E2 UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0015 RELEASED IN PART B 1 1 4 B 1 4 D SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H- 01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W 32874 01 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE - 00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 PTQ0015 161350Z AID-01 DS-00 INR- 00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-OO PMB-00 ------------------88DF8D R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5556 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161409Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 01 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY FRANK H PEREZ CLASSIFICATION SECRET REASON 1 4 B 1 4 D DECLASSIFY AFTER 15 NOV 2019 DATE CASE ID 12 NOV 2010 200905308 161350Z UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS - 01 ASDS-01 G-00 UNCLASSIFIED USVIENNA FOR USVIE E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA 1 SECRET -ENTIRE TEXT SUMMARY 2 WHILE MANY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ARE IN PLACE IN RUSSIA TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AGAINST THEFT OR DIVERSION FEW IF ANY OF THESE SYSTEMS WOULD MEET U S -STYLE STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY SOVIET NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEMS WERE BASED ON CONCEPTS OF ISLOATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SPECIALISTS AND ON PROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS FREQUENTLY SEEN AS U S SPYING OR SABOTAGE GOR ACTIONS OVER THE PAST THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND HAS BEGUN SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 MOSCOW 32874 01 OF 13 161350Z IMPROVEMENTS ALTHOUGH FUNDING CONSTRAINTS REPRESENT A MAJOR BARRIER TO RAPID PROGRESS 3 THIS CABLE PROVIDES A NON-TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS FROM THEFT OR DIVERSION ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE A BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS FOR THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS CAN BE COMPARED IT ALSO PROVIDES HISTORICAL AND OTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A UNCLASSIFIED Bl CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING INFORMATION ON THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RUSSIA ' S NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNT I NG SYSTEMS AS WELL AS ON CURRENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THOSE SYSTEMS END SUMMARY OVERVIEW 4 SEIZURES IN RUSSIA GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS WHICH MAY HAVE ORIGINATED FROM RUSSIA HAVE FOCUSED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION ON THE SECURITY OF RUSSIA ' S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AGAINST THEFT OR DIVERSION THIS CABLE PROVIDES A NON-TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN RUSSIA TO PROTECT NUCLEAR MATERIALS IT IS INTENDED TO ASSIST READERS ACTIVE IN EFFORTS TO ASSIST RUSSIA IN IMPROVING THE SECURITY ITS NUCLEAR STOCKPILE BETTER UNDERSTAND DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA BY PROVIDING A BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH REPORTS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE OVERALL SYSTEM AND AREAS OF U S -RUSSIAN SECRET SECRET MOSCOW 32874 01 OF 13 161350Z PAGE 04 COOPERATION CAN BE PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE WHILE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF BOTH STRONG AND WEAK POINTS IN RUSSIA ' S SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS ARE CITED THEY ARE CITED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY THIS CABLE DOES NOT PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION ON ALL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING MPC A IN RUSSIA 5 DETAILED INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF RUSSIA ' S MPC A SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN NUMEROUS REPORTING CABLES FROM THIS EMBASSY AS WELL AS FROM REPORTS PREPARED BY VISITORS TO RUSSIA FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DOE U S NATIONAL LABORATORIES THE IAEA AND EURATOM AS WELL AS FROM OTHER SOURCES WHILE MOST OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE FROM THESE SOURCES THIS MESSAGE PULLS TOGETHER TO PRESENT AN OVERALL PICTURE THIS REPORT DOES NOT COVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED THE SAFETY OF NUCLER MATERIALS IN RUSSIA 6 WHILE EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES AT FACILITIES