R FT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT The President's Meeting with Gorbachev December 10 Noon - TIME PLACE December 10 1987 12 00 m - 12 15 p m The Oval Office The White House PARTICIPANTS U S USSR Ronald-W Reagan President Mikhail S Gotbachev General of the United States Secretary CPSU CC George Bush V ce President Eduard A Shevardnadie Howard H Bak r Chief of Minister for Foreign Affairs Staff Aleksandr N Yakovlev CPSU George P Shultz Secretary CC Secretary of State Anatoliy F Dobrynin CPSU Frank Carlucci Secretary CC Secretary of Defense Sergei Tarasenko Special Fr tz Ermarth Special Assistant to Shevardnadze Assistant to the President notetaker -NSC Staff notetaker P Palazhchenko interpreter Thomas W Simons Jr Others Deputy Assistant Secretary of State EUR notetaker Dimitri Zarechnak interpreter Others ------------------------------------------------------ ----- ----- After initial pleasantries the President opened by saying that he'd had a chance to review the joint statement He understood that working delegations were now focused on the START and Defense and Space portions of the statement and suggested that we get a report Gorbachev said that meetings were now in progress between Marchal Akhromeyev and Mr Nitze While they were working he proposed that he and the President could have some further SE SENSITIVE DECL discusBions of regional issues and the President agreed Gorbachev asked to say a few words because he had the impression that the U S side had not appreciated fully what he had said on regional conflicts the day before He had sought to emphasize two or three important concepts First that regional conlicts are very worrisome in that they inject tension into U S -Soviet relations It was necessary to find some method or arrangement some means of acting to permit an interaction between the two countries in he interest of themselves and the parties to conflict The two sides had to discuss an approach to cooperation Gorbachev continued that this caused tension in our relations We had to find a method of action that would make it possible to take into account the interests of the parties to regional conflicts as well of course as our own interests Second Gorbachev went on we needed to take account of the trends that have emerged toward reconciliation among 'conflicting sides 'toward a political settlement of problems Regional organizations were involved too A situation had emerged that presents a chance if we move in a businessli'ke spirit for us to playa constructive role Take Central America for instance Gorbachevsaid The Guatemala agreement had been adopted We could express a positive response to it For example we could say both sides would not supply arms there except for small arms This was just an idea What was important was a positive statement On Cambodia Gorbachev went on contacts had begun between Sihanouk and the people in power They had talked Other forces should of course be brought in Vietnam had given the Soviets assurances that they will withdraw The principle of U S and Soviet support for a political settlement there was important In Angola too there were good opportunities to move forward to resolve the conflict politically The Middle East was of course a grave conflict Gorbachev said It had deep roots But the whole world believed that an international conference to solve it was necessary He understand there were doubts about this in the U S But what the Soviet Union supported was not inconsistent with what the U S supported ' There could be bilateral contacts in that framework Israel could meet with the Arabs with whomever it wanted But mention of a positive response would be good for the world The world was looking for the U S and the Soviet SECRET SENSITIVE SEC ENSITlVE 7-3 - Union to cooperate in a businesslike way The day before Gorbachev went on they had concentrated on Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war because these were particularly acute conflicts But with regard to Afghanistan he had felt there was no interest on the President's part But if without any publicity there was an interest in resolving the problem the Soviets could withdraw their troops and the U S side could stop its assistance to certain forces If there were agreement to that the two sides could say that as of a date certain the U S would stop its assistance and the Soviet side could say that its troops would not participate in any military operations They should let Afghanistan be neutral There was a basis for cooperation on Afghanistan Gorbachev went Qn But the U S side's attitude seemed to be you're there you should extricate yourselves it's your problem Naturally if that were the American attitude it would be harder for the Soviet Union to extricate itself The two sides should do better than that Gorbachev noted that he accepted the language on regional issues in the joint statement But what he wanted was practical solutions to the issues On the Iran-Iraq war Gorbachev went on he could say honestly with no hidden intent at all looking the President in the eyes that the Soviet Union did not want to create problems for America It wanted neither economic problems nor solutions which created tragic drama for the Administration American forces were- involved He felt Gorbachev said that there was a basis for regional cooperation between the two sides in this area He had had a short one-an-one discussion with the Vice President on this Gorbachev continued The Vice President had expressed doubt that Gorbachev or the President could entrust their security interests to UN forces He could say Gorbachev went on that the two sides should make those forces deserve trust This was inherent in the first resolution Movement could be made But if the question arose as to a real need to cease the supply of arms the Soviet Union wouid support this Gorbachev urged the U S side to think about these things It had experienced what kind of people the Iranians were A precise calculus of what would happen was needed If they were pushed too hard there would be an explosion and then the only SECRE SITIVE SEC thing left to do would be for the U S to use the forces it had there This would push the Iranians further and doing it could be dangerous not only in the region itself The Soviet side knew these people It was not saying it did not want to cooperate with the U S with other forces involved Iran was c lose t the pvj Jt i9 it was important to them 4 PVli I I CX hQ EMt b S %sp4J 7 The President said he thought his reply should come when they resumed for lunch at the White House He just wanted to say one thing It concerned Nicaragua t also 'concerned Afghanistan The Afghanistan government had its own military forces If the Soviet Union departed that would be fine But there were the the mujahadin who wanted a voice in their own government If it were denied them if they were disarmed they would be at the mercy of the Afghan government That would not permit equal participation in forming a new government If both sides were to come together to form one both would have to be armed Or one would have to disband the Afghan military for them to be equal Similarly in Nicaragua the President went on the U S side was for a peaceful settlement We simply wanted the Nicaraguan government to recognize other citizens who did not agree with it But it was never willing to do that even though the Contras were prepared to lay down their arms The Sandinista government just wanted to take Soviet supplies made it the most powerful military force in the area not only against the fJ 'eedom fighters but ore powerful than Honduras Costa Rica Guatemala put togeth r r vf vv fk 1 JI - A d Gorbachev suggested they continue at t e White House II Drafted EUR TWSimons Jr 12 10 87 x71126 0133A