0 Hist History Landa Europe Defense Book New Studies REDACT STATE EQUITIES AS SHOWN 5X1 25X6 WITH CIA CONCURRENCE 4th Draft 11-12-11 RETURNED TO ORIGINATING rol G E N C Y _ D O D_ _ _ __j Shots from a Luce Crumon Combating Communism in Italy 1953-1956 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Date Rf'j'dJA'If21J i Dl' WHS Begilming with the April 19481talian national election campaign 1 the United States invested large sums in economic aid and military assistance along with substantial covett funds to reduce the power of the Communist Party the largest in Europe outside the Soviet bloc and strengthen the governing Center coalition led by the Christian Democrats DC and Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi U The first series of policy papers the National Security Council NSC produced after its creation in 1947 dealt with the possibility of the Communists winning the 1948 election or staging an insunection to seize power 2 A successor series NSC 67 updating policy in 1950-51 in effect until the second year of the Eisenhower administration was unusual in that its focus-the Communist threat--was nanower than most NSC papers covering a single country The focus derived from the importance accorded the country's strategic position Ifthe Soviet Union gained control of Italy it could dominate the Western Mediterranean and could apply substantial military power against the Balkans and Western Europe ' J In 1951 President Truman established the Psychological Strategy o The smaller coalition parties included the Republicans PRJ Liberals PLI and Social Democrats PSDI In 1947 De Gasperi had ousted fi om his Cabinet the Communists PCl Jed by Palmiro Togliatii and the Socialists PSI under the leadership of Pietro Nenni The Social Democrats headed by Giuseppe Saragat were Right-leaning Socialists who broke with the party and joined the Center electoral bloc that defeated a PCI-PSI bloc in the 1948 election Small parties on the far Right not represented in the government included the Monarchists PNM and the nee-Fascist MSI U 11 C tCL l Board PSB under which a working group compiled a checklist of actions and coordinated U S Government efforts to weaken Communist influence in the country Although Eisenhower replaced the PSB with the Operations Coordinating Board OCB in 1953 the new body in effect retained the working group on Italy and a similar checklist of actions 4 U Little changed in the new administration's approach to Italy's Communist problem appearances to the contrary In appointing Clare Boothe Luce in March 1953 as ambassador the first woman to represent the United States at a major diplomatic post 5 Eisenhower essentially continued his predecessor's activist policy while giving it a different face U Luce soon became a center of attention as much for her glamour and an inclination to speak her mind openly and sometimes too sharply--as for the groundbreaking nature of the appointment She labeled it a myth that she talked too much Once dubbed the Candor Kid by the New Yorker now just shy of her fiftieth birthday Luce had been a magazine editor successful playwright among others the Broadway hit The Women and repmter for Life magazine at the outset of World War II Beginning in 1943 she served two terms in Congress becoming the first female member of the House Armed Services Committee After failing in 1952 to win the Republican nomination for the Senate from Cmmecticut she and her second husband 1-Iemy R Luce publisher of Time Life and Fortune campaigned heavily for Eisenhower No doubt the appointment was a reward for their support Her recent conversion to Catholicism may have been a 6 factor in her posting to a predominantly Catholic country U DF r LI SSIFIED N FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Reeords Dec ass Div WHS Date 1 1 J N 20 6 Office of the Sccrctmy ofDcfcnseS t s t ln L ChicC RDD ESD WI IS Date' 1't'P Authodty' EO 13526 Declassify Dlmy in Full Dcc assif in Pnrt y --Rcuson _ii b MDR' '1 - -M- Jlo' 2 U 8E0 C' t 'l- o w J -- - '-- -- The appointment was not Videly welcomed in Italy Embassy morale plummeted at the news Minister Counselor Elbridge Durbrow second in rank lobbied the Foreign Ministry to reject the appointment Another staff member thought of resigning The popular Ellsworth Bunker who had been in Rome as ambassador for less than a year had to lecture the staff on the need for supporting his successor 7 The Italian press reacted negatively A cartoon portrayed the American flag edged in lace hanging fmm the Embassy building Some Italians did not like the idea of relations with an imporiant country like the United States being handled by a woman Others thought her Catholicism meant a boost for clerical influence within the government But pruticularly on the Right people began to point out that her ties to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles could only help Italy and her husband's publications might enhance Americans' image of the country Despite all the grumbling De Gasperi decided to accept the appointment reportedly saying If the President of the United States wants to send a woman she will be more than welcome I have already met her and like her 8 U Under Bunker the Embassy tried to pull back from the highly visible role it had played during the 1948 election campaign and keep in the background Injecting the United States into the Italian scene he believed only helped the Communists U S policy should be as self-effacing as possible and let the Italians get the credit for the material progress which has been made Luce was aware of the expectation that she should maintain a low profile Shortly after her nomination a repotter asked if she would predict the outcome of the national election later that spring or offer advice on how Italians should vote She replied We don't like people or other nations to interfere in our elections Why should they She confided to a friend I think it will be a time for t 8ElKEI o DF L-' SSIFIED N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date 1 1 JAN 2016 tstl C l me to go quietly about my ambassadorial business lndicating that 'e simply do not interfere in other people's affairs Given her outspoken personality this may have been impossible As a biographer noted Luce was to the limelight what certain actors are to the camera they love each other on a level almost below consciousness and can find each other in a London fog 9 U It did not take long for Italians to wann to her By summer British Ambassador Victor Mallet observed that the phenomenon of a woman Ambassador excited the Italian imagination to such an extent that Mrs Luce has had to put up with a kind of film star reception wherever she goes Luckily she seems rather to like queening it in this mmmer but it makes it difficult for Italian politicians and her diplomatic colleagues to deal with her in business matters on an ordinary footing of equality He sized her up as goodlooking and beautifully dressed with much personal charm to mix with her not too profound intelligence noting that she was a convinced feminist eager to show that a woman can do the job as well as a man He added somewhat condescendingly that she was hardworking enough to make a suitable Ambassador Luce's celebrity status was reflected in a poll showing that within a month almost 50% of Italians knew her name while only 2 percent knew Bunker's 10 U It is open to question whether she helped during her three-and-a-half years' tenure to fm1ify the Center parties and weaken the Communists primarily by selectively awarding Offshore Procurement Program OSP contracts to reduce Communist OF GL SSIFIED N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass D v WHS Dot 1 1 JAN 1016 o Financed under the Military Defense Assistance Program MDAP offshore procurement provided funds for U S purchase of military equipment manufactured in other countries and its presentation to allies often the country of manufacture for their military forces By Aprill954 the United States had placed contracts in European NATO i- 1'--- 5 influence in Italian labor unions and by covertly funneling large sums of money to Center patties and organizations though not nearly as much as generally believed When she left Italy the relative electoral positions of the parties had changed only slightly Alihough her main mission was political military matters occupied much of her time In addition to involving herself heavily in the implementation of the OSP program she sought Italian backing for the European Defense Community EDC wrapped up agreements governing U S military facilities and the status of U S forces in Italy helped to resolve the Trieste controversy that in the fall of 1953 brought Italy and Yugoslavia close to war and wrestled with the question of possible U S militmy intervention should civil war break out in Italy U The Disappointing 1953 National Election By the time Luce arrived in Rome fem s had lessened of a possible Communist insun ection or a Left bloc victory in the next national election though the Center's electoral strength had been declining in local elections U During the 1948 election campaign military contingency planning played a large pa11 in Washington's thinking If the Communists came to power legally the Truman administration decided it would carry out a limited mobilization fmiher strengthen military forces in the Meditenanean begin combined planning with allies and provide financial and military assistance to any anticommunist underground that might emerge The CIA expected that anticommunist forces would try to prevent a communist govemment from consolidating power but would not be able to overthrow it or hold areas under their control without immediate and substantial foreign assistance The Joint countries amounting to $1 7 billion roughly half of which was for ammunition Ismay NATO The First Five Years 137 U j'MQPFT DF C L SSIFJED FULL Au honty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WH S Dotec 1 1 JAN 1016 6 Chiefs deemed sending additional U S air and naval forces to the region feasible Because deploying ground forces would deplete a reserve already dangerously lmv they advocated reinstitutiou of the draft They also pointed out that neither limited nor general mobilization would significantly boost combat strength until at least a year after mobilization had started 11 U Concerned also with the possibility-late in 1947 considered a likelihood that the Communists would use force to seize power the United States wanted to rush delivery to Italy of military equipment for the government's use in controlling disturbances expected during the campaign and immediately following the election De Gasperi initially balked fearing that knowledge of the shipments would give the Communists propaganda fodder but eventually relented The equipment mostly small anns ammunition began to an-ive in early April 1948 without notice via Germany 12 U Just before the election the Joint Chiefs finalized plans to move U S air and naval forces to the Mediterranean as a show of force A year later however they concluded that several positive developments including the favorable outcomes ofthe Italian and French elections the establishment of NATO and the Soviet Yugoslav split had obviated the need to have military supplies and equipment pre-stocked to carry out the movement of these forces planning for which they now considered a contingent rather than a firm demand 13 U By the beginning of 1953 the Communist Pa1ty was downplaying the use of violence and subordinating preparations for insunection to lawful political activities Although it had maintained a paramilitary organization of more than 50 000 members that number had apparently been declining there was no evidence the party intended to tf5 Cl i o DF t' Lt SSI IEO N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS Dote' 1 1 ' JAN 201 7 v 'e ti' l'to o augment these forces in the near future Police occasionally discovered and seized weapons hidden in large caches but found them in poor condition A State Department analysis concluded that in the unlikely event the party attempted a major insurrection government authorities could ruthlessly suppress it Even in northern areas where the patiy was strong only a Soviet invasion would give it any prospect of can'Ying out successful revolutionary action 14 U The national election held 7-8 June the first since 1948 confronted Luce with an immediate challenge Originally scheduled for April the State Department had wanted Bunker to remain in Rome until it was over When the date was pushed back State wonied that it would appear he was staying to manage another U S intervention decided Luce should arrive before the election 15 U In the contest for the more important lower house the Chamber of Deputies the Center coalition suffered a huge setback winning 49 8% of the popular vote a sharp drop from the 62% achieved in 1948 It narrowly retained control with a majority of 16 seats rather than the 160 it had enjoyed 16 The biggest gains accrued not to the Communists but to their allies Nelll1i's Socialist Party and to the neo-Fascist and Monarchist parties of the far Right What made the result even more disappointing was the failure of the Center coalition to benefit from a modified electoral law labeled the swindle lawH by the far Left and the far Right whereby it would have received almost two-thirds of the Chamber seats had it won just a bare majority of the popular vote 17 U The poor showing was not unexpected Although one historian has claimed that American officials viewed the coalition's prospects with much optimism 18 it is more accurate to describe official opinion as ranging from alarm to cautious optimism With 'SECPBM DF r L o 8-SIFfED N FULL AulhorJty EO 13526 Chief Records Dec ass Dlv WHS Date 'f l JAN 20 1i 8 the coalition's electoral strength already falling to around 51% in the 1952 local elections Bunker appealed to the CIA for increased subsidies for the Center parties prior to the 1953 national election perhaJ S more would be needed he said Embassy opinion unanimously held that the fate not only of everything we have done here but our present position in Italy and our hopes for the future hinged on the election's outcome If the Center lost Bunker declared I believe we shall be picking up the pieces not only in Italy but all over Europe for years '' 19 Subsequent prognoses brightened a little but remained mixed On rctuming to Washington in the spring Bunker told Director of Central Intelligence DCI Allen Dulles that the election would be quite close there was a fair possibility the Center would win a fraction more than the 50% of the total vote 1' But a State official monitoring the campaign felt the prospects did not point unequivocally to a victory for the center coalition 20 Two weeks prior to the election State thought the Center would obtain around 51% On election eve the Embassy held to what it had been saying throughout the spring It anticipated a rather slim margin of victory for the Center an 1 outcome the CIA also foresaw However disappointing the Center's winning just under 50 percent of the popular vote therefore came as no big surprise U Luce's first major public address may have contributed to the Center's setback In Milan on 28 May little more than a week before the election she warned that if -though it cannot happen--the Italian people should fall unhappy victim to the wiles of totalitarianism totalitarianism of the right or left there would logically follow logically and tragically grave consequences for this intimate and warm cooperation we now DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonly EO 13526 Chief Declass Dlv WHS Dote tl JAN 2016 enjoy Prom the Left and the Right came charges that the implied threat of a U S aid cutoff constituted meddling 2 U Although one ofLuce's staff contended that the speech said what needed to be said but had served as a convenient means of criticism for people ' vho hated a woman Ambassador anyway British Ambassador Mallet felt it ' may have done more harm than good Washington officials rcpmtedly prefened that the remarks not cleared by State had been worded more diplomatically but they had no intention of disavowing or clarifying them The Washington Post called them an inexplicable breach of diplomatic propriety that would not help the Center's chances After the results were in while acknowledging that many other factors had been at play the Post again mentioned the Milan speech emphasizing that a shift of one per cent of the votes would have made a huge difference in the Chamber's composition 3 U Then and later Luce strove to counter criticism that her remarks had cost the Center coalition the bonus seats col tending that they created more of a stir in the United States than in Italy She liked to repeat De Gasperi's gument that the Cold War thaw following Stalin's death and particularly British Prime Minister Churchill's call for an East-West summit had been responsible Months afterwards she told an Italian newspaper that two staff members had written the speech both of whom had since left Rome She eventually identified Durbrow as responsible for the warning comments saying she had wanted to remove them from the speech but he had insisted they stay Luce's social secretary who claims to have typed the speech recalled the ambassador working on it for five days Presumably repeating what Luce told her she said that the ambassador had discussed it with Secretary Dulles and others at State implying that the S 'CRFT 'IF LASSIFIED 1 1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records -Deelass Dlv WHS Dote 1 1 JliN 20 lh 10 text had been cleared in Washington '1 Luce herself never made this claim and there is no evidence such clearance took place U The marked-up first draft of the speech reveals that Lucc herself not Durbrow or anyone else inserted the controversiallanguage 5 It may be that when criticism arose Durbrow volunteered to take the blame or that at some point Luce changed her mind and wanted it removed but was persuaded otherwise In any event there is little doubt Luce was the original somce U Luce had an uncharacteristically rosy estimate of the Center's chances in the election A self-professed pessimist her response to a suggested course of action often was What's the worst that can happen 26 On the eve of the election however she told a friend that she was more optimistic about De Gasperi's chances than many other observers and believed that he will get comfmtably thru and will be able to fonn and continue a stable government In an election pool conducted by U S and British Embassy staffs she predicted that the Center parties would receive 54 8% of the vote and the Communists and Nenni Socialists together only 29 7% 7 Afterward in public comments and reporting to Washington she avoided expressions of alarm saying she saw the results mainly as a step in Italy's slow and steady move toward communism She even managed to put a positive spin on the results perhaps in part to deflect criticism of the Milan speech The outcome was a victory for the Christian Democrats she maintained since the party received more votes than any other and almost twice as many as the PCI For the time being she considered pessimism unwan anted and urged that it not be expressed 8 U DF LA SIF ED 1MFULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHB Dale rr r iwl1tt6 SECRET II 'bile the Embassy tried during the campaign to stay in the backgroundj one prominent journalist went too far in contending that the U S Govermnent-except for Luce's speech maintained a hands-off attitude In a number of ways less dramatic than in 1948 it did attempt to aid the Center parties One Vas President Eisenhower's atmouncement in April 1953 of his intention to seek legislation allowing a marked increase in the number ofltalian immigrants to the United States an announcement De Gas peri felt would help his chances in the election Another move was stepping up the pace of OSP awards even if it meant incmTing higher costs in order to stimulate employment and enhance the image ofthe ruling coalition Although the State Department doubted that contracts could be placed quickly enough to create new jobs before the election Washington went ahead with the effort anyway In fact the volume of contracts exceeded the target figure of $150 million An election postmmiem concluded that in spite of the Center's setback the accelerated OSP program had at least helped keep De Gasperi in office 29 U This notion that the election might have turned out worse were it not for at least limited American involvement appeared in a CIA assessment of its role Frank Wisner CIA Deputy Director Plans believed that had it not been for the agency's cove1t financial support the reverse suffered by De Gaspeti and the center patties would have been a rout and both the extreme Left and Right would have fared much better How much the CIA devoted specifically to the election campaign is not clear but the figure was less than outgoing CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith June 1953 expenditures for political action and other operations in Italy having an DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Oecless Dlv W Dale 1' I' I JAN lOifu 12 important political aspect-likely including some activities not related to the election-came to just the same pmvoses the previous OSIJ lAic Sounding the Alcl 'm Any concern Luce may have suppressed in the wake of the election gave way to alarm when the political situation quickly deteriorated after the De Gasperi Government fell the following month His inability to form a new government led to the collapse of the four-party Center coalition and formation of a one-party caretaker government in August by a Right-wing ClU istian Democrat Giuseppe Pella to serve until the end of October U Despite or perhaps because of his tenuous political position Pella n1ade a bold move to settle the Trieste controversy with Yugoslavia broaching his plan in an unorthodox way While Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR General Alfi ed Gruenther was aboard a plane returning to Paris after a visit to Rome in early September an Italian military officer orally conveyed a message that Pella wished transmitted to i Eisenhower He wanted the United States and Great Britain to announce a provisional arrangement in Trieste allowing occupation by the Italians of Zone A the area they were administering He could not make the suggestion openly because Yugoslavia would ceJtainly reject it and Italian opposition parties would accuse him of a sellout since Italy would no longer be contesting Yugoslavia's claim to Zone B To assure Eisenhower that the channel he was utilizing did not reflect a lack of confidence in Luce Pella included a strong endorsement ofher 32 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonly EO 13526 Chief Rocords Declass Dlv WHS Dote iiifJECi i 0 fi JAN 20 fl OLCltl' i 1 The United States and Great Britain went along with Pella's proposal a1mouncing on 8 October their intention to withdraw from Zone A and hand over administration to Italy When Yugoslavia Hu eatened to use military force to prevent Italian armed forces from entering the zone the United States and Great Britain shelved the proposal They decided to resolve the controversy by holding secret negotiations with the Yugoslavs beginning in February 1954 later bringing in the Italians 33 U The disillusioning effect of the Western powers' retreat from the 8 October announcement led to rioting and heightened the sense of crisis in Italy At the same time organized labor unrest threatened political stability as the non communist trade union confederation CISL joined the larger Communist organization COIL ' in a one day general strike in late September the first joint action involving both sides ofthe labor spectrum since 1947 4 At the end ofOclober political situation was rapidly worsening left wing extremists were in almost complete control directly or indirectly The Center parties had regarded the June election as a defeat and were engaging in all the petty quan els and name calling of those who fail Shoring up the political structure required a major infusion of resources It may not be too time is running out very fast to preserve the democratic processes here but 35 ce - Luce now came to the same discouraging conclusion According to Durbrow 'Do I Co' $Established in 1944 CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro was initially a unified trade union organization representing Communists Socialists and Christian Democrats In 1950 the Christian Democrats and right-wing Socialists formed their own organizations the predominantly Christian Democratic CISL Confederazione Italiana Sindiccrti dei Lavator and the Unione Iraliana del Lavoro UIL which mainly represented the Social Democratic Party By 1954 CGIL had 3 5 million members CISL 1 5 million and UIL between 100 000 and 200 000 DepState Public Services Division Background Ita y-1954 5-6 State Publication 5426 Aprill954 U 4ES Pffi DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Records Oeclass Olv WHS Dele r I JAN 21116 14 she was very disturbed-really gloomy at times She told him I've been here 6 months and what's happened We lost the election The government spends its time fighting itself Nothing has been done I've accomplished nothing 36 U She wrote Eisenhower warning that if the non-Communist patties did not take strong political action within two years Italy will be the first Western Democratic nation by legal democratic procedures to get a Communist goverrunent As a first step she advocated increasing U S covert financial support The amount CIA plam1ed to spend for all anticommunist activities by free labor unions civic committees cooperatives and others was not enough even to pay off the cun ent debts of the CD Pmty which she said amounted also urged prompt implementation of the Trieste declaration that had briefly boosted Pella's popularity but backfired on him as suspicion grew that the United States and Great Britain intended to weasel out to mollify Yugoslavia Finally she asked that State and CIA formulate new guidance for the Embassy regarding several contingencies I a Communist Italy 2 restoration of the Italian monarchy and 3 suppo1t of a Right dictatorship 37 U C r p f ' The appeal did not go over well at the White House The President drafted a prompt rather sharp response that he said had one purpose to get over to her in roundabout fashion that it would be a good thing to analyze and specify what Italy could do for herself as well as to point out what we must do in the situation He hoped Luce would get the point 38 Eisenhower assured her that the United States was not weaseling on the Trieste declaration He thought it odd that of all the countries in which we have been opposing Communism we have had less success in Italy than in any other The entire area of Western Europe including Italy has experienced a great rise in economic DECLASSIFIED IN PART 1tutbority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date JAN I I 2016 REI o ''''''' l - ' ' 1 1 LJl activity during the last few years and a great part of this result has come about because of American help Yet every new report from Italy bears evidence of an increasing resentment against us and increased respect for the Soviets In general he agreed that the United States should give Italy increased concern and interest-to say nothing of money but he believed that much responsibility rested with Italian leaders He concluded with a pointed suggestion that in addition to information as to the material moral and political assistance we should give either clandestinely or publicly it would also be useful to know what kind of pressme we should put on these governments to do something themselves As if to soften his remarks a handwritten postscript gave Luce a pat on the back You are really going good-according to all the travellers 39 U b l b o O The CIA already had begun to move in the direction Luce desired During the first oso 1 4 b Direct rA Icn Dulles requested a week on o oember thorough review to determine whether subsidies for Italy should be increased That summer the uncertain political situation had prompted CIA to approve financial assistance to the Christian Democrats on an interim three-month basis to help prop up the patty's sagging organization The agency's Western European Division now recommended greatly enlarging that figure In addition to what was already budgeted it proposed at mnually over the next few years Approval would have meant that the amotmt grew from arcJUntd year 40 l'O c LI ' Luce's warning did have some effect On 10 November Allen Dulles told the Intelligence Advisory Committee lAC that a report received over the weekend apparently her estimate had prompted CIA to produce a paper on Italy's short-term political outlook for discussion at an NSC meeting later in the week As it turned out the OS01 4 c DECLASSIFIED IN PART AuthOnty EO 13526 Chlef Records OBGI ss Dlv WHS Oala Jj r1 JAN 2f f8 16 NSC did not deal with the paper Briefing notes prepared for Dulles's use presumably reflecting the paper's conclusions indicated that developments depended much on the Trieste issue A solution acceptable to Italian public opinion would probably keep Pella in power Without this he V 'ould almost certainly resign or his government would fall thereby further increasing political instability and strengthening the extreme Left and Right The estimate concluded that failure to satisfy Italy over Trieste probably vmuld not cause the Communists to come to power within the next two years Also possible but unlikely unhappiness over Trieste perhaps combined with a prolonged general strike could create a revolutionary situation in which the left might seek to overthrow the govermnent lfthe government made a sharp turn to the Right the PCI might stage a coup Italian security forces were considered capable of putting down such an attempt The CIA paper with revisions and updating contributed by State the military services and the Joint Staff became a special estimate issued at the end of December One of the more significant changes from the earlier version replaced the statement that the Communists and Neru1i Socialists were unlikely to come to power within the next two years with an even more sanguine forecast that they were unlikely to attain power within the foreseeable future either by parliamentary means or by force 41 Washington was obviously not as alarmed as Luce U Although Luce had not mentioned in her estimate concerns about the Italian military or Department of Defense policies she soon made these known The Director of OSD1s Office of Military Assistance Major General G S Stewart visited Rome in December and received an earful Luce asked what the Pentagon could be thinking when it armed and trained Italians who would end up by fighting against us Regardless of DF C'iLA SSJ tED N FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass D v WH-'3 Datec 111 MN 2a aa H ' 17 Ku'n Jn efforts by the govemment to purge Communist officers from the military the armed forces could not be mobilized for war without including hundreds of thousands of Communists Moreover the Communists in complete control of the telephone system COllld probably disrupt comnnmications throughout the country in the event of an emergency The United States she declared was actually supporting rather than fighting communism by continuing military assistance and placing OSP contracts in Italy without requiring Italian authorities to purge Communists from the armed forces And she wanted to use the award of OSP contracts as leverage to reduce Communist influence in Italian labor Asking Stewart to pass her views on to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson she made the cryptic remark 11 Tell Charley that I have changed my ideas considerably since talking to him last April 42 Presumably this meant she no longer intended to adopt a hands-off policy U Luce also wrote to General Gruenther asking that NATO lend a hand in combating Communism in Italy Gruenther who discussed her appeal with Secretaries Dulles and Wilson when they came to Paris for the December NATO meeting thought that unless she presented better reasons he was not inclined to raise her concerns as a military problem He and OSD officials generally concluded that 11 the problem of communism within individual NATO nations should not be attacked through NATO military agencies but should be worked on by means of all diplomatic and economic pressures available 43 Offshore Procurement as a Political Weapon During a vacation in the United States after Christmas--she later complained that during her service in Italy she was never officially recalled for consultation and always #F@ Ml o DF CLA SSJFIED N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Dec ass Div WHS Doteo fj c JAN ailS to I o 18 had to pay her own travel expenses-Luce urged acceptance of her ideas at a series of meetings with President Eisenhower and vith State Defense and CIA officials Her major proposal Vas to make it clear publicly that offshore procurement contracts would be awarded only to companies that took decisive action to reduce Communist strength in their labor forces Luce later called it anntwisting that wouldn't be called interference She had to cut the visit shmi and return to Rome on 11 January after the Pella Government fell Allen Dulles thought their talks ' 1did a great deal to clarify our respective views regarding the Italian scene and when the emotional heat was removed I did not find that there was any very basic difference between us 44 U The new approach did not involve a f1mdamental change it merely made existing policy more systematic and its application more visible An impmiant objective in both PSB and OCB planning was to loosen the Communist grip on the Italian trade unions and bolster the free trade union movement From its inception OSP had been employed for this purpose The Benton Amendment to the 1951 Mutual Security Act stipulated that all U S military assistance should encourage and strengthen free labor movements in recipient countries But Washington was uncertain how explicit the anticommunist aspect of OSP contracting should be As CIA Director Smith had said in December 1952 in an apparent reference to Italy and France It is probably impractical to refuse to place a contract with a given factory solely because a majority of the workers in the factory are on the Communist rolls To do this might be to cut off essential procurement in these two countries On the other hand there will be instances where a particular factory can be put on notice that unless cmtain designated Communist agitators in that plant are dismissed or unless appropriate support can be given to anti-Communist groups the contract may be placed elsewhere If in a few instances we can in this way destroy or reduce the influence of Communist top leadership in certain plants the DF CLA SSlr ED f FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Dec ass Div WHS 0 lfi IIW 20 5 Y power ofthe rank and file will be decreased and the word will rapidly spread from plant to plant Aware that this required finesse and that bludgeon methods or the laying down of hard rules are impractical he believed that OSP represented a tool for weakening the Communist hold on labor which was not being fully utilized 45 U Luce wanted to use the tool more as a bludgeon She proposed that a high-level official the Secretary or Under Secretary of State publicly announce U S intention to employ OSP to combat communism Secretary Dulles refused but did send her a letter on 14 January 1954 expressing concern at increasing Communist strength discussing necessary countermeasures and pointing out the serious repercussions for U S -Italian relations ifthe unfavorable trend continued He authorized her to show it informally to Italian officials The letter also mentioned assurances Eisenhower had given Luce that Italy would receive a special aid package if the Communist threat were defeated 46 U Shortly after Luce returned to Rome New York Times correspondent James Reston in an account of her talks in Washington revealed that she had been authorized to inform whatever Italian Government succeeded Pella's that the United States would stop placing OSP orders with Communist-dominated Italian factories The Communists bitterly atta cked the policy accusing Luce of interfering in Italian domestic affairs and trying to dictate to the government Even spokesmen for the non-Communist labor federations CISL and UIL denounced it 47 U State wanted Luce to avoid drawing too much public attention to the new policy Recognizing the unfavorable Italian reaction Smith who had left the CIA to become Under Secretary of State doubted that any general information program would have a net favorable effect He judged that we are more likely to accomplish our purpose by D F Clll SSIFIED N FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS 0 o' 2 116 rFr w 20 working for the most part through normal diplomatic channels with the Italian Government whenever constituted and through normal OSP procedures with Italian industrialists Our neYo line has been made very clear to the Italian public and enough of our activities will show above water in any case to keep the Italians firmly aware of our continuing concern and unwavering resolve 48 U Luce's critics secured more ammunition from an Italian journal's publication of remarks she reportedly made at a dinner gathering while in Washington some of them critical of Italian governmental policy and De Gasperi himself Thirty-five Senators on the Left asked the government to declare her persona non grata Luce branded the story a fabrication pure and simple 49 The a1iicle may not have reported exactly what she said on that occasion but it did represent a thoroughly accurate account of what she did say at other Washington meetings and in her correspondence 11 was vintage Luce U Possible Civil T11ar and U S Milirmy Intervention Luce' s recommendation to employ OSP as a weapon to fight the Communists in the labor movement took a curious tum-a breakdown in communication at the upper levels of the two governments U With controversy developing over the new OSP policy the Pella Government gave way eventually in February 1954 to one headed by Mario Scelba a Christian Democrat who had been Minister of Interior for six years under De Gasperi but was not a member of Pella's cabinet The British Embassy described Scelba a 52-year old Sicilian as phySically unimpressive with an agreeable friendly manner The Foreign Office thought that as Minister of Interior he had been singularly successful in keeping his sense during elections and repressing Communist demonstrations thereby earning a DF C L d_ssrF EO N FULL Autllonty EO 1352S g IJ j rds Oecfass Div WHS Li JAN 1016 21 reputation for ruthlessness Respected for his cool clear-headedness there was no doubt about his ability as a leader 50 U American opinion was less flattering A New York Times correspondent likened Scelba to a pudgy Roman emperor According to State's biographical sketch Scelba was not intellectually brilliant but had the reputation of a sound democratic conscience Lacking the natural graces and the persuasive qualities usually required for successful diplomatic negotiations he was inclined to peevishness and relied instead 51 upon dogged persistence to achieve his objective U In November 1953 Luce held a troubling talk with Scelba during which she found it difficult to tell where he stood on the Communist issue His comments echoed what De Gasperi and other Center politicians had been saying for years Because Scelba thought the Communist menace not serjous it was not yet necessary to take action against it Mmeover it was politically dangerous to do so until a total attack could be made the Center parties would have to become much stronger before this could be done If the United States continued to trust and aid the democratic elements the government would handle the Communist problem in its own way Perhaps because of this conversation when Scelba was in the process of forming a new government in February 1954 Luce told Washington he was not regarded as a strong leader and few thought his government would smvive for long 52 U No longer on the sidelines as he had been in the fall Scelba quickly yet indirectly made known his intention to take decisive action against the Communists In late February U S Army intelligence in Austria leamed from someone in the Ministry of Interior putpm1edly close to Scelba that the new prime minister would try to gain 'IF L4 8SIFtED N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WliS o oTI r JAN ro 6 22 parliamentary approval ofEDC and that he anticipated uprisings by the Left in protest If this happened he planned to arrest more than 2 000 Communist leaders If disturbances did not occur security forces would provoke incidents The source asked Vhat support the United States would be willing to furnish specifically whether it would make available on a standby basis troops stationed in Italy and Austria and or elements of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean 53 U The substance of the approach and the manner of communication bothered State Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston Merchant uncc11ain as to the report's reliability did not want to deal with the Italian Government through a military intelligence link Moreover he was dubious about the United States agreeing to tlueatcn or actually demonstrate a show afforce 54 State therefore asked the Army to try to clarify certain points 1 What would be the legal basis for atTesting and detaining Communist leaders 2 How long would they be detained 3 Would Communist members of parliament also be anested 4 What measures would be taken to provoke the disorders 5 Would the plan have the full support ofScelba's cabinet It also suggested the Embassy in Rome as a better place for fmther discussions 55 U On 4 March Under Secretary Smith to whom Dulles had apparently turned the matter over informed Luce of the approach and of State's reservations We are taking care to avoid any commitment since we feel considerable skepticism as to whether the plan is either bona fide or practicable We doubt whether Scelba however much he might personally be inclined to take direct action could carry his three-party cabinet with him on a scheme of this kind and we question whether Communist leaders could be held under arrest for any length oftime unless Scelba was prepared to assume dictatorial DF C LA 8StFJED N FULL 7 Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dtv W i'S Doteo fill illf' 23 ClCLI powers He instructed Luce to take no action and to report if she received a similar approach 56 U Unknown to Smith an approach to Luce had already occurred On 3 March Scelba sent for her and insisted that they talk alone without an interpreter Their one-onone conversation conducted entirely in Italian lasted an hour and a half While Luce got the general drift of what Scelba said his rapid speech and Sicilian accent left her unsure about finer points 57 She gathered that he and the Christian Democrats were now committed to a real anticommunist program Reiterating what he had told her in the fall Scelba believed the Communists could not be defeated unless the government used allout force It had the muscle to do so but first needed to know what the United States would do if civil war developed Not yet aware of the probe by the Army's source and without guidance from State on how to respond Luce replied that the United States hoped it would not come to that and gave her personal view that it would probably back the Italian Government U Scelba seemed satisfied l-Ie then summoned an interpreter and resumed the conversation saying that he had just described the Communist situation as complex but not dangerous and had been pleading with Luce to stop the American press from exaggerating its seriousness In this complete about-face from the position he had taken privately he obviously wanted to conceal what he had just told her With the interpreter translating Luce then read Dulles's letter of 14 January setting forth the new OSP policy and his and the President's desire that the Italian Government take strong action against the Communist Pa11y She also stressed the need for Italy to sign the military facilities Dfr lA SSIFIEO FUll Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Decfass Div WHS Date o IW JAN 2b 24 agreement the urgency of a Trieste solution and passage of EDC Scelba replied that his government was ready to take action in all of these fields 58 U His abrupt shifting of gears may have surprised Luce The essence of his initial private comments did not She was inclined to accept them at face value since Vittorio Valletta President of the Fiat manufacturing company and Scelba's close friend had recently told her much the same thing According to Valletta Scelba who had also reclaimed the Minister oflnterior pmtfolio now controlled the country and all of its forces He predicted that the Prime Minister would take prompt action on EDC thereby bringing Communist resistance into the open Strong govenunent measures against the Communists would risk civil disturbances In order to face this risk Valletta said we must ask for the assurance of U S military help if needed 59 U Less than discreet about these feelers Luce dined with an American journalist the day after talking with Scelba and mentioned several times her fear that conflict between Communists and anti-Communists might erupt 'into the piazzas ' The violence would be good for the United States if a strong government were fully in power in Italy but she did not feel that Scelba's fit the bill 60 U Three weeks later on 28 March Smith sent Luce an English and Italian text of another formal statement she was authorized to show Scelba This one responding to the probe through the Army and his remarks to Luce noted Washington's satisfaction with his intention to restrict wherever possible the power and influence of the Communist Party in Italy It assured him of its moral and if necessary material support in the implementation of such a program The dangers inherent in meeting the Communist threat full on are recognized and appreciated Should the courageous new policy of the DF r tll S I ED IN FU Authonty EO 13526 LL Chlef f e ords Oats f DecJass Div WHo ''7 JANl ll - ro r r' l o - - L n Italian Goverrunent involve it in open strife with the Communist apparatus the United States Government would give such military assistance-shari of manpower emphasis added -as might be required to reestablish the authority of the legitimate Italian Government and restore peace in Italy Finally the statement stressed that 11 the assurances of support both moral and material just given are based upon and conditioned by the conviction that the Scelba Ministry intends to catTy out its program in defense of democratic institutions within a framework of legality and intends to preserve at all costs constitutional government in Italy 1161 U When Luce saw Scelba alone on 5 April and read him the statement he asked to read it himself then returned it without comment It was quite plain she reported that his reaction was entirely negative The qualification short of manpower may have been crucial As their conversation developed it became clear that his ideas about the intemal situation had changed since their meeting a month before Following this brief conversation he called in the interpreter and said several things that underscored his change of heart Luce could only conclude that he had abandoned his earlier ideas 62 U Although State had at first been skeptical about Scelba's initiative Smith was now disappointed at his reaction I do not believe however that we should give up hope just yet that an effective anti-Communist program will be forthcoming and eventually implemented by his Govenunent We are now thoroughly satisfied that the feelers we had previously received did in fact emanate from the Ministry of Interior It may be that they did not emanate from Sig Scelba himself or that Scelba subsequently changed his mind but I believe that we ought not to rule out the possibility that the plan originally had and still has the Prime Minister's support and that now that he knows that it also has American blessing he may proceed with greater vigor I would be the first to admit that this may be the merest wishful thinking but it costs us nothing to bide our time on this particular front for a while 63 ' '-1 oWR 1 DF GLA '3SIF ED ll-1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Dec ass Dlv WHS 0 ' ' r1 r w 1016' 26 Whether Scelba saw State's response as a blessing of the plan is debatable But Smith was correct to adopt a wait-and-see attitude Scelba would resurface the issue that summer U How the hedged answer given Scelba was prepared particularly whether President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had a hand in the drafting is not known But Scelba's probing of U S intentions coincided with high-level consideration in the spring of 1954 of a new policy paper on Italy NBC 5411 during which the President a ld Dulles dampened the Joint Chiefs' enthusiasm for a more aggressive policy 6 U In the past the two men had expressed reluctance to have the United States threaten or actually use military force to prevent a Communist takeover of Italy As a member of the U S delegation to the London Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1947 Dulles objected to a proposed statement by President Truman implying that if disturbances and revolution occurred in Italy the United States would take forceful action He argued that methods other than militmy should be used to combat communism that the United States did not have the right or the duty under the UN Chatter or the treaty of peace with Italy to take military action and that such a statement should not be made without consulting Congress and particularly the chairman of the 65 Senate Foreign Relations Committee U The issue arose again in June 1953 just before the Italian national election Eisenhower requested that a draft NSC paper on basic national security policy retain the word forcible in stating as an objective the prevention of significant forcible expansion of Soviet bloc power even at the grave risk of general war The NSC Planning Board had wanted to remove the word for fear it permitted Soviet expansion by means of DF ' LA SSIF ED f FULL a@t Ci l Aulhonly EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS Dote'rl l l' ' 1DIG 27 internal subversion At an NSC meeting the President explained his reasoning ' if some free world country such as Italy were actually to elect a Communist govenunent he did not see ho ' Ve could do anything to prevent its exercise of power When Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler intetjected that current policy toward ltaly provided for forcible U S intervention no matter how the Communists came to power Eisenhower strongly objected At Secretary Dulles's suggestion and with the President's approval the statement was changed to read To prevent significant expansion of Soviet bloc power even though in certain cases measures to this end may be used by the Soviet bloc as a pretext for war This removed the distinction between the Communists' achieving power violently mpeacefully Eisenhower made clear how much he valued flexibility in such situations l-Ie did not want to be frozen to ce1iain positions in advance of events If and when Soviet bloc expansion occurred the United States would have to decide its position in light of the situation existing at the time 66 U Now in March 1954 the Chiefs wanted to revisit the issue Concerned that the new paper on Italy gave insufficient weight to the damage a legal Communist takeover would do to NATO and Mediterranean security they recommended that the United States preferably in concert with its principal Allies should be prepared to take the strongest possible action to prevent such an eventuality such action possibly extending to the use of military power In general they felt the West should not passively accept anywhere in the world strategically or psychologically important acquisitions of territory natural resources industrial capacity or military manpower by the Soviets even under circumstances in which action to deny such accretions might involve increased risk of general war 67 U lF CiLL SSIF ED 1 1 PULl Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS iS i l Dat 1 c1 1 JAN Vi crrT o 28 Vhen JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford presented the Chiefs' views at the 25 March NSC meeting Secretary Dulles while agreeing in many respects pointed out that before their views could be applied to any country ''there was an immense educational job to do to induce both our allies and our own people to understand the reasons which invited us to assume greatly increased risks of becoming involved in general war rather than to see other p011ions of the free world fall into the Soviet orbit The JCS position could not be adopted at present because it v tould require popular congressional and allied support which it did not have Eisenhower stated that if the United States alone attempted to carry out this recommended course of action we would at once lose every ally we had Because he thought the matter required more thought the paper was returned to the Planning Board for fm1her work 68 U The Planning Board accepted some of the Chiefs' recommendations but not their desire to stipulate use of U S military force if the Communists cm11e to power instead of merely saying as the original draft had that the United States would be prepared to usc force The board doubted whether NATO agreements would penn it use of U S forces committed to the aJJiance to help overlhrow a Communist regime established in Italy It apparently based that position on an opinion obtained from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the following question In the event the Communists obtained control of the Italian Government through legal means and the U S wished to usc U S armed forces in Europe to turn out the Communists is there any reason involving the commitment of these forces to NATO which would prevent the U S using them unilaterally if NATO were not prepared to act The answer had been that in a strictly legal sense such unilateral action would represent a clear violation of the spirit and intent of existing 'F f L o SSJF ED lf 1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 12 11ft Chief RecCJrds Declass Dlv WI-IS a Dote' ro o JAN 29 NATO agreements Although the board's consideration of the matter was entirely hypothetical and did not involve any contingency planning it concluded that the original language provided the proper general guidance 69 U When the NSC resumed discussion of the revised paper several days later the President focused on his reluctance to endorse the Chiefs' position He could not imagine anything worse than the unilateral use by the United States of its forces to overthrow a Communist regime This simply could not be done except in concert with our allies If Britain France and Germany agreed he wouldn't hesitate When Radford pointed Ollt that the Chiefs had recommended strong language because they viewed the possible loss of Italy as very serious the President replied that no one would disagree By intervening against the advice of allies he declared we would lose a great deal more than ltaly 70 U Reflecting Eisenhower's views a key paragraph of the paper as finally approved NSC 5411 2 contained this carefully worded language In the event the Communists achieve control of the Italian goverrunent by apparently legal means the United States in concert with its principal NATO allies should take appropriate action possibly extending to the use of military power to assist Italian elements seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Italy Another paragraph allowed greater breadth for U S action in the event the Communists by anned insurrection or other illegal means threaten the legitimate government of Italy or dominate a portion ofltaly In these situations in o The Planning Board also rejected the Chiers recommendation that a distinction be made between the Communists coming to power by legal means and by constitutional means The Chiefs policy planning group the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had objected there was no such thing as the Communists gaining power legally At Eisenhower's suggestion the objection was met by inserting the word apparently Memo of disc 193'' NSC mtg 13 Apr 54 FRUS 1952-54 6 1675-77 U e SECJC 11 1 I L8 SS r ED 11' FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief t rds Oecfaes Div WHS o eofl I IW 20 b' _e I o 30 addition to orking through the United Nations and NATO to restore the authority ofthe government and increasing military assistance to areas under its control the United States would make 'such use of U S military power as may at the time be appropriate and consistent with over-all strategic concepts and international commitments to prevent Italy 71 from falling under Communist domination This more open-ended policy statement a kind of elastic clause would presumably apply to the civil war scenario envisioned by Scelba U Misunderstanding between Scelba and tbe U S Government soon surfaced He seemingly felt that by talking about tougher measures against the Communists he had satisfied the condition laid down in Dulles's I 4 January letter for an increase in U S economic assistance When he met Dulles in Milan in early May in an apparent reference to the letter he asked for more economic aid and for a high-level technical team to study ways to improve the Italian econm ny Dulles replied that he and the American public had been favorably impressed by Scelba's vigorous and realistic policies and his antiCommunist moves and were pleased that their views of the Communist peril were similar but admitted ignorance about specific plans fm economic assistance He nevettheless promised to consider the requests 72 U State subsequently searched records of messages to Scelba and concluded that the 14 January letter was the only one that could account for his intentional or unintentional misunderstanding Merchant pointed to the letter's mention of a special aid program as a possibility only following a decisive reversal of the dangerous trend and following a rejection of Communism '' It was impossible he told the Secretary to know whether the trend had in fact been reversed until new elections had been held although of course we f r r Lli SS F ED lf'l FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chlct Records Declass Dlv WH8 oateo 1ft JIW llllo 31 are happy about the measures the Italian Government has initiated and hope they will be implemented fully State instructed Lucc to clarify this to Scelba It opposed dispatch