SECRET NNNNPTQ0016 PTQ0016 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-Ol EPAE-00 059W 32874 02 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 161351Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ------- -- ---------88DF96 R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5557 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161409Z 38 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-OO UNCLASSIFIED S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 02 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161351Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA WITH ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS UNDERSTANDABLY VARY GREATLY DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL LOCATED IN A GIVEN FACILITY FEW IF ANY OF THE SYSTEMS ESTOFF HAS SEEN WOULD MEET U S STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ALL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEMS ARE UNIFORMLY WEAK THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE -- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT A N UMB E R -O F ---------- FACILITIES ARE QUITE IMPRESSIVE I UNCLASSIFIED Bl ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ UNCLASSIFIED 8 FINALLY THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFLICTING RUSSIA ' S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ALSO ADDS TO THE RISK OF DIVERSION MANY NUCLEAR WORKERS ARE LEAVING THEIR JOBS AND THOSE THAT REMAIN RECEIVE LOW PAY WHICH OFTEN ARRIVES MONTHS LATE RUMORS OF LAYOFFS AND CLOSURES CIRCULATE FREQUENTLY INCLUDING RUMORS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY CLOSE ENTIRELY SOME OF ITS SECRET NUCLEAR CITIES WHICH ARE HOME TO ALMOST 1 000 000 PEOPLE 9 WHILE WESTERN OBSERVERS TEND TO SEE MANY OBVIOUS WEAKNESS IN RUSSIA ' S SYSTEMS FOR SECURING THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS THE RUSSIAN AND FORMER SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHO DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED CURRENT SYSTEMS ARE QUICK TO DEFEND THEIR WORK AND TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED SLIGHTS THESE RUSSIAN EXPERTS CITE THE FACT THAT THEIR SECURITY SYSTEMS WORKED ESSENTIALLY FLAWLESSLY FOR OVER 40 YEARS WHILE A SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED Bl UNCLASSIFIED MOSCOW 32874 02 OF 13 161351Z PAGE 04 PART OF THE RISK FACING RUSSIA ' S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE CAN BE TRACED TO THE DETERIORATION OF SECURITY MEASURES SINCE THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO INCREASED RISK ARE CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND IN THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY SECURITY SYSTEMS IN PLACE TODAY WERE DESIGNED DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD WHEN THE NATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A POWERFUL CENTRALIZED STATE WITH A PERVASIVE SECURITY NETWORK THE MEASURES NEEDED TO INSURE NUCLEAR SECURITY IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT WERE VERY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THAT HAVE ALWAYS BEEN NEEDED IN WESTERN COUNTRIES OR WHICH ARE NEEDED IN RUSSIA TODAY 10 FINALLY MANY WITHIN THE GOR ARE WELL AWARE OF THE WEAKNESS IN SECURITY SYSTEMS DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT THE GOR ' S CHIEF NUCLEAR SAFETY WATCHDOG GOSATOMNADZOR FOR EXAMPLE HAS BOTH STUDIED THE PROBLEM AND RECEIVED REPEATED INSTRUCTIONS TO INCREASE SECURITY AND TO MANDATE IMPROVED ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS OTHER GROUPS INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR SOCIETY OF RUSSIA AND THE SOCIETY FOR NONPROLIFERATION HAVE COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THE NEED FOR TIGHTER CONTROLS UNFORTUNATELY GOSATOMNADZOR OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF SECRET NNNNPTQ0020 SECRET PTQ0020 UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 ACTION OES - 09 INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W MOSCOW ACDA- 17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 32874 03 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 UNCLASSIFIED 1613512 AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD - 01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 ------------------88DFA3 R 1613532 NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5558 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 1614112 38 S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 03 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 1613512 E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT THAT THE UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-OO PRIMARY PROBLEM IS ONE OF MONEY UPGRADING PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ESTABL ISHING ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS VIRTUALLY FROM SCRATCH WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE AMERICAN MPC A EXPERTS WHO HAVE VISITED VARIOUS NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN RUSSIA GENERALLY AGREE THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED COULD BE MEASURED IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH AN ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET OF UP TO USD ONE BILLION UNCLASSIFIED THE PEAK OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION THE CLOSED CITIES 11 RUSSIA ' S TEN CLOSED SECRET NUCLEAR CITIES POSSESS THE MOST SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIALS TECHNOLOGIES IN RUSSIA AND ARE THE BEST PROTECTED OF THE FACILITIES COVERED IN THIS REPORT Bl 12 THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM AT THE CLOSED CITIES IS PHYSICAL SPACE -- ALL OF THE NUCLEAR CITIES ARE PHYSICALLY REMOTE FROM POPULATION CENTERS WHILE THEY ARE LOCATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA WITH THE OPEN CITIES AFTER WHICH THEY ARE NAMED THE CLOSED CITIES ARE LOCATED BETWEEN 40 AND 150 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THEIR NEIGHBORS IN ADDITION MOST CLOSED CITIES ARE LOCATED IN VERY REMOTE REGIONS MANY OF WHICH WERE CLOSED TO FOREIGN TRAVEL UNTIL RECENTLY Bl rl__ _ _ _ _ UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 15 THIS OUTER PERIMETER FENCE SURROUNDS THE ENTIRE CLOSED CITY THESE CITIES RANGE IN POPULATION FROM A LOW OF ABOUT 45 000 TO A HIGH OF OVER 100 000 FROM THE TIME THESE CITIES WERE FOUNDED UP UNTIL LESS THAN A DECADE AGO NOT ONLY DID THE FENCES KEEP PEOPLE OUT OF THE CLOSED CITIES THEY KEPT THE RESIDENTS IN VERY FEW RESIDENTS OF CLOSED CITIES WERE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL WITHIN RUSSIA EVEN FEWER WERE ALLOWED FOREIGN TRAVEL RIGHTS WHEN ONE MEMBER OF A FAMILY WAS ALLOWED TO TRAVEL OTHERS WERE FORCED TO STAY BEHIND A NUMBER OF YOUNGER UNDER 40 CLOSED CITY RESIDENTS WITH WHOM ESTOFF HAS SPOKEN REPORT THAT THEY WERE BORN IN THEIR CLOSED CITY AND NEVER LEFT FOR ANY REASON UNTIL THE LAST FEW YEARS WHILE SOME OUTSTANDING STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW OR ELSEWHERE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION MANY OTHERS COMPLETED THEIR UNCLASSIFIED Bl UNCLASSIFIED SECRET NNNNPTQ0099 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS - 00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE - 00 059W 32874 04 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE - 00 SP-00 NISC-01 PTQ0099 161352Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ----- - ------------88E3A5 R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5559 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161433Z 45 S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE - 00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-OO UNCLASSIFIED NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET MOSCOW 32874 04 OF 13 PAGE 02 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161352Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA EDUCATIONS INSIDE THE CLOSED CITY 16 THE GEOGRAPHIC SIZE OF THE CLOSED CITIES HELPED SUPPORT THEIR ISOLATION LARGE LAND AREAS -SOMETIMES MEASURING HUNDREDS OF SQUARE MILES -- ARE ENCLOSED BY THE TIGHTLY GUARDED PERIMETER FENCES DESCRIBED ABOVE FARMS FOOD PROCESSING AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES STORES SCHOOLS HOSPITALS AND CULTURAL FACILITIES ARE ALL LOCATED WITHIN THE FENCE THUS MINIMIZING THE NEED FOR CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD DELIVERIES OF SUPPLIES ARE PROCESSED BY A SPECIAL SERVICES RUN ORGANIZATION IN THE PAST MOST TRUCKS WERE EITHER UNLOADED AT SPECIAL WAREHOUSES ON THE BORDERS OF THE CLOSED CITY OR ELSE DRIVERS WERE REQUIRED TO RELINQUISH CONTROL OF THEIR VEHICLES AT THE BORDER OF THE CLOSED CITY TO OTHER DRIVERS WHO WORKED ONLY WITHIN THE CITY TODAY SUPPLY TRUCKS APPEARS TO TRAVEL WITH RELATIVE FREEDOM IN AND OUT OF THE GATES 17 AT PRESENT WHILE RESIDENTS MUST STILL FILE PAPERWORK REQUESTING PASSES TO LEAVE PERMISSION TO TRAVEL WITHIN RUSSIA IS REPORTEDLY GRANTED ROUTINELY SECRET UNCLASSIFIED SECRET UNCLASSIFIED MOSCOW 32874 04 OF 13 161352Z PAGE 03 FOREIGN TRAVEL IS STILL