number DD P 59-61 21 Apr 61 86 Drain-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp 32-34 87 Esterline-Pfeiffer OR Interview Ope cit Tape 4 pp 48-49 88 Drain-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp 35-37 89 US Delegation to the UN General Assembly Press Release No 3697 15 Apr 61 U 90 Department of State Incoming Telegrams from New York to SecState No 2881 15 Apr 61 7 p m C No 2877 15 Apr 61 U 91 Ibid No 2875 15 Apr 61 noon 92 Ibid No 2885 15 Apr 61 11 p m 93 Ibid No 2892 16 Apr 61 6 p m TS 94 Ibid No 2894 16 Apr 61 7 p m S 95 Schlesinger A Thousand Days op cit p 27l C OUO Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Arthur M Schlesinger Jr 20 Jul 76 95a Department of State Outgoing Telegram to USUN for Stevenson 17 Apr 61 No 7314 OUO - 486 - 96 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Richard F Pedersen 19 Jul 76 97 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Francis T P Plimpton 24 Jun 76 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Francis T P Plimpton 22 Jul 76 Doyle Edward P 1966 p 263 Ed As We Knew Adlai New York 98 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Charles W Yost 8 Jul 76 99 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Charles P Noyes 23 Jul 76 100 Memorandum for Adlai E stevenson from Harlan Cleveland 12 Apr 61 sub Transmittal of Proposed Speech on Cuba 101 Ibid 102 CIA Employee Bulletin EB No 598 18 May 77 sub Addresss by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland U 103 Letter to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from Walter Johnson 3 Jun 76 104 I tter 105 Schlesinger A Thousand 106 Ibid 107 Ibid 108 Ibid p 273 109 Ibid 110 to Pfeiffer from Schlesinger op cit Days -Alsop Stewart The Center 223-224 op cit p 272 New York 1968 pp I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Days Ope cit p 273 Ill Schlesinger3 A Thousand 112 Alsop The 113 Memo for the DCI from Walter Pforzheimer 8 Apr 68 sub Forthcoming Book The Center by Stewart Alsop Cen er Ope cit p 224 r i 114 Memo for DDP from J S Earman 9 May 61 sub Memos for General Taylor l14a Travel Vouchers for Allen W Dulles Mrs Dulles and Walter Elder S 11 14 18 Apr 61 T O #DCI-9-6l Routing and Record Sheet for Chief i to Jack Pfeiffer 11 Mar 77 sub J an R UleL CaIl s Flight Schedules 1960-61 U 115 Bissell Oral History for JFK Library pp 39-43 116 Taylor Committee MRs for PM Study Group Meetings 10th Meeting 4 May 61 p 9 S Eyes l16a Oral History Interview of Thomas C Mann by Larry J Hackman for the John F Kennedy Library 13 Mar 68 OH 73-19 pp 18-19 117 Taylor Committee MRs of PM Study Group Meetings 7th Meeting 1 May 61 McGeorge Bundy Memo 4 May 61 U 118 Memorandum from WH 4 to Taylor Committee 6 May 61 sub Detailed Statement of all the Circumstances Surrounding the Cancellation of the D-Day Airstrike 119 Cable to TIDE from Director 17 Apr 61 GLOW 9923 OUT 89669-G 120 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 710 IN 3903 TS 121 Ibid 1 Ill Sch1esinger 3 A Thousand Days3 Ope cit p 273 112 Alsop The Center 3 Ope cit p 224 113 Memo for 1 68 sub Stewart A 114 Memo for Memos for _ -- 114a Travel VOl and Wa1teJ #DCI-9-61 Routing al to Jack P Flight Scl 115 Bissell 0 116 Taylor Comm 10th Meeting 4 May 61 p 9 I S Eyes 116a Oral History Interview of Thomas C Mann by Larry J Hackman for the John F Kennedy Library 13 Mar 68 OH 13-19 pp 18-19 117 Taylor Committee MRs of PM Study Group Meetings 7th Meeting 1 May 61 McGeorge Bundy Memo 4 May 61 U 118 Memorandum from WH 4 to Taylor Committee 6 May 61 sub Detailed Statement of all the Circumstances Surrounding the Cancellation of the D-Day Airstrike 119 Cable to TIDE from Director 17 Apr 61 GLOW 9923 OUT 89669-G 120 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 710 IN 3903 TS 121 Ibid - 488 - 122 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape IB pp 22-23 123 Bissell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 3 p 39 124 Conversation between Mr Bissell and Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 125 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 7 pp 97-98 126 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 19th Meeting 22-23 May 61 p 11 S Eyes 127 MR 11 May 61 sub Telecon Between C JMATE and William D Pawley 24 Apr 61 128 Phillips Ope cit p 109 129 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 6 pp 77-78 130 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape IB p 22 131 Ibid p 23 132 Ibid Tape 2A p 24 133 Ibid Tape 2A p 25 134 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 40 135 Ibid Tape 3A p 50 136 Charles P Cabell Handwritten notes on cancellation of second strike after 9 May 61 presumably prior to 31 May 1961 137 U S News and World Report 28 Jan 63 p 62 138 Ibid 139 Memorandum for Sterline J Cottrell from Richard - Helms 25 Jan 63 sub Reaction in the Cuban Exile Community and Brigade to the Attorney General's No Air Support Statements TS Sensitive 139a Washington Post 12 Jan 63 u s News and WorZd Report 7 Jan 63 pp 38-41 139b Cables to BELL from JMRIMM 18 Apr 61 RIMM 4901 IN 4253 1333Z RIMM 4919 IN 4310 l726Z RIMM 4920 IN 4311 l730Z RIMM 4921 IN 4315 1750Z RIlo' 1M 4932 IN 4330 l901Z 19 Apr 61 RIMM 4970 IN 4117 0100Z Cables to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 832 IN 4291 1623Z from BAYY 19 Apr 61 BAYY Unnumbered IN 4414 0040Z 140 Reader's Digest Nov 64 pp 283fGBP 141 Washington Post 21 Jan 63 New York Times u S Western Edition 23 Jan 63 News and WorZd Report 4 Feb 63 p 32 14la Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings Conversation with Colonel Hawkins undated probably after 30 May 61 SjEyes 142 Washington Post 21 Jan 63 - 490 - Source References Part IV Where Cuba Was Lost A 1 Over the Beach - 17 April 1961 Cables to TIDE from Director 16 Apr 61 GLOW 9896 OUT 88589-G TSi 16 Apr 61 GLOW 9913 OUT 89639-G Attachment 1 to Appendix 2 to Annex B of Op Plan 200-1 la Cable for BELL from TIDE 16 Apr 61 TIDE 680 IN 381l TS lb Sorensen Theodore C Kennedy pp 299-300 New York 1965 Ie Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 sub Transmittal of Documents Att A TS 155685 Id Memo for Brig Gen C V Clifton from Paul M Kearney 18 Apr 61 sub Restrictions of Flights Over and in the Vicinity of Cuba U Ie Playa Giron Ope cit I 98 29 Nov 73 Memo for DCI from Ope cit pp 1-2 T a b I e I ---------- I If Thoma Hugh Cuban Revolution Harper Rowe 1977 p 585 2 Playa Giron Ope cit 3 Ibid pp 97-101 I 91-115 Ferrer Ope cit pp 191-192 206 Cable to BELL from JMRIMM 18 Apr 61 RIMM 4869 IN 4156 - 491 - 3a Cables to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 829 IN 4263 from BAYY 18 Apr 61 BAYY 023 IN 4379 4 Ferrer Ope cit pp 200-203 206 Playa 5 Giron op ci t I 102 Ferrer op_ cit pp 200-203 206 Playa Giron Ope cit I 102 105-106 Sa Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 770 IN 4076 TS Ferrer op cit pp 201-203 206 6 Ferrer Ope cit p 192 7 Cables to BELL from JMWAVE 19 Apr 61 WAVE 5754 IN 4422 TIDE 19 Apr 61 ' TIDE 880 IN 4457 19 Apr 61 TIDE 889 IN 4509 21 Apr 61 TIDE 942 IN 4804 for TIDE WAVE BELL from Director 21 Apr 61 GLOW 0108 OUT 90217 for Director from Managua 2 Nov 61 MANA 3814 IN 16335 for Eglin Air Force Base from Director 3 Nov 61 DIR 22241 OUT 66374 for Director from JMWAVE 4 Nov 61 WAVE 9005 IN 17639 Ferrer Ope cit pp 192 205-206 8 Playa Giron Ope cit I 17 91-115 485 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit Andrade Ramiro Cuba el vecino socialista Bogota 1961 pp 240-245 History of an Aggression Havana ceremos June 1965 pp 243 246 errer Ediciones Ven- Ope cit PP 192 205-206 Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 816 IN 4237 TS 9 10 Cable to BELL from JMWAVE 18 Apr 61 WAVE 5739 IN 4179 Memo or DCI from op ct- t I I 29 Nov 73 -------------- 11 Taylor Committee Report MR's of PM Study Group Meetings Sixth Meeting 28 Apr 61 Tab A After Action Report on Operation PLUTO 4 May 61 p 9 Grayston Lynch S Eyes 12 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit 13 Cable to TIDE from GLOW 17 Apr 61 BELL 4596 OUT 6702 TS 14 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 738 IN 3979 TS 14a Cables To BELL from TIDE 1 Apr 61 TIDE 147 IN 1141 to TIDE from Director 1 Apr 61 GLOW 9422 OUT 88075-G 14b Cable to BELL from JMRIMM 17 Apr 61 RIMM 4775 IN 3938 15 Cable to TIDE from Director 15 Apr 61 GLOW 9856 OUT 89492-G TS 16 Cable to TIDE from BELL 17 Apr 61 BELL 4624 OUT 6758 TS 17 Memo for DCI from I I 29 Nov 73 op ci t ----------- 18 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 759 IN 4023 'TS 19 Ibid 20 Cable to BELL from TIDE 17 Apr 61 TIDE 753 _ IN 4036 - 493 - Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit Attachment E TS 20a Ferrer Ope cit p 159 21 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit Att E TS 22 Playa 23 Ferrer Ope cit p 193 24 Playa 25 Cable to BELL from TIDE 07 17 Apr 61 TIDE 693 IN 3849 Giron Giron Ope cit I 100-101 Ope cit I 169-170 MR from William E Eisemann 28 Dec 60 sub JMTIDE Cable to BELL from MADD 2 Feb 61 MADD 1311 IN 3550 for BELL from MADD 1 Feb 61 MADD 1296 IN 3428 Cable to BELL from MADD 4 Feb 61 MADD 1343 IN 3827 26 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp 26-27 27 Cable to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 BELL 4726 OUT 7003 TS 28 Lynch-Pfeiffer OR Int Ope cit Tape 1 p 10 29 Ibid pp 10-11 30 Ibid Tape 2 pp 19-21 31 Ibid Tape 5 pp 52-55 32 _Lagas Ope cit p 104 - 494 - 33 Cable to TIDE from BELL 17 Apr 61 BELL 4668 OUT 6843 TS 34 Playa Giron op cit I 97 341 Lagas op cit pp 93-95 34a Oral History Interview James A Cunningham Jr by Jack B Pfeiffer 11 Oct 79 Tape IB pp 27-29 35 Cables to I Ifrom Director 17 Apr 61 DIR 35334 OUT 96733 i 19 Apr 61 DIR 35666 OUT 97327 19 Apr 61 DIR 35744 OUT 97559 36 Cable to GLOW from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 780 IN 4097 36a Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape lA pp 18-19 R D Drain Personal Notes 17 Apr 61 Telecon between Walter Elder and Jack B Pfeiffer 30 Nov 77 IV B Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 37 Lagas op cit pp 117-119 38 MR from James A Cunningham Jr 26 May 61 sub Post D-Day Supply Drops from JMTIDE JMG 0399 39 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Garfield M Thorsrud 24 May 61 sub Resupply Sorties D-Day through 0 2 JMG-0395 40 Ferrer op cit pp 209-211 41 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 op cit Att D TS 42 MR from James A Cunningham Jr 26 May 61 sub Post-D-Day Supply Drops from JMTIDE Cables to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 BELL 4730 OUT 7011 18 Apr 61 BELL 4754 OUT 7056 -18 APl 61 BELL 4767 OUT 7085 18 Apr 61 BELL 4776 OUT 7109 TS - 495 - Cable to EGLIN TIDE from GLOW 18 Apr 61 GLOW 9982 OUT 89913-G TS Cables to HQS Signal Center from Director 18 Apr 61 GLOW 4681 OUT 6882 i 18 Apr 61 GLOW 4781 OUT 7120 TS 43 Cable to TIDE MANAGUA from GLOW 18 Apr 61 GLOW 9991 OUT 89930-G TS 44 Cable to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 BELL 4784 OUT 7123 TS 45 Cable to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 BELL 4700 OUT 6924 TS 46 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs 2nd Meet Afternoon Session p 1 U 47 Playa Giron Ope cit I 114 Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 833 IN 4292 TS 48 Cable to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 GLOW 4737 OUT 7020 TS 49 Cable to TIDE from BELL 18 Apr 61 GLOW 4739 OUT 7028 TS Cables to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 840 IN 4293 TSi 18 Apr 61 TIDE 841 IN 4304 Cable to BELL from RIMM 18 Apr 61 RIMM 4922 IN 4317 50 Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 Ope cit 51 Cable to BELL from TIDE 20 Apr 61 TIDE 895 IN 4679 TS Cab1e to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 874 NO IN number TS - 496 - 52 I 53 Ibid 54 Playa 5 Hay 6 1 p 39 Giron Ope cit I 496 IV 510 Playa Giron Tumba de la Invasion Mercenaria Habana Pub1icaciones Zit ros 1961 pp 31 40-41 Hereinafter as Playa Giron Tumba 55 Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 788 IN 4160 Cable to TIDE MANAGUA from BELL 18 Apr 61 BELL 4740 OUT 7029 TS Persons Ope cit pp 60-61 55a Cable to BELL from MANAGUA 18 Apr 61 MANA 3589 IN 4108 TS 56 Ferrer Ope cit pp 215-216 57 Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 TIDE 855 IN 4374 TS Cable to TIDE from BELL 19 Apr 61 BELL 4807 OUT 7168 18 Apr 61 BELL 4749 OUT 7047 TS Cable tO 35458 0 T L Jfrom Director 18 Apr 61 DIR 9 UU o IV 58 C Four for a Cause 19 April 1961 Ferrer Ope cit pp 213-214 Job 73-767 BOX 2 folder 1 Contract Personnel Memo for DDP from Casimiro Barquin 12 Mar 63 sub C-46 Landing on Playa Giron 59 Cable to BELL from TIDE 26 Apr 61 TIDE 1063 IN 0466 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from G rfie1d M Thorsrud 24 May 61 sub Resupply Sorties D-Day through D 2 JMG-0395 Ferrer op cit pp 213-214 Cables to BELL from RIMM 19 Apr 61 RIf1M 4978 IN 4441 RIMM 5015 IN 4518 RIMM 4967 IN 4427 RIMM 4968 IN 4420 59a Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 893 IN 4535 TS 59b Ibid TIDE 899 IN 4566 60 TS Cables to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 IN 4455 TIDE 893 IN 4535 TS TIDE 879 Cable to TIDE from BELL 19 Apr 61 BELL 4840 OUT 7271 TS 61 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 op cit Review of Persons's book Bay of Pigs UAPT 4678 23 May 68 HS CSG 1362 62 UADP 4678 23 May 68 op cit 62a MR from Gar Thorsrud 2 Sep 61 sub Bonuses JMG-0470-6l Job 73-767 Box 2 File JMGLOW ANG Participation BOP MR fromJ I 13 Sep 61 sub Report or 18 Aug 61 to Birmingham Ala 5594-61 Trip DPD- 63 Ferrer op cit p 214 64 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 op cit 65 -Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 906 IN 4603 Persons Ope cit pp 55-56 Ferrer Ope cit p 213 66 Ferrer Ope cit p 214 Persons Ope cit pp 56-59 67 Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 68 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 900 No IN number TS Ferrer Ope cit pp 214-215 Persons Ope cit pp 57-58 69 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 896 IN 4545 TS 70 Ibid 19 Apr 61 1609Z TIDE 899 IN 4566 on hard copy at 1624Z 19 Apr 61 1624Z TIDE 900 NO IN number TS Playa Giron Ope cit I 320 Playa Giron Tumba History of An Ope cit p 42 Aggression Ope cit p 230 70a Cable to TIDE from BELL 19 Apr 61 BELL 4851 OUT 7294 TS 71 History of An 72 Playa Giron Ope cit I 320 Playa Giron Tumba 73 Aggression Ope cit pp 230-231 Ope cit p 42 Thorsrud Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 3A p 55 Conversation between Sidney Stembridge and Jack Pfeiffer 12 May 76 Persons Ope cit p 71 - 499 - 73a Letter to Admiral Stansfield Turner from Peter H Wyden 20 Jun 78 73b Ibid 73c MR from Jack B Pfeiffer 31 Dec 75 sub call from Peter H Wyden 73d Wyden Peter Bay of Pigs Schuster 1979 p 240 New York Telephone Simon and 73e Washington Post S Sep 79 Washington Star S Sep 79 u 73f Wyden Ope cit 74 Ferrer Ope cit p 213 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley W Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit Att C TS IV D Bitter Recriminations The Navy CAP 19 April 1961 74a USN CINCLANT REPORT Operation BUMPY ROAD 5 May 61 Naval History Division Serial 000102 TS Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs 6th Mtg 28 Apr 61 U 75 MR from J Scapa 17 Apr 61 sub Rules of Engagement 75a Cable to BELL from TIDE 18 Apr 61 1623Z TIDE 832 IN 4291 75b Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy 18 Apr 61 sub Cuban Situation TS 206273-L JFK Ly Nat'l Security Files Countries Cuba - Gen'l 1 61-4 61 Box 35 75c Schlesinger A Thousand 76 Days Ope cit pp 277-278 Cable to TIDE from BELL 19 Apr 61 BELL 4834 OUT 7237 TS - 500 - 76a Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs 19th Mtg 22 23 May 61 p 20 SjEyes 77 Cable to BELL pass BAYY from TIDE 19 Apr 61 0815Z TIDE 887 No IN number 78 Message for CINCLANTFLT CTG 81 8 Exclusive to Adm Dennison and RAdm Clark 19 Apr 61 0334R sub BUMPY ROAD JCS 994369 TS 79 Ferrer Ope cit p 214 80 Message for CINCLANTFLT CTG 81 8 19 Apr 61 JCS 994369 Ope cit 81 Cable to BELL from BAYY 19 Apr 61 UNN IN 4514 TS 1128Z BAYY 81a Cable to JMRIMM from BAYY 14 Apr 61 BAYY 001 IN 3337 82 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 6th Meeting 28 Apr 61 p 2 U Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 17 83 Cable to BELL from BAYY 19 Apr 61 UNN No IN number TS 1144Z BAYY 83a Cable to LANT ESSEX from WASH 19 Apr 61 1405Z No DIR number OUT 7274 Cable to BELL from JMRIMM 19 Apr 61 RIMM 5024 IN 4527 84 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 894 IN 4536 TS 85 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 899 IN 4566 TS 86 Cable to TIDE from Director 19 Apr 61 BELL 4852 - OUT 7295 TS - 501 - 87 Cable to BELL from BAYY 19 Apr 61 UNN IN 4571 1642Z BAYY 88 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 900 No IN number TS 89 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 914 No IN number TS 90 Memos for the Record from Gar Thorsrud 7 Sep 61 sub JMGLOW Bonuses JMG-0470-61 Deputy Chief DPD Air Support Branch 7 Sep 61 No subject JMG-0471-61 JMG-0472 62 MR from I 113 Sep 61 sub Report for 18 Aug 61 to Birmingham Ala 5594-61 Job 73-767 Box 2 File Trip DPD- ANG Participation BOP 91 Cable to BELL from BAYY 19 Apr 61 l901Z UNN BAYY 92 Cables to Director from TIDE 19 Apr 61 TIDE 902 IN 38459 TIDE 904 IN 38460 TS 93 R D Drain Personal Notes 19 Apr 61 Schlesinger A Thousand Days3 op cit 93a Thomas Cuban Revolution 3 op cit p 590 Schlesinger A Thousand Days3 op cit pp 277-278 94 Cable to TIDE from BELL 19 Apr 61 TIDE 7315 OUT 94a Cables to TIDE from BELL 20 Apr 61 No BELL numbers OUT 7434 OUT 7449 21 Apr 61 No BELL number OUT 7591 Cable to USS Essex Miami SIG Center Miami from irector 24 Apr 61 No DIR number OUT 90306 - 502 - Cable to USS Essex from Director 24 Apr 61 No DIR number OUT 90445-G 95 Taylor Committee MR's of PM study Group Meetings 7th Meeting 1 May 61 p 1 U 96 Ibid Meeting 6 May 61 Conversation between General Taylor and Mr Thorsrud p 3 U 97 Memo for Lt Col B W Tarwater from Stanley Beerli 26 Apr 61 Ope cit UAPT 4678 23 May 68 HS CSG 1362 98 Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 3B pp 58-60 99 Ibid Tape 4B p 89 99a Thomas Cuban RevoZution ope cit p 590 100 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 7th Meeting 1 May 61 p 1 U 101 Ltr to Dr Jack B Pfeiffer from P E Robinson Jr Dept of Navy Naval Sea Systems Command 24 Apr 79 sub Radar Intercept Ranges of USS Essex Nov 60-Jun 61 SEA 62X EFW Ser 81 U Telecons between Jack B Pfeiffer and Representatives of Air Branch SaG 4 Jun 76 sub Radar Intercept Range of Carrier Essex April 1961 102 Telecon between Jack B Pfeiffer and Garfield t-1 Thorsrud 24 Aug 76 sub Navy CAP 19 Apr 61 103 Persons Ope cit p 57 104 Telecon between Jack Pfeiffer and Stanley W Beerli 21 Sep 76 sub Navy CAP 19 Apr 61 105 Conversation between Jack B Pfeiffer and Capt Lionel Krisel USNR Ret 23 Apr 75 and 9 Jun 78 105a 'Pfeiffer-Beerli telecon 21 Sep 76 Ope cit - 503 - 105b Pfeiffer-Krisel conversation Ope cit 9 Jun 78 lOSe Telecon between Jack B Pfeiffer and Garfield M Thorsrud 26 May 77 sub Navy CAP 19 Apr 61 105d Telecon between Jack B Pfeiffer and Capt Lionel Krisel USNR Ret 2 Jun 78 sub USN Air CAP 19 Apr 61 lOSe Notes by General Eisenhower on Luncheon Meeting April 22 1961 with President Kennedy at Camp David IV 106 E Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope Memo for DPD Contract Approving Office from George Gaines Jr 16 Feb 61 sub US Crew Members for Overflights JMC-0290 GaineS-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 31 Cables to TIDE from Director 12 Apr 61 GLOW 9749 OUT 89183-G I from BELL 19 Apr 61 BELL 4845 OUT 7281 TS Cable to BELL from TIDE 13 Apr 61 TIDE 504 IN 3150 107 Cables to Eglin Air Force Base from GLOW 18 Apr 61 GLOW 9977 OUT 89903-G GLOW 9981 OUT 89912-G Cable to Headquarters Signal Center from GLOW 19 Apr 61 GLOW 4844 OUT 7280 107a Memo for DDP from C F Welch 1 Apr 61 sub Contingency Aviation Materiel Assets l08 Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A pp 31-33 - Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope p 30 - 504 - T cit Tape 2A Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 2A p 28 Conversation be'tween Jack B Pfeiffer and Fred Welch 13 Jan 76 sub Bay of Pigs Memorandum for WH 4 from Stanley W Beerli 7 Apr 61 sub Contingency Operating Base JMATE JMG-0349-6l o MR from C F Welch 13 Apr 61 sub ZI Operating Base Contingency Memo for Comptroller DPD from James A Cunningham Jr 18 Apr 61 sub Covert Checking Account 'for Project JMGLOW 1 1-- Memo for To Whom it May Concern from Stanley W Beerli 18 Apr 61 sub Letter of Instruction to Mr 1 1 JMG-0363 C 109 Cable to BELL from TIDE 19 Apr 61 1551Z TIDE 898 No IN Numberl TS 110 Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer 20 May 76 Ope cit IV F Retrospective View of Air Operations Ope cit I 491 111 Playa 112 Ibid 492 113 Conversation between David L Phillips and Jack B Pfeiffer 11 Mar 75 sub Bay of Pigs 114 Lagas Ope cit p 141 115 Reporting on Cuba Havana pp 17-31 116 Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape lA p 3 Tape IB p 14 Tape 3A p 54 Giron - 505 - Book Institute 1967 Campbell-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 2B pp 39-40 Gaines-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape lA p 13 Beerli-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 4B p 91 Memo for DPD from James A Cunningham Jr 9 May 61 sub Meeting with Maj Gen Maxwell B Taylor DPD 2767-61 TS 155687 A 117 Bissell-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 1 pp 10-11 118 Richard M Bissell OR Interview with Joseph E O'Connor for John F Kenn dy Library 25 Apr 67 p 19 119 Ibid pp 12-14 120 Beerli-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 3B pp 65-67 Tape 4A pp 68-69 - 506 - TOP CRET Access Controlled CIA History Staff TOP 3 ET an Aha-Lu 'I '1 1 1I I 1 il 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 MAP AREA OF AIR ACTIVITY June 1960 - 19 April 196 1 56 64 A T A L I C N o ---------- --------- C E A N _---- -----_1---- ------ --- i I s ala FRONl If St petersbu g G U L F o F III c o --- _---- BA Y -__FL fGHT5 liS -c VA-'rJ M 7 I a-f - 'BPI ECE 80 72 CAPE FEAR i I est nd ' ' I ' GREAT ' l r ABACa GRAND BAHAMA ' 1 I BIMINI I IS _ BERRV IS 9 -' T '- l Nicholls o wn t ' ' I '- _ y HARBOUR I I ELEUTHERA t -7-- 4- ' O- --- _ - ' ----- ' r ' _ ANDROS Harbour -1 THE J I NEW PROVI NCE Coakley TOw y -'I ISLAND Governors N 'SSAU _-' 't' BA _AL_ _D_ EX ' 'l' ' I' _ LONG I' _ c J RUM CAY C _ --l _--_ _ -- _ ISLAND - LONG CAY J c ACKLlNS JP ISLAND MAVAGUANA CAlcas ISLANDS CAICOS ISLA 'w o TURKS AND CViJ c lta Fe o oo o U K qJGrand Turk GREAJA INAGU '''' ' A' _ Y' - Guantanamo PUNTA MAlsl __ J iLE DE LA TORTU E - puerto a TampiCo CABO R010 ata PUERTO RICO U S VIRGIN ISLANDS ANEGADA BR VIRGIN IS TDRTOlA VIRGIN GORDA ChaY tte _ Oadtown A'B' t T JOHN I VIEQUES I THOMAS ST CROIX U S VI S PUERTO RICO A iJ ' J NGUlllA T MARTIN Guadeloupe 'I t -S I l iii I NETH - S BA rNTILLES I ST V ST BARTHElEMYlGu deloupe EUSTATIUS I I'tJBARBUOA ST CHRISTOPHER I ' - Basseterre' JNEvIS ST CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA U K _ -J REDONOA o ANTIGUA U K St Johns '-- J NTlGUA Plymou h U M0N' i RAT II - -GUADE OUPE France -9'1 J JlESIRADE ointe a Pitre -- 1 I ISLA AVES Voene ueta Roseau DOMINICA U K rQl 1 g pASSAG8 ARTrN_ MARTlNIQUE F ance Fort de France --- Castries Co Q 5 ST LUCIA o U K -- - ST VINCENT PASSAGE K'Ingst own o ST U K 1BRlDGETOWN@' VINCENT N BARBA NETHERLl NDS ANTILLES UBA eth C RA AO W mstad Amuay I 6 4 untoFijO yV I A BONAIRE - _ ' LAS VES LA BLANQUILLA ' L dOQ ES LA ORCHILA ISLA DE j tJGRENADA LOS TESTlGOS ---- - 2 r' AARIACOU ST GEORGES' e LOS ' HERMANOS LA TORTUGA - I GREAiA INAG C - '''' ---- NAVASSA ISLAND U S N -----tifVIEURflGI N 'f---Ut o bi N OF C-sc ItIRCRA r I ec CVeiU MORANT CAYS Uamaiea PEDRO CAYS Uamaic a QUIT CA RIBBEA Iv SEA $Uf NO B 4 Vli PUNTA DE ISLA SAN ANDRES CQlomhia ISLA n C01BA IvAUU SAN ANTONIO -''' - Cjnl Barbat ISLE ' Of PINES BA Y OF A1I1PECHE uerto Cabeza -' oRwIlP 'r c - S j smWE J L tONCI lo-tq TRoop AI I IN c j '7 ' II1Y 1 1 0 0$ - IkE'S O VJ I9hIJ 111 t ' T Y 1lI CRAS c Ai CORN 'ISLANDS Nicaragua o tJ alina Cruz GULF OF TEHUAJ 'TEPEC jCQMITAN Mt XlCO- LAlf1 NG C -5 4- CO' j _ G-oM lIe VEURTtA 11 Tf4TM G-Rout JJ IiF1I' CAS TRAIN Ii Gt CRASIfEUR cff E$Tt cy J _ I Heuo iR AL H Lc r ltli I Wfl f' III tfAse 1ft I I cilltft PE I O - SITE CRASH I ft-PtNE I iF NCA SAN jUl tL rRIl-INIf'lG --G- oU f i AIRSMI E _ PUEJH'V $fl-RR10S C oA 'oINT Po PRoPA i siTe- of 8- ll 5i Y lJ 4 j NoV E fVle c t2 5k1lJpo r OF f s I P A - --- - _- ---- - -_ _ _ _ _- -- -----_ - C I ---J- I I I F I 1 gv-h - 'r a orlamarcampan G iria San Fernando ruuw I j 23 u TORTUGA Puerto La Guaira Cabeuo Marac 9' 3y a - VaHe - Pascua - Earinas i Barrancas r uiudad -- Sa Silvestre 17% ayana Nu'mas a 4 c r M Iu -a Bolivar Mum Achaguas Ciudad Piar Oh wow uo' 'x Santa Elena r-aJ San Fernando-'5 de Atabapo Guaviare A NOS l'1I PUNI iAN UlAS '1 I' F S I o ISLA DE MALPELO Colombia San Loren Esmeraldas PUNTA GALERA 80 1 PUNTA DURIC -- _- _----- _------- I E A N I o COCOS ISLANO Costa Rica I ISLA CULPEPPER ' ISLA WENMAN GALAPAGOS ISLANDS Ecuador ISLA ISABELA ISLA PINTA ISLA MARCHENA G AESA G 2 88 _ t OH - r r o - I siTe- 1 GBP_8- - - J tJIf p 11 1 OVe St I'f'O t OF i 1I ii I I I I i ------------ _ --------- i I c P A i - - - -- I F _ ___ c i I I I CARIBBEAN AMERICA I R NATIONAL CAPITAL @ DEPENDENCY CAPITAL RAILROAD ROAD - MAJOR AIRPORT Spot elevations in feet o ES3 100 o E3 400 300 200 E '3 500 Statute Miles E3 100 E3 300 200 400 I 500 I Kilometers BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 96 502931 3-76 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION OFFICL L Vo1Ul1 e I AIR OPERATIONS MARCH 1960 - APRIL 1961 September 1979 Jack B Pfeiffer FOREWORD Air operations over Cuba from 15-19 April 1961 were chronologically the penultimate phase of the Bay of Pigs story -- the surrender incarceration and eventual release of the members of the 2506 Exile Brigade provide the conclusion of the story Because what happened in the air not only couZd but did determine the fate of the US Government's anti-Castro program the story of air operations is offered as the first volume in CIA's official all-source history of the Bay of Pigs For the reader who wishes to focus solely on the gut issues involving air operations Parts III and IV of this volume are recommended because they encompass among other stories the D minus 2 air strike Adlai Stevenson's role the Second-Strike episode air combat efforts over Cuba and the role of USN Carrier Task Group 81 8 These portions of the history also focus on the actions and decisions or indecisions of various of the principals involved in the anti-Castro effort including President John F Kennedy and the White House Staff the JCS and - ii - the CIA Some of the characters are cast in true heroic mold four US and ten Cuban fliers died in the air war and others both Americans and Cubans knowingly flew at great personal risk for a cause in which they believed Although the author attempted to be objective the reader is sure to find instances where one or another individual or group is cast in a good guy or bad guy role The author also wishes to emphasize that he was in no way personally involved in the Bay of Pigs project and he was not then -- nor is he now -- a member of the Directorate of Operations originated with a decision made by 1r This history William E Colby then the DCI that the CIA should concentrate on writing some all-source histories of its major operations including among others the Bay of Pigs story It was further recommended that these histories then be sanitized for overt publication The author believes that within the framework of protection of sources methods and privacy the latter may be feasible Considering the distortions that abound in the overt publications about the Bay of Pigs -- particularly with reference to air operations -- he would favor such an undertaking - iii - Among many who assisted the author in his search for relevant documents he is especially grateful to Latin American Division Records Management Officers now retired Jean Krages and I On numerous occasions Robert Cintron of FBIS provided assistance with Spanish translations and in addition volunteered many helpful references The writer has been particu- larly fortunate too in the willingness of many of those most directly concerned with the air operations -- Garfield Thorsrud Stanley Beerli George Gaines Billy Campbell C Cunningham w Connie Seigrist and James to share for the record and for the first time in practically all instances their recollections with him Similarly open were Richard Bissell and Jacob Esterline who spoke not only to air operations but to the broad spectrum of the Agency's role in the anti-Castro effort which culminated at Playa Giron The author regrets that David McLean who initially was assigned to write this history passed away so soon after the present author was assigned to work on the history Mr McLean's initial explor- atory efforts and the guidance he was able to offer - helped to get the present author off to a running start - iv - Finally the author would be remiss if he failed to note that without the able assistance patience humor and understanding of the other two members of the History Staff Eulalie Hammond and Sharon Bond -for whom there can never be adequate job descriptions this volume would have been much more difficult to produce Whatever faults flaws or errors appear in this volume they are totally the responsibility of the author VOLUME I Contents Foreword o ii Introduction 1 Part I 3 Initiation of Air Activity A B C D Part II Organization and Management Acquisition of Aircraft o o Relations with OSO DOD and the Air National Guard o o Initial Planning for Air Operations o o o o Acquisition and Training of Air Crews A B C D Basic Plan for Flight Training Trainers and Trainees o JMADD Air Training Base Retalhuleu Guatemala JMTIDE Strike Base Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua o o Part III Initiation 6f Combat Air Operat10ns A B C Part IV D minus 2 15 April 1961 Post-Strike Contretemps The Stevenson Story and the Second Strike o o o o o o 3 30 58 76 95 95 101 107 152 174 174 213 233 Where Cuba Was Lost o 303 A B C 303 338 Over the Beach -- 17 April 1961 Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 Four for A Cause -- 19 April 1961 o o - vi - 352 D E F Bitter Recriminations The Navy CAP 19 April 1961 o o 362 Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope 390 Retrospective View of Air Operations 395 Appendixes 1 US Government's Anti-Castro Program o 406 2 Memorandum for Chief JMARC from Lt Col George Gaines Jr sub JMARC Tactical B-26 Capability o o 418 3 Anti-Castro Propaganda Leaflets for Air Drop Operations o o o o o 420 4 Letter of Instruction for Garfield M Thorsrud 24 March 1961 o o o 425 5 Final Instructions for Air Commander JMTIDE o o o 429 6 Cable Traffic on Results of D-2 Air Strike o o o 432 7 D-Day Target List 442 8 Logistics Support Plan for Operation Plan 60 AD-5 o 445 Possible Publicity About Flyers Killed at the Bay of Pigs o o o 447 9 Source References Part I Initiation of Air Activity Part II Acquisition and Training of Air Crews o o 467 - vii - 435 Part III Part IV Initiation of Combat Air Operations 479 Where Cuba Was Lost 491 Tables 1 2 B-26 Take-Off and Arrival Times 19 April 1961 o o 380 Estimated Radar Intercept Ranges USB Essex and Brigade B-26's 385 Charts 1 2 Chain of Command JMATE Air Operations Following page 22 Table of Organization JMADD September 1960 o o Following page 107 Maps Area of Air Activity June 1960 19 April 1961 o o Frontispiece Area of Combat Air Operations 15-19 April 1961 o Following page 206 Photos Figures 1-23 - Air Training Base Retalhuleu Guatemala Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Retalhuleu Control Tower Retalhuleti Service and Maintenance Area Retalhuleu Service and Maintenance Area - viii - 506 508 509 Page Figure 4 Retalhuleu Service and Maintenance Area Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Retalhuleu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker 511 512 513 B-26 Spare Parts Inventory at Retalhuleu 514 Retalhuleu Mess and Kitchen Area Outdoor Living 515 Retalhuelu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker Retalhuleu Maintenance and Service Area and Fuel Bunker Figure 9 510 Figure 10 Retalhuleu 516 Figure 11 Retalhuleu Barracks - Exterior View o o o o o 517 Figure 12 Retalhuleu Barracks View - Interior Figure 13 Retalhuleu Barracks View - Interior Figure 14 Retalhuleu Barracks View o o o 518 519 Interior o 520 Figure' 15 Retalhuleu Supply Area 521 Figure 16 Retalhuleu Supply Area 522 Figure 17 B-26 Practicing Low Level Attack at Retalhuleu o 523 Figure 18 B-26 Practicing Low Level Bomb Run at Retalhuleu o - ix - o 524 Figure 19 Figure 20 Figure 21 Figure 22 Figure 23 B-26 Practicing Low Level Bomb Run at Reta1hu1eu o B-26 1 s Practicing Leader Wing-man at Reta1hu1eu 525 o 526 Paradrop Practice at Reta1hu1eu 527 Paradrop Practice at Reta1hu1eu o o 528 Paradrop Practice at Reta1hu1eu o o 529 Figures 24-33 - Photos of Forward Operations Base Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua Figure 24 C-46 and C-54 Parked Off Runway at Puerto Cabezas o o o o 530 Figure 25 Puerto Cabezas View of Air Strip o o o o o o 531 Figure 26 Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to Air Strip o o 532 Figure 27 Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to Air S trip o o 533 Figure 28 Puerto Cabezas Bomb Dump Adjacent to Air Strip 534 Figure 29 Puerto Cabezas Armed B-26 535 Figure 30 Puerto Cabezas Armed B-26 Figure 31 Puerto Cabezas Underwing Detail BrigadeB-26 o o o 537 Figure 32 Puerto Cabezas Underwing Detail Brigade B-26 538 536 Figure 33 Puerto Cabezas PBY Air-Sea Rescue o o o 539 Figure 34-35 - Photos of Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba Figure 34 Figure 35 Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba 540 Air Strip at Playa Giron Cuba 541 We down in the military level had one idea of this invasion -- of why its purpose and what it was going to accomplish -- which I don't think they ever realized up at the top I think they missed the point completely This invasion of Cuba to us was basically an air invasion oo All we were going to do with this Brigade was to go in there take a beachhead big enough to protect an airfield and let the planes do the dirty work -- for one week two weeks or whatever time it took o The Cubans seeing these planes just roaming at will up and down the length of Cuba and Castro unable to dislodge this beachhead oo that's when they would jump off that fence we never down at the lower level envisioned or even asked for or wanted -- this spontaneous uprising that everybody keeps talking about Grayston L Lynch 13 November 1975 - xii - Introduction In the most simplistic of terms the US Governmentis anti-Castro program which climaxed at the Bay of Pigs might have succeeded only if the air operations plans as evolved by CIA had been retained intact The distortion of those plans for non-military non-strategic purposes eliminated all margin for error and insured the establishment of the first Communist government in the Western Hemisphere to trace the It is the purpose of this volume evolutio of those air operations from initial generalized plans suggested in the early spring of 1960 through the detailed tactical strategic target plan of March 1961 and to the execution of air operations -- as determined at the highest level between 15 and 19 April 1961 The story begins with the creation of the organizational and managerial structure to carry out Presidential policy examines the problems of acquiring equipment trainers trainees and training facilities describes the combat air operations from 15-19 April 1961 and documents to the fullest extent possible the numerous controversial - 1 - episodes concerning the role of Adlai stevenson the cancellation of the Second Strike the US Navy's air combat role on 19 April 1961 and the record of action and decision of various of the principals most closely involved in air operations Air operations involved not only CIA personnel but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other personnel in the Department of Defense and the various military services Air problems proved of major concern to the highest levels of the Department of State the United States Ambassador to the United Nations was directly concerned and ultimately they required decisions on the part of President John F Kennedy Nearly twenty years after the event the feelings and emotions of personnel who participated directly in the project still run strongly Participants' opinions may vary about one aspect or another of the operation but on one point there is almost unanimous agreement that had the air operations plan been carried out as initially conceived Cuban troops would not be a factor of any concern to the formulation of US foreign policy today Some questions concerning air operations will never be fully answered but in view of the - 2 - T misinformation that has persisted through the years i t is hoped that the story revealed here -- much of i t for the first time -- by both participants and principals will at least help set the record straight on the whats if not the whys - 3 - THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Volume I Air Operations Part I Initiation of Air Activity A Organization and Management Whatever form President Eisenhower's anti-Castro plan of 17 March 1960 was to take i t was clear from the outset that air operations would playa key role in the CIA program to oust the Cuban leader In re- sponse to a request for estimates of special flight requirements for fiscal 1961 and 1962 from the Agency's air arm -- the Development Projects Division DPD -Edward A Stanulis Executive Officer for WH 4 the component of Western Hemisphere Division established to direct the anti-Castro program replied to DPD on 29 March 1960 stating that because all major requirements should spring from the action cadre training and the commitment of action cadres in PM operations I have requested DPD Comptroller for an extension to 6 April For a copy of the US Government's Anti-Castro Program see Appendix 1 for compliance on the part of the WH D with the referenced memorandum Project JMARC as the anti-Castro program was then known was going to require air transportation for the cadres which would be involved in its planned PM operations By the summer of 1960 it was apparent that JMATE was going to need extensive and continuing not incidental support from DPD -- a unit which reported directly to Richard M Bissell the Deputy Director for Plans In addition to the need for air- craft for infiltration propaganda and supply drops to dissident groups within Cuba additional air transport capability would be required to move bodies and equipment to training sites outside the continental Specific source references follow the Appendixes Sources are numbered beginning with 1 for each of the four parts of the volume Unless otherwise noted sOurce documents or notes from such documents are filed with the CIA History Staff under project HS CSG 2632 Where the document is not available in History Staff files the reference note indicates repository of complete document Unless otherwise noted all documents cited are classified SECRET The project crypt was originally JMARC but this was changed to JMATE following compromise of the original Throughout this volume the JMATE designation will be employed except as it appears in quotations - 5 - United States and moreover direction of a tactical air force was going to be added to the responsibilities of DPD By July 1960 it appeared that tactical air operations with combat aircraft would playa major role in JMATE plans and discussion over the most suitable combat aircraft -- Douglas ADS's of USN vintage or Douglas B-26's from USAF inventory -- were becoming the subject of considerable controversy between DPD and WH 4 To meet the growing need for air support the Acting Chief DPD Colonel Stanley Beerli USAF prepared a memorandum for his Branch Chiefs noting among other items that 1 As the planning for JMARC is progressing rapidly it is quite imperative that all facets are considered and further that all Branches of DPD as well as other Agency elements involved know exactly for what DPD considers itself responsible In this way I will be assured that no important item is overlooked because of confusion over who or what element was responsible 2 Because of the importance of J RC to our national objectives I am hereby assigning it first priority over all other projects and programs presently assigned I further expect that all Branches will give prompt and full attention to what is required and will insure that an adequate number of the best people are made available Because of the heavy workload and tight time schedule I also expect that at times longer than normal work hours will be required - 6 - 3 Each Branch will assign a Project Officer for each major function involved This individual's primary job will be to insure that the responsibilities of his office are covered and that appropriate officers are kept advised of any changes which may affect the program A separate JMARC project is established The DPD Project Officer is Lt Colonel Gaines All offices will coordinate everything through him He will be kept advised of contacts with outside elements l This memorandum from Beerli is of added importance for it outlines for the first time the principal planning stages for the air operations From 20 July - 15 August 1960 would be devoted to acquiring personnel equipment and aircraft and establishing facilities for air training Between 15 August - 1 October aircrew training with concurrent necessary construction of airfield and housing facilities would be aircraft acquired and sterilized air operations developed undertaken and plans for final The final phase -- the tacti- cal air operations -- would be conducted between 1 October and 1 December 1960 To administer the planned air operations Lt Col George Gaines USAF was relieved as Chief Air Section DPD to become the Project Officer for JMATE and Garfield M Thorsrud was assigned to be Acting Chief Air Section - 7 - It was also during July that the decision was made to establish air training activity at Retalhuleu in Guatemala It was pointed out that Airfields under previous consideration have for one reason or another proved unwxilile and not available 'except for Retalhuleu Mr Jacob D Esterline Chief WH 4 pointed put that President Ydigoras by government decree had transferred this field to the Guatemalan Air Force troops had moved in on 19 July and public announcement had been made in the press regarding cover buildup ooo Although Ydigoras' action apparently is designed to force the us to build a firstclass airfield for him general concensus sic of opinion is that this airfield is about the only alternative left and that planning would proceed on utilization of this field 6 Even as Retalhuleu was being discussed as a probable training site it was also indicated that consideration had been given to establishing a forward operating base in Nicaragua At this time interest- ingly enough it was stated lithe use of airbases in Nicaragua was discussed however since the Cubans refused to go to Nicaragua this possibility was dismissed II V Once agreement had been reached on the Retalhuleu airbase -- it would carry the crypt JMADD -- and the necessary work to improve the field for training - 8 - purposes had been undertaken DPD and WH 4 began to get down to the serious business of discussing air operations plans On 10 Augus 1960 the first weekly coordination meeting between JMATE's planning staff and the JMCLEAR's staff was held Among the items that were on the agenda for that meeting were logistical support requirements for JMATE and JMCLEAR determination of the numbers and types of aircraft which would be involved in supporting JMATE the relationship between JMATE and JMCLEAR coordination of cables location of operating bases for initial air drops into the target country the processing of DPD personnel by the Western Hemisphere Division WH D aircraft transportation requirements and organizational control of JMATE activities in Guatemala Among the positive results of this first coordination meeting were the appointments of William E Eisemann as the senior Support repr sentative for JMATE and the appointment of Col John F Mallard USMC as the senior operations coordinator for JMATE In addition provision was also made for the mutual coordination of all cables that pertained to either JMATE and or JMCLEAR It is significant in light of - 9 - subsequent charges and countercharges about the chain of command to note the following paragraph which appeared in the Memorandum for Record of the meeting Organizational control of JMARC activities in Guatemala JMARC representatives expressed a desire to have one senior representative designated for Agency control of all activities in Guatemala JMCLEAR personnel agreed with this concept with the stipulation that technicaL matters pertaining to air activities be retained under the direct control of DPD JMARC will develop an organizational chart showing the centralized control arrangements within Guatemala 2 JMATE personnel would break a number of lances over the question of what constituted technical matters pertaining to air activities and personnel formerly associated with DPD in command positions remember these occasions with no fond affection What it came down to particularly in the eyes of both Chief WH 4 and Chief WH 4 PM Col Jack Hawkins USMC was who is in charge In a memorandum written in early Octob r 1960 Hawkins pointed out that there was divided command and responsibility at the opera tional level between JMATE and JMCLEAR and he emphasized that this was not in keeping with either the Emphasis added by writer - 10 - tian previously taken by the Deputy Director for Plans Richard M Bissel military policy nor was i t in accord with standard Hawkins emphasized that the objectives of JMATE were not and could not be met under existing conditions Among other things he recommended that the JMCLEAR staff be assigned to Chief WH 4 and integrated with the existing Staff of WH 4i and secondly he recommended that operational control of the airbase at MADD air bases which might be obtained in third countries and the bomber and transport aircraft be given over to Chief WH 4 Finally Hawkins recommended that any additional support required for JMATE should be provided upon request by DPD 10 Although it had been addressed to Chief WH 4 Col Hawkins's memorandum went to Mr Bissell the Deputy Director for Plans who responded on 12 October 1960 in a memorandum which while emphasizing the integrity of DPD as the air unit for the whole of CIA'S operations did make one or two helpful conces- sions in response to the stated needs of WH 4 Deferring on the question of field command for military operations in which the air and other forces would be employed the DDP noted the following as approved action - 11 - A Operational control of all air forces and facilities required and employed in JMARC will be assigned to Chief JMARC Task Force B Chief JMARC Task Force will exercise this control through a newly created staff section for air operations in the JMARC Task Force C AC DPD will serve as the Chief of the JMARC air section The staff of the air section will include any and all DPD personnel when actually employed on JMARC business D For DPD business unrelated to J 1ARC AC DPD will continue to report in the usual manner through the DD P When and if questions arise concerning the allocation of DPD resources as between JMARC and other requirements and activities such questions will be resolved by DD P 11 This was a decision that even retrospectively Mr Bissell stood by and because it dealt specifically with a decision that caused bitter intra-Agency feelings it is quoted here at some length In discussing this It is interesting to note that when approached on the subject of giving Chief WH 4 the authority he requested through Hawkins's memo of 5 Oct 60 over DPD C Tracy Barnes AnOP A one of Mr Bissell's principal assistants stated that he could see no objection to the proposal and that he thought such a move would be approved by Mr Bissell since this was in keeping with Mr Bissell's concept of a task force organization 12 Mr Barnes must have failed to do his homework His comment was made at a 6 September meeting but Hawkins's memo didn't go forward until 5 October Presumably Barnes should have been able to find out how Bissell felt well before Hawkins's memo went forward - 12 - decision in the Fall of 1975 Bissell stated It was entirely logical to keep the rest of the DPD operation that wasn't related to the Cubans off elsewhere Given the need for an air arm to-the Cuban operation -- which meant recruiting and providing for the training of Cuban aircrews obtaining the B-26's and all other equipment establishing chains of command and control assigning operations officers and the whole business of creating an air capability -- why use DPD for that Now I think the answer is that DPD had over the years a great deal of experience and I think had developed a very major capability to perform just that kind of task -- that is to create an operational capability including training acquisition through deniable channels of equipment and relations with the Air Force involved in this kind of task So I think in that sense it was natural to turn to the top echelons of DPD to have the operational air arm Now o why was not Col Beerli made subordinate to Col Hawkins for the Cuban operation I think my memorandum of 12 October 1960 probably states them more persuasively and with more detail -a great deal more than I could from memory today But having said t4at I want to make two other remarks in hindsight o The first remark is that I think that my judgment in response to what I have distinguished as two different questions o Why use DPD as the organization to build an air capability and secondly in that capacity why not subordinate it to Hawkins I think my decision on both of those matters was almost certainly influenced by my long association with and loyalty to DPD and very high regard for the people that operated it In other words I think I was prejudiced if you will in favor of the DPD 13 - Beerli remember had been in DPD by that time for I think at least five years so I had known him in a number of different capacities I had known him out in the Nevada test site I visited him when he was Base Commander in Ankara Turkey he had then been back as operations officer if I am not mistaken and then he became the Chief of DPD I had always regarded him as perhaps the best single Air Force Officer that moved through that operation in all of its years Now I had a darn high regard for Beerli so that's answer #1 -- I would admit to probably an element of prejudice on my part Observation #2 is that with hindsight I think my first decision still was the right one Remember that DPD had only absorbed what had been the Air Operations Unit of the old PM Staff and here you did have a readymade and a really highly competent organization for the purpose of developing the air capability and I think that to have tried in the short time span of the Cuban operation to have built another organization for that purpose would have been wasteful and duplicative and delaying itself I think that was a correct decision on my part The decision that with hindsight I think is questionable was the failure to subordinate Beerli to Hawkins ooo I am inclined to think that was a mistaken decision as it turned out Now if you want to know however the argument for it I seem to remember feeling that the memo I wrote to Hawkins at least set forth the arguments pretty persuasively and the argument after all by analogy was that you do have in the military theater commanders but you nevertheless do have an independent Air Force I am well aware that this is a subject of certainly decades of debate over this problem in the military but - 14 - I did have precedents I think for making them co-equal arms I still think that hindsight is a mistake l3 Col Stanley Beerli who was mentioned by Mr Bissell was also interviewed early in 1976 and he fully supported Bissell's position that DPD had sufficient world-wide responsibilities so that it needed to retain its independent status but by assigning his second in command Col George Gaines as the Air Officer on the JMARC Staff DPD was able to meet all of its commitments to Project JMARC Beerli vigorously denied that there was any serious friction between his office and JMARC He stressed that DPD was in effect a service organization charged with carrying out the tasks which were determined by WH 4 DPD might bring to the attention of WH 4 various options available but the decisions were made by WH 4 not by DPD 14 Another aspect that Beerli stressed in favor of retaining DPD's independence was that DPD had direct communication with our units through our own communications organization o not just the normal one that the Agency had but a separate one DPD had its own secure communications organization through which we could contact Eglin AFB directly o o later on Retalhuleu and then later the forward 15 - base in Nicaragua The commo facility was physically located in our DPD compound It increased and expedited the traffic and gave us a direct control oo to the unit It was almost a vertical command link directly to the commander in the field The field commander reported directly to us and we could provide any