of a technical mission fearing that a positive reply might further mislead him about U S intentions 73 U Further Probes of U S Intentions Toward the end ofsmnmer Scelba again tried to learn what military steps if any the United States would take in the event of civil war Once more he approached someone outside the U S Embassy During an August conversation in Rome with A1Ien Dulles about ways to attack the Communists he raised a matter which he did not wish to have taken up through ordinary diplomatic channels for obvious reasons of security If his govcnunent's effm1s to improve economic conditions failed to weaken the Communist Party he feared that the only way to preserve Italian democracy might be to outlaw the party But the government would have to proceed carefully and have absolute ce1tainty of success If the Communists reacted with force he had to know what assistance to expect fi om the United States Dulles who had been present at the NSC meetings in the spring when the President and his brother had strongly opposed unilateral U S military intervention replied that an answer could come only from a higher level and that whatever action might be taken would have to be within the framework of our own constitutional processes and obligations under the United Nations and Atlantic Pact Much as Luce had done in March he then spoke for himselfin an encouraging way pointing out that the background of American policy and action had been to render assistance to those governments who sought it in the effort to stop the advance of international f L lSS F ED IJ I FULL Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Rer Qrd Dactass D v WHo 0 1 JAN 2416 ' ' ' ' fj II t Cifl f9 32 Communism He was certain that ' the Italian case ifit arose would not be different The question was so important he would raise it upon his return to Washington He assured Scelba that in his own area of responsibility he would render all the assistance he could in the anticommunist struggle This implied of course Dulles stressed a willingness on the part of the Italian Govenunent to proceed vigorously and courageously on their own score 74 Dulles must have infonned Luce of the conversation for after he lef1 Rome she wrote to him As you know the question that seems to plague Scelba is the need for a guarantee a firm guarantee from the U S that military help will be available if they tryand encounter Trouble with a capital 'T' She thought the NSC would soon have to consider the question though she opposed raising it in a formal way until we are sme at this end that Scelba has both a concrete plan of action and a time schedule for putting it into action This he certainly does not seem to have now 75 U No record has been found that Scelba discussed with Luce herself the possibility of outlawing the Communist Party He did take it up in late October with British Ambassador Ashley Clarke After Scelba covered some of the same ground that he had with Allen Dulles Clarke asked whether he planned to consult other West European nations or NATO before proceeding Scelba replied that the government would give this considerable thought and would probably consult the British and the Americans However a month later he told Clarke that he was putting off any move to outlaw the Communist Party It could not be done without more preparation on both the intemational and domestic levels Clarke concluded that the idea had been shelved indefinitely 76 U lF ' LA SSIF ED lf 1 FULL Aulhonly EO 13526 Chief Recards D class Dlv WHS 0 ' l I JAN 20 16 5'EGREI 33 In Washington the matter Scelba had raised with Allen support in the event of civil war did Dulles U S military not come before the President until the end of October Meeting at the White House not with the NSC but with a small group and labeling the subject ''most confidential Secretary Dulles reported the gist of what Scelba had discussed with his brother including his inquiry whether U S forces would help the Italian Government put down a Communist uprising Subject to cetiain qualifications he and Eisenhower seemed open to the idea The Secretary then went on to say that the present NSC paper as well as the U S Senate hearings on the NATO treaty when it was discussed both seemed to give approval to a policy of suppotiing the Italian government in such circumstances The President expressed some concern and said he felt that in such circumstances a special session of Congress would have to be ca1led at once and mentioned that this was a tricky matter involving some of the points which had been raised in the Bricker Amendment discussions He asked the Secretary whether the U S would be asked to intervene with its armed forces The Secretary replied in the affirmative The President then indicated that action by U S armed forces in such circumstances should be under the doctrine ofself preservation and protection ofU S property life and the security of its forces and that if the affair assumed large propmiions the matter might be refen-ed promptly to a special session of Congress 77 It is not clear whether the sense of the discussion was communicated to Scelba U By late 1954 with a Trieste settlement having been reached in October the Center parties' prospects had improved considerably Moreover Scelba could feel more confident of his position A National Intelligence Estimate in November concluded that a government dominated by the Christian Democrats in coalition with or supported by other anti-Communist parties will almost certainly remain in power until the next national elections scheduled for 1958 and probably beyond The Scelba Government was The Bricker Amendment referred to a succession of amendments introduced in the Senate by John Bricker R Ohio to limit the treaty-making power of the president U SECREt r f'F GLAS$Hl' ED If FULL Autnonty EO 13526 Chief ef orcls Declass Div WH8 0 ' 1o' ltl iW1 2016 FQfibi 34 ''likely to be more vigorous than any previous postwar government in attempting to implement economic and social reforms but would not have much success in alleviating the unemployment problem without considerable outside financing The NIE contained a further note of caution ''Unless a wisely conceived program is carried out on a broad scale against the political economic and social bases of Communist power and prestige the Left Bloc's parliamentary representation might increase in the next general elections enough to obstruct parliamentary action and threaten the functioning of parliamentary democracy Should this situation arise anti-Communist forces would probably meet it by forming a government able and willing to carry out drastic repressive measures against the extreme Left A Communist attempt to seize power by force seemed unlikely If however the Communists should attempt a coup we believe that the government controlling the public security and military forces almost certainly would be capable of frustrating the coup Its present willingness to do so would be substantially increased if it were assured of prompt outside assistance 78 U What the United States for years had been urging Italian governments to do finally took place On 4 December the Scclba Government announced sweeping measures primarily commercial and financial to crack down on the Communist Party without going so far as to outlaw it The announcement welcomed by Washington did not appear as simply window dressing to keep us happy Later that month at the NATO meeting in Paris when Secretary Dulles congratulated Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino on the announcement Martino voiced apprehension over the Communists making trouble through their control of the labor unions He asked Dulles whether a high- 'II C LA S Slr-J lJ lt'l FULl shCREI ac Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Dsclass Div WHS Doteo 'j rl ' JAN 1 116 35 ranking U S military officer might visit Rome for a few days and ' by his presence and advice to Scelba give them further courage in their anti-Communist campaign 79 1hile in Washington again in January 1955 Luce suggested to Eisenhower Secretary Dulles Vilson and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson that Chief of Naval Operations CNO Admiral Robert Carney be sent to discuss the possibility of concerting military action with Scelba A logical choice Carney had served for two years as Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe headquaJtered in Naples before becoming CNO in August 1953 Dulles not Wilson or Anderson gave Carney his orders instructing him to be primarily a listener in his meeting with Scelba He should avoid making any explicit commitment as well as saying or giving the impression that we could do nothing Dulles seemed ready to act unilaterally If prompt action was required he thought it would be out of the question to await the completion of multi-lateral consultations Carney suggested using a reinforced battalion of Marines with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean or U S forces fl'Om Austria since neither was assigned to NAT0 80 U Carney's talk with Scelba in Rome on 14 January 1955 produced few specifics The Prime Minister remained uncertain when or precisely how he would crack down on the Communists l-Ie would probably wait until after the Sicilian local elections in June Depending on the outcome he might close all Communist schools dissolve local Communist administrations and arrest key party officials Confident that his government could handle disorders in Sicily and southern Italy he was less certain about the North U S military force he said should be close at hand there for its stabilizing effecL In some instances he might invite American troops to secure ports Carney indicated this m rLI SS FlED 1f' l FULL Authoflly EO i3526 Chief Rerords Oec ass D v WHS Dote 'l'i Jf H 20I T r 36 type of support Vas feasible given about30-days' notice but he was careful not to imply t --- a CO l11111tlllel1 Dulles's January 1954 Jetter had linked tougher anticommunist measures by the Italian Government to additional U S economic assistance Interested in more than assurances of U S military support Scclba now countered with a new linkage Put bluntly if the U S Government wanted strong anticomnmnist action it should invite him to visit the United States When the idea first came up in a general way in the fall of 1954 the Italian Ambassador to the United States Albe1io Tarchiani while in Rome for consultations gave it a historical twist l-Ie reminded Luce that De Gaspcri had ousted the Communists from the government after a visit to the United States in 1947 If Scelba received a similar invitation Tarchiani said he probably should take some fUliher antiCommunist actions before coming And after he had a chance to talk with high-ranking American officials on the subject of Communism he would return greatly strengthened in his determination to use all means at his disposal to reduce Communist strcngth 82 U The Prime Minister once again reverted to Italy's need for economic assistance He told Luce that anticommunist measures could not succeed without U S financial support of his government 1s economic plans and reiterated his request to Dulles at Milan for a high-level U S technical mission Instead of promptly agreeing which might lead to the U S Government's assuming an unknown cost in additional aid Luce recommended that Scelba be invited to Washington to discuss economic matters The visit would allow the administration to give him an economic aid package consisting ofitems already scheduled for Italy such as surplus farm products under PL 480 and to announce a specific amount ofOSP aid This said Luce he could bring home as his bacon Dulles f 8P l@ IWI 4 lfGLo '3SIF ED 1N FULL Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Records Dedas l Div WHS Datw 11 N fj r1 201 37 begitming to have doubts about Scelba nevertheless secured Eisenhower's agreement to invite the prime minister though he Vondcred whether it would not be wise to obtain the approval of Christian Democratic Party Secretary Amintore Fanfani since he might be an important rival and perhaps a more effective Prime Minister than Scelba A short time later Dulles remarked that Scelba's anticommunist program Vas somewhat of a mirage I essentially a ploy to extract U S economic assistance 83 In Vashington Luce found little enthusiasm for a large economic package It was not surprising for she essentially embraced Scelba's line of reasoning the United States should first provide Italy economic assistance then the Italian Government v ould take strong action against the Communists After meeting with the President in early January 1955 she made her case to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Cutler Invoking Eisenhower's authority she declared I believe with the President that this is a situation where we should as he puts it 'suppm1 success w She thought an offer of economic assistance essential to Italy's ability to carry out even more vigorous anticommunist measures should be contingent only on the Italian Government's making a good start within two or three months in implementing its anticommunist program If her recommendation was approved Luce foresaw ''real hope of achieving in the next few years a truly significant perhaps even a definitive victory against the Communists But Cutler learned that Stale had informed Luce her proposal required more money than would be available From a recent report by CIA Director Dulles Cutler knew that large amounts of economic aid had failed to diminish Communist influence in Jtaly and France and that further assistance would have to be conditioned on those governments taking strong action against the Communists 84 U 11 r L SJF ED ' FULL Authl mty EO 13526 Chief Record Declnss Div WL S UQRFT r o t rdiW 201 lifl@J r 38 The Operations Coordinating Board viewing her estimate of $1 00 $200 million over each of the next three years as merely an Embassy proposal that had not been reviewed in Vashington directed a working group to study it Luce continued to argue that ' economic aid should not be made available until after the Scelba Government takes a series of political steps designed to overcome Communist influence while noting that it will not take these steps unless a 'reward' in the form of economic aid is made available immediately following each step 85 She had more success Vith a proposal to stiffen implementation of the OSP policy in effect since early 1954 She told Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA H Struve Hensel of her dissatisfaction with Fiat over its ineffectiveness in reducing Communist influence within its plants Company officials apparently believed that the Department of Defense would not implement the guidelines for placing OSP contracts She recommended that a contract then under consideration with Fiat for F-86K fighters be awarded only for assembly of the aircraft The contract for procurement of spare parts and support equipment could be deferred until after assessment of the outcome of the March shop steward elections at the company's Turin plants 86 Luce had experienced difficulty in selling Hensel on the wisdom of the revamped OSP policy When they had first met she asserted that the whole point of military aid is to stop Italy from becoming communist Hensel had replied that it might have that effect but it was not going to be his approach I think that it's a question of making Italy sound and you're going to have to work out your fight with communism on some other basis Luce later teased him about how his retort had scared her Scaring Clare Boothe is very difficult for any man to do recalled Hensel so I know I didn't do it Hensel Dl' f LL '3S F ED lf 1 FULL Authoflly EO '13526 Chiof Racords Declass 0 nrfJAN 2016 D v WHS 39 had not argued with Luce about her diagnosis of the political situation with respect to Communist dominated unions in Italy or what she could or could not accomplish through withholding OSP contracts '' Instead he and Luce had worked out a method to smooth the process of awarding contracts by having the Embassy prepare a white list of acceptable companies that would be given to procurement officers By the beginning of 1955 the basic problem in Hensel's eyes was no longer procedural I am afraid he told a colleague that Vithout new legislation there is not going to be much of a volume of OSP for Italy or anywhere else 87 U At Luce' s urging Hensel agreed to release on 17 January 1955 an announcement that OSP contracts would not be awarded to plants dominated by Communist labor unions Although he felt the statement too dry and unlikely to attract much attention Luce and State assured him that it would receive adequate pub1icity 88 This was essentially the same public statement the Department of State had refused to issue the previous January the substance of which had been leaked in the New York Times En route back to Rome Luce discussed the f-86K question with General Gruenther in Paris They agreed that Fiat should receive a contract to assemble three prototype aircraft If these proved satisfactory the company might be given a follow on to build between one and two thousand planes In Luce's opinion this would allow the United States to retain leverage on Valletta If we got our way-and he really showed some progress in cleaning up his plants-we might then give him the rest of the contract Since there is no way of knowing how much Offshore there will be next year this item represents one of the few levers in our possession and should be treated accordingly f 'C L I SSIF ED 1 '1 FULL Authonty EO i 3526 Ch1ef Racords Declass Oiv WHS aSEGWST Date' f dAIUlilS SBClCL I 40 Back at her post she bore down on Valletta telling him that Fiat's upcoming shop steward elections would be ' the Marne of the Italian labor situation 89 U Coolness in TYashinglon Luce's difficulty in selling the idea of a large aid package foreshadowed the cool reception despite superficial cordiality that Washington accorded Scelba during his visit in late March 1955 90 The Prime Minister received no ofTe1' of large-scale economic aid Nor did anyone encourage him to expect the kind of military suppm1 that he sought in the event of civil war U Both in Washington and in Rome U S officials had endeavored to disabuse the Italian Government of any expectation of an offer of major economic assistance State's briefing paper for Eisenhower noted that after considerable persuasion from us Scelba would probably treat the visit as essentially a way to promote good will between the two countries and enhance his own personal prestige Still it was possible he would make a plea for $330 million in direct economic aid over the next three or four years If that happened State advised against weakening his position through a rebuff which might become known Notwithstanding its weaknesses his goverrunent was the best one in sight State therefore suggested topics for Eisenhower to raise and ways to avoid directly rejecting a possible request for economic aid 91 U The paper intentionally omitted mention ofScelba's approach to Carney in January Fearing that he might be embanassed if the President raised the matter in front of other members of his delegation whom he might not have taken into his confidence State's Bureau of European Affairs EUR treated it in a separate draft memorandum for Dulles to sign and give to Eisenhower The memorandum suggested that Eisenhower take spQQGT a DFr L 5SIF ED '1'1 FULL Aulhon l EO 13526 Chiof Rec ' Orcls Declm n Dlv WH9 Dote' 1 1 JAN 21116 41 Scelba aside prior to a White House luncheon and answer his inquiry Since nothing more had been heard from Scelba EUR thought he might be Vaiting for a definitive response Jt recommended that Eisenhower tell him that 'should his efforts seriously to weaken the Communist apparatus in Italy produce a violent reaction the United States stands ready to provide the military support of the general character and magnitude requested of Admiral Carney during his visit to Rome last January The draft stated that the Joint Chiefs Secretary of Defense Wilson and Dulles all considered Scelba's proposals reasonable and feasible From handwritten marginal notations it seems clear that Dulles did not sign the memorandum and decided instead that he not Eisenhower would deliver the response 92 Judging by what he subsequently told Scelba he objected to the views the memorandum attributed to him and perhaps also to the others U In fact Carncy1s repo11 of the conversation with Scelba had elicited little enthusiasm at Defense Contrary to what EUR's memorandum indicated the Joint Chiefs 1 were not willing to intervene Their position had changed radically Perhaps on the basis of informal soundings or awareness of the position they had taken in the past EUR anticipated what their views would be before receiving them in writing But without more specific information the Chiefs now were reluctant to become involved in a plan that appeared in the formative stage only and lacking sufficient definition as to its military implications They recommended that ''under no circumstances should the plan in its present indefinite form be endorsed since it could lead to United States commitments the nature of which cannot be forecast Though Scclba anticipated use of only token U S forces they needed more precise estimates of Italian capabilities and U S requirements The key factor was that once the United States is committed to iiOIC 1 DF Iil SIF ED 11-1 FULL Authonty EO 1352S Chiaf Reccrds Dectass 0 W'IS Dote' ll JAN 2016 o 42 extending military support it must be prepared to furnish forces adequate to assure success 93 U Meeting with Scelba the moming of 28 March the President adopted a more sympathetic approach than State had desired Scelba spoke at length about the anticommunist measures his government had taken and its efforts to improve economic conditions but he did not feel Italy's economic situation was fully appreciated in Washington Moreover it would be a disaster for the entire civilized world if Italy and Rome should fall into the hands of the communists He emphasized that they would never permit Italy to be taken over by the communists they were determined to fight and felt they had a right to be helped by their allies and friends U Eisenhower thanked Scelba for the actions taken to defend the common cause which had required courage drive and forcefulness assuring him that that the United States not only recognized the scope of the problem but was fully aware of Italy's importance to the world and NATO l-Ie said that the impression that Italy was entitled to some aid was generally correct He assured him that 'we would look with sympathy on his problem but did not want him to underestimate the scope of our problem l-Ie noted As a former military commander in the Mediterranean and as Supreme Commander he was well aware of the political and strategic importance of Italy We had no intention of losing Italy he wished to be a good partner to them but he trusted that the Premier would not make his plan so entirely dependent on American aid as to jeopardize our plans or make us fail in some other area nor to cause us to ask Congress for something we could not justify 'IF Lli SIF ED 11 1 FULL Authonty EO 13fl26 Chief Records De lass Div WI-IS Dote' 1 i JAN 21116 43 Scelba said they had no intention of unloading on the U S the problem of the internal defense ofitaly They would handle that themselves and secondly that they were not looking for gifts or donations but other forms ofaid 9'1 U During a dinner conversation with Dulles that evening Scelba said he had not received an answer to the question he raised with Carney Dulles's thought that a reply had been sent through both Carney and Luce but Scelba said there had been no follow-up from Carney and he could not talk about matters of this kind with a woman Dulles observed that 1'it was very difficult to make a specific reply because no one could foresee the conditions under which aid might be required or where it would be required or what kind of aid it would need to be If the Communists gained control of Sicily apparently a reference to the Sicilian elections in June Scclba warned he would have to do something about it His response might require U S help Dulles nevetiheless answered that the United States could not be more specific unless Scelba put up hypothetical situations sufficiently concretely so that we could make a reply Scelba then turned to his interest in obtaining World Bank or Export-Import Bank loans an increase in OSP or at least a large amount of surplus agricultural products Regarding the latter Dulles pointed out that there were sharp limits on the amount that could be given and that the total amount available for disposal had been already exceeded for the present year 95 The prime minister did not give up At the conclusion of his final meeting with Dulles two days later he suggested inserting in their joint communique a statement that if the Italian Government took steps to defend itself against subversion and faced a situation of emergency nature the United States would not hesitate to intervene 1 CCL ' IF ED FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Rec- rdn Decl 1ss Div WH s o fl f z 44 Dulles refused Scelba also wanted the communique to include explicit assurance that the United States would participate in his government's economic program and not just express its sympathy as a U S draft had put it Here the two men compromised After considerable discussion the reference to sympathy was deleted and a phrase added that stressed U S continuing interest in Italy's economic development 96 U Scclba's only significant achievement came near the end of the visit when he announced during a meeting with Secretary Wilson and Assistant Secretary Hensel the news that Communist strength had sharply declined in the Fiat shop steward elections 97 U Scelba seems to have been playing a lone hand On arriving in Washington several members of his party were astonished to learn that he planned to present economic proposals personally drawn up behind the backs of everyone in the Italian Government Although he left no formal request regarding his proposals Scelba felt at the conclusion of the visit according to a member of his party that he had not met with any firm refusal to have them considered What he mistakenly interpreted as generally sympathetic treatment thus inflated his hopes that special assistance might be forthcoming Opposition to the idea he blamed mostly on Luce In Rome Mrs Luce told me the position of the U S would be far harder than it turned out to be Personally she must be working against giving me hclp 98 U The issue of U S military intervention in the event of civil war was not put to the test Maneuvering within the Christian Democratic Party and lackluster results in the Sicilian elections brought about Scclba's resignation on 22 June Although State Department analysts expected his successor Christian Democrat Antonio Segni at the DEC LA '3SH IE D f' l FULL 5 GiPdiiif Authonty EO 13526 Chief Recarcb Declass Dlv WHS Dote i fl W f l Wb A twto 45 head of another Center coalition to continue the same foreign policy lines and collaborate with the United States and NATO they also thought he would not pursue as strong a policy against the Communist Party as Scelba had 99 U Scelba shov ed little gratitude for the suppoti he received from Luce later commenting that after all a male ambassador would have been better His experience with Luce's successor James Zellerbach caused him to soften his appraisal He remarked ' It's a pity that Ambassador Luce left when she was really beginning to understand Italian politics She had made her presence felt everywhere something Zellerbach was not doing though at times she had been too obvious in shaping Italian affairs Scelba recalled She was not only in the window but also under the countcr 100 U Questioning Covert Financial Support DECLASSIFIED lN PART AuthOritY EO 13526 Chlaf tlar oros Oeclus Dlv WHS oat ' 1111 111N 2111 Another manifestation of Washington's weakening support ofScelba's Govermnent was the re exarnination that took place in 1955 of continuing covert financial assistance to the Center pat1ies U Various factors contributed to the re examination One was discouragement over factionalism and bickering within the Christian Democratic Party that had always existed but which had increased since De Gasperi's death in August I A second troubling issue was the lack of forceful implementation of MJQitl@l L s 46 democracy would not survive and would give way to something more authoritarian and the CIA program might be mmecessary He subsequently suggested preparation of a new intelligence estimate to examine Communist intentions pa11icularly whether the party wanted to take Italy at the earliest possible moment If the estimate found the party satisfied with its present position here as many believe then that assumption may indicate a different policy Allen Dulles did not want 'to cling to a futile course of action and that State 0 was responsible for any rigidity that existed ' ' U C L J ' T u S g J04 Z j After Scelba's departure from the United States Luce remained in Washington to discuss with State and CIA officials his political future and especially the government's anticommunist program They strongly favored a showdown on the latter but uncertain whether he would be able to hold his coalition together in the near future and remain in 104 -'' power deel'ded to postpone actwn The issue of whether to continue covert assistance came to an unexpected head in late May 1955 Outraged by an advance copy of a magazine article charging the Italian Government with connivance in heroin traffic to the United States a charge that the article said the U S narcotics commissioner had confirmed Luce told Foreign Minister Etkhi OECIASSIFIED IN PI1RT Aulh0n1y EO 13526 Chiar Records Daclnss Dlv WJiS Dato' l'j -JAN llllli If 47 Martino before leaving Rome on another trip to the United States that the United States was greatly alarmed over the situation and expected the Italian Government immediately to ban both the production and consumption of heroin Years later she recalled that she became terribly indignant over the matter and considering resigning Jt was the only time J behaved like a woman Back in Washington she sent a red hot letter to Eisenhmver and Secretary Dulles about how come we give so much money to the Italians for this that and the other thing and what do we get back I-Ieroin 105 U In the letter Luce urged the President for both moral and political reasons to cut off covert financial assistance The cause of her distress went beyond the heroin issue For months Luce pointed out she and her staff had been debating the wisdom of CJ p continuing the as istance t 4 c '1 4 Others considered the risks too great that termination would collapse the governing l b J 'f r o coalition and lead to new elections in which the Center pa11ies would lose badly The original purpose of the program she reminded Eisenhower was to extend funds through key individuals to obtain strong and sustained government action against the Communists It seemed clear that the aim of these individuals had become to subsidize themselves and their following on a more or less permanent basis According to Luce Today the key figures tell us that the earliest date on which effective anti Communist action can be taken will be after the next general elections-a year hence They also insist that in the meanwhile they will require a greatly increased covert aid program Without it they say they will lose the elections So after five and a half billion dollars ofoverl aid and large amounts of covert aid the leaders of the ''democratic patties are telling us today just as they told us in 1948 that the only alternative to a Communist victory at the polls is for us to keep them and their parties on a permanent handout basis This certainly is not what we originally intended to do by our disbursement of money to the parties in power DECLASSIFIED IN PART AulhOnty EO 13520 Chief Records Oocless Dlv WHS Doleo 1 fl IAN l Mi 48 The failure of our original pUI QSe is manifest in the fact that afler four years of covert aid to the coalition parties neither sustained antiCommunist action nor a more 1'stable government has materialized They are not even in sight She recommended that Eisenhmver or Secretary Dulles urge the Italian Government to ban immediately the production and export of heroin and inform it that failure to do so would result in a cutback in U S economic aid and a less favorable attitude toward Italy's application for admission to the United Nations She also asked permission to inform Scelba or his successor and other remaining 'key figures' that aid to them will terminate unless the production of heroin is banned '' 106 U The Jetter as well as subsequent meetings with Secretary Dulles and Allen Dulles produced a stir The Secretary found Luce quite emotional about the situation and noted that the letter reflected a complete reversal When he discussed it with Eisenhower he learned that the President too was all excited about the use of money Eisenhower who desired an independent investigation needed to be straightened out The Secretary believed that Luce was probably exaggerating the situation pm1icularly in claiming that tluee or four people in the Italian Government were pocketing money from the heroin trade something Allen Dulles denied Luce's three hour conversation with the DCI was calmer She told him that the CIA apparently m aning others at agency headquarters--favored stopping the aid but that State wanted it continued 107 U C r f - j c i l lb Co JSI i 4 Q_ for an The heroin issue quickly faded along with Luce' end to the covert aiel program after the U S narcotics commissioner declared that the published article had misrepresented his views The situation it described had been true several years before he said but was no longer tos U lS@ftC I DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty eo 13526 Chief Records Dae ISS Olv WHS Date I I JAN 2016 49 The brief controversy may have helped weaken State's supp011 for cove11 assistance Without mentioning the heroin charges in July a State paper of unspecified authorship sharply criticized the CIA program Much like Luce's letter to the President it introduced a moral argument covert aid corrupted both the giver and the receiver to pass and to receive or offer to pass and receive specific sums for specific political acts by persons in official positions State questioned the efficacy oftlte program Even in cases where we Jeel one individual official holds views much more to our liking than another though both are sincere anti-Communists there is the greatest danger that it would be counter-productive in the long run if we made our preferences known in political circles where our actions would be considered interference in the nonCommunist intemal affairs of the country It recommended that if covert aid to the Center pa1iies were continued it should be directed solely at improving their parliamentary situation through strengthening the party apparatus and the only condition attached to such aid should be that the aid be used effectively to that end 109 Opening to the Left or Move to the Right Resigned to the lack of a vigorous anticommunist program by the Segni Government the United States increasingly in 1955 and 1956 focused on a different issue the opening to the Left The idea which predated Luce's anival in Rome held that the Center coalition could be strengthened by encouraging the Nenni Socialists to split from the Communists and bringing them into the government Whether Nenni who at times spol e as if he might break with the Communists on such issues as their opposition to NATO would actually do so occasioned much debate In Washington and DF C L-' 8-SIFIED II FULL a SLfCQit1' Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Dote fj 1 diiN - ztm8ftt f2 50 at the Embassy opposition rested on the fear that the Socialists would ultimately prove a Communist Trojan horse in the govcrnment 110 U Vhat distinguished Luce fi om others worried about Nenni was her dccp seated suspicion of prominent lefHving Christian Democratic figures particularly Fanfani and Giovanni Gronchi In October 1954 she warned that Fanfani behaving like many other European politicians felt forced to seek pO ver through compromise with the pro Cominform Left in a context where Russia not the USA is the nearest and most powerful neighbor JfNenni offered to support Fanfani the latter would find it difficult to refuse especially since it would give him a long whirl of power in Italy She feared that not even the most expert diplomacy not the craftiest cloak and dagger operation could prevent this great and final slippage to the East once Fanfani joins hands innocently or not with Nenni 111 U Gronchi 's election in April 1955 as President of the Republic with support from the Communists and Socialists raised concern that he would be sympathetic to the opening to the Left Although Luce advocated a wait-and see attitude toward him Allen Dulles could find nothing communist in his background and admitted that the CIA did not have a clear estimate as to whether the Socialists once inside the government would turn out to be a Trojan horse Gronchi's views on foreign affairs what Luce characterized as a nationalistic attitude strongly tinged with neutralism bothered her since they seemed to reflect a growing neutralist-leftist trend in Italy His election probably meant a 'new look' in Italy in economic and international matters and that Italy views its NATO partnership mainly as a dollar-generating program and not as a mutual defense agreement against the USSR 112 1 Ct Ll'l SSIFIED lf 1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief ecards Declass Div WHS WGBPT o t1 l 1N 2016 51 During Luce's congratulatory call on Gronchi in May he spent the first half hour complaining about his unfair treatment by the American press He assured her that as a Catholic he was strongly against communism on political grounds He was not opposed to the Socialists on the same ethical and religious grounds as he was to the Communists and made clear his willingness to work with the fanner to improve Italy's standard of living Though the time had not yet come to bring the Socialists into the government he believed an opening to the Left absolutely necessary It should be to the econmnic not political Left While Luce's record ofthe conversation made no mention ofGronchi specifica1ly criticizing her press accounts painted a different picture Sources close to the new President said that he had bluntly blamed her for inspiring the press campaign against him when she intimated to reporters that U S aid would be sharply reduced ifhe were elected Journalists joked that Luce upset by Gronchi's election was suffering from a severe bout of gronchitis Gronchi reportedly hoped that Luce would not retum from an upcoming trip to the United States and would be replaced soon preferably by a man Luce did return and ironically one of her last major activities as ambassador was accompanying Gronchi whom she continued to mistrust on a visit to the United States in the spring of 1956 113 U Though most of the talk regarding political realignment centered on the opening to the Left the United States also considered encouraging the Center coalition to move to the Right by reaching out to the Monarchists The Christian Democrats were against this and De Gasperi criticized Luce for pushing the idea At times she wanted the Monarchists to be asked to provide parliamentary support for the government but it is difficult to find evidence for her favoring their inclusion in the cabinet She seemed more interested in l r l' SSIFIED 11 FULL iFGRET AUihomy EO 13526 Ch1ef Recmds 0 Date IJJJ tJAN ass Dlv WHS 52 having them play a useful role if the political situation became desperate As early as January 1954 even before the Pella Government fell she believed that sentiment for the Monarchists was stronger than generally believed She recommended establishing clandestine contact with former King Umberto then in exile in Switzerland and finding someone to head a Monarchist government in case it becomes advisable to undertake a Monarchist co up to forestall either a Communist or Fascist dictatorship in Italy She saw this solely as an emergency measure in case our best efforts to support democracy in Italy fail The House of Savoy she thought might be the only half-way House for Italian democracy 114 Nor was she alone in thinking favorably of the Monarchists A few months later the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory observed that if the Scclba Govenm1ent fell we cannot risk elections at this time and an effort will have to be made to get a national goverrunent including the monarchists who he felt were reasonably liberal economically sensible and in some cases reform minded The Embassy he reported thought bringing them into the government might bring two years of political stability Theirinclusion in the government however did not become U S policy As a State Department paper put it Formation of a rightist coalition would only accelerate the expansion ofthe Communist bloc pa1iicularly in the South where the Social Democrats and the non-Communist lefl -of-centcr groups have no organization 115 U In December 1955 Luce who had obviously modified her views told Assistant Secretary of State Merchant l think we must continue to support the center-a move to the Left is unacceptable while a move to the right would be politically unpalatable in Italy today On the other hand I don't think we should expect any earth-shaking antiCommunist moves If we can head off an opening to the left by which the 4itti l' 'l r r L SJr 'fED It- FUll Authonty F O 13526 Chief Rt tarJ Declnss Div W l' Dote oWl 1I 015 ' 53 Socialists are used as an organized party by the Government and if the intemational situation continues to result in the d6tente's not being translated into real Soviet concessions of substance I think there is some chance that the trend of organized labor away from the Communists will be maintained and that the slight political amelioration of the center parties especially the Christian Democratic patiy will increase 116 Although much of the movement to the Left-the Socialists eventually entered the government during the Kennedy administration--and the corresponding decline ofthe Right occurred after Luce's departure she and others may have misread or underestimated the changes taking place below the surface of Italian politics U Mission Accomplished Absent from her post for long periods in 1955 and 1956 ostensibly because of poor health Luce left Italy in dramatic fashion in November 1956 the apparent victimas she claimed of lead poisoning from paint chips falling from her bedroom ceiling or possibly the main character in a hoax she herself had concocted 117 U How effective was she as ambassador While scholars especially Italians tend to portray her in a negative light conten1poraries held mixed views New York Times correspondent Cyrus Sulzberger who traveled extensively throughout the country in the spring of 1954 and met with her for four hours had little good to say I think she's nuts and merely wants to make a big name for herself as an activist in her first diplomatic job 118 Prime Ministers Pella and Scelba had qualms about working with her on sensitive military matters occasionally employing other channels Prejudice against her as a woman was a factor but concern over her indiscretion may also have been at work On the other hand British Ambassador Clarke came to regard her more favorably than did his predecessor She is an intelligent woman and it is always stimulating to discuss with her matters of common interest A top Italian Foreign Ministry official called her the '8ii9il4T o 'JF f l ' SIF' ED 1 1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chiof Records Dedass Div WH-S o JN# 2016 54 most influential U S ambassador to serve in Rome because she is a member of your Politburo Ifthcre is anything we really want done we persuade her-she circumvents the State Department and telephones the White House Time and Life are more valuable to us than experience 119 U Foreign Service officers working for her generally gave her high marks Durbrow called her the most democratic ambassador with whom he had served Moreover she was so damned intelligent thought things through using a lav ryer's logical method sought advice and took it with an open mind you can say what you think-but she makes up her own mind and had a wonderful sense of humor A junior officer said she was a great lady no doubt about it Like British Ambassador Clarke a staff member who spoke Italian and often served as interpreter during conversations with Italian officials found Luce's intellectual curiosity made it extremely stimulating to be around her Another recalled her as a person of extraordinary presence the very definition of the word 'charisma' although from the perspective of 40 years later she struck him as almost a caricature of our pervasive American phobia over Communism Elsewhere in Europe U S diplomats spoke critically of her loose tongue and inappropriate social remarks 120 Perhaps in part a sign of the disdain career diplomats sometimes have for political appointees their attitude may have stemmed from jealously over Luce's direct access to the President and the Secretary of State U A conservative staunch Republican Luce occasionally viewed developments through partisan eyes magnifying setbacks in Italy or elsewhere into catastrophes that required drastic action to lessen political fallout The summer of 1954 was a low point for her grudging progress in the Trieste negotiations EDC floundering in the French SFPPET 'f C' l SSIF'JED IJI FULL Autronly EO 13526 Chief ejords Q class Div WI-I Date a ' Jl N tui6 55 National Assembly and the Italian Govenunent holding up agreement on such issues as the military facilities accord She complained to the President that the Italians felt in a position to blackmail the United States Eisenhower took a practical approach l-Ie did not think military bases in Italy diminishing daily in importance were vital pointing out to Dulles that this attitude might change if the Italians received the impression we were losing interest Dulles later told him that Scelba had promised to sign the facilities agreement within 24 hours after the signing of any agreement on Trieste If he did not keep his word State would let it be known that the United States was considering deployment elsewhere of the forces planned for Italy 121 U Luce' s frustration elicited a more extreme response from her She told Eisenhower's press secretary that unless the United States took decisive action Europe would go Communist within five years The United States should do something and do something fast to gain a political victory When he asked whether she was recommending an attack somewhere in the world she said yes suggesting Formosa and mainland China as the most likely spot Luce had expressed similar thoughts in a meeting with Eisenhower At his request she expanded on her ideas in a 37-page paper sent to the President and many other high government officials about the sorry state of U S foreign policy and the damage it would do to Republican Party chances in the November 1954 congressional elections No response from Eisenhower has been found but Secretary Dulles said that answers to the problems she had raised were not as available or as effective as he had hoped Use of tactical nuclear weapons on Communist China was a matter which deserves and receives very careful consideration Dulles said But to take the initiative in precipitating atomic wal' cQ 21 1 Df r LG '381 1ED I FULL Authonty EO 13fi26 Chief Reccm b Declass DJv WHS 0 1 WI ' HI 2111 56 involves the gravest consequences in terms of our world vide relations It is not clear that on balance we would gain 122 U In September 1954 when the Trieste negotiations were still stalled and the French National Assembly had just rejected EDC Luce despairingly told Eisenhower Unless a the balloon goes up in either the Pacific or Europe or b the Italians themselves take bloody action against their own communists now unfortunately harder to do since the collapse of EDC and the Trieste failure or c we are now prepared to extend a vast aid program to the Italian economy we must be prepared for a political Pearl Harbor in the next election She added that Yugoslavia will not remain on our side ifltaly goes communist and Germany cannot enter NATO so we may lose Yugoslavia as well before many more years have passed 123 U Preparing to leave Italy two years later Luce viewed her record positively and pointed to political stability as the greatest achievement She told Secretary Dulles Today the threat of a Communist takeover in Italy is all but forgotten Politically and ideologically Italy is more stable than many competent observers predicted three or four years ago it would be today It is true that during her tenure and a few years thereafter Communist Party membership declined sharply from54 000 in 1954 to 30 000 in 1959 but this was due in part to disillusionment over the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution and perhaps to Italy's growing economic prosperity 124 U Luce did lack a major advantage her predecessors enjoyed She could not promise substantial amounts of economic assistance By the time she arrived the United States had given Italy $2 8 billion in post-war economic aid ln Luce's first year FY 1954 it received only $105 million an amount that fell the following fiscal year to $45 million t'IF f L ' S8JI ED lt l FULL M @IWI 7 Autl'only 1 0 IJG26 Chief Recartl Dedas Dlv WH' Doto b I wl 21116 t8 PFE 57 Offshore-procurement contracts totaled $383 million during her first sun11ner they plunged to $91 million in 1954 and $39 5 million the year after 125 U The turnabout in March 1955 in the Fiat shop steward elections helped Luce to boast that OSP policy had a profound and stimulating influence on the growth of the free labor unions--with a corresponding loss in strength and prestige of the Communistdominated CGIL An Embassy survey showed that in more than 250 plant elections during the first six months of 1955 COIL strength declined 15% compared to the same period the previous year In plants where the OSP policy was in effect the drop was even greater-21 % By 1957 results were more striking That year CSIL and UIL representatives won 55% of shop steward elections compared to 20% in 1952 126 U Although OSP contracting was a diminishing asset an Embassy official looking back on the period rated it a fairly successful example of hard ball 127 One scholar however considered the results illusory since many workers voted for non-Communist unions to save their jobs while their loyalties remained Communist Approximately 1 5 million left the CGIL between 1954 and 1958 without joining either of the main nonCommunist confederations They simply left the labor movement While another study pointed out that COIL membership at the Fiat plant dropped from 40 000 in 1950 to only 1 000 in 1960 it did not identify pressures exerted through OSP as a cause of the decline 128 U Luce's biggest tool was the CIA's political action program A June 1956 agency study noted that at least 90% of its expenditures in Italy went for covert political psychological and propaganda operations The study concluded that payments to some political parties had helped stabilize central governments favorably disposed toward the 'lf C LA SS F ED lf l FULL Autr onty EO 13526 Chief RecnrdJ Declass Div VVHS Dote- l h iiAN 1Q 6 58 United States '' But it expressed concern over shortcomings in the delivery and supervision of the use of the subsidies and unce1tainty vhether payments to other political entities had furthered U S objectives 129 U William Colby who administeJ ed the CIA pmgram said the amount came to several million dollars and represented the agency's largest-ever political acti011 program Some accounts put the figure at $25 million a year relying on a former employee's claim that during the 1950s the agency annually spent at least $20-30 million in Italy This seems much too high given the decidedly smaller amounts of which there is a record Moreover the agency disclosed that dming the period 1948-1968 it gave the Center parties labor groups and other organizations $65 15 million an average of little more than $3 million a year 130 Given the virtual withering away of the program by 1962 131 an annual amount of around $5 million during the Eisenhower years seems more accurate than $25 million U Whatever ils size Colby argued that the program's accomplishments could not be measured in shmt-term ways that we were in this for the long haul'' and 1'that it would not be until the 1958 elections that we could have even a benchmark of whether we had succeeded in halting the trend toward waning Christian Democratic strength and rising Cmmmmist strength But the results of the 1958 election were not decisive The Clu istian Democrats gained two percentage points the Communists and the small Center parties remained at about the same percentages and the Right lost substantially 111e Ne1mi Socialists emerged the only big whmers While son1e in Washington questioned whether the CIA program had any impact on the results Colby thought otherwise The defeat of the Right meant that Communism's threat would be met through democratic lf GLI Sf JI ' ED 1 1 FULL Authonty EO IJG26 Chief Rerprds De lass Dlv WHS Date r1 1 l' N 20J6 ' WI 59 politics not a reversion to Fascism The strength ofthe Socialists even without aid from the outside meant that left-wing sentiment looked toward a democratic form of socialism The efficacy and morality of U S intervention in the domestic affairs of another country--as Luce and others called into question in 1955-have remained subjects of continuing debatc 132 U Under a succession of prime ministers in the late 1950s coalitions led by the Christian Democrats continued to govern amid general domestic calm save for a political crisis beginning in the spring of 1960 that culminated in public protests and riots in June and formation of a new Center government the fo1lowing month 133 U U S military intervention to prevent a forcible Communist takeover remained an officially sanctioned option through the end of Eisenhower's administration But the policy underwent a significant change In a new NSC paper drafted in August 1960 the Planning Board recommended that in the event the Communists appear to be acquiring or actually achieve control of the Italian national Govenunent or portions thereof by either legal or illegal means emphasis added the United States should be prepared in the light of conditions existing at that time to take appropriate action either alone or in cooperation with other allied nations emphasis added including as a last resort the use of military power to assist whatever Italian elements are seeking to prevent or overthrow Communist domination 134 U In presenting the paper to the NSC in December 1960 Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray noted that existing policy required the United States to act in conceti with its allies but it also provided great freedom of mane lver for any multilateral action While the new policy would allow the United States to act alone OEGDiT a L1fGl' '3 fF ED 1 1 FUll Authonty EO 13 26 Chief Rec f DeUass Div WH C Dole t rt IAN 2016' 60 it would more severely circumscribe the range of actions The President asked what the United States could do alone Secretary of State Clu istian 1-letier said the only thing was a naval blockade by the Sixth Fleet Drawing attention to use of the phrase military power Eisenhower declared that when we began to usc our military power we had to be prepared to use all our military power He suggested deleting the phrase including as a last resort the use of military power and replacing it with taking every realistic or feasible measure He also wanted a sentence added to indicate that in the event of a Communist takeover U S military action would occur only in concett with major European allies 135 His views on the matter had changed little during the course of his administration 'iii'J Because of Luce's mmTiage to a powerful figure in the publishing world her access to Eisenhower and Dulles that fe v ambassadors enjoyed but mostly her personality and gift for dramatization it is tempting to exaggerate her influence If Luce indeed talked too much she also in one sense--wrote too much leaving a big paper trail for historians However forcefully colorfully or persistently she offered recommendations it is impmian1 to note how ofien they were not accepted U Her public persona made it appear that the Eisenhower administration carried out a more aggressive policy than Tmman's toward Italian communism ln fact Eisenhower basically followed the approach of his predecessor Despite later inflated claims the Eisenhower thought enough ofLuce's performance in Italy to appoint her in 1959 as Ambassador to Brazil In April 1959 the Senate overwhelmingly approved the nomination although Wayne Morse D-Oregon citing among other things her record in Italy bitterly attacked her as unfit for a diplomatic assignment Luce's subsequent quip that her difficulties began when Senator Morse was kicked in the head by a horse something that in fact had happened years before provoked a public r-uror during which she decided to resign before being sworn in U DECLII 'SJf' ED 1'1 FULL AulJ onty to 13526 Chietf Je r ' 0o Dale tJ li ' eelass Oil' WHS JIW 2016 61 amount of covert funding stayed much the same as did the focus on strengthening free trade unions through the OSP program though Luce ce11ainly lent that effort more visibility What did change given congressional tightfistedness was the amount of economic and military assistance the Eisenhower administration was able to provide U During Luce's time as ambassador Vashington-primarily Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles-made policy toward Italy with little input from the Department of Defense and no great inclination to accept advice from her It has been said that Eisenhower was his own secretary of defense particularly during Wilson's tenure With his World War II experience and service as NATO's first military head it was natural for him to take an especially active part in shaping policy toward Europe And because of the extensive covert program the Central Intelligence Agency though not a policy-making body obviously played a big part U Eisenhower and Dulles were willing to intervene militarily only if the Communists forcibly seized power and then only in concert with other European nations Despite the possibility of civil war erupting if Prime Minister Scelba took strong action against the Communists they were reluctant to commit forces unilaterally an act that could well have had disastrous consequences--the unraveling ofthe Western alliance or the outbreak of general war Once Eisenhower ruled out a military response in the event the Communists came to power legally Dulles may have squelched any inclination he had to pusl1 for smncthing stronger Robert Bowie who as head of State's Policy Planning Office knew Dulles's mind better than most said that the Secretary was reluctant to asse11 an independent judgment on military matters because Eisenhower knew so much more about military things than he would ever know 136 Although a DEt LI Sf IED 1r- 1 FULL Autf' onty EO IJC26 Chief Recor Lo D dus Dlv WHS Do ' J f r PI 2016 62 Communist takeover of Italy by legal means would have constituted a terrible setback it was something the two men could countenance U DI C LI '381F ED 1 1 FULL 1 tnr onty EO 13526 Chief Record Declas Dlv WH'3 Date' 1 1 UM N 2016 wstkbi 63 1 Regarding the U S intervention in the 1948 Italian election campaign see Miller Taking Off the Gloves 35 56 U Ventresca From Fascism to Democracy 6199 U Mistry The Case for Political Warfare 301-29 U Callanan Covert Action in the Cold War 2445 and Rearden Formative Years 169-74 U 2 NSC 1 1 The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy 14 Nov 47 FRUS 1948 3 724-29 NSC 1 2 The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy 10 Feb 48 ibid 765-69 NSC 1 3 Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in Light of the Possibility that the Communists Will Obtain Patiicipation in the Italian Government by Legal Means 8 Mar 48 ibid 775-79 U 3 NSC 67 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Communism in Italy 12 Apr 50 Doc CK3 00454654 DDRS quote U NSC 67 I The Position of the United States with Respect to Communism in Italy 21 Apr 50 F'RUS 1950 3 1486-9 U NSC 67 2 The Position of the United States with Respect to the Communist Tlu eat to Italy Doc CK3 00391042 DDRS U NSC 67 3 The Communist Threat to Italy 5 Jan 51 FRUS 1951 4 543-45 U Rearden Formative Years 4 174 75 U Lucas Campaigns of Truth 289 U Del Pero The United States and 'Psychological Warfare' in Italy 1310-19 U For continuit ' in approach between the administrations see PSB D-15b Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power DECLASSIFIED IN PART AuthOnty EO 13526 Chief Records O cles DIV WHS Data' '1 '1 WI 101 64 in Italy 21 Feb 52 Doc CK3 00140779 DDRS U and the OCB Working Group's progress repm1 of31 March 1954 on PSB D- Sb combined with progress reports on two other PSB papers Doc CK3 100133289 ibid U 5 Morin Her Excellency 32 U Luce was the second female ambassador Eugenic Anderson having served with that rank in Denmark December 1949January 1953 Three women had held the rank of minister Ruth Bryan Owen to Denmark May 1933-Junc 1936 florence Jaffray Harriman to Nonvay July 193 7-April 1940 and Perle Mesta to Luxembourg September 1949-Aprll 1953 Dept State Principal Officers of the Department of State and Unired States Chiefs of Mission 40 72 83 I 05 U 6 For Luce's earlier career see Shadegg Clare Boothe Luce U Shccd Clare Boothe Luce U and Morris Rage for Fame U The last covers only the period prior to her election to the House of Representatives For her rebuttal of the claim that she talked too much see her interv by Alden Hatch 28 Oct 54 5 fldr 36 box 5 Hatch Papers UF U For details regarding the appointment see Galambos ed Public Papers qfDwight David Eisenhower 14 66 n 5 U FRUS 1952-54 6 1605 n I U and Hatch Ambassador Extraordinwy 14-21 244 U See also Luce interv by John Luter 11 Jan 68 17w2 CUOHP and various documents in fldr Appointment 1953 Corrcsp box 642 Luce Papers LC U 7 Ur Mallet to Harrison 16 Feb 53 FO 371 107799 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U Hatch Ambassador Extraordinwy 205 244 U The staff member who considered resigning was Joseph Jacobs Shadegg Clare Boothe Luce 241 U o l5EEREI Df CL SI ED r t FULL Autt- Jnty 0 IJ J26 Chi f RecCJr-_ J DedClsJ Dlv WHS Dote I i JNI 2015 65 8 Luce interv 11 Jan 68 25 CUOHP U tel 52 Saving Rome to For Off 6 May 53 FO 371 107743 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U interv Wells Stabler by Charles Stuart Kennedy 5 Apr 91 74 FAOHC Frontline Diplomacy website U Sterling and Ascoli Lady of Villa Taverna 12 U Rossetti Italian Woman's Thoughts 20 U interv Elbridge Durbrow by Alden Hatch 22 Nov 54 tldr 27 box 5 Hatch Papers UF quote U 9 Summary mins London Ambassadors' mtg 24 26 Sep 52 fldr London Ambassadors' Mtg Sept 1952 box 31 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP 1 51 quote U rif'ashington Post 19 Mar 53 2nd quote U Hughes diary entry 3 Mar 53 tldr Diary 1953-1957 box 5 Hughes Papers PU 3rd quote U Sheed Clare Boothe Luce 119 4' quote U 10 Desp 205 Mallet to Eden 20 Jul 53 w encl rpt Italy Heads of Foreign Missions nd FO 48217 Confidential Print Italy NAK quotes U Shadegg Clare Boothe Luce 242 U The British Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins had informed the Foreign Office that at a di1mer for Prime Minister Churchill in January 1953 during a visit to the United States Luce's excessive emotionalism made a very poor impression on those of us who met her l-Ie suggested that because of her considerable ambition her skill in handling people her ability and lack of scruple Mallet should handle her rather cautiously at least at first A judicious mixture of flattery of the lady as a person and full acceptance of her as a colleague can no doubt be combined with close relations on RliiH PFT 'H U SlF ED IJol FULL Aulh mty EO 13 2 8 Chrer Recnrd Declass Dlv IAIJ C 0 '' I d MIN 20Jo fidiiilM I 66 business matters with her Number Two Ltr Makins to Harrison 30 Apr 53 FO 371 I 07799 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U 11 NSC 1 3 Position of the United States with Respect to Jtaly in Light of the Possibility that the Cornmunists Will Obtain Participation in the Italian Government by Legal Means 8 Mar 48 cited in n 2 U memo JCS for SccDcf 10 Mar 48 FRUS 1948 3 782-83 U CIA ORE 6-48 Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means 5 Mar 48 3A CIA website U 12 Memo Hickerson for SecState 8 Mar 48 ibid 779 80 tels 1062 Rome to State and 677 State to Rome 12 Mar 48 tels 680 1195 and 1558 Rome to State 13 18 Mar and 6 Apr 48 FRUS 1948 3 784-89 U Regarding the strong likelihood of a Communist insurrection to seize power sec tel3957 Rome to State bid 73839 U For a slightly more optimistic assessment see CIA 4 Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States 4 Jan 48 Doc CK31 00367740 DDRS U 13 Memo JCS for SecDef 30 Jun 49 and memo SecDeffor ExccSccNSC 14 Jul49 Doc CK31 00454647 DDRS U Executive Secretary Souers circulated the memos to NSC members under cover of his memo of 15 July in which he said that the Secretary of Defense had requested no action on them unless someone wished to object or comment In that event they would be scheduled for consideration by the NSC l1 EGLI SSIF ED 11 1 FUll Autnonty f O 13526 Chief Recore Declnss Div WHS Dote' @IECit 1 1 1 WI 2llif 67 14 State OIR rpt Communism in the Free Vorld Capabilities of the Communist Party Italy JR-6165 22 Jan 53 ClA-RDP78-02646R00030005000 -9 CREST Database NACP U I 5 Schaffer Ellsworth Bunker 44 U memo Norberg for Morgan and Browne 25 Feb 53 fldr PSB 091 4 1 box 15 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U 16 Rich Political Trends in Italy 469-75 U 17 Poggiolini Italy 13 7 U The electoral reform law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies 3 J2-80 on 21 January J953 and by the Senate 174-0 on 29 March after opponents staged a 72-hour filibuster and walked out before the vote It was signed into law on 31 March 1953 18 Del Pero ' American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy 416 U J 9 Ed note FRUS 1952-54 6 1577 U ltr Bunker to Dulles 28 Jul 52 fldr I-IS-CSG Document 2590 Con espondence Dealing with Covert Assistance for Democratic Political Parties in Italy box 7 History Staff Records Job 83-00764R 20 CIA NSC paper '1Current Policies of the Govemment of the United States Relating to the National Security J Nov 52 val I pt III Doc CK31 00265755 DDRS U NIE-71 Probable Developments in Italy 31 Mar 53 CIA website quote U remarks mins LENAP cmte mtg 22 Apr 53 fldr PSB 091 4 J box 15 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U oso 'i 4qc CU 1-'tC rt l @11 I a DECLASSIFIED IN PART AulhOnty EO 13526 Chief Record$ Deol lSS Dlv WHS Date 1 1 JAN 2016 id I 21 68 Memo Elliot State R for Craig State R 21 Oct 52 Doc CK3l00085062 DDRS U mins LENAP cmte mtg 27 May 53 fldr PSB 091 A l LENAP box 15 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U te1498l Rome to State 3 Jun 53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1606-08 quote U OCI Current Intelligence Weekly 5 Jun 53 7 CIA website U 22 USIS advance text ofLuce address Milan 28 May 53 fldr 5-28-53 box 686 Luce Papers LC U Christian Science Monitor 29 May 53 quote U New York Times 29 30 May 2 5 Jun 53 U Chicago Tribune 29 May 53 U See also MSA USIS Combined Information Services ''Italian Press Trends No 82 for week ending 31 May 1953 6-7 and No 83 for week ending 7 June 1953 2-3 fldr Italian Press Trends 1953 voL l box 639 Luce Papers LC U 23 Interv Francis Williamson by Alden Hatch 10 Nov 54 fldr 47 box 5 Hatch Papers UF U tel66 Saving Rome to For Off 4 Jun 53 FO 371 l07743 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U Hartford Courant 6 Jun 53 U Washington Post 7 quote ll Jun 53 U 24 Ltr Luce to Jackson 18 Jun 53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1612-13 U Sterling and Ascoli Lady of Villa Taverna 13 U Hatch Ambassador Exlraordinmy 21618 U Martin He111J' and Clare 312 U Baldrige A Lady First 117-18 U For Baldrige's earlier more detailed account of working with Luce in Italy in which she does not mention the Milan speech see her Roman Candle U Dorothy Fanner not Baldrige apparently typed the drafts see note 25 25 First type-written draft 24 May 53 with numerous handwritten changes and additions ldr 5-28-53 box 686 Luce Papers LC U Luce added to this draft by DEr L ' SSI ' IED N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS 0 ' L1 1 JAN 10 IS 69 hand several passages including the following So long as Italy continues her thrilling forward march on the ancient highway of her greatness so long she can count on Americas' intimate and warm cooperation For I am required in all honesty to tell you that should your stable and progressive govermnent be stopped and unsteadied in that march there would logically and tragically follow a grave rupture of that collaboration and if-though it cannot happen-the Italian government and its unhappy people should then fall victim to totalitarianism of the left or the right the rupture would be irreparable Attached to the first draft is the following undated note in the same hand as the language added to the text D orothyJ F armer 2 carbons retype double space starting on new pages where blue marks are Thanks Back to the old familiar salt mines eh C Iare B oothe L uce A second clean typewritten draft incorporating the handwritten revisions on the first draft and datec125 May is ibid U 26 Barzini Ambassador Luce as Italians See Her ' 27-28 U 27 Ltr Luce to Bemays 5 Jun 53 fldr Correspondence 1953 A-H box 763 Luce Papers LC U unsigned memo for Mr Ray British Embassy Voting Pool Estimated Election Figures Submitted by Ambassador Luce-American Embassy 8 Jun 53 fldr Memoranda InterOffice 1953 box 787 ibid the memo also indicated that a 1 000 lira note was enclosed U 28 Hariford Courant 12 21 Jun 53 U tel 5112 Rome to State 12 Jun 53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1609-12 U 29 Arme O'Hare McCormick Just a Little Too Close for Comfmt New York Times 10 Jun 53 U tel Dulte I Paris to State Dulles to Pres 23 Apr 53 Doc DF r LA 9SI ED '1- FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Rec ards Decfass Div WHS Dote I 1 JAN 21JI 70 CK31 0000187413 DDRS U ltr Bunker to MSA Dir Harriman 12 Nov 52 ltr Harriman to DepSecDef Foster 1 Dec 52 ltr DepSpecRep Europe Anderson to Bunker 11 Dec 52 1tr Haniman to Foster 23 Dec 52 Cote 3003 State to Rome 24 Jan 53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1595-1603 U NSC 142 Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31 1952 10 Feb 53 28 fldr Italy 1945-60 box 127 Subject Files OSD Hist U Semiannual Psychological Activity Status Report of the Department of Defense for the Period From 1 January tlu ough 30 June 1953 Summary 30 Jun 53 22 CIA-RDP8001 065A00050001 0-8 CREST Database NACP U 30 31 OS Uk CiA I H 32 Ltr Gruenther to Pres 5 Sep 53 fldr Italy 9 box 33 International Series Whitman File DDEL U Unhappy about being used as a messenger in this way Gruenther told Eisenhower that if he had been asked while in Rome to cany out this task he would have declined Under the circumstances however he considered transmitting the message the lesser evil He also sent copies of the letter to Luce and to MacA1ihur at State DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chler R9 M Is Decleas Dlv WHS D nte '8Ji'iilPSJS ' 1111 iiW 2flf6 @JSGPFT 33 71 For a summary of the fail 1953 crisis and sketch of the 1954 negotiations see Campbell Successfit Negotiation 3-21 U 34 Briefing notes for NSC mtg Italian Strike Situation 9 Dec 53 CIAMRDP79R00890A000200020015-7 CREST Database NACP U 35 OSIJ i 4 c 36 lnterv Durbrow 22 Nov 54 cited inn 8 U 37 Ltr Luce to Pres 3 Nov 53 with atchd memo Estimate ofthe Italian Situation nd fldr Letters 1953 box 11 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U Luce sent copies of her estimate to Secretary Dulles and Allen Dulles The letter and the estimate with deletions are in fl US 1952-54 6 1631-34 U A completely declassified copy of the estimate is in fldr CmTespondence box 633 Luce Papers LC U 38 Memo Pres for Smith 7 Nov 53 summarized and quoted in FRUS 1952-54 6 1634 n 1 U Eisenhower said that if Smith disagreed with this approach he would probably destroy the letter 39 Ltr Pres to Luce 7 Nov 53 Galambos ed Papets ofDwight David Eisenhower 14 659-61 U The text here includes the phrase clandestinely or publicly in Eisenhower's concluding sentence but it was deleted fi om the version in FRUS 1952-54 6 1637 U The complete text is in file 765 00 11-753 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty 13526 Chief Reoorda Dootess Olv WHS eo POlO lt I oliW 2Jl CSEEUR4 4 40 72 Mem for DCI 4 Aug 53 cited inn 30 Chief Operations DD P 6 Nov 53 paper Recommended Program of Political Action in Italy nd atchd to mem for DDI 9 Nov 53 State Depmiment memo at the end of December indicated only that the OCB had approved Luce's recommendations regarding covert activities but gave no specifics memo Bonbright for SecState 31 Dec 53 file 765 00 12-3153 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U 41 Mins lAC mtg 10 Nov 53 CIA-RDP82-00400R0001 000060008-2 CREST Database NACP U briefing paper for NSC mtg 12 Nov 53 CIA-RDPSOROl44JR-000200020003-6 ibid quote U The paper bears the handwritten marginal notations Estimate and not used See also a draft of SE-54 ''The Political Outlook in Italy 28 Dec 53 atchd to memo ActiilgExecSec National Estimates for lAC 28 Dec 53 CIA-RDP79R-00890A0002000020042-7 ibid U 42 Memo Stewati for ASD IS A 16 Dec 53 atchd w Nash memo for Merchant 23 Dec 53 file 765 00112-2353 box 3943 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U Stewart saw to it that her ideas reached Wilson as well as Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA Nash and others memcon Christenson w Nash 15 Dec 53 and supplemental note of conv w SecDef Wilson Nash et al 16 Dec 53 Doc CKJl 00493570 DDRS U Nash's memo to Merchant of 23 December DECLASSII IEO IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declaas Olv WHS Date il-l JIIN lruli ' 73 summarized the discussions in Paris among Defense and State officials regarding l-tlCe's views on the growing Communist threat to Italy 43 Llr Luce to Gruenther II Dee 53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1642-45 U ltr Gruenther to Luce 18 Dec 53 1645-46 U memcon Gruenther Norstad eta 17 Dec 53 fldr 092 NATO box II Ace 60A-1025 SA Files RG 330 44 WNRC Nell' York Times 12 Jan 54 U ltr Dulles to Gruenther 9 Jan 54 CIA-RDP80B- 01676R00270001 0055-4 CREST Database NACP U Morin Her Excellency 39 U A memo ofLucc's meeting with Secretary Dulles and Allen Dulles as well as various State CIA Defense and FOA officials is in file 765 001 1-254 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U A memo of her conversation with Nash and other officials on 5 January is in fldr Washington Trip January 1 1954 box 8 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 ibid U 45 Planning Activities of the Psychological Strategy Board Through June 30 1952 1 Aug 52 Annex E to PSB D-30 The National Psychological Program FRUS 1950-55 Intelligence Community 319-20 U State eire airg 21 Jan 52 FRUS 1952-54 6 1570-72 U memo Walmsley State C for Norberg PSB 13 May 52 Doc CK31 00085021 DDRS U ltr Smith to Foster 6 Dec 52 CIA website U 46 Ltr Dulles to Luce 14 Jan 54 atchd to memo Merchant for SecState 7 Jan 54 file 765 00 1-1454 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U Also attached to the memo was a copy of the proposed statement for the press to be made either by the President the Secretary of State or FOA Director Stassen The statement bears a handwritten notation that it was not used U 11 C L a SSIFtED I FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chlof Recardr Oeclass Dlv WH-'3 Dote' l'j l'j w llliS 74 47 Reston U S to Bid Italy Curb Reds New York Times 13 Jan 54 U ibid 15 30 Jan 54 U Time 25 Jan 54 U ltr Lucc to Smith 8 Feb 54 fldr Offshore Procurement Orders box 5 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U Sterling Italy Is Not Lost Yet 23 U Reston said the source of his information was the Fiat representative in Washington ltr Arthur Hays Sulzberger to Luce 13 Jan 54 fldr Correspondence 1954 0-Z box 687 Luce Papers LC U 48 Ltr Smith to Luce I Mar 54 fldr Offshore Procurement Orders box 5 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U 49 A1anchester Guardian 27 Mar 54 U New York Times 27 29 March I Apr 54 U According to an article in the journal L 'Europeo 28 March 1954 Luce made the remarks on 5 January at a dinner at the Mayflower Hotel given her by a dozen journalists An English translation of part of the article is attached to a letter from Ashley Clarke to Geoffrey Hat1'ison at the Foreign Office 6 Apr 54 FO 3 71 113140 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U Clarke said that Luce had spoken to him at length about the article admitting that some of the statements attributed to her correspond roughly to remarks she has made in private or to joumalists from time to time but she claims that someone with ill Intention has collected snippets of her views over a period and put them together with a number of pure inventions in order to produce the most damaging effect and discredit her gencra1ly She suspected the Communists On the whole Clarke accepted her denial believing the article bogus in the sense that while some of the views attributed to Mrs Luce correspond to what she has said to me OEr Lil SS ED It FULL Autllonty EO 13526 g Rr w1 Declass Dlv WHS f Ji N 20 6 1 75 and others from time to time they have been taken out of context and given a slant Vhich largely falsifies what she meant 50 Desp 173 Rome to For Off 30 Ju1 54 FO 482 8 Confidential Print Italy NAK quote U min Lake 9 Feb 54 FO 371 113090 Foreign Office General Correspondence ibid quotes U 51 Diary entry 6 Mar 54 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 982 U memo Mario Scelba Biogr aphy nd atchd to memo Scott for Goodpaster 24 Mar 55 fldr State Department of Mar 1955 box 70 Vhite House Central File Confidential File DDEL U 52 Tcl1164 