Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker with delegations Moscow May 18 1990 Shevardnadze was present at the first part of conversation Gorbachev I am glad to see you in Moscow Mr Secretary The regularity of our meetings is evidence of the fact that we not only want to maintain the capital we have accumulated but we aim to increase it And capital likes it when it grows The very fact that in the context of current events our contacts are becoming more rather than less dynamic is significant in itself The opposite would have happened in the past When difficulties would arise in some part of the world-since we and you are involved everywhere one way or another--we would start looking at each other sideways and even take steps to slow down the development of our relations Nowadays the bigger and more difficult the problem the more active our dialogue I appreciate this At the same time I have to say that I've been observing the events unfolding and I'm coming to the conclusion that the United States has not yet finalized the process of determining its relationship to the Soviet Union I've said many times before that at times like these times of great changes we cannot view our relations in the context of one presidential term We are 1 building the foundation for more than just the relationship between our two countries--we are setting up new relationships throughout the whole world We are essentially the architects and builders of a new world I think that something is troubling you after all I think there are two main problems First there is the question of whether you should get seriously involved with us We know that you have different advice and opinions on this So far at least the President and you have shown restraint and withstood the pressure you are holding your position I value that Secondly I was under the impression that we formed a mutual understanding about the kind of relationship we would like to have between our countries at the current stage One of the central points of this mutual understanding is that both of us would like to see the other side strong and confident in its security--not just military security but also economic and national as a whole We are interested in a strong confident United States and you are interested in a strong confident Soviet Union As far back as two-three years ago we predicted that we are standing at the threshold of a major regrouping of forces in the world Back then we decided that in these circumstances our 2 cooperation is not only useful but absolutely vital for us and for the whole world However I think that periodically when the time comes to move from the philosophical level to implementation with specific political actions we see relapses of the past We see actions based on the traditions and habits of the past decades I see that sometimes when we are going through critical moments in our relationship so to speak you want to take advantage of the situation to get the better of us In the past I would have simply taken note of this and continued to watch the situation But right now our relationship is such that I can openly share my impressions with you What am I talking about specifically You are a clear thinker and I value that That is why I will speak with you frankly and clearly Let's look at Eastern Europe Everything that is happening there now corresponds to what we discussed before I hope you see that our actions strictly follow what I told you then At the same time I have information that the goal of your policies is to separate Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union Or take the question of German unification Your position on this issue is contradictory I do not know what drives it Maybe you are afraid of European unification I have said many times both here and in Europe and I can confirm it right now we 3 understand the necessity of American participation--not necessarily military participation--in all European processes That is a given But now you say both Germanys are peaceful democratic countries and there is no reason to see any danger in what is happening You say that we are exaggerating the danger But I told President Bush if this is the case if you don't consider it an important factor then why not agree to have united Germany join the Warsaw Pact Or another aspect you say that we can trust the Germans that they've proven themselves But if this is the case then why include Germany in NATO You respond that if Germany does not become a part of NATO it could create a problem in Europe So it turns out you do not trust Germany I would understand if you provided some other realistic arguments I will be frank with you If you said that Germany's absence in NATO would disrupt the existing security structure in Europe I might have understood you In that case let us think let us look for a way to replace the current security structure which is based on the existence of two military-political blocs with some new structure Let us think how to move towards this new structure But you say that NATO is necessary right now and will be necessary practically forever And you immediately add that the Soviet Union continues to have a large army and is 4 strongly armed that is why so to speak NATO will always be necessary In general I repeat your position and your arguments are contradictory They do not agree with the core approaches we agreed to instill in our relations What is my point Once again I will be frank If a united Germany enters NATO it will create a serious shift in the correlation of forces the entire strategic balance We will be faced with the question of what our next step should be You are a logical thinker so you understand this Evidently we would have to halt all discussions in the sphere of disarmament we would have to analyze what changes to make in our doctrine and positions at the Vienna negotiations to our plans for reduction of military forces The question arises why we are doing all of this And it is a very serious question We would like to count on a serious approach from your side And when we see signs that you are playing a game we grow worried Is it necessary Can we allow our relationship to turn into a petty intrigue The Soviet Union is undergoing major changes we are going through a renewal which is an inevitably difficult process We see that sometimes you are tempted to take advantage of the situation I think doing that would be a very big mistake 5 And finally the synthesizing aspect We inform you about our plans By carrying out perestroika and transforming our politics through New Thinking we would like to move towards the West the United States We would like to open our country to the world We said that our goal is to integrate our country as fully as possible into the political economic and cultural processes taking place in the world We had an understanding with you that new relations between the USSR and the U S will benefit not only our countries but considering the central position of our countries in the world it would benefit the whole world Now I ask myself does the U S Administration follow the understanding we reached I will tell you how it looks from Moscow From here we see the whole spectrum and we see many nuances We note many positive aspects in your position At the same time some elements worry us Right now we are approaching a major turning point in the Soviet Union which will determine the future of our economy in the short and medium term Naturally it will reflect on all the other spheres of life in our country--political social cultural interethnic relations and international relations We have come to the point where we need to introduce a regulated market economy in our country This is a pivotal step in our 6 perestroika We are talking about fundamental changes at the very core of our economy I am talking about property privatization antimonopoly measures and the introduction of all types of property--stock ownership cooperative property collective property private property We will be reforming the bank system organizing a stock market and commodity exchange building a tax system creating a social security system and doing price reforms It will be a radical change Therefore we are talking about a critical point in our perestroika And at this stage we have a right to count on the understanding and solidarity of our partners In any case events somewhere in Nagorno-Karabakh or Vilnius should not take up more of the Administration's and Congress's attention than this monumental turning-point I will say more we need not only understanding from our partners but cooperation as well What is the U S doing The U S welcomes perestroika as you mentioned numerous times Mr Secretary You quite competently described the problems we are facing today in our perestroika At the same time you caution everyone against helping the Soviet Union You say let them take care of themselves helping them will only slow down the real perestroika 7 I cannot understand that argument It seems like instead of showing solidarity during this time you would prefer that we figure out this mess ourselves You might even think that if our situation gets worse that won't be such a bad thing for you I am saying all of this so you can think it over before our meetings in Washington and Camp David Will we continue what we started together or will we step away from the coordinated approach and understanding of