report or support required by our field units It was difficult for us to work down in the WH 4 facilities since all our communications with our units had to be conducted at 1717 H St We would however keep Hawkins and the people in the Western Hemisphere Division informed about what we were doing but we still had to come back to 1717 H to run the communications If I am confusing you i t is because I am trying to layout the framework in which we were working to show you that it was a logical arrangement ooo that it wasn't a bastard organization which was unable to provide the proper support to JMATE 15 In his retrospective view of the chain of command problem between DPD and WH 4 Col Beerli was extremely critical of the approach taken by Gen Maxwell Taylor during the course of the Taylor Committee's review of the Bay of Pigs Operation wha Beerli pointed out that Taylor attempted to do was to draw some sort of an admission that there was friction between DPD and the Western Hemisphere There wasn't Established by President Kennedy the other committee members were Robert Kennedy Adm Arleigh Burke and Allen Dulles But of course with him being a military man you had to have complete cooperation complete direction or else you didn't have a good organizational arrangement I would vehemently defend that there was not any compromise at any time 'Bissell would have been aware of it 16 At another point in commenting that Taylor was trying to suggest that the command relationship was the reason for the collapse of the invasion Beerli said In my opinion that wasn't the case at all because the tasks were clearly defined discussed and approved at the WH level and later approved at the Bissell level We knew what we had to do was preset The missions were going to be flown oo DPD's jobs were to see that they Cubans were adequately trained to see that the equipment and everything was properly in good condition and to be sure that we understood the plan as the Western Hemisphere wanted us to understand it They made it out -- all that we did was to provide the technical expertise If there were options we presented the options to tnem and they made the decision At no time did we ever say this is the way you've got to do it -17 In addition to his reflections on General Taylor Col Beerli was also quite conscious of criticisms which apparently were levele4 both during the course of the operation and subsequent to the collapse of the invasion by Col Jack Hawkins Chief WH 4 PM who was - 17 - responsible for the tr ining and the paramilitary employment of the Cuban Brigade Hawkins not only went on record early in October 1960 suggesting that the chain of command left something to be de ired but his subsequent post-mortem of project JMATE and his comments to the Taylor Committee indicated tnat the lack of more direct control of the air operations by WH 4 was an important factor contributing to the failure 18 Jake Esterline Chief of Project JMATE also was quite frank in his expressions of displeasure with the relationships between WH 4 and DPD I never felt that we had adequate control of our air arm This was a very unsatisfactory relationship Mr Bissell wanted it that way We didn1t like it As a matter of fact the only two people we could work effectively with at that time were Col George Gaines who was a very practical airman and Gar Thorsrud 19 Esterline also engaged in the following exchange on management of air operations with an interviewer When contacted by the author of this volume regarding an oral interview Colonel Hawkins refused on the grounds of ill health -- he was just recovering from hospitalization and faced even more -- and the fact that his post-mortem report for the Taylor Committee adequately told all that he had to tell about the Bay of Pigs The author of this history - 18 - JE I felt the same way about the air I found that it was almost unworkable and impossible because I never knew whether this air thing was going to work with Beerli or not Most of the time we were highly dissatisfied Interviewer Well DPD was nominally -- the Cuban activity for DPD -- was nominally placed under your control wasn't it JE Supposedly the looks of it but they o there were never any teeth in it It is like saying the Intelligence Community was placed under Helms a few years ago o I mean it was nominally placed under him but you know and I know that he never had any control over it Interviewer You couldn't countermand any Beerli orders then JE And I never knew whether he was giving ones that weren't compatible with what I wanted to do either Interviewer What kind of management plans did you try to work out with Beerli Daily meetings with him or written record or how JE We kept extensive memos of the things we did but as a practical matter I finally got Beerli to name -- to designate - one person whom I could be working with on a regular basis and that was Stan sic Gaines Richard M Helms DCI 30 June 1966 - 1 February 1973 - 19 - When that was done that made it very much easier for us to operate Although i t complicated Stan sic Gaines' relations I think with Beerli 20 Richard D Drain Chief lVH 4 Ops was less inhibited than Jake Esterline in reflecting on the relationships between WH 4 and DPD Where on the one hand he was quite high in his praise of the military personnel in charge of the ground force activity particularly Col Jack Hawkins and Lt Col Frank Egan the Army Special Forces Officer who was actually in charge of Brigade training in Guatemala Drain was harsh in his evaluation of the management of air operations for JMATE RD The most unsatisfactory military personnel were those in DPD and the trouble with that was that Air Ops had become so enmeshed in the U-2 that with the exception of a very small unit which you could say loosely was Tactical Air -- but which was buried in this exotic DPD complex -- it was very difficult to find anybody to talk to We finaIIY did Gar Thorsrud who got the point and almost in violation of the superiors in DPD gave us the kind of intelligent cooperation that we needed but until we found him dealing with D D was like dealing with a foreign power George Gaines lnterviewer You are now referring specifically to Beerli and Gaines RD Yes mostly Beerli and Cabell Cabell was of no help throughout this thing He never understood it as far as I could see and we had to brief every air drop operation to Cabell I would go along with somebody from Hawkins's shop Dave Phillips would go along if it would involve propaganda and than Beerli would be there Beerli and Cabell would play Strategic Air Command -- moving their hands around and talking about the angle of vector and this and that For example this is where Cabell got his nickname Rice and Beans from the project Once he told us that we were making an uneconomical use of the aircraft in only dropping what we were dropping oo we must fill our airplane up with rice and beans and drop that too We sat there and tried to explain to him the size of the reception party and the nearness of Castro's security force and that we couldn't really linger over those targets for a long time and just drop forever God damnit he says I have to defend my expenses against the Bureau of the Budget o isn't that right Stanjri Yes Sir General o o So that kind of military assistance was not particularly useful As a point of fact we ran about 30 drops and never really achieved a thing We had all the standard errors like we dropped once on a string of headlights coming out of a movie instead The author of this history Gen Charles P Cabell thenDDCI 21 - of to the reception party and we had people shoot themselves in the tail and land in Montego Bay 21 In fact Drain claimed that at one point when the Cuban air trainees in Guatemala got out of hand -he was forced to go to Mr Bissell to ask that a nonDPD officer be put in charge of the Retalhuleu air base Drain said that he drafted a Letter of Instruc- tion fori Ito become Chief of Base where heretofore DPD had claimed that only an Air Officer in fact took over as could run an airbase L Administrator of the Base 22 As apparent from the chart on the chain of command for air operations in Project JMATE the man caught in the middle between DPD and WH 4 was Lt Col George Gaines Jr His observations on the Questioned about Cabell's role in target selection and evaluation of air operations at any stage of the JMATE activity Col Beerli responded He Cabell saw it He made a very specific effort to see it all He was very concerned We made visits to his office frequently to show him what plans we had He told me being an Air Officer he said I feel that I should be informed at this point just what is going on 23 Chart 1 follows p 22 - 22 - T CON CHART 1 CHAIN OF COMMAND JMATE AIR OPERATIONS I DCI Dulles 1 - -----_ - - Cabell WHD-King i I DPD-Be rli I I - - - - - - - - - - -1 WH 4 - Esterline Gaines Ch Air Ops Ch Air Staff WH 4 DPD Field Oe s -- l-4 I i u l lJWU n - tL arnpoe L L I TM'T'TT 'l'l ' _ 'T' n l 1- - I 1---1 Direct reporting Indirect reporting Nominally command went thJ 'ough COB In fqct fOl air op Cqropbell and Thor rud w ere 'ihe ' c1 iJn lt31 C9N IAL I peculiar position in which he found himself have also been put in the Oral History record Among other comments Col Gaines said I was Chief of Air Operations in DPD at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation and I was asked if I would divorce myself from my normal activities to the extent necessary to set up an air arm for what later turned out to be the Bay of Pigs oo I was very happy to do that I had some very good people to help me o Psychologically it had a traumatic effect on my attitude o I think you will find if you go look into the Inspector General's files back in '61 you'll see that I went to the Inspector General two or three times regarding what I called unethical or unprofessional conduct Then I believe overall that the effect it had on my career was beneficial 24 The following exchange which took place with Col Gaines during the course of an interview reveals that like the senior JMATE personnel Gaines also had some reservations about dual responsibilities Interviewer Could you ' ell me a little about the command relationships that existed at the time that you went into the operation You reported to Beerli GG That's correct Interviewer And how about Jake Esterline Did you work with Jake For Jake How did that fallout The author of this history GG Well I had a dual role you see As Chief of Air Operations I reported to Beerli and I kept him informed on my activities with the JMARC Project but as far as the project itself was concerned I was in my dual capacity there and my immediate superior was Esterline Interviewer Well where did you sit down there with Jake GG No I sat up in my office on H Street and then I went to all the meetings as a Staff member on the Project We had some space assigned to us down there but my actual dayto-day operation was in the H Street Building Interviewer Were you satisfied with this set up GG No I don't think it was a good set up I think there should be a clean break because while there were never any irreconcilable differences of opinion people who are strictly 100% air tend to approach a problem differently han people who are using air as a vehicle I believe that to take an air specialist and put him on a staff for his technical know how would be a better relationship rather than let him keep the relationship where he was reporting to two bosses 25 Another of the reasons Gaines offered an Air Force type to the JMATE staff was WH 4 had some would be pilots who were and such advisers frequently caused more were warranted 26 - 24 - Did you sit for assigning that Chief advising him problems than Dick Drain noted that the command difficulties were reflected in field operations and Billy Campbell who ran the air operations'at Retalhuleu from July 1960 until early February 1961 expressed rather strong feelings about the situation When I first went down to the Retalhuleu airbase I was supposed to be working for Col Stan Beerli I was told to go down and set up the base and approve the runway operations with the type of training that we were going to conduct and determine how long it would take us to do the training ooo My job was strictly from the operations end of it Although DPD sent out a Chief of Base to be responsible back to them and the office in Guatemala City sent out a directive saying we were responsible to them and then Jake Esterline's people thought I was responsible to them and Frank Egan thought I was responsible to him I ignored the whole damn bunch and went directly to Washingtonto stan Beerli and George Gaines Then we had to have round table discussions in Washington several times with everybody concerned with that planning -- the initial planning for the targets etc -- and with the Cubans I lhad come in oo He was then tebllea CUIer of Base and I was the ops type But I had control of everybody who was flying and there was always a conflict there 'ras a paratrooper and a real good frIend of mine but he had nothing to do with flying airplanes or training aircrews That was all my area Though we did get into many discussions and conflicts with Guatemala City -- what people were we going to do it flying missions with when were we going to 25 - do it what were the capabilities -- it boiled down to where I finally retained the authority of operating airplanes sent me on base 27 One can find some signs of progress being made in the management of air operations by mid-summer of 1960 In August WH Division had agreed and DD P had approved a tactical air capability for JMATE operation of the air arm was to be DPD's responsibil- itYi and i t would be budgeted out of funds for JMATE 29 Even agreement on funding however did not end the bickering between the two components One of the principal problems they faced was one of communication between the elements in Headquarters area -that is DPD at 1717 H Street and WH 4 Headquarters down on Ohio Drive -- and also communications problems that had to do with instructions between Headquarters and the field In early October 1960 C Tracy Barnes the A DDP A wrote a memorandum to Mr Bissell complaining Billy Campbell's relationship with Frank Egan indicated some degree of interservice rivalry particularly at the time of the attempted Guatemalan revolt against President Ydigoras Fuentes in November 1960 28 See Volume II of this history Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy rather sharply about the failure ofDPD to coordinate messages concerning JMATE activity with the proper senior officials in WH 4 In one instance cited by Barnes an expenditure had been improperly authorized and in another a commendation for the commanders of both JMTRAV and JMADD had been included in a message originating with DPD Barnes objected that DPD had no authority over JMTRAV and he recommended that DPD activities related to JMATE be fully and clearly p t under the jurisdiction of Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 -- however this was not the way Mr Bissell chose to regard the matter 30 Although the differences between DPD and WH 4 were to continue in some degree through the course of the project the records reflecting the disenchantment of one component with the other dropped off sig nificantly after the decision rendered by Mr Bissell JMTRAV was the crypt for the infantry training base in Guatemala and JMADD was the air training base What might have been an attempted end run by WH 4 to get a similar memo to Biss'ell asking for the transfer of DPD to NH 4 apparently died aborning on 20 Sep 60 when Rudy Gomez Acting Chief Western Hemisphere Division failed to sign a memo addressed to the DDP 31 - 27 - T in October For purposes of establishing air opera- tions JMCLEAR had provided an initial budget estimate of some $4 million dollars for the period from August through 31 December of 1960 The budget was to include TDY travel costs of Headquarters personnel to Eglin and to forward areas flying hour costs the transportation of logistics to the training sites and strike sites the cost of aircraft operations the cost of aircraft acquisition and reconditioning and such other items as cost for POL ordnance aircraft spares ground handling equipment and HBILKA Far East support Late in November 1960 when Stan Beerli forwarded to Chief WH Division some internal revisions of that estimate the budget estimate through the end of calendar year 1960 -- he also indicated thttt he had heard that the JMATE operation was planning to continue for six months beyond 31 December 1960 Beerli requested to be advised of JMATE's operational concept and of the continued support which might be required for JMCLEAR so that these revised figures - 28 - could be included in any overall JMATE budget estimate 32 In discussing the funding for air operations Bill Eisemann who was Chief WH 4 Support pointed out that We had earmarked a certain amount of funds for military needs -- for Air Branch needs We would obligate those funds and they DPD would pick it up on their own records and do their own buying They were sort of an independent activity in themselves They were not really o under Support in any way but we had a very close relationship with those guys We had to have a very close relationship so they did most of their own requisitioning for oo the aircraft as an example and the bombs o o You see anything on the Air Branch side of the house they handled As I recall back then when that materiel was issued to the operations Neither in the copy of the August budget that accompanied Beerli's memorandum nor the revised estimated budget do the totals accurately reflect the numbers that are given for each of the categories of expenditures In the initial estimate for e ample the total is some $24 000 higher than the sum of the parts In the revised estimate -- where Beerli said that the total was identical to the total that had been submitted in August because the changes that were being made were revisions within internal categories -- the figure appears to be either $10 000 too low or $290 000 too high based on the various subtotals by category which appear in the JMCLEAR budget estimate There is no way to reconcile these differences on the basis of the information presently available - 29 - it was written off at that point no matter where the location was whether i t was JMTRAV or JMADD or what have you I recollect that we received approval to write off anything once it was issued out of Headquarters to one of the operational training areas or the launch base In other words not when it was consumed but upon issue 33 B Acquisition of Aircraft One of the most time consuming activities of Project JMATE from June through September of 1960 concerned the acquisition of combat aircraft From the initiation of the Project it was apparent that combat aircraft would be a major factor to the success of the developing anti-Castro effort In addition to the use of standard transports -- C-46 C-47 or C-54's -- for supply drops prop drops infil and exfil there was need for aircraft that could conduct tactical strikes on Cuban targets with a variety of ordnance The choice of air raft was to be limited by plausible deniabilitYi and consequently the choice was quickly narrowed to one of two Douglas models -- the Navy's AD-5 or the Air Force's B-26 light bomber Prior to DPD's formal involvement in the Project sentiment in WH 4 was running strongly in favor of the use of the AD-5 In fact in his progress report to - 30 - o the DDP in mid-July of 1960 Jake Esterline in talking about the p ogress that had been made to implement a training program for Cuban pilots pointed out that JMARC had been given assurance by DOD that a total of 12 AD-5's would be made available per requested schedule The first four aircraft will be turned over between 10 and 15 August Navy has agreed to supply maintenance personnel instructor pilots and an administrative CO These personnel about 75 officers and men will be placed under light civilian cover Screening and recruiting of 20 Cuban pilots is currently in process at JMASH 38 It was perhaps wishful thinking on Esterline's part that the question of utilization of the AD-5 had been resolved In a meeting of the Special Group on 21 July 1960 i t became apparent that there were too many problems involved in obtaining permission to use this particular aircraft not the least of which was its deniability as a US aircraft Despite the fact that the Australians the British and the French did have some incorporated into their Air Forces none JMASH was the crypt for the Forward Operations Base Miami The Special Group referred to the Designated Representatives under NSC 5412 2 charged with supervising Special Operations The group consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs the DCI and the CIA secretariat secretary - 31 - were in use in Latin American nations 39 According to the Defense representatives to the Special Group Admiral Burke apparently found particular difficulties with the proposal to sheep-dip Navy personnel for use as pilot trainers and aircraft maintenance for JMATE Within a few days of the 21 July Special Group meeting a session was held in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and it was decided that the B-26 aircraft would be substituted for the AD-S in connection with the JMATE Project In his memorandum to Jake Esterline Tracy Barnes the A DDP A also pointed out that DPD would run a cost analysis to compare the merits of bringing in 8 B-26's from the Agency's Far Eastern activities to Project JMATE with the cost of acquiring B-26's The former Chief of Security for JMCLEAR indicated that another reason for steering away from the AD-5 was that the Cubans would charge that these were US aircraft flying out of Guantanamo because part of the USN air contingent there was equipped with AD-S's 40 - 32 - from Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona This cost analysis was to be submitted to the Deputy Director General C P Cabell through Barnes's office -- an indication of the multiplicity of managerial levels superimposed on WH 4 Barnes's memorandum also indicated that during the meeting in General Cabell's office on 27 July 1960 it was planned that four pilot trainers Filipino maintenance personnel and fly-away kits also would be brought in from the Far East and a request was going to be forwarded to 1 lin an attempt to determine whether the SALA aircraft maintenance organization in that country had B-26 mechanics or would be able to obtain B-26 mechanics on short notice 41 Among others who were involved in ascertaining the availability of B-26's a cable from Guatemala reported that the Chief of the US Air Mis to Guatemala a Col James Harvey had informed that there were 12 to 16 B-26's in very gooer---condition in Tuscon 40a A fly-away kit is an aircraft maintenance kit that is designed to provide minimum maintenance parts and equipment for an aircraft when it is operating away from its home base The kit is normally designed for each type of aircraft by the operator of that particular aircraft and is not a standard set by the technical manuals of the manufacturer of the given aircraft - 33 - Despite the fact that the decision to use B-26's had already been made by the DDCI and the A DDP A there was at least one last futile attempt by JMATE representatives to reject the choice The following Memorandum for Record which is presented in full shows how WH 4 conducted a step-by-step retreat on the issue during a meeting with DPD shortly after the decision to get ten B-26's had been made 1 JMARC opened by saying they didn't think 10 B-26's would be enough air support for their PM effort 2 I indicated that 10 would be enough if the strike base was within the original radius of the target 200-500 miles 3 They then asked about F4U's and PSI's with an additional statement of striking from Guatemala I indicated that these aircraft would give hardly any time over the target 4 Next they indicated that the B-26 could not function as a close support aircraft My statement to that was this was the only aircraft available and we would do our best with this problem 5 Commander Imler stated he wanted each aircraft over target four hours I stated that the B-26 would not then have fuel to return to Guatemala He indicated they would have to land on the Isle of Pines 6 My statement to four was it would be difficult to take a normal pilot and give him 8-10 hours fuel send hi on a - 34 - CRET four or five hour flight then keep him on target for four hours with no secure base to return to 7 Colonel Egan finally understood the problem which as we left them was they will present in writing to DPD the targets time over them desired and the operating base to strike from Without these two problems resolved we can't say how many aircraft will be needed 8 We could get B-26's back from the Far East to add to the 10 we now have but the pilot problem hasn't ever been resolved as yet Imler again said that he had biographical data on 23 but as yet no firm answer has come back to DPD on the 15 we originally requested 9 The operations plan will therefore not be written until the specific criteria of the PM operations is forwarded These criteria will outline general air requirements in support of all PM concepts 41a Word of the switch to the B-26's in lieu of the AD-S's was immediately sent to Florida ith the in- structions that there should be a delay in the attempts to recruit aircraft maintenance personnel because of The WH 4 representatives were Col Frank Egan Col John F Mallard Cmdr John Imler The memo is not specified as an MR and it is unsigned and undated but it is pres umed to refer to a meeting at the end of July or very early in August 1960 The author probably was either stanley Beerli or George Gaines and Sidney Stembridge also was in attendance for DPD - 35 - the change from AD-5's to B-26's 42 Late in July a memorandum was prepared for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Special Operations in which it was stated that the Agency had backed off from the use of the AD-5 in favor of the B-26 and it noted the Agency's request that 10 B-26 aircraft be reclaimed from surplus storage and placed in the following combat configuration with eight 50 caliber machine guns in the nose rocket-launching system pylon fuel tanks under each wing and bomb bays capable of accepting either 250 or 500 lb bombs Four such aircraft are required by 1 September 1960 the remaining six will be required by 15 October 1960 ooo In order to expedite receipt of the aircraft requested above it is desired that maximum emphasis be placed on timely reclamation of the aircraft to include authorization of overtime for which this Agency will reimburse from funds presently available It is the understanding of this Agency that the B-26 aircraft are surPlus and would be acquired under an interdepartmental transfer at no expense other than labor and associated costs 43 ' It is interesting to observe that the response from DPD concerning the cost and availability of B-26's out of the Arizona stockpile went to the Department of Defense at least two days before Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 apparently received word about the availability of the B-26's Again t is would indicate some breakdown in the internal communications between DPD and WH 4 - 36 - As the decision was made to shift to the B-26 there was a sudden increase in correspondence concerning the acquisition of these aircraft One of the immediate questions that came up in a meeting between representatives of WH 4 and DPD was that of the need for a backup aircraft to support the B-26's In view of what subsequently developed over the beach at Playa Giron in April 1961 it was unfortunate that this question did not receive far greater attention than it did in late August of 1960 The question being discussed was whether the backup should be provided by fighter aircraft or whether there should be additional B-26's acquired for the strike force 45 The question of backup support for the B-26's presented problems to the air operations officers who had Oral History interviews with the author Both ColoneL'Beerli and Gaines pointed out that if the air operations had been conducted as initially structured there would have been no need for backup Dighter aircraft because Castro would not have had any aircraft in the air It is interesting to observe however that the discussion referenced in the text above took place in late July 1960 -- well prior to the time that any planned attack on the strategic targets had been fully developed or perhaps even partially developed Knowing that the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria FAR had both T-33 jet trainers and Sea Fury fighters in its inventory there seemed to be little point in suggesting that additional B-26's try to fly cover for those employed in bombing Cuba - 37 - Between 29 July and 11 August when a memorandum was prepared by the JMCLEAR Project Officer Col Gaines for Col Moore the Director of Materiel Management of the Air Force a very significant modification was suggested in the equipment of the B-26's which were to be acquired from the Air Force On 29 July the a-gun nose had been requested plus pylons for fuel or napalm and rocket racks On 11 August it again was requested that the a-gun nose be installed but if this was not possible then a 6-gun nose would be acceptable Of more significance however was the plan to add to the plane's firepower by adding three internal guns to both the left and the right wings -- bringing the total of 50 caliber forward-firing machine guns to either 14 or 12 47 One can only speculate whether the installation of the additional 50 calibers would have made a significant difference in terms of the effectiveness of the B-26's at the time of the D-2 airstrike The reason that the wing guns were not installed probably was best explained by stan Beerli who said -- with reference to other modifications that he was questioned about -- that the restrictions were imposed by time - 38 - and money How much time did you have and how much money did you want to spend The Defense Department's initial estimate of the cost of the B-26 aircraft was approximately $11 000 for those which were flyable and $27 500 for planes which would have to be taken out of storage These were base costs exclusive of the added cost due to overtime which had been authorized by the Agency to refurbish the aircraft in as short a time as possible 4- bl The Air Force notified the Agency that four B-26's configured in accordance with your requirement would be available from Kelly Air Force Base on 30 August 1960 and that they would be dropped out of the USAF aircraft inventory and made available to the Agency on an interdepartmental transfer practice at that time 49 - standard In apparent response to DOD USAF concern that they not be tied into clandestine activities the Agency agreed that once the Air Force Among the other modifications suggested same time were the installation of the 125 bomb bay gas tanks and the installation of Some of the aircraft did have the bomb bay installed but none had gun cameras - 39 - at this gallon gun cameras gas tanks delivered the B-26's to Kelly Air Force Base Agency representatives would then take over and would ferry the B-26's black to an operational location It was stated Once the aircraft had departed Kelly Air Force Base they would proceed black to a Latin American covert training location for training of indigenous crews At this location and at all times after the delivery of the aircraft to the site the aircraft will be owned by a foreign Agency proprietary organization This organization will have purchased the aircraft from another US Commercial company who sial had owned and maintat the aircraft at a location in tlie Far East An inquiry into the history of the aircraft OWI' e Lsnip would reveal that they re originally purchased in the Far East from Air Force surplus a num r of years ago and subsequently B61d to a New York broker who in turn sold them to a Latin American Company It would be further explained that the aircraft proceeded direct from the Far East to the Latin American site 50 There seemed to be no question that the presence of B-26's at Eglin Kelly or possibly other of the It is not known whether the four B-26's were delivered as scheduled in August or not It was reported that between 23-26 September 1960 there were two B-26's at Eglin and four at Kelly The two at Eglin may have been the ones borrowed from the D C Air National Guard and the four at Kelly may have been those scheduled for August delivery JMADD expressed a desire to have a dual combat configured B-26 included among the four aircraft ready for delivery -- presumably one of the four at Kelly 50a Air Force bases could be covered for a brief period of time but the military was quite firm in urging that there not be undue delay in moving these aircraft off of Air Force bases In addition the USAF rejected CIA's request for the use of their personnel as crews on black-flight operations in C-54's or C-118's between the continental United States and Central America 511 The Agency apparently failed to live up to its agreement with the Air Force to move the B-26's from USAF bases and on 16 January 1961 the DDP from Col Ler y memorandum to F Prouty USAF Office of Special OperAtions OSD in response to the Agency's req est for additional B-26's from the USAF noted In compliance with an earlier request for B-26 aircraft ten were made available to meet an early deadline At the time of this request 19 August 1960 it was stated that these aircraft would be removed from the military base to a designated civilian airfield and then would exit the US As of this date six of these a rcraft have been p cked up but four still remain on an Air Force Base in the US o This situation is cited because it has a direct bearing on future actions to provide B-26 aircraft for such projects Within seven or eight weeks the Air Force will no longer have any remaining B-26 - 41 - aircraft This not only means that the USAF will be unable to provide morei but it also means that it will be unable to cover this type any longer Therefore any request for B-26's must include provision for removal of this type from USAF bases This should provide for the four now at Eglin Air Force Base and should take into consideration the fact that as a result of this situation none of these aircraft may be returned to USAF bases You may be assured that upon receipt of a firm request for these aircraft which include sufficient policy guidelines this office will be ready to assist with this support without delay In the interim necessary action offices in the Air Force have been alerted for this requirement 52 Prouty's memorandum to Mr Bissell brought a quick response from Jake Esterline for eight -- rather than six -- additional B-26's from the Air Force for Project CROSSPATCH Jake's memorandum indicated appreciation for the problem presented to the Air Force as the B-26's were being phased out but i t assured Col Prouty that when the aircraft were ready Col Prouty seems to have been a thorn in the side of practically everyone of the DPD officers with whom he came in contacti and in addition mention of his name drew forth 'expletives of a strong nature from those WH 4 individuals who had even limited contact with Prouty notably Dick Drain and Jake Esterline CROSSPATCH was the DOD's identification for Project JMATE support - 42 - for delivery qualified Agency-assigned USAF pilots would be sent to HilL Air Force Base Utah where they would test fly and test the weapons prior to formal release of the aircraft The planes would then be ferried to Field 3 at Eglin Air Force Base and according to Esterline within 48 hours they would then be ferried black to the Project site where they were to be put to use The Chief WH 4 also said that the Agency would assume responsibility for the disposition of all the B-26 aircraft upon completion of the Project and that none would be returned to USAF 53 Acquisition of these eight additional B-26's would have meant that a total of 18 had been acquired from the Air Force It is not entirely clear whether the Project did in fact receive eight or only six aircraft following the above request but in any event at the end of March 1961 in response to a query raised by the Office of Logistics C F Welch Chief of the Materiel Staff DPD noted that there were 16 These were in addition to two B-26's which had been borrowed from the DC Air National Guard and subsequently were returned to the DC Air National Guard - 43 - B-26's which would require maintenance and supply support for a period of 120 days from 30 March 1961 54 Problems of acquisition notwithstanding there was no question in the minds of the men most closely associated with air operations -- Stan Beerli George Gaines Gar Thorsrud and Billy Campbell -- that the B-26 was the best possible aircraft that could have been acquired for the operation intended George Gaines DPD's Chief of Air Operations for JMATE was most emphatic in his defense of the B-26 He noted that even when the operation still was planned to be one of guerrilla warfare there were to be combat aircraft on call and Gaines went on to say that if possible they wanted to use the same type of aircraft that the Cuban Air Force had When queried about the initial attempts to get the AD-5 t s rather than It is not clear whether the Air Force failed to deliver the B-26's at the time that they were requested by Jake Esterline or whether the 16 rather than 18 total to be supported represents the loss of two B-26's during training operations Whatever the number DPD had apparently given serious consideration -- as they had in the summer of 1960 -- to recalling some B-26's from the Far East for use in JMATE but this transfer apparently did not take place However on the last day of March 1961 Mr Bissell did order Col Beerli to attempt to get an additional two combat- ' ready B-26's assigned to Eglin on an alert basis 54a - 44 - the B-26's Gaines allowed that the AD-5 did have good range and combat load characteristics but he went on to state I personally preferred the B-26 all along because it had a come-home engine ooo twin engines The AD-5 was sort of a protege of some of the other people in the Air Section who thought that we should try it because of its range and combat load I was more interested in deniability and of course the safety factor of the second engine 55 Along the same line Gaines also noted that Jake Esterline had some would-be pilots on his staff who were trying to tell him how we should employ our aircraft This caused more friction than it did help We knew what we could do with the aircraft and we didn't need any Monday morning quarterback telling us how far we could fly B-26's and still get home Because we are going to be sitting in them we want to make damn sure we get home 56 Like Col Gaines Gar Thorsrud who actually directed the air strikes against Cuba out of the TIDE base was unequivocal in his support of the B-26 saying I thinR the B-26 was the best aircraft with the firepower and the wing-loading of that aircraft ooo there were some questions later in the game o why didn't you have a tail gun a tail-turret Well that went out years ago as far as a tailturret on those aircraft It might have saved someone later in the opera ion but I think everything should be looked at from the way it was originally planned and changed 57 - 45 - Thorsrud also pointed out that under the original plan there would have been plenty of loiter time for the B-26's and according to him the aircraft could have unloaded all the armament that they carried and still had time for reconnaissance 58 In response to a question regarding the configuration of the a-gun nose rather than mounting calibers and 37mm fou 50 cannon or perhaps a 75mm cannon and two 50 calibers Thorsrud said Oh God oo an 8-gun nose you can roll a locomotive off that track with it o Eight 50's oo we had all we needed to take out any of the Sea Fury's the T-birds -- the jets that they had -- and most of the light tanks and then we had oo I can't remember all the ordnance that we had o 500 pounders and frags We had all the ordnance that we needed to do the job that we were supposed to do 59 Col Stan Beerli also defended the choice of the B-26 as quite adequate for the mission that had been planned for the Brigade Air Force and he too emphasized the twin-engine aspect as one of the more favorable features of the B-26 in comparison to any single engine aircraft 60 There were one Or two aspects of the B-26 however which were looked on with less favor by the Air Operations people one was the difficulty that the aircraft footnote continued on following page - 46 - Connie Seigrist one of the few North Americans who would fly a B-26 in action over Playa Giron had some particular objections not to the B-26 itself but to the modifications that had been built into some of the aircraft which were acquired during the course of the JMATE operation Going back to the initial request of 11 August 1960 it was suggested that long-range ferry tanks be installed in the bomb bays of the B-26's Seigrist pointed out About six replacement B-26's arrived at TIDE at the same time of evening as we Price myself and 4 Cuban flown B-26's returned from our strike at the Bay of Pigs These replacement B-26's had ferry tanks strapped permanently in the bomb bays In my estimation they were flying bombs -- we never used presented in terms of an emergency bail-out Thorsrud in a discussion of this subject for example pointed out One of our contract pilots had bailed out in Indonesia He went over the top of the canopy and he hit the horizontal stabilizer and broke his leg which probably saved his life o o because when he got on the ground he had his carbine and his pistol with him and he was in such shock that o he probably would have tried to fight his way out of it if he hadn't done that It was not an easy aircraft to get out of though There is a recommended technique if all goes well but if your speed is up it is going to carry you right up and into the horizontal stabilizer 61 - 47 - them Like the T-33's it was too late anyway to have used them 62 It should be mentioned in passing that despite the strong support for the B-26 from the air operations officers particularly the Headquarters element some rather interesting questions evolved shortly after the receipt of the first B-26's at the training base at Retalhuleu On 25 November 1960 a cable from Headquarters requested MADD In order complement published technical data at Headquarters desire you advise us maximum range possible with fully-combat armed B-26 with one hour fuel reserve 63 It strikes the non-technical observer that this was a rather strange request to be coming from the Headquarters complement that had pushed so hard for the acquisition of this particular type aircraft -especially since one of the principal contentions was the suitability of the range for B-26 operations MADD responded to the Headquarters query noting a range of 1 600 NM or an action radius of 800 NM 63a The difference between the Agency's initial request for long-range ferry tanks in the B-26's and those noted by Seigrist was the fact of a permanent installation of the long range tanks heretofore the tanks had been of the type hung on the bomb shackles and removable Headquarters then made the following inquiry regarding the 50 caliber machine guns on the B-26's 1 Request confirmation re 300 rounds each of 8 machine guns 2 T O IB-26B-2-9 states 360 rounds per ammo box which feeds two guns Four ammo boxes installed each A C This would provide 180 rounds per gun 3 Advise 64 It would seem that the cart had preceded the horse with Headquarters asking the field what kind of a monster they had on their hands The cable traffic between Retalhuleu and Headquarters also revealed that from very early during the training period through the close out of the operation there would be various types of B-26 equipment shortages that would crop up to the consternation of the air operations people Of the pieces of equipment that seemed to be in critically short supply during the course of the activity w re pylon fuel tanks for the B-26's and as early as November 1960 cable traffic indicated concern about the shipment JMATE apparently queried DPD along similar lines early in Sep ember 1960 In response to a 2 September request Lt Colonel Gaines forwarded a memorandum to Jake Esterline outlining various characteristics of the B-26B aircraft See Appendix 2 - 49 - of these particular items and MADD stated i t had no spares in this category a situation recalled by Connie Seigrist who 15 years after the event recalled that All of our first B-26's had pylon mounted external tanks But we all attempted to bring the tanks back as we didn't have many replacement tanks 65 In addition to the acquisition of B-26's for project JMATE it was also necessary to acquire aircraft for transport supply propaganda drop and paradrop operations The aircraft that would be used for these activities were C-46's and C-54's The initial acquisition of C-46's was from HBILKA with four C-46's being flown in from the Far East and there were to be four instructor pilots a maintenance man and a logistics procurement specialist also brought in from HBILKA The estimated cost for bringing in the aircraft training the crews and other expenses for a period of four months -- the overly optimistic estimate made in early October 1960 -- was $206 290 00 66 Connie Seigrist then with the Civil Air Transpor ferried one of the first two C-46's from the Far East to Guatemala He told the following story - 50 - of this particular episode I was living in Taipei Taiwan in August 1960 I knew there were preparations being made to send a couple of C-46's to Texas Naturally all of us pilots were curious to what was in the wind I asked my boss and a good friend VPO Bob Rousselot if I could get in on the operation we were all employed by Civil Air Transport Although I didn't know what the operation was at the time and I doubt that Bob knew Anyway I was accepted and I was immediately given a refresher flight in B-26 gunnery flying on a CAF Gunnery Range just west of Taipei CAF-Chinese Air Force o W H Beale co-captain L C Cartwright navigator S L Tong 1st Officer and myself as co-captain departed TPE 3 September 1960 flying a CAT C-46 to Oakland S L Tong left the crew in Oakland and returned to TPE We three flew to San Antonio where we were informed by Chick a nickname a formerJ I jemployee an A ency company I lOLUlll 1 PE that we were to fly to San Jose Guatemala I am not really sure but I believe we arrived late at night on the 9th or past 12 midnight which could have been the 10th From that time I never left the operation 67 In addition to being instructor-pilots for C-46's Beale and Seigrist were also qualified instructorpilots for B-26's Seigrist also was qualified as an instructor-pilot for the PBY Seigrist was probably the best and certainly the most active in terms of operational flying of all the American pilots associated with Project JMARC - 51 - T _E_T _ ____ The C-46 aircraft -- like most of the JMCLEAR aircraft -- were nominally owned __________-----lla legal 1 1 and also an Agency proprietary corporation The aircraft were leased to Manuel F Goudie and in turn by Goudie to the Cuban exile organization the FRO The C-54 work horses which were used to transport the bulk of the troops and materiel from Florida to Guatemala during the training period were similarly under the nominal cover of I f Unlike the C-46's which actually belonged I toO but had conditional sales papers -s-h-o-w- - n-g-t-h-e-o-wn-e-rship by I ---Jr the C-54' s with the exception of two of the aircraft were leased from the United States Air Force 67a As with the B-26's acquisition of the C-54's gave rise to additional occasions of displeasure among DPD WH 4 and DOD Although the original memorandum was not recovered it is apparent that a direct approach was made by WH Division to the Department of Defense -- - 52 - circumventing the DPD channel-- to provide air resupply to anti-Castro guerrilla forces upon request by WH 4 Chief DPD Colonel Beerli was highly incensed over this apparent by-pass and among other items that he brought to the attention of Chief Western Hemisphere Division were the following That the WH requirement set forth in the referenced memorandum would seem to preclude the use of DPD assets which have been developed for employment in other similar type operations That DPD had both aircrews and available aircraft capable of delivering 60 000 pounds of cargo per night and in addition had an experienced task force capable of planning launching and retrieving air missions This delivery capability was far in excess of requirements which had been indicated by WH 4 Beerli went on to point out that under certain conditions requests could be made of DOD for aircraft to supplement the Agency's capability but it was apparent from the tone of his memorandum that he did not believe that such time had arrived 67b In an internal memorandum from John Mallard WH 4 SA Mil to Chief WH 4 0ps Col Mallard made it quite clear that he believed DPD had overstated its case and he specified that while Col Beerli had - 53 - claimed that DPD had five C-54's available one of these was being held by the Mexican government following an eme gency landing and a second had crash landed in Guatemala while on a training flight The latter had been so badly damaged that its destruction by burning was authorized fo'llowing the removal of some salvagable parts 67c Mallard also suggested that the Agency go forward to DOD asking them to develop a contingency air plan for resupply of guerrilla forces should the anti-Castro program of the US become overt 67d Even as Mallard's comments were going forward within WH 4 Col Beerli apparently concluded that the certain conditions If to which he referred in his earlier memorandum had arrived and he went forward to the DOD with a request 26 October 1960 for loan or bailment of four C-54G's on an extremely short deadline e g by 1 November 1960 67e Beerli' srequest went over like a lead balloon with General Lansdale OSO OSD who had received the request Lansdale had a memorandum hand carried to Mr Bissell 27 October 1960 the DDP in which he outlined the impracticability of being able to meet the deadline - 54 - recommended He suggested the need for improved management practices by the Agency noted that readying the aircraft from the standpoint of safety and security was time consuming and concluded it is suggested that if you determine that 1 November is a more or less arbitrary deadline which can be eased it would be most helpful to do so for the benefit of both organizations 67f The foregoing kinds of skirmishing would be characteristic in greater or lesser degree throughout the life of the project It should be recorded how- ever that the project did not suffer more than minor inconvenience re the availability of C-54's from the USAF inventory -- none of which in any way affected the outcome Through October and into early November 1960 there was considerable correspondence concerning the methods by which the business transactions and commercial activitiesofl L ICOUld be securely backstopped to hide JMCLEAR activities but these were resolved to the satisfaction of both WH 4 and DPD Monthly cost for rental ofl lair- craft -- 4 C-46's 8 B-26's 2 C-54's and 2 Helios -- as of early November was nearly $35 000 a month All of the aircraft of course were presumably leased to Senor Goudie the FRO's finance man in Miami 68 The heavy demand for transport aircraft of course was explained by the sharp increases in manpower that resulted from the changing concepts of the anti-Castro program in the Fall of 1960 The program calling for the infiltration of the three-man guerrilla teams had given way to the invasion program which by the first week of December in 1960 called for a 750-man Brigade to seize and hold a lodgement in Cuba A ISO-man element of that strike force would either be airdropped or air landed in the lodgement area Air delivery of supplies to support the Brigade forces plus overflights to support the increasing numbers of dissidents -- who would JPY be attracted to the antiCastro side as the Brigade's lodgement became more certain -- were estimated to run on the order of two million pounds for the period between 1 December 1960 and 28 February 1961 Of this total 600 000 lbs was The change in concept of Project JMATE is discussed in detail in Volume I I I of this history EvoZution of CIA's Anti-Castro PoZicies 3 1959-January 1961 - 56 - shown as a requirement for a consolidation of the GW and strike force activities 69 Among the types of aircraft which were utilized for the JMATE operation there also was a Constellation model 1649 Belonging to DPD it had been acquired for use in another capacity but in effect it was put into serviceable condition following the request of the DDP in November of 1960 for possible use as an evacuation vehicle for personnel at JMADD On 17 Jan- uary 1961 the Assistant Chief DPD James A Cunningham Jr had prepared a memorandum requesting DDP approval to charge JMATE $100 000 for getting the Constellation the necessary FAA certification Of this sum $15 000 was required for the installation of a weather radar $50 000 for a rebuilt spare engine and $35 000 for maintenance in the standby capacity for the possible evacuation of JMATE for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1961 