j SECRET t-w cx RECORD OF A MEETING REAGAN AT CAMP BETWEEN DAVID ON 22 THE PRIME DECEMBER MINISTER 1984 AT AND 1030 PRESIDENT HOURS Present Prime Mr Minister C D President Powell Mr The Prime famous election kept most would Minister victory of the team ensure been a good So mmer P congratulated President and expressed her pleasure Reagan President although Rea an agreed some people on his that he had from his first Administration continuity idea Reagan This that it had had thought differently President had an exciting grateful said over The Prime than other Soviet amount not stick that the Prime the past few days particularly kind of Russian considerable did time for an account Mr Gorbachev unusual co mmented Reagan Minister He was leaders of charm to prepared statements easily him which in her experience would He had a delightful wife The Prime Gorbachev Soviet who over Union had applied lunch to leave Minister President Rea an did she had made sign of the weakness offend that had received clear points other that of the Soviet SECRET raised with Soviet permission that system from 89 per cent The Prime to Gorbachev He she had tackled she did not believe not either he He had a authority of emigration had claimed said that that to have on the subject Gorbachev The Prime continued with was an but was able to discuss He was prepared Minister with in what she had met He spoke be that Gorbachev less constrained whom had He would of her meeting said and debate leaders Minister of those to do so this Minister in her view to have the continued it was a to keep SECRET 2 people in She had also Soviet Union had been interference that in internal very quick Co mmunists in British discussion had moved Gorbachev had made decentralisation the economic Minister society was limitation spoken The Prime the Western there said was from succeed Alliance Union and the West for instance the avoidance in order that that balance and task had been to persuade in wanting the President arms a detailed had told in the Soviet but had part Gorbachev Union any in trying way Britain special They was part of ties with the that the of co mmon interests and the Each must must powers and it had been she there of a free that no-one it in good confidence meant and armaments the essence a number in The Prime government of conflict to build which interested on to suggest shared in Their and was not just that But she had gone us of some had very said had replied in favour States was for system before point We also Soviet sincere that United It was States to security no the United contacts fashion Union support She thought But he had taken Britain never in this sort of economic that of central miners Minister in Hungary she had replied Minister that powers itself Prime to do with pursued not delegation for him divide would that being the Soviet Gorbachev he was of government of government explicitly to that the a case of the on Soviet unions that to striking The are nothing plain to Gorbachev salutary about on to the Soviet reforms said which Gorbachev trade your Co mmunists effect this was affairs tackled him the fact assistance that to complain she had also with supplying Rea an co mmented President always raised improvement side was be a balance entitled of forces be verifiable Her main Gorbachev that States reductions The account the United Prime Minister of her remarks said Rea an said to Gorbachev Followed GroTy co 2erceived in that was very talking the thems to Soviet es Mr that what much on the same Gromyko Union 7 o be and ender the threat SECRET the Prime to Gorbachev He had Jni ed from Minister lines out States each -he_ had as he had pointed other was gave on this point President of to an 1 SECRET 3 therefore needed better off with discuss was to exploit now trying a propaganda that Reagan he wished to explain on present the weapons He had therefore find a weapon The question ought Ballistic Joint Missile elimination 'rotection nuclear United of weapons States at the service this Research attainable be ready to date He wished not violating had He saw negotiations proceeding in parallel with and verifiable equal long-term goal The Prime President She had the Russians Minister that through 'Jeen the first to acquire She to SECRET for th it so that it his goal was the United its research research But States nuclear These that the ac s s rt it was his she agreed had weap should entirely with as programm weapons to go ahead this lead also offer were in offensive that wo If the SDI concep that reductions said right Gorbachev had indicated this This He had told Gromyko to get rid of nuclear had been told with than into it could to internationalise on reduction o this to obtain advantage to emphasise the ABM Treaty rather research It would intention n of people that successful of all countries At conducted such as Gadaffi hi it was possible agreed now being said Minister millions As a result It was not his he would Ii to was retaliate weapons had weapons some unilateral lost to walk SDI weapons other If it was nuclear in space intensity whether Staff was if some mad man succeeded was system notable killing destroy Defence having time round to the Prime the question of Reagan be planning Initiative meant to be studied be a defensive the with again nuclear Chiefs to on this point Defence that would people They might personally which asked the first be Gromyko Union issue of weapons speaking the only defence nuclear the Strategic would President the Soviet control negotiations President thinking with on arms advantage out of the Geneva the world to this goal that his fear was that battle gain o effect the propaganda He had weapo ns and challenged no nuclear how to give continued o statemen t that to Chernenko's referred mu tual confidence to establish research pointed out wire ASAT an on the to him capaoil ry I that SECRET 4 and that they must believed