A25 956 la - - SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UMBER 12-2-56 I PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY 1 Submitted by the 241-731 on mama - - The following mtelligence organizattom participated in the preparation of this estimate The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations 01 the Departments of State the Army the Now the Air Force and The Joint Star -E Concurred in by the 'f momma ADVISORY comm on 30 October 1956 Concurring were the Special Assistant av-55 Intelligence Department of State the Assistant Chief of - Stag Intelligence Department of the Arrhg the Director of Naval Intelligence the Director of Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff The Atomic Energy Commtmon Representative to the mo aridthe Autetant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained a the subject being outside of their - J I 1 - r 3 I- val-h CWTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1% m as i o DISSMATION Horror 15 1 This estimate 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Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the Of ce of Central Reference CIA 3 When an estimate is disseminated overseas the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year At the end of this period the estimate should either be destroyed returned to the forwarding agency or permission should he requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with 22 June 1953 I schnapp- The title of this estimate when used separately from the text should be classi ed FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WARNING material contains Information a ec authorized person is prohibi rhea document has been - DISTRIBUTION mm Home aPP'roye-i for release through National Security Council the REVIEW PROGRAM of 1 Department of State the Central Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Operations Coordinatina oard Date 7 7 1 Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation 3 HELL j_ PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY I PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES 1 Events in Poland and Hungary have dem- onstrated the strength and vitality of anti- Soviet sentiments in these Satellites Par- ticularly in Hungary there have been man- ifestations of strong anti-Cormaunist senti ment as well The Soviet strategic position in Eastern Europe has been weakened Soviet policy is now confronted with serious dilem- mas the need to make some accommoda- tion with the increasing pressures of national- ism in the Satellites without losing the essen tial minimum of control over them the dif culty of 115mg Soviet armed might to put down nationalist and anti-Communist revolt in the face of world opinion Poland 2 A new Communist regime considerably more independent of Moscow than the pre vious one has been established in Poland with reluctant Soviet acquiescence This regime is pledged to maintain the alliance with the USSR including the retention of Soviet forces in Poland as long as NATO forces remain in Germany but reserving the right to choose whether or not Soviet specialists and military advisers will remain in the Polish army It is also pledged to introduce certain democratic procedures presumably compatible with par- ty control to stop coercive collectivization and to raise standards of living 3 The stability of the Gomulka regime rests on its ability to strike a balance between pop- UIar Polish aspirations for independence and economic improvement on the one hand and the minimum requirements of the USSR with respect both to the maintenance of the Com munist system and to Soviet military security on the other Developments in Hungary may I make a middle road course dif cult for Go mulka Hungary 4 In Hungary concessions were made so slow- ly and reluctantly as to intensify rather than satisfy the pressures for change The regime of the Communist Imre Nagy once purged from the party for deviationism_and only recently restored to party membership took over with the outbreak of open revolt and the employment of Soviet forces Nagy promised drastic reforms and announced a government which included non-Communists The Hun- garian army does not appear to have been employed on a large scale and its allegiance in the struggle is unclear There have been widespread desertions to the rebels particu- larly in the west and the rebels are in pos- session of some tanks in other areas but at least elements of two Hungarian divisions are known to have participated in the repression at the outset 5 It is unlikely that any Hungarian govern- ment will be able to reach a compromise be- tween Soviet security requirementsand Hun garian nationalist sentiment Certain rebel groups appear willing to accept Nagy tem- porarily and it seems possible that he can gradually establish control if he can reach an accommodation with the rebels with respect to their principal demands abolition of the secret police complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and changes in the composition of the government If the rebels refuse to make an accommodation with Nagy the Soviet Union will be faced with the alter- natives of risking the development of a non- Communist and independent Hungary or of intervening with large scale military forces to take over the country by force 1 - e Other Satellites 5 Signs of nationalistic ferment were seen during the spring in Czechoslovakia Begin ning late last year a number of non Com- munist politicians were released from prison in Czechoslovakia Rumania and Bulgaria in the spring a number of prominent Stalin purge victims in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were cleared of Titoist charges and concili- atory personnel changes were made partic- ularly in the Czech defense ministry and the Romanian police apparatus But there have been no challenges to soviet in uence by the governments of those Satellites and few in- dications of sharp divisions within the local parties However in the absence of a Soviet return to a policy of repression a more auton- omous and nationally-oriented regime will probably be evolved for Czechoslovakia and possibly Rumania and Bulgaria This likeli- hood would be increased if the Hungarian rebels win most of their demands Albania on the other hand is less likely to press vigor- ously for independence 7 East Germany is a special case Regard- less of East German desires the USSR will almost certainly not tolerate any substantial weakening of controls or the introduction of effective nationalist in uence into the govern- ment The USSR regards East Germany as vitally important to Soviet security and main tains a garrison oi 22 line divisions there Moreover fear among the Poles and Czechs of a reuni ed Germany with claims is a factor serving to persuade them of the need to cooperate with the USSR and to pre- vent them from supporting an East German independence movement Economic Considerations 8 longstanding economic grievances con- tinue to be an important factor behind unrest in the Satellites Reduced use of repressive measures and an increased candor in discus- sing