MORE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED WITH FOREIGN PASSPORTS ONLY ISSUED AFTER LONG SECURITY CHECKS THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FROM WITHIN THE CLOSED CITIES ARE REPORTEDLY EITHER WAITING FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD OR ARE APPEALING DENIALS 18 ACCESS TO CLOSED CITIES BY OUTSIDERS IS STILL TIGHTLY CONTROLLED ALL VISITS BY FOREIGNERS REQUIRE 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE VISITS BY RUSSIAN NATIONALS REQUIRE AT LEAST 10 DAYS NOTICE AND ARE NOT APPROVED WITHOUT A SPONSOR INSIDE THE CLOSED CITY AND A VALID REASON FOR TRAVEL 19 WITHIN THE CLOSED CITIES RESIDENTIAL AREAS ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM PRODUCTION RESEARCH AREAS DESIGN BUREAUS AND OTHER BUILDINGS IN WHICH ONLY PAPER WORK IS PERFORMED TEND TO BE LOCATED RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE MAIN POPULATION CENTERS LABORATORIES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES ARE LOCATED FARTHER AWAY EACH INDIVIDUAL BUILDING OR FACILITY IS PROTECTED BY ITS OWN SECURITY GENERALLY CONSISTING OF ONE OR MORE FENCES AND SECURITY GUARDS UNCLASSIFIED Bl UNCLASSIFIED 81 SECRET NNNNPTQ0032 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 32874 05 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 PTQ0032 161352Z AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 EPAE-00 059W SNIS-00 NISC-01 G-00 ------- - - - --------88DFCO R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5560 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC 161 415Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN - 42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 05 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161352Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA GAPS IN THE SECURITY NET 22 Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 81 SECRET SECRET RAGE 03 MOSCOW 32874 05 OF 13 1613522 BI UNCLASSIFIED SECRET UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED BI UNCLASSIFIED NNNNPTQ0033 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W 32874 06 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 PTQ0033 161353Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ------------------88DFC8 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-OO PMB-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161415Z 38 R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5561 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 06 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE UNCLASSIFIED 161353Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION AT OTHER SITES Bl I jTHE _ F A c T o R ' 'S -- WH I ' 'C H D E T E RM I N E---- T H E -- L' 'E VE L-- O F --- S E' 'C UR - I TY AT A GIVEN FACILITY ARE DOES THE FACILITY HAVE ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM IS THE FACILITY CONSIDERED TO BE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN IN NATURE WITHIN THE MILITARY CATEGORY IS IT A WEAPONS AS OPPOSED TO FUEL FACILITY DOES THE FACILITY DEVELOP OR POSSESS TECHNOLOGY WHICH IS CONSIDERED MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT OR THE POSSIBLE TARGET OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE -- WHICH MINISTRY MAINTAINS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE FACILITY 2 7 THE FEWER TIMES THE ANSWER TO ONE OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS IS YES THE LOWER THE SECURITY AT THE FACILITY WILL BE J UNCLASSIFIED Bl UNCLASSIFIED SECRET NNNNPTQ0035 PTQ0035 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W MOSCOW ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 32874 07 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 161353Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 ------------------88DFDO R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5562 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161416Z 38 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-OO Bl UNCLASSIFIED AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 07 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161353Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA Bl UNCLASSIFIED SECRET UNCLA SSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Bl Bl B1 UNCLASSIFIED SECRET PAGE 04 MOSCOW 32874 07 OF 13 161353Z Bl SECRET NNNNPTQ0039 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W MOSCOW ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 32874 08 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 PTQ0039 1613532 AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 ------------------88DFDA R 1613532 NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5563 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 1614162 38 S E C R E T SECTION 08 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 08 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 1613532 E O 12356 DECL OADR UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA UNCLASSIFIED Bl Bl Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING 35 WHILE MODERN PRACTICES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING MC A ARE COMPLEX AND OFTEN DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN THEY ARE A KEY ELEMENT IN THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS BY TRACKING NUCLEAR MATERIALS AS THEY MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE OWNER TO OWNER AND EVEN FROM ONE PHYSICAL FORM TO ANOTHER MC A PROCEDURES PROVIDE A MEANS OF DISCOURAGING THE THEFT OR DIVERSION OF MATERIALS BY PERSONS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY BY MAKING IT LIKELY THAT ANY SUCH DIVERSION WOULD BE DETECTED DURING AN AUDIT AND COULD BE TRACED TO THROUGH ACCOUNTING RECORDS UNFORTUNATELY IN RUSSIA WHERE THE POSSIBILITY THAT WORKERS MAY CHOOSE TO STEAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS EXACERBATED BY THE WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HAS FACED IN ITS 50-YEAR HISTORY MC A PROCEDURES ARE ALMOST NONEXISTENT UNCLASSIFIED Bl UNCLASSIFIED 36 WH I LE MINATOM AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN THAT FULLY SECRET NNNNPTQ0044 PTQ0044 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P - Ol EPAE-00 059W MOSCOW ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SN I S-00 32874 09 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 161354Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ------------ -- ----88DFE7 R 161 353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5564 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC- 00 161418Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 09 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 UNCLASSIFIED SECRET PAGE 03 MOSCOW 32874 09 OF 13 161 354Z 37 WHILE A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF RECORDS COULD THEORETICALLY LEAD TO A VERY GOOD ESTIMATE OF STOCKS ON HAND THE PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RECORDS ARE MAINTAINED ONLY AS STATIC DOCUMENTS Bl TRACING THE MOVEMENT OF MATERIAL BASED ON THESE RECEIPTS IS NOT POSSIBLE WHILE INVENTORIES ARE SOMETIMES TAKEN AT FACILITIES THESE INVENTORIES CANNNOT BE RECONCILED TO THE STACK OF RECEIVING AND SHIPPING DOCUMENTS 38 A MEMBER OF A VISITING EURATOM DELEGATION SUMMARIZED THE SITUATION HIS GROUP OBSERVED BY STATING THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT NO SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR ACCOUNTING EXISTED IN RUSSIA EACH OF THE SIX ORGANIZATIONS HE SURVEYED CLAIMED TO HAVE A SYSTEM BUT EACH SYSTEM WAS DIFFERENT AND THERE WAS NO INTEGRATION THE SYSTEMS ALSO LACKED COMPUTERIZATION OR ANY OTHER METHOD FOR PRODUCING RELIABLE RUNNING TOTALS HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE LACK OF BASIC LEGISLATION UNDERPINNING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY MADE THE PROCESS OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE DIFFICULT Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET NNNNPTQ0048 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW 32874 10 OF 13 PTQ0048 161354Z UNCLASSIFIED Bl INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-Ol EPAE-00 059W ACDA-17 OASY - 00 H-01 NRRC - 00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 ---- - -------------88DFF5 R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5565 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM- 00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 CIAE-00 UNCLASSIFIED OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 161419Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 10 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON RIPPEL SECRET SECRET MOSCOW 32874 10 OF 13 PAGE 02 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161354Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA BI 40 AT LEAST AT RUSSIA'S CLOSED NUCLEAR CITIES THERE ARE ELEMENTS TO THEIR MC A SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT UNCLASSIFIED GENERALLY EXIST IN THE WEST AND WHICH PROVIDE SOME ADDED LEVEL OF ADDED SECURITY IN THE CLOSED CITIES INFORMATION CONCERNING STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND CONVERSATIONS