that the Russians on lasers ahead risk and directed the Americans However energy In practice neutralise suggested looking with weapons further the deployment she believed or overwhelm that The meeting ahead continue She also research hey were If they-were' to get would be put at she foresaw of Ballistic it would it extensive balance such a system that they should in a wider to match had been doing in this area the strategic difficulties point expect grave Missile Defence be too easy to President their Rea an discussion on this circle ended at 1115 hours 0 22 December VSCAEU 1984 SECRET z SECRET t RECORD OF A MEETING REAGAN AT CAMP BETWEEN DAVID ON TH 22 PRIME D EMBER MINISTER 1984 AT AND 1120 PRESIDENT HOURS Present Prime HM Minister President Ambassador Mr F E R Mr C D Washington Vice Butler Reagan President Secretary Powell of Ambassador Bush State Shultz Price Mr Macfarlane Mr swi-as Burt Mr Sommer o Strate is Defence President the Prime the Union itself Minister gave Reagan continued that she agreed essential to pursue system decision But research if this had to be made very difficult would OP_ was not limited consiste in with 1 time nor with He quoted t the the SECRET from a of mankind 1967 that Missile to Defence and deploy ABM Outer She it was the point arise 1972 of disputes Reagan to produce wi arsenals Mr Gorbachev reached the of such of her report with would it to to destroy on a Ballistic problems research owed way to settle research why we have weapons President whether either We nuclear threaten an account reasons pursue States when on her discussions in space not they the of weapons the United that President BMD should as the existing we have to find a better The Prime her SDI Eisenhower power to States the world and from President such destructive explained Initiative to rid on his t8te- 2i-tote with briefly the United possibilities the Soviet letter had Defence generation destructive He that Strategic present both Rea an reported Minister he had decided on Initiative where a weapons Deployment T earu Space wh i _ T r eaty SFCPFT 2 The former in particular and of existing would mean arms control talks perceived weapons negotiations concept to result effect that the and of tocounter Minister of BMD on existence conventional peace There was a risk the doctrine conventional ition from deterrence this there system could be strike Moreover This were any system would make The Prime would have effect were wide of the mark to pre-empt decisions showed was risk and what that the arms West even actually control would find more risk of trans- a BMD Otherwise 11 A pre-emptive option I triggering not be fully 9 be happy in a position stories to this be a mistake the results wrong-footed the attractive She would it would would undermine difficult Press Equally SECRET out on automatic States negotiations itself an period risky in which to find herself possible period knocked of BMD on the SDI until would particularly ways o system The that we might aspects of the United a BMD become to rely She did not want of war or would acknowledged unprecedented increase be was nuclear an would technical management more that and would of systems to learn were was fact both destabilising overwhelmed of all the technical at odds with be defence informed if a weapons The prevented Europe biological BMD Minister had deployment would a host crisis offensiv consideration deterrence brought or countered against of deterrence to be tragic of nuclear that another that one of far more that arms control It would weapons had chemical Beyond first nuclear and to acquire them doctrine war mean stage if the Soviet itending on acquiring This would continued of at an early were the reduction of the a partial existing was of BMD to be re-negotiated Her fear was that States of deterrence Deployment itself to failure increase particularly of have insist it doomed objective in an The Prime in Geneva they would were whose the would that the United a BMD capability of the doctrine arrangements of SDI was likely to present in the US Soviet nuclear a keystone that both Treaties The issue Union was of research there was a serious reach with deadlock public rapidly opinion o SECRET 3 President working on the SDI had deemed acknowledged Prime Rea an said that had raised would of the points depend He recognised production and deployment would on what came up with - In addition earlier mind to the arguments put forward would practical their impose limit people expenditure was another making weapons superiority to have it States The United But equally it would The fact was that seeking Carter any counter President Reagan international winter realisation them to see the SDI in a more ro achieve the nuclear not allow weapons adequate For for offensive instance without Union scientists had joined the risk of nuclear weapons He believed of such use would favourable light with available Union the United the Bl bomber deterrence currently they the Soviet years nuclear of the consequences would which Defence in recognising that push to join the United from the Soviet from the use of offensive possible effort that Russian community could was not seeking to cancel continued had to be a to face defence in recent concession in his The Russians disarming had agreed he had the United Government Missile States many had mentioned There they prefer Ballistic had been unilaterally President Union the massive Or would into account up with the road of austerity 11 V choices Were they ready than on of the SDI which keeping the the scientists consideration to how far the Soviet in substituting nuclear which on the Soviet far greater already States the there in favour down face difficult were which which that decisions need a to take the Prime Minister that was the strain States o to many who were forward ' ' He going eventually of the difficulties is it worth that the