CABI ET I CO -JF DEI CE C A B I N E T MINUTE Security Committee Canberra 13 December 1993 No Memorandum 1361 - 2412 SEC The Threat to Australian Government Communications The Committee noted the Memorandum Secretary to Cabinet - ABINET IN CONFIDENCe C I c 2 J CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE MEMORANDUM No FOR CABINET 1361 -· of30 COP' No 1 J I % THE THREAT TO AUSTRALIAN GOVERMENT COMMUNICATIONS Title 7 October 1993 Date Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security SCJS Originating Department s Decision 6193 SEC of 25 June 1985 asked SCIS to report regularly to Security Committee on all relevant intelligence and security matters Cabinet or Ministerial Authority for Memorandum To provide the Security Committee with a report on the threat to Australian Government communications and the state of communications security based on advice provided by the Defence Signals Directorate in consultation with ASIO Purpose of Memorandum Not Applicable Legislation SCIS comprising Secretaries of the Departments of the Prime Minister Cabinet Defence Foreign Affairs Trade Finance and Attorney-General's the Chief of the Defence Force and the Directors-General of ASIO and ONA The Director DSD was also consulted Consultation Departments consulted Is there agreement Yes Cost This fiscal year year 2 year 3 Evaluation Strategy Agreed 11366 86 SECRET Not Applicable Not Applicable This document is the property of the Australian Government and is not to be copied or repr duced CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE St C Kt I C A INt I·IN·'-'UNI' IUt N C 2 THE THREAT TO AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS This memorandum reviews the threat to Australian Government communications and the state of communications security It draws primarily on the annual report to SCIS prepared by the Defence Signals Directorate DSD in consultation with ASIO for the period 1992-93 FOREIGN SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AGAINST AUSTRALIA Russia 2 - ASIO assessed in the reporting period that the Russian Embassy in Canberra - 3 This is based on a number of factors ASIO assesses that personnel from the Russian foreign intelligence e SVR - the KGB's succes sor SECRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE 3 Si GKt l GA81Nt f -IN- ON IUt N t 3 Other countries involved 5 DSD is unable to determine to what extent Australian communications may be targeted by these countries But it seems likely that their Sigint assets are used primarily to monitor military communications in areas of greatest strategic interest to those countries or communications within their own territorial boundaries SECRET CABINET -IN-CONFIDENCE 4 SECRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE 4 l_1 The General Threat DSD continues to assess that there is a high level of threat to the Government's communications when they are not properly enciphered This applies not only to international communications carried via satellite but also landline and microwave circuits provided to Australian government agencies by the communications authorities of foreign countries and to unprotected Government communications within Australia 9 DSD considers that the use of DSD approved cipher equipment and the ADCNET secure network for government communications overseas should be encouraged to eliminate the risk of interception and exploitation THE STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY Telephone Facsimile and Data 10 Many crisis situations in recent years eg Bougainville the Gulf War Somalia and Bosnia have demonstrated the need for the availability of secure telephone facsimile and data facilities within Government departments DSD is developing the SPEAKEASY project as a means of providing an affordable secure terminal for widespread government u e 11 DSD advises that the SPEAKEASY project has made significant progress over the past year Current results are very positive and the technical risk in proceeding to a production version is assessed as slight Full scale production is planned to commence in mid 1994 Telegraphy and Data 12 Government telegraphy and data services processing national security classified information are protected by high-grade crypto equipment which has been upgraded progressively over the past years Provided the SECRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE 5 t Kt l AtjiNt I·IN- UNJ-IUt N t 5 equipment continues to be used correctly and in accordance with prescribed doctrine DSD considers that classified by this means is safe from exploitation Sensitive Classified Data 13 The publication of the new Protective Security Manual and the introduction of new classifications Highly Protected Protected InConfidence has served to focus attention on the need to secure government data communications in the interests of privacy Much of this data although not classified for national security reasons has potential intelligence value for its economic trade and financial content The use of DSD approved commercial standard cryptographic equipment has spread and has increased the resources a foreign intelligence service would need to devote to any attempt to exploit these communications 14 Both the Privacy Commissioner and Australian National Audit Office have been instrumental in directing government agencies to seek DSD's advice on data protection and on the security of information processing systems generally In that regard the relocation of DSD's information security branch to Canberra continues to provide a more responsive service to the various customer agencies 15 When combined with a robust DSD Attorney-General's Department computer security educational program the result has been a much greater awareness across government agencies of the value of the information they process and the need to take measures to protect its confidentiality availability and integrity But there is a continuing threat from 'hackers' to Government information processing systems of all types and DSD assesses that this threat will continue to grow CONCLUSIONS SECRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE 6 t GRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE 6 d unenciphered telegraphy telephone facsimile and data links to and from Canberra and the mobile telephone network are particularly at risk of exploitation e the risk to Australian Government communications carried on international circuits and not protected by DSD-approved cryptographic equipment remains high f the secure system operated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on behalf of the Australian Government minimises the risk of hostile electronic exploitation g the SPEAKEASY Government Secure Communications Terminal project should continue to be progressed by DSD and AOTC and brought into service as quickly as possible in order to meet the need for an affordable secure telephone for widespread government use h there is a continuing risk to government information processing systems from unauthorised access and i there continues to be a heightened awareness in agencies beyond the traditional intelligence and security community of the requirement to improve the security of their information processing systems SECRET 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