ma a umrso sum NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o c 20555 9F a SEEP-HART January 22 1993 93 Jim 21' 2 2 census e if M0 The Honorable Lee Aspin JAN 2 1995 Secretary of Defense ashinqton D c 20301 Dear Les We talked 'l'uesdey about the challenges that Russia's nuclear programs still offer the West Enclosed in telegraphic form is an outline of the issue and its security implications Prank Wiener is of course up to date on this and has been my principal point or contact at state in the development of the nuclear safety parts of the U8 position Best of luck in your daunting tasks Sincerely Ji f Ivan Selin Enclosure As Stated 15 calm 73383 THEMES FDR CONCERH 1H THE FORMER SOVIET Ivan Belin I THE 1 There have been a large number of positive developments in nuclear security issues in the FSU I The two START agreements I Shipment of tactical weapons from Ukraine and Belarus to Russia I Agreement of Russia to sell weapons grade highly enriched uranium HEU to the US 500 metric tons over 5 years could bring the er-Soviets at least $533 and up to $1033 depending on the market I Nunanugar program to deal with storage and dismantlement of nuclear weapons including a Material Controls and Accounting compcnent I Ukraine Belarus decisions to he non-nuclear states under the EFT The recent Yeltsin-Kravchuk agreement on security guarantees 2 There has also been some progress on nuclear safety issues though not as much I Lisbon initiative to provide some short term safety assistance SEED legislation - EC programs for assistance to FSU 6-7 decisions in principle in July 0 DEED commitments not all finalised for a total of $300 HM in safety related assistance over the next three years a World Organisation of Nuclear Operators WANG and certain individual western utilities have delivered useful training and assistance directly to the operators January 22 NRC programs directly with the_regulators and some of the NRC and 003 programs with_the operators have been quite effective 3 The nuclear safety problems' and the approach to a solution are well understood in principle Follow a triage approach on short term emergency aid for all reactors on the grounds that their owners will not close them down immediately regardless of what we say on ImproVEment in the mid-term of those that can be rescued some 440 MW and all 1000 MW no replacement in the longer term of those that are too sick to recover Chernobyl-type and 440 230s Build the confidence and mechanisms in the short run which will make the mid-and long-term steps feasible since they require painful economic decisions in both East and What Concentrate short-term aid to the PSU into forming model plants which the Russians and Ukrainians can then try to replicate rather than spreading a band-aid on each patient 4 The FSU is also facing a set of nuclear related environmental issues which dwarf those that we usually scues Chernobyl clean-up is often discussed Problems around former weapons plants near Chelyabinsk in the Urals are much worse Problems in Siberia around Krasnoyarsk are also severe we are just now starting to realize the enormous potential problems involved in the contamination of the Arctic sea and the north Russian coasts These problems should give us pause before trying to rush in to help clean up the after effects of Chernobyl II THE SECURITY PROBLEM 1 January 21 ms 1 Authority is breaking down in Russia There are voices in the military and the Parliament who claim that Yeltsin has gone too far towards meeting the US's demands on The hassle over the Department of commerce's dumping action on raw uranium and the impasse on paying generous prices for the HEU have cost momentum to this program of significant importance for foreign policy and economic assistance on There are second thoughts about selling us HEU at any price II The military are playing a much larger role on the Russian side of the Kuhn-Luger initiatives Rumors persist concerning the sale of nuclear materials and less often nuclear weapons to third countries In any event the ability of the KGB to guarantee security of weapons has clearly decreased Progress towards a science and technology center in Moscow has slowed down The desirability of keeping nuclear weapons is under active reconsideration More and more Russia is conditioning its ratification of agreements on actions in Ukraine and the other nuclear successor republics Ukraine however is withholding its support at least until it gains compensation and guarantees Unfortunately and in spite of the Yeltsin-Kravchuk understanding the dynamics between Russia and these republics could be troublesome The weapons and materials have significant financial value Many Ukrainians argue that they should receive some significant compensation for giving them up Also many Ukrainians argue against joining the NPT in the perceived lower status of non-nuclear states without compensation What start out to be Ukrainian positions to use as bargaining chips have a way of becoming strongly held positions for their own sake To add fuel to the fire Ukraine and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan have some doubts about Russia's 3 Jane- 7 u m trustworthiness given troubling statements about Russia's obligation to protect ethnic Russians in the other republics Do they want Russia to have a monopoly on nuclear weapons especially in the absence of Western security guarantees When you add this all together you can see how a number of understandable and innocent eyents can lead to an unstable situation Ukraine holds out for assurances and compensation before surrendering their last weapons and ratifying START and HPT Russians hold up until the Ukrainians do ratify the treaties the Russians make statements designed to support ethnic Russians in Crimea and elsewhere Ukrainians react to these statements with alarm and start believing their own public 4 The problem in Ukraine is also very severe The interactions with ethnic Russians living in Ukraine are fraught with possibilities for split Ukraine inflaming relations vith the Russian Federation Political dynamics in Kiev may be as bad as in Moscow II The government is not strong or effective and will not be until role of president and parliament is settled II The nationality problem and the need to maintain unity hangs over all other decisions This makes tough decisions unlikely to be taken The economy is very weak making any potential source of funds very attractive on Underlying all this is a chauvinistic desire to be a nuclear state and the concern about being non- nuclear but bordering on a potentially unfriendly nuclear state 111 THE 8333 PROBLEM 1 Problems exist on the eastern front The Russian nuclear energy program is in the nuclear ministry not the energy ministry which in turn is under military domination Both nuclear safety and the admission of the seriousness of the problem receive low priority The Ukrainian ministry involved deals only with nuclear'power but it also soft-pedals the safety question 4 January 21 19 2 Regulators in both countries are very poorly funded and in a very weak political position Both countries and Lithuania as well feel that economic necessity is much more pressing than safety considerations Although I am skeptical that the recently announced Russian nuclear power program is a serious decision nevertheless it is discouraging on its face finish three reactors in the near term including a Chernobyl- type RBMK at Kursk authorize all the unfinished reactors including the dangerous the unnecessary fast breeder reactors as well as the arguably justifiable modern 1000 MW pressurized water rezctors worry about funding and local approvals la er Problems exist in the west Although assistance programs are considerable they have fallen short of the acknowledged need or of the intentions of Germany and the US as recently as last July Too much of the European assistance has been spent by the West and in the West for projects and equipment chosen by the West rather than bringing in the host countries and letting them take responsibility and the lead The EC countries until recently insisted on multilateral assistance which involved yet another balky institution the further slowing down the short-term assistance process Coordination of the Western efforts has been inadequate although there has been some progress here We have not even begun to address the political and economic issues which will be involved in the mid- and longer term issues Predictably this has led to problems between the East and the West There is little mutual confidence between the high level Eastern and Western organizations some high profile short-term successful assistance programs are badly needed both for their own value and as confidence building measures 5 Jamar 31