Approved For Release 2000 05 15 Secret No Foreign Dz'mm Soviet YA Computer Pragmm Scret ER RP 73-15 August 1973 Approved For Release 2000 05 15 098Aggp 90151093 9 Approved For Release 2000 05 15 WARNING This ducument contains infonnation affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of Title 18 sections 793 and 79-1 of the US Code as amended Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law Classified by 0l5319 Exempt from general declassificarion schedule at E O 116 52 exemption rut-gory 53 1 Automatically declassified on Date lmpass h l to Determine Approved For Release 2000 05 15 Approved For Release 25X1A SOVIET RYAD COMPUTER PROGRAM 'Summary 1 The Soviet Union's computer development program is in serious trouble For some years Moscow has been pushing its RYAD program -- a series of third generation computers in an effort to meet the country's enormous data-processing re- quirements The program however is at least three years behind schedule and large scale pro duction is not likely for several years 2 By modeling RYAD computers after the IBM 360 series the USSR hoped to Save both time and money and make use of the large stock of IBM soft ware Although the concept was sound the program has been hampered by shortages of highequality com- ponents out of date production and testing tech niques and absence of effective direction and coordination 3 The USSR lacking a solid technological base persuaded Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary and Poland to de-emphasize their own computer plans and help develop some READ models These countries and the USSR are now testing prototypes of a few of the models Only the smaller RYAD models have reached limited-series production or the customer testing stage The Soviet Union has the sole responsibility for pro- ducing the two largest RYADs which are roughly comparable with IBM's powerful 360-75 and 360-85 These Soviet computers however require special integrated circuits that are being produced in the USSR only eXperimentally 4 Although no firm target was ever announced the USSR apparently was counting on producing from 3 000 to 5 000 RYADs per year by 1975 Probably only a few hundred machines will be produced in that year Moscow has recognized this fact and has abandoned plans to phase cut production of the 25X1A Note Comments and queries regarding this publica tion are welcomed They may be directed to of the Office of Economic Research Code 143 Extension 6901 Approved For Release Approved For Release MINSK-32 an obsolete second-generation computer Indeed output of an improved is scheduled to reach 900 units annually by 1975 These machines will be the foundation of the automated management systems to be set up during 1973-75 5 Additional Western help will be a critical factor in determining how fast the Soviet Union can mass-produce a reliable set of RYAD models The United States France the United Kingdom and Japan already have supplied machinery to manufac ture key RYAD components Despite COCOM regula- tions the USSR has acquired much Western tech noloqy and machinery to produce integrated cir cuits Nevertheless without additional Western aid the USSR will find it difficult to mass- produce RYADs during the next plan period 1976480 Moscow now is seeking to purchase complete auto mated plants for the manufacture of integrated cir- cuits magnetic tape and disc packs disc drives magnetic cores and printers Selected purchases of large machines for high priority uses and an interest in Western computer programs for indus trial applications also can be expected And this is the heart of our computer center 2 Approved For Release Approved For Release Discussion Introduction 6 A new family of third-generation computers called RYAD was recently displayed at the Perma nent Exhibition of National Achievements in Moscow These computers had been scheduled for wide application in industry during the Ninth Five- Year Plan 1971-75 The RYAD program however is in deep trouble This publication discusses the program its goals progress and problems and assesses the prospects for RYAD production through 1975 Background 7 Soviet computer production has increased very rapidly since 1960 about 32% a year and the USSR is currently the world's third largest producer of computers after the United States and Japan By US standards however the Soviet in dustry is still small output of digital computers was about 1 300 units in 1972 compared with more than 20 000 in the United States and about 3 000 in Japan A comparison of computers in use is even more striking about 8 500 digital computers in the USSR and more than 100 000 in the United States The Soviets have imported about 200 com- puters from the West and probably less than 100 from Eastern Europe 8 Soviet computer systems differ from those in the United States and in the West in several impor tant respects All Soviet computers currently in series production are second generation machines fitted with transistors Although some transis torized computers are still made in the United YniAccording to official data on the ruble value of output Computer production in the USSR is in cluded under the heading Means of Computer Tech- nology Sredstva Vychislitel'noy Tekhniki which includes spare parts for computers peripherals and possibly non-computer hardware such as calcu lators The extent to which ancillary output may