V 0 1 SYSTEM II THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON November 3 l986 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER g osa At my meeting with Ge eral Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik Iceland on October 1986 we wer bl to reach a series of understandings that Will serve as the foundation for future progress in a number of areas With respect to nuclear arms control matters the common ground that exists between positions of the two sides was substantially expanded in both the START and INF areas A path toward progress was also uncovered in the area of nuclear testing However as we neared the end of the time allotted for our second day of discussions the General Secretary placed great emphasis on the Soviet need for the United States to agree not to exercise its xisting right to-Withdraw from the ABM 5 ears At the same tions on some aspects of our SDI p rag_that go well the existing treaty restrictions He ltimately t 9 further progress at that meeting those areagi tanding which we h' Usgwilling 5e such a commitment hened ABMwith respeCt to a otential path to he General I did not intend to Therefore I pol jpart we would illing to consider 'did not demand 0 that we compromise our fundam l principles an security and that of our allies or our hopes for a more stable future through a transition to an increased reliance on defenses that threaten no one U Further I made it clear that I believed that we should make progress in each substantive arms control area based on the individual merits of the understandings reached in that area We should not hold the potential increased mutual benefits to security and stability ievable by such gress hostage to either side's desires 'ther areas of_ ssion U With respect to thegspecific Soviet demand a US commitment not to exercise ogr egisting right twithd w from the ABM Treaty I explai d at a blanke 1 mm meat to waive all rights of withdrawal woulyp be acceptabl 5 that any US attempt to meet Soviet concerns in this regard should apt be interpreted by the Soviet Union as US readiness to for it ts existing right to withdraw from the AB gTre ty due to supreme ational interest or in the face of materi breach of the t at by a party U ernh a aaes Declassify on OADR WES F94 #37 MARIE Date Therefore as an attempt to see if I could find a way to respond to the General Secretary s concern inga manner that met the criteria outlined above I reviewed the various elements of the previous US proposals to see if they could be reformulated in a novel way so as to meet both US an Sq iet doncerns As a result of this effort I offered the followrng initial proposal which laid out the conditions under which I was prepared to consider meeting the basic thrust of the Soviet request U Both sides would ag ee to confine themselves to research development and testing which is perm gted by the ABM Treaty for a period of 5 years through 1991 during which time a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved This being done both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five year period As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace the same restrictions will continue to apply At the end the ten-year pe bd with all offensive ballist missiles elimin either side would the following Soviet The USSR and 7 Un ted States tags for ten years not to exercise their sting right oi wi hdrawal from the ABM Treaty which'iSiof nlimited duration and during that period strictly serve all it J'sions The testing in space of all pa components o mi ile defense is prohibited except search and te tin conducted in laboratories Wi the first fivewyears of the ten-year period and thus through 1991 the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent During the following five years of that period the remaining 50 percent of the two sides strategic offensive arms shall be reduced Thus by the end of 1996 the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated w U learly unacceptahge in a number of ave the US accept restrictions on This Soviet proposal wag respects It sought b research on advanced def nses well beyg d those specified in the existing ABM Treaty Itiredefined the conditions for the subsequent five ear per od to inv ve the elimination of all strategic forces and the ovigt Union And it did not include a positive mmi ment that l owing the ten-year period either side cbul then begin th transition to increased reliance on advanced ef hses U ens-T ur ftl CID LA Having evaluated the Soviet offer I again attempted to find an appropriate bridge between the Us and Soviet positions In this effort I tried to uSe as_much as possible of the Soviet proposal The result waSche following second US offer which was designed to correbt the key problems associated with the Soviet proposal while making it clear that ithhis Context the US was prepared to meet what was%perceived to b the central Sbviet concern by an appropr ately limited US commitment not to ekercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1996 for the purpose of deploying advanced defenses It was this US offer which was the US gf er of record when ghe discussions ended without further agreem nt l U The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty which is of unlimited duration and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research development and testing which are permitted by the ABM Treaty Within the first five years of the ten-year period end thus through l991 the strategic offensive arms of th two sides shall h reduced by 50 of that period Eliminating All OffenSd Ballistic Missilesgs At the heart of the last US proposal made at Reykjavik i the expressed US commitment to join a a la ral agreement delay any deployment of US and Soviet advanced defenses against bailistic missiles until after the elimination of all US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles with this US commitment made in return for a corresponding Soviet commitment to join a parallel bilateral agreement to complete this elimination within a specific period of time The ten year period of the US proposal was associated with the period through 1996 because I