answers Minister the scientists bring It would be only one third to each of side VN The Prime position that inited points West of was not Soviet States on which seeking she wanted between unfounded superiority into to BMD pursue SECRET to work use publicly Britain There she and President research similarly that she could of a split on the issue were several light said on the SDI which suggestions States the Minister but it was research out a to make clear and the United seemed Reagan to be were balance that necessary to pres agreed for e rve in th the SECRET If 4 balance but it was only did not contravene research any treaty feasible obligations to be negotiations nuclear with Shultz than the Prime time of Russians ABM Union and many While even though it was had deployed phased in defence offensive strength would had pointed be He did existed offensive and would United that BMD would out that Prime of offensive deterrence remained undermine it risk be intercepted There was thus on equa the United Minister acknowledged to eliminate doubt so if suchill and destroyed strength a good o the argument BMD weapons Her that s _ - at argument SDI O e SECRET Despite recent that that BMD would Minister conce7l'L 7e on a she believed fear was the Prime e but pointed put a premium on the doctrine vital said this also 61 be deterrence of BMD would _sumotlon be in not be sure how many of retain crl_lc_ would not necessarily retaliatory Mr Macfarlane and to the Prime But even could o the had invested that The would Moscow had relied what Minister casting p would which States this Union the notion round Union defence not dispute the than had now moving The Soviet on at being had dropped radar was a real wider assumed weans system array a BMD system enhance statements _- on behind rather expected therefore would strike easoneJ There missiles deployment pre-emptive s sd should by the ABM Treaty were the United the Soviet not know States The left out that tiht their while States They of the ABM Treat y not offensive a defensive of a large heavily I were permitted construction system talks went reductions the United it water when of treaty The conditions SALT more modernised violation the problem suggested subsequently t States in view and this reached on the reduction of the major had acquired of defence that Treaty Instead foreseen Soviet have were in the meantime Union said Minister the fulfilled been would involved weapons Secretar the the Soviet was if the stage BMD appeared be renewed there which de fir had made Buy once 003 Oll_d some _L'On SECRET 5 endure Analysis it was true We simply Soviet Union mobile strategic upset to it disadvantage There were various States offensive the last United States was to negotiate Minister itself to weapgis Mr defence existed Nonetheless acquisition of BMD could could the risk change had to say that remarkable of The Prime could easily strides might One had also be cheaper defence systems capability the to acquire that this he did not think enhancing them positions that were that a space - based deterrence Secretary a first a 3_MJ system - n soul i e a-so oe a ac kn ow edge SECRET He including only their in recent of trade-offs It was trying would greatly Macfarlane between system continued the British The United could recognised f e-c t deploymen 'a _i ect3 State contribute that ilegoat0n h a- the said that States extensive or It in the Minister Mr they i had to acquire the differences ma __ r strike be overwhelmed the United defence Shult calculus Minister Union image Equally against to put up partial The Prime very to be that no perfec with such suggestion public of possible defence the costs States was that Any was had been made for the Soviet of this the Alliance's believed Soviet than superiority and American cf for the United to overwhelm implication weaken to consider this The purpose technology of space-based non-nuclear systems survivability some of which had become known months Union for the the strategic uncertainties that a BMD system was acknowledged he agreed be about that the question thus add to deterrence suggested option whether Macfarlane and opinion But the Soviet was any absolute nuclear The But this side could seriously third discover there risk and its allies interjected was whether balance to sell to public The of the West systems option four years SDI offensive the preferred to defend into in the face of this more the the end of the century on each no willingness during was a risk that systems had shown of what in the development before and hard This was ' increasing o well build reduced that full details and find the strategic options morally Alternatively answered There by surprise could was difficult x The Prime led one to ask whether did not have weapons be taken research proposition was up to for instance might United o of this the i o _n of the SECRET 6 United States' de-stabilising negotiation Prime strategy the strategic with Minister to stable the Soviet shared Shultz to make was that nuclear systems both offensive whether unless risked it was done But he hoped the po iat which by enhancing the in that the could contribute were reduced be operative said that Minister impression she could to defend against of a split in the Alliance to draw subsequent would and used by the Prime approve Minister asked was that that press The if missiles again use at her the President Minister emphasised ask her officials It cou themselves Cruise answer trying of America to deterrence The Prime the short he had been survivability contribute forces She would approved said a capability any she hoped defence that defence with The Prime which Union sides Mr Macfarlane issue balance the view BMD could BMD would to avoid space-based deterrence Secretar leave towards it would she was anxious on this up a statement conference text which subsequently is attached to this record 0 SECRET