distort the actual growth in output of computers cannot be determined 3 Approved For Release Approved For Release States most US production consists of third generation machines using integrated circuits ICS and can be built in much smaller sizes and in the United States at least at greatly reduced cost 9 Most Soviet computers are scientific machines Design has been optimized to handle numeric inputs numbers rather than alphanumeric inputs letters symbols and numbers Therefore Soviet computers are most efficient in engineering applications Most US computers are general purpose machines designed for data processing but useful and efficient in engineering applications as well 10 In performance and reliability most Soviet computers are obsolete by US standards For ex ample the MINSK-32 perhaps the most widely used Soviet computer for data processing has an average speed of about 25 000 operations per second has a maximum internal memory capacity of 64 000 words and can operate on the average only 20 hours before failure Data processing computers currently word million-word memories and can run trouble- free for several hundred hours 11 Soviet computer peripherals tape drives printers card readers etc -- are greatly in ferior to their Western counterparts in quality design and performance Peripherals and supplies tape paper and cards are a major cause of in- service failure of computer systems and a matter of urgent concern in the USSR 12 Finally Soviet computer software systems are primitive by US standards Generally the Soviets lack transferable high level languages application programs and efficient operating sys- tems software for most of their computers In the United States both computer software and hard ware are developed by the manufacturer for the user High-level languages such as FORTRAN have the special merit that almost anyone can be trained to write a program operating systems are software programs that operate the computer 4 Approved For Release Approved For Release as an integrated package in the USSR the user is forced to develop much of his own software Be- cause Soviet computers are rarely identical soft- ware developed at user facilities is of limited or no value to other users even to those employing the same model computer 13 Early in the Eighth Five Year Plan 1966-70 Soviet planners recognized the need for more ad- vanced general-purpose computers and more efficient software and peripherals for processing economic data Although no official announcement was ever made A A Dorodnitsyn of the USSR Academy of Sciences indicated to US businessmen in late 1967 that a decision had been made to build a family of modern third generation machines RYADs From Dorodnitsyn's remarks and other information it was apparent that Moscow hoped to modernize the entire Soviet computer industry relatively quickly General Aspects of the RYAD Program 14 The RYAD program is the USSR's first major effort to produce a family of computers designed specifically for economic and data processing applications The RYAD series is a direct copy of the IBM 360 series machines technical character- istics of RYADs and IBM 360 computers are compared in Table l A comparison of RYAD and other Soviet computers is given in Table 2 15 The decision to copy IBM strongly opposed by some who felt it degrading had two distinct advantages By using a proved design the Soviets hoped to avoid costly development programs and reach large-scale production more quickly than otherwise would be possible The IBM 360 series program was the most successful effort ever under- taken to develop a family of computers that though differing in size and capabilities were mutually The task of copying may have been aided by the clandestine acquisition of embargoed 360 series computers and association documentation This 'probably decreased the time and effort needed to achieve a Soviet prototype but the availability of the hardware for inspection does not reduce the effort needed to go from the laboratory to mass production 5 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2000 05 15 Table 1 Technical Specifications of Selected RYAD and IBM 360 Series Computers Add Time1 Memory Cycle Time2 Input-Output Rate3 Storage Capacity4 Microseconds Mieroseconds Kbytes5 per Second Kbytes IBM 360-20 58 3 6 160 4-32 Es -i 01 0 200 1 140 8-64 IBM 360-30 40 1 5 400 16-64 ES-1020 25 2 200 64-256 36040 12 2 5 800 32-256 BIS-1030 6 5 1 25 700 128-512 360-50 4 2 1 200 128-512 138-1040 1 4 1 3 5 1 300 2561 024 36065 1 3 0 75 1 200 256-1 024 138-1 050 0 65 1 25 1 300 128-1 024 IBM 360-75 0 8 0 75 1 300 ES-1060 0 5 0 6 1 300 256-2 048 360-85 0 16 0 08 1 300 5124 096 1 Time required to execute one addition 2 Time required to read and restore a speci ed number of bits 3 Maximum speed of input-output operations 4 Number of units of addressable internal storage available 5 Kilobytes A byte is a basic unit of memory used to form words 6 Yedinnaya Sistema unified system Table 2 Technical Specifications of Selected RYAD and Other Soviet Computers Add Time1 Memory Cycle Time2 Storage Capacity3 Microseconds Microseconds Kbytes 20 154 4-16 URAL-14 20 294 16-64 10 9 128-512 MINSK-22 12 24 4-8 MINSK-32 25-34 5 16-64 138-1020 25 2 64256 BESM-6 1 1 2 16-64 ES-1050 0 65 1 25 128-1 024 1 Time required to exscute one addition 2 Time required to read and restore a speci ed number of bits 3 Number of units of addressable internal storage available 4 Estimated 6 Approved For Release Approved For Release compatible Subject only to hardware limitations on speed and memory size programs designed for any model in the series can be run on all other models Soviet computers generally are not com- patible with_each other The Soviets also hoped to make RYADs compatible with IBM 360 machines since this would give them access to a large IBM library of systems software and applications programs The USSR could also supplement domestic production by importing IBM machines and compatible peripherals manufactured by IBM and other Western firms 16 The Soviets planned to put RYAD into series production in 1970 This enormously complex undertaking involved the concurrent development of several areas of technology that were poorly de- veloped in the USSR in 1967 Integrated circuits were not being produced serially nor were multi layer printed circuit boards which together with integrated circuits are the fundamental 'building block of third-generation computers The magnetic disc technolOgy essential for all RYAD models was only in early stages of development To help meet the program's challenge the USSR turned to Eastern Europe Role of Eastern Europe l7 RYAD became a CEMA wide program under Soviet leadership and control in late 1968 when Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary and Poland reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the USSR in the joint development and production of RYAD computers These countries were already using Soviet computers and were not anxious to increase their dependence on Soviet computer sys tems The East Europeans strongly opposed coopera- tion because they already had computer development programs that were tailored to their special needs The commitment to purchase RYADs was especially troublesome for Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary and Poland since they had licenses to produce Western style computers that were not compatible with RYAD Eastern Europe was first given respon sibility for developing software and peripheral Used for mounting and interconnecting the ICS 7 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2000 05 1 hardware By 1970 their role was expanded to include producing central processing units as well 18 The East European computer industry is quite small Poland with the largest has pro duced only about 500 computers during the past 10 years Nevertheless capability to produce ad- vanced design computers has improved markedly in recent years through the acquisition of Western computers and computer related technology Poland has built prototypes of a medium-sized third generation computer based on British design and has developed a minicomputer based on UK technoloqy acquired illegally Bul garia allegedly has acquired French technology to produce integrated circuits for calculators and Japanese technology to manufacture magnetic tape drives Hungary and East Germany are manufacturing a few third-generation process control computers based on imported components Poland soon should have the best capability to produce integrated circuits in Eastern Europe having acquired an integrated circuit production facility from France Czechoslovakia manufactures ICs in small quantity based on clandestinely acquired US technology Models Characteristics Uses Producers and Prices 19 The RYAD program will have six basic com puter models referred to interchangeably as the E5 or series In ascending order of complexity they are the ES-1030 and The Smallest of the RYAD series the memory and low processing speed restrict its useful- ness to simple engineering tasks teaching applications and limited process control and data processing operations It can serve also as a satellite processor for larger RYAD computers in preparing input data or controlling peripherals The central processing unit includes the main memory and arithmetic circuitry 8 Approved For Release 2000 05 15 79T01098A000100150001-9 Approved For Release Having about the same speed as the IBM 360-30 computer and the Soviet MINSK-32 the will be used for data processing or engineering problem-solving at the enterprise level The Several times faster than the and having a memory twice as large the ES-1030 is about equivalent to an IBM 360 40 It will be used in medium-sized enterprises The ES-1040 According to claimed speCifications the ES-1040 is a large computer roughly comparable with the IBM 360-50 It is large enOugh to accom- modate multiprogramming and time sharing and will be used by production associa- tions or regional computer centers for complex economic and scientific problems The ES-1050 Faster than the but EaVing the same maximum memory size the is the counterpart of the IBM 360 65 It is to be used for planning at the Republic or All Union level The With a planned speed of 2 million operations per second and a maximum memory of 2 million bytes the ES-1060 compares with the largest IBM 360 computers It will be used at the highest levels of government for the most demanding planning economic and scientific weather prediction problems About 150 models of the approximately 20 basic types of peripheral machines will be produced in the USSR and in Eastern Europe for use with RYAD Some types magnetic disc storage systems video terminals plotters and alphanumeric optical readers are not yet in production in the Soviet Union while other peripherals currently in pro duction will be redesigned and improved substan- tially for RYAD use 20 All RYAD models except possibly the minicomputer and the ES-1040 are under development in the USSR The very largest machines 9 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2000 05 15 the and are being developed ex clusively by the USSR and the others jointly with Eastern Europe Hungary is building the with the help of a licensed French design that has been modified extensively to meet RYAD compati- bility standards The ES-1020 is Bulgaria's re sponsibility although versions with greater Speed but smaller memories are being developed in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia ZPA- 6000 20 Poland is developing the basic model of the and Czechoslovakia is designing a modified version the East Germany is the only country working on the ES-1040 The principal development production centers for RYADs in the USSR and Eastern Europe are shown in Table 3 21 The prices available for two RYAD systems are surprisingly high The ES-1030 is priced at about 900 000 rubles The is priced at 3 5 million rubles For comparison rough counterparts in the IBM series -- the 360-40 and 360-65 -- cost about $250 000 and $1 7 million reSpectively 22 The high RYAD prices reflect the high costs of prototype production The price of the seems low relative to that of the suggesting that the bigger models in the RYAD series may be subsidized The price of the is about four times that of the ES-1030 whereas for IBM the price of the larger model is about seven times the smaller one 23 Until production costs decline with ex- panding production and unless the State Commission on Prices decides to cut prices some users of computers will find RYAD prices non competitive with those of existing second-generation machines V M Glushkov a leading Soviet computer authority noted that some third generation RYAD computers with the same capacity as the will cost several times more until comprehensive measures are implemented to insure comparable prices second generation computers must be used extensively In fact the Possibly the developed by Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique At the official rate of exchange 10 15 Approved For Release 2000 05 SECRET Approved For Release Table 3 USSR and Eastern Europe Facilities for RYAD Production1 Country and Model Facility Location Comments USSR ES-102O Brest Electrotech- Possibly several dozen units have nical Plant Brest been built Apparently converted for computer production Minsk Computer Development testing and proto- Plant Ordzhon- type production Full-scale production ikidze Minsk of RYADs has been delayed owing to con- tinued production of MINSK-32s ES-1030 Yerevan Experimental Development testing and proto- Computer Plant type production May be preparing for Yerevan production This plant's previous production of NAIRI computers may have been shifted to the Baku Radio Plant ES-1050 Moscow Computer Prototype production Planning to Plant Moscow fabricate ve prototypes during 1973 Penza Computer Apparently preparing for production Plant Panza ES-1060 Unknown Still in design phase A prototype has not yet been produced Bulgaria ES-1020 Sofia A few models have been assembled using 7 imported components Czechoslovakia A2 ZPA Cakovice A prototype reportedly has been 20 produced - ES-1030 A2 ZPA Cakovice Under design 30 - East Germany 021 2 Several units reportedly have been ROBOTRON-2 1 den produced- ES-1040 Development testing and prototype den production Hungary 01 0 Videoton Preparing for production A few proto- Szekesfehervar types have been built Poland ES-1030 Elwro Wroclaw Development testing and prototype production 1 Assembly of central processing units 2 Modi cations of RYAD models 11 Approved For Release Approved For Release costs three times as much as the MINSK-32 320 000 rubles the which has roughly the same computing power as the MINSK-32 will cost an esti- mated 600 000 rubles nearly twice as much 24 In addition to a much higher initial pur chase price the RYAD because of its complex hardware and software will require the user to employ more people with higher skills This means higher operating costs At three times the ini- tial cost and many times the operating cost an ES-1030 would need to perform several times as much work as a MINSK-32 to be competitive RYAD computers which cost more to buy and maintain than MINSK-3ZS will probably encounter buyer resistance especially from smaller facilities where the technical capabilities offered by the are adequate Production Goals 25 No official plan for production of RYAD computers has been announced The 1971 75 Plan provides only that the USSR will put into series production new systems of electronic computers based on integrated circuits 26 There is much evidence however that gen eral objectives for RYAD production in 1971-75 do exist After a prototype had been tested success fully in 1971 the Soviets began to talk optimis tically The Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Rakovsky stated that 12 000 to 15 000 third generation computers would be produced in 1971 75 The Soviet press reported that more than 10 000 third-generation computers would con- stitute the base of the automated systems of man- agement to be set up Other sources said that the total number of computers of all types in use in the USSR would increase from 7 000 in 1970 to 25 000 in 1975 an increase possible only with large scale production of RYAD or other third generation Avtomatizirovannye Sistemy Upravleniya ASUs Several Such systems have been developed by and for a few large plants The heart of these sys tems is the informationmcomputer center Tsentr IVT whiCh typically includes one or more computers for data processing 12 Approved For Release Approved For Release computers or with massive imports Soviet com- puter industry officials also told a US consulting firm that the USSR would have 35 000 RYADS by 1980 Another aspect of the RYAD program calls for a huge training effort to provide skilled programmers systems and technicians During 1971-75 about 160 000 computer specialists will be trained including 50 000 systems That number of trained Specialists based on US experience would be sufficient to maintain about 15 000 RYAD sys- tems Together these statements suggest that the Soviets hoped to be producing 3 000 5 000 RYADs annually by 1975 Cost of the RYAD Program 27 RYAD is a costly program in terms of both expenditures and manpower The cost of developing RYAD hardware and software was estimated by Academician Dorodnitsyn in 1967 at 10 billion -rub1es $13 8 although the USSR's fi 'nancial burden has been reduced to some extent by Eastern Europe's participation in the program This cost is equivalent to that of building and equipping three plants the size of the Kama Truck Plant the largest heavy truck plant in the world In the United States the counterpart IBM 360 pro- gram was developed at an estimated cost of $5 bil- lion 28 Although the RYAD program is large the program's manpower requirements seem astonishingly high According to Soviet sources 300 000 people are involved in the program in the USSR and Eastern Europe By comparison only about 172 000 people were employed in the entire US computer industry in 1972 manpower requirements probably Besides the RYADs the USSR is develOping third-generation computers for process control in industry That program called A gregatnaya rSistema Sredstv Vychislitel'noy TeEhniki ZASVT centers on the series of computers M-5000 M-6000 now claimed to be in the early stages of production In the United States three programmers are needed at the user facility for each IBM 360 sys tem and one is needed at the plant for every three systems At the official rate of exchange 13 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2000 05 15 will be cut back sharply when RYAD moves out of development and into large scale production In the United States a labor force of 25 000 could produce 3 000 small RYAD systems annually in- cluding components integrated circuits and memory cores and all the peripherals needed for a stand ard configuration 29 Although manpower needs may fall the tran sition to large-scale production of RYADs will strain the production capacity of the Soviet com puter industry The estimated requirements for electronic components and peripherals to support an annual production of even 3 000 RYADs of the simplest type ES-1020 and in a standard configuration are large relative to current Soviet capabilities This situation may be seen in the accompanying tabulation Required Estimated 1972 for 3 000 RYADS Soviet Output Integrated circuits million units 50-60 30-40 Ferrite memory cores billion bits 6 2 Magnetic disc units thousand units 10 Negligible 30 In addition at least 2 million square feet of floorspace would be required to assemble the central processing units alone -- more than half of the estimated floorspace in the eight Soviet plants known to be major producers of these units The largest computer assembly facility in the USSR the Minsk Computer Plant has about 500 000 square feet of floorspace an amount suf ficient to produce about 750 RYADs annually To produce 3 000 per year the USSR WOuld need four plants the size of the Minsk Plant just to assemble central processing units to produce 5 000 RYADs annually the requirement for floor- space would be about two thirds larger Only two facilities the Minsk Computer Plant and the Brest Electrotechnical Plant have been asso- ciated definitely with the'manufacture of central 14 Approved For Release Approved For Release processing units and the main item of production at Minsk continues to be the MINSK-32 The Brest plant may become the major producer of the its size is unknown Progress and Problems 31 Reportedly several dozen RYAD computers have been built in and a few have been installed in user facilities Several more have been built in Eastern Europe No RYAD model is being produced in large quantity however and the program as a whole is at least three years behind the schedule originally announced by Academician Dorodnitsyn - 32 The the smallest variant is being tested in Hungary and according to the local press will go into production before the end of this year By 1975 Hungary plans to manufacture 100 to 150 units a year A prototype of the ES-1020 was 'fabricated by the USSR as early as 1970 and passed acceptance tests in 1971 The first batch reportedly was delivered to customers in early 1972 when series production was said to have begun Subsequent information indicated that the was being redesigned at the Minsk Computer Plant and in December 1972 Gosplan Chairman Baybakov implied that production would begin in 1973 Although this model was still undergoing acceptance testing by a small number of users in mid 1973 the ES-1020 probably is now in limited production 33 In Eastern Europe Bulgaria was the first to exhibit a prototype of the_ES 1020 -- at the Plovdiv Fair in late 1971 Czechoslovakia claims to have built a successful prototype of its version of the the intended mainly for internal use and said that production might begin in 1973 East Germany's version of the ES-1020 the also designed primarily for internal use is behind schedule too although a few units have been built and installed 34 Little is known about production of the more advanced RYAD models The has been recommended for production in the USSR and Poland claims to have produced a working prototype 15 Approved For Release Approved For Release Czechoslovakia's version of the ES-1030 is still in the design stage East Germany may have built two experimental models of the The two largest RYADS the ES-1050 and require special integrated circuits that are only in exper imental production in the The USSR has built a prototype and plans to produce five more experimental this year the ES-1060_is still in the design phase 35 The delay in the RYAD program is the reSult of a number of factors especially a shortage of some critical components The limited output of high quality integrated circuits has been shared with other high-priority claimants such as pro ducers of military equipment and ASVT process con- trol computers There are also problems with the supply of peripheral equipment Magnetic disc peripherals needed for every RYAD installation are still in short supply despite years of develop ment The USSR has found too that compatibility between computers and peripheral equipment requires close tolerances that are difficult to obtain In this regard the RYAD like all Soviet computer projects has been handicapped by a failure to apply automated production techniques or computerized on-line testing technology Software development also has lagged The RYAD pragram was supposed to capitalize on the software used in the IBM 360 series but it has proved more difficult than ex pected to adapt IBM software or to modify the RYADs to handle the IBM software 36 Above all the RYAD program is suffering from the same lack of effective direction coordi nation and control that has plagued Soviet computer development over the years A recent Pravda article deprecated the duplication in research and the mis allocation of skilled labor resources among scattered institutes ministries and departments Even so no single authority as far as is known has been vested with responsibility to bring about the necessary coordination 3F These circuits are emitter-coupled logic ECL integrated circuits rather than transistor transistor lOgic TTL devices to be used in all other models ECL which is significantly faster than TTL is needed for the very high speeds re- quired by the and models 16 Approved For Release Approved For Release Western Assistance 37 The West has played a small but crucial role in the RYAD program Early in the program a number of IBM 360 series machines were approved for export to Eastern Europe and hence became available for Soviet inspection In addition critical RYAD components are being manufactured with the help of production machinery acquired both legally and illegally from firms in the United States Western Europe and Japan To manu facture multilayer printed circuit boards for ex ample the USSR purchased several dozen precision spray-etching machines mostly from the United States valued at about $2 million and an unknown number of lamination presses and numerically con- trolled drilling machines from the United Kingdom The USSR also reportedly purchased two complete printed circuit manufacturing plants from France The USSR now is interested in buying more advanced US technology and machinery for manufacturing printed circuit boards 38 The COCOM embargo has hindered the USSR in its efforts to acquire technology and machinery to produce integrated circuits Still much US British Japanese and French equipment has found its way to the Soviet Union and is being used to make integrated circuits in Soviet laboratories and plants So far the USSR has been unable to buy complete plants to produce ICs but inquiries in the West continue 39 The USSR also has sought to purchase com plete Us plants to manufacture magnetic tape magnetic disc disc driVes magnetic cores and printers all based on highly automated computer controlled production and test techniques SOme equipment to manufacture disc drives has been acquired from Japan and France That is outside established COCOM embargo channels Chemical milling machines used to etch out electrical patterns of printed circuit boards A recent application by a US firm to export two separate plants to produce magnetic tape and disc paCks valued at nearly $50 million was denied by the US Government 17 Approved For Rel-ease Approved For Release 2000 05 15 Prospects 40 The likelihood that RYAD computers will be produced on a large scale by 1975 several thou- sand per year -- is poor No new facilities for assembling RYAD central processing units are known to be under construction Neither does the massive conversion of existing floorspace from the produc- tion of second generation machines appear to be