economic problems have recently an- couraged more overt expression of discontent In an effort to alleviate the situation the USSR has recently negotiated modest aid agreements with Poland Hungary East Ger- many and Bulgaria 9 The Polish and Hungarian governments will almost certainly attempt to lessen their economic dependence on the USSR by in- creasing trade with the West and probably also by seeking economic assistance especial- ly in the form of credits 10 The most serious immediate problem for East Europe may be the fuel shortage which will probably result from underiul llments in the Polish Czech and Hungarian coal indus- tries A severe winter would increase fuel demands and might freeze up East German open pit operations causing serious shortages which the USSR with its own coal dif culties might not be able to alleviate The bumper Soviet harvmt could compensate for the poor Satellite crop of this fall and assure food sup- plies II IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY 11 We believe that the Hungarian rebellion came as a surprise to the Soviet leadership On the basis of the evidence presently avail- able Soviet policy through the Polish and Hungarian crises appears to have been vacil- lating It is too early to be con dent on this matter but we believe that Soviet leadership may be in a state of confusion and until basic decisions are made may be unable to conduct policy with sureness of touch A crisis in Western relationships over the Middle East might make Soviet leaders feel that they had greater freedom of action in the Satellite area 12 There has for some time been difference of opinion among Soviet leaders about the post-Stalin policy of seeking to geduce apathy at home disa ection in the Satellites and distrust in the non-Commanist world Soviet con dence in this policy generated by gains in morale at home and an improved position in international relations must now have been shaken by the need to make concessions in Poland and especially by the events in Hun- gary It is possible that the Hungarian rebel- lion will precipitate changes in the composi- tion or structure of the Soviet leadership If the Hungarian rebels are able to achieve a substantial political victory pressures for policy changes will almost certainly make the position of the Khrushchev leadership increas- 6- 3 ingly dif cult The position of advocates of a harder line may be strengthened Changes in the leadership would be even more likely if the professional militar'y under Zhukov insist that basic Soviet security is being jeopardized by current policies Domestic and Foreign Policy 13 Irrespective of any action which Soviet leaders may feel forced to take in Hungary it is unlikely that they will wish drastically to reverse the course of domestic relaxation which was undertaken largely for pressing internal considerations and has signi cantly improved party and popular morale It is also unlikely that Soviet leaders will abandon the effort to woo the areas of the world and to weaken Western alliances So- viet armed action in the Hungarian crisis will have an adverse effect on the credibility of the USSR's propaganda exploitation of anticol onial movements but the ultimate effect in this area as well as on the attitudes of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists promoters of Satellite autonomy will be determined more by future Soviet policy than by the present emergency action Policy Toward the Satellites 14 Evidence at present does not permit an estimate of whether or not the USSR will oc cupy Hungary with additional military force suf cient to quell the rebellion in the event that present measures to establish control are unsuccessful Unless it does so however we believe it unlikely that the USSR would nd it feasible to impose for any long period a Stalinist system of rigid police and ideologi- cal controls over the Satellites For the pres- ent the USSR will probably endeavor to pre- vent further outbreaks in the Satellites by insisting on precautionary police measurm and the suppression of anti-Soviet ferment These closer controls will probably be accom- panied by ameliorating measures such as So- viet help in meeting food shortages moratoria on collectivization and relief from some other economic pressures East Germany will be watched with particular vigilance 15 If confronted by strong natiOnalist pres- sures in the other Satellites the USSR will probably attempt to establish Communist re- gimes which possess a larger measure of his ternal autonomy but which maintain military and foreign policy solidarity with the USSR Military Implications 16 We believe the Soviet leaders estimate that the minimum military requirements for their national security include the maintenance of effective early warning capabilities on the Satellite borders of powerful Soviet forces in East Germany and of secure lines of com- munication from the USSR to East Germany The developments in Poland and Hungary will probably result in a substantial _c_lownward re- vision in the Soviet estimate of the reliability of most of the Satellite armed forces 1 We be- lieve these circumstances will dictate a keen Soviet desire to retain its own military forces in the other Satellites in which they are now stationed especially in Poland For the im- mediate future the possibility of new Satel- lite rebellions will reinforce this desire There- fore the Soviet leaders will almost certainly retain the Warsaw Pact organization in order to preserve the rights which they enjoy un- der it It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obvious prepa- ration for such intervention would lead th USSR deliberately to take steps which it be- lieved would materially increase the risk of general war The Soviet leaders probably rec- ognize that the US nuclear-air capability re- mains superior to that of the USSR and have probably concluded that at present the USSR even if it launched a surprise attack would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear ex change with the US 18 Soviet suspicions of US policy and pres- ent circumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihood of a series of actions and counter- actions leading inadvertently to war Such a series of actions could most readily originate with respect to East Germany 1 See Annex i ANNEX Line Jet Jet light Ground attack divisions ghters bombers aircraft Satellite forces Albania 0 7 brigades 4O 0 0 Bulgaria 12 225 5 100 piston CzechosloVakla 16 incl 2 tank 3 mach 505 40 250 plston Hungary 10 incl 1 tank 1 mech 220 20 115 plstom Poland 18 incl 6 mech 490 so 275 piston Romania 14 incl 1 tank 1 mech 240 35 126 piston East Germany 7 incl 3 mach 40 0 77 1 160 180 886 - - East Germany 22 incl 3 tank 10 mech 500 73 25 recon 21 recon Poland 2 1 tank 1 mech 234 78 11-1 jet 21 recon Hungary 2 lmech 212 '18 0 Romania 2 mech 128 0 23 1 099 276 114 Mine warfare and Destroyers Submarines patrol vessels Albania 0 0 17 Bulgaria 1 3 46 Poland 2 9 44 Rumaola 4 3 16 East Germany 0 49 Soviet naval forces in East Not including Baltic and Black Sea Fleets East Germany 0 38 Poland 0 0 30