will not permit the possibilitg of the US moving to a more stable deterrent unilateraIIy if need be to slip further into the future This specific tenryear period as chosen to balance the Soviet desire to have the US commitm nt not to deploy defenses for as long as possible against theg s desire to find an appropriate means of WW was eliminating the currently posedgby offensive ballistic missiles as The elimination of IE offensive bal is ic missiles is not a new objective for the In l983 when I announced the establishment of the SDI program I did So with the specific objective of making offenSive ballistic missiles obsolete It was examined as a part of our review and response to the r1 5 1 an mm we IJVEQ proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev in January 1986 which went beyond this to call for the_total elimination of all nuclear weapons within the next 14 years In short it is an objective that we have studied and discussed both within the US government and with our allies moSt recently in the deliberations that led to my July 25 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev In the preparations for that letter I initially focused on my desire to make a concretefproposal which would formalize my offer to share the benefits of advanced defense with the Soviet Union should our research into such defenses meet the objectives that we have set However When considering this idea the Secretary of Defense correctly pointed out that it made little sense to commit to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union insisted on continuing to retain large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles which would in turn attempt to defeat our defenses After discussion and study by my principal advisors it was agreed that the new US proposal should contain a specific call fer a plan for the eiimination of all offensive ballistic missiges Therefore my July 25 letter to the General Secretary L framed to incorporate this objective key element of the new US proposal presented in that letter After full consulty on With our allies on this and the other elements of the pea osal to be contained in this correspondence I finalized and Sf he Letter IQ 53 Additionally the obj ctiye of the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles'is consistent with what we have been trying to do for some time both in START and in INF and also with the fundamental goal that I specifically set for the SDI program U With respect to the START negotiations our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security neither side needs fast flying non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose From the very first in START we have been trying to draw a clear distinction between fast flying ballistic systems which are uniquely suited for an attempted first-strike by an aggressor and slow flying systems which are better suited for deterrence through the prospect of retaliation As a result we have been attempting focus on reductions in ballistic missile warheads whigh also are an area of Soviet advantage as the heart of the isspg to be resolved g'andihave addressed restrictions on slow flying systems largely as means to meet Soviet concerns siUlh In the INF negOtiatiOns we have taken a similar position We have kept the focus on missiles and avoided discussion of dual-capable tactical aircraft We proposed the zero-zero solution for the LRINE missile problem We have called for the similar reduction and elimination of shortertrange ballistic rer s-seam Jn 731771 f 172$ a 1 1 i ji 1 1 5 missiles missiles that pose as direct a threat to our Allies and our forces deployed in support of those allies as Soviet ICBMs do to the United States a With respect to the Strategic defense Initiative my specific stated goal has always been5 make ballistic-missiles obsolete Here again our focus has been oh eliminating the threat posed by these fast flying missiles U In Iceland at the critical point of attEmpt ng to find a response to Soviet congerns which would he ompromise our principles our security or our future I drew upon previously COmpleted work with respect to the objective of eliminating the threat posed by offensive ballistic missiles and I incorporated this objective into my response to the Soviet call for a ten year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty By doing so we undercut any Soviet objection to our having the right to deploy defenses as insurance since we would have committed to_delay until all offensive ballistic missiles of the two superpowers should have been eliminated By calling for the elimination of offensive ballistic miSSiles of all ranges also in one step addressed the problem' liminating bot'i last 100 Soviet SS-ZO warheads in Amg a concern of on allies and the remaining shorterer hge missiles a 11 would threaten our European all pafticular our German allies An Alternative Futures Should the SOViets offered in Reykjavik we would face a future than that we anticipate today At th end of the ten-year period specified in the foer neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would is any offensive b fistic missiles When adequate advanced defenses are deploys they should provide insurance against the return or covert retention of such missiles and guard against third country ballistic missiles Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces although smaller than today and of a different composition would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring US and allied security U With respect to strategic forces by the end of 1996 the United States and SovietEynion could retaind percent of today s stra' gic nuclear offen ve forces These forces would consist of bombers and cruise missiles Since the major forces of_the ited States and Soviet Union wouldgbe covered by agr ments@ hat would reduce these forces to egualglevels unli gthesi fuation today these forces should pf yidaia sufficient rategiqgretaliatory capability to deter attack on the Uni deta es or its allies while eliminating the crisis stability inherent in the short time of flight'ballistic missiles f A the same time elimination of ballistic missiles on both