Rome to Stale 30 Nov 53 FJWS 1952-54 6 1640-42 quote U ltr Luce to Smith 8 Feb 54 fldr Offshore Procurement Orders box 5 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U 53 Memo Howe Dir INR 26 l'eb 54 w atchml file 765 00 3-554 box 3949 Central Decimal l'iles RG 59 ibid U 54 Memo Merchant for ActgSecState I Mar 54 file 765 00 3-1354 ibid U 55 M sg Trudeau to Arnold 3 Mar 54 drafted by Trueheart State INR and approved by Smith ibid U 56 Ltr Smith to Luce 4 Mar 54 file 765 00 3-1354 ibid U 57 By the spring of 1954 Luce's Italian was probably good but not fluent Prior to 1953 she had been to Italy five times and had met De Gasperi during his 1947 visit to the United States At her Senate confinnation hearing in February 1953 she stated that her command of the language was limited She could read fairly well deliver formal presentations from a script and understand it when not Mrei l o DF f' L' SSJF ED If FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Recards Decl ss 0 WI o lift oWl 2fJ15 ' 76 spoken too rapidly but was unable to converse for any length of time as she could in Spanish and French Upon disembarking in Naples in April she read in broken Italian a portion of prepared remarks to a cheering crowd Shortly after she assumed her post in Rome De Gasperi probably was too generous in telling reporters that she already speaks ltalian quite fluen1ly Rpt of executive session hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nomina ion of Clare Boothe Luce of Connecticut to be Ambassador to Italy 17 Feb 53 19-20 fldr Appointment Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing 1953 box 642 Luce Papers LC U Mrs Luce Wins Italian Throng with--Accent Chicago Tribune 23 Apr 53 U Mrs Luce Gives De Gasperi Copy of Credentials ibid 29 Apr 53 U Regarding her previous visits to Italy see the typewritten answers to questions nd fldr ca 1953 1 of2 box 686 Luce Papers LC a handwritten notation at the top reads Martinelli Interview 1953 U 58 L T Luce to Smith 13 Mar 54 file 765 00 3-1354 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP J The letter with portions excised is in FRUS 1952-54 6 1660-63 U 59 Ltr Luce to Smith 13 Mar 54 cited inn 58 U 60 Diary entry 5 Mar 54 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 978 U 61 Ltr Smith to Luce 26 Mar 54 w encl paper on U S views toward Italy nd file 765 00 3-1354 file 765 00 3-1354 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U 62 Ltr Luce to Smith 7 Apr 54 file 765 00 4-754 file 765 00 4-754 ibid quotes U tel Rome 3102 to State 6 Apr 54 file 765 00 4-1554 ibid U ii KGafT 'lF LA SSIF ED 1N FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WH'3 Date '111 'JAN liJlli' 77 63 Ltr Smith to Luce 22 Apr 54 file 765 00 4-1554 ibid U 64 NSC 5411 U S Policy Toward Italy 12 Mar 54 FRUS 1952-54 6 1656-60 heavily excised U 65 Dulles Memorandum re Italy nd bound volume Council of Foreign Ministers 11 box 533 Dulles Papers PU tel State Te mar 70 to SecState in London II Dec 47 and SecState tel Martel 71 to State 12 Dec 47 FRUS 1947 3746 748- 49 For Truman's statement released on 13 December see ibid 749 n 2 66 Memo of disc 149 111 NSC mtg 9 Jun 53 fldr 149 1h Meeting box 4 NSC Series Whitman File DDEL Jl A sanitized text is in FRUS 1952-54 2 374 quote U The approved paper NSC 153 1 Restatement of Basic National Security Policy 10 fun 53 is ibid 378-86 U 67 Memo Radford for Wilson 23 Mar 54 ibid 1665-68 U 68 Memo of disc 190' NSC mtg 25 Mar 54 ibid 1668-71 U 69 Memo of disc 193' NSC mtg 13 Apr 54 Doc CK3100083833 DDRS quotes sanitized text in FRUS 19'52-54 6 1675-77 U memo Bonesteel for Gerhardt Dep for Eur Aff For Mil Sales Office 26 Mar 54 fldr NSC 5433--lmmediate US Policy Toward Europe box 8 Ace 65A-3500 ISA-NSC Files RG 330 WNRC U memo Gerhardt for Bonesteel 29 Mar 54 fldr NATO box 5 Ace 68A-4024 ISA-NSC Files RG 330 ibid U memo Merchant for SecState I Apr 54 file 765 00 4-I 54 box 3949 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U 70 Memo of disc 193' NSC mtg 13 Apr 54 cited inn 69 U 71 NSC 541112 U S Policy Toward Italy 15 Apr 54 I 0-11 Doc CK3100522482 DDRS U Portions are in FRUS 1952-54 6 1677-81 U DF C' l6 SSIF ED FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS o 'f filw 21116 78 72 Tel3514 Rome to State 4 May 54 file 611 65 5-454 box 2838 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U 73 Memo Merchant for SccState 11 May 54 quotes U ltr Dulles to Stassen 14 May 54 tel3832 State to Rome 14 May 54 ibid U The letter to Stassen is also in FRUS 1952-54 6 1681-82 U 74 Memcon with XYZ Scelba 24 Aug 75 Ltr Luce to Dulles 13 Sep 54 fldr Memoranda Atomic Power and the Lost American Revolution 1954 box 634 Luce Papers LC U 76 Ltrs Clarke to Kirkpatrick 25 Oct 23 Nov 54 quote FO 3711113093 l'oreign Office General Political Correspondence NAK U 77 MacArthm memcon 30 Oct 54 Doc CK3100500759 DDRS quotes U According to another record of the meeting the secretary of state referred to certain questions that might arise in connection with Italy and indicated that some basis for U S action exists both in NSC decisions and in the U S legislative history of the Nmih Atlantic Treaty Eisenhower observed that there was 11 a doctrine of self-preservation that applies in ce1tain cases but that Congress would be called in at once In addition to Eisenhower and Dulles Under Secretary of State Hoover Assistant Secretary of State Merchant State Counselor MacAtthur i E8R f4 oecLASSIFtED N PART A thOMY' EO 1a526 C lef s Declaas Dlv WHS Dooo IU'i 'IAN 2M5 79 and Goodpaster attended the meeting Goodpaster memo of confwith Pres 30 Oct 54 fldr _ box_ Diary Series Whitman File DDEL U 78 NIE 24-54 Probable Developments in Italy 16 Nov 54 CIA website U CS01 4Cc 79 Cu lo'i note tel Secto 4 Paris to State 16 Dec 54 quote FRUS 1952-54 6 1711 1717 and n 4 U 80 Memcon Dulles w Pres I 0 Jan 55 fldr Meetings with President 1954 I box 1 Dulles Papers DDEL U Schratz Robert Bostwick Carney 244-45 U Merchant memcon 10 Jan 55 file 611 65 1-1055 box 2539 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U 81 Memo Cmney for Dulles 18 Jan 55 fldr C-D I box 2 Confidential Con-espondence Subseries Dulles Papers DDEL 82 Memcon Luce and Durbrow w Tarchiani 22 Nov 54 fldr memoranda of Conversation '54 box 4 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U 83 Tel Rome 2218 to State 15 Dec 54 FRUS 1952-54 6 1713-15 quote U Dulles memcon 14 Dec 54 fldr Meetings with President 1954 1 box 1 'White House Memoranda Series Dulles Papers DDEL quote U For a biographical sketch and assessment of Fanfani see the NSC briefing notes prepared for Allen Dulles ''Fanfani's Efforts to Fonn a New Italian Cabinet 14 Jan 54 CIARDP79R-00890A000200030030-9 CREST Database NACP U memo of disc 237' NSC mtg 17 Feb 55 fldr 23th Meeting box 6 NSC Series Whitman File DDEL quote DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 RSiWdf f f filass Div WHS BZCIC 1 a 80 84 Ltr Luce to Cutler 14 Jan 55 FRUS 1955-57 27 213-14 U The discussion at the 14 January OCB meeting is summarized with some text not declassified ibid 213 n2 U 85 Mins OCB mtg 26 Jan 55 Doc CK31000095425 DDRS U notes OCB mtg 26 Jan 55 atchd w Godel memrcd 27 Jan 55 fldr Chrono box 12 Ace 63A1575 OSD Files RG 330 WNRC 86 quotes Hensel memo for files 5 Jan 55 atchd to ltr Hensel to Merchant 6 Jan 55 fldr 0921laly box 11 Ace 60A-I 025 SA Files RG 330 WNRC ltr Hensel to Anderson 10 Jan 55 ibid 87 Interv H Struve Hensel by Maurice Matloff 26 Oct 83 33 OSD Hist quotes ltr Hensel to Anderson 10 Jan 55 cited inn 87 quotes U 88 Hensel memo for files 5 Jan 55 cited inn 87 memo Hensel for Davis ASD ISA 15 Jan 55 fldr 092 Italy box 11 Ace 60A- I 025 SA files RG 330 WNRC quote 89 Hubbard memo for files nd fldr Memoranda of Conversation '55 box 4 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U The subject line reads Comments made by Ambassador Luce after her Conversation with General Gruenther and General Norstadt sic Feb 3 1955 memcon Luce and Valletta 11 Mar 55 ibid U 90 A Department of State press release of23 March showing the schedule of meetings and activities during Scelba's visit to the United States 27 March-3 April 1955 is in fldr Visit ofFM Scelba to USA box 7 ibid U For a DF r L SSIFIED IJl FULL F PiiT Authon y EO 13526 Chief Rec d DDate ' f M m sDiv WH s 81 description by the Counselor of the Italian Embassy of his impressions ofScelba's visit see Ortona La Diplomazia 121-28 U 91 Memo Dulles for Pres nd atchd to memo Scott for Goodpaster 24 Mar 55 fldr State Department of Mar 1955 box 70 White House Central Files Confidential File DDEL U 92 Memo Jones for Merchant 22 Mar 55 U draft memo Freund EUR WE Sec for Pres 24 Mar 55 file 765 00 3-2455 box 3614 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U Merchant wrote in the top margin of the draft the following notation which is not completely legible Signed by the Secy handed by him to the President 2 30pm 3 24 55 LJM 1-Iowever that notation is crossed out and another written under it Not signed by the Secy LJM 93 Memo JCS for Sec Def 23 Mar 55 Doc CK3100424600 DDRS quotes U 94 Memcon Pres w Scelba et al 28 Mar 55 FRUS 1955-57 27 249-54 U 95 Dulles memcon 28 Mar 55 fldr Memos of Conversation-GeneralS 1 box I Dulles Papers DDEL 96 jl A partial text is Doc CK3 00575242 DDRS U Memcon 30 Mar 55 fldr Visit of PM Scelba to USA box 7 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U a partial text is in FRUS 1955-57 27 259- 65 U jt communique 30 Mar 55 American Foreign Policy 1950 55 Basic Documents 1683-85 U 97 Memcon Wilson Hensel Scelba et al 29 Mar 55 fldr Scelba visit box 33 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U 98 Memo ofconv with Grillo 1 Apr 55 fldr Memoranda Eisenhower Administration 1954-56 n d box 633 Luce Papers LC U In the margin is the DF I ll 8Hc ED IN FUll Au homy EO 13526 Chref Records il D Date J 1 JAN 20 Iass D v WI- S 82 following notation in Luce's hand April 1 1955 in New York Luce had accompanied the Scelba party to New York as part of a six city tour after it left V ashinglon 99 CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary 9 Jun 55 Pt 2 16 CIA-RDP7900927A0005000 000001-7 CREST Database NACP U ed note FRUS 195557 27 276 U 100 Sterling and Ascoli Lady of Villa Taverna 16 quote U oso 1 41 101 Stenographic red ofconv between DCI Lucc ct al 11 Jan 55 fldr DCJ-Memo for the Record 1955 box 8 Executive Registry Files Files of the Directors of Central Intelligence Job 80R01731R CIA 102 103 104 -1 OS Henry Jordan How ltaly 's Govenunent Lets Heroin flood the U S Bluebook 101 2 June 1955 24-32 81-82 U memo Luce 26 May 55 fldr Missions Investigations Heroin 1955 box 634 Luce 11 apers LC U also Doc 4fJ Ci i DECLASSIFIED IN PARr Authonty EO 13526 Chief lj rds OOOsss Dlv WHS Date' IJtl oiAI 21116 83 CK3100068412 DDRS J interv Luce 11 Jan68 45-47 C JOHP quote 47 J 106 Draft ltr Luce to Pres 6 Jun 55 fldr Missions Investigations Heroin 1955 box 634 Lucc Papers LC J 107 Telcons Foster and Allen Dulles 7 9 Jun 55 Microfilm Reel3 Du les Herter Telephone Conversations U mins DCI mtg w Deputies 13 Jun 55 CIARDP80B-O 1676R002300 170004-7 CREST Database NACP J 108 For the U S Government's follow-up on the heroin story see memo Dulles for Pres 5 Ju155 FRUS 1955-57 27 276-77 J and airg A-34 State to Rome 15 Jul55 fldr Missions Investigations Heroin 1955 box 634 Luce Papers LC U Perhaps to cover herself if public criticism occurred Luce prepared a two-page summary of her involvement in the affair in which she falsely asse1ted 1'My memorandum neither stated nor implied that heroin diversion was a current problem Any inference to the contrary which may have been drawn was en oneous Memo nd fldr Missions Investigations Heroin 1955 box 634 Luce Papers LC J OSIJ i 4 109 language that made it open to the same kind of objection that tl1e Director and the rest of us found with the recent letter of an important Ambassador Even if it were true that a certain course of conduct on our pa1t was immoral-which I do not consider it to be-what useful purpose is served by this kind of DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Ded ss Dlv WHS 0 1 1 JAN 21116 DECLASSIFIED IN PART AUthOOty EO 1 1 Olv WHS 84 Chief R jr lo ' % Date L 1 WI' characterization in writing Does this not come under the heading of 'nest fouling' Instead of focusing on the cove11 program Visner thought State's moralists should direct their indignation at similar public aspects of U S policy like the refusal to award OSP contracts to Italian firms with Communistdominated unions A handwritten notation in the margin of his memo reads Never used t i f' 110 For early expressions of opposition to the idea of an opening to the Left see tel 173 Moscow to State 25 Jul 52 and eire airg State to Rome and other posts 29 Jun53 FRUS 1952-54 6 1584-87 1620-21 U 111 Ltr Luce to C D Jackson 29 Sept 54 f dr Misc Luce Papers box I 0 Enn y 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U pa1tia1 text in FRUS 1952-54 6 1705-06 U 112 Memo of disc 24i11 NSC mtg 5 May 55 fldr 24ih Meeting box 6 NSC Series DDEL cl'f ltr Luce to Foster Dulles 10 May 55 fldr Mem oranda Interoffice Jan- July 1955 box 633 Luce Papers LC 113 Memcon Luce and Gronchi 21 May 55 FRUS 1955-57 27 267-71 U Gronchi Can Do Vithout Clare New York News 1 Ju155 U Kisatsky United States and the European Right 115 Regarding Gronchi's visit to the United States in late February and early March 1956 seeFRUS 1955-57 27 331-51 U 114 For De Gasperi's views on the Monarchist question see Bunker's memorandum of a conversation with him 5 Sep 52 FRUS 1952-54 6 1591-95 U and diary entry 5 Mar 54 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 980 J@t i i OSI H 4 c 85 Luce to Allen Dulles 12 Mar 54 fldrConespondencc box CL 1 Luce Papers LC final quote U 115 Amory address Anny War College Carlisle Barracks Pa 16 Mar 54 26 CIARDP79-01048000 00300008-7 CREST Database NACP quotes U State Intelligence Report communist Potential for Growth in Italy 9 Jun 54 9 fldr Italy 1945-60 box 127 Subject Files OSD -list U 116 Ltr Luce to Merchant I Dec 55 FRUS 1955-57 27 313-14 U 117 For differing views on whether Luce's lead poisoning story was genuine see Mmtin HemJ' and Clare 331-33 U interv Luce II Jan 68 58-59 CUOHP U ed note FRUS 1955-57 27 371-72 U A compilation apparently done by a staff member showed that in 1955 Luce had been away from Italy 152 days out of 365 1 18 ofthcm in the United States ''Residence Record 1955 Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce nd fldr Memoranda Interoffice Nov-Dec 1955 box 634 Luce Papers LC U 118 Diary entries 10 Feb 5 Mar 54 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 964 973-79 U 119 Brogi Ike and Italy 13-14 U Nuti The United States Italy and the Opening to the Left 39-40 U desp 165 Clarke to Eden 20 Jul 54 w encl rpt Italy Heads ofForeign Missions nd FO 482 8 Confidential Print Italy NAK U Sulzberger ltr extract 14 Mar 54 quoted in Long Row of Candles 983 U 120 Durbrow quoted in Hatch Ambassador ExtraordinWJI 244 U See also Charles Stuart Kennedy's interviews with Wells Stabler 5 Apr 91 8@@1Cf P 15 16 Paul McCusker DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief rda Decl lss Dlv WHS DAio l f f lfAN l lfl6 86 14 Oct 91 2 Wil iam Harrop 24 Aug 93 2 James Engle I Aug 88 1-2 and Horace Torbert 31 Aug 88 3 FAOHC Frontline Diplomacy website U For comments by Cavendish Cannon Ambassador in Greece James Riddle berger in Yugoslavia and Douglas Dillon in France see Lo11g Row o fCcmdles 916 1006 1010 1018 U respectively In addition Gruenther complained to Sulzberger that Luce talked too much and that he was appalled by her indiscretion ibid 992 U 121 Memo Pres 9 Jul 54 and memo SecState for Pres 7 Aug 54 FRUS 1952-54 8 471 489 U Part ofEisenhower's memo is quoted in Mandate for Change 41617 U The military facilities agreement was signed on 20 October 1954 two weeks after the Trieste agreement was concluded FRUS 1952-54 8 579 n 2 U The Italian Government's signature of the NATO Status of Forces SOF agreement which was delayed by the redeployment during the summer of 1955 of U S forces from Austria to northern Italy following conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty did not take place until November 1955 FRUS 1955-57 27 309 n 2 Regarding the Austrian State Treaty the redeployment of U S forces creation of the Southern European Task Force SETAF headquattcred at Verona see Leighton Strategy Money and the Neli' Look 588-91 U 122 Diary entry 10 Aug 54 Fen ell ed Dimy of James C Hagerty 114 U Cook Declassified Eisenhower 195-96 U ltr Luce to Pres 20 Aug 54 fldr Atomic Power and the Lost American Revolution 1954 box 634 Luce Papers LC U A list of more than20 recipients of the paper is ibid U Dulles's letter to Luce ofl September is in fldr Russia Atomic Power box CL 1 ibid U ' ECkEl 4 flF l' 5 81FJED li' FULL Au honty EO 13526 Chief RecnrJs Declflss Dlv WH'- o 1 JAN 2Dt6 DECLASSIFIED IN PART 87 Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date J A I W - ' - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 123 Draft llr nd Sep 54 ldr Uncompleted CBL Drafts box 10 Entry 2783 Luce Embassy Records RG 84 NACP U 124 Ltr Lllce to Dulles 10 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-57 27 388-97 U Amyot Italian Communist Party 123 U 125 Sterling and Ascoli Lady of Villa Taverna 13 U 126 Ltr Luce to Wilson 10 Aug 55 fldr 400 12ltaly box 11 Ace 60A-1025 SA Files RG 330 WNRC U statement Van Dyke ICA 31 Mar 58 Hearings Mutual Security Act of 1958 370 U 127 lnterv Stabler 5 Apr 91 13 FAOHC Frontline Diplomacy website U 128 Filippelli American Labor and Postwar Italy 214-15 U Amyot Italian Communist Party I I 8 U 129 Memo Coyne ExSec Pres For Intell Adv Board 9 May 61 1-2 CIA website U 130 Colby Honorable Men Ill 115 quote U Winks Cloak Gown 389 U Barnes Secret Cold War 11 663 U Prados Lost Crusader 59 U Blum CIA A Forgotten History 130 The CIA in Italy An Interview with Victor Marchetti in Agee and Wolf Dirty Work 168-69 U CIA-The Pike Report 204-05 U The Marchetti interview originally appeared in the Milan publication Panorama 2 May 1974 U 131 Interv Samuel Gammon by Charles Stuart Kennedy 2 Feb 89 3 F AOHC Frontline Diplomacy website U 132 Colby Honorable Men 130 135-37 U Muravchik Exporting Democracy 120contended that Khrushchev's secret speech of February 23 c@MRiz t ua 88 1956 and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution later in the year were more impmtant factors in reducing the strength of the Italian Communist Patty than U S economic aid military assistance and covett financial suppO i OSD Vi C 133 C tl - I J c CIA Office of National Estimates memo for DCI The Italian Political Crisis 17 May 60 and CIA CuiTent Intelligence Weekly Review 23 Jun 60 CIA website U ed note FRUS 1958-60 7 599 U 134 NSC 6014 0 8 Policy Toward Italy 16 Aug 60 fldr NSC 6014 Series Lot 63D-351 S S-NSC files SD U A sanitized text without the financial appendix is in FRUS 1958-60 7 600-09 and on the Digital National Security Archive website along with the appendix U See also memo JCSM-383-60 Twining for SecDef 29 August 1960 fldr Italy 091 box 2 Ace 64A-2093 OSD Subject Files RG 330 WNRC U 135 111 Briefing paper Gray nd atchd to memo of disc 470 NSC mtg 20 Dec 60 fldr NSC 6014 Series box 13 Whitman File DDEL declassified text ofthe memorandum of discussion with one small excision is Doc CK31 00308849 DDRS U The text of the approved paper NSC 601411 U S Policy Toward Italy 19 Jan 61 is on the Digital National Security Archive website U 136 The Eisenhower Administration and NATO Nuclear Strategy An Oral Histmy Roundtable 16 Mar 90 35-36 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Oeclass Dlv WHS 0810 ' Bft IAN 2016                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu