_ _ _ 'J' 1 II_V' J g I 'I III II WJ lOll 0 C 05OS u UUl Y'- 'b t ' 24 Novembec 1987 MEMORANDUM r FOR The Vice President ' lsecretary of State Secretary of Defense Assistant to the President for National Security Affaics Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff I 3 S8 Today I have forwarded the attached Memorandum 'to the President The memo by Bob Gates briefly reviews Gorbachev's long-term strategy and the perspective with which he likely views the Summit I think you will find it interesting and useful ' --- _ I William H Webster Attachment j DEC 14tm _' o _ ----- ' __ -'- CL By 1 RVW OADR _ _ 880 - lhc Depu ' Director of Cenlr J1 Intelligence - - 174C C-' a I g - I 5 4t U c w uJ 'neOC1 0 c 20505 D 4 J -24 November 1987 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT ' Gorbachev's Gameplan The Long View 8 The December summit and INF Treaty are important for the Administration and for Gorbachev Yet while there is substantial uncertainty about the US strategy _ toward the USSR beyond 1988 Gorbachev's gameplanpotentially can be played out over a prolonged period -- thus giving him and the USSR a significant advantage His long range-strategy is an important backdrop for the Summit Understanding it essential to maintaining perspective during and after the 'r meeting and to identifyin both pitfalls and opportunities achieve ents Domestic Imperatives o There is general agreement among the Soviet leaders on the need to modernize their economy -- not so much for its own sake or to make Soviet citizens more prosperous but to strengthen the USSR at home to further their own personal po er and to permit the further consolidation and expansion of Soviet po er abroad They differ as to the pace of change and hether economic mode nization also requires a loosening of political controls Gorbachev thinks so many on the Politburo either disagree or harbor serious reservations i There is also general agreement in the Politburo that economic modernization requires a benign international environment The Soviets' need to elax tensions is critical because only thus can massive new expenditures for defense be avoided and Western help in economic development be obtained The roots of Gorbachev' dynamic foreign policy are to be found at home -and in the need for a prolonged breathing space ' S i---- SECRET CL Ey Signer DECL OADR p Foreign policy Consequences The elements of foreign policy that spring from domestic economic weakness are a mix of new initiatives and longstanding policies 1 Gorbachev wants to establish a new and far-reaching detente in the late 19805 to obtain technology investment trade and above all to avoid major new military expenditures while the Soviet economy is revived Gorbachev must slow or stop Americ'an military modernization especially SDI that thre tens not only Soviet strategic gains of the last generatiQn but which also if continued will force the USSR to devote huge new resources to the military in a high technology J competition for which they are ill-equipped The 0 Soviets kno that detente in the early 19705 contributed significantly' to downward pressure on Western defense bUdgets nearly halted military modernization weakened resolve to counter Soviet advances in the Third World and opened to the USSR new opportunities for Western technology and economic relations ' x 46' 2 A ' less visible but enduring element of foreign policy -- even under Gorbachev -- is the continuing extraordinary scope and sweep' of Soviet military modernization and weapons research and development' Despite Soviet rhetoric we still see no lessening of their weapons production And further Soviet research on new exotic weapons such as lasers and their own' version of SDr continues apace Virtually all of their principal strategic weapons ill be replaced with new more sophisticated systems by the mid-1990s and a new bomber is being added to their arsenal for the first time in decades Their defenses against us weapons are being steadily improved as are their capabilities for war-fighting -- command control communications and leadership protection As our defense budget declines again theirs continues to grow slOWly but steadily Gorbachev is prepared to explore -- and I think reach -- significant reductions in weapons but only in ways that protect existing Soviet advantages leave open alternative avenues of weapons development offer commensurate political gains or take maximum advantage of US unilateral restraint or constraints such as our unwillingness in the 19705 to build a limited ABM as permi tted by the treaty d @zgJ s i 3 4 to o ' --- -- - The third element of Go bachev's foreign policy is continued p otection of Soviet clients in the Third World Under Gorbachev the Soviets and Cubans are now providing more than a billion dollars a year in economic and military assistance' to Nicaraqua more than a billion dollars worth of military equipment was sent to Vietnam Laos and Cambodia in the first six months of this yea more than four billion dollars in milita y equipment has been sent to Angola since 1984 And of course Cuba gets about five billion dollars in Soviet support each year At a time of economic stress at horne these commitments speak volumes about soviet priorities The fou th element of Gorbachev's foreign policy is new and dynamic diplomatic initiatives to weaken ties between the Us and its Western allies China Japan and the Third World to portray the Soviet government as committed to arms control and peace and to suggest Moscow's interest in diplomatic solutions to Afghanistan and Cambodia In Europe Gorbachev through IMP is trading a modest military capability for hat he sees' as a significant political gain We can and should expect new and bolder initiatives including -conventional force reductions -- possibly unilateral that will severely test Alliance cohesion Similarly new initiativ s with China and Japan will be attempted to overcome bilateral obstacles to improved relations and to exploit problems between them and the US And in the Third World they will seek to take advantage of any relaxation of US vigilance or constancy Conclusion - -' There clearly are great changes underway inside the Soviet Union and in Soviet diplomacy Yet it is hard to detect fundamental changes currently or in prospect in the way the Soviets govern at home or in their principal objectives abroad The PartY certainly will retain its monopoly of power and the basic structures of the Stalinist economy will remain A major pu pose of economic modernization -- s in Russia in the days of Peter the Great -- remains the further increase in Soviet military power and political influence S These enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and policy abroad make it clear that -- while the changes underway offer opportunities for the United States in arms control Afghanistan and other areas -- Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic performance greater political vitality at home and more dynamic diplomacy to make the 'USSR a more competitive and stronger adversary in the yeats ahead S II Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian economic mode nization and political reform -- even revolution -- signaled an end to despotism and the beginning of Westernization Repeatedly ince 1917 the West has hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in Communist coeccive cule at home and aqqressiveness abroad These hopes dashed time and again have beeu revived by Gocbachev's domestic agenda innovative foreign policy and personal style S While Gorbachev arrives in Washington after a serious political setback at 57 he can afford to take tbe long view he will likely be in power long after his adversacies at home and abr oad have moved off the orld' stage His domestic needs and foreign policy initiatives offer the United States significant opportunities but they must be seized with an appreciation of Gorbachev's long range perspective and strategy as well as with realism particularly with respect to our very lim ted ability to influence internal developments in the Soviet Union And somehow amid the inevitable media extravaganza of the Summit a sobeI ' - even sombeI ' -- reminder of the enduring features of the regime and the still long competition and struggle ahead will be needed S 1