si es would drastically at a a reduce the Soviet first strike potential and to the extent Soviet fears of a US first strike are genuinely felt would alleviate such concerns 3 With respeCt to bur commitment to NATOE the remaining strategic nuclear systemsiwould also prqyidgithe US nuclear umbrella over NATO which-has been one o gth pillars of NATO's strategy for decades Net only would t b US commitment to NATO's agreed strategy as embodied in MC 14 3 re sin but the elimination of the bailistic missile th ea 0 the United States and to NATO should ingyugge the both NATO's ability to execute itsi trategy and the commitment to use nuclear weapons if necessary in accordance with that strategy in support of the alliance U The United States presently contributes to all legs of the triad conventional forces non strategic nuclear forces and strategic forces That contribution would continue Nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons on dual capable aircraft would continue to fill the twin deterrent roles of helping offset Soviet conventional supe strategic forces Thu or accelerate cur ht ATO initiativ capability it wil pbe equ future to keep spLe non-strategic y_ maintain the deterr set forth in MC 14 3 the NATO strategy With respect Defense I itiative SDI program it is clear ha the alternativ ifuture that such an agreement would provi he requiremenyw at SDI would have to meet would be alteredi' tantially nap ments of advanced defenses against ballistic missiles could be sized to provide the insurance that we need against both any existing or potential third country threats and against the covert retention of ballistic systems by the Soviet Union Even if ballistic missiles were covertly retained only certain elements of such systems could be covertly tested boosters under the guise of space launch systems It would be extremely difficult covertly to test offens' p ballistic missili' as integrated combat systems in a sur ' e-to surface mod 'n such an environment Therefog onfidence in t e a erall reliability of such systems would Qggrade over time gglsoggwithout the ability to conduct develop ntal iesting of new offensive ballistic missile system having to constantly stay ahead of a istic missile threat may also be greatl reducgd ize complexity and technological difficulty pf fielding a li rily meaningful defensive system agai sti ny residual bailij ic missile threat will be substantiallY different If th roposal were accepted and implemented these factor reduced to the alternative forces to deter and to res ggp i riuiur - -N pp a A L v 4 i w point that even based on the progress made in SDI to date there would be little question that a scaledrdown defense will be adequate and feasible under those future conditions U We can consider the possibility bore limited requirements for defense if ballistic missiles are ciualiy eliminated On the other hand even if the Soviets were to accept the proposal that I made in ReykjaVik fwe will continue to need the leVerage and protection produced by the possibility of being able to develop a system capable pf handling a more extensive and evolving offensive bai tic threat Uiiagi Deterrence in such a future The basic concept of deterrence in such an alternative future need not be altered Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes so uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack This would require that we possess a mix of military forces including those nuclear and conventional forces providing defensive and capabilities that the viets will view to deny them their pol and militar In short deterrenge of aggression is phieved by maximizing an aggressor's unb rtainty that he -a ye political objectives by forg ndg he certaint that he will face grave risk to things tha vagues most shb ld ftry Certainly the tools for maintaininqueterrence will Change The challenge and 3best to channel that The potential impact 5f eliminating ballistib missiles on deterrence The elimination of offensiV bailistic missiles offers the possibility of enhancing deterrence because the slower pace associated with the employment of bomber and cruise missile forces makes their effective use by an aggressor in a first strike much more difficult The effects of such an attempt are also much more uncertain At the same time it should be recognized that the certainty of the ability of the US to respond to a first strike with strategic forces which are not degraded by that attempted attack is onsiderably high 5 when both sides have only slow flying system These consideraf ns should be factored into eValuati of the militar ficiency of 99nd 9 a first strike U In today's world or in a future th mb dlds on today's trends ballistic missiles are uniquely suiteg p beiemployed by an aggressor with relatiVelf certain results ghe time between the detection of a ballistic missile its arrival is so short that it freezeSEthegsituation redycing the options of the 11mm mans hhmo bsouhmqs party attacked so that they can be largely anticipated by an aggressor Facing no defenses there can be little doubt that if ballistic missiles function reliably they will arrive on target Finally pre icting the spgcific levels of damage they can inflict on a target is largely'a matter of physics Their effectiveness does no depend on the sk il courage or training of men in the loop gt depends on the technological reliability of the system which can be tested and measured in peacetime U If such systems were eliminated the uncertainty in the mind of an aggressor must increase because of the loss of their unique characteristics Provided that we take steps to ensure that other forms of attack are not permitted to rebuild that certainty over time the result can be a significant net gain in terms of the quality of deterrence and in turn in our security and that of our allies In considering the requirements for maintaining deterrence in such a future world a high premium should be placed on identifying determining the feasibility of and taking such steps U eterrence In mess ring our ability to future we must keginto account the '4ution of our- n b llistic missiles and elative increasevz the degree of our 