WI TH PRESENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF SOME OF THE CLOSED CITIES HAVE PROVIDED INSIGHTS INTO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SYSTEMS OF CONTROL OVER INFORMATION ARE USED TO SUPPLEMENT SECURITY MEASURES THE SYSTEMS SURROUNDING THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AT TOMSK-7 AND KRASNOYARSK - 26 PROVIDE A GOOD EXAMPLE FUEL IS LOADED AND UNLOADED INTO FROM THE REACTORS BY A SPECIAL CORPS OF TECHNICIANS A COMPLETELY SEPARATE GROUP OPERATES THE REACTORS AND A THIRD GROUP PROCESSES THE FUEL AFTER IRRADIATION THE WORKERS WHO OPERATE THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO KNOW THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE FUEL ELEMENTS IN THE REACTORS THEY OPERATE SIMILARLY THE WORKERS WHO PROCESS THE SPENT FUEL TO SEPARATE THE PLUTONIUM FROM OTHER ELEMENTS DO NOT KNOW EITHER THE EXACT SECRET SECRET MOSCOW 32874 10 OF 13 161354Z PAGE 03 COMPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL FUEL OR THE EXACT CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT WAS PROCESSED IN THE REACTOR DUE TO THESE GAPS IN INFORMATION NO WORKER OR SINGLE GROUP OF WORKERS KNOWS EXACTLY HOW MUCH PLUTONIUM URANIUM ETC SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR EXTRACTION FROM THE SPENT FUEL WHAT EACH GROUP DOES KNOW HOWEVER IS THAT THE FSK-RUN SECURITY FORCE HAS ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO CALCULATE THE ACTUAL QUANTITY OF MATERIALS FINALLY EXTRACTED FROM PROCESSED FUEL SUCH CALCULATIONS CAN BE COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL QUANTITIES RECOVERED DURING THE PROCESSING OF THE IRRADIATED FUEL THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR THE CONTROL OF MORE THAN JUST NUCLEAR MATERIALS EACH GROUP INVOLVED IN THE CREATION OF PLUTONIUM STOCKPILES KNOWS IT MUST FOLLOW DIRECTIONS EXACTLY OR RISK BEING CAUGHT THE HISTORY 41 THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE MIS - MATCH BETWEEN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED RUSSIAN MPC A SYSTEMS AND THE CURRENT THREAT CLIMATE IS OF MORE THAN ACADEMIC INTEREST ANYONE HOPING TO ENGAGE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA SHOULD REMEMBER THAT RUSSIAN MPC A SYSTEMS WERE ON THE WHOLE VERY CAREFULLY DESIGNED BY HIGHLY QUALIFIED EXPERTS TO RESPOND TO THE THREAT CLIMATE WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY EXPERTS FEEL UNJUSTLY ATTACKED AND TEND TO REACT NEGATIVELY BY CUTTING OFF DISCUSSIONS WHEN OUTSIDE OBSERVERS MAKE SECRET SECRET PAGE 04 MOSCOW 32874 10 OF 13 161354Z STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT RUSSIAN SYSTEMS FOR MPC A ARE POORLY DESIGNED GIVEN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT A MORE CORRECT AND LESS CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENT IS THAT RUSSIAN MPC A SYSTEMS NEED TO BE UPDATED TO MORE EFFECTIVELY PROTECT AGAINST NEW THREATS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED ONLY RECENTLY 42 AT THE TIME RUSSIAN EXPERTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION DEVELOPED THE SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT ARE STILL IN USE TODAY THEY PROCEDED BASED UPON SEVERAL ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT WHICH ARE NO LONGER VALID KNOWLEDGE OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS CAN HELP UNDERSTAND WHY RUSSIA ' S SYSTEMS OPERATE THE WAY THEY DO KEY ASSUMPTIONS -WERE -- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES REPRESENTED THE SOURCE OF THE PRIMARY THREAT TO WEAPONS NUCLEAR MATERIALS THIS AMERICAN THREAT INCLUDED BOTH AN INTELLIGENCE ASPECT -- ATTEMPTS TO STEAL SOVIET NUCLEAR SECRETS -- AND A PHYSICAL ASPECT -- POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO STEAL OR SABOTAGE SOVIET NUCLEAR STOCKPILES FACILITIES UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET UNCLASSIFIED NNNNPTQ0051 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 INFO LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W MOSCOW ACDA- 17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC - 00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 32874 11 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 PTQ0051 161355Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ------ -- -- - -------88EOOO R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5566 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 CEQ - 00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161420Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 UNCLASSIFIED SECRET MOSCOW 32874 11 OF 13 PAGE 02 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161355Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA --DUE TO THE NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY THERE WAS NO DOMESTIC BLACK MARKET FOR STOLEN NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN ADDITION THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TIGHTLY CLOSED GREATLY REDUCING THE CHANCE THAT A THIRD COUNTRY OR A TERRORIST GROUP WOULD ATTEMPT TO TARGET SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS -- PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS NUCLEAR MATERIALS NEEDED FOR THE CREATION OF A NUCLEAR WARHEAD WERE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND MONITORED THEY COULD NOT GENERALLY TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE CLOSED SECRET CITIES WHERE THEY WORKED EVEN THOSE FEW WHO COULD TRAVEL EITHER WITHIN RUSSIA OR IN RARE INSTANCES ABROAD KNEW THAT SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES WORKED ALONG SIDE THEM AT ALL TIMES AND TRACKED BOTH THEM AND THEIR FAMILIES THE THREAT OF CERTAIN AND SEVERE RETRIBUTION VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WORKERS WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS -- PERSONS WITH ACCESS TO THE MOST SENSITIVE MATERIALS WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM FOR EXAMPLE WERE KEPT SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 MOSCOW 32874 11 OF 13 1 61355Z UNCLASSIFIED RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM ONE ANOTHER INFORMATION FLOWS CONCERNING THE PROCESSING AND USE OF THESE MOST SENSITIVE MATERIALS WERE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED IN ORDER TO GUARD AGAINST ANY PRESUMABLY U S -INSPIRED CONSPIRACY TO DIVERT STEAL OR DAMAGE NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR THE SECRETS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM UNCLASSIFIED 43 THE FACT THAT THE FSK IS STILL IN CHARGE OF SECURITY AT THE CLOSED CITIES IS AN INDICATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH OLD THINKING STILL PERMEATES MODERN RUSSIA THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICE CONTROLS SECURITY BECAUSE THE THREAT IS PRESUMED TO FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHILE FSK OFFICIALS APPEAR QUITE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING SECURITY AT RUSSIAN FACILITIES AGAINST DOMESTIC CRIMINALS THEIR FUNDAMENTAL FOCUS IS STILL ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING THE USG 44 THE LEVEL OF CONTROL -- AND THE USE OF STATE TERROR TO EXERT CONTROL -- IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE OVER STATED THIS USE OF TERROR SHAPED THE SECURITY AND THREAT ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH OFFICIALS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION DESIGNED SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO USE ANY LEVEL OF TERROR TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM INSIDE RUSSIA'S CLOSED CITIES MANY SCIENTISTS ARE ONLY JUST NOW BEGINNING TO MENTION THE NAMES OF COLLEAGUES WHO DISAPPEARED SOMETIMES TOGETHER WITH THEIR ENTIRE SECRET SECRET PAGE 04 MOSCOW 32874 11 OF 13 161355Z FAMILY THE PRESUMPTION WAS ALWAYS THAT THE PERSON HAD BEEN SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES MANY STORIES AND EVEN BITS OF BLACK HUMOR DEAL WITH THE HEAVY HAND OF THE KGB AND WITH SECURITY IN THE SYSTEM OF CLOSED NUCLEAR CITIES Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECRET NNNNPTQ0055 PTQ0055 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC-00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-Ol EPAE-00 059W 32874 12 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 161355Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 ------------------88E012 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00 161421Z 38 UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-OO BI UNCLASSIFIED R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5567 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN-1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET MOSCOW 32874 12 OF 13 PAGE 02 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161355Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA Bl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Bl Bl I TERROR WAS A L- T -o -o L ---cT HA - - T-W A - S- u s E D- N o- T -- O- - N L 'Y -- T ' - o -- P R - 0 - T E - c T --- S ECRETS AND MATERIALS IT WAS EVEN USED AS A MOTIVATION TECHNIQUE WITH THE THREAT OF TERROR SO CONSTANT IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE WHY SECURITY FORCES DID NOT FEEL THAT SPECIFIC TECHNICAL MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST INDIVIDUAL MALFEASANCE BY NUCLEAR WORKERS WAS NEEDED THE FUTURE 48 THE ACTIONS OF THE GOR OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLEARLY INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE RECOGNIZES THAT NUCLEAR SECURITY IS A PROBLEM AND IS TAKING STEPS TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION OFFICIALS FROM THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG GOSATOMNADZOR THE FSK THE MVD THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL LOCAL POLICE NUCLEAR INSTITUTES AND EVEN INDIVIDUAL NUCLEAR WORKERS HAVE ALL COMMENTED BOTH IN THE PRESS AND TO U S OFFICIALS ON PRESIDENT YELTSIN ' S COMMITMENT TO INSURING THAT RUSSIA LIVES UP TO ITS RESPONSIB IL ITIES TO CONTROL NUCLEAR MATERIALS WHILE MANY INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN SECURITY CAN BE IMPLEMENTED A LACK OF FUNDING WI LL IMPEDE PROGRESS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE COMMENTING ON THE DIFFICULT PROCESS OF CONVINCING A RANGE OF POWERFUL MINISTRIES AND GOVERNMENT BODIES TO AGREE ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA UNCLASSIFIED THE GOSATOMNADZOR OFFICIAL WHO LED A INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORMED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO EXAMINE THE SECRET SECRET PAGE 04 MOSCOW 32874 12 OF 13 161355Z MATTER TOLD ESTOFF THAT IN THE END THE ONLY PROBLEM WHICH COULD NOT BE RESOLVED WAS FUNDING 49 U S EXPERTS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY HAVE VISITED A VARIETY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES OVER THE PAST YEAR BASED ON ROUGH GUESTIMATES FROM THESE EXPERTS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FUNDING NEEDED IS HUGE PROBABLY IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN COMPARING SYSTEMS OBSERVED IN RUSSIA TO THOSE IN PLACE IN THE U S MORE THAN ONE EXPERT HAS COMMENTED THAT THE ANNUAL BUDGET FOR OPERATING SYSTEMS EVER AFTER THEY ARE INSTALLED COULD EXCEED ONE BILLION DOLLARS 50 THE INDIVIDUAL PRIORITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A LACK OF FUNDING WITH BUDGETS TIGHT ALL AROUND DEVOTING SCARCE RESOURCES TO FIXING OLD PROBLEMS IS NOT ALWAYS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AT MINATOM IN PARTICULAR THERE IS A STRONG TENDENCY TO DEVOTE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO KEEPING EXISTING PROGRAMS -- CIVILIAN COMMERICAL AS WELL AS WEAPONS - - FUNCTIONING IN THE HOPE HOWEVER UNREALISTIC THAT FUNDING LEVELS WILL SOMEDAY RETURN SECRET UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED NNNNPTQ0063 PTQ0063 SECRET PAGE 01 ACTION OES-09 MOSCOW INFO ACDA-17 OASY-00 H-01 NRRC - 00 SNP-00 SNIS-00 LOG-00 CFE-00 HHS-01 ADS-00 P-01 EPAE-00 059W 32874 13 OF 13 ACDE-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 NSAE-00 SP-00 NISC-01 161355Z AID-01 DS-00 INR-00 OIC-02 SS-00 SSD-01 ------------------88E017 R 161353Z NOV 94 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5568 INFO USEU BRUSSELS USMISSION USVIENNA AMEMBASSY BONN DIRFBI WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NRC WASHDC DOE WASHDC AMAD-01 EB-01 I0-16 PA-01 T-00 PMB-00 CEQ-00 EUR-01 L-01 PM-00 USIE-00 DSCC - 00 161423Z 38 S E C R E T SECTION 13 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874 STATE FOR ACDA GOODBY PM NE EUR RPM AND EUR ISCA CAST DOE FOR S-1 BERLS NN - 1 LUONGO NN-42 ROONEY AND P0-70 NRC FOR OIP WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC STERN AND OSTP VON HIPPEL SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED CIAE-00 OIG0-01 MC0-01 PRS-01 ASDS-01 G-00 PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 13 OF 13 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI USVIENNA FOR USVIE 161355Z E O 12356 DECL OADR TAGS PARM MNUC TRGY ASEC RS SUBJECT OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA TO PREVIOUS LEVELS IN ORDER TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR ITS GROWTH PLANS PLANS WHICH INCLUDE MOVING TO A CLOSED FUEL CYCLE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND USING PLUTONIUM DERIVED FROM WEAPONS AS A CIVIL REACTOR FUEL MINATOM' S LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT IT MUST DENY THAT SECURITY IS A PROBLEM OTHERWISE IT MIGHT BE COMPELLED TO DIVERT SCARCE FUNDS FROM ITS DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS TO SECURITY PICKERING SECRET NNNN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED