Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 Argentina Grapplin Intelligence Reform- When President Alfonsin took office in December 1983 he inherited a chaotic intelligence apparatus whose mission and mind-set was out of step with Argentina's new democratic system The President soon made clear in public statements that he had little confidence in these services and would make intelligence reform a priority Alfonsin began several reforms but military resistance to change and a lack of capable intelligence officials loyal to the government have hampered these initiatives Moreover a string of scandals has raised charges of corruption and incompetence and reinforced the public's conviction that Alfonsin does not fully controi the intelligence services The-President is now trying to reorganize the intelligence community and has proposed legislation that would severely restrict the military's autonomy We believe however that military intransigence and civilian weakness will frustrate efforts at change and that the military intelligence services in all likelihood will continue to serve their own interests-rather than those of the elected government-for the remainder of Alfonsin's tcrm llllll A Tarnished Image Argentina's many intelligence services see inset enjoyed favored status under the 1976-83 military government Acc6rding to academic and press accounts the services operated virtually independently of the military junta seldom coordinated their activities or shared information and frequently tried to discredit and sabotage one another Testimony from ongoing military trials indica tes that all the services committed human rights abuses during the dirty war against terrorism and heavy press coverage of the court proceedings has reinforced the publi c's e opinion of the intelligence commumty - SIDE had conducted illegal surveillance of Argentine legislators to justify a purge of all senior staff officers with military rank or who had been appointed during military rule he replaced many key officials with loyalists from his own Radical Civic Union who would represent administration interests and implement reforms These moves in our view enhanced Alfonsin's control over SIDE but career officers of inexperienced individuals to senior POSitions and resigned from the service - avJ We believe that these losses gutted SIDE's operational capability and left Alfonsin with no source of intelliience Alfonsin tried to fill intelligence organizations established extraofficial itoups within the Ministries of Defense and the Interior that operated for roughly two years before being exposed in a scandal referred to by some Argentine political commentators as Alfonsin's Watergate ''- The case hit the Buenos Aires' headlines early this year when relatives of real estate magnate and kidnap victim Osvaldo Sivak alleged that elements within SIDE and the Federal Police had inadequately investigated his case and extorted ransom money from the family Heavy press coverage forced Alfonsin to order an investigation that subsequently revealed the involvement of members of his parallel groups according to the US Embassy This evidence unleashed a deluge of criticism from the opposition Congress demanded that Interior Minister Troccoli and then Defense Minister Lopez explain these Civilian Services Alfonsin announced publicly early in his administration that cleanup of the intelligence services would be high on his agenda The President used charges that the civilian intelligence service r 7 Photocopy Reagan library SeeH ALA LAR 86-022 12 September 1986 C0 5 675634 SECRET Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 Swact 't Argentine Intelligence Services St4te Intelligence Secretaritll SIDE serves as central intelligence Natty Intelligence Set'fice SI N reports directly I ' i ' ' g the dirty war Army Intelligence Set'fice S E reports directly Staff and Ministry af Defense its Collection Center CRIM former y the 601 st Army battalion-which has - for processing the information S perintendency o the Interior reports to Federal Police and the Ministry af Interior main central repository af criminal information responsible for enforcing all federal Jaws under National Defense Law will assume internal intelligence collection duties from military Nattal Prd'ecture Intelligence Se ice reports to Naval Prefecture roughly equivalent af US Coast Guard and Ministry of Interior Air Force lntelligelfce Senlce SIFA reports directly to Air Force General Staff and Ministry af Defense operates through Q fice attaches abroad - Gendarmerie Intelligence Directorate reports to National Gendarmerie border police and the Ministry af the Interior irregularities The Embassy reports that Troccoli weathered the storm laraely because of extensive support from Radical Party leaders but that Lopez resigned to protest what he called the administration's mishandlina of the affair Finally another case that is now unfoldini in the Argentine press reveals that at least one of Alfonsin's political appointees was a traitor The SIDE officer named to a post in Geneva in 1983 recently vanished the overnment has accused him of selling SIDE codes to the British according to the US Embassy This scandal cast doubt on Alfonsin's judament and led to a round of public name calling among Radical Party officials Former Defense Minister Lopez publicly denounced the head of SIDE for coverin up the case the SIDE chief blamed Lopez for appointing the accused and both pointed the finaer at Alfonsin Other scandals have also damaaed the civilian service's reputation A SIDE officer accused of involvement in the 1983 kidnapini of an Araentine magazine editor for example easily eluded law enforcement officials and escaped to Spain according to US Embassy and press reports Cha rined SIDE officials subsequently urged AJfonsin to neaotiate his extradition with Madrid The Embassy reports however that SIDE was unable to provide the evidence necessary to convict him when he returned to Buenos Aires causing the courts to release him - Seaet 8 SECRET Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 TROCCOLI o o o'' ' - - A strlu Q lttttlllttnce community scattdals has Al ottSin to sttp up his lagging rtorgattlzatlott plan for d Militarylntelligenc Although overshadowed in the press by SIDE's blunders the military services have been implicated in several scandals according to Embassy and defense attache reporting In September f985 a wave of terrorist lombings affiicted Argentina The government- advised by SIDE that extremist elements within the military were trying to foment trouble prior to the November electionsarrested six active duty and retired officers for masterminding the violence Although evidence against the alleged tnr they were eventually rel eas ea - t e n d e d to substantia that elements within military intelligence had engineered at least some of the bombings to give the impression that Alfonsin was not in complete control of the country - 9 Photocopy Reagan library Interior Minister Trocco i was called to testify In Congress on the SIVAK case Only a show Q support from Radical Party leaders kept him in Ambito flnanclcro 0 office - There is other evidence of military intelligence's uncertain loyalty to Alfonsin In May of this year police discovered a bomb along Alfonsin's route to visit an Army headquarters in Cordoba Press reports indicate that Army intelligence carried out a cursory investigation after which military officials publicly impl ed that the incident was only a mildly dangerous Seeret C056 75634 Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 tiunt lD being debated in the Senate- aimed in part at defining the responsibilities of each service and establisbin checks on their activities The most controversial provision of the bill in our view iives civilian authorities sole responsibility for domestic intelJiaence activities and restricts the military services to foreign and strategic matters In our view Alfonsin hopes that this division of intelli ence functions wiU limit the influence of any one se r v i c e - - The proposed law addresses the issue of accountability by centralizine authority over the entire intelli ence community in a single government agency the National Intelligence Center CNI The head of the CNI--appointed by and directly responsible to the President- would coordinate all intelliience tasking collection and processing The government has not determined the exact structure of the A faJiun by military illrtlli fW to ldrlltlfy _ Alra lkrald those responsible or an attempt on A fonsln 's lift lras raised serio tlons about its loyalty to tire government _ The Milltary Response We believe that the armed forces are the biggest obstacle to lastini reform of the intelligence community The civilian intelligence agencies in our view are at present too weak and ineffective to take over the duties currently performed by the military services Moreover many midlevel would even welcome subordination to the military hoping that it would restore some of their prank The Cordoba corps commander resiined rather than comply with the administration's demands that he identify the perpetrators he military then alleged that nchild of Radical Party leaders who wanted to use the incident to justify a purge of the Cordoba corps- a longtime locus of antidemocratic activities Several courts continue to investiiate the case but the US Embassy reports that as with last year's bombinis convictions are unlikely cechiefs _ _ resent the attempts to alter their role and or anization and oppose Alfonsin's Democratizing tbe Intelliaence Services The Embassy report s that Alfonsin is extremely sensitive to public and Congressional criticism of the intelligence services He has publicly acknowledged the need to coordinate and control intelli ence activities to avoid future operational disorders and - 10 SECRET - Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 t l ARGENTI NA PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTION RESPONSI BILITIES PRESIDENT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER r DO MESTIC T RNAL 2 MINISTtR OF DEFENSE STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT SI D El DOMESTIC EX ERN L r--- MINISTtR or INTERIOR AIR FORCE GENERAL srAFF ARMY CHIEF o r srArr NAVY CHIEF or srArr NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF GENDARMERIE NAVAL PREFECTURE CHIEF FEDERAL POUCE AIR FORCE ll'fTEWGENCE ARMY INTElliGENCE SERVICE E EXTER L NAVAL INffiUGENCE SERVICE SIN EXTERNAL GENDARMERIE INTEWGENCE DIRECTORATE EXTERNAL NAVAL PREFECTURE INTEWGENCE SERVICE EXTERNAL SUPERINTENDENCY or INTERIOR DOMESTIC IF ER L I civilian appointees citing their lack of experience in several of the chiefs indic ted that they will intelligence matters and the litany of errors they have continue to collect domest even if legally committed as evidence of their incompetence More prohibited from so doing - fundamentalJy the military-and especially its intelligence branches-in our view has pledged only Finally longstanding rivalries between the services conditional loyalty to democratic rule It remains are fueling opposition to reform Alfonsin 's proposed primarily concerned with protecting its institutional changes call for the intelligence aaencies to share interests and countering leftist influence not with information and coordinate data processing The protecti till fragile Argentine constitutional services however have historically been pitted system against one another by military governments and the resulting mistrust permeates them as they scramble to proposal to protect well-established and hard-won power bases any supposed give civilian agencies sole responsibility for domestic collection has become the rallying point for the favoritism Alfonsin displays toward one of the services military's resistance to Alfonsin's reforms quickly prompts the others to demand equal litary leaders met treatment For example when the press reported that recently to coordinate a lobbying campaign to persuade the Senate to alter this provision of tbe I defense law Although they ar t t I I I I muster the support they need 11 Photocopy Reagan Library Scc ct C05675634 Seefoet SECRET L the Air Force Chief of Staff bad presented an intelliaence reform plan to the President the Army and Navy Y countered with their own proposals - Outlook In our view problems over intelligence reform are likely to plaeuc Alfonsin for the remai n der of his term The Senate probably will decide to water down the provisions for civilian control in the National Defense bill leavina the military with substantial responsibility for domestic collection We believe that under these conditions the military-with its antidemocratic ethos and adversarial view of the Alfonsin eovernment- will continue to place a low priority on monitorine the activities of antigovernment rightwine extremis may on occasion even abet these activities Senate passage of the intelligence reforms as they now stand would not substantially improve the situation either in our view Under such circumstances the military probably would continue its domestic operations illegally while the President would be forced to rely on S IDE and the Federal Policeservices of proven ineffectiveness-for internal intelligence The President's only option would be to risk more scandals by once again organizing extraofficial groups to keep tabs on civilian extremists and the military's political activities Seeoet Approved for Public Release 8 December 2016 12