'dicting the effec Veness bf our retaliatory c ffail a he same time we must our measurements the contribution that rtainty makes in deterring an aggressor We should also consi the even more fundam ntal contribution that is made to our ourity should we face n aggressor who is not rational or findw imself placed in in irrational situation by events that have tt n beyond his cog but who is armed only with systems against which we can b lama reasonable defense should we choose to do so We must also weigh the real and immediate benefits of removing an immense existing threat to the United States that is literally only thirty minutes away Nor can we forget that unlike Soviet stated policy US strategic and nuclear forces are intended to make an explicitly identified contribution to the deterrence of conventional attack on our Allies and our forces de loyed in support of our Allies U Measuring the Impact on deter in an alternati elimination of the the corresponding uncertainty in pa strike should deter also properly reflec this same inherent In accomplishing this surement to the ent practical we should attempt to app anh the problem from the point of view of a net assessment ofgall dpnsiderationsginvolyed Our present analytic tools will fall Short of reSolving all the questions such an alternati future present Therefore until new methods adapted to tn challenges of this alternative future are fully develop dj ye will have to depend heavily on the experience eXpertise resourcefulness creativity and judgment of our professional military and defense community I believelthat this too plays into a significant aspect of our strength VKU 3 i7 L l Ml zdito L The Immediate Task Ahead At this time it is not clear whether the Soviet Union will have the wisdom to accept the US proposal which I made in Reykjavik The main fhrust of our national security planningdand military proggammihg should not be altered now in anticipatibn suph an uncefta ngpospibility In fact if we were prematurely to adjust our d rient military plans and programs for either the modernization o gour own ballistic missile forces or to limit the scope of pur SDI program the Soviet Union would certainly attempt to poch t these actions without a reciprocal on their p rti Unilateral action of this sort would be co hterproductive ind angerous It would not only reduce the likelihood of our convincing the Soviet Union to join us in the approach to a future elimination of offensive ballistic missiles contained in my Reykjavik proposals but it would also reduce our security and that of our allie U However I want to ensure that we are prepared to exploit fully and safely our proposal should the Soviet Union be willing to join us in its pursuit In order to do so the necessary foundation of detailed careful planning must be laid now Therefore I request the Joint Chiefs of Si f under direction of the Secretary of ther agencies as necessary to providw p an which would pe the US to safely transition to the awterna ive future I have proposed LET Renee and drawing_g 6 The nature of th pl n Thisi necessary nationalaa iuri y requireme implementation of th eg tiated elimin ballistic missiles'b y 7% at Reykjavik It shogldh ully take int 'acd unt the discussion of deterrence that I Have provided abovej Having done so it should propose programmatic and non-progra tic approaches -- including changes in4m Eary strategy an dttics force structure and posture and additional supportive arms control reduction initiatives -- which could be used to meet and fulfill those requirements The identification of multiple and competing approaches to meeting requirements is encouraged If alternative paths or methods exist they should be presented Finally the resource implications of all alternatives should be estimated and provided with the alternatives LGT loping this pla he following U Assum tions In d- assumptions should be' -- With resp to the 50 perc forces to be fig 1 be no subI mit 5 the 1 600 ce g mg onithe number Qf and 2 within the 5 000 ceiling assod ated with ballistic missile warheads air-launched cruise m ssiles and indirectly other hpmber weapons there will be no sublimit on reduptions in strategic vseach ALCM on a heavy bomber counts as one warhead C all the gravity bOmbs and SRAM on a single heavy bomber counts as one wajhead and will not be inc Wded in this number J21 The US and Soviet Union will eliminate all offensive parture point for planning ballistic missiles by 1996 As a de tic missiles should be applied to type of weapon the term offensive ballis ballistic missiles offallgranges and carrying 22X designed for use in a surface-to-surfaceimod Air-to-surface missiles that employ a ballistic trajectoryf hould not be tillery rounds and included Artillery rocket assisted ar should also not be included rocket assisted ASW systems Recommendations with respect to alternative or additional limitations on the term offensive ballistic missile are encouraged um -- While eliminating offensive ballistic missiles the cept of strategic nuclear United States will not abandon the con deterrence U They should he poses of the ncerning alternative a ballistic al ernatives should be ca be reviewed and if alanning -- The strategic -should be consideredsi critically reviewe development of th' formulations whib missile free world a provided as soon as poss considered anoro-riat activity It will continue% The NATO strategy embodied in MC 14 will remain in by the United Etates The current lear threshbl hrough conventional U effect and be fully supported NATO efforts to raisejthegnuc improvements will contin e cumin ungns blmm In hsauhmqs 1 Vi- Wm mescma ll For the purpose of this plan the total resources available to the Department of Defense will not exceed current planning levels with a rate of growth thereafter not to exceed three percent in real terms However the reorientation of priorities may be considered withinithose totals Should the JCS consider additional resources essential they should so indicate as an excursion to their baseline -- The military capabilities associated with this plan will be acquired under peaCetime non-mobilizatioh conditions Where this guideline constraints on our industrial capacity or constraints on non-fiscal resources ranging from availability of trained manpOWer to the availability of special nuclear materials impact upon achieving desired force levels this fact should be explicitly indicated with a clear identification of the governing constraint -- In Soviet acceptance of the proposals made in Reykjavik which would open the possibility of the projected alternative future in question the Soviet Union would aiso agree to monitoring as necessar permit effective verification of their compliance ii or implementing the tionipf ballistic missiles Union not act in accord ached the Unite tatgs could stop the tion process and Hak additional responses tepfalong the way withbut unacceptable reductions and elimig as necessary at any risk U Initial progress report In devel pip ithis plan an initial progress rePOrt should be submitted hot later than December 1 1986 wh'ch addresses the following -- initial recommendations if any with respect to national policy guidance and strategy for the employment of nuclear and non nuclear forces that should be considered in the development of such an plan -- an explanation 0$ the analytic methodology planned for evaluating risk and fo ieffectiveness in support of the development of the plan recognizing as mentioned earlier that military expertise and judgment will play a critically important role accomplishin he ovarall task- 1 -- a descriptioh of the initfgl basic planning assumptions that will be madewhoncerning friendly forces available during the period in question cbrresponding hostile fqrces critical missions to be accomplished and the general number and characteristics of the targets associated with these missions an SEER- developmentu -- a method for appropriately folding into this planning process the contribution of highly compartmented programs while maintaining their security and -- an estimate submitted for my approval of the date upon which this plan will be available for my final review r TS Issues to be addressed in the full plan The final completed plan should address at a minimum recommendations Qn the appropriate phasing of the elimination of US ballistic missiles by 1996 in the context of the US prOposal and those steps which we could take to ensure that the phasing of the elimination of Soviet ballistic missiles is accomplished in an appropriate manner and preferably in a manner advantageous to US and Allied security recommendations on Specific changes in strategic nuclear force employment strategy and related force structure made necessary by the elimination of both US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles 4 -- recommendations on similar changes in the associated strategy for the emploYment deplOYment and structural 55recommendations on additional general purpose capabilities that may be needed increased ASW capability -- recommendations on additional improvements in any area needed to ensure our strategic deterrent relative and our overall military capability to meet NATO and other alliance commitments are maintained recommendations 0n how we can best use technological advantage to implement competitive strategies in support of this plan a -- recommendations on how other existing arms control proposals including in the conventional area could be made more supportive of national security as a consequence of the elimination of ballistic missiles recommendations concerning how we can best address the US commitment to pursue in START limitations on with the Soviet Union in the contegt of this plan an Treatment of Risk In formulating fhei lternatives and making the assessments asSociated with this plan the objective of the baseline plan should be to hold overall levels of risk generally constant It is unlikely that the risk could be kept genuinely constant in the projected environment which will be continually changing over the ten-year period On the other hand every effort should be made to avoid even short periods of greatly increased risk and to remain within a band of acceptable risk using today's levels as the departure point U An appropriate methodology for measuring risk over the period being considered will be required to ensurefthis objective is met Sources of great st risk and uncertainty should be documented as they are identified and addresSed in the development of Alternatives thatixed ce risk at no significant cost can and should be included With the baseline plan Alternatives that reduce overall levelSiof military risk from current or anticipated levels as measured assuming currently planned or programmed forces and that significantly increase the cost or difficulty of achieving an executable baseline plan can also be jw considered and presented However these should be presented as excursions to the baseline plan U p5 Associated Taskings _It goes witho t saying that the assurance of effective verification is essential to our entering into the arms control agreements that are assumed as the backdrop for the above tasking Therefore the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence with the participation upon the assistance of other appropriate agencies shogld prepare a sgpporting plan which recommends a preferred path and alternafiye paths where appropriate for achieving the effective verification of the aSsumed arms control agreements U Additionally the Director of Central Intelligence should provide an assessment of the Soviet Union's intentions and capability both military and economic to satisfy its own national strategy and tegic force objec -- an assessmen capabilities of othe to monitor Soviet ham ltegnative future and to requirements Implementation The objective is the op ma executable plan with alternative appropriate h ch would permit me to move quickly to exp Oit any Soviet wilii the proposal involving the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within ten years which I made in Reykjavik This should be completed on a priority basis U Access to this NSDD and to the resulting products should be limited only to those with a clear need to know about and assist in the development of each individual product U FTW nn UP