the roles and positions of our countries our relationship during this historic period We both have to choose right now I thought the choice had already been made However recently there have been moments when it seems that you are still deciding I wanted to say all of this in a confidential conversation rather than in a meeting with a bigger group I think this will be useful for the President when he is preparing for our meeting Baker Mr President it is very good that you decided to raise these issues in a narrow circle And in general it is good that you brought them up This gives me the opportunity to respond to these legitimate concerns It will also give President Bush the opportunity after he reviews the transcript of this conversation to concentrate his attention on questions that are legitimate and appropriate topics for discussion 8 It is true that at the early stages of this administration there was a period when we were deciding what our relationship with the Soviet Union should be However this period ended almost a year ago after my trip to Moscow my meeting with you and lengthy conversations with E A Shevardnadze Right now we are not debating the nature of our relationship with the USSR We know very well what we would like the relationship to be As I said in Wyoming we would like our relationship to shift from competition to dialogue and cooperation on all fronts Naturally this will depend not only on the actions of the United States but of the Soviet Union as well However I want to assure you that the U S leadership is not debating whether to place our stakes on your policies and perestroika The President and I made the decision last year and we will adhere to it firmly In October of last year I made a speech in which I emphasized that we will look for new avenues of cooperation with the USSR I talked about the need to look for points of mutually beneficial contact It is true that there is a great deal of debate in the United States whether your efforts will be successful It is no secret that there are some people who would prefer to see you fail These are the Cold War warriors people who can't give up old habits There are also quite a few people who criticize me and the President for placing too much hope in your success and for taking actions to help you 9 This is all true But I appreciate the fact that you noted our restraint and our refusal to give in to the strong pressure we are under right now I told E A Shevardnadze numerous times that I had my doubts whether we could hold on to our current positions We cannot forget that there are some substantial differences between us For example it is no accident that the flags of independent Baltic nations still hang in the lobby of the State Department We never recognized their incorporation into the USSR I touched upon this subject for the first time last year on the way to Wyoming Today when this issue is quite critical we would really like to see the beginning of a conversation that could eventually lead to a solution At no cost do we want instability in the Soviet Union We say this constantly The President and I are always emphasizing that we are not seeking unilateral advantages from the changes happening in the Soviet Union We are not playing political games or seeking to win Later I would like to show you that our position on German unification aims to take your position and your concerns into consideration I've been asked on many occasions what can we do to assist perestroika I think that our first priority should be to help create a stable international environment for perestroika That is exactly what I am trying to do 10 During my last two addresses to the U S Congress I had to answer a multitude of questions regarding Lithuania I had to defend our position I was subjected to some serious criticism The President and I were accused of giving up on our principles I responded that our support for the aspirations of the Baltic States peoples does not contradict our support for perestroika I emphasized the important interests at stake in our relations with the Soviet Union The agreement on conventional armed forces START continued cooperation in resolving regional conflicts--cooperation that did not exist in the past but we were able to establish in the past two years--all of these are of great importance to us Our policy shift from competition to cooperation does not mean we will always agree on everything I mentioned our disagreement on the Baltic republics It is based on history At the same time we understand your concern that the Baltics do not create a precedent for the other republics I told E A Shevardnadze on several occasions that we take into account the legal differences between the Baltic States and other Soviet republics We have disagreements over Cuba We understand that you have certain obligations to this country But our differences remain And yet despite these differences we have to keep moving from competition to cooperation We understand the difficulties you 11 are facing and what kind of pressure you are under We believe that everything you are doing right now--changing the political social and economic approaches that have formed in your country over the last 70 years--is a courageous effort and we support it Over the last year and a half we succeeded in shifting the American public opinion in the direction of supporting your policies Still we have a vocal minority that wants to continue the Cold War they don't want to trust the Russians When the events started in Lithuania when the economic embargo was introduced some people started saying Look Bush and Baker are naive while the bear remains a bear Allow me to say a couple words about your remark that we are cautioning others against helping the Soviet Union You must be talking about our position on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Indeed due to internal political reasons our position is that we cannot support the use of American taxpayer money to subsidize loans to state-owned enterprises or institutions in the Soviet Union Moreover under the current regulations of the Bank the Soviet Union could borrow the entire amount of its contributed capital which would be very difficult for us to push through Congress This is due to the fact that according to our data at least you continue to allocate significant resources 14-15 billion dollars per year to support regimes in countries 12 such as Cuba which engage in subversive activities against other countries Therefore some people some congressmen say How can we support giving American taxpayer money to the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union supports Cuba The same goes for direct loans which I discussed with your Minister of Finance when he was in Washington Gorbachev Yes he said that the Secretary of State flatly rejected this option However other countries are willing to assist us For example I was in Sverdlovsk recently and visited a factory that used to profile in the defense industry and space Right now it is in the process of conversion They have good plans highly qualified workers engineers The problem is that the conversion will take 2-3 years and in the meantime while military production is stopped their financial position is very difficult Philips has expressed interest in this factory In the beginning they were only interested in the factory's research work they were not interested in investing money for conversion Naturally they are careful people However when we showed them the factory they apologized and agreed to full cooperation In two years this enterprise will be producing consumer goods competitive on any market This is an example of cooperation Of course we have long traditions with West Germany in this sphere But I am convinced 13 and I have said this many times there can be no stable relations between the USSR and the U S if they are not supported by economic ties What do we have right now Grain purchases from the U S But is this real economic cooperation Baker I agree with you completely Gorbachev As for our connections with other countries which you don't like I can tell you this in our administration and our Supreme Soviet there is a sentiment to build economic relations in a new way in the spirit of new political thinking and in accordance with our country's domestic priorities So we will rebuild them But we cannot do it in one day Only the United States can for example in one fell swoop impose an embargo on grain deliveries to the Soviet Union Baker That was not under our administration It was a big mistake and it will not happen again A few months ago President Bush talked about the need to expand economic ties with the Soviet Union I also think we have to look for ways to establish economic cooperation However I have to try to explain to you some of the historic factors in our domestic policy that we have to take into account in our country We cannot give consent to grant loans in excess of the Soviet Union's contributed capital with funds allocated to the EBRD from American taxpayers while we will be told that the Soviet Union is subsidizing countries like Cuba At the same time as 14 you know yesterday the United States voted together with other countries to grant the Soviet Union observer status in GATT Gorbachev But you hesitated for a long time Others agreed sooner Baker Yes like Japan we hesitated because there are different opinions in the U S on this subject Gorbachev Yes here too Baker I know that Gorbachev We are being told that we supposedly betrayed the developing world we threw it under the bus of imperialism As if we are some kind of social security for developing nations They accuse us of betraying the Arabs of practically fighting on the side of Israel Right now this is compounded by the problem of Soviet emigrants settling in the Israeli occupied territories In my opinion it is a real provocation aimed at pitting the U S and USSR against each other We are being accused of giving away too much in the disarmament negotiations that we are surrendering our positions etc In general there is a major struggle and in these circumstances I hope I can expect that you won't simply wait around for the fruit to fall into your basket Baker No we are not going to wait and do nothing Gorbachev Because first the harvest has to ripen Otherwise you could end up with an empty basket 15 Baker We are for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union For example yesterday I suggested to E A Shevardnadze the idea of Soviet participation in the program to promote the development of Central American countries on an international basis A similar program is being implemented in Eastern Europe by the Group of 24 and it has raised 14 billion dollars for countries such as Poland and Hungary In September in Wyoming I said that we are ready for broad technological and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union which we hope will be beneficial to both countries We can defend mutually beneficial cooperation in Congress However we cannot get support for programs that involve the use of U S taxpayers' money Yesterday I said that as you develop your major economic measures we are ready to help with consulting and offer the services of our chief experts and economists Gorbachev I plan to raise the question of economic cooperation with the President Today when we are preparing for a major radical economic turn it is important for us to get some temporary reinforcement The transition to a market economy may be accompanied by more serious complications and we will need some oxygen during this time Moreover we are not asking for a gift we need targeted loans We have for example some Ministry of Defense enterprises that after a 100-200 million 16 investment will soon start manufacturing civilian products worth 1-2-4 billion To avoid major complications associated with the introduction of new prices and market mechanisms we will need trade credits as well We estimated that we would need around 1520 billion which we will start to repay in 7-8 years It's not much and the need arose only because of the circumstances We wanted to postpone the implementation of radical economic reforms for a little while however political processes took such a turn that the old command economy system is being dismantled completely We need to move faster to replace it with a new market system We need the resources I'm talking about in order to maneuver Overall 20 billion is not such a great sum for you or for us but under the circumstances we need it precisely at this moment We are planning to present a market economy transition program to the Supreme Soviet by May 25th So I will bring up this question with the President I must say in the West this has generally been met with understanding Baker The President is familiar with this issue I discussed it with your Minister of Finance in Washington When I return home I will think it over again and speak with the President Gorbachev We discussed it with a number of European representatives and the necessary amount is mostly starting to 17 emerge However we need understanding from your side as well The situation demands it I personally don't like being in debt but I am a realist and see that this solution is necessary Baker I believe that you will not have much difficulty in obtaining credits for this sum in the West especially if you are willing to take them with a respective mortgage which as I understand you are I will speak with the President about it Gorbachev I want to emphasize that only part of the credit will go towards the purchase of goods the rest will go into investments possibly including joint ventures expanding production conversion etc Baker I will try to convey to the President the importance you place on U S participation in this program Gorbachev Precisely After all it would be strange if now when we are talking about improving Soviet-American relations the United States did not respond and participate I recently watched a documentary on the history of SovietAmerican relations It is truly a story of missed opportunities the list is staggering So I ask myself will we really let ourselves miss this opportunity too Baker I will speak with the President Please understand that due to domestic politics in the United States giving a direct loan to the Soviet Union or credits through multilateral 18 financial institutions such as the EBRD is met with traditional negative context Gorbachev It could be done some other way for example through a consortium Baker You see partly because of the inertia of historical stereotypes and partly for valid reasons many people in the U S will say that we simply cannot give loans to the Soviet Union while it continues to supply MiG-29 airplanes to Cuba or resorts to economic pressure on the Baltic States Of course to this you would say are Vilnius or two-three MiG-29s really more important than perestroika in the Soviet Union And this is a legitimate question However we cannot ignore a certain atmosphere that exists on the American political stage The vast majority of our senators are in favor of halting the development of economic relations with the USSR until the problem in the Baltics is resolved I don't need to tell you how sensitive the subject of Cuba is in the U S We have to take all of this into consideration Before saying a few words about the German issue I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union We had that policy before But today we are interested in building a stable Europe and doing it together with you 19 You say if the U S trusts Germany why include it in NATO My reply if you trust the Germans then why not give them an opportunity to make their own choice We are not forcing them to join NATO The reason we want unified Germany to be a NATO member is not because we are afraid of the Soviet Union but because we believe that unless Germany is solidly rooted in European institutions conditions could arise to repeat the past You've studied history as I have you remember the League of Nations It's nice to talk about pan-European security structures the role of the CSCE It is a wonderful dream but just a dream In the meantime NATO already exists and participation in NATO will mean that Germany will continue to rely on this alliance to ensure its security Gorbachev And yet what is the purpose of NATO It was created for a different time what is its purpose now Baker If Germany is not firmly rooted in the existing security structure there will be an entity in the heart of Europe that will be concerned with ensuring its security by other means It will want nuclear security whereas now this security is provided by the U S nuclear umbrella If Germany remains in NATO it will have a much easier time renouncing its nuclear biological or chemical potential 20 At the same time I want to say that we understand why Germany's membership in NATO presents a psychological problem for the Soviet Union Gorbachev Let's examine this issue from a military standpoint Right now when the Warsaw Treaty is rapidly turning into a purely political organization Germany's membership in NATO will strengthen your military alliance Baker In the immediate short-term maybe However we are currently talking about a change about adapting NATO giving it a more political nature We recognize the importance of reducing the Bundeswehr However we have a disagreement regarding the best platform to negotiate this But we understand your concerns and we are taking them into account I don't think that we are trying to get unilateral benefits We want stability in Europe and we wish success to perestroika Same as you we went through two wars that were the result of instability in Europe We do not want this to happen again Allow me to give you some examples of ways in which we tried to take your completely legitimate concerns into consideration as we developed our policy towards Germany First We proposed to review the reduction and limitation of the Bundeswehr at the second phase of the Vienna talks which 21 should begin immediately after the signing of the first agreement on conventional armed forces We spoke about this with the Germans and I think they will agree Second President Bush proposed to hasten the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons Third We proposed and the Germans agreed that Germany would pledge not to produce develop or acquire chemical or biological weapons Fourth We proposed that for an agreed transition period NATO troops would not be stationed on the territory of the GDR Fifth We also proposed that for an agreed transition period Soviet troops would remain on the territory of the GDR Sixth NATO will undergo an evolution to become more of a political organization Moreover there will be a major review of military strategy in light of the reduced effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact and the need to strengthen the political role of the alliances as you mentioned Seventh We put a great deal of effort into reaching an agreement on Germany's borders Right now we have a solid understanding that a united Germany will include only the territory of the GDR FRG and Berlin This is important to the Poles as well as some Western European countries Evidently it is also important to the Soviet Union 22 Eighth We are making an effort in various forums to ultimately transform the CSCE into a permanent institution that would become an important cornerstone of a new Europe This institution would include all the European countries the Soviet Union and the United States I proposed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers of 35 countries this September in New York to prepare for the Summit of the CSCE And finally the ninth point We are actively trying to make sure that the Soviet Union's economic interests are duly considered during the unification process We are fully aware that including a united Germany in NATO is a political problem for you Nevertheless we believe that if a united Germany is firmly anchored in the framework of this time-tested security institution it will never want to have its own nuclear capability or its own independent military command Militarily NATO will look completely different as the result of the changes currently taking place in Central and Eastern Europe Of course if Germany does not want to remain a member of NATO then it won't The United States cannot force Germany to be in NATO This is not a question of whether we trust the Germans We sincerely believe that NATO is the structure that provides the greatest stability in Europe And not only in terms of East-West relations There are a few pockets of instability in Europe 23 arising from inter-ethnic rivalries ethnic tensions etc Often this happens in European countries that have nothing to do with the tension between the East and the West The fact that Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary supported our approach is not the result of American diplomatic efforts We welcome their position but we did not actively seek it Incidentally we expressed our opinion that it would be good for some of these countries to establish regional associations So I understand your concern it is quite legitimate I hope that my explanations were useful to you Gorbachev What if your words turn out to be prophetic and a united Germany will not want to remain in NATO You say that you can't force it What will happen then Baker I would like to ask you in turn if Germany is not in NATO what do you propose Gorbachev I would like us to do something during the negotiations before the unification We have this opportunity right now When this process is finished we won't have any more opportunities to suggest anything else That's the point Your reasoning is based solely on the idea that a united Germany must be a member of NATO You are not offering any alternatives At the same time you say that at some point Germany could decide not to be in NATO Let's imagine what would happen when the negotiations are over Germany will have the 24 right to leave NATO but we won't have a chance to offer any alternative Right now we have this opportunity we have the rights and responsibilities of the four victorious powers The unification process is not yet complete If we decide that a united Germany will not be a member of any military organization then of course the question arises about its status I think it should be a democratic demilitarized country with clearly defined borders etc It would be a new situation and we would need to secure it in a final peace settlement The settlement could include your nine points This would be something everyone could understand It would be a more or less of a middle ground though of course Germany would still be closer to you but the balance would be better Baker You are suggesting that the document stipulate that Germany would not have the right to remain in NATO Gorbachev Germany would be outside any military groups The same as many other countries Baker So you are talking about a neutral Germany Gorbachev I don't know Maybe non-aligned Maybe some special status For example France has a special status To conclude this part of the conversation I would like to suggest let us thoroughly think about this one more time We will think and you should think Let us continue this conversation in Washington And if none of my arguments convince 25 you then I'll suggest to the President and announce publicly that we want to join NATO too After all you say that NATO is not directed against us that it is just a security structure that is adapting to the new reality So we will propose to join NATO Baker E A Shevardnadze was asked about this at a pressconference in Bonn Shevardnadze At the time I responded that we have not yet submitted an application for admission to NATO Gorbachev In any case it is not a purely hypothetical question It's not some absurdity Baker This is interesting You said there are many neutral and non-aligned countries This is true But it is by their choice not because someone forced them to take this status Gorbachev Well maybe the Germans will take this status themselves In any case there should be some fallback option Your position is based on only one option It is what you want But we want something else We can't proceed just based on what you want Baker We want it only because they are asking for it themselves You say that it is unacceptable for you But neutrality cannot be imposed You cannot demand it as a condition for the termination of the four powers' obligations This would be contrary to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act which 26 clearly states that countries have the right to participate in alliances Moreover such an approach would place Germany in some special category it would cause a great deal of resentment and hostility on the part of the Germans In other words it would sow the seeds of future instability which is exactly what we don't want Gorbachev What makes you think that resentment will occur only if Germany is not a part of a Western alliance Baker There will be resentment if Germany is separated into some kind of special category if it is forced to do something against its will If Germany makes its own choice to become a member of the Warsaw Pact that would be a different matter Gorbachev If they want to join the Warsaw Pact what would your response be Baker We will not object if it would truly be their free choice Gorbachev Thus we can note that you would react with understanding to such a request Baker The Helsinki Final Act states that any country can be a member of any organization or alliance Gorbachev Can I conclude that should a united Germany want to become a member of the Warsaw Pact the United States would meet this with understanding 27 Baker We would say in our view Germany should be a full member of NATO however only by its own choice Gorbachev And still in principle if a united Germany based on the principle of the freedom of choice uses its right to choose the organization it wants to belong to and decides to become a member of the Warsaw Pact will you be able to give your consent to that Baker We will say that in our opinion it is the wrong decision from the point of view of future stability However we will uphold the Helsinki principles Gorbachev I see Well I am satisfied you essentially gave arguments in support of my position Because we are saying that a united Germany's membership in NATO will change the correlation of forces that has ensured stability in Europe for the past 45 years Therefore our argument is a mirror of yours Baker No I cannot agree with that Gorbachev We must look for a way to combine our approaches The unification of Germany is a new reality and this new phenomenon is testing our ability to find solutions based on a balance of interests After all we have said this is what we strive for Right now when this approach is subjected to the first serious test we must look for a mutually acceptable solution 28 Baker Let me ask you would you consent to Germany's free choice to remain a member of NATO Gorbachev I am honest with you and I told you if a united Germany will belong to NATO or the Warsaw Pact it will lead to a change in the strategic balance in Europe and the entire world I think in the current situation you should not leave us stranded It is a very important moment and if this happens we could take completely unexpected steps So let's look for mutually acceptable solutions Shevardnadze I would like to say Mr Secretary of State that when you are thinking about united Germany's membership in NATO you forget that no one has yet cancelled the Potsdam Agreement Theoretically this Agreement defines the structure military-political status and conditions such as denazification demilitarization and democratization of Germany It also defines our rights the rights of the four powers Right now we are being asked to surrender these rights but on the basis of a unilateral decision which only takes into account the interests of the West and does not take into account our concerns Secondly I think the Secretary of State is right when he says that we must consider the public opinion in the United States And you are talking about the minority of your population So I want to say I am certain that if united Germany becomes a member of NATO it will blow up perestroika 29 Our people will not forgive us People will say that we ended up the losers not the winners One more thing I do not share your opinion that panEuropean security is only a dream some kind of fantasy The CSCE process is a reality We have to think about European security structures that would not be based on blocs We can create them Gorbachev And our potential membership in NATO is not such a wild fantasy After all there was a big coalition at one time so why is it impossible now Baker I understand your point that you cannot be left standing on your own right now Frankly speaking this is exactly why we proposed the 2 4 mechanism We recognize the necessity of your participation in regulating the European process including the process of German unification Gorbachev Exactly right Baker We understand your domestic political factors as well Gorbachev Yes we are already hearing people say that the mechanism has turned into 1 4 And the Soviet Union is the one while Germany is in the Western four Baker And one more thing I said that pan-European security is a dream What I meant is that it is a dream today We made concrete proposals on how to build its structures in order for it to become a reality In the meantime we consider it important 30 for Germany to be firmly anchored in security institutions so it is not tempted to create some kind of security structure of its own We think it is important for Germany to be a member of the European Economic Community even though we are not members We have seen the past results of having a separate neutral Germany Shevardnadze Two words on the issue of the size of the Bundeswehr We think a decision on this matter should be made in the framework of the six and afterwards consolidated in the framework of the CSCE at the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces After all the issue of unified Germany's military potential has to be tied to the external aspects of German unification Gorbachev Summing up I want to say that we had a good session of throwing around ideas before the meeting in Washington I recently gave a speech in connection with the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany I talked about the 27 million Soviet citizens who died in the war But I did not tell the whole story We lost the best part of our population And the 18 million wounded and shell-shocked And the damage to the health of those who hungry cold and poorly dressed worked on the home front It was an enormous shock for the entire nation 31 Therefore this is a very complex situation Our people will not accept a unilateral decision Not only we but you too will find yourselves in conflict with our people So think about it again In conclusion I want to say--do not believe the people who claim that the Soviet Union would like to drive the United States out of Europe On the contrary we are convinced that it is impossible to achieve anything in Europe without the United States Baker We never believed such claims Gorbachev Although I am sure that you hear this thesis thrown around as we do conversation continued with delegations Gorbachev Greetings to my colleagues on both sides We need your help I think that the importance of Secretary of State's visit is clear It is determined by the fact that this visit is happening literally on the eve of the summit We will review what we already have and what still remains to be done We have time to accomplish more Today I would like to hear your information about the state of negotiations on the strategic offensive weapons Maybe we will be able to resolve some issues right now and on some we will issue home assignments 32 Baker E A Shevardnadze and I had comprehensive discussions on many issues related to reduction and limitation of armaments economic cooperation regional problems in particular on Afghanistan and Cambodia Today in the second part of the day we will continue our discussion of regional issues and also we will hear reports of the groups on human rights and transnational problems I would like to mention the fact that there was some progress on eight out of twenty names on the list which President Bush gave you on Malta Gorbachev If we are talking about progress Ambassador Matlock has created probably the longest line in Moscow in front of his Embassy Matlock It is becoming shorter Baker Unfortunately in one case progress meant that the person on the list passed away Seven received an exit permit However twelve people are still being refused an exit visa Mainly with reference to their knowledge of state secrets However none of them had access to classified work for at least ten years Therefore we would ask you to give some consideration to this list before your departure for Washington Gorbachev We'll see Baker The majority of our conversations focused on arms reductions and limitations As you know we gave E A Shevardnadze our new proposals in Bonn which the Soviet side 33 then responded to Over the course of further negotiations we made some progress but unfortunately we cannot yet say that the main questions of strategic offensive weapons have been resolved President Bush hopes that an agreement on SLCMs and ALCMs will be achieved before your visit to the US It is very important to him to be able to announce during the visit that we reached an agreement on the main points of the future treaty In the course of this meeting we discussed some other aspects of strategic offensive weapons as well As far as I know we made some progress on the issue of non-circumvention as in the text sic and a few others We are also prepared to discuss issues concerning the reduction of conventional armed forces although we do not consider bilateral discussions to be a forum for negotiations and a way to reach an agreement on this issue The progress made in preparing the protocols for the nuclear testing agreements gives us every reason to believe that these protocols will be ready for signing at the Summit We also moved forward in preparing a joint statement on nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons as well as missiles and missile technology We are very close to agreement on a bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons This will be a big step 34 forward and we are sure that it will be well received around the world Shevardnadze As the Secretary of State noted the issues of disarmament were the priority at our meeting I think as the result of our work we have good preconditions to announce in Washington that we have an agreement on the main points of a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons Two problems appear to be the most difficult and delicate These are air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles I will go over the unresolved issues in these spheres The question of limiting the number of heavy bombers with ALCMs The United States is against any kind of limits Now the Secretary of State has in principle given his consent to establish limits however the proposed level--180 units--is too high Perhaps in the course of this meeting we will be able to reach a compromise The second issue concerns the feasibility of discerning nuclear SLCMs from non-nuclear ones The United States is against such an approach since they say our agreement not to include any control measures removes the question of distinguishability This is a serious hurdle The lack of distinguishable features would prevent us from having a real idea of the state of affairs in this sphere 35 We have not yet agreed on the exchange of information regarding naval nuclear weapons with ranges exceeding 300km We have not resolved the issue of excluding American nonnuclear missiles Tacit Rainbow from the treaty on the range limit of ALCMs According to the agreement reached in Moscow in 1988 it was supposed to be counted as a nuclear missile The American side is asking to make an exception Gorbachev In general how do things stand with control This is a very important question if the future treaty is to pass the Supreme Soviet Shevardnadze We have reached agreement on the majority of questions in this sphere Baker We have not fully resolved the issue of control over ground mobile ICBMs Shevardnadze According to the current position of the U S the Soviet side would have to send 40-50 notifications on the movement of such missiles daily We are for control but such an approach would create serious difficulties I think we should continue discussing this question in the working groups Gorbachev Indeed it looks like you are avoiding control over SLCMs which are mobile missiles while demanding 40-50 notifications per day on our mobile missiles Mr Secretary of State you recall how in the beginning the United States did not want to discuss SLCMs at all while we said 36 that without an agreement on this problem there would be no treaty at all So we made a serious concession we are practically saying that we will take your word for it What will we tell the Supreme Soviet how can we explain this decision Baker I will reply to your question I will start with the fact that two weeks ago we had big differences on the subject of SLCMs and ALCMs The main differences concerned three issues The question of range of ALCMs From the beginning you argued for the range limit of 600 kilometers Marshal Akhromeyev even insisted that he reached an agreement on that with P Nitze several years ago We don't think so Our initial position was 1500km Before the meeting in Bonn our position was 800km yours--600km In Bonn I told the Minister that if we find a satisfactory resolution on other elements of the package and in particular if an exception could be made for the missile Tacit Rainbow the range of which is over 600km then we will agree with your position on the range limits because you explained to us that your entire anti-air defense system is built on the assumption of precisely that range The second issue--the problem of the overall limit on the number of SLCMs You raised it twice in your conversations with me Gorbachev And I raised it about ten times before you 37 Baker In Bonn I said that even though we always rejected that approach we are ready to establish the limit of 1000 units But I have to be honest--such a decision does not sit well with many of us Third issue--the limit on the number of heavy bombers In Bonn I said that having met you halfway on two of the three main issues we expected that you would agree with our position on the third one However yesterday we showed flexibility The fact of the matter is that President Bush really wants all issues resolved before the Washington summit So yesterday we agreed to the approach you were proposing on the basis of which heavy bombers over a certain limit would be counted by their real ALCM armament The only question is the quantitative parameter of this limit Thus we met you halfway on the three main issues that divided us three weeks ago There still remains the question of the range limit of SLCMs covered by the political statement Our position is 300km yours is 600km We understand that you have a significant number of SLCM in the range between 300km and 600km But yesterday for the first time the Soviet side raised the question of including other naval nuclear arms in the statement besides SLCMs Now I will explain why it is quite difficult for us to accept your proposal on differentiating between nuclear and non38 nuclear SLCMs First and foremost SLCMs are covered by political statements that are not part of the treaty Nuclear ALCMs are covered by the treaty itself therefore it is quite natural to differentiate them from non-nuclear missiles We have thousands of non-nuclear SLCMs A special feature of their production is that it is the same as the nuclear You are essentially asking us to transfer the approach developed for ALCMs to a completely different situation I would say it would be pushing the control over SLCMs through the back door But we always maintained that they could not be controlled That is why they are considered separately As for your argument that you won't know how many SLCMs we have this is not the case Our budget is published and you know how many nuclear and non-nuclear sea-based cruise missiles we produce every year In conclusion I would like to emphasize one more time that we made great efforts in order to meet you halfway on the main issues of the SLCMs and ALCMs Shevardnadze If I start listing everything that happened in the course of our negotiations two days will not be enough to list all our concessions Gorbachev That's true the American side should not assign all the credit for achieving the agreement to itself 39 Shevardnadze It would be difficult for us to defend this treaty in the Supreme Soviet We made the biggest concession to agree to resolve the issue of SLCMs on the basis of a political statement Gorbachev How can we convince the Supreme Soviet Shevardnadze This will not be easy Besides we gave up our right of inspection of any submarines and ships with SLCMs Therefore we have all the right to expect that the United States would move more in the direction of our position as we have done taking into consideration the specific concerns about which the U S side told us Gorbachev If your unwillingness to agree to inspections of ships with SLCMs is related to your concern that all your ships would be subject to such inspections then maybe we could agree on the following let us establish a minimal quota let us say two ships a year which would be subject to selective inspections Or does your position consist of the condition that an alien foot should never be able to step on an American ship Baker We of course would prefer precisely this solution We do not want to start movement down this slippery road Gorbachev A quota--one or two selective inspections per year--would permit us to tell the Supreme Soviet that some control was envisioned What is it that bothers you Tell me honestly 40 Baker We always held the position that SLCMs could not be controlled and therefore could not be considered in this treaty And we welcomed your willingness to agree to the resolution of this in the framework of a separate statement Gorbachev We welcome the appreciation you showed of how serious this issue is for us If it is not resolved there would be no treaty But we have to do something on the inspections Baker We agreed to establish an overall limit on the number of SLCMs It was not easy for us But if you are saying that the absence of inspections of SLCMs puts the treaty in danger then the situation truly becomes very different You are asking how you would persuade the Supreme Soviet Gorbachev And ourselves too Baker We will also have to persuade ourselves and the Congress For example the treaty does not envision a prohibition on modernization of the heavy ICBMs even though we were seeking it actively You however are telling us that there could be no talk about such a prohibition So we had to meet you halfway even though in our country very few people are happy about that This is the logic of compromise Gorbachev I think that every position about which we are negotiating should presuppose some form of inspection We agreed to a separate document on the SLCMs But in order for that to be a serious document we need a mechanism of control or inspection 41 You are worried that in that case almost the entire American fleet would suddenly be subject to inspection OK we are willing to free you from that concern by establishing the quota of two inspections per year This is an insignificant number considering the fact that you have hundreds of ships Baker If we propose to the Congress to approve the limitations on any kind of weapon systems then the Congress would ask--is that possible to inspect The SLCMs are not possible to inspect Neither you nor we can inspect them Gorbachev We only propose selective inspections One or two per year And you are against any inspections Why Baker Because the SLCMs are not part of the treaty And precisely because they cannot be controlled effectively And as far as it is the fact we cannot agree to a regime that does not provide an opportunity for an effective control Some kind of control would be a mistake The Congress would not agree to that they would say it was a fiction The Congress would say to us that if the treaty was not limiting the SLCMs and that the issue was resolved by a political statement then why would you need to establish a system of inspection which would not be effective anyway We made very serious progress in the direction of your position on the SLCMs and the ALCMs We accepted your position on the range limits of the ALCMs on the overall limits on the SLCMs 42 on limiting the number of heavy bombers All these issues which were left hanging during the last five or six years were resolved in the last two weeks Shevardnadze If one was to count concessions then the biggest concession is the agreement by the USSR to resolve the issue of the SLCMs on the basis of a political statement Baker We admit that Gorbachev In the treaty on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons the Soviet Union made such a concession that the American side did not even anticipate I am talking about the agreement to cut the number of our heavy missiles by half We agreed to that in Reykjavik Compared to that American concessions are just sunflower seeds Baker Tell that to the Congress Gorbachev Are you inviting me Seems to me that this is the first time Seems like members of Congress don't want me to speak there for some reason I will continue If you look at the structure of the Soviet forces subject to reductions you will see that the Soviet Union is destroying hundreds of very modern missiles And you will be cutting the old trash recyclables which you would be eliminating in any case As far as submarines are concerned yes here you are cutting more modern weapons as well but on the whole the situation is such that our Supreme Soviet could ask 43 the legitimate question why does the Soviet leadership agree to such reductions which weaken the basic units of our arsenal If one looks at the prospects of our further negotiations then what are the consequences of the current American position The United States is taking out the strict limitations or strict inspections of precisely the kinds of weapons--planes sea and air-launched cruise missiles--that focus on development and modernization and to which the Soviet Union has been paying less attention What are the implications of such a position It would make further negotiations more difficult Baker I agree with your words that the Soviet Union made a big concession by agreeing to a political statement on SLCMs We acknowledge that this made the treaty possible But as soon as you agreed to it certain consequences were to follow For our part we feel that we also made significant concessions to the Soviet Union In particular we agreed to establish a limit on the total number of SLCMs and a formula to limit the number of heavy bombers I do not think that our agreements will complicate the process of arms reductions and limitations Let alone that limits under the treaty will be in effect for at least fifteen years I want to mention the possibility of accepting at the summit a joint statement for future negotiations on strategic offensive 44 weapons We made good progress in preparations and the work continues Gorbachev And what will the military men who are here with us today say about this Akhromeyev The main breakthrough on the SLCM issue was achieved in Washington in 1987 Everyone here knows that this is where the foundation was laid In a joint statement the parties agreed to establish a separate limit on the number of SLCMs and find means of control If we didn't find these means it is because only one side was interested in this the Soviet Union The United States was not Therefore the lack of control as noted by President Gorbachev really does create a problem Gorbachev We will be suspicious of your intentions The question will arise whether we can trust the United States Baker Every year we will make a statement on cruise missiles they will be politically binding in nature The American system is quite transparent and it is inconceivable that the United States could produce SLCMs in violation of the agreement This is guaranteed by the open nature of our defense budget Gorbachev If this is the case then why is it not known how many nuclear SLCMs you are planning to produce 45 Baker It seems you know how many The level proposed by the Soviet side--760 units--is almost entirely in line with our plans The difference is only two units Gorbachev What we know is another question Our intelligence services work and so do yours And it seems they are feeding each other information general laughter Baker By the way the joint statement from the Washington summit does not stay that the parties will find a solution to the issue of control over SLCMs It says they will seek a solution And we tried to find it Gorbachev So maybe we should add a formula to the text of the political statement that the parties will seek a solution to this problem This way we will at least confirm the old position Baker You are suggesting to repeat the Washington formula Gorbachev At least if such a political statement will be made simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty on SLCMs if the sides state that they will continue to search for a solution to this problem we will be able to convince the Supreme Soviet If we can't make progress then at least let us confirm the old position Otherwise it will be a setback It seems to me that the phrasing that both sides would keep searching for a solution to this problem which was included in the political statement would help both you and us to avoid 46 many problems in the course of ratification I would ask you to think about this Bartholomew Right now we are working on the basis of the Soviet draft of the document And it did not mention the means of inspection It only talks about the measures of cooperation Gorbachev Yes I know But please allow the President of the USSR to have his own opinion The issue of ratification of the future treaty is an exceptionally important issue If we sign the treaty and it is not ratified it would be trouble a scandal Baker That already happened once before We will think about your proposal Gorbachev The issue of limits of heavy bombers with ALCMs This is an important thing We proposed the limit of 120 planes and above that--according to the actual number of ALCMs Your proposal is 180 heavy bombers The difference is 60 planes This is a big difference corresponding to 1 200 units of ALCMs Maybe we should split that difference in half and establish the limit of 150 planes Baker I agree Next issue Gorbachev Range limits Here I take your position Baker Are you ready to make an exception for Tacit Rainbow Gorbachev Yes I am ready Baker The issue that remains is the range limits for SLCMs 47 Gorbachev We need to agree on the number of nuclearequipped SLCMs Let's meet each other halfway In other words-800 units Baker I think we should split the difference between our current position and your current position--760 and 1 000 Then the limit should be 880 units Gorbachev I agree But then we need to affirm that both sides would be seeking methods of inspection of SLCMs Baker This is your proposal Gorbachev At least it allows us not to step backward Baker We will consider it We still have planned conversations today and tomorrow But I would like to be reassured that you propose to restate the formula that was included in the Washington joint statement In other words you are not proposing that the two sides would announce that they would actually implement the stipulations of the political statement They would just be seeking ways to inspect SLCMs This will be just a statement of intentions Gorbachev Yes I propose the Washington formula It would not be easy for us to defend this position in the Supreme Soviet but at least we will be able to say that we have been seeking and will continue to seek a solution for this issue Otherwise it might seem that this issue was buried 48 Baker If we accept your proposal then you will not raise the issue of distinctive features of nuclear-equipped SLCMs Gorbachev I think we will accept the formula that at the next stage of negotiations both sides would raise all the issues of concern to them We can remove them for right now Baker I want to return to the question of range limits for SLCMs The statement will include SLCMs with a range over 600km With regard to the confidential exchange of data we believe the data should be confined to SLCMs with a range of 300-600km and not other nuclear weapons like bombs etc Gorbachev I understand your position I think we agreed on some things but some details remain that need to be worked out Let us not rush through this Baker But my consent for the range of SLCMs will depend on the details Gorbachev The decisions will be made in a package Baker I repeat I can agree to a range of 600km on the condition that we will come to an agreement on what information will be transmitted in the 300-600km range Gorbachev This question should be worked out We will have a statement on future negotiations on strategic offensive weapons and strategic stability In that statement we could note that the sides will review the issues on which they 49 were not able to reach agreement in the treaty on 50 percent reductions Baker I agree that we will have such a statement if we can agree on wording Some more questions on strategic offensive weapons have not been resolved yet I don't know if we have the opportunity to discuss them right now I am talking about the issue of flight tests of heavy ICBMs and the question of limiting the number of warheads on mobile ICBMs Shevardnadze We made a good proposal on this issue Our former position was 1 600 units Now we are proposing 1 200 However the U S proposal of 800 units is not fair Baker We met you halfway Before we had no position at all Gorbachev We need to find a compromise solution Baker Between 1 200 and 800 We also would like to find a solution on the issue of limits on flight testing of heavy missiles You know our former position on this issue You rejected it But we have to show something to Congress Shevardnadze The United States currently proposes to limit the number of flight tests to two per year and in addition to that the Soviet Union would be required to stop production of such ICBMs by 1993 If the U S insists on this proposal this could negate all our work As far as the issue of heavy ICBMs is 50 concerned we have already made all the concessions that we could have made Akhromeyev This issue was resolved in the Washington statement at the highest level Gorbachev Our work is not finished with this treaty The next stage will involve solution of more difficult tasks And then we would be able to consider many issues including those related to the heavy ICBMs MIRVs mobile ICBMs and so on Baker If we agree that the treaty does not stipulate limits on the production of the heavy ICBMs then we probably have a right to count on you to move toward our position on the issue of test flights to some extent Gorbachev This is beyond the limits of this treaty Right now we are not prepared to tell you anything on this issue It would only slow down our work I do not know maybe to some extent the statement about future negotiations and strategic stability would swallow this issue and would give you something with which you can go back to Washington But right now we are not ready to solve this issue it would only complicate everything Baker I promised to think about your proposal to restate the Washington formula on inspections in the statement on SLCMs Maybe you could think of a different version that would move toward our position on the issue of test flights for heavy ICBMs 51 Gorbachev I think these are two different issues We are now seeing outlines of a statement about future negotiations and strategic stability and I think that at the second stage of our negotiations we could very well discuss heavy ICBMs I do not see any connection with the issue of SLCMs Baker I did not imply that there was a connection I would like to hope that before my departure from Moscow we would be able to resolve the two remaining issues relating to SLCMs and that way the issues of SLCMs and ALCMs would be removed Without any connection with these issues we have concerns about the issue of heavy ICBMs I told Minister Shevardnadze yesterday that our initial position which is still on the table of negotiations in Geneva presupposed cessation of testing production and modernization of such missiles We dropped it and asked only to set a limit--two flight tests per year and cessation of production in 1993 In the course of the negotiations I realized that the position of ceasing production is impassable Alright Now I am only asking for one thing consider whether you can accept any wording in the treaty that would limit the scope of testing of these highly destabilizing missiles Gorbachev As I understand the discussion of strategic offensive forces problems will continue It seems we did some good work and made some decisions I want to thank all the participants of this discussion 52 Baker Thank you Mr President After talks with the delegations the conversation was continued once again one-on-one Baker I would like to thank you for your time and attention I appreciate it and the President appreciates it I would like to bring up the Lithuania issue It has been repeatedly discussed between us we had extensive conversations with E A Shevardnadze on this problem As I told him we tried to influence the Lithuanians through indirect channels to get them to take a more moderate position We said the same thing to our allies At the same time as I was talking with E A Shevardnadze we had indirect contact with Landsbergis It so happened historically that our countries have different positions on this issue At his last press conference President Bush acknowledged that this problem is creating some tension That is why we really wanted the Lithuanians to put their decisions on hold on their own initiative and agree to come to Moscow to start negotiations We put pressure on the Lithuanians but at the same time refrained from certain concrete steps that Congress would have liked to impose on us As I said to Shevardnadze today I have to meet with Prunskiene I simply cannot renege on this meeting because the President received her at the White House I will say the same 53 thing to her that we conveyed to them by other channels they should suspend their declaration of independence come to Moscow and open a dialogue I would like to ask you if they take this path can we expect a dialogue I am sure that should a dialogue begin especially before our next summit it would greatly improve the atmosphere for your meeting with President Bush Such is political reality it is necessary to take it into account Gorbachev Yesterday N I Ryzhkov and I met with Prunskiene Baker I know about this Gorbachev I must say that our platform for maneuvering is limited It takes a great deal of skill to execute a broad maneuver on this rather limited platform I won't lay it out for you in detail We are still committed to a political settlement of this problem Yesterday we agreed that she will try to get a resolution at the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania to freeze the implementation of Lithuania's Independence Act Baker And she agreed Gorbachev Yes she will try to get it done The situation is currently pushing us and them towards a resolution I told her that the Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution declaring the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania's decisions invalid For me as President these decisions simply do not exist However I told her that I will try to make the argument though it will be difficult that the decision to freeze the Act is 54 viable and enables us to start a dialogue I have to tell you that the overwhelming majority here is not prepared to accept this and is insisting on introducing presidential rule So we will have to prove that this approach is acceptable At the same time I told her that she will have to do some work to prove that the present resolution is the best possible and viable compromise I told her if you had to rescind the Independence Act you would be accused of letting Moscow bring you to your knees If however you freeze its implementation then you can say that the Act still exists but is not being implemented All told we spoke until 11 p m last night and in the end she said that she will try to get it done If the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania accepts such a decision we will immediately create working groups and begin negotiations on all issues The economic sanctions will be lifted and a normal process will get underway Baker If the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania votes to freeze their declaration but at the same time it will remain as a declaration of intent you will accept it Gorbachev That problem is somewhat different We are talking about freezing this declaration and beginning a discussion with the Center regarding realizing the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination 55 I told her it is entirely possible that we may be able to work out single common position At the same time it is also possible this won't happen and we will have a referendum with the Center's opinion on one side and the Lithuanian opinion on the other If the people decide to leave the Soviet Union then we will begin the process of division This won't be a simple task For example a few days ago a delegation of ethnic Poles came to Moscow and declared that in the case of Lithuania's secession they would like to join with the Russian Federation Approximately 500 000 Russians and Belarusians live in Lithuania If the American administration goes to such great lengths to rescue any American from trouble then how do you expect us to act It is likely that a significant portion of Russians will want to leave Lithuania and return to the Soviet Union This also needs to be resolved Remember that France gave Caledonia 10 years for divorce proceedings There will be a great number of economic problems a complex intertwining of economic concerns We will have to agree on the format of economic relations Military defense questions We have missiles there This all needs to be resolved That is why we are inviting them to have a normal constitutional process Lithuania has always been connected to Russia its market has always been here But we won't impose anything on them If 56 they want to leave that's their right But you have to do things considerately taking all problems into account For instance it turns out that in 1940 Stalin gave a few regions of Byelorussia to Lithuania Now Byelorussians are demanding the return of their land Baker When I was speaking to Congress I specifically mentioned the fact that Vilnius was not part of Lithuania until 1940 Gorbachev As well as Klaipeda Instead of merging it with Kaliningrad Oblast Stalin gave it to Lithuania As for the Byelorussians they say their republic suffered from the Chernobyl disaster Many districts of Gomel Oblast had to be resettled due to the radioactive fallout Even now they want to use the former Byelorussian regions to settle their citizens there They adopted a resolution which we tried to keep under wraps by the way but they made it public it themselves I told Prunskiene yesterday look at this mess you've made We are in favor of giving Lithuania economic and political autonomy with the possibility of choosing a special status such as a confederate But at the same time all the issues must be resolved--humanitarian territorial etc We will seek a solution for this problem We will do everything we can to untangle this knot to everyone's best interests 57 Baker Do you think that she will succeed in convincing the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania Gorbachev I think she will There is already a split among them Baker On Brazauskas' side Gorbachev Yes We appreciate your position and your determination to help us find a way out of this situation Right now it is important to show restraint We will see how events unfold Recently some comrades visited rural regions of Lithuania and saw that people there do not support the separatists They are happy with the current situation they receive concentrates from the Center the existing network I think this is why the Lithuanian leadership is afraid of a referendum Baker Only 40 percent of the population voted for the current Supreme Soviet Gorbachev Exactly So we will untangle this knot You have to understand that we could have taken a completely different route and acted more harshly if we ourselves hadn't been the initiators of the democratization and reform process in our country I'm under tremendous pressure I'm getting telegrams with demands to take decisive action I'm being told look at what the American president does to protect his citizens I'm going to show your President these telegrams 58 We are firmly committed to our line and we are committed to a political settlement of this problem Baker We wish you success in this and all of your efforts I would like to affirm once again that the President and I support you support perestroika and we will act accordingly Source The Gorbachev Foundation Archive Fond 1 opis 1 Published in Sobranie sochinenii v 20 pp 13-29 Translated by Anna Melyakova Svetlana Savranskaya and Chris Johnson 59