SEGREZF THE PRESIDENT HAS SEE THE WHITE HOUSE 0420 GEGREG DECLASSIFIED PER E O 13526 March 1 1939 Slou 005 - HR 1 lala iha IN MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT SUBJECT Getting Ahead of Gorbachev 43 This memorandum lays out the premises that I believe should guide the way we go about developing an overall strategy for U S - Soviet relations Gorbachev presents us with major challenges but also with opportunities As you know he is a skilled leader whose diplomatic activities have significantly altered the international community's view of the Soviet Union good we have to be better He is very Getting and staying ahead of Gorbachev is less a question of a few early and dramatic proposals than a requirement that we develop a sound strategy Trying to match Gorbachev headline for headline given our need for domestic and allied consensus will lead us down the wrong path Rather _we need to put forth considered and consistent positions while negotiating from strength We will be creative but should seek a steady pace that can lead to real and sustainable progress Gorbachev's adroit diplomacy is rooted in an understanding of international politics that far outstrips his predecessors' in __mbre dth_and so h stication Not satisfied to number only weak and dependent states like Vietnam and Ethiopia among Soviet partners Gorbachev is determined to improve rehations with all of the global power centers including China Japan and our Western European allies Gorbachev wants to turn adversaries into potential sources of support smoothing points of friction that drain his all too scarce political and economic resources cc Vice President DAD Chief of Staff Declassify on i f h i T N- 191qu eguapgsaua t1an 2 The rhetoric of his peace offensive has beennaccompanied by a willingness to make dramatic concessions in the military arena Gorbachev possesses a refined understanding of the role of military power He will sometimes conduct a tactical retreat surrendering military advantages in order to gain the upper hand politically Weakening NATO remains his prime international objective If the troop cuts in Eastern Europe are carried out as reportedly planned they will be militarily significant The political impact will be even greater The pictures on the day that Soviet boys begin to leave Hungary the GDR and Czechoslovakia will do more to promote the image of a changed Soviet Union than four decades of Soviet proclamations of peaceful intent The bold activity on the international front complements his domestic reforms Yet the pace of change is slow in the U S S R Economic nationality and social problems are mounting Gorbachev enjoys the support of intellectuals but most workers are suspicious of the reforms and many bureaucrats are hostile But whatever the reception at home perestroika and glasnost are having an impact on the Soviet Union's image abroad Some of Gorbachev's rhetoric and some of the initiatives could unsettle the postwar status quo You may face major upheavals in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union itself during your Presidency As uncertainties grow we must preserve the traditional pillars of American postwar strength military power economic resilience firm alliances and skillful diplomacy We must continue to stress the fact that Soviet flexibility is in large part a response to Western especially U S policies Clearly it would be unwise to walk away from a successful strategy which has brought us to this point This is our agenda not his and we need to recapture credit for it Yet in the current environment we cannot afford to be naysayers Gorbachev's new foreign policy cannot be dismissed as propaganda It is often backed up by action And we do not want to miss opportunities to improve the relationship and move to our own vision of the future Our review of policy has begun and we will proceed with dispatch But the worst thing that we can do at this critical juncture is This is an ake olicy precipitously or in a piecemeal fashion flashy proposals on the assumption that Gorbachev cannot accept them He has surprised us before fa annapgsma an 3 I suggest the following strategic approach w' First we should work on the domestic side to strengthen the image of America's foreign policy as driven by clear objectives The appeal of Gorbachev is his decisiveness We cannot meet him head on if we do not appear confident about our purposes and agenda Attending to the economic problems that weaken us abroad including the trade and budget deficits will reinforce our global image as strong and vital And the spirit of bipartisanship that you have rekindled gives us an opportunity to present a united American policy for the first time in a generation We may at last be able to concentrate on our core goals instead of warring over the details of implementation Second we need to send a clear signal that relations with our allies are our first priority Jim Baker's trip to Europe was a good start in this direction Perhaps as we approach a NATO summit you should make a major speech dealing with Europe One of the aims of Soviet policy is to distance us from our friends We can counter Gorbachev's common European home theme by pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe as occupiers In the European security realm our first priority is to underscore the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent through modernization With regard to conventional arms control the alliance must develop a political strategy soon concerning conventional force reductions and where we want them to lead We might be able to offer an innovative proposal for a more extensive troop inspection regime and other confidence building measures These measures should be announced as building on Gorbachev's troop cut to reduce the possibility of surprise attack through our own proposals to increase transparency Similarly we will need to prepare carefully for bilateral arms control including START Arms control is not the only issue on the U S Soviet agenda but it is the one watched most closely by the world community If we perform competently in arms control confidence in our ability to manage the broader relationship will 8031' Third after ouEHEeview of policy we may wish to undertake initiatives with Eastern Europe The East Europeans to varying degrees are taking advantage of Gorbachev's invitation to exercise greater control over their own affairs Eastern Europe is a weak link in Gorbachev's strategy We should exploit this but must do so in a prudent way Our best lever is economic assistance to the East But the management of East-West economic relations poses special 19 1ng 991131335916 Llan assess 4 challenges for us For political and economic reasons Japan and EurOpe are more sympathetic than we to East European and Soviet requests for Western investment -They are pressing for a weakening of COCOM procedures and restrictions The I Administration needs to establish acceptable boundaries for East- West economic cooperation and then coordinate them with our allies Fourth the recent settlements in Afghanistan and Southern Africa have raised hopes that U S -Soviet cooperation will spur agreements in other parts of the world We should work aggressively to promote regional stability aware that the Soviet Union can be an important asset in some but not all regions In Central America for instance multilateral efforts may be more effective if the Soviet Union is excluded Finally you will in due course need to lay out a vision of American power as a global stabilizing force in its own right Whatever the state of U S Soviet relations America will continue to have interests abroad to defend In the Persian Gulf for instance our military commitment provided the stability that supported the UN search for a peaceful settlement We need to establish the principle that American power is not simply a reaction to Soviet military capability This will be important over the next few years because Gorbachev may succeed in diminishing the sense of an overt Soviet threat in a number of areas of the world Getting ahead of Gorbachev is a complicated and enduring task The American people our allies and the international community are looking to you for steady and confident leadership The time that you take now to set a sure course is a good investment one that will pay dividends throughout your Presidency 51 10 30 qu 19 1ng enuopgsoig L1an