Mr Bissell approved these changes 70 As discussed in another volume of this history WH 4 and DPD initially hoped to solve the problem of aircraft maintenance and servicing through agreements with the Costa Rican organization SALA Negotiations were terminated by November 1960 when it seemed apparent - 57 - that SALA was about to make excess profit -- also the SALA activity got into a sensitive political area in Guatemala 71 c Relations with OSO DOD and the Air National Guard Reference has already been made to some of the difficulties between Agency components -- DPD andWH 4 -- and both the Office of Special Operations of the secretary of Defense OSO DOD and the United States Air Force concerning the acquisition of additional aircraft from the USAF inventory There also were continuing difficulties between the Agency's representatives and the Defense components concerning the See Volume II Participation in the Conduct of Foreign PoZicy I utilization of military personnel particularly air either in support of black flights or for assignments in foreign areas Permission for assign- ment of USAF personnel to foreign countries was not granted during the course of JMATE and even the military assignees to CIA who were serving in Guatemala were prohibited from serving in Nicaragua during the immediate invasion period By mid-September 1960 however the Air Force was amenable to the use of its aircrews for black flights into areas outside of the ZI but the Agency had to insure that in case the operation was blown the crewmen and their families would have all the benefits that they would have accrued had they not become involved in the Agency's anti-Castro operation The task of acquiring the resignations from Air Force personnel and preparing the volunteer statements which each individual was required to sign fell to the Military Personnel Division of the Office of Volume II of this history discusses the problems presented when the Agency attempted to get a specific allotment of Special Forces Trainers for use in Guatemala A passing reference was made in that discussion to the possible assignment of USAF personnel in the overseas area - 59 - Personnel Pending completion of the paper work utilization of Air Force personnel in black flights was to be suspended and although it was not specified in the memorandum of consent from the Air Force i t was reported that USAF personnel at the third country training site Guatemala were being withdrawn 73 With the initiation of DPD as the operational air arm for Project JMATE it was quickly realized that there was an urgent need for an airbase in the southern United States that would be suitable as the point of origin and the terminus for black flights -- for bodies and supplies -- to Guatemala Among other inactive airfields in southern Florida which were inspected was that portion of the Marine Corps Air Station at Opalocka Florida The 4 000 acre field had been declared excess to the needs of the Department of the Navy in early-1959 Following an Why such withdrawal would have been necessary is somewhat confusing in view of the memorandum from Ed Stanulis the Deputy Chief of WH 4 on 12 September 1960 in which he pointed out to the Chief WH 4 that at a briefing on 18 August 1960 for President Eisenhower and ranking US Government officials approval for use of DOD personnel in the Guatemalan Training Program was requested and obtained Stanulis's memo further said that WH 4 needs were spelled out for two USAF Training Supervisors 15 crew members from C-54's and two USN medics one MD and one Corpsman 74 inspection in early September 1960 the Agency determined that a 1 500 acre segment in the north part of the field would be ideal for JMATE requirements -length of runway hangers magazines warehouses railroad siding and relative isolation provided the facilities and security necessary to the planned anti-Castro operations Because the General Services Administration had started disposal action a year and a half prior to the time of its investigation the Director of Logistics worked quickly and got the GSA Public Buildings Service Commissioner to agree to withhold disposal action on the north portion of the field and some magazines near the particular airstrip in which the Agency was interested Working through channels representatives of the Office of Logistics -- Col Thomas A McCrary Acting Director of Logistics andl -- O-- - ----- Chief Real Estate and Construction Division -- contacted Rear Admiral H A Renken Director Shore Station Construction and Maintenance Division Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Renken indicated that Navy would interpose no objection to Agency use of the field and offered whatever assistance was - 61 - required and the Admiral also advised both the commanding officer of the Opalocka Station and the Admiral in charge of the Charleston District of the decision to support CIA's use of the Opalocka facility 75 It is possible that the quick footwork on the part of the Agency1s representatives in acquiring rights to the Opalocka facility antagonized some people in OSO DOD with whom the Agency had been negotiating for the acquisition of an airstrip for a period of several weeks -- but with negative results Some evidence of satisfaction is apparent in the memorandum of WH 4 1s weekly meeting with the OSO representatives on 15 September 1960 which stated in part The use of Opalocka Marine Air Base was discussed and the OSO representatives were told this use for black flights had been cleared by Navy through Admiral Rankin sic GSA approval had been previously obtained however DOD interest was still indicated since the field was guarded by US Navy enlisted personnel and Naval Air Reserve occasionally uses the field Col routy was called at 1730 this date and informed that the field would be used 16 September He agreed with this A paper on the use of Opa1ocka will be forwarded to OSo 76 Emphasis by author - 62 - Initiation of Agency operations at Opalocka soon became the focus of local business interests which had commercial designs on the property and of the n media Fortunately DOD's initial cover story that the facility was being used for storage of outdated ammunition by an Army element prior to ultimate disposal -- had been replaced by a more effective story of FAA responsibility for the activities at Opalocka This was brought to the attention of the Executive Officer DCI John S Erman on 8 November 1960 by Col Stanley Grogan the Agency's public information officer Grogan noted that Jim Haggerty of the White House staff and Andrew Berding of State had been asked by the Washington representative of the Knight newspapers to discuss allegations that CIA was operating a training camp at Opalocka Both the White House anct the State representatives referred the newspaper people to the Agency but when a DOD representative remarked that the facility was under GSA control the newsmen immediately pursued that lead The GSA representative did confirm that the Opalocka Naval Base was surplus adding that it was his understanding that the Navy was using the area - 63 - for classified purposes When Grogan broached this question with Ed Stanulis of WH 4 Stanulis called Elton Hailey Director of Information GSA and informed Hailey that the cover story was to be that FAA now operated the field and would be doing some classified experimental flights for safety purposes Stanulis also informed the Navy liaison officer at Opalocka to avoid making any public statements or providing information to the press regarding activities at Opalocka The Navy retained responsibility for base security and maintenance -- at Agency expense but the operational responsibility would be attributed to FAA with all public announcements originating in Washington 77 Immediately following the decision on Opalocka there seemed to be a greater degree of cooperation between the Agency representatives and their DOD counterparts Even when the Office of Special Opera- tions pointed out that the Navy would be unable to For additional operational details concerning Opalocka the reader is referred to James Burwell Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba March 1960-0ctober 1961 DDS OL-7 April 1971 pp 34-37 49-55 S - 64 - provide either search and rescue vessels on an intermittent basis as requested for Agency air operations or to provide much assistance in the vicinity of Swan Island Chief WH 4 seemed to be relatively unconcerned In fact his report seems almost cavalier in pointing out to the Acting Chief DPD that until Project JMATE acquired several ships which might be of some assistance for rescue of airmen downed at sea it would be some time before such resources would be sufficient to meet the needs of DPD 78 By late November 1960 however relations with OSO DOD seemed to be going down hill again Not only would the question of the Army Special Forces trainers be a point of contention but the whole spectrum of decisions on bases overseas operations overflights use of US military personnel and other responsibilities was again at issue between WH 4 and OSo The memo- randum of a conference WH 4 representatives had with It is for this reason that the DPD operations officers were much concerned about the acquisition of a PBY to be able to perform air-to-sea rescue Swan Island in the Caribbean was the location of an Agency operated radio station which broadcast antiCastro propaganda to Cuba See Volume III of this history Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies 3 1959January 1961 for more detailed discussion capt Burns W epresentative of OSOI DOD concluded among other things that the conference with Capt Spore accomplished little other than to point up the difficulty of obtaining future DOD support under the present circumstances 79 On 29 November 1960 a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations went forward for the DDP requesting two operational staff officers who were recently qualified in air to ground gunnery rocketry o and capable of tactical mission planning two operations support officers who had recent experience in tactical mission planning and six weapons maintenance supervisors and one aircraft It was at this meeting on 25 November 1960 that Jake Esterline strongly suggested that the reluctant attitude exhibited by Capt Spore towards supporting Project JMATE was a reflection of the pressures that were being exerted by the Department of State which was squeamish about OAS and UN discovery of Agency involvement in the anti-Castro activity Spore's contention was that DOD was being asked to buy a pig in a poke and that the problems could be resolved if WH 4 would provide more detailed briefings concerning its plans An interesting note is that reporting on this and other of the sessions betweenWH 4 and OSO was the responsibility of Col John F Mallard USMC a military assignee to WH 4 responsible for liaison with the DOD Mallard's reporting throughout the operation reflects high credit on his integrity for it reflects the pros and cons of all parties positions -- and could easily have put him between a rock and a hard place Mallard's career may in fact have suffered He refused the author's request for an oral interview and he declined to respond to written questions and missile ground support equipment repairman for assignment to Project CROSSPATCH the DOD designation for JMATE Col Mallard's note on WH 4's copy of the memorandum made the following cryptic comment This requirement has already been for'warded I have talked to Spore Capt Burns W who is withholding any action until he is notified this requirement meets with the approval of C JMARC Maybe we don't have this authority to withhold action since the requirement is signed for DD P A thermo copy has 'been provided to both CCD and MMPD 81 As would be pointed out in a subsequent review of the JMATE operation DOD did not respond to the request of 29 November and consequently on 17 January 1961 another memorandum repeated the request for the weapons and maintenance men Again however DOD failed to respond to the Agency's requirement and the weapons men were never assigned and the mission planners were selected from Air 'National Guard personnel in lieu of a response from DOD 82 Although the routing slip with this notation is addressed to WH 4 COPS and to Mr Richard D Drain the distribution list typed on the memo itself does not indicate that any copies were provided to WH 4 Mallard's comment presumably isa reference to the fact that Chief WH 4 must have been unavailable at this time -- at any rate the routing slip shows that C WH 4 had been scratched out - 67 - On 27 December 1960 a memorandum was hand carried to Team B Directorate of Plans DCS P P Hqs USAF by Agency representatives requesting the TDY assignment of 47 USAF enlisted personnel to TDY duty at L- Hanky-panky over this --------- request continued through February and March of 1961 and on 25 April after the close out of the Bay of Pigs operation it was reported that the 47 men still had not been assigned to Eglin 83 The fuss over the use of USAF types was not limited solely to the discussions between the Agency and DOD although this is where the most serio s in- fighting took place but i t also ascended to the level of the Special Group meetings During December 1960 the Special Group questioned the need for increased numbers of Air Force personnel at both US and foreign bases and there also was discussion about the increasing use of USAF personnel to fly missions in support of Project JMATE including over-flights of Cuba Resistance to involving US personnel frequently came from Deputy Secretary of Defense James H Douglas during the course of the Special Group meetings and Douglas was supported frequently by Thomas Mann the - 68 - Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs The Special Group was particularly concerned about the Agency's requests to operate direct supply or resupply flights to the dissident elements in Cuba out of Opalocka or Eglin There were no positive responses given to the problems presented in any of these areas prior to the end of December 1960 84 In a memorandum to the DDP on 21 December 1960 OSD had apparently set IS January 1961 as the date for pulling out all of the Air Force personnel assigned to the Agency who are on TDY at JMADD The DDP and the A DDP A Messrs Bissell and Barnes respectively were ready to joust with higher echelons in the Depart- ment of Defense but cooler heads prevailed when it was pointed out to the DDP that Major General Winston P Wilson Deputy Chief Air National Guard Bureau had recently stated that he wouid be quite willing to have the Air National Guard do anything that it could to contribute to the success of Project JMATE Conse- quently it was agreed that approaches be made to the Air Force to modify the date for the withdrawal of their personnel from JMADD until ANG replacements had been organized In question were IS positions which - 69 - the Air Force was filling at the Retalhuleu Base 85 The decision to turn to the Air National Guard for qualified air operations personnel in January 1961 was not any hurried decision on the part of DPD planners Shortly after the authorization for DPD to participate in Project JMATE contact had been made with General Wilson Sidney Stembridge a security officer for DPD and Lt Col George Gaines made the initial contact with General Wilson One of the reasons for visiting Wilson was that the ANG in Washington had two B-26's which the DPD representatives asked if they could borrow to train crews This was agreeable to Wilson and when additional planes and crews were needed Wilson took DPD to visit the commanding officer of the Georgia Air National Guard General Davey -who in turn sent them to General Reid Doster of the Alabama Air National Guard General Davey's Georgia Air Unit had phased out of the B-26's but Gen Doster's Alabama Group was still familiar with that particular aircraft 86 Following the initial contact with General Wilson Sid Stembridge and a contracting officer from DPD Lyle Miller signed up five of the DC Air National Guard - 70 - between 11 and 15 August 1960 for maintenance work on the B-26's explaining to the ANG members that the work would be outside the continental United States and would be for a period of thirty days Cover stories emergency contact numbers insurance and secrecy agreements were all concluded with the CIA representatives and this was the first contingent of Air National Guardsmen who were signed aboard for service with Project JMATE 87 Before the operation closed out in April 1961 there were 33 members of the Alabama ANG 21 from the Arkansas ANG 14 from Georgia 9 from the District of Columbia and 2 from California who served with the project Of nearly gO ANG personnel who participated in the anti-Castro effort 19 served as overflight crews The four Americans who lost their lives over The California duo were apparently not in the ANG in that State but were spotted by Guard or military contacts In addition to those 80 who actually belonged to National Guard Units another SO contract employees with either ANG affiliation or spotted by ANG personnel were under contract to one of pro ect JMATE's cover companies I I r were d1rect h1res onsequentIy tne LIgure co only used for total ANG participation in the Project is 130 - 71 - Cuba on 19 April 1961 were all members of the Alabama ANG contingent 88 Major Billy B Campbell who was initially put in charge of the B-26 air training program down in Guatemala also played a key role with Sid Stembridge in obtaining support from the ANG In an interview with the author Campbell made the following remarks We borrowed General Wilson's two National Guard airplanes out of Andrews AFB to do the initial training in These aircraft were much lighter and much faster than the airplanes we finally received which were the ones from the Far East Flown back to Kelly Air Force Base and refitted we flew them all down to Guat City Getting back to the qualifications and the training and the people we were training ooo among the areas that I was really worried about was the maintenance of the airplanes the maintenance of the guns on the B-26's and making sure that we had the proper people to l ad the cargo aircraft for paradrops This is why we initially went back and started asking for Americans to come on down and help and I was the one that proposed to get people out of the National Guard They had B-26's in Georgia in Alabama and in Arkansas at the time Sid Stembridge was well aware of this In fact we flew together with Gen Reid Doster on his airplane back in the fall of 1960 to Birmingham and Doster said you can have all my people who want to volunteer as long as I go myself We pointed out to him that we couldn't take a two-star General and put him down there in charge of the people In any event he did go down and was there in Puerto Cabezas during the operation This takes us back again too ooo we got the initial maintenance people down and this gave me a cadre of qualified people to take care of the three types of airplanes we had then 89 There is evidence that the push for the acquisition of Air National Guard personnel -- even prior to the time that OSO DOD and the Agency came to the parting of the ways -- was overly successful In early December Headquarters cabled MADD as follows 1 Headquarters feels mandatory all repeat all ANG personnel be assigned MADD and kept busy 2 If necessar to return all I cept supply to EGL o JrOVide space personnel ex- 3 Realize this may create temporary hardship but feel inability utilize all ANG personnel after all out push to recruit may seriously affect relations with ANG ANG by long odds most reliable and cooperative source personnel 90 That this appreciation of support from the ANG was not overstated was made quite clear in January 1961 when the Agency's representatives again went to General Wilson They requested five officers and seven additional enlisted personnel explaining to the General that the USAF was about to withdraw its - 73 - personnel from the project As usual Wilson was quite sympathetic and he immediately called Brigadier General Frank A Bailey Commander of the Arkansas Guard Gen Bailey was told that the agency representatives would shortly be in contact with him and that he should fully support CIA's request for officer and enlisted personnel When the contact was made with Gen Bailey he was fully 'cooperative as he had been in the previous instances where Arkansas ANG personnel had been provided to Project JMATE 91 As D-Day drew nearer the underemployment of ANG personnel apparently was a thing of the past for by 1 March 1961 the Agency again had made advances to the Air Force about the possibility of using USAF personnel in Nicaragua As in the past however DOD's position was that another secret agreement -- this time with the government of Nicaragua -- would be necessary before military personnel could be utilized Even as the approach was being made to OSO DOD Jake Esterline was suggesting to the DPD that ANG support As detailed in Volume II a secret agreement had to be 'negotiated with Guatemala before DOD would assign US Army Special Forces trainers to JMTRAV - 74 - would be easier come by than that from DOD Jim Cunningham Assistant Chief to Stanley Beerli in DPD was pointing out that with the additions of C-54 aircraft to Eglin to support Project JMATE to say nothing of the problems of handling B-26's which were being delivered to Field 3 from Hill Air Force Base the problems of loading and unloading logistics storage and painting of aircraft at the Eglin Base were so great that DPD might seriously have to consider drafting people from throughout the Agency or going into the open market to obtain blue collar workers 92 As a final note on the Agency's relations with OSO DOD i t should be emphasized that without exception the air operations personnel -- and others familiar with the air operations -- who we e interviewed by the author were universal in their agreement that Col Fletcher Prouty the 000 050 USAF representative was ______________________ ------------IParticularlyas the decision was made to withdraw USAF personnel from the overseas base in Guatemala Gar Thorsrud put it in the following rather explicit terms There was a guy over there at DOD OSO b the name of Fletcher Prouty -- who was and he did everyt ing he could to put stumbling blocks 1 1-- - 75 - in front of the Agency all through that operation ooo There were some situations with our liaison with the Air Force through Fletcher Prouty that I think were I I '93 D Initial Planning for Air Operations It has already been noted that when DPD officially came into the JMATE program in July 1960 various aspects of air operations had been considered in the planning infiltration and exfiltration propaganda drops supply drops and the possibility of tactical targets for combat aircraft Even before being assigned to support JMATE DPD had anticipated some requirements which would be necessary to the success of WH 4's air operations As early as 6 April 1960 for example Casimiro Chick Barquin participated in a meeting with representatives of the Photo Intelligence Center to gather all known sources of coverage of Cuba ooo It is my opinion that complete coverage of the island will be required if any PM efforts are envisioned which will be supported by air 94 That Barquin's insticts were excellent was verified by a memorandum from George Gaines Jr the Chief JMCLEAR to the Acting Chief DPD on 2 August - 76 - - ' 1960 when Gaines wrote It was determined in the meeting of the JMARC Task Force on 2 August 1960 that photo coverage of the target country was necessarY in order to adequately affect the JMARC Project This photo coverage should be done '50 as to provide JMARC intelligence with a finished product not later than 19 September 1960 The specific requirement is to determine with the latest equipment' available the loca- tion and type of ai roc roaft in the ta roget count roy 95 From the outset of DPD's involvement i t was clear to Gaines that the first step in a successful operation would have to be the elimination of Castro's Air Force Such aerial reconnaissance as had been done on Cuba was principally the work of the US Navy At the time that DPD became involved in the project the push was on for the use of the U-2 but this had to be cleared not only with the DCI but also Special Group 5412 wi the During the discussion of the first planned U-2 overflight Mr Gordon Gray President Eisenhower's Assistant for National Security Affairs showed signs of trauma -- perhaps residual from the shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in May 1960 and Emphasis by author in the Special Group meeting of 20 October 1960 Gray insisted that the pilot be carefully selected and that he be thoroughly briefed by a CIA official senior enough to have your Allen Dulles's full confidence He said'that he thought it particularly important to direct the pilot not to land on Cuban soil under any circumstances and also that the pilot be well indoctrinated in the cover story 96 When the Special Group met on 27 October 1960 General Cabell told the group that the U-2 flight was then in progress and this led to the expression of some controversial opinions between Assistant Secretary for Defense Douglas and other members of the Special Group Douglas said that he saw little necessity for running the risk inherent in the U-2 flight suggesting that the only purpose of the flight was to get photographic verification of the existence of Bloc military equipment in Cuba but other members of the group disagreed with Douglas's view Mr Merchant of State pointed out that there was a minimal risk of serious mishap and emphasized The Powers' shoot-down also appeared to be an issue when the use of the U-2 had been discussed a few weeks earlier during a White House meeting which DDP and WH 4 representatives had with Col John Eisenhower 97 - 78 - '- ' that there was a considerable need to obtain adequate topographic information however and noted Merchant went on even further that it will always be easy to find some reason not to run such a mission e g if i t is not the election upc9ming us Presidential elec- tion of November 1960 i t might be the General Assembly or something else Undaunted Mr Gray said that any subsequent U-2 operations would also be subject to prior discussion with the Special Group before being flown 981 As the reader can well imagine there was a growing need for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba as Project JMATE progressed Req irements concerned not only potential air targets but potential troop landing sites landing strips for light aircraft for black operations including seaplane landings and possible areas for the Brigade landing or deception to divide Castro's forces activit es With the approach of D-Qay in early April of 1961 Col Gaines was meeting with representatives of the Special Projects Branch of DPD The Special Group also was to be advised of any planned overflights of Cuba -- reconnaissance supply or other -- but notification of any but U-2 flights might specifically be waived by the DCI 98al - 79 - to formalize the final reconnaissance requirements for Project JMATE Among other items it was agreed that there would be complete overhead coverage of Cuba beginning as of D-3 there would be both pre- and post-strike reconnaissance of primary targets and the post-strike photography would be done as soon as possible after the initial D-Day strike with followup coverage on the afternoon of D-Day Such follow- up post-strike coverage as required or special photographic requirements that developed during the course of the operation were also noted in the discussions of 3 April 1961 between Gaines and Lt Col Songer of the Special Projects Branch 99 In addition to the early call for photo reconnaissance requirements there were other considerations of immediacy to early planning for air operations Soon after Eisenhower's anti-Castro program had been announced WH 4 had d ferred on a DPD request for estimates of air transport requirements for its operations in support of the various anti-Castro guerrilla forces in At the time that these reconnaissance requirements were being discussed the operational plan still called for the D-Day Air Strike - 80 - Cuba A 13 August 1960 memorandum from Chief WH 4 to DPD is one of the most interesting documents that has been surfaced in the course of preparing the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Jake Esterline made a casual reference to the document during the course of an Oral History interview but he recalled that the memorandum outlined the anti-Castro program as initially conceived -- not as it ultimately failed For this reason there are a number of points the reader might consider apropos of the plans finally put into operation Among its key features the document called for the initiation of air support operations against Cuba to begin between August and 15 November 1960 One paragraph of this memorandum read as follows Aircraft requirements a e predicted on mounting the air and maritime assault for a base or bases within 450 statute mile radius of targets in Cuba Base to target distances in excess of this criteria are unrealistic andunsupportable from continuing air and maritime operations utilizing World War II vintage air and sea support on a scale compatible with nonattributability to the us Government 100 In the discussion of air suppression operations which were scheduled to begin in November 1960 the 81 - destruction of the Castro Air Force on D-Day was to be achieved by attacks on eight principal airfields and in addition D-Day air strikes also were scheduled for non-military bases with the intent to cripple the mobile reserves in the barracks and to destroy materiel 101 Discussing air cover operations during the assault phase the following paragraph appears Provision for fighter escort for air assault forces air cover of amphibious force and on-call close air support of ground operational force in all surface operations encompassing approximately 100 square miles of area Estimated aircraft requirement two fighters on station during daylight hours 102 Further examination of this document indicates that there were to be nine apparently small air-maritime infiltrations in the period between August and 15 November 1960 and on D-Day he basic assault was to be a 170 man combat assault force airlifted into Cuba carrying crew served weapons mortars recoiless rifles small arms bazookas and demolitions To back up the initial strike force there was to be another 170 man contingency force which subsequent to delivery of strike force on an on-call basis for execution within 6 hours of return from first airlift 103 - 82 - This was the guerrilla warfare plan which Jake Esterline thought might be mounted against Castro's forces Had this plan been followed air operations could have been launched only from the Yucatan peninsula or the Continental United States The only other Caribbean areas that would fit within the air range indicated in the referenced memorandum would have been the Bahama Islands and the Cayman Islands and Montego Bay in Jamaica would have been at the extreme range for attacks on Havana Eglin Air Force Base too would have been ruled out as the site for a launch from the Continental united States Also in terms of the air operation the extension of the distance between the operational base and the target country ruled out the possibility of using light aircraft for reconnaissance between the ground forces and the air force and it also eliminated the possibility of using the light aircraft to spot targets so that guerrilla units could take out such targets themselves Through early September at least a 500 mile maximum radius between operational base and target was still apparently the rule Similarly the use of USAF USN airfields and Caribbean possessions of the - 83 - British apparently had not been completely ruled out as of mid October 1960 -- at least Jack Hawkins and Jake Esterline still had thoughts about such facilities 104 Frank Egan Chief of ground forces training for JMATE also made a case for combining the use of bases in the Bahamas and in Florida for tactical air air transport and maritime operations In mid-September 1960 the Acting Chief Western Hemisphere Division went so far as to say of the Egan proposals While these recommendations have not yet received policy approval it is felt that operational requirements will dictate approval essentially as recommended and that this paper combined with anticipated air and paramilitary ground material sic requirements Attachments 2 and 3 will enable you to begin the development of base and transportation support requirements 105 As it turned out Egan's recommendations were not approved fo the use of either the Bahamas or CONUS as the site for operational strike bases In the lengthy memorandum in which he summarized the nature of the combined Air Maritime guerrilla attack on Cuba Egan came up with one estimate illustrating a problem that plagued DPD throughout the duration of JMATE -- that the air experts on the WH 4 staff would - 84 - make suggestions about air operations which had no necessary relation to the facts In commenting on the enemy capability to interdict or deny JMATE the use of the Florida and British airbases Egan stated By air attack the Government of Cuba's current capability to mount air strike operations of any magnitude against JMARC bases is considered to be minimal GOC however does possess the capability to conduct small scale air attacks 1-2 planes utilizing B-26 aircraft Major limitation to this capability is the current lack of politically reliable GOC flying crews 106 The point of course which Egan overlooked was that Castro did have the T-33's and Sea Furies which could reach the bases which might be established in either the Bahamas or in the southern part of Florida The FAR was to be the primary target of much of the photo reconnaissance that has just been mentioned The August 1960 USAF report identified the various types and numbers of aircraft including an estimate that among others there were some 30-odd combat types including B-26's Sea Furies and T-33's Of these USAF intelligence estimated that there were 12 B-26's 6-8 Sea Furies and 4 T-33's which might be used for - 85 - reconnaissance or light bombing missions 107 But the report claimed that there was at that time a shortage of pilots available for these aircraft and in fact stated The Cuban Rebel Air Force CRAF continues to be a highly disorganized force with very little operational capability The arrest of some 20 CRAF officers in May stripped the Air Force of its most qualified pilots including nine that were jet-qualified o o Although the Cuban Naval Air CNA was abolished and integrated with the CRAF this will not increase the CRAF's capability Thirteen 13 naval pilots who were trained at Pensacola during the past seven years were told that because of this training and their orientation they were no longer part of the armed forces o o Total personnel strength of the CRAF remains unknown After the arrest in May of some 20 CRAF officers and some 20 enlisted men the CRAF reportedly had remaining 4 USAF jet qualified pilots an unknown number of assimilated transport pilots from Cubana Civil Airlines and CRAF qualified B-26 transport and light aircraft pilots 109 The canard that Cuban airmen would prove to be an unreliable and undependable factor in any air operations that Castro might mount made little or no A report by an ad hoc USIB Committee showed the 1960 inventory for FAR as 14 Sea Furies 13 B-26's and 7 T-33's It also showed 6 TBM-38 Presumably this was a typographical error for TBM-3S an aircraft which had it been operational would have been of great concern to JMATE planners because of the threat it represented to shipping 108 - 86 - impression on the principals who were responsible for planning the air operations -- Beerli Gaines and Thorsrud clearly were concerned about FAR In fact George Gaines is on the record as having said We did not have to be told that one aircraft in the air would do us a great deal of damage and for that reason our understanding of the operations plan was that there ould be no landing on the island until we had destroyed all air-to-ground and air-to-air capability of the Government of Cuba aircraft 111 and Stan Beerli noted We had U-2 coverage and Art Lundahl and his people were giving us detailed readout of where everything was oo especially in terms of what had to be done to knock out the Cuban Air Force 112 It might be well at this point to mention that subsequent to the close out of JMATE there was speculation that the Air Operations people failed to consider the Castro T-33' they proved to be as the serious threat that These aircraft had been identified in the Castro inventory in the August 1960 memorandum Emphasis by writer Thorsrud also noted that they had U-2 photographs of every serviceable aircraft on the island 113 - 87 - from USAF intelligence Before the end of the year it was known that the T-33 jets were armed with two 50 caliber machine guns and in addition on the last day of 1960 one source had reported that FAR was in the process of equipping the T-33's with two additional 50 caliber guns 115 The question of knowledgeability about the armament or the lack of armament on the Castro T-33's was a subject of some misunderstanding during the Taylor Committee investigations ordered by President Kennedy following the failure at the Bay of Pigs Col Stanley Beerli in testifying before the group said that the FAR B-26's were the primary concern of the JMATE planners and that the capability of the T-33's had been underestimated because it was believed that they were unarmed 116 In discussing the subject with the author Gar Thorsrud Chief of Air Operations at the time of the invasion however pointed out that there As nearly as can be discovered from the records however nothing in particular was said about the USAF's statement that they had reports that the T-33's had been designated an interceptor role in FAR 114 No such armament was installed at the time of the invasion - 88 - was no question in the minds of the people closest to the Air operations that the T-33's were armed The question was one of how many 50 caliber machine guns they were mounting -- not that they were unarmed 117 George Gaines excused Col Beerli for not knowing the seriousness with which the Task Force regarded the T-33's because Col Beerli wasn't actually as close to the air operations details as he Gaines Being dependent on briefings for information Beerli may have been misinformed or uninformed about the armament of the T-33's In any event Gaines pointed out that anything that flew with a gun was important to us 118 ven on questioning Gar Thorsrud 15 years after the event one could sense the degree of resentment -- understandably so -- at being asked if the air operations people really did appreciate the T-33 for by no stretch of the imagination could Thorsrud the Air National Guard pilots and the contract American fliers be considered novices in 'combat air operations Thorsrud also emphasized the fact that the Brigade's Cuban pilots understood what they were going to be up against in flying B-26's into air space protected by the T-33's Thorsrud was far more willing to elaborate about some of the details of the combat characteristics of B-26's vs T-33's than he had been when the opportunity was presented to him for such discussion in the course of the Taylor Committee investigation In response to a Committee member's question of Were you surprised at the effectiveness of the T-33's Thorsrud's terse answer was I've flown T-33's -they're a good airplane We weren't surprised at footnote continued on following page With the destruction of FAR aircraft as the principal objective of air operations the discussions through the late fall of 1960 and early winter of 1961 focused on the number of air strikes which would be permitted vs the number which were necessary and the order of target priority By the end of 1960 one of the problems appears to have been over management of Project JMATE Air operations questions were being discussed in the Special Group and in addition Tracy Barnes the A DDP A was taking a more than active interest in air plans In mid-December a Barnes memorandum to Chief WH 4 strongly recommended that a program of three days of fairly intensive air strikes then under consideration be dropped because it would be objected to by Livingston Merchant of the Department of State among others Merchant according their capabilities once they were airborne 119 Chief Project JMATE Jake Esterlin also was extremely concerned about the possibilities of jet aircraft being employed against the Brigade's B-26's In the case of Esterline the fear was that MIG-IS's were going to be introduced into Cuba before the Brigade conducted its operation It was known for example that Cuban pilots were training in MIG'S in Czechoslovakia Although Esterline and some others have suggested that there actually were crated MIG's in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation the author has been unable to confirm this 120 - 90 - to Barnes would object because such intensive attacks would clearly indicate that the US was behind- the op- eration and then the Cubans could make a case in the UN which would be difficult for the to handle us representatives Barnes went on to suggest that All of us try to eliminate important opposition whether air or land by all possible means other than air strikes Various types of sabotage are of course obvious alternatives If the Cuban air strength remains as deficient as it now appears to be and if some sabotage operations can be effected it would seem that air strikes in support of the landing could be restricted to a small number of planes directed at relatively few targets and making their attack early on the morning of the landing By relatively few planes I have in mind a maximum of three 121 Barnes believed that the small number of aircraft would provide a rationale for blaming the attacks on the FRO -- that the FRO could have financed a small number of aircraft but they could not possibly finance the large number of B-26's being acquired in the JMATE inventory In his 28 December 1960 response to Barnes's memorandum Jake Esterline conceded that it was infeasible to expect a two-week period of air strikes prior to the landing and Esterline said that neither he nor - 91 - Col Hawkins had seriously considered that possibility Chief WH 4 did stress the fact that a three day period of intensive air strikes could be a critical factor in the success of plans against Castro He did how- ever recognize that there was a political problem for the US Government in continuing the air strikes over this length of time and he went on to suggest Recognizing however the difficult political problem this creates for the government community an acceptable compromise would be D-Day minus one This compromise is somewhat risky as new information coming in from controlled and sensitive sources indicates a formidable array of retaliatory power being pulled together by CASTRO Nevertheless we believe we can live with this compromise i f the D-Day minus one strike is made in sufficient strength to ensure negation of the Cuban capability I might add that this concept was discussed at some length with Ambassador Wilhauer who seemed to think he could live with it in his dealings with the Special Group 122 Barnes apparently was indefatigable for on the same day that Esterline was addressing the above Emphasis by author This reference to the possibility of a pre D-Day air strike -- D minus I -- as acceptable to Chief WH 4 is important in a later part of the story of air operations This is the earliest positive reference that the author found in the record - 92 - memorandum to him he in turn was addressing to Esterline -- again -- the question of the number of air strikes or alternatives to air strikes As he had done earlier in the month Barnes reraised as a possible alternative the elimination of air strikes completely Barnes also suggested the possibility of supporting an enclave on Cuban territory but not pushing forward with aggressive air attacks Just how this enclave was to be defended against Castro's forces without strong air support was left unclear 123 General Cabell the DDCl also got involved in the question of strikes when on 7 February 1961 he issued some injunctions apparently to Jake Esterline for Esterline had a memorandum for record listing several items the l ast me of the list reading as follows Re the D-l effort opposition in Defense DOD to this was expressed and the Director was inclined to agree Gen Cabell said he would hold firm on the concept that D minus 1 was necessary but that his compromise position with the Director would be that strikes on D minus 1 would not take place before he afternoon of said day extending into the morning of the attack 124 To the author's knowledge this position was never introduced nor defended by Gen Cabell when push came to shove on the critical issues of follow on strikes to D minus 2 and cancellation of the D-Day strike It is interesting to note too that if the language of Esterline's memorandum is correct then it was apparently anticipated that there would be strikes plural rather than any single strike - 94 - Part II Acquisition and Training of Air Crews A Basic Plan for Flight Training The problem of the acquisition of aircraft for the anti-Castro operations was discussed earlier in this volume This section will concern itself with the recruitment and training of pilots to fly those aircraft and the initiation of overflight operations The basic program for training of anti-Castro pilots is set forth in a document which probably originated in July or early August of 1960 It was prepared by DPD with Jake Esterline's concurrence port Annex I The Air Sup- Eye to Paramilitary Operations Plan #1 Operations Plan 60 AD-5 set forth its initial mission as follows A To conduct tactical air training designed to produce 12-15 combat qualified pilots in B-26 aircraft no later than 1 November 1960 B To conduct air training designed to produce 8-10 C-46 transport pilots as soon as practicable 1 In terms of its operational responsibility the plan went on to say The development of a controllable deniable air strike force has been levied on QKDAWN in support of PM Plan 1 of JMARC The requirement calls for a deterrent force capable of neutralizing various operational targets such as shipping docking facilities economic stockpiles and in general harassment of the target area regime to include marginal close order support to the extent of the aircraft's capability A task force capable of six month's sustained operation is planned As the nature of the over-all anti-Castro program evolved away from the guerrilla warfare concept through 'the early fall of 1960 so too would the air operations concept change from one of harassment to one of tactical targeting The basic programs set forth in this initial plan for the training and development of the anti-Castro Air Force would in large part continue to be the policies followed at JMADD the air training base at Retalhuleu Guatemala Among the many details spelled out in the plan some of the following are important in terms of their impact on the ongoing air training operation 1 The definition of the responsibilities of the Chief of Air Training at JMADD was spelled out The reader might note that in the above statement of utilization of the deterrent force no mention is made of an attack on Castro's Air Force - 96 - not only in terms of flight proficiency of the B-26 and C-46 pilots but also for establishing liaison in accordance with procedures established by I _ _ _ _ _ _Iin Guatemala -- a point which w-o-u l-d-p-r-o-v-i-de some differences of opinion through the months of training ahead 2 The responsibility for administration of the JMADD Base particularly the responsibilities of the administrative officer were clearly spelled out to indicate that this individual would be a WH appointee responsible for the personnel services and housekeeping of the base facilities whereas the Chief of Air Training would be responsible for personnel aircraft and services involved in the air operations and again this point provided some differences of opinion 3 All times were to be reported in Greenwich Meridian Time -- a requirement which at the last possible point for turning the invasion around or salvaging some of the Brigade was misinterpreted ignored or lost in the shuffle of operational pressures and contributed to the tragic end of air operations over Cuba in April 1961 4 Some specifics were also spelled out for _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1 including the broad responsibility to insure that KUBARK regulations pertaining to cover security travel finance logistics and others are observed This instruction proved broad enough to provide for some points of disaqreement between and the DPD representatives 5 at 0 JMADD HBILKA Civil Air Transport was charged in the original Air Operations Plan with providing two B-26 instructor pilots a maintenance supervisor for B-26's and responsibility to provide C-46 aircraft as required 6 The Photo Interpretation Center was charged among other things with establishing a PI facility at JMASH for post-strike analysis raises interesting questions This requirement why establish a PI facility in Miami rather than at the strike operations base or why at JMASH rather than at Headquarters This seems to have been an unnecessary step in the process of getting post-strike photography analyzed and the results back to the field operation JMASH -- Forward Operations Base Miami - 98 - The RET annex on Logistic Support spelled out in great detail the procedures that would be followed for the acquisition and supply of materiel and materials necessary to the air training operation sharply defining the respective roles of JMATE and JMCLEAR in such acquisitions OPS Plan 160 AD-S also provided for the movement of the two Air National Guard dual-controlled B-26's black to JMADD suggesting that HBILKA or KWCANINE Pilots be utilized to make the L- transfer It was hoped that the planes could be re- turned to the Air National Guard within 30 days but it did provide that they should be held until replacement aircraft were on hand Those B-26's which were to be refurbished by the USAF were also to be flown black out of the US to JMADD and the expectation was that the HBILKA crews would be utilized to the greatest degree possible for such ferrying flights Interest- ingly enough sterilization of the ANG B-26's at Eglin was scheduled to be completed within a period of six days following arrival of the aircraft The first four B-26's being acquired from the USAF however were apparently going to require six weeks - 99 - For the B-26 pilots Plan 60 AD-5 provided 20 hours of ground school and a total of 20 sorties with 51 hours of flying time during a minimum of 15 days from the first flight In addition to the normal standards which might be expected of any flight training program such as thorough briefings provisions for rest and meals flight patterns away from populated areas record keeping etc there were one or two specific items of special interest Tower operators were to be encouraged to speak in their native tongue Spanish and for all flights that were scheduled for more than three hours duration or when live ammunition was being carried an instructor pilot an American had to be a participant in the flight In view of some problems which would subsequently be surfaced it also is interesting to note that PBPRIME military interest in this operation must not be compromised Political discussions between trainees and PBPRlME personnel will not be tolerated All efforts will be made to assure harmonious conditions and high morale The training of C-46 pilots apparently would present less difficulty than B-26 training because it would be primarily a matter of transition and - 100 - training in night navigation To get C-46 pilots combat-ready would require only five sorties with a total flight time of 21 hours and a minimum elapsed time of seven days and additionally it was provided that the training requirements could be satisfied during the course of local cargo runs between JMADD and the San Jose Guatemala airfield There was no provision included in Operational Plan 60 AD-5 for the training or transition of C-54 pilots or flight crew B Trainers and Trainees As already mentioned pilots from Eglin Air Force Base HBILKA pilots from the Agency's operations in the Far East and Air National Guard pilots provided the pool of expertise which would train the Cuban air crews The first contacts with the ANG were made in Washington D C through Maj Gen Winston P Wilson Deputy Chief National Guard Bureau In all there were nearly 130 members of Air National Guard units or individuals who were affiliated with -- or closely known by members of Air National Guard units -- who signed on as contract employees of - 101 - Project JMATE and participated in the air training activity as flight instructors or as ground and maintenance personnel -- a cadre without which the Brigade Air Force never could have gotten off the ground Albert C Persons one of the transport pilots from this group has given a good first hand account of the recruitment process involved in obtaining the services of transport pilots out of the Alabama Air National Guard 2 In addition to the Air National Guard personnel the records show that two United states Forest Service licensed riggers and PDO's served under contract at the TIDE MAnD complexes James M Allen was at both MAnD and TIDE and it appears that Fred A Barnowsky might also have been at one or both of the overseas bases Recruitment of Air National Guard and affiliated personnel began as early as August 1960 and continued through the period of March of 1961 I Although there is no firm evidence that they participated directly in the actual flight training of the Cuban crews a number ofl pilots OSTIARIES also contributed significantly to the success of air operations When their original program phased out in the fall of 1959 they had been moved from tol and when JMATE got uhaer way they served as air crews flying passengers and materiel between the Florida bases and Guatemala J - 102 - It might be emphasized too that from the initial Agency contact with Gen Wilson in Washington the Agency's contacts with the state ANG units were maintained with CO's of General rank Once having insured that adequate trainers and senior maintenance personnel would be available the next step for JMATE was to recruit Cubans for potential service as pilots and air crewmen One of the first suggestions for a cadre of Cuban pilots originated with Adm Arleigh Burke Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff By mid- August Burke raised the question of whether the dozen Cubans who had recently completed flight training at Pensacola had been considered as candidates for the anti-Castro movement air force Burke was of the opinion that these pilot trainees were still in the us Unfortunately however all of the pilots had completed their training before 30 June 1960 and all of them had returned to Cuba -- where they were all deprived of their commissions in the Cuban Armed Forces and grounded Their training in bhe United States of course being the reason for considering them to be of doubtful loyalty 11 - 103 - Recruitment of Cuban aircrews was the responsibility of the FRD in the Miami area Candidates given first consideration were those refugees who had been members of the Air Force Cubana Air Lines personnel private pilots and former armed services personnel Some pilots had exited Cuba without any problem but others such as Eduardo Eddy Ferrer who commandeered a Cubana DC-3 at gun point and landed i t in Miami had corne out the hard way 12 Once the contact was made through FRO channels then the Agency's representatives got into the act of selecting those who would go into the air training program In discussing the recruitment business Billy B Campbell who initiated the air training program at JMADD stated that as early as May 1960 I was assigned another name Billy Carpenter and was asked to go down to Miami and recruit the initial Cubans for the air training effort Our goal then was to recruit pilots mechanics or any personnel that we thought were needed in association with setting up the airbase and initiating training I met a Navy Lt Commander and we set up in a motel in Coral Gables and inter viewed and recruited the first 75 or 76 pilots engineers and mechanics We were told where to go and people would be fed to us o We almost blew - 104 - the whole thing the first day of recruiting because the Agency had failed to pay the rent on the motel The landlady came over to the motel -- it wasn't a motel as such it was little houses in a cluster -- and she caught us recruiting some of the initial Cuban pilots We had to make sure that she was paid so that we could continue our job oo The first operation was to train six B-26 crews and either two or four C-46 crews and two C-54 crews o and I think our target date on that was October 1 1960 or somewhere in that area We met our first target date Then we were given a new target date in November to train more crews 13 Eduardo Ferrer one of the Cubans who was recruited to be a transport pilot and the individual who had flown a Cubana airliner out at gunpoint was one of those whom Billy Campbell interviewed In telling his story Ferrer emphasized that Campbell's questions were straightforward and were concerned with Ferrer's qualifications as a pilot From Campbell Ferrer and the other Cubans were then passed on for the security medical psychological and psychiatric interviews Except for the initial interrogation concerning their qualifications as fliers the Cubans took an extremely dim view of the five days of the interrogation to which they were subjected In re- porting on his LCFLUTTER examination Ferrer found - 105 - that the interrogator appeared to be interested in improving or acquiring a vocabulary of Spanish idioms Stating that he had no homosexual proclivities Ferrer used the word maricon which the interrogator immediately picked up repeating i t several times as Ferrer said If con un horrible acento If 14 The group of Cuban pilots found the questions not only repititious but also farcical One of the pilot group in fact claimed that he had answered most of the written questions with obso dties rather than telling the truth suggesting that these were no basis on which to judge qualifications of the indiv concerned Fausto Gomez the pilot in question reportedly said Si yo voy a los cammamentos dependiendo de estas pruebas todo esto es una farsa porque cuando me canse de escribir conteste las preguntas con buZZ shit ooo go to heZZ ooo fuck you oo yas ooo If my going to camp depends on these proofs it's all a farce because when I was tired of writing I answered the questions with Ifbullshit oo go to hell fuck you 15 According to Gar Thorsrud Gomez's responses and attitude put him at the bottom of the list of candidates for flight training Thorsrud however told th author that Gomez a former smuggler in the Cuban and Caribbean area proved to be a competent and loyal pilot At one point according to Thorsrud Gomez's intimate knowledge of the coastal areas paid off in one of the few successful air drops to anti-Castro dissidents in Cuba lSa - 106 - C J MADD Air Training Base ' Retalhuleu ' Guatemala The initial recruitment efforts for air crews began in August 1960 and by 23 September the air training base with the full cooperation of the Government of Guatemala had been established at Retalhuleu in the western part of Guatemala approximately 40 kilometers NW of the Pacific Coast city of Champerico By 23 September Cuban personnel at the base numbered 39 pilots 2 navigators 18 mechanics a chaplain and a doctor In addition 8 PDQ's 2 radio operators and a number of guards had been recruited from the Cuban infantry contingent training at Finca Helvetia JMTRAV and were undergoing training at JMADD -- the crypt assigned to the air base The US contingent at JMADD consisted of 9 staff a contract cook 2 contract PDO's 6 HBILKA 3 ANG a USAF sergeant and a USAF private who also was a cook 16 When the base began opera- tions it was made quite clear to all personnel Cuban and US -- that Major Billy B Campbell would be See Frontispiece The Table of Organization planned for JMADD in September 1960 is shown in Chart 2 following page 107 - 107 - CHART 2 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION Air Training Base Retalhuleu Guatemala September 1960 i HEADQUARTERS I DPD WH 4 I Chief Air Operations Retalhuleu ----------- 2 Admin personnel I Civil Air Transport - Instructor Pilots - 2 - Engineering Office - 1 I Air Operations Officer - 1 -Trainees - 40 - Indigenous Personnel for Maintenance Support - 57 I - 1 -Personal Equipment - 1 -Tower Operators Indigenous - 2 - aramilitary Aircraft Inventory 4 Combat B-26's 2 Dual Controlled B-26's 6 C-46's r __ I Support -Officers -Commo - 3 -Security - 1 Support Officer - 1 -Medical Officer - 1 -Medical Corps - 1 -Courier - 1 -Cooks - 2 3 Indigenous helpers -Base Maintenance - 1 Source Air Support Annex to WH 4's Paramilitary Operations Plan No 1 Op Plan 60 AD-5 15 September 1960 fully responsible for air operations at MADD -- ineluding both incoming and outgoi g flights and the line of command from Campbell to Headquarters was reinforced by Headquarters communications at subsequent intervals prior to Campbell's departure in 1961 l6a The bulk of this group had come out of Opalocka black and some like Eddy Ferrer had been aboard C-54's flown by theOSTIARIES Major Campbell and others who were associated with these initial air force trainees were very high in their praise of the qualifications of the group Many of the recruits had been Cuban military or commercial pilots The ex-military types were more or less familiar with the B-26 and the commercial group with both C-46's and or C-54's Campbell emphasized that the pilot instructors for this group were of extremely high caliber Project JMATE 1 Throughout the course of lat Eglin was subject to constant pressures from all sides and in the very early days We had to maintain our aircraft at Eglin we had to assist in Guatemala and we had an operation going commercially down in Ft Lauderdale withi--I Itrainin g crews there We weic - 108 - pretty thin and we needed help Initially because the target dates that we had were so early and then they kept changing on us 17 Eduardo Ferrer was in the first group of Cuban pilot trainees to be flown from Opalocka to San Jose Guatemala From San Jose they were transported by bus to a coffee plantation near the town of Retalhuleu a drive of some four and a half hours from San Jose The coffee plantation Finca Helvetia was owned by The Ft Lauderdale operation to which Campbell referred was run under cover of 10n was se ontract crews from C-54 operations The program is discussed in some detail in Persons's book Bay of Pigs 18 As shown on the map see Frontispiece flights from CONUS to either Guatemalan or Nicaraguan bases were instructed to avoid overfli hts of third countries orsru heights of 25 feet to avoid Air Defense Command radar and then regained altitude to check with the Miami control tower l8al - 109 - Roberto A1ejos Ferrer reported that there were 44 pilots included in the 'first group Arriving in Guatemala in late August 1960 they were joined on 9 September by 14 additional pilot trainees -- bringing the total number to 58 19 They spent roughly two weeks living in very primitive conditions in a coffee warehouse at Finca Helvetia while waiting for comp1etion of the BOQ and other facilities at Reta1hue1u The infantry Brigade was being trained at JMTRAV base about 10 miles away from Helvetia -- also on property owned by Robert Alejos Alejos was a confidante of President Ydigoras and the brother of the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States The only explanation for the difference in the reported number of Cuban pilot trainees between the 58 indicated by Ferrer and the 39 mentioned previously in the JMADD ca le of 23 September 1960 is that Ferrer must have included ground crew and maintenance personnel in his pilot total Some discussion of the construction of the air base facilities at Reta1hu1eu appears in Volume II of this history A full description of the construction effort is contained in Support Services Historical Series OL-11 Agency Engineering Activity 1947-66 Feb 72 Vol I pp 53-67 Vol II pp 131-193 s For photos of JMADD see' Figures 1-23 pp 455-478 of this volume Eduardo Ferrer has some interesting vignettes of daily life of the trainees at both Helvetia and MAnD in Operacion Puma pp 50-73 - 110 - When informed by one of the North American trainers that JMADD would soon be ready for occupancy Ferrer claimed that the Cubans were told that they would be trained in C-46's C-54's and B-26's and that fighter aircraft either also be assigned P 5l Mustangs or F-4U Corsairs would Hearing that the move to JMADD was imminent the Brigade Air Force proceeded to set up a formal organization of the Air Group -- evidence of the Cubans' concern for titles and status This problem would plague both the air and the infantry organization throughout the course of the operation JMATE The pilot trainees were assigned squadrons squadrons being designated on the basis of the previous experience of the Cuban pilots 20 The initial breakdown and responsibilities as shown by Ferrer was as follows Adjutant Mario ZUNIGA Chief of Operations - Luis Cosme Deputy Chief of Operations - Rene Garcia Chief of Supply - Mario Tellechea Chief of Security - Eduardo Ferrer Chief of the C-54 Squadron - o Alvarez Builla Dep Chief of C-54 Squadron - Jose Perez Menendez Chief of C-46 Squadron - Juan Perez Deputy Chief of C-46 Squadron - Pedro Etchegoyen Chief B-26 Bombers - Jose A Crespo Deputy Chief B-26 - Joaquin Varela Chief Personnel - Leonardo Seda Chief Radio Section - Cesar Luaices Ferrer noted that he also was designated as a Captain in the C-54 squadron 21 - 111 - Aside from differences because of political beliefs Ferrer also was quite conscious of the differences that developed between those who were exmilitary fliers and those who had served as civilian pilots He reported that when it was the turn of the ex-military group to be responsible for preparing and serving meals there was a rigorous drill that was S O P -- with the tables organized in perfect formation the bottles of catsup sugar bowls and salt shakers equally spaced and in reach of everyone 22 The ex naval officers were pointed to as being the most meticulous and concerned with form One of the officers in fact reportedly posted a notice in the dining area reading This mess has been served by members of the Navy Conduct yourself like a gentleman and an officer 23 Following the move to JMADD Ferrer pointed out that the training got under way as they had been told some time before and he emphasized that the training for the C-46 and the C-S4 pilots was in fact a retraining exercise rather than an initiation of training to pilots of those aircraft The basic need for the transport pilots was to learn the procedures of - 112 - the USAF 24 Almost inunediately however there began to be some doubt in the minds of the American instructors as to whether there was need for something more than retraining Before the end of September Manuel Gonzales one of the most experienced of the Cuban C-46 pilots made such a rough landing that he damaged the landing gear in his aircraft and in the process of attempting to regain control herniated his diaphragm and was lost from the program 25 In addition to the loss of this C-46 two C-54's flown by the Cubans also were lost before the end of September One instance was a real comedy of errors A C-54 under the conunand of Orlando Alvarez Builla the conunander of the C-54 Squadron with an experienced co-pilot navigator and radio operator -- the cockpit crew claimed a total of roughly 45 000 hours of flying experience -- took off to make a supply drop near the city of Trinidad in the Escambray area of Cuba Un- fortunately they dropped their load on a power plant After a series of misadventures they had to make an emergency landing in Mexico near Comitan The air- craft was confiscated by the Government of Mexico and the crew's release was obtained only through the - 113 - intercession of Col Antonio Batres Chief of the Guatemalan Air Force and the personal pilot of Pres ident Ydigoras Fuentes 26 In the second instance a C-54 with a Cuban pilot and a North American instructor was coming through the mountains when one of the wings touched an outcropping and tore a third of the wing off The consequence was a forced landing on the beach near Champerico Neither the pilot nor the co-pilot were injured but a Cuban pilot who was on board as an observer suffered a wound and had to be evacuated to a hospital in the United states 26a Needless to say that North American trainers took a rather dim view of these accidents The episode in Mexico in particular caused considerable consternation Major Campbell who was in charge of the flight training operations made the following comment We set up operations and prepared the first air crews to fly resupply missions into Cuba There must be about 7 or 8 hours of tape on the first mission We lost that first airplane Stan Beerli was with me down there Guatemala and we both sat up all night long waiting for the bird to come back This is the one where the air crew dropped a 12 000 lb - 114 - supply of cargo on top of a power station mistaking the lights on the power station for our ground support team It had a side note too ooo the air crew in command of that airplane had about 45 000 pilot hours and they got lost coming back and landed up near Comitan in Mexico We found the airplane before the Mexicans did and were refused permission to go in and pick it up I say we oo one of the officers of the Guatemalan Air Force and Mr Alejos I believe and probably Connie Seigrist were included They flew to Comitan and landed and came back and said we could pick up the airplane because the air crew had mismanaged their fuel The airplane had fuel in it and i t could have been taken off and flown back to JMADD 27 The series of mishaps in the early weeks of the air training program initiated a period of declining relations between the Cubans and their American instruc tors -- the Americans tending to regard the Cuban capabilities with some considerable suspicion From the early fall of 1960 through the initiation of overflight operations there were constant requests from the field for authorization to use the American pilots in both the transport and in combat training operations Ferrer himself pointed out in considerable detail that there was a negative impact on the American trainers as the result of these early foulups In this context too Ferrer also charged that the North - 115 - Americans consistently looked down on the Cubans Th separation of club facilities the existence of areas which were closed to the Cuban pilots and constant patronizing by the North Americans antagonized the Cubans There is no question that some of the Americans undoubtedly felt superior to the Cuban trainees but by the same token JMATE personnel were much more concerned with the security and cover aspeets of the operation in which they were involved than the Cubans ever were In his own story Ferrer said that on several occasions he demonstrated that the Cubans flying the C-46's and C-S4's were competent to do the tasks assigned and in one instance he was responsible for carrying out some tests of navigational skills which he claims were performed to the f ll satisfaction of the American instructors On another occasion in early November 1960 he was responsible for bringing together a crew for an airdrop in the Escambray There despite some problems concerning the signal in the drop zone the mission was carried out exactly as planned -- Ferrer being cautioned incidentally by Billy Campbell following the debriefing not to - 116 - repeat to the other Cuban pilots the problems that had come up concerning the identification of the drop zone 28 Success of the November drop notwithstanding airdrop operations on the whole were a dismal failure Of 68 missions between September 1960 and March 1961 only seven of the drops put supplies as intended in the hands of the guerrillas who were operating in various parts of Cuba Ferrer took umbrage with the charge that the basic reason for the failure of the air drops was the inability of the air crews to find the proper drop zones or that they were less than brave in pushing on through difficult situations This is a subjective matter and some of the American personnel involved in the air operations still believe that some of the Cubans discharged their cargoes into the sea at the first opportunity and spent the time tooling around until the fuel gauges indicated that it was time to return to the base Regardless of the question of courage or cowardice Ferrer was entirely justified in his criticism of the failure to provide for direct contact between the air - 117 - operations personnel and the guerrillas who were seeking support through the air drop of materiel Consid- ering the success of the maritime infil and exfil operations it does not appear that this would have been as difficult to accomplish as some of the project planners believed Jake Esterline Chief of Project JMATE put it in the following manner I just felt the air crews weren't telling the truth about what they saw or didn't see and I knew damn well where they were dropping their stuff because our intercepts -- within six hours -- would let us know exactly how many miles away the Castro Cubans Stan Beerli made the following comments about the airdrops We had a heck of a time trying to determine if we were getting to those spots There was really no way to know and we were getting very little feedback oo We weren't really sure if e were really making i t and how effective we were It was always a great concern to us Then of course there were the crews that would come back and report that they had drifted off to the side of the drop point o o I am sure there was a question mark in their US minds that maybe there was some collusion among the Cuban crews o o But we had nothing to substantiate that except that we understood that the crews were all dedicated to suppo ting the operation and so we hoped they were doing the job 29 - 118 - had picked up the stuff that had been dropped o and then the messages coming in from the agents on the ground o these plaints and these bleats about What happened to the aircraft Our fires were there o they went all around us and they did all kinds of things 30 As previously mentioned the Cubans organized their squadrons by types of aircraft and or tasks and almost immediately upon moving to mDD signs of polit- ical action on the part of the Cuban cadre were apparent On 21 September 1960 a cable from Miami to the Director reported that the pilot group at Retalhuleu was threatening to leave the training camp and withdraw from the FRD because their families had reported that the FRO Headquarters were treating them badly and in an arrogant or condescending manner and that their pride was hurt The pilots reportedly were dissatisfied because of various administrative difficulties -- principally the screwup in the delivery of mail from home JMADD personnel however made clear that they would tolerate little or no more nonsense from the Cuban group One suggestion was that those who were threatening drastic action be put on bread and water and incarcerated until they straightened out - 119 - The crisis was averted by the intervention of Roberto Alejos the arrival of two B-26's a step-up in the transition training that was already under way using one of the C-S4's and perhaps most important the clarity with which the Acting Chief of Base indicated that procedures would be followed as specified or all air training would immediately cease It was also directed that the Cubans be made responsible under the same FRD military code that was employed at JMTRAV and if any of the air trainees were unwilling to accept this they were to be grounded until they changed their minds 31 Even as the pilot trainees at MADD were threatening to strike DPD prepared a memorandum which raised questions concerning disposal of Cuban air crew members under various unfavorable conditions concerned such items as c ewman The questions refusal of an airman or air to go on a second mission refusal to go on a first mission once having learned of an overall plan and the problem of handling those airmen who fabricated stories to cover mission failures addressing himself to solving L ese In kinds of problems Chief WH 4 instructed his Chief of counterintelligence - 120 - L I that the problem should be met by in- -------- creasing case officer competence to the point where they would recognize problem individuals -- those whose morale was low who lacked motivation or who were cowards 1 1 also was urged to make use of any information on the air training program being acquired by a WH 4 penetration agent who had been infiltrated among the Cuban air crews to report on just such problems Esterline believed that attempts should be made to rehabilitate -- mentally or physically -- aircrew members who had problems but if such rehabilitation failed the FRD military tribunal which was in place on the Base should apply its code of military justice Those who failed to comply were to be committed to the Base brig pending transfer to a permanent detention facility 32 More than a month after the DPD memorandum had raised the questions about the handling of the air crews it appears that Col Gaines DPD's principal contact with WH 4 was unaware of the fact that there was a controlled penetration agent among the Cuban air trainees Chief WH 4 CI had to point out to Col Gaines that a priority cable outlining the agent's background reporting on his polygraph tests and recommending his use as a penetration agent had gone to MADD in August 1960 Because the subject of a penetration agent had come up in connection with problems of security and cover at JMADD footnote continued on following page - 121 - American concerns about the Cuban air crews were not misplaced As Ferrer himself pointed out even though things seemed to improve through November once the Cubans had met certain of the tests that had been posed them a number of the pilots who were discontent asked to be transferred back to Miami To Ferrer this was a difficult time for among the dozen who as he said renounced the privilege of fighting for their country were the second in command of the Air Force Leslie Nobregas the Chief of the C-54 squadron 0 -Alvarez Builla and the Chief of the C-46 squadron Juan Perez key figures among the Cuban air group 34 The loss of these personnel was rather quickly reflected in air operations at JMADD for a Director cable of 11 December noted Headquarter's records indicate curtailment flying training combat activities Request clarification and future plans 35 MADD was quick to respond to Headquarters questions Col Gaines also was requested to report any such problems to Chief WH 4 CI According to DPD's Security Section the penetration agent was a useless boob who was widely known for what he was -- an informant 33 - 122 - pointing out that the 'stand down of operational training flights had not affected MADD's operational capability Moreover the air base attributed part of the stand down to completion of the B-26 air training program per Ops Plan 60 AD-5 36 The departure of the 12 pilots from the training program also meant a restructuring of the Cuban cadre a position which was supported by the field A cable to Headquarters for example pointed out that the trainees had requested a T O for an air group showing military rank structure and emphasizing that those who were in training at MADD -- and who might be participating in overflights -- should have first opportunity toward obtaining rank The Cubans were supported in this position by the field which cabled Headquarters If trainees permitted to wear rank and realizing they would be cadre for the new air force morale would improve the Cuban commander would have positive Even before the partial stand down MADD had reported that six B-26 pilots had completed their training program including rocket firing Noting that there were 93 rockets available at MADD the message closed with the suggestion let's go 37 - 123 - control of troops trainees would have more pride in themselves and most of all would believe the FRD is supporting them 38 Headquarters deferred on the question of rank however suggesting instead that the continued use of different colored baseball caps and perhaps the addition of scarfs would be adequate identification for the different flight groups A promise was made that some sort of rank designationfwouldLeventually be permitted the Cubans 39a Whether and which of the Cuban air trainees would be available was at question throughout the training activity at MADD Toward the end of March 1961 when COB MADD was suggesting R R for various of the Cuban Ferrer indicated that there was extreme concern among the Cuban trainees about this question of rank at the' time of the defectior of the dozen men He pointed out that within the C-46 squadron when he proposed advancing two of the C-46 trainee group he ran into opposition from Col Villafana the Chief of the Air Group and Luis Cosme The latter became the second in command after the Nobregas defection Villafana and Cosme suggested that pilots who were available in the Miami area had more experience and were better qualified for the positions which Ferrer wanted for his squadron trainees In fact so serious and violent did the discussion between Cosme and Ferrer become that it nearly ended up in a shootout between two highly emotional Cubans 39 - 124 - pilots the cables that went forward to Headquarters stated in very specific terms that Senor So So was most trustworthy loyal helpful friendly etc and sure as hell would return if given three days R R in Miami Those who had stuck it out through the training program did return from their R R's including at least one Osvaldo Piedra who lost his life in a B-26 over the Bahia de Cochinos Some of those who bugged out of the training program apparently had qualms of conscience -- or at least made inquiries about the possibilities of returning and it appears that at least one of the defectors did return on 12 or 13 April 1961 then defaulted Two others however Stalled Suggest they be forgotten 40 Connie Seigrist recalled that in addition to the normal problems and stress of training the political discussions and differences would occasionally become quite heated Seigrist has ritten The biggest and most continual problem concerned the dislike for our Cuban Air Commander o I have forgotten his name Col Villafana He was the Commander throughout One of the Cubans explained that it was his the Commanderis background dating back to Cuba I was sent flew a C-46 to Mexico City to persuade some AWOL Cubans to return to MADD Not - 125 - a single AWOL would return to MAnD with me as they said they would not serve under him Although overall I felt then and now it was not a serious impact I do not remember the exact number of the R R Cubans who refused to return but there were a few and it was well known by all that they would not return They packed their belongings at MADD and took them with them not to return Surprisingly some that sic packed out did return They AWOL's as a rule were non-producers and were not missed 41 Seigrist apparently had an unusually good rapport with the Cuban pilot trainees including those who bugged out at the end and also those who were contemplating a return from Miami to the air bases Simpson Seigrist was the one the Cubans looked to for reassurance should they decide to come back 42 In his own words Seigrist said The only thing I kept intact was my pseudo of Seig Simpson I believe the Cubans had high respect for me and I also believe they knew my name because they had everyone else pegged immediately But because or their respect they were not really interested in exposing me 43 Aside from the fact that he was a top pilot and instructor that Seigrist flew a B-26 out of MAnD in support of the Government of Guatemala at the time of the November 1960 attempted overthrow of Ydigoras Fuentes also added to his favorable reputation among the Cubans See Volume II of this history Participation in the Conduct of Foreign PoZicy - 126 - Life with the Cuban air trainees at JMADD was undoubtedly made even more difficult because few of the North American trainers were fluent in Spanish even though Gar Thorsrud expressed a more pragmatic approach to the problem There was some language problem but an airplane is an airplane and they overcame it by physical actions and signs 44 Even though most of the other principals involved in air operations also tended to disregard the language barrier as a significant problem insofar as the training went it is interesting to observe that in December 1960 MADD made a specific request to Headquarters for a Spanish speaking CI representative -- request made due to increasing possibilities more trainees will try to leave base In addition will be asset to security 45 Eduardo Ferrer of course was quite conscious of the lack of ability to communicate with the North Americans who did not speak Spanish The cable traffic requesting increments of personnel to JMASH to JMADD and to JMT DE reflects a strong interest on the part of the people involved in the day-to-day operations to have assignees available who were fluent in the language The December request to Headquarters from MADD for someone fluent in Spanish had been preceeded by a similar suggestion at the end of October in the course of a meeting called by Lt Col George Gaines Chief JMCLEAR Several returnees from JMADD met with Chief WH 4 CI and other rootnote continued on following page - 127 - L In an October meeting at Headquarters where among other items the question of the Spanish language competence was discussed i t was apparent that there was ongoing friction between DPD and WH 4 representatives -- with each side seeming to want to pass responsibility for the identification of the problem cases to the other DPD suggested that its Air Commanders should not be responsible for determining the stability of Cuban personnel and indicated that such decisions should be made prior to sending personnel to JMADD for training WH 4 representatives however were of the opinion that those actually in the field were best able to finger those with personality or other problems that made them unsuited for flight training Col Gaines in fact vig rously recommended that the whole operation at MADD be closed out because of the in surmountable security problems and the lack of discipline among security officers from WH Division as well as other security officers and personnel from DPD to discuss various problems at the air base A recent DPD returnee from JMADD reported that Not one American speaks or understands the Spanish language and the Cubans do a great amount of talking on the flight line and the mess hall It would therefore be of significant value to plant an American there who does speak and understand Spanish 46 the Cubans Gaines even suggested the possibility of moving the training activity to Nicaragua -- limiting the training to the actual number of pilots required to carry out the air strike and the support types who would be a minimum number required to support that strike effort 47 Difficulties between administrative and operational personnel at MADD continued from the fall of 1960 through the early winter of 1961 -- the situation being further complicated by the desire ofl to play a more active role vis a vis MADD mid-February 1961 for example Toward asked DPD to appoint a Chief of Air Operations for MADD and to station him permanently at the Base Because of the numerous shifts and or rotation of personnel between the airbase and Headquarters I ras apparently unable to keep track of who was on first IL- _ cabled Headquarters that lito prevent this type confusion now 1 and in future I I will not allow any personnel to depart MADD without his concurrence 48 Apparently Headquarters was not too enthralled with the suggestions from and a 2 March 1961 cable to MADD indicated that the movement of personnel and - 129 - aircraft would be decided by Headquarters or Eglin and stated specifically that the determination of Agency interests would be decided by Chief Air Ops and or the COB at MAnD One paragraph of the Head- quarters message read Order provide positive CIA control one CIA Air Ops Officer will be kept MAnD as Chief all air operations He will be responsible insuring peculiar CIA requirements accomplished and overall objectives achieved Deviations will be reported to Headquarters immediately by COB or Chief Air Ops 49 This response was inadequate for Ernie Sparks who was the off-again-on-again COB from the time of the establishment of MAnD throughout the course of that activity In response to the Headquarters direc- tion just cited Sparks requested To avoid confusion MAnD due constant rotation air ops personnel request CLEAR JMCLEAR designate py name CIA Air Ops Officer o FYI MAnD has had six changes involving four people acting as Air Ops Chief in past five weeks 50 It is perhaps understandable in view of the long term association that Sparks had with the somewhat and sometimes mad MADD operation that the following Director cable to Eglin Air Force Base was sent Request 100 packages Turns anti-acid tablets be procured and shipped to MADD via first avail acft Package should be carried and marked for Santoro Ernie Sparks on inner marking 51 - 130 - A Letter of Instruction to Gar Thorsrud 24 March 1961 eliminated much of the difficulty between COB and Chief Air Ops at MADD Thorsrud's letter clearly spelled out his responsibility as Chief Air Ops as distinguished from the responsibilities of COB at MADD -- or at TIDE since Thorsrud's LOI also made provision for him to continue as Chief Air Ops at TIDE when the move to Nicaragua took place 52 Even before he actually took over as Chief of Air Operations at JMADD Thorsrud had been in and out of JMADD and was well acquainted with the training situation there He recalled that when he first arrived at MADD in January of 1961 the basic training was largely completed and unlike some of the other problems that had been faced by Billy Campbell -- who had to depart MADD earlier than anticipated because of restrictions imposed on USAF personnel by DOD -- the flight training had been largely completed Thorsrud stated Morale wasn't a problem for me because by the time that I got there the operation was getting close and everyone was trying to pull together We set up a little bar down there When I came See Appendix 4 for copy of Thorsrud's LOI 131 - down there was a kind of a segregation of Americans and Cubans and everyone else I just set up a little beer bar and when the flying was done everyone came in and talked together There was a lot of comment and some of these more outspoken Cubans said ooo if we are successful and we land we are all going to be fighting again just to see who has got control They'd tell these stories on themselves so there were plenty of political factions but I'm not up to date on what they were 53 In addition to the problems of interpersonal communications communications between the field and Headquarters or between the field bases at MADD and TRAV also caused headaches Shortly after the Cuban personnel at MADD began to fly operational missions propaganda drops and supply drops in December 1960 MADD sent a detailed cable to Headquarters complaining bitterly about two aspects of the communications problem One complaint concerned the use in opera- tional messages from Headquarters of mission names which were completely nd unidentifiable to the field and as MADD said These names are entirely foreign to our operations section Our only means of identifying any mission is by the assigned mission number We would be aided immensely if at the time a mission number was assigned an operation your messages would also identify any previous reference that had been made to the operation by name only 54 Further in this same cable it was pointed out to Headquarters that various of their messages concerning drop zone times or control times had been received without identifying the time zone MADD reported It was apparent that the time was not ZULU Therefore i t was necessary to reason that i t was Cuban local time To prevent confusion suggest all times be identified by the time zone or that all times that are vital to the success of all operational mission be stated in ZULU only 55 In response to another question concerning mission approvals Headquarters spoke very firmly to the field concerning its Headquarter's responsibility for weather forecasting as related to approvals for given missions and specified that Mission approvals from Headquarters are based on intelligence political security and other considerations usually known only at Headquarters as well as review of weather forecast to determine general missicn feasibility 56 On e Headquarters approval had been received how- ever the message authorized the launch-base commander or designated officers at given sites to cancel or Emphasis by author The criticality of this last statement concerning the use of ZULU time will be discussed in detail later in this volume - 133 - delay any mission based on their repsonsibilities or safety of flight considerations Go-no-go permission had to do with such things as aircraft and equipment status crew proficiency and numerous other considerations While Headquarters also claimed the responsi- bility for providing the appropriate bases with recap r weather forecast for return routes as author- ized to provide MADD with return flight approval based on the weather forecast -- a question which had been of some concern to MADD Headquarters claimed responsi- bility both for designating stations which would be responsible for maintaining communications with aircraft in flight and also primary responsibility for giving directions to crews in flight Eglin had been delegated the responsibility for providing inflight control using the commo facilities JRIMM or YOGURT as necessary to insure that action messages got to airborne aircraft engaged in current support missions Current support missions being designated as the Egli FIG MADD EGLI route There was also a communications breakdown between Headquarters and the field in the early part of JMFIG was a cryptonym for the - 134 - Opa1 airfield February 1961 when JMTRAV complained that the base was receiving trainees and supplies with little or no prior notice JMTRAV requested Miami Opalocka or Eglin Air Force Base to provide them with details concerning the ETA of passenger or cargo flights and they asked for an advance notice of 24 hours Similarly any outgoing flights from MADD for CONUS were to be brought to their attention so that they could plan movements of passengers cargo or whatever from TRAV to the other bases 57 The push for air drop operations antedated the opening of JMADD when as early as I September 1960 a strong pitch was made to provide an arms drop to supporters of Manolo Ray in the Escambray region of Cuba One of the first suggestions apparently had been to use the OSTIARY crews out of Eglin Air Force Base to fly the mission but recognizing the difficulties of using these particular pilots the second suggestion since the Cuban crews were not yet ready was to use an HBILKA crew Although discussed with the Special Group the plan was rejected by the DCI 58 In the interval between the Mexican disaster and the completion of the training of the Cuban pilots and the initiation of operational flights the DDP Mr - 135 - Bissell outlined the procedures that should govern all overflights of Cuba except U-2 overflights Addressed to the A DDP A to Chief WH Division to Chief WH 4 and to the Acting Chief DPD Bissell's memorandum of 24 October 1960 specified among other things that prior to any authorization to the field for an operational overflight the DDP and the A DDP A -- or one of them and the DDP's Assistant for Executive Branch Matters EBM would be included in a briefing of the operational plan The Assistant for Executive Branch matters Thomas A Parrott was included so that he would be informed when the question was presented to the Special Group Bissell made WH 4 re- sponsible for arranging the briefing and the minimum aspects of the operation which were to be covered were a detailed flight plan the communications plan and the methods for communicating with the reception party DPD was given the responsibility for briefing on the detailed flight plan The Bissell memorandum further provided that once the senior echelon of the DDP had been briefed that The referenced Mexican episode is described on pp 114-115 - 136 - group would then be responsible for briefing the DDCI General Cabell on each planned overflight In emergency situations however the DDP did suggest that a single briefing could be held for all of the individuals mentioned providing that the briefing was arranged through his office Once an overflight was approved Chief WH 4 and Acting Chief DPD were authorized to communicate the plan to the field It was stressed however that both Chief WH 4 and Acting Chief DPD were to limit their instructions to matters that had already been reviewed by the DDP or the DDCI The final caveat entered by Mr Bissell was that No flights shall be dispatched until the Special Group has been advised of the plan or the DCI has specifically waived this requirement 59 In a memorandum subsequent to that of the DDP Richard D Drain issued a memorandum to various WH 4 Section Chiefs providing even more explicit details concerning overflights of Cuba In addition to On 12 December 1960 when the memorandum in question was issued Drain was Acting Chief WH 4 During the course of Project JMATE he appeared in a number of different capacities including both Executive Officer and Chief of Operations - 137 - restating that all briefings on overflights would be arranged through Chief WH 4 Mr Drain's memorandum of 12 December 1960 made the WH 4 Special Assistant for Military Liaison responsible for notifying both State and DOD in advance of planned overflights and also as to the results of the overflights The Drain memorandum also had an added fillip regarding the Special Group which did not appear in Mr Bissell's 24 October memorandum each member of the Special Group will be advised in advance in each instance of a leaflet drop as in the case of supply drops 60 There is no evidence however that specific attempts at individual briefings were ever employed insofar as can be determined Briefings on overflights were presented to the Special Group whoever was there As previously mentioned the Air Support plan for Project JMATE ' AD 5-60 scheduled the initial flight training for the Cubans to be completed in November 1960 Beginning in that month there was a stir of activity concerning the use of the JMADD contingent for drops of propaganda leaflets Interestingly enough the initial request for authorization for prop drops over Cuba seems to have originated with - 138 - Col J C King Chief WH D on 9 November 1960 At that time King prepared a memorandum for the DCI requesting approval for overflights frornAgency controlled fields in Guatemala for the purpose of propaganda drops Routed to the DCI throughtheDDCI King's memorandum was not sent to the DCI but was sent to the DDP instead 61 By mid-November the cable traffic reflected a high level of concern about leaflet drops The B-26's -- acquired for a combat role -- were going to be put into service for both the propaganda activity and resupply missions Attention was immediately focused on the problem of the tail numbers game -- with Headquarters telling the field to be sure and obtain sufficient numbers from Guat AF to allow assignment of a MADD number for each B-26 in present inventory This will allow the same number utilized' for each individual aircraft any time presence at MADD 62 The problem with flying B-26's from Retalhuleu to Cuba however was that they couldn't make the round trip without refueling Consequently it was worked out with Roberto Alejos President Ydigoras's right hand man that Puerto Barrios on the east coast of Guatemala would be made available for refueling the - 139 - aircraft on both launch and recovery from the Cuban overflights cable traffic In late November 1960 however the but no other record -- reveals the evolution of a major air strike to be launched out of Puerto Barrios by six B-26's carrying both ordnance and leaflets against unspecified targets in Cuba The air crews were given a cover story of being recruited by the FRD in the US and then being transported to an unidentified airfield in Honduras where they were presented with combat-ready B-26's Sched- uled for launching on 26 November 1960 Puerto Barrios airport was having its supply of avgas built up to 8 000 gallons capacity most of which was being airlifted from MADD in 55 gallon drums Aircraft ordnance would be loaded on the B-26's at MADD rather than being hauled overland to Puerto Barrios or being airlifted in by C-46's or C-54's Authentic Cuban tail numbers had been obtained from two FAR aircraft and they were to be used on the B-26's Unfortunately however available records did not reveal the intended targets for the ordnance 63 Originally planned for 26 November 1960 the first of the B-26 missions was not actually flown - 140 - -------------- ------- until 5 December By that time however the combat role had been eliminated -- again for unknown reasons -- and the mission became strictly a resupply drop for Manolo Ray's MRR After an apparently exact job of navigation and identification of the drop zone lights the pilot failed to open the bomb bay doors on his first pass over the drop zone and after making second and third passes without any sign of drop zone lights he returned to Puerto Barrios to refuel en route back to Retalhuleu Billy Campbell's comment to Headquarters with regard to the mission put things in proper perspective Pilot head up and locked Headquarters felt it necessary to cable apologies to Havana for the failure of the drop plan for the MRR group and also to raise the question of whether that drop zone had been so badly blown by the three aircraft passes above it that it should no longer be considered for use 64 Of the other B-26's which had been declared ready for operations in November two flew a propaganda drop on 12 December 1960 They worked the western The US had not yet broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and Havana Station was still in operation - 141 - end of Cuba from the Isla de Pinos to Cienfuegos ineluding Havana and on the same night a C-54 dropped leaflets in the Manzanillo area Except for one B-26 which tried to unload leaflets through a side hatch rather than the bomb bay -- making it impossible for them to get the full load out -- the mission was quite successful Reporting on the operation JMADD cabled Suc- cessful completion of missions has made trainees happy and eager to repeat Highly recommend fast follow-up any type mission using as many aircraft as possible Believe time right for airfield strike if political situation warrants Don't stop now Let's go 66 Aside from the bad luck associated with the initial drop mission in September 1960 and the abort in the first week of December when the bomb bay doors One B-26 carried 1 700 Ibs of leaflets the other B-26 1 000 Ibs and the C-54 1 000 lbs 65 In addition to its combat supply drop and leaflet drop role Billy Campbell reported that there also were plans to use B-26's for dropping infiltration teams into Cuba In response to a question of how such personnel would exit this particular aircraft without suffering serious injury or killing themselves Campbell noted that they had developed a platform for use in the bomb bay He also stated that a couple of the aircraft had been modified to handle as many as 12 people 2 - 142 - wouldn't open the missions flown from October through the end of December 1960 -- principally propaganda drops -- were successful averaging about one a week during that period Marine Col Jack Hawkins Chief of WH 4 PM however was very dissatisfied with the air operations On 4 January 1961 Hawkins claimed that for the ten B-26's which were available to JMADD there were only five Cuban pilots of high technical competence and six others were nof questionable proficiency For the seven C-54's available to MADD and for the four C-46's Hawkins claimed that there was one qualified Cuban C-54 crew on hand at this time and three C-46 crews On the basis of these estimates Hawkins made a strong appeal for the employment of US contract pilots in his memorandum to Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 68 From the first of the year until the middle of March 1961 there was a significant increase in the number of air drop operations that were launched out of JMADD All three types of aircraft available to the Brigade were employed -- B-26's C-46's and C-54's As the number of overflights increased so did the ground opposition in terms of small arms and - 143 - anti-aircraft gunfire to the point where in early January 1961 the DDCI Gen Cabell agreed that only the B-26's would be used in propaganda drops over the city areas and that the C-46's and C-54's would do their prop drops in the less-inhabited parts of the island 69 It seems that there was probably more propaganda material than the air operations could have handled under the most ideal conditions On 15 February 1961 it was noted that 75 000 leaflets asking teachers to support a student strike were available from Miami for an upcoming drop and that 100 pounds of materials bearing the fish symbol also were to be used in a nueva University in Havana drop aimed at Villa- On 18 February a cable from MADD stated that there were approximately 18 000 pounds of'leaflets occupying about one third of the available warehouse space required for man-pack storage Request deliveries leaflets to MADD to be withheld until present supply reduced 70a For those who questioned the validity of risking air crews and aircraft on propaganda drops it is difficult to imagine that they were particularly The increase in anti-aircraft fire probably coincides to the increasing quantities of Soviet heavy weapons including 37 mm anti-aircraft artillery which Cuba claims it began to receive in the final months of 1960 7J - 144 - enthusiastic to hear from Headquarters with reference to a Havana drop that Again qualitative rather than quantitative dispersion will be required since leaflets are directed to a specific group now being suppressed by Castro These missions carry small amounts only because of the importance of hitting the select groups Headquarters feels that these small quantity runs are most important to overall mission 71 In order to deliver to these select groups the directions given to the Cuban aircrews sounded like directions being given to a city taxicab driver For one drop it was stated that Villaneuva University located on south side Fifth Avenue between 172nd and 176th Streets Fish to be dropped after University drop on way out Fly down Fifth Avenue and COP be- tween Hotel National and US Embassy 72 Before mid-March with the exception of the propaganda drops which were considered 100% successful DPD began to show increasing dissatisfaction The fish sYmbol was one of the more widely used during the course of the anti-Castro movement Samples of this and other propaganda leaflets appear in Appendix 2 In all there were 23 leaflet drops between 12 December 1960 and the collapse of the Bay of Pigs Operation About 12 million leaflets were dropped in addition to assorted publications 72a - 145 - with the supply drops Both the Headquarters and field elements of DPD agreed on the need for improvement in such areas as the rapid transmission of agent reports on the effectiveness of the drops particularly on such matters as time spent in the drop zone compared to brief instruction and the in and out routes over potential drop zones On matters of improving the navigational training for the crews there was no disputei nor was there any disagreement on the suggestion that it would help some of the weaker Cuban air crews if Cuban instructor-pilots flew with such crews DPD was not going to take full blame for the failure of the drop missions While admitting the need to improve the quality of the air training program Col Beerli emphasized the need for better support from the recipient dissident groups in Cuba DPD wanted better liqhting and identification of drop zones elimination of blind drops wider use made of beacons and per mission to make drops from higher altitudes 73 Although the question in Cuban crew discipline worried DPD throughout the course of the JMATE operation the performance of the Cuban trainees -- exeluding the initial disasters of the first month of - 146 - operation -- appears to have bee quite satisfactory With the exception of one B-26 mishap in late March 1961 such other aircraft as were lost during the period of air operations out of JMADD were the result of damages suffered during the course of missions over Cuba but no aircraft were lost nor were deaths or injuries suffered by any of the crews In one such instance a C-54 was forced to land at Kingston Jamaica and this presented a problem in diplomatic relations between the US and Great Britian which was satisfactori1y resolved and the aircraft recovered The C-54 had been badly shot up in an attempt to carry out three supply drops over the Escambray area and according to Eduardo Ferrer it had not only lost one engine but also suffered numerous punctures in its fuel tanks and was rapidly losing fuel when it made the landing at Kingston 74 In other instances B-26's made forced landings at the US Naval Air Station NAS at Boca Chica Florida This base incidentally was highly praised by one of the DPD officers stationed in the area of Boca Chica who had responsibility for providing assistance to downed aircrews who might turn up at this NAS 1 1 I an intelligence officer said of one - - - - - - episode at Boca Chica where a B-26 was repaired refueled and the crew rested I believe any future incident such as this need be no cause for Headquarter's concern Due to the frequency of other air and sea operations by other agencies of similar nature Navy at Boca Chica is witting and acrornmodating 75 Insofar as can be determined from the available records the only aircraft accident in which one of the Cuban trainees was involved concerned a B-26 training flight which landed with wheels up and locked at the San Jose airfield A cable from JMADD to The question of availability of emergency landing strips was a continuing concern to air operations personnel In addition to Boca Chica Grand Cayman Island was a much used emergency strip whose use if not officially sanctioned had the unofficial blessing of the British Government 7 a Toward the end of March 1961 WH 4 and DPD representatives planned to raise the question of bulldozing an emergency strip on Navassa Island with the Navy Navassa is a US possession two miles long and lies between Jamaica and Hispaniola There is no evidence that this suggestion got beyond the talking stage 75b - 148 - headquarters reported in 5 hours and 30 minutes 5 ANG pilots voluntarily and unassisted with minimum equipment and a lot of initiative and a lot of imagina- Alc tion raised Ref B 26 lowered gear replaced damaged props and flew AIC to MADD 761 This local initiative went over with a dull thud in Headquarters Although stating that Head- quarters appreciated the initiative enthusiasm imagination of the Air National Guard pilots Washington pointed out that engine malfunction or structural failure with the resultant loss of crew or equipment would represent an irreplaceable loss to us in addition to being an embarrassing situation in explaining the circumstances Headquarters added As a grudging afterthought in this instance due to suc- cessful outcome you are commended 771 A subsequent cable from Gar Thorsrud Air Commander at MAnD undoubtedly mollified Headquarters DPD for Thorsrud pointed with reference to the repairs that Of the five ANG pilots three are ex-B-26 crew chiefs one is a certified FAA A E mechanic two are qualified maintenance officers and three were civilian test pilots On this basis it was felt they were technically qualified to determine air worthiness - 149 - Regret Ref B did not contain sufficient information and may have led Hqs to believe MADD running an unsafe operation Will request Hqs approval future similar actions 77a The other two accidents to JMADD aircraft which appear in the records both concern Col Tony Batres the personal pilot of President Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala In one instance Col Batres had borrowed the Agency's L-28 Helio while his Aero Commander was down for maintenance and MADD's initial report of the accident said that the plane had been damaged on landing at Guatemala City In fact the plane had struck a grass covered log in the middle of a sod runway which was on the property of the President of Guatemala not the air strip at Guatemala City The plane was more than damaged -- for all practical purposes i t was ruined and in fact it was recommended that the aircraft be dismantled and returned to JMADD by C-46 or by truck and that the aircraft be scrapped for parts 78 In addition to pushing the main gear structure up through the bottom of the fuselage into the pilot and the co-pilot cockpit the other damages were reported as follows Broken engine frame a ripped and buckled bottom fuselage and cabin floor footnote continued on following page - 150 - In an attempt to salvage the Helio that Col Batres had piled up on the sod runway at President Ydigoras's plantation a C-46 was dispatched from MADD with an American pilot and an American co-pilot plus 5 Cubans and 4 Guatemalans to assist in the salvage operation In approaching the sod field at the Ydigoras plantation a sudden gust of wind caught the C-46 and threw the left wing tip into the top of a coconut tree with the result at the plane despite the best efforts of the American crewmen hit a clump of trees cart- o wheeled and was totally destroyed in the subsequent fire Fortunately however the crewmen and all pas- sengers on the aircraft escaped serious injury Less fortunate however was a Guatemalan worker who had been picking coconuts in the tree that the plane hit on its initial approach He was killed when he fell out of the tree to the ground a warped right wing tip probable engine damage probable propeller damage a windshield popped out a buckled top right wing rudder controls ripped loose a bent control column fuselage tube framing was broken the left fuselage door entrance buckled and the right stabilizer slightly buckled 79 O - 151 - Col Batres had actually witnessed the crash and when the father of the Guatemalan worker threatened legai action Col Batres covered for the Agency by saying that he had been flying the plane The Guatemalan Air Force provided cover by claiming ownership of the pl ne I sought Headquarters I permission to authorize $5 000 to settle the claims including legal fees of the father of the deceased worker who was threatening to go to court Apparently this was the way the matter was finally settled 80 D JMTIDE Strike Base Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua As a training program for the Cuban fliers at JMADD was intensified and as an increasing number of air drop missions were being performed negotiations were under way to establish a strike base JMTIDE at Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua One of the first problems to be resolved with reference to the establishment of JMTIDE was that of selecting an efficient manager to be Chief of Base Apparently having learned from the experiences at JMADD that an efficient base For more details on the Agency's negotiations for the base at Puerto Cabezas see Volume II - 152 - administrator was an absolute necessity James A Cunningham Assistant Chief DPD approached Col L K White the D puty Director for Support early in December 1960 to discuss the appointment of a qualified support officer to be the base manager Cunningham stated We were keen on having a Chief of Base who would effectively control the management and base operating end of the effort so as to avoid criticism arising from unpredictable changes in the scope and cost of the facility 81 The concern regarding the choice of a COB for JMTIDE paid off for short lived though i t was at no time during the operation of TIDE was there the sort of friction between the Chief of Air Operations and the COB that occurred at MAnD The JMTIDE crypt was assigned on 10 December 1960 and four representatives from Headquarters went to Nicaragua in January 1961 to negotiate with Presi dent Somoza concerning the renovation use and operation of the JMTIDE base With the full cooperation of the Nicaraguan Government the construction activity In his discussions with Col White Cunningham also noted that it would be beneficial if the appointee to be COB were fluent in the Spanish language - 153 - ----_ _ _----'---- --------------------- got under waYi and although the base was not ready for occupancy as initially scheduled e g by the first week of February 1961 the communications link between the base and n Managua had been I established 82 with the base at JMTIDE being completed and readied for operation Garfield M Thorsrud received a Letter of Instruction on 24 March 1961 assigning him as Chief JMATE Air Operations at JMADD and JMTIDE and he was instructed to designate an Acting Chief for JMADD Air Ops in his absence It was made quite clear that Thorsrud had authority over all things related to the planned air operation -- personnel materiel logistics or whatever His responsibilities as Chief of the air operation were distinct from the duties of the COB's of MADD and TIDE Thorsrud was responsible to the Chief JMCLEAR Gaines who in turn was responsible to Chief JMATE Esterline and to the Acting Chief of DPD Beerli 83 Thorsrud had been involved in the JMATE activity in a marginal capacity prior to this time In mid-July A copy of the Letter of Instruction to Thorsrud appears as Appendix 4 - 154 - 1960 he had been assigned as Acting Chief of the Air Section when Lt Col George Gaines was relieved as Chief Air Section DPD and assigned as the DPD Project Officer for JMATE e g JMCLEAR 84 Thorsrud's responsibilities were principally outside of the JMATE Project area until the Letter of Instruction In the cable to the Base at MADD announcing Thorsrud's imminent arrival there were two or three items of interest Concerning the ongoing problem of obtaining an adequate number of air trainees the cable contained the following comment Request Villafana be contacted to determine any knowledge Cuban trainees or pilots presently in Cuba who might be defected Event potential defectors known expedite names positions occupied etc 85 Perhaps this was an unintentional reflection of the suggestion in the amecable that Thorsrud be briefed on all facets air activities including idiosyncracies attributes personnel involved air mission More interesting to the recipients on the MADD end of the cable however was the request MADD paint white stripe 36 inches wide completely across runway five hundred feet from normal approach end Measure four thousand feet down - 155 - runway from white stripe and paint second white stripe same measurements as first Teegen Thorsrud will explain specialized B-26 training program on arrival 86 The request to paint the white stripes on the runway was a result of decisions made in Washington one aspect of which called for B-26's to land on an air strip at the invasion site in Cuba -- an air strip which at best was just over 4 000 feet in length In describing the training activity at MADD for the short field landings Billy Campbell noted that one means of encouraging the Cuban B-26 pilots to land within the white stripes was a promise of a tour of guard duty for those who after touching down failed to stop their roll in the interval between the two stripes 87 It is interesting that one of the arguments used when the operational plan was changed from the Trinidad site to the Bay of Pigs was that the B-26's would not be able to operate from the 4 000' asphalt runway at Trinidad In an oral interview Mr Campbell indicated that the tour of guard duty was without parachute attached Recalling the somewhat wistful nature of Mr Campbell's comment on this subject one suspects that perhaps in his cadet days in the Army Air Force Mr Campbell had pulled similar duty -- but with parachute attached The 4 000 foot landing roll was shorter than the 4 500 foot roll for a loaded B-26 over a 50' obstacle See Appendix 2 - 156 - The cable to JMADD notifying the base of Thorsrud's appointment also mentioned in alias Gen George R Reid Doster the Commanding Officer of the Alabama Air National Guard As stated earlier in this volume Doster worked very closely with Agency representatives to secure the services of Alabama Air National Guard personnel -- ground crews and flight crews -- to support the training and eventually the air operations against Castro's Cuba In early February 1961 subsequent to his efforts to obtain ANG personnel to support the JMATE operation Doster himself requested that he be allowed to participate in JMCLEAR activities as Chief of Tactical Aviation at the forward strike base Gen Doster's request was based on the fact that he had personally recruited crew members operations supervisors and maintenance personnel from his own ANG units and he desired to complete a package capability 88 The request by Gen Doster was discussed with Mr Richard Bissell the DDP and with Mr Bissell's approval a contract was prepared for the General ately upon his arrival Almost immedi- Thorsrud got together with Gen Doster Col Villafana the Commanding Officer of the Cuban Air Operation and Luis Cosme Chief of Operations for the Cuban air contingent to discuss - 157 - procedures for bringing the Air Force up to peak performance Among other things that fell out of this discussion was the selection of two Cuban B-26 pilots to go into the short field training exercise preparatory to the initial landings at the airfield at Playa Giron The C-46's were to be checked out for night formation proficiency and as the cover plan to disguise the actual movement of the air oprations from MADD over to TIDE gaggles of 5 to 6 aircraft were to fly with other training exercises on and off the JMADD air base R R's for both Cuban and American air personnel were to be cancelled as of 26 March 1961 89 On 31 March 1961 the use of Air National Guard pilots on C-54's as arpilots for the move from MADD to TIDE was approved the subject apparently having been under serious discussion since the first week of March 1961 when Col Gaines had scheduled a visit to the base at JMADD to check out procedures possible use of US pilots 90 Thorsrud's arrival at JMADD raised the morale of Cuban air trainees because it was apparent that the The author had been unable to ascertain the identities of the two Cuban pilots who were so selected - 158 - operations for which they were trained so long were about to begin on full scale The Cubans were probably also aware that Headquarters had been requested to provide the materiel for use by the Cuban air personnel for the assault phase including personal side arms and ammunition submachine guns for the aircraft light machine guns for base defenses at JMTIDE watches for pilots co-pilots and navigators binoculars and other equipment 91 Cuban morale undoubtedly received an additional boost with the opening of Gar's bar In a cable to headquarters on 31 March Thorsrud requested authorization for 1 Purchase of operational beer cigarettes commencing 31 March on arrival Cuban crews 2 Plan giving Cuban s same privilege as Americans while at JMTIDE However most Cubans without funds 3 If approved please advise EGLI 4 For EGLI Upon receipt answer Par 3 advised Donigran Doster and Dunn R J Durnin to pick as much beer cigarettes and general commisery commissary items as allowable 92 In addition to painting the MAnD landing strip for practice STOL operations another painting problem - 159 - that surfaced as early as October 1960 concerned the color identification and insignia of the Castro B-26 aircraft The availability of oil paint was noted in the early weeks of air training operations and it continued to present difficulties in the final weeks of JMATE As the time to move the B-26's from MAnD to TIDE approached there were two problems -- one being painting the B-26's identically to the B-26'sof Castro's Air Force and the other being the question of painting B-26's for the transfer to TIDE so that they would appear to be part of the Nicaraguan Air Force the operations out of both JMADD and TIDE In the hope of maintaining plausible deniability for the B-26's lay in the possibility of disguising the B-26's as aircraft of either the Guatemalan or Nicaraguan Air Force It is difficult to understand therefore why on 22 March 1961 Headquarters was raising questions about the availability of painting matQrials for putting Cuban markings on the B-26's still stationed at JMADD Headquarters also recommended to both MADD and TIDE that the specific marking which would identify Brigade aircraft from Castro's FAR aircraft -- the painting of a three foot wide light blue stripe around the - 160 - B-26 wings outside of the pylon tanks -- might be undertaken almost immediately Whether it was in the supply line or whether it was simply an oversight the question of paint for the aircraft at JMTIDE seemed to be serious As late as 14 April TIDE was appealing to Eglin for all colors of oil paint even a partial ship nt and making a specific request for red white blue and silver lacquer masking tape and paint brushes for special shipment via Southern Air Transport C-46 on a flight to TIDE 93 Billy Campbell shed some light on the problem of painting the B-26 aircraft when in response to a question if the planning couldn't have been a little better he noted as follows You are getting into a problem area here o we had three different areas working on this one The main fleet of B-26's was sitting at Eglin The ones that we had borrowed had come in through Kelty The ones that we took down o we started off in Guatemala with two National Guard airplanes that we had borrowed from the Air Guard Andrews APB So they then picked up six B-26's out of Kelly which had been flown in and cleaned up -- no markings We flew those down to Retalhuleu Then we began to get other airplanes in at Field 3 where we had the capability of - 161 - changing the markings Then we got into a problem -- that you were on a USmilitary installation and you couldn't do that Then we had the problem where if you'd fly them anywhere else in the United States and try to reconfigure then you've got another problem because you would have to do it at night oo So the planes were flown in if I recall correctly from Eglin as Air Force aircraft and flown down to Guatemala unmarked o and reconfigured and flown from there on into Puerto Cabezas unmarked Then at Puerto Cabezas the Cuban markings were put on them and this is where we needed the paint 94 Even as the discussions were being held concerning the painting of air strips and the aircraft progress was being made toward assembling the necessary aircraft -- 10 C-54's and 4 C-46's to provide the airlift from Retalhuleu Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua The movement of aircraft involved not only flights from Guatemala to Nicaragua and return but also flights of aircraft from Eglin Air Force Base to Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico qnd thence to TIDE or from Eglin Air Force Base directly to TIDE Inas- much as the transfers were going to be made after dark the problems were made even more difficult Although TIDE was scheduled to become operational on 1 April 1961 the airlift of the ground forces rom JMTRAV was not to begin until 0-8 and was to - 162 - continue through D-Day The actual opening of JMTIDE however was delayed until 2 April 1961 because leaders of the recently organized Consejo Revolucionario Cubano CRC Jose Miro Cardona Antonio de Varona Antonio Maceo and Manuel Artime were still visiting in the MADD TRAV area and rather than begin the airlift out of MADD while these people were still present the operation was delayed for 24 hours 95 Once the political representatives of the Cuban exiles had departed the base at JMADD operations at TIDE went into high gear By 2 April a gunnery bomb and rocket range had been located some 45 miles northeast of Puerto Cabezas in the vicinity of the Cayos Miskito Island In a three hour' period on 3 April 11 aircraft had arrived at JMTIDE -- six B-26's three C-46's and two C-54's -- with the transport aircraft scheduled to return to MADD for additional cargo and passengers These aircraft brought in 169 Cuban personnel and on that same day two of the B-26's were sent out to inspect the bomb and gunnery range Eduardo Ferrer stated that this visit of the Consejo took place at the end of February 1961 but he was a month early in his recollections 96 - 163 - with Capt Quintana of the Nicaraguan Gardia Nacional riding in one of the B-26's as an observer On 4-5 April 17 sorties were planned for the First Pilots of the B-26's with the pilots to ride in both the left and the right seats of the airGraft The ordnance load for these sorties was to be two 500 pound bombs four 200 pound fragmentation bombs four rockets and 800 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition 97 With the move to TIDE i t was not only the B-26 pilots who went into advanced training -- the C-46 pilots too were immediately engaged in upgrading their skills and improving their techniques According to Eddy Ferrer the Cuban pilots also spent their time assisting the ground crews in aircraft maintenance and arming bombs and rockets -- the ordnance activities being conducted under the supervision of the armorers Insofar as Ferrer was concerned it appeared that the living conditions for the air crews at JMTIDE were an improvement over the situation at JMADD The Interestingly enough five sorties on live bomb range 5 Apr 61 cancelled due lack Nicaraguan markings 98 The paint shortage which had been raised with Heaaquarters was no joke - 164 - quarters messing and other facilities were not noticeably better than they had been at MADDj but the fact that the airstrip was both longer and wider added to the mental comfort of the pilots 99 At the same time that the advanced training for the aircrews was going on plans were made to airlift the ground troops from JMADD to JMTIDE for embarkation on the ships which were being assembled to transport them to Cuba Because of delays imposed by Washington the bulk of the Brigade cargo had been airlifted to TIDE before the troops were ready to be debarked Initially i t had been planned that troops and cargo would be flown in simultaneously Major Billy Campbell who had been in charge of air operations at JMADD prior to Thorsrud was called back from Eglin to coordinate the administrative airlift details with Gar Thorsrud The one lament that Ferrer did raise about facilities at JMTIDE concerned the latrines Apparently some of the quick-lime used in the latrines for sanitary disposal got on the seats of the johns and the Cubans were coming up with sore butts Consequently some chose to go pistol in hand into the nearby woods to perform nature's functions -- the pistols being necessary according to Ferrer for protection from the wild animals which roamed the areas near the Base 1001 For photos of JMTIDE see Figures 24 through 33- --Also see DDS Historical Series OL-7 James Burwell Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba March 1960 - October 1961 Fig 70-88 S - 165 - with Campbell handling the airlift end of MADD a lift of nearly 1 300 troops was to be completed in a period of less than 4 days leaving only a handful of new trainees at JMTRAV and at JMADD the 160 airborne troops who would be flown directly from JMADD to the drop zones in Cuba on D-Day 101 During the period of transition from JMADD to JMTIDE and in the interval before the first of the operational air strikes the records reflect numerous indications of a serious shortage of Cuban pilots for the planned air operation This is contrary to the belief of all of the principals who were most directly involved in the air operation Richard Bissell how- ever claimed to have been seriously concerned about the number of air crews I do clearly remember that one of the limiting factors in the whole operation was the number of competent Cuban air crews that could be found recruited and trained I remember saying to Col Stanley Beerli that I wished he had a lot more aircraft and he said No point o we could get more B-26's easily enough but we don't have the crews to man them and we just can't find them We are training all the competent Cubans -- pilots co-pilots air crewmen -that we can find and this is as much of a capability as we are able to develop 102 - 166 - Additionally too i t has already been noted that when Gar Thorsrud took over as Chief of JMADDJMTIDE air operations one of the first sessions he had with Col Villafana and Luis Cosme was to find out whether they could recommend any additional Cuban aircrews who might be picked up for training -- or who might be defected out of Cuba if they had not already fled to the United States Of less than a dozen individuals whose names were produced as a result of this meeting six in fact arrived at JMTIDE prior to D-Day -- none of them however are known to have participated in the air operations over Cuba But at least one of the Cubans who had gone through the training at JMADD Fausto Valdez a C-54 commander did return from Miami to JMTIDE in time to participate in the air operations 103 Examination of the cable traffic between Head quarters and JMTIDE for the ten day period prior to D-2 15 April 1961 when the first tactical air operation against Cuba was launched indicates that there was a very narrow margin between the number of trained pilots particularly B-26 pilots and aircraft that were available for the planned operations - 167 - On 6 April 1961 it was reported that there was some doubling up in the training effort -- four of the C-54 captains were reported to be qualified to fly B-26's or C-46's in addition to the C-54's which were their primary responsibility 104 The situation was com- pounded by the fact that at this same time JMTIDE was reporting Review aircrew capability TIDE reveals critical shortage C-54 and C-46 aircraft commanders due loss trained personnel various causes Trained pilots Miami area should be dispatched immediately TIDE order to provide better indigenous crew air drop capability All three personnel in Miami are A C commanders in C-46 or C-54 105 Where both George Gaines and ar Thorsrud were of the opinion that this last minute flurry of activity regarding the acquisition of the additional Cuban pilot personnel would have made no difference at all -- had the initial air operation plan been carried out -- Col Stanley Beerli who was Acting Chief of DPD at he time went a step further and suggested that the supply of Cuban pilots who were really qualif ed to go into the air operations training program of JMATE had already been put into the program The ones that were screened that had any sort of potential were taken - 168 - whenever we could get them But near the end as you know everyone got a little bit apprehensive as we got near the D-date and they were beginning to think do we have enough and people were saying well maybe we ought to have a few more pilots here and there ' 106 But like Gaines and Thorsrud in response to the question of whether more pilots could have changed the course of the action Beerli said I don't think so because what you are doing here o you're not going to send aircraft in there that are going to be shot down Once we let that T-33 off the ground it raised havoc with us Then there was no number of aircraft ooo there was no number of crews that were going to do it 107 In addition to the problem of insuring adequate numbers of air crews to fly the three types of aircraft that were involved in the operation there were additiona1 difficulties that cropped up at TIDE prior to the D-2 air strike Through D-2 as a matter of fact one of the problems of considerable importance concerned the availability of 230 gallon drop tanks for use on the B-26's These were necessary to extend the range of the aircraft TIDE was going to Eglin requesting supplies of these tanks -- while at the same time Headquarters was going to Eglin and saying that the - 169 - 230 gallon tanks were in such short supply that if they were shipped to TIDE they should not be dropped in- the course of the air operations except as a last resort Not only was there a question about the availability of the drop-tanks but TIDE originated a request the day before 14 April 1961 the first air strike for an inflight test of the drop-tanks to see if their release damaged the aircraft said Moreover TIDE's message Request documentary film of test Faith in Headquarters judgment seems to have been in short supply A rather interesting response from Eglin pointed out that various of the Headquarters personnel were thoroughly experienced with the drop tanks including dropping them from B-26's Headquarters informed TIDE that there was only minor damage that might be expected to the flap areas of the wings and that this was so minor that it didn't interfere with the flight charac teristics In the cable reporting this the comment was made that no noise or anything occurs to frighten the pilots 108 At best these last minute questions about drop tanks for the B-26's appear to indicate a serious oversight of an issue that should have been studied diagnosed dissected and determined long before D-Day In the days immediately before the instigation of tactical air operations another difference be tween JMTIDE and Headquarters concerned TIDE's request for parts and spares including fly-away kits and incidental materials relative to the maintenance of B-26 aircraft A sharply worded protest was directed by Headquarters to JMTIDE on 8 April 1961 questioning the tremendous volume of items requested Most requirements you request previously shipped your activities 109 TIDE went back to Headquarters in very positive terms stating that 1 Original mission TIDE distorted beyond recognition Instead of forward air base providing support maritime i e unlimited storage diesel fuel and arm packs TIDE now primarily engaged support maritime operations 2 Investigation reveals TIDE base logistics and PDO personnel unloading ships loading and shifting cargo between ships plus providing provisions and records keeping In addition approximately 250 000 pounds cargo shipped MANA thence IDE thence ships Also aircraft parts and equipment for MADD dropped on TIDE extremely short period of time These actions conducted concurrent providing quarters and - 171 - rations 350-400 personnel on base built and manned to support approximately 200 personnel 3 Recommend following actions provide timely and orderly accomplishment all missions simultaneously A Personnel experienced KUBARK air repeat air logistics be sent to TIDE TDY to support this operation B Five motor scooters be made available immediately for operations security commo armament airborne section supply and maintenance 110 Although the bickering between Headquarters and the field over the need for various support items for the air operations continued even through the course of the invasion itself it can safely be said that the logistics support for the Air Operations through the In discussions the author had with principal air officers regarding the change of the target from TRINIDAD to ZAPATA the question was asked if this change in location made any significant difference in terms of air operations Both Cols Beerli and Gaines suggested that this did not make any particular difference and Gar Thorsrud who was the Air Operations Commander at JMTIDE recalled only some of the maintenance problems about the actual use of the air strip at Playa Giron -the need for pumping equipment and ground support equipment was more difficult than would have been experienced had the air strip at TRINIDAD been available Thorsrud as well as Gaines and Beerli apparently forgot about the difficulties that were caused to the logistics support effort at TIDE with the dispatch of the B-26 items intended for Playa Giron mentioned in the discussion above - 172 - period of training at bothJMADD and JMTIDE and through the course of the invasion itself was highly successful Having then assembled the strike aircraft having completed the advance training and having laid in the necessary ordnance the next aspect of the air story to be discussed must be that of D minus 2 D-2 One of the most needless cables that was sent by Headquarters to the field concerning supply items was the following of 10 April 1961 which read Request every effort be made to prevent further cracking of B-26 windshields since this one of critical supply items The field response to this on 12 April was Concur Will stop cracking windshields 111 - 173 - Part III Initiation of Combat Air Operations A D minus 2 15 April 1961 Initiation of tactical air operations against Cuba on 15 April 1961 evolved as insurance for the planned invasion -- in fact it came to be the keystone of the operation This tactical air strike caused a real brouhaha in the United Nations and put Adlai Stevenson -- the US Ambassador to the UN -- in the center of a controversy concerning the ultimate outcome at the Bay of Pigs which even today brings harsh words and bitter recriminations from Agency personnel who were involved -- some quite marginally -- in the JMATE project From this first tactical air operation there also evolved th E3 controversial episode commonly referred to as the second strike Eventually this issue would involve not only all of the key Agency personnel assigned to Project JMATE but also Mr Richard Bissell the Deputy Director for Plans Lt Gen Charles P Cabell the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the Secretary of State Dean R Rusk the President of the United States John F Kennedy and the President's brother Attorney-General Robert F Kennedy Although there has been much written about air operations over Cuba between 15-19 April 1961 much of it has been pure speculation or exaggeration with only limited segments being demonstrably accurate -the most reliable stories were those told by Eduardo Ferrer and Albert C transport pilots Buck Persons who served as Because it has been examined from an all source basis what follows may help to clarify -if not resolve -- some of the issues about which there has been the greatest dispute Final decisions on what where and when the tactical air operation was to be mounted was discussed debated and 'decided in th Readquarters area -- the principals most directly concerned with the overall air operation more frequently than not were relegated to the sidelines as observers The ball in terms of the management of the air operation was being carried principally by Mr Bissell and General Cabell Even before the departure of President Eisenhower the new Administration had been informed in specific detail - 175 - of the nature of the anti-Castro operation but it was not' until mid-March 1961 that the Kennedy administration really opted into the anti-Castro program Between 11 and 15 March 1961 the issue of the TRINIDAD Plan the agreed choice of CIA and the JCS as the best site for the invasion was debated and at the direction of the President following the L ' rl i f Y' advice of Mli Rusk - - the CIA planners and their JCS 1 ' f - counterparts were directed to find an alternative site for the upcoming thrust against Castro The re- suIt was a decision to launch the invasion of the Cienaga de Zapata from the Bahia de Cochinos The change in the invasion site forced a number of significant alterations to be worked into the planning In the version finally submitted to JFK TRINIDAD would have provided tactical air support concurrent with but not prior to the amphibious and airborne assault on Cuba and earlier versions had called for a pre liminary strike principally at Castro's airfields during the period D-3 to D-l The revised plan targeting the ZAPATA area required the landing of troops and the concurrent movement onto the beachhead airstrip at Playa Giron of B-26 aircraft - 176 - I I Operating these aircraft from the beachhead was intended to support plausible deniability re US responsibility for the attacks and also to protect the invading Brigade from Castro's planes One impact of this decision has already been mentioned -- the need to provide ground support for the two B-26's to be operated from the Cuban beachhead forced a drastic revision in the loading program for one of the supply vessels in order to insure that appropriate materiel POL and parts would be available Personnel adjustments also had to be made so that ground crew would be waiting at the beachhead airstripf when the B-26's arrived The aircraft and materiel in turn had to be replaced by Headquarters and Headquarters in turn complained about the field's mismanagement of supplies The change in invasion sites also forced an additional effort on the part of th reconnaissance and photo interpretation people to identify the most suitable possible landing strip for B-26 operations In the end the 4 000 foot strip at Playa Giron was chosen -- a decision reached after having rejected the possibilities of using the airstrips at either Trinidad or Soplillar both of which were acJ A u CA - rlI d 1o J -88 -8 COUNTRY Cuba COUNTRY CODE 520 WAC 586 ASSOTW VOL 6-01 MAP REF CHT C eu oa l age ts Vol 6 Mar 58 IDENTI AIRFlEL VALUATION NAME CLASS lNSTALLAT'ION NO 8017 ALT FT 50 DATE LATEST INFO Fe b 58 TRINIDAD ALTERNATE NAME S Grau San Martin I COORDS 21 48 N 80 00 W Just SW of Trinidad 32 miles SE of Cienfuegos 32 miles WSW of Sancti Spiritus 37 miles S of Santa Clara LOCATION AND LANDMARKS PHOTO OR SKETCH DATE RWY DllilENSIONS 4000' X 120' NOTE Mar 55 ORIENTATION NE SW SURFACE Asphalt excellent CAPP CiTY C-54 EXTENSIBILITY Unlimi ted S1' ' by use Extensibility l E limited by urban bUildup T' ' XIW YS AND PI' RKING Turning circle at Sl ' end of l uu' ay P2rkj uf for large aircraft at N end of field ample parking for light aircraft on grassed areas u a t 'Ab'- uu ' RINIDAD WIGATlO 1 FACIUTlES- l RADIO 2 COMMUNICATIONS 3 AEROLOGY 4 LIGHTING None Telephone telegraph and cable in Trinidad Forecasts available by telephone from Jose M2rti Airfield 150 miles NIl None VIG S- l POL 2 REPAIRS 1 None 3 JET STARTING UNlTS 2 None OXYGEN SUP L Y 4 No info 3 None 5 OTHER 5 No info XED INSTALLATIONS- l HANGARS 2 PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATIONS 3 MIse SLDGS None Poor quali ty hotels in Trinidad 3 Small a ninistration building i 1SPORTATION FACILlTIES- I ROAD 2 RAIL 3 WATER Seconda y paved road joins Central Highway at Saucti Spiritus Single-track railroad in Trinidad joins island network at Santa Clara 3 Small freighter and lighter accommodations at rrl inidad Excellent port facilities at Cienfuegos GPERI TOR jS RS Civi l Aviation Company of Cuba Ci v i I Av iation Company of Cuba G'HFlo NT ST EMGBPNT Trinidad was rebuilt lud officially hr 53 to encourage tourist trade The runway will opened in support edium tr nsport aircraft however the lack of facilities stl ict it to llmite operations of tl1is t 'P2 judged to be too short for the B- 6 operation Another significant difference between the TRINIDAD and the ZAPATA air strike plans was that TRINIDAD anticipated the use of six US pilots each in a B-26 which was scheduled to strike one or another of the fields on which Castro's combat aircraft were stationed The ZAPATA plan ma21e no such provision for US airmen and as has been pointed out previously the use of US pilots was a point of considerable contention between Headquarters and the field -- and in Washington between CIA and State White House air experts throughout the course of the training activities at JMADD and at JMI'IDE 1 In planning for tactical air operations the question was raised of the need for the number soften- ing pre-D-Day strike or strikes prior to the actual day of the invasion During meetings of the Special The B-26 pilots had been training on 5 000 - 6 000 foot strips at both JMADD and JMTIDE and as noted later in this volume during final training the can- didates for flying the B-26's into Playa Giron were practicing landings between the two white strips 4 000 feet apart on the runways at JMTIDE and JMADD The author has been unsuccessful in attempts to discover why no serious protest appears to have been made over the rejection of Trinidad on the basis of the airstri __ field was 4 OO'xl o' M n l w o k -t l -t-t-J 'V- M 1 u r 4- '-y 4 c t- 'ito --v t A li l w - -f-b- t - J- J p -vi tZj-J l'fbl -r A J- - - - -u I r -' u fw-tJ - --- - 178 - -l j c -v r f -u 1 -- A Iv _ I - 10 7 - TO ET -- c - ' Group on 8 and 15 December 1960 the issue of spoiling raids and tactical air operations out of Puerto Cabezas had been raised but not resolved and in planning for the 5 January 1961 meeting Tracy Barnes was instructed to ask the Special Group for approval for air strikes beginning on D-l cD been advanced as early y auo The need for such a strike had 16 -JanuarY y of Defense when the Joint Staff r the Department e Agency's thinking about the operation against Castro o 3tThe actual responsibility for incorporating theD-2 air strike into the ZAPATA plan as it finally evolved s been a subject of some speculation but it appears clear that Col Jack Hawkins Richard Bissell and C Tracy Barnes were responsible for devising the D-2 strike and the defector story that went with it None of the principal air officers -- Thorsrud Gaines Beerli Campbell -- nor Chief WH 4 was able to pinpoint the actual individual or time when the decision was made that the inclusion of a pre-D-Day air strike was essential to the success of the operation The records provide evidence that the push for a pre-D-Day air strike received strong support from McGeorge Bundy President Kennedy's National Security - 179 - Adviser In a most interesting Memorandum to the President dated 15 March 1961 during the period when the Agency and JCS were in the process of revising the TRINIDAD plan Mr Bundy noted among other things that Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's air force in a single day without anyone knowing for some time where they came from and with nothing to prove that i t was not an interior rebellion by theCtiban Air Force which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations 4 This recommendation by Bundy was undoubtedly the result of his contacts with Hawkins an1 Bissell In his May 1961 post-mortem of the operation Hawkins claimed that both the pre-n-Day and D-Day strike concepts went to the President and in response to a query on the subject Mr Bissell could not recall whether the plans went directly to President Kennedy - 180 - or some of his JFK's principal aides McGeorge Bundy was probably the recipient of the Hawkins-Bissell message calling for two strikes for Bundy wrote I have been a skeptic about Bissell's Cuban operation but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer I think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State There is however evidence to indicate that President Kennedy himself was involved at least twice -- on Sand 6 April 1961 -- in discussions of the planned defection operation and the concomitant preD-Day air strike David W Gray specified that on S April the President Secretary McNamara General Lemnitzer and State and CIA representatives met at the White House and discussed among other things fake defections and preliminary air strikes Sal In response to a question concerning the validity of Hawkins's statement that he Hawkins Bissell and Barnes hadorigi ated the D-2 strike and defector operation and that the President had been briefed on both D-2 and D-Day strike plans Bissell told Sherman Kent on 23-24 March 1977 that Hawkins was correct except as noted above that Bissell could not recall if it was the President or some of his principal aides who had been given the detailed plans Major General USA Chief Subsidiary Activities Division J-S and the JCS liaison officer with the JMATE project - 181 - In reference to 6 April Gray did not list the participants and he reported that Bissell outlined the defection plans with air strikes and diversionary landings 5b In another reference to results of meetings with the President on 4 5 and 6 April Gray stated that Planned 'Defection' air strikes had forced revisions in the CIA plan 5c It is difficult in retrospect to understand how one of Bundy's position could seriously believe that the mounting of a tactical air strike would not uN be used against the United States in the _ Castro Certainly there had be n forum by enough publicity on the training efforts in both Guatemala and Nicaraguaand on US support for the FRO's anti-Castro efforts to indicate that the White House Staff had not done its homework if in fact Bundy really believed the US would not be held culpable Bundy's reference to the possibility of a quiet landing per the stric- ture of Secretary Rusk -- also seems to offer a placebo I ' uring the period 5-7 April 1961 Jack HaWkins 1 I WH 4 CI Dick Drain C OPS WH 4 and MrL--- -- B sseII among others appear to have been most closely involved in planning th-e -B-26 defection-deception operation 5d - 182 - for the President Even without an accompanying air strike how could a landing of 800 - 1 200 men with tanks heavy machine guns mortars and recoilless rifles be considered quiet Although uncertain concerning the origin of the D-2 and defector plan both George Gaines and Stanley Beerli of DPD recalled that they were firmly in favor of the idea Gaines who was Chief of Air Operations for DPD on Project JMATE stated We wanted something to insure success of the absolute total annihilation of retaliatory capability when we put our troops ashore One strike early in the morning we didn't think was sufficient to guarantee the degree of success that we needed So several schemes were proposed and we checked them and finally we decided that -- and I think the decision actually was made in Bissell's office -- that what we would do would be to pursue the course of a fake Cuban Air Force defection We had intelligence enough available to us that we knew the names of the people who still Were active -- even though they may have been part of a dissident element to some degree -they were still active in the Cuban Air Force So we decided what we would do was stage very near to the time of the actual strike a fake defection Purportedly one of Castro's own pilots would become disgruntled and take an aircraft shoot up his own Air Force facilities and seek asylum in the US The damage done during that fake strike would give us the insurance that we - 183 - needed In other words whatever damage we could do -- we were hoping for something around 50% -- if we could knock out 50% on that strike then when we went in with our morning strike just a couple of days later we could be more sure of getting everything that could hurt the ground troops and the ships The timing was arranged that closely to the actual landing because it would keep -- the short period of time -- would keep the analysis of the overall damage from being complete by the time the total invasion occurred We were going to hit three not one o which would purportedly have been his act the notional defector We are going to hit three bases Libertad San Antonio and Santiago o ooo I think there were several of us that thought that we needed a little bit more of an edge than putting all our eggs in one basket for that one strike to be totally successful I was one of the people who was apprehensive about trying to guarantee 100% success with one effort and I think that the discussion among us oo we sort of o this decision evolved Gaines's opinion is supported by Stan Beerli who was the Acting Chief of DPD of Project JMATE durin the course Beerli for example noted I think we determined that ooo if we could have an air strike on D-2 and then follow it up with an air strike after we had an assessment that we could accomplish the air control mission But we would like to have had an air strike maybe we wanted air strikes o maybe - 184 - as far back as D-6 But oo you risk your covert operation when you start doing that You couldn't depend on doing it all at one o on one strike In other words if you would like to establish the fact that you have control of the air before you hit the beaches You have got to go before D-Day unless you are prepared for air-toair combat -- which we were not The thing is I don't think the air operation really ever got seriously nailed down to a schedule until after we went to the second landing site You see the air people wou1d like to have gone in and neutralized it all before the ground force was there But of course you start compromising your covertness o What you did was to alert the world press that something was probably going on In other words we couldn't do everything we desired to do to guarantee neutralizing the Cuban Air Force in one day J Unlike Cols Beerli and Gaines Gar Thorsrud who was Air Commander at JMTIDE and would be responsible for setting the tactical air operations into motion was far more optimistic about what might have been attained by the single D-Day air strike using the full force of B-26's as originally intended Thorsrud said The tactical strikes -- or if you want to call them strategic -- really didn't matter whether it was TRINIDAD or Playa Giron because we had to knock out the air -- the enemy air capabilities and I was in on the tactical planning on how we hit those fields The time of day and the type of weapons that we were going to use That was for the first day of the operation That was to go in simultaneously - 185 - with the invasion and we had napalm earmarked for the 75 tanks that were lined up on the soccer field and we had 50 calibers -- the 8 gun nose B 26's which was a helluva lot of fire power -- to hit the parked aircraft o o There was just no doubt in anyone's mind that with the element of surprise at the crack of dawn that first day that there wouldn't have been anything left on those on any of those fields 8 With the decision made that there would be a preinvasion strike on D-2 it is easier to understand the reason for the intensification of the training activity as the air operation was moved from JMADD to JMTIDE That the Cuban crews were ready to undertake tactical air operations had been attested to by both George Gaines and Gar Thorsrud Gaines made quite a point of the increased_capability of the B-26 contingent noting The B-26 capability -- combat capability -- was exceptional They had come It was not until he was reviewing this volume that Thorsrud learned of the origin of the D-2 effort He was highly incensed to learn that such a strike was being considered even as he was being appointed air commander for TIDE and MADD on 24 March 1961 Thorsrud claimed that the first he heard of the plan was when notification of its approval was cabled to him as a fait accompli As the only Agency staffer who had first hand experience in a similar air effort --- e was el er 19nored orgotten y the Headquarters planners To say he was unhappy to learn how the decision was made is an understatement - 186 - from the last place in c ombat capability as far as proficiency was concerned to what I would consider first place among the three airplanes -- the 46 the 54 and the B-26 They were good Now the American Air Staff -- USAF -- didn't realize how good they were and probably doesn't to this day but they were unusually good combat crews They had not had any seasoning in combat so when I say they were unusually good I'm not talking about the psychological factors that go into combat I'm talking about the technical proficiency in putting the gun on a target and bomb on a target They didn't have the guts that an American would have displayed but on the other hand they might have had a little bit more intelligence than the average American combat pilot When they were asked to fly in sorties up to the beach and provide some cover'for the people on the ground the Cubans didn't want to do it because of the danger and so the Americans volunteered to do it and we lost some The C-54's and C-46's oo for a long time the 54's were the prima donnas of our entire Cuban Air Force -- the Brigade air force -- because ooo a lot of them were ex-Cubana Air Lines pilots and capable They were sort of looked up to as the old sen10r pilots with oo thousands of hours But as time went on the C-46 people got more and more proficien too and they turned out to be kind of brash johnny-come-latelys who really did a good job I would say the C-54's turned out to be technically competent and the C-46 people were much better than would originally have been expected Like Thorsrud and Gaines Stan Beerli also was high on the technical competence of the Cuban pilots More than the others however Beerli did indicate some footnote continued on following page - 187 - Within the first week of the move to JMTIDE and the rush into the final training activity in anticipation of D-2 Gar Thorsrud received a set of final in- structions concerning the B-26 operations The nature of these instructions emphasized that complete authority for target selection except for tactical close support targets assigned by the Brigade Commander on the beach would reside at Headquarters It was stressed that B-26 aircraft commanders should understand this because deviation from Headquarters authorized targets could jeopardize the entire operation Innocent victims or non-tactical target destruction can bring world reaction and or intervention against this effort 11 In addition to the final instructions for the Air Commander of JMTIDE there was a continuing reservation about the emotional makeup of the Cuban crews for tactical air operations For this reason he was more sympathetic to the frequent requests from the field for the authority to use US pilots during the course of air operations -- even before the tactical air operations began 10 Complete text of these final instructions appears in Appendix 5 - 188 - E_T_ --- __ --- - _ flurry of activity regarding the risk of capture briefing materials that were forwarded for the Cuban crews There were instructions that this information also be passed on to the American crews in case they were used in the combat areas and there was an ongoing hassle over the number of aircraft that would be involved in the initial strike at the three airfields Libertad San Antonio and Santiago Ini- tially it was planned to use a total of six B-26's two at each of the three fields As will be noted later when the plan matured Headquarters did agree to assign three B-26's to attack both Libertad and San Antonio with the remaining two aircraft being sent to Santiago An additional B-26 was assigned as a spare in case of mechanical failure of one of the eight attacking aircraft and a tenth B-26 was assigned to the defector operation which will be discussed later There also was a deception aspect built into the planned attack on the Libertad and San Antonio airfields Two of the three B-26's assigned to Libertad and two of the three assigned to San Antonio would bear identical tail numbers - 189 - At each airfield two aircraft with unidentical tail numbers would make the first strikes and then the third aircraft -- with an identical tail number to one of the other aircraft would make its pass The theory was that this would make the Cubans believe that a total of only four aircraft were engaged in the strike at San Antonio and Libertad In fact this proved to be the case at least for a few days for Castro in his 23 April 1961 TV spectacular on the invasion specified that there had been two aircraft at each of the three airfields 12 Another of the problems that faced the planners of the D-2 operation concerned procedures regarding both US Navy and US Air Force aircraft USN aircraft operating in the area of Nicaragua and Cuba during the initiation of tactical air operations were advised to stay clear of both the south coast of Cuba Nicaraguan air space and of TIDE reported that Nicaraguan Air Force P-51's had been alerted to intercept any nonscheduled aircraft approaching the TIDE base Castro observed the attack on Libertad from the nearby General Staff quarters where he was attending a meeting - 190 - Technically the Nicaraguan pilots were supposed to provide warning before shooting at strange aircraft but TIDE suggested that it would be advisable not to tempt them with reference to the coastal areas of Cuba TIDE pointed out that there had been at least two instances where USN aircraft had strayed over Cuban territory and had been lost In one instance One USN plane shot down by rebel forces backed by KUBARK 13 A set of rules had been delivered to the Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense Command CONAD providing rules for identification and engagement at the time that the Cuban air operations were being monitored out of Nicaragua The main concerns of CONAD were to prevent Castro's aircraft from entering United States air space for possible attack under the guise of Brigade aircraft and to prevent the destruction of Brigade aircraft which might be headed for the United States air space on an emergency basis 14 Whether the information about the shoot down of the USN aircraft by Agency-backed rebeis in Cuba has ever been revealed is not known - 191 - In the context of possible violations of air space by Brigade aircraft being forced to make emergency landings Headquarters told TIDE that The planned air operation for D-2 was not finally set until 14 April 1961 at 2100Z when a message to TIDE from the Director specified the commitment of eight aircraft against three airfields the airborne spare in case of an abort of an aircraft assigned to either San Antonio or Libertad and one aircraft for the special defection operation 16 As mentioned there had been considerable niggling between Headquarters and the field in the period 12-14 April for the assignment of a third aircraft at both San Antonio and Libertad Gar Thorsrud was very much concerned about the need for the extra aircraft and then Lt Col Gaines arrived at JMTIDE to conduct the final briefings for the upcoming air strike he too was convinced and consequently the decision finally was made favorable - 192 - to the wishes of the Air Commander at JMTIDE 17 On 10 April 1961 Lt Col George Gaines was at JMTIDE to begin the briefings for CIA staff personnel and advisers on the D-2 and D-Day air targets The briefings began at 1300 in the afternoon continued through that day and on through 11 April until the final preparations for the attack plan were worked out On 12 April the six Cuban combat crews plus the spare crew chosen for the D-2 strike were moved into isolation -- an area surrounded by concertina wire adjacent to the operations compound and guarded by two security officers Here they were given a general operations and intelligence briefing and the crews were assigned to the individual targets Be- ginning at 0800 local time on 12 April the crews studied the targets with the advisers and intelligence officers in a series of two hours on - one hour off sessions throughout the day 18 Each crew was called on to present its attack plan for a specific target from memory and Col Gaines said the system worked well We had the Cuban pilots go over and over and over their role and striking those three bases to the point where - 193 - they knew exactly from what compass headings they were to arrive at the base and when they switched from 50 calibers to bombs and when they switched from bombs back to 50 calibers ooo Which direction they pulled up in o Whether they made a 90 or 270 degree turn to come back in on their second run They could do it in their sleep they had done it so many times on photographs o aerial photographs We got an unexpected amount of damage because they had followed their briefing right down to the T oo I think if we could go back and look at the training that they had received and the job that they did they did a job on those three air bases that our first line American fighter pilots would have been proud to claim as their own handiwork 19 The crews were served their meals within this isolation compound and if they had to leave the area they were accompanied by their operations advisers and security personnel A cable going back to Headquarters from TIDE on 13 April 1961 at 0953Z made the following comment about the Cuban air rews Concensus sic here that crews were highly motivated and appear eager for strike Morale could not be higher Selection of crews was very competitive as all 17 crews volunteered As for combat readiness believe this group could compete with any comparable selection USAF pilots 20 This cable was probably prepared by Lt Col George Gaines and it is interesting to note that there - 194 - was a rather significant modification of the language which appeared in this cable from Col Jack Hawkins's cable from TIDE of the same date but at l802Z in response to a Headquarters request concerning the readiness of the Cuban Brigade In the much publicized cable of 13 April 1961 Hawkins stated among other things the following Germosen Lt Col George Gaines USAF informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadron equal to the best US Air Force squadron 21 The best US Air Force squadron is not necessarily the same as any comparable selection USAF pilots Eddy Ferrer although not a B-26 pilot wrote that the whole situation surrounding the target briefings highly irritated the Cubans He pointed out that when the Constellation carrying the VIP contingent arrived they met exclusively with US personnel t layout the strike plan Ferrer says that the Cubans were totally excluded and ignored despite the fact that it was their country their fight and moreover they had a better knowledge of the terrain and the people than the Americans who were taking full charge of the show Ferrer stressed that there were nearly - 195 - 20 ex-Cuban Air Force and ex-Navy pilots at TIDE whose expertise was completely ignored in the initial stages of the briefing and planning operation Ferrer too pointed out that when volunteers were requested all of the B-26 crews stepped forward Unfortunately Ferrer said that the feeling among the Cubans was that the Americans regarded anyone from south of the US border down to Patagonia as uncivilized savage Indians The eight Cubans who were not selected were particularly critical Although it cannot be confirmed Ferrer also reported that Gen Reid Doster had lost his composure and had thrown his flight bag against the wall cursing out the Headquarters idiots who had conceived of the D-2 air strike employing only eight B-26's 22 As a C-46 pilot Ferrer had not been a participant in the briefings for the B-26 bomber pilots however Connie Seigrist's comments on the briefings tend to support some of the reactions that were stressed by Ferrer Seigrist wrote There was a Staff briefing for our Staff personnel first I was not invited -- I was not Staff There was some VIP from D C that gave this briefing I - 196 - always thought it was Mr Bissell but again I am not sure The VIP left and Gar and Gaines gave we management personnel our briefing Gen Doster from ANG attended along with myself the troop commander American Col Egan and someone else I don't remember I do recall vividly I objected to the plan The reason was because of the stand down period I felt we could only win by striking hard and fast day and night and could gain victory in 8 hours I felt the 2 day stand down would prove our undoing as it would permit Mr Castro the time he needed to organize his air and ground and become unbeatable Col Gaines in- formed me the plans were made by brilliant people and it wasn't our duty to pick the plan apart but to abide by it I was sick at heart and have never forgotten that moment I learned of the 2-day stand down It was like working for a traitor and yet not knowing who the traitor was I just could not believe our Joint Chiefs would permit our President to go ahead with that part of the plan I had made friends with the Cubans and they came to me afterwards actually crying and very upset when they found out about the stand down They expected me to explain this -- I could not -- it was an impossible situation for me I have never felt worse or more hopeless 23 Carlos Rivero author of Los Sabrinos del Tio Sam Havana 1976 p 98 also claimed that Bissell who always kept his identity secret was at the briefings but Bissell was not in attendance Possibly the VIP in question was Colonel Hawkins Emphasis by author - 197 - The commitment of the D-2 air strike was to destroy Castro's air force One of the persistent questions concerning that air strike was whether Castro's T-33's were the specific targets for the attack The plan of attack however called for the destruction of all combat or potential combat aircraft Both Gar Thorsrud and George Gaines clearly recognized the superiority of the T-33 to any of the aircraft that the Brigade would be mounting and the fact is that when the D-2 airstrike was set up all of Castro's operable T-33's were believed to be located at the three airfields which made up the D-2 targets Stan Beerli however was quite emphatic about the nature of the planned air attack on D-2 with regard to the T-33's saying If you had said prior to the mission D-2 had we made a specific point to go after the T-33's the answer is no 24 The question o the T-33's as primary targets is mentioned at this point because both Richard Bissell and Stanley Beerli apparently indicated to the Taylor Committee during the post-invasion investigation that among the reasons for the defeat was an underestimation of Castro's air capability and particularly a - 198 - belief that the T-33's were not armed 25 Before discussing the actual strike on 15 April 1961 the second aspect of the D-2 operation must be explained o that is the planned defector operation The scenario for JMFURY -- the crypt which was assigned to this particular aspect of the project read in part as follows At or about 0800Z 0300 EST on Friday 14 April 1961 a Cuban pilot selected from the group now on alert in TIDE will depart TIDE in a specially prepared B-26 for a point 15-20 miles off the coast of CUba He will arrive at this point at or about 0610 local He will then fly No satisfactory explanation is found in the record for either man having this particular belief Beerli admittedly recognized the fact that the T-33 was a trainer but as DOD had pointed out in response to an Agency request the planes were equipped with two 50 caliber machine guns Perhaps both men were too far from the actual air operations to be fully briefed on all of the details of the air equipment but this seems doubtful in view of the serious debates which had taken place concerning the choice of aircraft to be employed by the exile Brigade facing opposition from Castro's T-33's and Sea Furies Unfortunately however in its final report on the Bay of Pigs the Taylor Committee did fault the intelligence o as to the evaluation effectiveness of the T-33's 2sa The date for the pre-D-Day air strike had initially been set for D-3 14 April 1961 but on 12 April 1961 Headquarters notified TIDE that the JMFURY project had been set back to D-2 or 15 April 1961 to Miami International Airport Time of arrival will be at or about 0740 local He will send a MAY DAY distress signal while off the Florida coast and inform US authorities that he has defected from the Cuban Air Force is having engine trouble must land in Miami and requests asylum The US Customs and Immigration and Naturalization authorities will take him in hand after landing The pilot will inform these authorities that he defected from the San Antonio de los Banos airbasei that he had before leaving the area attacked this basei that two colleagues had also defected from Campo Libertad base and had attacked other Cuban air bases o The pilot will be held under maximum security for his protectioni a press interview will be scheduled in which he will answer questions along lines set forth in preliminary briefings He will be escorted that night by black flight from the United States to TIDE by KUSODA Security personnel 211 Both pilot and aircraft were to be reamed steamed dry cleaned sterilized and sanitized in order to make it appear tha a legitimate defection from Castro's Cuba had occurred The aircraft itself was to be painted identically to the B-26's of the FAR Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria and it was also to be given a tail number identical to one of those used on a particular Castro B-26 which was known to be inactive at the time The pilot would be chosen on the basis of - 200 - individual motivation emotional reliability and security awareness as currently adjudged and on the basis of DPD's extensive period of work with these pilots 28 According to the scenario none of the pilot's colleagues would know the details of this mission either before or after its completion His return to JMTIDE would be by a C-46 which would be stationed at Miami and upon his return to the Air Base at TIDE it would only be stated that he had been damaged by gunfire and this was the explanation for his return by the C-46 In terms of the down time at Miami pilot Garcia a phony name dreamed up for the pilot would be under the control of Immigration and Naturalization Service INS officers who were briefed about the-operation to the extent necessary to insure the security of the activity The pilot would be debriefed and held in custody by the INS and his cover story and such briefing as INS was directed to permit would be totally in Spanish INS was told to prohibit all picture taking and nothing was to be said about the relatives or friends of the pilot to deceiving the other Cuban - 201- flie s In addition Agency personnel at the JMWAVE Base also would be in the dark as to the identity of the supposed defector 29 Once the plane landed at Miami International David Phillips Chief WH 4 Propaganda was to call the base and tell them that he had received a report that a Cqban military aircraft had landed somewhere in the Miami area and asked the base personnel to check out this lead and to get the full press coverage of the incident In addition to the high standards which the pilot had to meet the project outline appealed to the pilot to keep his mouth shut out of respect for the success of the operation which was upcoming and perhaps not incidentally a sum of $10 000 was In his book The Night Watch published subsequent to his retirement Mr Phillips claimed that about 13 April 1961 Abruptly I became involved in the air action o o It was my assignment during the next 24 hours to stage manage the incredible charade 30 From the record there is no question that PhillipSprobably contributed significantly to preparing questions in Spanish to ready pilot Garcia for questions by US reporters but he implies a larger role in this episode than can be supported Also as noted later Phillips story is in error when he states that there were to be two defectors -- one in Miami and one to Key West - 202 - to be deposited for him in a New York bank He could withdraw the money on the basis of a personal check at the rate of $2 000 a year for a five year period if according to the scenario over this five year span no word on the deception aspects of the mission leaks out 31 One further incentive to the chosen pilot was that his children if any or his first two were to be educated in the United States at company expense In charge of this deception operation for DPD was Casimiro Barquin who apparently huddled with the chosen pilot Mario Zuniga in isolation from the eight crews who were being briefed for the airfield missions According to at least one report Barquin was in charge of makeup and disguise for Zuniga in case he should be inadvertently photographed while down in Miami The aircraft itself in addition to being painted to resemble the FAR B-26's was to be given a weather-beaten look by rubbing the markings On 18 April 1961 the Chief WH 4 CI requested that such an account for Zuniga be opened in a New York bank 32 Presumably the pilot collected the full amount- - with dirt holes were to be punched in it to simulate bullet holes and phony maintenance logs and litter similar to that traditionally found on Cuban military aircraft were to be included in the B-26 that Zuniga flew into Miami International According to Eddy Ferrer the cowlings were taken off the engines of the B-26 and shot full of holes placed over the engines They were then re- When Zuniga went into Miami these at least would appear realistic 33 On a course that would take him over a less dangerous part of Cuba enroute to Miami Zuniga was also to fire the eight 50 calibers that were mounted on the B-26 One unconfirmed story indicates that he may have failed to do this and when the plane was spotted by reporters in Miami International the muzzle covers were still on the guns Before turning to the story of the actual D-2 operations -- both deception and tactical attack - The author has not been able to establish the validity of this story It seems inconceivable however with the attention being given to the aircraft that such a stupid mistake could have occurred Phillips The Night Watch p 106 also repeats this story - 204 - mention should also be made of another interesting deception operation which never materialized Shortly after noon on 14 April 1961 Headquarters received a cable from TIDE originating with Col Hawkins which read as follows Request large scale sonic booms over Capital sial night following JMFURY and over other major cities if feasible same night Suggest arrange with Col Clarke USAF at Pentagon through Gen Gray 34 Based on the author's interview with Richard D Drain who was Chief Operations from WH 4 at this time the rationale for the sonic boom was that We were trying to create confusion and $0 on I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing you know Great Let's see what it does break all the windows in downtown Havana o distract Castro I remember briefing the appropriate authorities in the Department of State about this because they had to know about it -- I don't quite know why -- and yes Gen LeMay I can tell you exactly who turned that down -- Department Assista nt Secretary of State Wymberly Coerr o and LeMay said Thank you very much young man Now can you tell me why that sonofabitch turned i t down I said No sir General the reasoning was unclear to me but it had something to do with Berlin LeMay said Jesus Christ and slams the phone down and frankly that was typical of the Department So I told LeMay in answer to his question Sure I know who turned it down in - 205 - ET State He LeMay obviously never got i t unturned because we had no sonic boom 35 The D-2 air strike at San Antonio Libertad and Santiago was based on a targeting operation that had been conducted at Headquarters an operation in which both Cols Beerli and Gaines played a most active role According to Stan Beerli We did that target planning right there in Washington based on U-2 photography and prime intelligence o o knowing where everything was and at that time the priority was on the Cuban Air Force 36 An unsigned chronology of events related to the Bay of Pigs dated 23 April 1961 and submitted to the Taylor Committee by the Agency noted among other items that on 14 April 1961 Consulted General Cabell Mr Bissell and Mr Braddock in State re using sonic boom Mr Braddock said Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr could not approve as too obviously U S 35a It is probable that this chronology was prepared Qy Richard D Drain C OPSjWH4 from his personal notes For 23 April 1961 Drain noted that he came to the office to do Chrono record for diary On 14 April 1961 Drain wrote that among other items Consulted Cabell Dan Braddock Bissell re sonic boom 35b The need to prepare the Chronology for the Taylor Committee triggered the additional information about Assistant Secretary Coerr which otherwise might have been lost to the historian working exclusively from the written record left by COPS WH 4 See map following p 206 - 206 - I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 3 0 t 4 6 5 82 8C' Cay Sa Baham G j F F Anguilla Cays Bahamas I I ' ' I C '- ' - Sagua' la Grande San ' Cristobal r Los - 0' Palacios-' r -- j de HulahaT2 ' La Fe J CABO SAN ANTONIO -- DE ISLA 'j DE PINOS N ue vaGerona sSanta '- arbara A ' 'r Hr - ' - t t ' ' ' C' Cer-t ' GI_ c r' l n j '-' ' 1'- C ' MUNICIPIO f j f Encrucijada '' ' c ' 1' f 1 oo GBP d ' ia 1n ' 'l j u ' GBP2 l _ _el_Rio _ r 'If Tfin dad Santa ' Ca'iilc l ' J ' ' Tunas de Zaza Fe CAVO ' LARGO ' - Sant -9 O CUBA Provincia boundary I e I I Railroad e National capital - - - - - Central highway Matanzas Provincia capital - - - - - Other surfaced road C 1 N Airfield -l Major port j JJ n J ' ' ' seA Populated places o Over 50 000 o 10 000 to 50 000 o Under 10 000 Scale 1 2 450 000 o O J1 60 s RO 100 - l4 4 3 6 5 7 C 78 '---- Cay Sa Baham ' ANDROS ISLAND ' AREA 76 THE BAHAMAS Anguilla Cays Bahamas Leg nd D-2 Target S n Antonio A F D-2 Target Libertad A F Area of Air O s 17-19 April 1961 Appx Site Ray-Barker Shoot Down Appx Site Shamburger-Gray Shoot Down Emergency La jings B-26's D-Day D-2 Target antiago A F 1 2 3 4 5 - ATLANTIC CAVO COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS 15-19 April 1961 O 6 OCEAIV 7 coco o _ 0'-- - ' II ' J ' -'- 2 ' c i n '-'J' - _ C Ur 'agua Cay lobos Bahamas o ' ' r i f- Ir o o _---------_ _'-- _-_ - CAVO ROMANO _ _ _- ----- -_ _ _ I r j '-- CAVO Esmeralda ' '''-- -- -' '- '-L CAVO SABINAL ita s ' Tunas de Zaza GUAJABA -' Santa Maria J O Y ' 01' - S -c l4 F tl GREAT INAGUA - -- ' Pa '--' -t'tS ' ---- I ' uelle o ' _ 'i' _ Cayo Uaamd - -_ ''- ' Manopl Santa CruZ- _j-- '-- del Sur Guayabal ' Puerto Manati anati - 3 - '_' r -' Ii' L __ iVll J' ' 1 F -j ' s 4 - Media luna ' a t - ' ' o 'I - CABO'MAISi - ' NiQuero ' I o CIIBO CRUZ _--------- --'JPilon- - ' - Baracoa it- z ' Sibciney '-J ' I ''' - -- ' j uo 'U ' a 1 2 3 4 La'isabela ATLASTIC o OCEAS I 5 6 7 coco CAVO D-2 Target San Antonio AlP D-2 Target Libertad AlP Area of Air Ops 17-19 April 1961 Appx Site Ray-Barker Shoot Down Appx Site Shamburger-Gray Shoot Down Emergency Landings B-26's D-Day D-2 Target Santiago AlP Cay lobos Baha as - -- '-----' D o d - 2 CAVO ROMANO CAVO GUAJABA CAVO SABINAL Loc -_ -- -- -JucaroC- - _ - Nu vitas '---i_- Boca Grande' e---' Mari ' --' L ' S q 4 r b lJlt f''--- 'S '0 tJ ' i4 o '1 01 R I INIj Puerto - '- Padr '-''- 7 -- Puerto Manati anati -i-' s- _ __' __ santa -1 -- J O '0 'J J ' I j T U -J A S ' r - Santa Cruz del Sur i i 1 i Baracoa _ '- --- ' AN SEA r J Media Luna NiQuero c ' ------ -- _----- 1-- -- ------_ _---- ' --- IV' CABO CRUZ l _ ----- _ -p r I 2 PlfOn- --- s- - ---- r- '---' ' - a s an tagode ' - -- - Ui _ J ' '_ o _ _ - - - _ J I 1 BASE ' I U - - _s _ - - BoQ eron -- ' o - - - ------ i l h '-f '''''lr -I -U'-s r Siboney_ _ __ NAVAL 'c i CABOi MAISI - - z ' ' CAYMAN ISlANDS U K J 80 78 76 74 ' ' _20_ -- ----------- o I I I I I ' A I I I La lsabela CAYO COC f_ ' - Los Arroyos ' ' f -- ' IJ 1- d ' a f L n La Fe CABO SAN ANTONIO J i -- DE ISLA 'j 'i ' ii I i DE PINOS 1 Sant 8arba a Ad ninistel 'd by the Centl al N va Gerona -t - MUNICIPIO - -- GO'VCf nn- enu' ' '- _ Santa Fe CAYO LARGO -- Flo '- Santa ' 0-1 Mari tC i 4 ' ' 0 CUBA 4- s National capital - - - - - Central highway Mat- nzas Provincia capital - - - - - Other surfaced road I CARIBBEAN l Major port Airfield -20- SEA Populated places @ Over 50 000 a 10 000 ta 50 000 o Under 10 000 Scale 1 2 450 000 o 2 40 60 80 Statute Mil'2S a C 20 40 60 80 100 CAYMAN ISLANDS JOO Kilom'O'ter$ U K - -- _________ J Base 502989 1 77 ' o if Nil R - Cc t l Railroad - ' - ' - Provincia boundary 3 ' 30 - ' '- 84 I Bahamas Corralilla 1 -'I I ' X Ie F ''3 ' I I 1 I I I r r l - ' Beerli also stated The one big concern that I remember we were preoccupied with but could do nothing about ooo we knew where their aircraft were and we had designed a number of missions that had to be flown to knock these out But we were concerned that maybe what they would do after the first mission was to take the undamaged ones and deploy them o o especially go into the Havana International Airport and then we would have their aircraft mixed in with the airliners That would really have given us a problem 37 The best available U-2 photography of the three Cuban airfields had been taken on 11 and 13 April 1961 - On 13 April there were five B-26's and five F-47's or Sea Fury aircraft at Campo Libertad At San Antonio de los Banos on the same date there were at least five B-26's one T-33 and one F-47 or Sea Fury -the PI readout however noted that haze and partial cloud cover had obscurred most of the San Antonio airfield The Santiago airfield had been photographed on 11 April and there were two B-26's one T-33 and one derelict F-47 or Sea Fury aircraft identified on the photography In addition to the aircraft at Libertad at least 140 trucks and 130 pieces of artillery were identified on the infield between - 207 - the runways and taxiways 38 The reader familiar with the problem of bomb damage assessments given by participating air crews -- in contrast to the read-out of post-strike photography - can appreciate that a similar difference of opinion occurred following the D-2 air strike against Castro's air fields Although no copy of the PI read- out made immediately following the attack is available a review of the post strike photography for this history stated that Analysis of 15 April 1961 photography revealed that air strikes had been made against the air fields at Campo Libertad San Antonio de los Banos and Santiago de Cuba No damage to any of the runways and only minimal apparent damage to the combat aircraft was observed The only confirmed damage to combat aircraft was the destruction of a B-26 at Santiago de Cuba A C-47 cargo plane and another unidentified probable cargo plane were also destroyed at Santiago de Cuba A C-47 cargo plane was destroyed at San Antonio de los Banos airfield The edge of a taxiway was cratered at Campo Libertad airfield There could have These trucks and artillery pieces were still present when the Campo Libertad airfield was resurveyed by the U-2 on 23 April 1961 so apparently these were not part of the artillery that were called into action at the Bay of Pigs - 208 - been additional damage to aircraft from cannon fire that would not be visible on the photography o The combat aircraft at Campo Libertad Airfield on 15 April 1961 consisted of four B-26 and five F-47 Sea Fury aircraft All of these aircraft were parked in out of the way areas rather than in the main operations area of the airfield and were probably unserviceable No movement of these aircraft was observed between 11 and 20 April 1961 39 The combat mission report prepared by Col Stanle Beerli following the D-2 action a report which was prepared on 15 April 1961 stated as follows Santiago Both aircraft returned to base safely Pilots reported airfield completely destroyed and fires everywhere One B-26 reported destroyed by rockets one T-33 probably destroyed by 50 caliber fire and one C-47 destroyed by 50 caliber fire All aircraft on ramp reported afire AAA reported as heavy and determined Aircraft repeatedly exchanged fire with AAA positions until AAA ceased One aircraft returned base with numerous holes complete hydraulic GBPailure and one hung rocket However it landed without incident San Antonio Two aircraft returned base safely and pilots reported attack destroyed 75 percent of field Operations building was destroyed and one T-33 on alert exploded Two additional T-33's were possibly destroyed Smoke from bombs partially obliterated target and precluded accurate damage assessment Heavy AAA was reported One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman Island because of low fuel - 209 - Libertad One aircraft returned to base safely and pilot reported target partially destroyed All bombs fell within confines of the base Press reports stated one bomb scored direct hit on an Air Force ammunition dump and explosions were still occurring 30 minutes after the attack Heavy AAA was reported One aircraft was damaged by AAAand forced to feathe engine which was on fire Companion aircraft accompanied toward Key West but observed damaged aircraft in uncontrolled crash into ocean No parachutes or survivors were observed Second aircraft now low on fuel continued to Florida and landed at Boca Chica Extent of damage not yet determined Special Aircraft The special aircraft landed at destination as planned Airborne Spare One airborne spare aircraft aborted on take off due to engine trouble 40 The difference between the PI report and the crew debriefing was highlighted in a cable from TIDE to Headquarters on 16 April 1961 defending the aircrews' reports 1 Considerable discrepancy exists between 0-2 strike crew debriefings and U-2 reports in regards to damage assessment Granted that strike crews and excitement may have tendency to overstate nevertheless this does not account for so great a discrepancy Concensus sial TIDE that 250 lb frags and 50 cal guns have caused considerable damage that is not possible for U-2 to see - 210 - 2 Strike crews were debriefed separately and had no opportunity to collaborate on each other's assessment Yet under separate debriefing crews verified what other crews on same target had said 41 The best source for bomb damage assessment concerning D-2 strike came from the Cubans -- particularly from Castro himself Based on Castro's own statements of 23 April 1961 when he appeared on the People's University TV broadcast in Havana before a live audience and told the story of the Bay of Pigs it appears that the TIDE assessment of the damage was more accurate than was revealed through the photographic intelligence available from the U-2 flights On 17 April the photography showed four T-33's 13 B-26's and two Sea Furies at San Antonio de los Banos 42 On that date Castro claimed that his Air Force had at its disposal two jets two Sea Furies and two B-26'sj but according to the Chief of the Revolutionary Air Force Capt Raul Curbelo Morales the situation was even worse than had been painted Appendix 6 provides examples of the cable traffic received in Headquarters following the return of the B-26's from the D-2 strike - 211 - by Castro for of the six aircraft that were available four weren't fit to fly 43 Assuming that Castro may have had an inventory of as many as 30 combat aircraft 20 B-26's 6 Sea Furies and 4 T-33's prior to the D-2 air strike and that he had available on 17 April only six aircraft then 80 percent of his combat aircraft were down at least on D-Day Some of the downed aircraft were undoubtedly unserviceable because of malfunctions unrelated to the bombing attack on 15 April but other aircraft may have suffered gunfire or bomb damage that was not visible on the photography 44 The debates discussions and'problems attendant upon the mounting of the D-2 air strike were as nothing compared to the problems following the attack problems are discussed in the fqllowing section - 212 - Thes Part III Initiation of Combat Air Operations B Post-Strike Contretemps The post-strike philosophy of air operations personnel affiliated with proj ct JMATE was probqbly best summed up by Col George Gaines who said We had the key to Cuba already in our hand All that we had to do was to eliminate those few other airplanes and our landing Brigade would have owned Cuba 45 Not only would this represent the belief of everyone who was even remotely affiliated with the air operation it also was the belief of many of those who were closely associated with the JMATE project in capacities other than air operations The manner of dealing with the few aircraft available to Castro would come to be the pivot about which reputations were made and unmade tarnished and shined In the first glow of victory Carpenter Barnes and crowd from JMADD told TIDE to Give the boys our congratulations 46 Even as Gar The Barnes referred to in this cable was not C Tracy Barnes the A OOP A but was the alias used for a military assignee to air operations at Retalhuleu - 213 - Thorsrud was requesting additional B-26 replacements he cabled Suggest B-26 be loaded with operational beer on bomb bay racks in the rear gunner's compartment 47 Even though convinced that the D-2 air strike had done more extensive damage than was apparent on the U-2 photography air operations personnel at JMTIDE -- and Col George Gaines who had returned to Headquarters -- wanted a second strike at the aircraft Gaines was convinced that because of the 48 hours concentrated briefings they had received that the B-26 pilots could easily manage the re-attack Gaines was concerned that any potential combat aircraft had been left untouched and in an Oral History interview he stressed that the air and ground force leaders and Chief JMATE agreed that no troops would be landed as long as there was any combat capability available in Castro aircraft Gaines stated We knew we had to get every single gun that could be put in the air before we put our soldiers ashore Jack Hawkins and I agreed to that over and over We said we don't land anybody and Esterline agreed to that oo that we don't ' land anybody until we can stop a goat if it goes down the highway Our air - 214 - cover will be constant and if a Castro tank moves we knock him out 48 Gar Thorsrud also commented about the D-2 strike The tactical surprise on that first strike was aimed at getting those aircraft and if you didn't you're in trouble -- they didn't get them and we were in trouble o There was plenty of concern among the pilots at Puerto Cabezas because they knew they had to get them the T-33's I don't know what was discussed at the Headquarters at the Staff levels but that was the primary target -- to get those T-birds first It was their ass that was going to get shot down if they didn't and so there was no doubt in any pilot's mind what they were after first when they got to that airfield The first thing they looked for was any aircraft taking off on runway then to the taxiways and then to the parking ramps -- where they were briefed by their targets -- by the pictures -- where they were supposed to be located But the first thing they were to look for was that runway or something just breaking ground and then back to where the aircraft was supposed to be parked iJ they weren't alerted o What would you be looking for first If there is only one aircraft that is a threat to you That's what we were hoping to do even with the six sic aircraft that went in instead of the 22 We still had to get those aircraft 49 Even though he claimed to have only six aircraft available following the D-2 air strike Castro also said that the 15 April air strike was a bust -- claimin that as a result of the air strike he actually lost - 215 - only two combat aircraft one at San Antonio and one at Santiago plus a transport at San Antonio a Cubana C-47 at Santiago and several smaller aircraft Castro stated that the attack on Libertad was a net loss to the invaders since there were no operable aircraft on that base and at least one 9f the attacking planes was hit Moreover he claimed that unserviceable air- craft had been dispersed about Libertad and the other fields Review of the pre- and post-strike U-2 photog- raphy lends some credence to Castro's claim about the dispersal of unserviceable aircraft but the photography clearly indicated which aircraft were being used for decoy purposes 50 The two combat aircraft that Castro claimed were destroyed in the course of the D-2 attack probably were dual-controlled B-26's -- accordins to one of the FAR pilots Jacques Lagas the only dual controlled B-26's available to the Fuerzas Aerea Revolucionaria Loss of these particular aircraft help to explain why despite the high number that were spotted on the Castro airfields so few B-26's actually participated in the combat even on those occasions on 18-19 April when - 216 - Brigade aircraft were not in the area 51 Lagas pointed out that after the D-2 strike -- and the loss of the dual-controlled planes -- a number of Cubana Air Lines pilots showed up requesting that they be given transitional training to fly the B-26's Lagas said that efforts had been made many weeks prior to 15 April to get these pilots to take the transitional training but none of them had taken advantage of the opportunity and after 15 April it wasn't possible Painting identical tail numbers on the Brigade B-26's -- as already noted -- did deceive Castro as to the actual number of planes that were involved in the attack and painting the planes the same color as FAR aircraft made i t possible for the aircraft at Libertad to come in low as though they were making a landing approach before beginning their actual strike against the airfield In addition to the damage to the aircraft and airfields the 15 April Lagaswas a Chilean pilot who flew for the Castro Air Forces He later became disillusioned or was persuaded to become disillusioned and returned to Chile Based on the other ev dence a v a I a b I e --th e r e s I t t Ie reason to doubt the truth I of what he had to say about the Bay of Pigs air operation - 217 - strike resulted in the deaths of eight Cubans and the wounding of some 40 52 Castro lost no time in denying that the attack on the airfields had been by dissident members of the FAR and Castro's Foreign Minister and UN representative Raul Roa readied charges against the US as the instigator of the air attacks for the UN session on Monday 17 April As the attack on the airfields was in progress the planned deception operation for the B-26 flying to Miami International was carried out successfully Senor Zuniga put his plane down was taken in tow by Immigration and Naturalization notification was made to WAVE Zuniga remained silent and the press gathered The D-2 air strike was not without cost to the Brigade air force for the B-26 piloted by Daniel Fernandez Mon with Gaston Perez as navigator was shot down by ground fire and crashed into the sea Gar Thorsrud has suggested that rather than ground fire Mon's plane was caught in the blast of a 500 lb bomb 260 lb that he dropped when too low damaging the aircraft to the extent that it caught fire and crashed Thorsrud stated that this was the report from one of the other pilots In Ferrer's book Capt Osvaldo Piedra -- the pilot of the 3rd aircraft involved in the attack on Libertad -stated that Mon and Perez were ready to make a third pass over the field when the plane blew apart in the air and fell into the sea in flames 53 Hugh Thomas is in error in his statement that no Brigade aircraft were lost on D-2 54 - 218 - to get the story Unfortunately however the B-26's piloted by Jose Crespo in the attack on Libertad was hit by ground fire and Crespo was able to make an emergency landing at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station in Key West Fortunately neither Crespo nor his navigator Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo were injured and Even after it had been exposed as false the cover story which required Zuniga to land at Miami after the first air strike continued to cause problems The pilot's first story was that the B-26 belonged to Castro's air force and the plane of course carried Cuban markings Taking this story at face value Harris and Company a Miami advertising agency which claimed the Cuban Government owed it money for tourist advertising obtained from the Superior Court of Dade County a writ of attachment on the aircraft The advertising agency had previously tried to attach Cubana Airlines planes to satisfy a judgment against Cuba The B-26 had been under US Customs guard since arrival To keep the Dade County sheriff from seizing it DPD arranged with the Customs Service to havEUR the US Attorney in the Miami area file action under Section 1934 401 Title 22 of the US Code This section dealt with the unauthorized entrance into the United States of arms armed vehicles or aircraft and specified that such equipment would be forfeited to the Secretary of Defense for disposition Federal action would supersede the Dade County writ On 27 April Chester Emerick Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Investigations informed DPD that the action had been filed and that the US Marshal had taken over custody of the B-26 DPD then planned to have an Air Force crew move the plane at night to Field 3 at Eglin Air Force Base - 219 - the plane was repairable The aircraft as chance would have it bore the same identification -- No 933 -- that was carried by the plane which Zuniga had landed at Miami International Airport and the discrepancy was quickly noted by reporters 56 The landing of aircraft No 933 at Boca Chica was only one of the misfortunes with regard to the great deception operation that had been a part of the D-2 air activity cover story The Navy apparently offered to provide a that the plane burned up -- but actually would allow the plane to take off for TIDE after dark on 15 April 57 No action was taken on the offer The B-26 piloted by Alfredo Cabellero in the attack on San Antonio de los Banos developed engine trouble on the return flight and was forced to make an emergency landing on Grand Cayman Island The spare aircraft which had been intended as a replacement in case difficulties were encountered by the planes heading for either San Antonio or Libertad was forced to abort before it could join in the attack 58 On 16 April 1961 Fidel Castro was in charge of the funeral services for the eight individuals - 220 - who had been killed in the air strike and in the course of his funeral oration Castro damned the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency up one side and down the Other for their unprovoked Pearl Harbor-tYpe attack on Cuba He also challenged the United States to provide the name of a single de fector who had participated in the raid In an attempt to divert the upcoming UN accusa tions which would be filed on Monday 17 April the day on which the invasion was scheduled Dave Phillips Chief WH u Propaganda spotted an opportunity to pro- tect the cover story and suggest a means by which Castro's call for the identity of any FAR defectors could be countered Phillips who was fluent in Spanish heard a live broadcast from Cuba reporting that early on the morning of 15 April a FAR jet piloted by Crestes Acosta had been lost at sea and Phillips also was aware that a live broadcast from Havana on 15 April had stated that one of the planes attacking the airfields had been shot down at sea Having heard both of these broadcasts the propaganda chief then advised a US journalist that the Cubans had claimed that a jet which was among the attacking 221 SECRET forces had been shot down at sea and that this jet was flown by Acosta Q I Chief WH 4 CI on hearing this - - - - - - - - story was of the opinion that this would counter the Castro claims concerning the failure of the United States to identify any of the attacking pilots addition I In I noted that he and Phillips had dis- cussed some follow-up action A That the UPI be requested to check to determine if jet pilot Acosta had a wife If so i t was agreed that a US money collection drive be initiated to provide for the widow's well being B If such a widow providing she exists claimed her husband was an ardent Fidelista then Mr Phillips and the undersigned I I agreed that a collection be init ated on a nationwide basis for the unhappy but brave widow subjected to such coercion by Fidelista security forces 61 A further part of the D-2 story concerns Gar Thorsrud's request to Headquarters for a follow-up There is no further reference to the suggestion advanced by Phillips and in all probability it came to naught in view of the proximity to the invasion When the UN debate began on 17 April the Brigade forces had already landed at Playa Larga and Playa Giron and it had already been proved that the B-26 involved in the deception effort did not belong to Castro's Air Force - 222 - strike to complete the destruction of Castro's combat air capability Thorsrud has stated We were at this time however more concerned with eliminating the remaining T-33's that U-2's had also confirmed were operational at Havana We therefore proposed a strike oo during daylight coming out of the sun and we talked all day Saturday 15 April on this and said ooo how can we do this We all got together in the operations room and they said -- these pilots flew out of Havana -- they said that sun is just big and golden and that you could come out of the sun and no one will see you coming We had it planned to oo come in off the coast of the western tip of Cuba o skimming right out of the sun where you've got the sun shining down on those T-birds oo We had U-2 photos clearly depicting where they were They weren't in bunkers or they were half bunkered Six aircraft were going after those two T-birds and not coming back until'they got them They turned the plan down Not only did they turn that down then they turned down the next request oo We said O K we were turned down It's maximum effort this morning ooo we've got to get them and then they wiped that out They might just as well have closed the whole operation right there and calied off the landing on the beach because that decision wiped out the whole operation right there 62 Thorsrud was referring to his cable of 16 April 1961 in which he recommended B-26 strikes against both the Libertad and San Antonio airfields - 223 - His request to Headquarters read as follows Approach to target will be directly out of the sun One pass only pilot proficiency and familiarity with the area makes this pattern feasible Haze should make AAA sighting extremely difficult into the sun Bomb load NBR 2 will be 6 each 600 lb 500 lb GP on one aircraft and 10 each 260 lb frag on the other All pilots volunteered Crespo target with Piedra wing Garcia and Herrera target #1 2 Above will allow max utilization aircraft and crews turnaround for D-Day strikes Targets 1 and 2 will not be hit on D-Day if pilot report successful mission TIDE in process of preparing ref sorties Consensus here above best tactics Advise soonest 63 As already indicated however Headquarters rejected Thorsrud's appeal for the follow-up strike on D-l The Thorsrud cable requesting the D-l strike raises some interesting -- but unresolved -- historical problems As noted Thorsrud himself indicated that after reviewing the esults of the strike the remainder of the day -- Saturday 15 April 1961 -- was spent discussing reattack and he said that a request for such reattack on D-l Sunday 16 April 1961 went forward to Headquarters In reproducing a copy of this cable for the writer of this history the Cable Secretariat copy of TIDE 654 IN 3752 carries a date to be 20 April 1961 0144Z and the same cable is included in the DPD records -- if the date were correct a cable arriving in Headquarters four days after the original request footnote continued on following page - 224 - ----- ---'------------- footnote continued and one day subsequent to the collapse of the 2506 Brigade There is no explanation for this discrepancy but Headquarters did get the request for on 16 April 1961 a cable from the Director to TIDE at 1714Z read Ref TIDE 654 Regret unable approve strike per ref Will advise D-Day strike schedule soonest 64 In view of this Director response it is reasonable to assume that there was some unexplained hang-up in reproduction of the cable by the Cable Secretariat otherwise there would have been no response from Headquarters rejecting the suggestion advanced in TIDE 654 In a subsequent cable to Headquarters TIDE 710 17 Apr 61 Thorsrud referred back to TIDE 654 and asked as follows Request authority launch strike at San Antonio Libertad and Santiago airfields five minutes prior to sunset as requested ref TIDE 654 Also launch afternoon strikes today on basis pilot debriefings 65 One further discrepancy is that in his 17 April cable requesting restrike at the airfields Thorsrud also specified Santiago as well as San Antonio de los Banos and Libertad The original request TIDE 654 specified only the two fields San Antonio de los Banos and Libertad Eduardo Ferrer introduced another version of the D-2 air strike operation in his book Operacion Puma claiming that the first strike on D-2 was the one which actually took place but also claimed that a second follow-up strike was set up for the same crews at 1400 hours on the afternoon of 15 April 1961 In addition Ferrer alleged that there were to be two follow-up strikes by the same crews on 16 April 1961 along with strikes against other military targets bridges and roads and that on 17 April two more strikes would be made to complete the destruction In short three successive days of air strikes 66 _ footnote continued on following page - 225 - Once having initiated tactical air operations against Cuba the immediate question that comes to mind is why the planners scheduled a 48 hour break between the initiation of these operations and the strike which was planned for D-Day 17 April 1961 Testifying before the Taylor Committee Col George Gaines seemed opposed to the D-2 strike in favor of a D-l and D-Day air strikes When queried about his opposition however Gaines responded as follows I wouldn't use the word opposed recommended that timing militarily would be better if you hit them on the day before D-Day -- or D-l -- and then go back the next day and get all of them Once you start hitting them don't have the interlude for them to move airplanes or create defenses Nobody goes into a fight by popping a guy in the nose and then standing back five minutes and letting the guy get his bearings oo and come to you I was overruled and so o I was not adamantly opposed o I just thought it was a better plan to go D-l instead of D-2 67 I The Taylor Committee investigation also revealed some vast differences of opinion between representatives fl' '2-1- GBP Obviously - Ferrer I who was assigned to fly transport missions usually in C-46's has confused the various on-again-off-again target plans and target lists which he had heard about from the B-26 pilots of the Department of Oefenseand the JMATE principals concerning 0-2 To CIA the D-2 operation was aimed at the complete destruction of the FAR -- and when it was apparent that that objective had not been achieved Thorsrud requested permission for a follow up strike on D-l to complete the job Unfortunately at least two senior military officers displayed varying degrees of ignorance concerning D-2 objectives with perhaps the strangest comment of all being made by Admiral Arleigh Burke Chief of Naval Operations member of the JCS and a most active participant in Special Group meetings on the anti-Castro effort In testi- fying before the Taylor committee of which he himself was a member Burke spoke as follows about 0-2 None of the Chiefs JCS felt that the 0-2 strikes were good militarily but they could see that it was an important aspect of the plan politically The D-2 strikes were not built or designed to knock out any great amount of the Cuban Air Force This was to be done by the D-Oay strikes More abysmally ignorant than Admiral Burke was the Chairman of the JCS General Lyman Lemnitzer Testifying before the Taylor Committee a day in Emphasis by author - 227 - advance of Burke the General offered the following remarks about 0-2 The D-2 strikes were added for nonmilitary reasons We would have preferred to do without the 0-2 air strikes They ere never intended to accomplish the destruction of the Castro Air Force They were to lend plausibility to the story that the D-Day strikes had been launched from wi thin Cuba o I'd like to point out that the D-2 air strike was never expected to wipe out Castro's entire Air Force It was the D-Day strike which was the important one 69 How the deception aspect of the 0-2 strike -- particularly considering the 48 hour stand down -- could possibly have lent plausibility to the D-Day strike the General failed to explain was not called on for Unfortunately however he clarification Emphasis by author Of the senior military personnel called before the Taylor Committee only General Decker of the Army is on record in support of the D-2 air operation Decker testified The advantages of pre-D-Day strikes would be that Castro's aircraft would be knocked out prior to the landing I was in favor of pre-D-Day strikes two or three days in advance 70 General David Gray who was responsible for liaison between the Joint Staff and CIA said nothing pro or con about the D-2 strike emphasizing in his testimony only that the Joint Staff's understanding of the air operations plan was that there would be D-Day air strikes out of Puerto Cabezas beginning at dawn 71 secretary of State Rusk's testimony before the Taylor Committee' twas 1 ' 1M Rusk a J- claim among other things that he and the President ' A fbi iZ o r there was to be a h i strike J p stftrtr Qe r I SI_iIttttt i iIleiPCl1UMJ1d411 JPY1fit5 D-_ L 6 U$ iS c p it also told the Committee that there was an inadequate appreciation of the enemy's capability in the air 7la Less than two years after this display of innocence Mr Rusk compounded his error when the subject came up during an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations In a briefing on 16 January 1963 Rusk told the Committee that with reference to the BOP It is also true that in terms of the deficiencies of information that turned up after the event that the count of planes on the island Cuba from sources on the island as well as other resources turned out to be inaccurate There were some planes in hangars and so forth that were not hit with sic the strike that did take place and more planes in fact turned out from the Cuban side than had been anticipated 7lb Rusk's comment is completely unsupported by any evidence that has surfaced since the colJPYP3se of the invasion To the c pntrary - 229 - one area in which the plans and operations personnel of JMATE were on sure ground was in the number of potential combat aircraft available to FAR from 11-19 April 1961 Col Gaines was quite correct in his assessment of what might happen if the enemy were given breathing space between initial air attacks and D-Day -- from Castro to common laborers the D-2 air strike got the Cubans together The high point of course was Castro's oration at the funeral of the eight who died in the attack The speech was given on 16 April and was attended by thousands of Cubans usual portrayed the evils of the Castro as Agenc and US imperi- alists and predictably ordered all military units on the alert ready for action 72 In his television address of 23 April 1961 subsequent to the collapse of the invasion Castro himself Mr Rusk has continued to pop up with interesting statements related to the Bay of Pigs apparently claiming that Allen Dulles confided to him that he never had much faith in the Bay of Pigs operation and had reservations about the outcome Leonard Mosley a Dulles biographer states that Rusk said of Dulles that he Dulles never once mentioned those doubts during the cabinet meetings One wonders why this information was not surfaced long ago 71c - 230 - appeared at a loss to the reason for the D-2 air strike rather than 'a D-l or a D-Day air strike He emphasized that militarily the nature of the air strike itself was a give-away to the impending invasion and he was able in effect to reinforce his reinforcements The strike on the airfields was clearly dif- ferent than the harassing tactics which had been employed heretofore aqainst the Fidelistas sabotage of sugar mills and industrial facilities and fires in cane fields were not in the same category as an air operation which obviously sought to destroy the revolutionary air force his leaders was clear The message to Castro and The Army the Militia and the people were given common cause and it stimulated their will to resist 73 It also served as a signal to Castro to adopt vigorous measures to insure that the attacks did not provide the catalyst for a spontaneous uprising to overthrow the regime Mass arrests of potential dissidents began just a few hours after the air attack on 15 April 72a Clarence F Welch the air materiel chief for DPD during Project JMATE told the author that shortly before the D-2 operation he was in attendance at a meeting on the project at DPD Headquarters at 1717 H Street NW Washington D C In the course of that meeting Welch claimed that two Department of State attendees footnote continued on following page - 231 - Among those most directly concerned by the appearance of the Brigade B-26's were the pilots of Castro's Air Force Most of these men were well known to members of the Brigade Air Force and as Eddy Ferrer noted during the final days of training in Nicaragua there were frequent sessions where the individual FAR pilots were discussed and rediscussed as potential enemies in the skies over Cuba Some of the more experienced FAR pilots had actually received training in the United States Among others there were several Nicaraguan pilots who would participate in the air action and of nine Chilean instructors who had been working with Castro's Air Force one Jacques Lagas joined the Castro Air Force and participated in the air operations against the Brigade were adamant that there be a breathing space between the first air strike and any subsequent follow n strike According to Welch when Hawkins heard this he Hawkins audibly stated that if this was the case the operation should be cancelled in toto Welch said Bissell either didn't hear or didn't choose to hear the remark Welch said that Ralph Brown a logistics officer assigned to the project also heard the remark Welch told the story because he believes Hawkins's reputation was unjustly tarnished because of his key role in the operational planning 74 As mentioned earlier Jacques Lagas would eventually write a bOOk'J I complaining hi tterlyoom 'COne IilIIUence OI 'COne communlsts on the Castro Air Force at the time of the Bay of Pigs - 232 - Accor ing to Ferrer the Brigade pilots also discussed the capabilities of the equipment which would be flown by Castro's pilots-- particularly the US built Lockheed T-33' s Even though subsonic the T-birds were far faster than the B-26's and they carried two 50 caliber nose guns and had provision for mounting rockets on the wings The Sea Fury the British fighter aircraft which was the fastest non20 jet aircraft ever to be produced mounted four iimm cannons in its wings and Castro's B-26's were basically identical to the B-26's in which the Brigade air force had trained The Castro B-26's were still configured for bomber-reconnaissance activity and mounted 6 wing guns and 4 tail guns presumably two tail guns in each of two turrets top and bottom 75 C The Stevenson Story and the Second Strike Reference has already been made to the attempts of Gar T rud and other air operations planners to One other feature helping to distinguish FAR B-26's from those of the Brigade was the plastic nose of the FAR compared to the metal nose of Brigade planes See photos pages 535 537 - 233 - _ L - _ get authorization for a follow-up strike against the Castro airfields that were taken under attack on D-2 and i t has been noted that such requests were denied The only other scheduled air attack in addition to D-2 was to be mounted against selected targets -- including reattack on the airfields at San Antonio Libertad and Santiago on D-Day It h been emphasized that with the shift from Trinidad to Zapata for the D-Day invasion two B-26 aircraft would put down on the beach at Playa Giron and begin operations from that airstrip The plan for D-Day consisted of 11 primary targets to be attacked by 15 B-26 aircraft Four of the primary targets -- the three airfields which were struck on D-2 plus the Managua military base -- were to be attacked by two B-26's each Five other primary targets in fact were double-headers requiring single B-26 aircraft to hit two separate facilities The remaining two targets also were to be attacked by single B-26's With the exception of the Managua military base -where napalm was to be employed against the tank park -- all other targets were to be attacked with rockets machine guns and either fr amentation or demolition o ' bombs See Appendix 7 for a list of the D-Day targets As of 16-17 April the list of 11 targets -- which had been pared down from well over 20 targets -- represented the maximum which Headquarters authorized for the available aircraft and crews Destruction of the targets on the list would do much to insure the success of the planned operation This list of D-Day targets came to be the focus of one' of the major disputes concerning the Bay of Pigs -- The Second Strike Controversy This section of the history of JMATE air operations will attempt to put that controversy in perspective The cancellation of the second strike -- for on 16 April all of the targets including restrikes at the D-2 airfields were cancelled -- turned a long planned much discussed tactical air operation into a 100 percent ground support mission for the invasion troops By denying the requests from the field for a strike to eliminate or at least reduce even further Castro's fighters it forced the Brigade B-26's into an unplanned and unwanted air combat role Many of those who were most heavily involved in the JMATE operation and much that has been printed lays the blame for the cancellation of the second strike - 235 - almost exclusively to the opposition from Adlai Stevenson the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Some have contended that Stevenson was fully briefed about both the planned D-2 air strike and the subsequent D-Day air strike others are less sure about the degree of Stevenson's knowledgeability Because it has been established that Stevenson was given a briefing on the planned invasion on 8 April 1961 by a CIA representative for many he has become the villain in the piece For this reason a serious effort has been made to determine the degree of Stevenson's and his UN colleagues' knowledgeability regarding the planned air operations against Castro's Forces The D-Day air strike was to be against both Castro's air force and Cuba's principal military and communications installations but as the planning ' was evolved both as progressed the 0 m1nus 2 str1ke insurance for keeping Castro's Air Force on the ground and politically it was intended to help maintain the fiction of plausible deniability By late January 1961 when the DCI the DDCI the President and the JCS were all given briefings on the PM aspects of Project JMATE references were made to a 0-1 air - 236 - strike When briefed on 31 January 1961 the JCS representatives queried the wisdom of the 0-1 air strike because they were afraid that i t would alert the Cuban forces to the imminence of an invasion The Agency's response was that while this might be true the risk of having Castro's aircraft in opposition to the landing was grea er than the possibility of an alert that would result from the pre-O-Oay strike The responsibility for briefing Ambassador Stevenson on 8 April 1961 at the UN Headquarters in New York City was delegated to C Tracy Barnes A OOP A What Barnes was instructed to tell about the upcoming operation and what he told has been the subject of much speculation but the Agency has been charged with everything from outright deception to sheer ineptness r- terms of the Stevenson briefing In his book One Thousand Days Arthur M Schlesinger Jr who was then a member of the Kennedy White House Staff spoke of the briefing as follows In fact i t was reported that the DCI tended to agree with the JCS in this evaluation but General Cabell the DDCI said he would hold firm on the concept that D-l is necessary but that his compromise position with the Director would be that strikes on D-l would not take place before the afternoon of said day extending into the morning of the attack 76 - 237 - In preparation for the debate US Cuban debate in the UN Tracy Barnes and I had held a long talk with Stevenson on April 8 1961 But our briefing which was probably unduly vague ' left Stevenson with the impression that no action would take place during the UN discussion of the Cuban item Afterward when Harlan Cleveland the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Clayton Fritchey of the United States Mission to the UN and I lunched with Stevenson at the Century he made clear that he wholly disapproved of the plan regretted that he had been given no opportunity to comment on it and believed that it would cause infinite trouble But if i t was national policy he was prepared to make out the best possible case 77 The question of what Stevenson was or was not told became critical following the D-2 air strike against Cuba on 15 April 1961 Appearing in an emer- gency session of the UN Political and Security Committee on the afternoon of 15 April -- an emergency session that had been called at the request o Raul Roa the Cuban Foreign Minister -- Stevenson stated that the attack on the airfields had been conducted by defectors from Castro's own air force In the course of this discussion Stevenson presented the photographs of the B-26 which Zuniga had landed in Miami International Airport to support the defector cover story but the - 238 - story was soon blown because the photograph of the B-26 from TIDE which wasgiveri to Stevenson showed a metal nose rather than the plastic nose characteristic of the FAR aircraft One writer in speaking of the Bay of Pigs operation stated A prominent victim of the air strike was Adlai Stevenson at the time the United states Ambassador to the United Nations Ironically enough along with Senator Fulbright and Chester Bowles he was one of the few with some prior knowledge of the invasion project who was completely opposed to it However he Interestingly enough this must have been an agon z ng time for Senor Roa In mid-July 1960 one of the daily reports of Dave Phillips's propaganda activity noted that there was a defection pitch for Cuban UN delegate The sky is the limit if this one can be accomplished dramatically in the UN meeting 77a A memo from Jake Esterline to Mr Bissell on 11 April 1961 revealed the identity of the Cubans Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm committment sic or promise on whether he would defect in the U N Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time 77b The planned defection did not come off and Roa continued as Castro's Foreign Minister until the 1970's Currently 1979 he is Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly and a member of the Counc l of State - 239 - was kept in the dark about the actual plans and so on the very afternoon of the attack 15 April 61 in a verbal dual with Raul Roa at an emergency meeting of the United Nations Political and Security Committee he accepted as truth the misinformation he received from Washington 78 Charles Murphy who wrote one of the few articles that was favorable to the Agency in terms of the Bay of Pigs operation stated that after Stevenson's embarrassment of 15 April From this hapless moment on Stevenson's role becomes unclear There was a subsequent published report that he had intervened to block the second strike Stevenson has flatly denied and continues to deny that he even knew about the second strike let alone that he demanded it be called off 79 A notorious ex-CIA employee who also has written about this episode noted It was later alleged that Stevenson had been kept in the dark about invasion preparations In self defense Barnes was to produce a record of his briefing of Ambassador Stevenson well prior to invasion date The Barnes-Stevenson memorandum was furnished Lyman Kirkpatrick CIA'S Inspector General at the time 80 The ex-employee was E Howard Hunt Unfortunately however the former Inspector General of CIA has no recollection of such a memorandum coming from Mr Barnes -- nor do the records of his former office or of other repositories within CIA pro- vide any such memorandum that Barnes miqht have written either at that time or later concerning the Stevenson briefing 81 The only piec'e of evidence that can be attributed to Barnes is contained in a memorandum which he wrote more than two years after the fact concerning comments which appearea in Wise and Ross's book The Invisible Government With reference to the book's relation of the Stevenson episode Barnes wrote I can best provide an answer by first giving a brief statement of what in fact occurred I would like to say that my entire statement is based on my recollection without having reviewed documents or other evidence so I would not like to be held to the accuracy of minute details without a further check Generally speaking however I know it to be correct ooo The rash of publicity however much of it inaccurate plus the presence of Roa in New York with the threat of a UN presentation made it seem advisable to provide stevenson with an up-to-date bri fing of the exact status of the operation Consequently such a briefing was arranged for Saturday 8 April ' 1961 and I as chosen to give it In addition to stevenson Arthur Schlesinger was present as were a number of Stevenson's staff including - 241 - Francis Plimpton Charlie Yost and Charlie Noyes Although Stevenson did not know me well we had known each other slightly for a good twenty years and there was no doubt in his mind as to my association with CIA -- in fact the briefing had been announced to him as a CIA briefing rtold him about the then status of the operation in detail I also explained to him that as of this date it was impossible to state whether or not such an operation would ever take place since the final decision was entirely in the President's hands and he had not yet made up his mind I did state that the President had called a meeting for 12 April for another review of the entire matter and it was possible that he would announce a decision after or shortly following this meeting My recollection is that I did not mention to Stevenson the air raid which occurred on Saturday 15 April since this plan as I recollect it was not worked out until after the briefing I did however explain to him in some detail not only the essentiality of achieving the control of the air but also a number of the air proposals which had been made including those which had as of 8 April been t rned down If it is important I could check the matter of the 15 April raid If my recollection is faulty and the plan for this raid ad been completed on 8 April I would have told it to Stevenson since I told him all the significant aspects of the invasionpl ns then in effect or under consideration oo Stevenson a week later following the l5 April raid sent a message to the Secretary of state and the DCI saying that I had given him an inaccurate assurance on one point i e that no invasion would occur while the Cuban matter was before the UN What I did say was that no invasion would occur - 242 - prior to 02' during Roa's Monday 10 April I said presentation on this because at that time after the aelays mentioned above Roa was definitely expected to make his postponed attack on the floor of the UN on IOApril and i t was so scheduled Obviously I could have said nothing else in view of my other statements that no decision of any kind existed as to the invasion and that nothing could be known prior to the Wednesday 12 April meeting called by the President In fact at the time the Stevenson message was not taken in the least seriously oo It is alleged that I did not mention that an invasion was about to begin over the weekend nor that I indicated that one was even imminent As indicated above I could not do either since the only decision authority had not spoken 82 Barnes also noted that Stevenson was specifically told about plans that included any aspect of US involvement in the JMATE anti-Castro operation 83 Stevenson's The provenance of the document from which this quois taken has not been determined The author inherited a Xerox copy from miscellaneous files collected by David McLean but was unable to locate the original or a carbon copy Consequently i t is impossible to determine whether the emphasis shown in the quotation came from the Barnes's original copy or was added when McLean made his copy Similarly the author's copy reflects at least one grammatical change and two spelling corrections from eminent to imminent and from eminence to imminence which mayor may not be part of the original At the time that Barnes wrote the referenced memorandum he was Chief Domestic Operations Division DDP and Gordon Mason to whom the memorandum was addressed was a Special Assistant to the DDP ta ion remembrance of the briefing was according to Hugh Thomas that i t left something to be desired Tracy Barnes of the CIA came up and briefed us here on the Delegation to the UN ooo He assured us -that this was simply a question of helping the exiles and this was not in any way a us operation In the light of what happened I suppose this can be regarded as less than candid It is not known if Barnes was ever called on to retrace his steps concerning the briefing for Ambassador Stevenson but if he did so no written record has been recovered As for his comments about setting the date for the D-2 strike it has already been pointed out that Barnes himself had been involved in promoting such action as early as January 1961 and the need for such a strike had been generally accepted by mid to late March By 1 April when it was anticipated that D-Day would be 10 April rather than 17 April the cable traffic between TIDE and Headquarters indicated that the briefing team that came from Headquarters Quoted in Thomas Cuban Revolution Harper Rowe 1977 p 530 as told to Thomas by Stevenson on 6 February 1963 Various attempts to locate the Tracy Barnes papers like similar attempts to recover the J C King papers have come to naught -244 - should be prepared to brief in TIDE on 4 April with 5 April being reserved for coordination of air ground and maritime operations The briefings were to be completed by the night of 5 April at the latest 84 The briefing team was delayed however because in the period from 4-6 April the President and his White House staff were still discussing the merits of a pre-D-Day air strike with representatives of the Agency the JCS and State By the morning of 6 April the pre-D-Day defection and deception strike had been approved and Barnes clearly should have included this information in his briefing for Ambassador Stevenson Inasmuch as Barnes did not depart Washington until Saturday 8 April -- the day he briefed Stevenson -there is no way that Barnes could have been ignorant of the decision to make the D-2 air strike and follow on with the D-Day air attack Lt Col Gaines and the other members of the briefing team for the D-2 and D-Day strikes began their briefings at TIDE at 1300 hours local time on 10 April They probably departed the Headquarters area at 0800 hours local tima pn 9 April The target folders and briefing aids would have been completed at least by 1 April in all probability 'S4a On 8 April 1961 Barnes departed Washington on North east Airlines Flight 106 at 0745 and he returned on a Northeast flight departing New York at 2215 on that same day 85 The only explanation that can be offered for Barnes's failure to clearly recall whether he had or had not briefed on D-2 may be attributed to a personality problem In discussing the nature of the mission to the USUN in New York the following comments were made by the then COPS WH 4 with respect to what Barnes was supposed to tell Stevenson Knowing Tracy I've always had severe doubt that Tracy made it very clear to the Ambassador Now he was sent up there to make clear to him o o the whole works ooo I think Tracy dealing with Adlai -- in a way they were two of a type -- dealt with him probably the way Tracy just intuitively dealt with everybody -- very pleasantly kind of elliptically lots of smiling and graciousness interjection of completely nonconnected events shook hands laughed and said what a great time he'd had and came back and announced that he briefed the Ambassador I wasn't there but that was the form that Tracy would customarily employ What Adlai Stevenson needed not that i t would necessarily have done any good was the worst case presentation of what was going to happen Even then he may have wet his pants as he did and I have no confidence that Adlai Stevenson heard from Tracy what Tracy himself probably felt that he had told him But Tracy just wasn't clear in that kind of a way I'm sure that he and Tracy had long fruity chats with each other because for some - 246 - reason Tracy had great faith in him 86 The same source when asked if he had seen a memorandum from Barnes on the subject of his meeting with Adlai Stevenson responded as follows No no but I remember hearing at a staff meeting at this time oo hearing from Jake as he ticked off the events of the previous 24 hours that Tracy Barnes had been up in New York and had briefed Stevenson So Tracy undoubtedly came back and told Bissell and Bissell told Esterline or Esterline was there when Tracy was debriefing himself to Bissell but I Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 had an almost identical reaction to Barnes's briefing of Stevenson Jake said Well I think when you talk to Dick Drain you will find out between his records and mine that we were very unhappy when Dick Bissell sent Tracy up to brief ooo We understood the Ivy League ties involved in this thing or what not but we didn't really feel that Tracy understood it well enough himself to brief anybody I guess it was Hawkins and Dick Drain and I who were quite disturbed about this because it was so important at that time -- that this guy knew exactly what the hell we were talking about We just didn't think that Tracy really understood it that well or if Tracy did he couldn't articulate he wouldn't articulate it that well Tracy was one of the sweetest guys that ever lived but he couldn't ever draw a straight line between two points and with a briefing of that sort 87 never saw any memorandum for the record oo Well I'll tell you even Tracy Barnes who was not all that meticulous and punctual would have been very well advised to have written a memorandum on this subject After all Allen W Dulles would want to know -- and more than just a telephone call -- what the hell had gone on It's customary in the DDP when you have a meeting of this sort -- that is to say with somebody as important as the Ambassador to the United Nations and on a fleeting transitory problem -- to do a memorandum of conversation for the Director at least because he might be asked at the next meeting of the 5412 Group or something By the way says Under-Secretary of State you had a man who saw Adlai Stevenson I mean you can count on Adlai Stevenson doing a memorandum and we had better goddamn well have ours too Now that would not necessarily be the kind of a memorandum that I would necessarily see and all I needed to know if I even needed that was to hear it and I know I heard from Jake Oh by the way one of those things that happened yesterday was Tracy got his ass up to New York and briefed Stevenson 88 Examination of the cable traffic between the USUN Mission and the Secretary of State clearly indicates that Stevenson accepted the deception story at face value and that he was completely in the dark about the fact that the D-2 strike at Castro's airfields had been the work of the Agency sponsored Brigade -- either that or Stevenson was the world's best and greatest liar In his statement on 15 April 1961 in response to the Cuban complaint Stevenson was well aware of the fact that Roberto Verdaguer and his brother Guillermo both officers in FAR had defected on 14 April in a Cubana airlines cargo airplane and had landed at Jacksonville Florida prior to the air strike This was on the day 89 The actual defection of two Cuban airmen may in fact have caused problems in the subsequent decisions which were made regarding the planned air strike for D-Day After cabling the Secretary of State about Jose Miro Cardona's statement for the Cuban Revolutionary Council -- which was addressed to the members of the United Nations and which repeated the deception story -- the US Mission to the UN then cabled the Secretary of State as follows Miro Cardona statement US UN Telegram 2877 given to only a few UN delegates according to Garvia sial Amador Cuban Revolutionary Council depending on press to give ample publicity so that all UN delegates will have been informed of statement before resumption debates Monday Recommend USIA give full publicity 90 Garcia Amador seems to have contributed additionally to the confusion which would grow out of the D-2 air strike USUN cabled the Secretary of State as follows Garcia Amador states that reported bombing of Habana known in advance to footnote continued on following page If Stevenson had believed that he was playing with the hot potato of a deception operation it seems highly unlikely that a message such as this would have been forwarded to the Secretary of State nor would Stevenson have followed that cable up with another one also dated early in the morning of 16 April reading as follows Confirming TELECON request to ARA for use in Cuban debate desire urgently on Sunday 1 Revolutionary background of Verdaguer brothers 2 Detailed info on Cuban acquisition and possession of defecting FAR B-26's which will serve to discredit Roa's statement that it is easy to paint up aircraft to look like FAR plane 92 It was not until shortly after 7 30 p m on 16 April 1961 that Stevenson's Priority Top Secret Eyes Only cable to Washington for the Secretary of State and Allen Dulles was received revealing the Ambassador's second thoughts Miro Cardona He states plan called for four Cuban FAR rpt FAR planes to carry out attack from within Cuba Three of aircraft reportedly followed through with plan while fourth apparently at last minute did not take part He claims two of aircraft are accounted for in Florida Third aircraft has not shown up and believed to be one reported shot down 91 - 250 - about the upcoming discussion in the UN over the Cuban question The cable stated 1 Greatly disturbed by clear indications received during day in process developing rebuttal material that bombing incidents in Cuba on Saturday 15 April 61 were launched in part at least from outside Cuba 2 I had definite impression from Barnes when he was here 8 April 61 that no action would be taken which could give uS political difficulty during current UN debate This raid if such it was if exposed will gravely alter whole atmosphere in GA General Assembly If Cuba now proves any of planes and pilots came from outside we will face increasingly hostile atmosphere No one will believe that bombing attacks on Cuba from outslde could have been organized without our complicity 3 I do not understand how we could let such attack take place two days before debate on Cuban issue in GA Nor can I understand if we could not prevent such outside attack from taking place at this time Why I could not have been warned and provided pre-prepared material with which to defend us Answers I made tc Roa's statements about incident on Saturday were hastily concocted in Department and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was a clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba 4 There is gravest risk of another U-2 disaster in such uncoordinated action 93 Emphasis by author - 251 - About this same time the Department received another Priority cable from Stevenson for the President and the Secretary of ' State asking for guidance to meet the Soviet charge that armed attacks against Cuba were being launched from the United States territory He requested authority to go on record as favoring the motivations of the Cuban refugees in the US who were anti-Castro but I wish to make clear however that we would be opposed to any use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign government An advance copy of this message went to the Secretary of State at 9 15 p m on 16 April 94 That Stevenson was in the dark regarding details of the planned anti-Castro operations being sponsored by the Agency is clearly evident from the reports of the various USUN and Department of State officials who were present at the Tracy Barnes briefing and or who worked with Stevenson during the crisis that evolved following the D-2 air strike Correspondence with these individuals reveals that Barnes did not in any way provide details about the anticipated tactical air operations -- neither its objectives nor its dates -- or about the deception activity - 252 - He apparently did indicate that there was an upcoming invasion but none of those in attendance at the briefing recall any mention of numbers of troops or the anticipated D-Day date The only discrepancy that has been found in the comments of any of the participants who were queried concerns Arthur Schlesinger's remark in his book One Thousand Days where his statement that our brief- ing which was probably unduly vague differs from his response to the author's question Schles nger's letter stated I have checked my journal with the following result I had an appointment with Dean Rusk on the morning of April 8 1961 in a vain effort to get him to oppose the Cuban adventure and for that reason was late in setting off for New York I now quote the journal Ithen took a plane to New York I went immediately-to the office of the US Delegation to the UN Tracy Barnes CIA and Bill Bowdler State had preceded me and were already deep in discussion with AES about a proposed response to oa We discussed aspects of this most of the morning Then AES Harlan Cleveland Clayton Fritchey and I went to the Century for luncheon AES made it clear that he wholly disapproves of the project objects to the fact that he was given no opportunity to See page 238 for complete text of Schlesinger's paragraph - 253 - comment on it and believes that it will cause infinite trouble However he is substantially the good soldier about it and is prepared to try and make the best possible US case I' As I recall it Tracy Barnes was to provide the detailed tactical briefing and this presumably had been accomplished by the time of my arrival Perhaps Bill Bowdler may recall what Tracy in fact told Stevenson Looking at your four points I would say that Stevenson certainly understood No 2 that there would be a D-Day invasion by anti-Castro troops o but I assume d that Tracy had said something to him about your points I that there would be a D-2 air strike and 3 that there would be a D-Day air strike and that we did not make point 4 the specific date of either D-Day or D-2 clear to Stevenson leaving him under the impression as I wrote in A Thousand Days that the invasion would not take place while the Cuban item was under discussion at the UN I do not know why stevenson was not informed more precisely about the date It'was probably because the date had not been finally set in Washington and we supposed that that question could be faced farther down the road 95 Obviously there is some reason for speculation about the accuracy of the comments in A Thousand Days since Schlesinger was not in attendance during the full course of Barnes's presentation he was delayed in Washington for his meeting with Rusk and he assumed that there was probably mention of the upcoming D-2 and D-Day tactical air operations - 254 - If D-2 was mentioned it is hard to imagine that it could have been in any context other than that it was to be carried out by the CIA trained anti-Castro Cubans Thus presumably any references that Stevenson picked up about the 15 April 1961 air strike against Castro should have alerted him to the probability that this was what he had in fact been briefed about More- over as previously discussed the D-2 date had been firmly set at the time that Barnes and Schlesinger were in New York to do the Stevenson briefing There are other witnesses however who were closer than Schlesinger to Stevenson during the course of the activity beginning on 8 April and continuing through the D-2 strike One of them in particular seems to have recalled in precise detail the course of events and actions taken by Ambassador Stevenson during this period Richard F Pedersen then Chief of the Political Section f USUN operation has re- ported the following details I was present with Amb Stevenson and Amb Francis T P Plimpton in the briefings by Tracy Baines sic and Arthur See page 245 - 255 - Schlesinger in 1961 The answers to your specific questions are explicitly no in each case In fact the briefing totally misled Amb Stevenson Amb Plimpton and me as to the scope and timing of what was underway The effect of the briefing was this 1 that the CIA was involved in plans for an internal uprising on the island This had to have included mention of outside Cuban assistance though I do not now remember this as a fact 2 That nothing would happen from US territory 3 That no US forces or personnel would be involved 4 That whatever happened would have the appearance of an internal Cuban event 5 That nothing would happen during the session of the General Assembly then underway I asked this question myself The questions were to determine if Stevenson was told that 1 there would be an air strike against Castro's airfields on D-2 15 April 61 2 there would be an invasion of Cuba by a force of some 1 200 anti-Castro Cubans 3 th re would be an air strike or a series of air strikes on D-Day or on D-Day and subsequently as necessary against a series of tactical targets 4 the actual date of the D-2 air strike was 15 April or that the upcoming invasion was set for 17 April - 256 - There was no mention of dates no mention of an invasion by a force of Cubans no mention whatsoever of anything like a D-DAY no mention of US air strikes and no mention of a date I do not recall any mention of air strikes by non-US forces either and am fairly sure there was none The three key factors for us were appearance of an internal uprising no U S participation and nothing during the General Assembly session I am very clear about these matters as I was responsible for our handling of the Cuban item then before the General Assembly Foreign Minister Roa kept delaying debate in order to have the item available when and if something happened Confident that nothing would happen during the General Assembly and having no idea of the degree of U S involvement we coop _ erated in this tactic Our negotiating position on the substance of draft resolutions pending on the subject based on the same assumption also was wrong I was also intimately involved in the false statements of Gov Stevenson which he made about the two aircraft in Florida just before the invasion It was obvious at tha point that something was accelerating though we were completely uninformed about an invasion Nevertheless we were fully assured from Washington that the two planes in Florida were legitimate Cuban airc aft which had defected I wrote the first draft to this effect myself This was then rewritten in Washington where i t was cleared by Secretary Rusk himself and I was told by the responsible person in CIA When Mr Sisco telephoned the redraft back on Saturday morning 15 April I commented about half - 257 - waJPY through that the draft was not a denial Mr Sisco said that i t was and that the rest of the text would show that It did although i t may well be that we strengthened the words on the phone I then took the text to Governor Stevenson telling him that the Department had verified that whatever else was happening the two planes concerned were legitimate defecting planes of the Cuban Air Force As we by then had pictures of these planes in New York as well as the statements of the pilots both of which were also legitimate if the Washington text was true we added those elements to the statement he later made to the Committee As we were obviously dealing with a delicate matter on which it was important to be right I suggested to Gov Stevenson he verify the statement again directly with Secretary Rusk He asked his secretary to make the call but just at that point Mr Sisco called him Gov Stevenson then verified the statement with Mr Sisco instead and we shortly went into the Committee where he made it All of the above took place in a small working office we then had in the UN building itself Foreign Minister Roa attacked our statement in the Committee so robustly that I began to get concerned again Saturday afternoon I asked one of our staff members to get corroborating details on the planes -- engine numbers and other data -- that we could read into the record during the next debate to prove that these two planes were from the Cuban Air Force Joseph Sisco was Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs located in the Department of State in Washington D C - 258 - On Sunday morning I was Washington had finally said suant sic of that line of inquiry would not be fruitful It was then clear that our Saturday statement had been false I p epared a Top Secret telegram of complaint from Stevenson to the Secretary or the President and accompanied by Wm Bowdler now Ambassador to Pretoria took it to Gov Stevenson at the Waldorf I told him the Saturday statements had been false and showed him - the telegram which he signed -- probably though I do not remember for sure with changes of his own He was understandably very disturbed After we left he must have called the President or the Secretary or both In any case McGeorge Bundy then came to New York As I recall they had breakfast Monday morning which I believe was when the invasion was taking place My impression is that the timing was determined so that he Stevenson would only be told after the invasion was already underway I do not know what Stevenson was then told or what he said about possible air strikes But as both the President and he by then had said that nothing would take place from u S territo ry and that no u S forces would be involved he certainly must have been opposed and must at that point have been consulted about the strike Stevenson's protest apparently had little or no impact on the Department for a cable was sent to him on Monday 17 April 1961 at 1213 hours providing him with some language for contingency use if Cubans make show with bomb and rocket fragments from attack on D-2 95a - 259 - As I recall the nature of the President's statement on non-involvement of u s Forces and territory was worked out with Mr Schlesinger on the day of the briefing by Amb Barnes But you may want to check with him on that 96 Others queried in addition to Mr Pedersen on the subject of the Barnes briefing were Francis T P Plimpton Charles W Yost and Charles P Noyes Among other things Mr Plimpton said I do not recall any mention of an air strike against Castro's airfields either before or on D-Day and in addition Plimpton stated that he was in complete accord with everything that Mr Pedersen had written to the author 97 Charles W Yost was present at part of the briefing which Barnes gave to Stevenson but having taken no notes he did not recall any of the specifics 98 Charles P Noyes too was vague on being briefea on the operational plan noting that As I recall it we were trying to prepare ourselves to conduct a defense in the UN against what we assumed would be a vio I ent attack on Cuba 99 The author also sent inquiries to both Harlan Cleveland and William Bowdler but neither had responded as of this writing Mr Cleveland however sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State on 12 April 1961 requesting guidance -- as Stevenson himself did in the cable cited above for 16 April 1961 -- for the UN Ambassador in an upcoming speech on Cuba Cleveland'smemorandum raised the question of the validity of comments in the planned speech which denied that the US was supporting and promoting the anti-Castro efforts which were being so widely publicized Cleveland closed his memorandum with the following If I may add a general comment I confess to some concern as to whether the Cuban matter has not been held so tightly no doubt for good and sufficient reasons of security as to make impossible a really adequate review of its foreign pOlicy implications Certainly neither Ambassador footnote continued on following pag - 260 - footnote continued Stevenson nor I have been in it enough to make a professional judgment on the U N aspects Compared to the full staff process that I think has been going on for months on the Congo I wonder whether a fuller discussion on Cuba might not produce a better policy with which we could live longer 100 In transmitting a copy of his memorandum to Stevenson on the same date that it was prepared for the SecState Cleveland called Stevenson's attention to the paragraph cited above 101 Mr Cleveland also has offered a somewhat different version of who told what to Stevenson concerning the D-2 strike than that specified above in Mr Pedersen's letter In an address to a CIA audience in the Spring of 1977 Cleveland stated among other things that At the UN General Assembly Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was defending U S noninvolvement in the refugee raids on Cuba as they were being called He asked Washington for the true story of the D-2 raid as many of you will recall and the CIA provided the State Department with a false cover story which Stevenson used his global credibility to trumpet as the truth The cover blew off in less than 24 hours Stevenson was a kindly and mild-mannered man I've never seen anybody so ore in my life And it is to his eternal credit as far as I am concerned that he didn't get sore at me even though I was the person who handed him the paper with instructions to trumpet it 102 The writer has not been able to resolve the question of whether the cover story re the D-2 strike went to Stevenson via the Sisco-Pedersen Sisco-Stevenson route or whether it went from Cleveland to Stevenson as noted above T Walter Johnson Stevenson's official footnote continued on following page - 261 - Keeping the various aircraft that entered the scene in Florida properly identified -- Zuniga's B-26 at Miami which was part of the D-2 deception story the Brigade B-26 which had been shot up during the D-2 strike and was forced to make an emergency landing in Key West at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station and the aircraft which the defecting Verdaguer brothers had landed at Jacksonville on 14 April -- has added further confusion to the Bay of Pigs story Accord- ing to Schlesinger Secretary Rusk Seems for a while to have confused the phony defector at Key West with the authentic defector at Jacksonville Apparently it was not until late Saturday afternoon that he understood that the Key West plane was part of the CIA plot 105 As just indicated the B-26 that landed at Key West was not a part of any intended CIA plot and the deception effort concerned Zuniga's landing at Miami not the Verdaguers landing at Jacksonville Schlesinger then made a most unwarranted charge against the Agency stating biographer says Cleveland told him Johnson that he had given the story to Stevenson 103 The author did not contact Clayton Fritchey the only other person who might be knowledgeable about the Barnes-Stevenson meeting on 8 April 1961 because of Fritchey's journalistic interests 104 - 262 - Why CIA should have misled State has never been clear Possibly the Agency having worked out its deception plan felt obliged to deceive even the rest of its own government or possibly the CIA source if in the Intelligence Branch was himself unwitting 1'06 If Schlesinger's sequence is correct in saying that on Saturday 15 April 1961 following the air strike that Harlan Cleveland contacted State's Bureau of Interamerican Affairs actually the Bureau of American Republic Affairs which in turn called the CIA and if these inquiries went to the Intelligence Branch CIA's Directorate for Intelligence it was an inexcusable screwup by State ARA State should have known enough to go to either Secretary Rusk or Adolf Berle in its own house or to the Western Hemisphere Division in CIA's Directorate for Plans for information'on the anti-Castro project Rusk's confusion about the aircraft would seem to imply certain ineptitude on his part or on the part of his immediate staff rather than by the Agency Moreover considering the comments that had been made concerning Tracy Barnes's instructions in contrast to what Barnes apparently said it would seem - 263 - more reasonable to blame Barnes alone not the CIA for Stevenson being confused Schlesinger's harsh criticism was unjustified Schlesinger also stated as follows The collapse of the cover story brought the question of the second air strike into new focus The President and the Secretary understood this strike as one which would take place simultaneously with the landings and have the appearance of coming from the airstrip on the beach It had slid by in the briefings everyone assuming that it would be masked by the cover story But there could be no easy attribution to defectors now Nor did the fact that the planes were B-26's flown by Cuban pilots save the situation despite the great to-do about Cubanizing the operation they would still be united States planes in the eyes of the UN 107 There is an inherent paradox in Schlesinger's comment about the second strike sliding by in the briefings because it would be masked by the cover story If everyone ll assumed that it would be masked by the cover story then apparently everyone was aware of the plan to hit Cuban targets on D-Day In view of the written record of Mr Bundy favoring a pre D-Day attack it is 'difficult to imagine that the principal White House staffers were not fully aware of what was intended in the way of air strikes against Cuban soil - 264 - Schlesinger does go on to pin Rusk down as the one principally responsible for the cancellation stating Rusk after his talks with Stevenson concluded that a second Nicaraguan strike would put the United States in an untenable position internationally and that no further strikes should be launched until the planes could fly or appear to fly from the beachhead Bundy agreed and they called the President at Glen Ora 108 Then according to Schlesinger when Rusk and Bundy had the President on the telephone Rusk said that the projected strike was one which could only appear to come from Nicaragua Kennedy said I'm not signed on to this the strike he knew about was the one coming ostensibly from the beachhead After a long conversation the President directed that the strike be canceled 109 What Schlesinger conveniently overlooked in the above comments regarding the cancellation of the second strike was the fact that the prohibition was not only that the strikes must appear to come from the beachhead but there was no provision in the new directions for strikes against any tactical air targets The B-26's were to support and protect the troops coming into the beachhead and strikes against the airfields -- the key to the success of the entire invasion operation -- were automatically ruled out - 265 - Stewart Alsop who also wrote about this period has a significantly different version of the events which resulted in the cancellation of the second stri e Alsop has Rusk calling Tracy Barnes early in the evening of 16 April to come to his Rusk's office in State Department to straighten him out about the various aircraft At the time that Barnes was doing this McGeorge Bundy also arrived at the Secretary's office and supported Barnes's version about each of the three aircraft At this point according to Alsop Rusk shook his head and remarked I guess I got mixed up Rusk evidently realized that he had unintentionally misled Stevenson Briefly he discussed with Bundy whether he Rusk ought to join Stevenson at the UN to give him support in the furious debate which was certain to break out on Monday It was decided instead that Bundy shoul go to New York to backstop Stevenson Rusk asked Barnes to go down to the floor below where Stevenson's speech for the next day was being drafted and to make sure that the speech contained no errors of fact Barnes did so and went back up to Rusk's seventh floor office at about eight o'clock By this time Bundy had left to fly to New York and Rusk was alone He remarked casually to Barnes that the second air strike had been called off ' Bundy it transpired had telephoned - 266 - the President briefed him on the course of events and explained that he was going to New York to backstop Stevenson in the UN and to help him deal with the inevitable furor over the second air strike What second air strike asked the President He had been well briefed but apparently he had forgotten this part of the plan In any case the evidence of American duplicity produced by the Cubans in the UN and Adlai Stevenson's anger at being misled had both deeply worried the President So he told Bundy to order Rusk to cancel the second air strike 110 There is a difference of opinion reflected between the Schlesinger book and the Alsop book also in terms of how the word of the cancellation was passed on to CIA According to Schlesinger Bundy upon hear- ing from the President promptly passed on the word to General C P Cabell 111 According to Alsop when Barnes who was still in the State Department reading Stevenson's speech presented himself back to Rusk's office Rusk told Barnes that there would be no second air strike and at that point according to Alsop With Rusk's assent Barnes called his superior Bissell and asked him to come right over He told Bissell of the President's order but told him not to worry - 267 - too much the order made no sense and was sure to be reversed 112 Which version of the story is more precise is impossible to determine but one can look at the reaction which the news once received by Gen Cabell and Mr Bissell precipitated at that level It was not until the close out of the Bay of Pigs activity that Gen Cabell and Mr Bissell went on record with their version of the events which transpired among themselves Secretary Rusk and Presi dent Kennedy In a memorandum of 9 May 1961 for General Maxwell Taylor Gen Cabell and Mr Bissell forwarded a three page memorandum which is reproduced here in full 1 At about 9 30 p m on 16 April D-l I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President Mr McGeorge Schlesinger's book appeared in 1964 Alsop's book appeared in 1968 In a memorandum prepared for the DCI on the Alsop book it was reported that Mr Barnes confirms his conversation with Secretary Rusk and that Mr Bundy who had arrived during the conversation backed him up on the details as reported by Alsop Thus the cancellation of the second air strike by President Kennedy was apparently based on a misunderstanding of which CIA was unaware until too late to correct Mr Barnes also confirms his subsequent conversation with Secretary Rusk in which Alsop reports Barnes'3 learning of the cancellation and calling Mr Bissell - 268 - ll Bundy He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State 2 I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office and discuss this decision Mr Bissell joined me at the Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10 15 p m 3 The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in our hands and usable The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations Political requirements at the present time were overriding The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations The Secretary described Ambassador Stevenson's attitude in some detail Ambassador Stevenson had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make i t absolutely impossible for the U S position to be sustained The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable 4 In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the deci- sion We told him that the time was such now almost 11 00 p m that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beachhead area the first thing in the morning D-Day would clearly be disastrous I informed him that there would be four effects of - 269 - the cancellation order as it plied to strikes against Cuban airfields a There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of the ships as they withdrew from the beach This would be serious but not catastrophic provided that the unloading had proceeded as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by daylight In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing was required i t was pointed out that the probability of smooth performance here was doubtful As i t turned out the unloading was not accomplished in the time planned b The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the case In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate for massive air attacks the attacks to be expected under the new circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive c Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air Force very early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of the Expeditionary Air Force's B-26s to isolate the battlefield The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks No fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield operations The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the superior surface attack which could be brought against it d Loss of efficiency would result from this late change of orders - 270 - S After considering the foregoing the Secretary of state agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields a harbor and a radio broadcasting station could ' not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand He asked if I should like to speak to the President Mr Bissell and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire political position of the United States and the firm position of the Secretary We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary 6 Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require replanning and re-briefing of crews This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits 7 Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of effective air strikes In order to protect the shipping as i t withdrew from the beachhead I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover At 4 30 a m 17 April D-Day I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need to protect the shipping The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone o After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on After conversation with the President the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved 114 - 271 - The memorandum was initially signed by C P Cabell General USAF Deputy Director of CIA Typed beneath Cabell's signature was the following the foregoing conforms to my recollection and this was signed by Richard M Bissell Jr Deputy Director Plans Clearly according to Cabell and Bissell political considerations negated the military importance of the D-Day strike Paradoxically however the Secretary of State did agree that the B-26's could be used to fly beach cover for the invading forces How it was expected that this limitation would be less of a risk to the US in the UN is inexplicable Conspicuous by his absence at this critical time was Allen W Dulles Director of Central Intelligence Dulles was in Puerto Rico fulfilling a previous commitment to address the Young President's Organization The author was told by Mr Dulles's former Special Assistant Walter Elder that it was decided that plausible deniability could best be supported if Dulles made his planned speech Cancellation it was feared either would be a tip-off to the upcoming attack or would lead to charges that CIA was behind the invasion -- charges which were made in any event However since Dulles did not depart Headquarters until Saturday 15 April 1961 arriving in Puerto Rico that evening this would seem to have been a rather weak rationale -- Dulles was actually in Washington as the D-2 air strike was in progress Dulles departed Puerto Rico on 17 April arriving at Friendship Airport around midnight l14a - 272 - 'I I 1 ' I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I The memorandum was initially signed by C P Cabell General USAF Deputy Director of CIA Typed beneath Cabell's signature was the following the foregoing conforms to my recollection and this was signed by Richard M Bissell Jr Deputy Director Plans Clearly according to Cabell and Bissell political considerations negated the military importance of the D-Day strike Paradoxically however the Secretary of State did agree that the B-26's could be used to fly beach cover for the invading forces How it was expected that this limitation would be less of a risk to the US in the UN is inexplicable Conspicuous by his absence at this critical time was Allen W Dulles Director of Central Intelligence Dulles was in Puerto Rico fulfilling a previous commitment to address the ung President's Organization The author was told by Mr Dulles's former Special Assistant Walter Elder that it was decided that plausible deniability could best be supported if Dulles made his planned sp ech Cancellation it was feared either would be a tip-off to the upcoming attack or would lead to charges that CIA was behind the invasion -- charges which were made in any event However since Dulles did not depart Headquarters until Saturday 15 April 1961 arriving in Puerto Rico that evening this would seem to have been a rather weak rationale -- Dulles was actually in Washington as the 0-2 air strike was in progress Dulles departed Puerto Rico on 17 April arriving at Friendship Airport around midnight 114a 1 L J'I -JPY' i - 272 - uffi-- -I-- J The memorandum was initially signed by C P Cabell General USAF Deputy Director of CIA Typed beneath Cabell's signature was the following the foregoing conforms to my recollection and this was signed by Richard M Bissell Jr Deputy Director Plans Clearly according to Cabell and Bissell political considerations negated the military importance of the D-Day strike Paradoxically however the Secretary of State did agree that the B-26's could be used to fly beach cover for the invading forces How i t was expected that this limitation would be less of a risk to the US in the UN is inexplicable Conspicuous by his absenc at this critical time was Allen W Dulles Director' of Central Intelligence Dulles was in Puerto Rico fulfilling a previous commitment to address the Young President's Organization The author was told by Mr Dulles's former Special Assistant Walter lder that it was decided that plausible deniab' - - _-- --_ - ' ' c Dulles made his 'f 'l -'l t4 J feared either w l GBP-0- L attack or would -I Ttl '-- the invasion - 'Z -' v f 't r I However since I ' _ 4Ln4 11-r J6 f t J f t it-hV - _ ''''' til Saturday 15 r ' I' r 1 that evening th h r-tve S3 c f J- '1-11 ' _ I' weak rationale I as the D-2 air s parted Puerto Ri f ' ship Airport arc d I i-vif ' _ 1Z 44 v I-wn l' 7Gc n' ' 7 o h jr 4 r IL -vv o lM J' A1J -r' kn i f --- r' - h 1 0 'o--rtu-f-'j4''I tztlA d 'L- ltj tfrrd o-z v C4-t 4 t -w r-fl 1 0- U-t 1 f- 1 0 A I 'Ct -0 - u-Y J ' tl d '1 j t J Tf 't VL rv' I Several years after his resignation from the Agency Mr Bissell offered some additional significant thoughts concerning the cancellation episode During an Oral History interview for the John F Kennedy Presidential Library Bissell surfaced the following information which for the first time openly revealed that the JCS may have had serious reservations about the essentiality of the air strikes In a meeting that General Cabell and I had with Dean Rusk early Sunday evening which has been described in various books he offered us the chance to speak to the President on the telephone in his presence and seek a reversal of that decision We did not take that opportunity feeling frankly that the cause was hopeless Rusk had called the President Rusk had laid this matter before the President Rusk had told the President that we felt very strong that this strike was a military necessity Rusk had then stated his own reasons why given developments in the U N another air strike would be politically disastrous and the President to Rusk had reaffirmed his decision Cabell and I felt that there really was a negligIble chance that we could induce the President to change his mind Moreover I think it has to be repeated that in some quarters at least there was a doubt as to whether the air attack was such an absolute necessity Dean Rusk himself had been a participant in World War II operations in Burma of an irregular warfare type and he had said on a number of occasions that operations of this sort - 273 - did not depend nearly so heavily on air cover as did conventional amphibious operations by organized troops More than that a fact that is very little known is that the Joint Chiefs more than once in their discussions of the operation had expressed some doubt about the absolute essentiality of these air strikes I don't want this remark to be subject in any way to the interpretation that the Joint Chiefs did not favor these air strikes or did not believe that they improved the military chances But they attached less critical importance to them than did for instance the Marine colonel who was really in direct charge of the planning of the operation I think that knowledge of this attitude on the part of the Joint Chiefs may have had a little influence on General Cabell's and my decision that we won't pursue the matter further with the President that Sunday night I think knowledge of this attitude by the Joint Chiefs may well have been reported to the President although i t never was in my hearing And if so I'm sure it would have influenced him very significantly Later that night General Cabell went and made another appeal first to Rusk and then from Rusk's apartment on the telephone to the President This was an appeal for the authority to use U S Naval air -I think it was in as far as the three mile limit This was a much milder request than the request for another strategic strike by the Cuban aircraft And yet it was turned down by the President I must admit I have always taken that as an indication as has Cabell that our original judgment was correct that the President would not have been moved by our appeal - 274 - to him I still think it was a mistake on our part not to make the appeal 115 As told to the Taylor Committee Rusk's version of the meeting with Cabell and Bissell showed significant differences from that just quoted After stating that neither he nor the President realized that there was going to be anything other than the D-Day air strike Rusk said the President Didn't think there should be second strikes in the area unless there were overriding considerations Bissell and General Cabell indicated that the air strikes would be important but not critical I offered to let them call the President but they indicated they didn't think the matter was that important They said that they preferred not to call the President o Since Mr Bissell and General Cabell didn't want to talk to the President on the matter I felt there was no overriding consideration to advise him of I didn't think they believed the dawn air strikes were too important 116 If indeed the Cabell-Bissell memorandum of the cancellation is accurate in its statement of the eGBPfects of the cancellation i t is difficult to understand how Secretary Rusk concluded that the CIA duo Emphasis by author - 275 - ET regarded the second strike as of marginal importance Without it they had indicated probable loss of vessels and defeat of the invasion force -- hardly minor considerations McGeorge Bundy President Kennedy's National Security Adviser too submitted some interesting comments to the Taylor Committee concerning the cancellation of the D-Day strike After initially emphasizing that it was clearly understood that the air battle should be won Bundy subsequently commented that Apparently Rusk was out of communication with Thomas Mann one of State's principals throughout the Bay of Pigs planning While often at odds with Agency personnel on details of the operation Mann has claimed to have been a strong proponent of control of the air over Cuba The Zapata plan was based on the assumption that we would be able to control the air We would have complete control of the air o It was clear that control of the air was of the essence In fact the plan called for a standby of our own US planes in case anything went wrong 116a Bundy was apparently more perceptive about the accuracy or completeness of the official record than other of the witnesses before the Committee because he forwarded a memorandum with his own version of what he had told the Committee on 1 May 1961 in lieu of the non-verbatim record being made by the Committee secretary - 276 - One startling omission in retrospect is the failure of any of the President's advisers to warn of the danger of the T-33's I suspect that one reason for the President's later decision not to launch an air strike on the morning of D-Day was that this capability of the Castro Air Force was never put forward as significant 117 The question seems obvious How could the National Security Adviser contemplate winning the air battle unless theT-33's -- which were positively identified as available and armed well prior to D minus 2 were destroyed If Bundy expected to give the Com- mittee a valid case for poor military judgment by JMATE and the Joint Chiefs Rusk's testimony on the political nature of the cancellation left him high and dry When Cabell and Bissell returned to the operations center shortly before midnight on 16 April they passed the word on as to what had transpired at the White HQuse and despite the efforts of Col Hawkins Jake Esterline and Dick Drain who pointed out that the cancellation of the D-Day strike against the airfields would probably mean the failure of the whole operation Gen Cabell reportedly replied that the Agency had been given its marching orders and would comply 118 Shortly after 0100 hours Washington time on 17 April 1961 Stan Beerli sent a cable to TIDE which read in part as follows Complete plan amended to place all B-26 aircraft at disposal of Brigade Commander and Task Force protection Targets outlined in Ops Plan 200-1 Attachment #1 Appendix 2 to Annex B are cancelled 119 The TIDE acknowledgment of the receipt of Beerli's cable clearly reflected discouragement on the part of Thorsrud the Chief of Air Operations at the strike base It read in part 1 Refs received and reluctantly complied with Complete plan amendment per refs received 170715Z 0115 hours local time 0215 hours Washington D C time with all pilots in cockpit ready for start engines Needless to say this less than desirable operating procedure when 12 aircraft timed for take off between 0730Z and 0800Z 2 Realize it desired to give maximum protection to Brigade however believe per sial change will not afford as much protection as original strike plan The only real offensive danger to the Brigade is enemy fighters and bombers which are better hit on their home field --not repeat not over the beachhead 120 In this same cable Thorsrud went on to request authorization to launch an airfield strike five minutes before sunset on D-Day and he also requested permission - 278 - to launch strikes on the afternoon of D-Day on the basis of debriefings of pilots who had been flying operations over the beach 121 To suggest that Thorsrud was upset by the cancellation of the D-Day strike understates the case That it was an extremely emotional experience for him comes through quite clearly in his description of the events as they had occurred 16 years prior to the time that the author talked to him There were only two people in that commo shack the sergeant who was my commo officer and myself This message came in FLASH PRECEDENCEl I couldn't believe it neither could he ooo A lot of things that went through my mind right at that point were What do they know that I don't There must be a reason for this They said to divert a couple of aircraft to cover the ships in the Isle of Pines area God maybe there is something happening politically that I don't know about Maybe there is some reason to this When I thought about it -- maybe five minutes because I had to stop the aircraft -- I finally said well I don't have any choice I've got to take the order but I thought of 'every way that i t could have been a mistake I thought 'of every way that there must be other reasons behind it because in my own mind I knew it was over I knew it was over right then -- the minute that I read that message I went out -- and - oo 279 - you've got to picture this situation -the PBY had already taken off It had to take off at midnight to get there by daylight The 46's were lined up to go -- they were the next slowest so they were launched next We had firepots and lights We had all kinds -- three quarters of them didn't speak English so we couldn't cancel it by an English order We were launching the 26's by the distance that they had to go -- to Santiago and to Havana and all the other places by their elements All the aircraft were started They were all taxied in position It was almost like a World War II movie of a strike -- there were over 30 aircraft on that one strip getting ready for takeoff when that message came in The lead aircraft -- the lead B-26's -were loaded with napalm for that line up of tanks that we had and the guys had photos of those tanks there Fresh a few hours before They would have wiped out that tank force Do you know what it means to de-arm an armed aircraft of napalm -- the problems and all Unbelievable When it was called off it was bad enough There was enough gloom around that place when someone came up with that assinine defector's operation But that morning In fact we said o that's in the cable traffic too oo I forget my exact words but it was either a o I think o I sent one personally to the Director and I think the Cubans came in and asked to send one personally to John F Kennedy ooo Villafana and his group o o and I said Of course you can I will send it to Headquarters and I am sure that i t will be relayed to him Everyone knew that the operation didn't have a prayer So we launched those six guys in the morning and I think four of - 280 - them were shot down -- or three of them were shot down They were just sending guys as fodder into the cannon It was just unbelievable And how that decision was made I don't know ooo I remember going over to the operations room and I remember going back over to the commo shack ooo at the teletype ooo at the hard copy that matched mine and ooo Well I'll never forget that few hours and then it got worse ooo each day o and that was the end Each day it got worse -- you could end your story right there In fact you could almost end your story with the defection part because air was the key to that operation 122 Being on the scene with the pilots who were going to conduct the air strike Thorsrud was most directly affected However other of the principals in Project JMATE obviously reflected at some length about the cancellation of the second strike Mr Bissell one of the principal actors in the scene in Dean Rusk's office the night of 16 April 1961 offered the following comments which if correct help to explain Rusk's position Adolf Berle was quite an activist Now Rusk himself was not Rusk was always afraid of this operation Rusk was all for a powerful guerrilla effort -- anything that could be done along that line But he consistently argued for reducing the sound level and as you know had everything to do with abandoning the TRINIDAD site Rusk's influence always was to avoid the noisy actions Do everything - 281 - ET you can not to make this look like an invasion Make i t look like a guerrilla landing Make i t look more like Castro's original operation in Oriente And I think i t is a matter of record that his opposition or his recommendation was what led to the cancellation of the secohd air strike I am sure that his opposition contributed to the cancellation of the original plan's second of three air strikes I want to say also though that Rusk after the fact was always generous He never said I told you so at least to my knowledge or in any report that has ever reached me 123 Recognizing that i t was in hindsight Mr Bissell has expressed regret that he did not take the opportunity to speak to President Kennedy at the time that Rusk offered him the chance on 16 April 124 While Bissell wondered whether he acted properly at the time that the second strike was being called off both Jake Esterline Chief JMATE and George Gaines who ran the JMATE operation for DPD had different retrospective views concerning not only Bissell but particularly General Cabell Jake Esterline in fact holds Cabell principally responsible for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation and he has stated as follows Cabell was the guy he was the Air Force General He was the fellow - 282 - that the people would have listened to and ooo he was the equivocator that let the thing get away from him that night He came in ooo I'll never forget him coming in with a cigar and he said Well we are going to have to rationalize a little bit here ooo Hawkins and I looked at each other and I said General are you saying that weare not going to get that airstrike and he said Yes Hawkins said Well we've lost We are going to lose every ship Cabell said Colonel he said I don't know that that's right I don't think I agree with that ooo That's when I wrote out a resignation to the Agency That was before the first shot had ever been fired ooo Cabell said o there was not going to be an airstrike Well he equivocated he didn't speak in forthright terms to whomever of Kennedy's group he was talking to He didn't tell them that it is going to be a disaster if this doesn't happen If he'd said that and they had said well you are not going to get the airstrike Call it off at least we might have still had a few hours to try and call i t off Now whether they would have come back or not is something else oo What I am really saying by this is if we were running this operation at this point -- Hawkins and t -- Cabell who was not very deeply informed on it shouldn't have been the one that was up there giving the facts in cold terms of what would happen if any further diminishment of the capability took place Now I would like to think that the reason that he failed so miserably was that he wasn't adequately informed and didn't know As I had said at that time he had clay feet o - 283 - He never spent enough time around in my judgment to be informed to the point that he should have been I don't think the right person was going up to talk is what I am saying We Hawkins and Esterline were the only ones that really knew at that point the total details of the operation and knew what the risks were in detail and what further diminishment of capability would be When the equity became so great I don't think just because a person was a GS-18 or because he had four stars on his shoulder that he should have gone himself ooo He should have at least had one of the principal lieutenants charged with the operation -- and that would have been Hawkins or myself I have never understood why they would presume to go up when things were so critical and not have one or the other -- it didn't have to be me if I was too thorny for them It could have been Hawkins but somebody who knew intimately what how soon or how easily disaster could come should have been there 125 Esterline and Hawkins apparently tried -- unsuccessfully to resign from Project JMATE when the switch was made from TRINIDAD The above referenced attempt is supported by Esterline's testimony on 22-23 May 1961 to the Taylor Committee when in discussing cancellation of the D-Day strike he said I decided the operation was lost at midnight on the 16th of April 1961 The next day I told Mr J C King Chief WH D that I couldn't continue because we were lost 126 In a very emotiona l phone conversation wi th William D Pawley on 21 April 1961 Jake stated that he had resigned last Sunday 16 April and that I have quit the Agency Esterline also indicated that the resignation hadn't been accepted because he was being sent to Florida for R R 127 Dave Phillips has a more colorful description of the scene with Jake sitting at a typewriter a bottle of skey at his elbow and wrote out his resignation several times Bill tore them up as soon as they were typed 128 - 284 In addition to Cabell Esterline also faults Bissell having pointed out It was a continual plea to Bissell that we had to destroy all of those planes on the ground Those air strikes had to go and i t might even have to be ones beyond the programmed points if we didn't get all the aircraft o o I really feel from my own recollection that if we Hawkins and Esterline had known that we were going to be cancelled out on that very critical air strike we would have tried to stop the operation because we knew ooo we expected to lose every ship ooo not just two 129 In his recollections of the situation at the time of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike George Gaines reported that he had just returned from the Puerto Cabezas briefings and walked into the office in time to be told that the President had cancelled the D-Day strike Gaines stated At that time I told Stan Beerli and later on Bissell that this thing is doomed It cannot go if we don't get those airplanes 130 When asked if he himself had recommended that the whole operation be called off at that stage Gaines said No the President -- when he cancelled i t -- did not arbitrarily override everybody He said unless there are operational reasons dictating otherwise - 285 - we'll cancel tomorrow morning's strike Well nobody had told him that there were operational reasons At the moment he made that decision he thought that there was a chance -- a good chance -- of success without that air strike He should have been informed right at that moment that operational reasons do dictate that we continue oo that we go ahead oo because if we don't we can't land those troops Mr President 131 Concerning Cabell's responsibility and degree of familiarity with the operational implications of the cancellation Gaines pointed out that Cabell was not too well aware of the air plan He had been briefed We had our regular briefings to keep him up to date but he had been apart from the military community for such a period of time that his operational expertise had been eroded by time This was my whole argument o that the President deserves some operational information because he has killed the entire project if we cannot make that strike 132 Making this point to both Beerli and later to Bissell Gaines stated further r got the impression that there were so many political considerations involved that they did not want to go back and beard the President in his office or ask for a special audience when it would have been much better had we done so r really believe that Beerli should have been more forceful in this -- and r don't - 286 - mean to be critical of Stan because Stan was trying to do the right thing But Stan was military and I was telling Stan -- military to military -- this cannot succeed and I believe if he had been forceful in his presentation to Bissell Bissell might have done it Bissell was the type who would do something if he believed in it But Cabell is the one on whom the ultimate responsibility must lie he was the man that Bissell -- and Dulles and the President -- was looking to for professional operational advice and he didn't get it That's my personal opinion 133 ' Beerli was far less harsh on Cabell than either Esterline or Gaines and pointed out that He Cabell made a very special effort to see it air operations plans all He was very concerned We made visits to his office frequently to show him what plans we had He told me being an air officer he said I feel that I should be informed at this point just what is going on 1t 134 Beerli apparently was less concerned about who did what -- or should have done what -- than he was about the impact that cancellation of the second strike had on operational planning As with the other air operations planners and JMATE principals he too believed that if the two attacks had gone forward as planned Castro's Air Force would have been destroyed on the ground But in his retrospective view of the D-Day cancellation Col Beerli offered another - 287 - consideration which the others involved in he opera- tion -- particularly Thorsrud -- recognized but failed to articulate so clearly Beerli's comments do much to explain to the layman some of the critical problems that began to surface at TIDE even before the close of D-Day This is something again that probably hasn't been emphasized If we plan an attack on D-2 aad another on D-Day you get everybody cranked up You get the schedule and everything else going So you go to D-2 when everything is going well and then you've got everybody ready to go on the D-Day They've all worked they've all been rested and then you cancel it Then you start it again but you get everybody out of cycle Therefore you've got yourself in a hole because your maintenance people and everybody else are working up to a point and then you delay it Then you want to start again Well then you're wearing your people down In other words by the cancellation of that mission you have compounded the problem back at the base on rest schedules mess schedules and everything else You might be able to do it as an exception but in the long run if you are going to do it for four or five days oo again on again off again o you know what that does It is like any schedule that you would set up -- you start wearing people down and you get nothing to show for it 135 Subsequent to Gen Cabell's death 25 May 1971 a 15 page hand written note surfaced among the General's - 288 - effects Attached to the handwritten memorandum was a cover comment which read These notes very valuable because they were made when memory was fresh C P C On the foolscap itself at the top of the first page appears the comment Written soon after my appearance The first sentence of the notes then explains That these notes are further to the statement submitted by me and Mr Richard Bissell to the Taylor-Kennedy-Dulles-Burke Board on 9 May 1961 As it adds to what has already been discussed about Cabell's reaction to the news that the second strike was to be cancelled -- and because he is accused of serious shortcomings on the cancellation of the D-Day air strike i t is believed worth repeating the verbatim text of that note When Mr McGeorge Bundy Assistant to the President called me at Project Headquarters the night of 16 April 1961 he made it quite clear to me that the decision had already been made by the President cancelling the air strike on Cuban airfields planned for the morning of 17 April 1961 This decision was made without consulting in advance with me as Acting D C I or anyone else in CIA - 239 - Mr Bundy further made it quite clear that the President had left for Glen Ora and tha the Secretary of State would act for him in the event that I wanted to discuss the matter and in fact the Secretary of State had the President's proxy in the case He Mr Buridy was leaving immediately for New York to hold Ambassador Stevenson's hand I immediately contacted Mr Bissell Project Chief Bissell was DD Pi Esterline was Project Chief and made an appointment for the two of us to calIon the Secretary of State in his office at the earliest feasible moment When we reported to the Secretary he gave us a long explanation of the political impact of the now cancelled air strike He made it quite clear that a new criterion or policy for the conduct of the overall operation was now in effect Whereas in the preceding weeks and days I had formed the clear impression that the policy was that once launched the operation must not be allowed to fail the new policy was to accept the possibility of failure of the operation but not accept the political implications of u S involvement which flowed from the air strike This was so even though that strike was by Cuban air crews in aircraft staged from Central America I pointed out the jeopardy to the success of the military phase of the operation caused by the cancellation of the air strike The landing itself would be jeopardized unless a it attained complete surprisei b all ship and boat movements and unloadings including ammunition were completed without hitch prior to dawni and c paratroop operationsall were accomplished according to - 290 - plan I pointed out that it was most unlikely that all these favorable results would ensue -- in fact it would be a miracle if they did As to holding the beachhead after an assumed successful landing this was dependent upon friendly control of the air over the beachhead Air control was necessary for our B-26 aircraft slow piston-engined to be able to render close battlefield support in the beachhead This close support was particularly necessary by virtue of the fact that there was only a small amount of artillery and armor in the landing force and the B-26's had to substitute for them The B-26's also had to interdict the movement of enemy reinforcements and weapons to the beachhead by land The B-26's had as well to hold off enemy reinforcements coming by sea and prevent enemy sea bombardment in view of the fact that there was no friendly naval combat support I pointed out that in view of the fact that we had no friendly fighter aircraft to cover the beachhead none could be based within range the only way we could get air superiority over the beachhead was to catch the enemy fighters on the ground by the strike just cancelled All my arguments were directed at the implications of the air strike cancellation to the success of the military phases of the operation These arguments were to no avail however because actions required for'the success of the military operation that is the establishment and holding of the beachhead were no longer the issue The only issue now was the fact that the air strike was judged to be politically - 291 - unacceptable and therefore it had to be cancelled The only person there qualified to address himself to the political implications of the air strike was the Secretary of State the man holding the President's proxy for action The Secretary then suddenly called the President on the telephone reported our discussion which he did with accuracy including the gist of my analysis of the military implications of the cancellation He reiterated the political unacceptability of the air strike and recommended that the cancellation stand He then turned to me to see if I had anything else to say to the President I said No as I believed that all had been said The Secretary had given all my military arguments but these were overbalanced by the political implications There was now a great urgency for action if I were to be able to carry out the orders of my Commander-in-Chief This was no time for repetition of arguments Rather it was time -- perhaps already past time -- to transmit to the Central American air base the command to cancel the strikes As it turned out our cancellation order caught the crews in their cockpits preparing to take off in a very short while I knew of the difficulties facing me of getting across the order first to our Staff The order hit them like a bolt from the blue We had tried to think of all the things that could go wrong with the operation and to be prepared with corrective actions This development was completely unexpected and caused great consternation in the Staff However there was no time here either for argument about the President's order We had first to get out the stop order in a manner that would be understood and accepted by those - 292 - emotional Cubans already under the great tension which precedes immediate entry into battle Then we had to do some fast work to pick up the pieces and thus do what we could to salvage the operation and mitigate the terrible difficulties facing it When we first got word of the cancellation Mr Bissell and I had agreed that the time had passed to turn back the landing force and so cancel the entire operation The landing force was already entering the area of expected enemy observation and its U S Naval escort was dropping back An order at this time to turn back might not have been received and if it had been there would have been questions at least and possibly refusals to obey in either case with resulting serious confusion -- all in the face of the enemy This too I explained to the Secretary of State Whereas had the decision to cancel the air strike been received a few hours before we would have had the option of cancelling the whole operation At this late hour we had no such option 136 In contrast to the memorandum which he and Mr Bissell signed jointly on 9 May 1961 explaining the cancellation of the second strike in this undated version Cabell emphasized that Kennedy's mind had been made up at the time that CIA the strike as been reached off and it ithout as as informed that a decision hich had consulting anyone in the Agency The handwritten notes also emphasized the obvious that military success was no longer the principal - 293 - criterion for action -- the criterion now was that the air operation be politically acceptable these difficulties however Cabell Recognizing proc eded to play the good soldier tf in saying that the time for discussion was past and that i t was imperative to follow the orders of the Commander-in-Chief According to this version of the cancellation of the strike Cabell and Bissell together agreed that i t was too late to turn the fleet about in the face of the enemy but Cabell noted that had the cancellation been ordered some hours earlier there would have been no problem about scrubbing the whole operation Considering the actual status of the fleet at the time the decision was made final -- little or none of the unloading had actually started -- and considering that the first firefight had not yet taken place and alerted Castro's troops it is difficult to understand why the attempt was not made to halt the operation -to recall everything that was in motion and if need be to use the B-26's to try to provide short-time cover for the withdrawing ships The expressions of concern that orders to turn about might have led the Cubans to seize the vessels - 294 - and proceed with the invasion seem high y exaggerated in light of the subsequent performance of the invading Brigade The action of the troops aboard the Houston the long runs made by the Atlantico and the Caribe on D-Day also would indicate that if it had been clearly specified that there would be absolutely no air cover or that Castro troops were ready and waiting -- there would have beert little if any resistance to a recall order Following the collapse of the invasion the issue of the cancellation of the air strike scheduled for D-Day became highly political particularly following Castro's release of the Brigade prisoners in December 1962 One of the most demonstrably partisan pe - formers was President Kennedy's brother the Attorney General Robert Kennedy In the course of his partici- pation as a member of the Taylor Committee to investigate the Bay of Pigs it was apparent that whatever else he intended to protect the gobd name of the President Concerning the cancellation of the second Interestingly enough the sessions of the Taylor Committee were not recorded verbatim and the researcher usually must speculate on the identity of a given questioner On many questions which have obvious political overtones it is apparent that Mr edy is speaking - 295 - strike Robert Kennedy in an interview session with U S News and WorLd Report 28 January 1963 added some new fillips to further confuse the story Kennedy charged correctly that U S News and World Report had claimed on various occasions that President Kennedy had withdrawn US air cover and that as a result of that withdrawal the invasion had failed The Attorney General stated that no US air cover had actually been promised -- and had he stopped with this comment there would have been no problem In a question and answer session with the reporters however he went on to deny that any consideration had ever been given to the possibility of providing us air cover -- but as pointed out earlier in this volume this subject had been extensively debated throughout the course of Project JMATE More controversial and inaccurate was Kennedy's subsequent version of the truth concerning the planned air strikes Robert Kennedy also said that the President understood that after the D-2 air raid there was to be another attack on Castro's airfields on the morning of D-Day The excitement at the UN however caused The plan called for both reattack and the addition of military and communication targets See pp 233-234 - 296 - the President to have second thoughts and call off the pl anned air strike on Monday morning unless those who had the responsibility felt that i t was so important that i t had to take place in which case they were supposed to call him and discuss i t further Kennedy seemed to imply that the President would have changed his mind However this overlooks the call General Cabell made early on the morning of 17 April to request USN air cover Moreover Robert Kennedy went on to say that the attack on the airfields took place later that day -- that is later on Monday 17 April No such strike was authorized even Thorsrud had requested it though It was not until near midnight Monday and before dawn on Tuesday morning 18 April that the abortive reattacks were launched More disturbing was Kennedy's response to the question Wasn't there to be air cover of the beaches from Central America Kennedy's answer was as follows That is correct -- and that was not disturbed All of the pl nes that were supposed to be utilized were utilized -all in the planning I might say they proved to be inadequate The air cover at the beaches was definitely inadequate -- but not because of some last minute decision by the President or anyone else 137 - 297 - That simplistic statement totally ignored the basic concept of the planned D-Day air strike which was to kill off the remainder of Castro's aircraft interdict a major portion of his armor and disrupt his communications If the air cover for the Brigade on the beach was inadequate -- although on D-Day it appears to have been successful but at heavy cost it was because B-26's were no match for Sea Furies and T-33's Moreover the cancellation of the strike made it impossible for the Brigade B-26's to operate off the airstrip at Playa Giron and hence coverage of the beach areas -- even without the losses to FAR would have been spotty In response to the ques- tion of who did the planning Kennedy responded The plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military -- the Pentagon the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Central Intelligence Agency This wasn't something that was planned by a few fellows over at the White House and then put in operation However the President had to give approval to the plan and he quite properly has accepted the responsibility 138 The point most conveniently ignored by the Attorney General was the fact that the White House did interfere with the air plan a by changing the initial site for the landing from TRINIDAD to ZAPATA and - 298 - b completely revising the planned air operation against Castro's Air Force and military targets The critical issues mentioned above were lost in the flurry of political reaction to other statements which Kennedy made about air cover -- principally that JFK had made i t quite clear that there would not be any us air support for the planned invasion nor would there be any additional US support for the invasion effort in the way of troop advisors or cadre leaders When Kennedy's remarks -- many of which first appeared- in the Miami Heratd on 21 January 1963 -- hit the press there was an immediate uproar Richard Helms who was then Deputy Director for Plans prepared a memorandum for theCoordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State pointing out that the comments of the Attorney General were of great concern to the Cuban community and threatened to blow Jose Miro Cardona out of the leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Council and they also were causing extensive criticism of the Brigade's military leaders Manuel Artime and Jose Perez San Roman If these Cuban leaders knew that neither US air support nor other US assistance had been promised then the invasion should not have been permitted to take place On the other hand Tony Varona who had frequently opposed the FRD and the CRC for their extreme dependence on the US prior to the invasion was coming more to the fore as the leader of the exiles 139 The Attorney General's 28 January 1963 session with u s News and WorZd Report was his second attempt to deflect criticism from the Administration following release of the Brigade prisoners by Castro On 11 January 1963 Jose Perez Pepe San Roman when interviewed while paying a courtesy call to Robert Kennedy's offices denied that he had called unsuccessfully during the invasion for cover by jet airplanes San Roman also said that he had not been told that the US would provide air cover for the operation 139a His latter statement was true insofar as can be determined but he was less than candid about events on the beach The cable traffic between TIDE and Headquarters for footnote continued on following page - 299 - President Kennedy himself suffered semantic aphasia over the question of US air cover defending his brother's position that no us air cover had been promised the Cubans and saying that the Attorney General's interview by U S Ne s and World Report describing the cancellation of the strike on the morning of 17 April 1961 was correct The President too claimed that the strike was postponed until Monday afternoon but again this was less than the truth The restrike was authorized for just before dawn on Tuesday morning when two separate flights of three B-26's each tried unsuccessfully to find the airfields the other military and comma targets which had been scheduled for the D-Day air strike weren't even considered 17-19 April 1961 reflects the increasing calls from the Brigade for jet support over the beach 139b In the fall of 1964 iri a Reader's Digest article Richard Nixon also attempted to make some political points concerning the White House's action at the time of the invasion Nixon stated He JFK in talking to Nixon on 20 April 1961 at the White House did not mention the fatal advice -- given him by some of his liberal State Department and White _ House advisers -- to cancel the two air strikes -- and in effect destroy the plan 140 Perhaps the most serious chqrge leveled by Robert Kennedy in the course of his 21 January 1963 interview with the Miami Herald was his reference to Castro's T-33's According to the President's brother We underestimated what a T-33 carrying rockets could do o It wasn't given sufficient thought caused us a great deal of trouble 141 They As has al- ready been demonstrated and'as evidenced by the cable exchanges-between the field and Headquarters there was little question in the minds of the JMATE DPD principals Esterline Hawkins Thorsrud Gaines among others that the T-33's could make or break the invasion Similarly former JMATE personnel found little to commend in Robert Kennedy's additional comments when he stated Hawkins did appear to waffle a bit during the Taylor Committee hearings on the question of the T-33 During an undated conversation with an unidentified committee member -- or members -- Hawkins was asked if the importance of getting the T-33's was appreciated He replied I think so but I think the T-33 turned out to be a more effective aircraft than we had anticipated I don't believe we thought they would be as dangerous to us as the B-26's l4la This was an unjustified comment by a non-airman and it was never supported by the principal air oper - tions officers - 301 - The President inherited people with major reputations and he accepted their advice There was not sufficient air cover at the beach This was a mistake There were not enough men and eq ipment That was a mistake Underestimating the T-33's -- that was a serious mistake The planning was inadequate just inadequate 142 - 302 - TOP CRET vvrvaUl Lrt u CIA History Staff TOP CRET