taking place To the contrary the Minsk Computer Plant originally designed to produce RYADs now is scheduled to continue to produce the obsolete MINSK-32 in 1973-75 Indeed these machines are Vbeing improved and output is scheduled to grow from 300 units in 1972 to 900 units in 1975 The MINSK-32 rather than RYAD according to recent Soviet press statements will serve as the basic machine in the automated systems of management being set up during 1973 75 41 Even after 1975 mass production of RYAD computers will be difficult without substantial help from Western manufacturers The USSR can be expected to press its efforts to acquire machines and technology for automated assembly of_central processing units as well as other computer related equipment and technology The value of the pro duction equipment and technology that the USSR might import over the next few years could range from $100 million to $200 million The Soviets however are not likely to purchase many several hundred IBM computers the Soviets have stated emphatically that they are firmly committed to RYAD and are net interested in large numbers of used computers Any machine imports will be restricted to high priority needs for which Soviet computers clearly are not adequate These purchases however will involve large expensive computers for use in complex applications and could result in sales of several hundred million dollars during the next three to four years At a recent press conference D M Gvishiani Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology stated We are not interested simply in buying computers even if credits are available The USSR reportedly has signed a multimillion dollar contract with footnote continued on p 19 18 Approved For Release Approved For Release The USSR would also purchase IBM 360 applications prOgrams for use with RYADs if these could be obtained on a single-price no royalty basis Such programs would be especially useful in fostering increased industrial productivity 42 The least complex RYAD models -- and -- will probably be produced on a small scale in Eastern Europe and the USSR in 1973-75 Small numbers of also may be produced by East Germany All these machines are based on electronic circuit elements that already are in production A few experimental production models of the ES-1050 will be built although the most advanced RYAD machine -- the may not even reach the prototype stage 43 The RYADs that are produced are likely to fall short of Western standards just as the com puters now in use do deSpite the RYAD's reliance on IBM designs The USSR lacks the newest tech nolOgy for testing components quality assurance techniques including zero defect and other stand- ardized manufacturing procedures are only now being adopted and the labor force is less skilled than its Western counterparts The operational effectiveness of RYAD computers probably will be further limited by shortages of external random access storage devices display terminals and high-speed data transmission equipment 44 The crash program to increase the number of systems proqrammers is likely to fail Most pro grammers are being trained in Soviet universities many of which do not even have a computer and none have RYADs In any case 50 000 systems cannot be trained adequately in universities on an accelerated basis In the United States several years of highly specialized post-university training sponsored by computer manufacturers is generally needed to reach professional standards As in the past trainees are to be programmer mathematicians The mathematical training which may have been use- ful for programming past Soviet computer systems IBM fOr large computers to handle the scheduling and reservations for Intourist IBM apparently has also been chosen to provide the computers for management and automation of the Kama Truck Plant 19 Approved For Release Approved For Release takes time and is not needed for RYAD's high-level languages Finally to be fully effective pro grammers need in-place training at the user fa- cility -- training that the USSR does not generally provide 45 When the RYAD program finally gets into high gear it probably will keep the Soviet com- puter industry technologically inferior to those in the United States Western Europe and Japan Soviet industrial practices will tend to freeze the RYAD design and prevent the modifications and improvements needed to stay abreast of changes in technology In fact the hardware and software technology embodied in the RYAD design is being superseded rapidly in the United States IBM has introduced an advanced 370 series of computers that incorporate across-the-board hardware improve ments and more efficient concepts of operating software 46 Meanwhile it may take some time for RYADs to be used efficiently Technical manuals and other documentation are not yet available making it difficult for the user to choose among the various RYAD models In addition because the programmers systems and technicians are not being trained on RYADs many users will have to rely on specialists who will have to learn as they go 20 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2000 05 15 CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 Secret No Foreign Disse'm Secret Approved For Release 2000 05 15 CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 I SECRET ft r 1 s mg m -9 USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN FINISH GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS Rating forms will be completed for each finished intelligence publication prepared by the and This is a machine-supported system and information must be gathered in a formatted fashion Therefore each analyst will complete the NON-SHADED parts of section I and II of this form Please type or print Iegibly Questions should be directed to Room 2G 40 x1631 red or x4273 black SECTION I - PUBLICATION TITLE AND CONTENT NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF RATER l i ill f a 1910101 19291919331919 IC TION NUMBER FOR ONLY BL A CIB PUBLICATION DATE 13-23Frags-Lam I 80 EC CARD 2 - RECORD OFFICE 9-10 NO- Irma nos I as - or 176 73 o2 OER 04 one - 03 - 08 FMSAC I I 2 JOINT OFFICE lspecifyl TOPICAL CATEGORY I GEOGRAPHIC AREA CATEGORY Domestic Politics USSR International Relations Eastern Europe Economics Communist China Military Other Far East Science Technology Near East Geography South Asia Biography Africa Latin America Western Europe LIST SPECIFIC COUNTRIES 33 3114 mg P-OLgnd TO BE COMPLETED BY IRS REC TYPE TOPIC AREA ii-L2 13 16 8e 05 15- 3 unease u 019V 3492 SECRET Cl BY 007622 ll 0 3'43l SECRET For each collection program contributing information to the publication check only the highest rating that is applicable More than one collection program may be rated as Key Supplemental or Incidental for each publication if the source did not provide any reporting useful in the publication check the box labeled Not Applicable If a single publication treats more than one geographic area and or topical category and the source mix for each varied then additional forms must be completed e g lndia economics State and Japan economics CS Rating categories are defined as follows Key Information from a particular collection program was of such importance that basic conclusions of the finished intelligence item could not have been reached without it Supplemental Information from a particular collection program was important but not essential to basic conclusions of the finished intelligence item Incidental Information from a particular collection program was useful or interesting primarily as background but was used only incidentally in the finished intelligence item COL COLLECTION PROGRAMS 17 OVERHEAD IMAGERY 19 COMINT ELINT 23 TELEMETRY 25 RADINT 27 DEFECTOR RPTs 29 cs REPORTS STATE REPORTS 33 DOD REPORTS 35 REPORTS 37 FBIS PRESS RADIO 8 TV REPORTS Translation of Foreign Lang documents eit- I40 Rpts USIA AID otherr such Open Literature professional iournals 43 US wure ser OTHER For Items No 12 I3 14 and I5 specify source of reportIng used TRANSLATIONS F313 3 1933 NON-USIB OPEN LITERATURE Soviet rue cics Review RamimCorporation OTHER TYPE Weekly Review-Spec CLASSIFICATION SECRET CLASSIFICATION CONTROLS NED List CS Information Reports that were key or supplemental information sources pun Bugpm umop - nunummn we mpgg- waos w 1a 1 1 f 271 7 5 3765 Art-Fem 3qu er07 Pa'dt r'Qd ElinlliSEH'lS C LXQZ 83A NSIBNOJ Oi 318VSV3138 A Gaunt I LJVECI 13M GENO EAOWEE NEil QNIZILINVS MBIAEH am armada NVHEI LDEIFHFIS ER soviet RYAD Computer Program nal st Ap 2000 05 15 A0 0 Mg STATINTL STATINTL Ir National Security Agency 6% Dr Ronald A Finkler Institute for Defense Analysis 4 Jeremiah Kratz lg Atomic Energy Commission Division of Int'l Security Affairs e3 Rauer Meyer Hewnvnentkw Department of Commerce Office of Export Control 2% efi Jean Tartterf Qitj Department of State vi George R Department of State SCI in -3 9% Hylan B Lyons Department of State I at Y s a Balph Piekarz' uyu xw Nat cience oundation 515 David Elliot 3i VNational Security Council UJ y 4 Steve Farrar 15% j155 figi Office of Management and Budget 5 Dr Ruth M Davis National Bureau of Standards Lji it 153 We 1 Pmnaao a 'm se y 5 Gus W Weiss Jr i3 Council on International Economic 5 53 73 wmn iznew reme x 5p 303-33315 ngi V Henry R Engehausen ikv y Army Foreign Science and Tech 2 Center FSTC STATINTL Defense Intelligence Agency v 25 f i E31113 Defense Intelligence Agency DT STATINTL e3 1 Miss Joanne Thomas Navy Intelligence Support if a Center NISC ti we Lt Col Frank E Fravei i Headquarters USAF AFNIAKA 'gc Fred E Eichler y 9 a Foreign Technology Division TDPT Department of the Air Force w Ira Battlg- i-J i Department of State '17 b- p wb rwm 2L0 ilt I cum em a 5 ea gem owe 50001 -9 - I I prove eease I - CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION SERIES ER CLAS ICATION DISTRIBUTION To RC 13 gr DATE DOCUMENT NUMBER OF COPI 5 NUMBER IN RC 7 COPY No S RECIPIENT RETURNED I0 Cree-u 7 69 I 92 2353 ApproVed For Release 2000 05 15 lease 2000 05 15 CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 RECIPIENT DATE SENT RETURNED 5I15 CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 J- Analyst Project 11 6381 or eease - 1 98A000100150001-9 CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 25X1A DISSEM 5 Se 73 NO ELITE ERIES NUMBER 7 CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION TO RC ER RP 73 15 35 ATE OF DOCUMENT NUMBER OF COPIES nuuncn at August 1973 130%4 91170 COPY RECIPIENT N0 3 RETURNED F DDI OER A ER via c h lD 61 fan 2 El-70 RECIPIENT Filed in Archives le Records Center Doubkecover CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 DATE SENT RETURNED 25X1A 5 Sep 73 I amc'f 5 w Cam i747 CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu