- - - --- - on nr f I ' -S-T-A-- -RS-U I' ' J ' t ' o I 9 0E G1 o J U INFO RM A TIO N MEMORANDUM SIS 8926742 t o I roo r ' - III No v e mb e r 17 1 989 o MEMQEANQUM TO Th e THROUGH T - R Ba rt h o l o e Sec r et ary I t ' c 3 ' - ' FROM ART - E Rowny SUBJ ECT Malta Meet ing o o i I i The Malta meeting presents an excellent opportunity to add momentum to the political changes sweeping Eastern Europe However to do this the meeting must not become an -arms control summit - He re are some suggestions on how to i mp l e men t such a strategy In d i sc u ss ing wh at is happening in Ea st e r n Eu rope a nd within the USSR rein force the idea that further refor m a nd g r e a t er freedom serve both our interest s i I 0 0 -n c o o If Go r b a c he v s a y s that Malta s h o u l d move a r ms cont rol f or wa r d we s ho u l d focus the discussion on process and no t enga g e o n s u b s ta nce T he o ne area o f a ms co ntro l i t wi ll be pr ofi table t o d is c us s wi th Gor b a c h e v i s CFE s i nce it has few ri sk s a n d l arge po ss ible gains CFE c an reinforce our broa der p ol it ical goals for Eu rope by r educin g t he Sovie t mil i tary pre sence a n d i n c re a s i n g t h e f r e e d o m of a c t i o n o f the Eastern European s ta te s t ' L ' - -I ' -0 0 - ' L Gj _- r -1 ' ' c I o i P We s ho u l d also address o ther regional problems it _L t e ll Go r b a c h e v that Sov iet subs idies for destabilizing regimes i n Central America Afghanistan Ethiopia Camb o d i Libya a nd North Korea undermine US Sovie t r elations l Ui v rr t' -o --t i I o 0 u - f c 0 ' v f ' 0 I -I 1 0 n ro- I Ij C l o r- J -2- 1 UNbj Jhj j l r l U ' ' ' j CFE is litmus test o f Soviet commItment t o military s t a b i Li t y in Eur ope Gorbachev should be pressed into ma k i ng go od on Soviet statements that they are willing to re d uce th eir large asymmetries in equipment aircraft and troops by rapidly concluding a CFE treaty o In c o nt r a s t there ar e potential risks and few gains in d is cu ss i ng START The remaining issues which divide us are fundamental ther e is little room for compromise in o u r pORi tion The fa ct that the Soviets have ou t-paced us in modernization only reinforces this point o We s ho u l d expect Gorbachev to make some new offer on the ABM Treaty and START which jeopardizes SDI He may also propose mo r at o r i a on fissionable materials and production of s t r a t e g i c weapons The s e are all losers for us o Gorbach ev will certainly attempt to involve us in naval arms c o ntr o l The mounting campaign which began with Akhromeyev' s visit and was cont inued by Shevardnadze in Wyoming will be advanced by the media who will exploit the fiymbolism of a meeting at sea to advance the re as o n a b l e ne s s of naval arms control We must be prepared to comba t this no-win situation to include a statement by the President upon his arrival on the cruiser that the US Navy is not on the bargaining table o On t he political level Gorbachev may try to persuade us to look the other way should he crack down on movements for se l f - d e t e r mi n a t i o n human rights or further democratization We s ho u l d tel l him that setbacks in reform will set b ack our relations o Go r b ac he v may aga in propose dissolution o f the Warsaw Pact and NATO The bonds of NATO members are far stronger and mor e diverse than military security interests Such a proposal should be dismissed out of hand o Go r b ac he v may also s ay that this is the time to work t o geth e r toward a neutral and united Germany It is en t i r el y premature and i mproper to enter into any such d iscuss ions Free democratic choices in both the GDR and the FRG together with thorou gh c o ns u l t a t i o n s with o ur Eur opean allie s s ho u l d gu i de t he f uture shape of Germany o In s um Malta discussions should not focus on arms control CFE can be addressed i n the context of supporting our po l i ti c a l objectives in Eu rope The best outcome would be' o ne where we and the Soviet s hilve a frank exchnnge of views o n the fast-moving events of Ea ste r n Europe and o n our di spleasure wi th Soviet ac t ions in ot he r regions o I have a l so sent the se i de as to t he Pre sidellt