Magi-II Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Confidential Soviet BYAD Computer A Program in Trouble Confidential ER 77-10491 September 1977 COPY 1 85 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants Caution Proprietary Information Involved NFIB Departments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL This Information has been Authorized for Release to Classified by 015319 'Exempt tram General Declassificetlon Schedule of EC 11652 exemption category Sec 2 and 3 Automatically declassified on date impossible to determine Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CON Nofom Soviet RYAD Computers A Program in Trouble Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence September 1977 Key Judgments The USSR continues to experience serious delays in the development production installation and effective use of its RYAD computers which form the cutting edge of the Kremlin s computer modernization program In the Ninth Five-Year Plan 1971 75 the USSR and its East European allies produced only 10-15 percent of the anticipated number of RYAD computers a series of third generation computers modeled on the IBM-360 series Furthermore output has included only the smaller less powerful RYAD models with the final product decidedly inferior to the IBM originals in reliability and compatibility and in the quality of associated input-output and auxiliary storage devices Despite this poor track record the Kremlin is pressing ahead in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period 1976-80 with the development of a RYAD II series similar to the IBM-3 70 series In addition to the general-purpose RYAD computers which represent about 20 percent of the current value of output of the Soviet computer industry the USSR is turning out several types of specialized military and civilian computers Through the brute force application of large technical resources the USSR is gradually incorporating modern computer technology into its military and industrial operations but at an efficiency level far below Western standards and at a technological level roughly 10 years behind Use of RYAD computers to handle complex Soviet military problems such as command and control will be delayed until larger RYAD systems equipped with high-performance off-the-shelf peripherals appear in the 19803 While the use of computers in specific civilian sectors moves forward in numerous small ways the difficulties encountered in these relatively simple CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL 7 Nofom tasks demonstrate the unreality of grandiose schemes for computerizing the planning management and operation of the entire economy E1 SOViet and EaSt EUTOpean achievements in the computer field would be even less impressive were it not for substantial acquisitione legally and illegally1 #of Western equipment and technology 1The term illegal in this report refers to acquisition in contravention to established COCOM barriers i i CONFIDENTIAL E 2'25 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CONFIDENTIAL quom Soviet RYAD Computers A Program in Trouble Origin of the RYAD Series The Soviet decision in the mid-19608 to build a family of compatible2 RYAD computers was a belated response to the need for complete mod ernization of Soviet computer technology The USSR was lagging far behind the West in the development production and application of data processing systems for economic and in- dustrial uses Soviet computers had been de- signed mainly for scientific applications and had insufficient internal memories Auxiliary mem- ory and input output equipment were techni- cally poor and in short supply electronic com- ponents were unreliable spare parts were diffi- cult to obtain and a multiplicity of models prevented users from sharing programs and ex- periences Moreover because individual users typically made nonstandard modifications even compatibility between computers of the same model was lost To cut development time and save resources top-level planners chose to adopt the IBM series 360 logic design and software using the engi- neering talents and production capacity of So viet and East European countries The planners may also have gambled that the improvement in relations among several East and West European countries would speed acquisition of needed Western know-how Also the Soviets wanted to decrease East European reliance on the West as a supplier of computing equipment The RYAD program was designed as a family of seven computer models3 which were to be 2Two computer models are compatible when the same programs can be used on each 3RYAD models are referred to by the designation ES Edinnaya Sistema Unified System followed by four digits or by RYAD followed by the final two digits BIS-1010 is equated to R-10 The seven models were the ES-1010 1020 1021 1030 1040 1050 and 1060 CONFIDENTIAL compatible with each other and with IBM-360 computers as well Production originally planned to begin in 1970 was delayed until late 1972 when serial production started on the two smallest models in the series the 138-1020 and 138 1030 In May 1973 several different RYAD central processing units and a number of RYAD-compatible peripheral equipments were exhibited in Moscow Production of third gener- ation RYADs thus began in the USSR and East ern Europe about three years later than antici- pated and nearly 10 years later than production of comparable equipment in the West 4 Levels of Output The RYAD production program has contrib- uted to the advancement of the Soviet position in computers although at a pace far below ex- pectations The USSR and Eastern Europe to- gether produced an estimated 1 700 RYADs during the Ninth Five Year Plan period 1971 75 5 The USSR produced about 80 per- cent of this total mostly the smaller and 138 1030 models see table I The largest RYAD models the 135-1050 and ES-1060 which the Soviets had hoped to put into quan- tity production were still under development in 1975 Output of RYADs in the USSR rose sharply over the plan period from only 10 units in 1971 to 700 units in 1975 This growth was achieved mainly by shifting resources from the produc- tion of to RYADS at the Minsk Computer Plant and from M-222s to 4For additional information on the early phases of the RYAD program see ER RP 73-15 Soviet RYAD Computer Program August 1973 SECRET NOFORN This report furnishes details on the performance characteristics of the various RYAD models 5For the methodology used in production estimates see the Appendix Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CONFIDENTIAL Table USSR and Eastern Europe Estimated Production of RYAD Computers Model 1971 Total 10 Total production 10 USSR 10 1020 5 1030 5 Eastern Europe 0 Bulgaria 7 1020 0 Czechoslovakia 1021 0 7 East Germany 1040 0 Hungary 1010 0 Total prototype 0 USSR 0 1050 0 1060 0 Eastern Europe 0 Poland 1030 0 RYADs ES-1030 at Kazan By the end of 1975 production of MINSK- 323 had been phased out entirely This left RYAD as the only major computer system in production that was intended mainly for use in economic data pro cessing 6 As for East European producers East Ger- many provided the only success story East Ger- many developed and produced the ES- 1040 a well made and apparently reliable machine Al- though output remained small by the end of 1975 East Germany was producing at the rate of about 100 units per year and had the manu- facturing facilities to produce roughly twice that figure Elsewhere in Eastern Europe progress in the production of RYADs was slow Hungary took on the smallest and simplest machine in 6In addition to RYAD the USSR is producing a series of computers for industrial control applications Some models in this series such as the M-4030 also are based on IBM-360 designs and are competitive with RYADs for general data processing applications The status of production of a third series the URAL computers which had resulted from earlier Soviet attempts to provide a compatible family of computers for general uses is not known 2 Approved For Release OI 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971-75 40 206 559 886 1 701 39 - 205 555 880 1 689 35 175 450 700 1 370 the RYAD family the 1010 but had gotten production up to only 100 units by 1975 Czechoslovakia was producing the E84021 at the rate of less than two per month in 1975 and Poland which was intended to be a major pro- ducer of the ES-1030 had built only a single prototype Furthermore in Hungary and Czechoslovakia the machines produced were not fully com- patible with the other RYAD models They are still included in the RYAD family because they can use the same input output and related pe- ripheral equipment The 010 is used as a front end processor initially massaging the data for further processing by the larger RYADs a control unit in a process control environment or a minicomputer for stand- alone problem solving The Czechoslovak ma- chine has found little acceptance either inside or outside Czechoslovakia Failure to Meet Plan Output of 1n the USSR and Eastern Europe has fallen far short of the planners CONFIDENTIAL 51111 71111 11111111 111111 11111111111 111111111111 1 1111151 1511111 73111151 1 51 1' I I li 1y1tl l ll1g 1 1 1 11111115111 11 111111 1 11 1 111- I w 1l1111 11 I 1111 111 1 - - 11 i 11 15111501 1111 111111 1 1111 11111- 1111111 111111111111 r1111 51 1151- 1 31-1111111 1 111 11 1 1 511 14011511 1 11511 11 s I 1111 1-11 1 11 1'1 1 firm 111111151111 7111 111-11111 11 1111111111 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 expectations Specific numerical goals for the production of RYADs have never been pub- lished The Soviets at least early in the program apparently anticipated output of 3 000 to 5 000 RYADs a year by 1973 For instance Rakovskiy the Deputy Minister of GOSPLAN hinted in 1971 that 12 000 to 15 000 RYADs would be available for use during the Ninth Five Year Plan In the USSR production of RYADs has been delayed by shortages of adequate components mainly integrated circuits and by backward production technology and quality assurance Through 1973 few integrated circuits ICs were available for RYADs The USSR produced ICs of the type used by smaller only in very small quantities yields of acceptable de- vices were low with military authorities having first selection of the better quality devices Out- put of ICs increased rapidly after 1973 enabling the USSR to move into commercial scale pro- duction of the smaller RYAD machines Poor fabrication techniques have also held down production Lacking the advanced ma- chinery of Western producers the Soviets have substituted manual techniques for automatic wiring of back panels and for automatic inser tion of components into printed-circuit boards 8 In addition the Soviets have relied on simple electrical and electronic instrumentation such as voltmeters and oscilloscopes for online test- ing of subassemblies while most Western pro- ducers use computerized test equipment Mass production of RYADs has also been delayed by tight competition for resources within the computer industry RYAD while the most publicized program is only one of several large computer production programs in the USSR The share of RYAD output in the total value of Soviet computer production probably amounted to less than 20 percent in 1975 This calculation is based on the unit price of RYAD 7TTL Transistor-Transistor Logic of relatively low density up to ten gates and low power 8Despite Soviet claims to have introduced automatic production and test equipment Western observers have reported that computer production remains highly manual CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL 10208 and 10303 in standard configuration including associated peripherals By 1980 RYAD production will remain less than half of the computer industry s output even in the unlikely event that RYAD produc- tion can be boosted to 3 000 units per year That level of output would require commission- ing new plant capacity or converting existing facilities to the RYAD program In mid 1977 there was no evidence of either development Problems with Peripherals Conventional types of peripheral equip- ment punch-card and paper tape devices line printers and magnetic tape units appear to be produced in adequate quantities to meet RYAD production needs but are obsolescent by West- ern standards For example Soviet-produced line printers in use with RYADs are slower and of generally lower performance than printers in use with IBM Series 360 machines Soviet mag- netic tape units are approximately 10 years be hind Western state of the art and have not been supplied with sufficient quantities of domesti- cally produced high-quality magnetic tapes The USSR has tried to remedy this shortage by im porting tape from the US and Western Europe and magnetic tape units from Eastern Europe Failure of the USSR to produce high-capacity magnetic disc drives and disc packs has been a major deficiency in peripherals technology Most of the RYADs produced to date use low capacity 7 25 megabyte 9 disc drives produced by Bulgaria or 30-megabyte disc drives imported from the West Soviet and Bulgarian claims that production of lOO-megabyte drives is imminent are exaggerated to judge from the continued vigorous pursuit of Western manufacturing tech- nology for high-capacity drives Relation of RYAD to Overall Computer Effort Despite the unspectacular performance during 1971-75 the Soviets appear committed to RYAD as the major computer system for meet- in Soviet general purpose data processing 9Millions of bytes each of which has eight binary digits Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CONFIDENTIAL CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Table 2 USSR Estimated Value of RYAD Production as a Percent of Total Computer Production 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total Million 1967 Rubles Total computers 905 1 213 1 699 2 221 2 927 8 965 Of which - RYAD 8 25 122 296 486' 937 ES-1020 3 11 53 158 210 435 ES-1030 5 14 69 138 276 502 Percent RYAD as a share of total 1 2 7 13 17 10 needs Conversion to large-scale production of upgraded models is now being accomplished and planning is under way for a follow-on program of more advanced systems At the same time other special-purpose com- puter programs for both military and industrial applications are proceeding apace Military pro- grams include development of a new military computer system at the Vilnyus Computing Ma- chines Plant expansion of military computer production at the Minsk Computer Plant and continuing strong efforts on military-related computers by major development centers in Moscow supported by production facilities in Moscow and Zagorsk Among special-purpose computers for industrial applications produc- tion of the M-6000 process-control minicom- puter believed to be a copy of a Hewlett- Packard model is being emphasized Role of Western Technology Western technology has made important con- tributions to the RYAD program both directly and indirectly The West has 8 been the source of designs for most models of the RYAD family provided manufacturing technology for disc drives and packs and furnished components especially some types of integrated circuits in 4 Approved For Release 2001 03 critically short supply in the USSR and Eastern Europe Moreover the USSR has acquired through both legal and illegal channels specific items of machinery crucial to the development of supporting technologies such as machines used in the production of multilayer printed- circuit boards integrated circuits and memory cores The Communist countries are acquiring valuable expertise in systems analysis pro- graming and other computer specialties at a training center in Czechoslovakia established under United Nations auspices Center special- ists also conduct courses in the USSR and else- where in Eastern Europe Much of this training- and experience is applicable to the exploitation of RYADs Finally the Soviets have gained ex- perience and training in systems analysis soft- ware and applications through work in Western computer installations and through purchases of RYAD-like computer systems The USSR began to copy IBM designs after it clandestinely acquired an unknown number of IBM-360 computers in the mid-to late 19608 About the same time East Germany also clan- destinely acquired an IBM computer and or major and components which served as the basis for development of the ES-1040 CONFIDENTIAL 15f 1 We new Winn-5 1 are - ml 1 ll or l il 1 1m r se 11an 14 In 1 g ll u-rol r all Approved For Release 2001 03 22 None of the other countries in Eastern Europe so far as is known has been directly involved in copying IBM computers or components The USSR copied mainly the architecture or- ganization 10 of the IBM-360 while East Ger- many also appears to have attempted to copy the physical layout subassemblies and com- ponents Copying by East Germany which in- volved dismantling measuring and analysis of parts and circuitry required at least 7 000 scien- tific-engineering man-years to bring the 138-1040 program to the stage of production prototypes East Germany may have chosen to go the route of complete duplication because of its willingness to use or its broad access to critical components from the West The USSR on the other hand may have felt that it could leap-frog valuable development time by designing around its own components In any event East German copying efforts appear to have been the most successful since its RYAD model 138-1040 more closely approximates the operational character- istics of the IBM machines than any other RYAD model The design of the Hungarian version of RYAD ES-1010 is based on the design of a French computer which the French firm C1111 in 1970 licensed Hungary to produce Hungary modified the design of that computer to work with RYAD peripherals Since the USSR has been unable or unwilling to provide Eastern Europe with needed quan- tities or semiconductors several countries have been forced to use Western-made semicon- ductors For example Hungary s model has been built with substantial reliance on Western components Poland has acquired small quan tities of Western semiconductors for RYAD de- velopment work and East Germany has com- bined both Communist and Western US West 10A general application computer system consists of one or more processors memories input output devices and communications links The number interconnection scheme and operating modes of these determine the architecture of the computer system llCompagnie lnternationale pour L Informatique CONFIDENTIAL CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL German and Japanese components in its pro- duction models Soviet capability to provide components for RYADs though severely limitedwhas been aided greatly by acquisition of Western-made machinery The acquisitions have included whole plants for production of printed-circuit boards machinery for most of the processes in IC manufacturing specialized equipment for making memory cores and technology for as- sembling and testing memories The illegal ac- quisition of core presses and test machinery has made it possible for the USSR to provide in- creased memory capability in its new model RYADs developed after 1974 Bulgaria may have received assistance in setting up production of disc drives and disc packs from West Germany in early 1972 Appar- ently Bulgaria did not acquire technology for producing the critical magnetic recording heads because Bulgaria purchased a large number of Western-made heads legally and illegally during 1972-74 Bulgaria also purchased a wide variety of machined metal parts for disc drives East Germany is believed to have acquired significant assistance from West German firms for its RYAD development and production program including production machinery and know-how Backwardness of Eastern Technology The RYADs produced to date have failed to achieve the levels of technical performance spe cified by original design goals speeds have been slower and memory capacities far smaller than desired The USSR came closest to reaching original speed goals with the ES-1020 but still fell short by 15-25 percent The Hungarian exhibited the poorest performance with operating speeds falling short of goals by 30-50 percent In all cases RYADs were able to reach only about 25 percent of the original goals for memory capacity Poor quality ICs and other design deficiencies were primarily respon- sible for failure to meet speed and memory goals Table 3 compares the original design goals for speed and memory for four RYAD models with those actually achieved Approved For Release 2001 03 22 nun-n Lag- - Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CONFIDENTIAL- Table 3 USSR and Eastem Europe Performance of RYAD Computers Planned and Actual Thousand Speed Operations Memory Second Characters Model Planned Actual Planned Actual 1010 10 5-7 64 16 1020 20 15-17 256 64 1030 100 60-70 512 128 1040 380 250-300 1 024 256 These are typical installed memory sizes a few larger installations have been noted That the USSR is not reported to have deliv- ered any RYADs with the maximum internal storage capacity cited in early design goals may be due in part to manufacturing problems that forced use of cores with 0 8-mm outside diameter rather than the 0 6-mm cores originally specified for the computers The larger power require- ments and increased heat dissipation problems with the larger cores impose constraints on the capacity and performance of the internal mem- ories that are physically and economically prac- tical for most RYAD installations Medium-sized RYAD systems ES-10203 and have a poor record for reliability Central processors currently appear to operate satisfactorily but users continue to complain of downtime from overheating of com- ponents andfrequent breakdowns of periph- erals Poorly constructed magnetic disc drives suffer from dust contamination and metal ex- pansion from temperature changes these drives require excessive downtime for scheduled main- tenance alone In contrast the East German model ES-1040 which has been examined by a US computer manufacturer is said to be highly reliable in operation Apeprevd Fer Release 2001013122 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 The Soviets continue to grapple with the technological design of the most powerful RYADs the and ES-1060 To achieve the high speeds called for in these models the designers are using special ECL emitter coupled logic integrated circuits These circuits tend to break down under conditions of high heat gen- erated by their large power requirements and sustained by the poor heat dissipation character istics of the computer s design Recently some have been delivered to Soviet users although series production is not yet apparent The ES-1060 continues to be under develop- ment Troubles with Software Users of RYADs are faced with exceptional difficulties in meeting data processing needs with existing software 1 2 Few standard applica tions programs have been developed from scratch for use with RYAD For the most part programs currently in use were originally devel- oped with the MINSK-32 and have been re- written to operate with RYAD 'Even so delays have been extensive the complexities of soft- ware alteration have left many of the MINSK-32 programs as well as programs developed for other Soviet computer models still not con- verted for use with RYAD In addition users have been unable to use without modification the inventory of software programs devised by IBM for use with its Series-360 machines be- cause many IBM programs were designed for use in a different institutional environment and simply are not applicable the memory capacity especially external random access disc storage requirements of many IBM programs exceed the capabilities of RYAD computers and 0 since the operating system for the Soviet RYAD is not a precise duplicate of the most IBM programs require modifica- tion to run on RYAD machines 12Software is of two types 1 Systems software which refers to the sets of instructions needed to operate a computer and 2 Applications software which refers to the programs written for use with the computer facilities of a given industrial plant laboratory or military installation Programs are written for use with a particular computer installation and can be run on a different installation only if they or the installation are modified CONFIDENTIAL Till nlIgl-I - l-Hfsij r ll Il lillz I a It 1 I Inger- rm n iIrl II Irru-I I-r'im y'lih mum-mum um I Will Murmur ennui - - 5111 we In I ll Ell-Ml Ill will l ll l Mutual 1'qu I lilIillilli H Ill- 1 llIl 1' I 1 erng Approved For Release 2001 03 22 As an exception to these limitations users of the East German ES- 10405' may be able to employ directly IBM-360 applications programs East Germany seems to have duplicated the IBM operating system successfully East Germany s assimilation of IBM design a sharp contrast with the experience of other RYAD pro- ducers probably reflects the closeness of its co- operation in computer technology with West German manufacturers The Soviets have intensified efforts to rewrite eXisting RYAD programs and to develop new standardized data processing programs specifi- cally for RYAD computers At the same time the Soviets are developing new operating sys- tems to reduce the need for program modifica- tions For example the development of DOS-2 Disc Operating System which is capable of utilizing most of the programs for the MINSK-32 was recently announced This sys- tem may be intended for use only with the RYADs produced at Minsk since it was devel- oped at the Minsk Scientific Research Institute of Electronic Computers the institute that de- signed the ES-IOZO and 3538-1022 A larger and much more versatile system called also is under development It is being designed to exe cute several different programs simultaneously multiprograming The status of and ES-OS in mid-1977 is not known The OS in particular has not been fully tested implementation of this operat- ing system will require internal and external memory capacity greater than what is being delivered with most RYADs Checkout and debugging of 138-08 almost certainly will con- tinue for several years Acceptance of RYADs The USSR is the largest user of RYADs During the Ninth Five-Year Plan East Germany shipped about one-third of its output to the USSR and Hungary about 80 percent of its output Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria produced RYADs mainly for their domestic markets 0f the more than 200 RYADS exported since 1972 by the USSR the bulk of these were supplied to CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL Eastern Europe The USSR has shipped RYADs to the Netherlands Belgium and Finland for use in Soviet-controlled rms in those countries to India and probably to a few other non Com- munist countries According to a high-ranking official of the Soviet computer industry Soviet- controlled firms will attempt to market more than 500 RYADs apparently in Western Eu- rope during 1976-80 RYADs may eventually find a small market in developing countries if reliability servicing and the availability of spare parts can be improved Czechoslovakia Hungary and Poland have participated in the RYAD program reluctantly Understandably they prefer native or Western computers for their own use Poland in partic- ular favors its own successful line of ODRA computers which have been built under British license However Soviet pressure is mounting for greater participation by Poland in the RYAD program lessening Poland s chances to market ODRAs in Eastern Europe as an alternative to RYAD RYAD in Transition Even as RYADs began to go into large-scale production in 1974 the Soviets were busy de- signing more powerful versions of the basic models These new computers the ES-1022 and 138-1033 are to replace the ES-1020 and 138 1030 They have been designed to operate much faster than the original modelsefive times as fast in the case of the to have double the memory capacity see table 3 Higher speeds and larger memories are achieved through the application of more powerful cir cuits and smaller memory cores otherwise the original models are largely unchanged The new models went into production in the USSR in 1976 and production of the original models has been substantially reduced Produc- tion rates of the new machines can be expected to rise rapidly since no major changes in manu- facturing technology need to be assimilated In- deed in the case of the ES-1022 recently intro- duced simplified production methods may en- hance learning effects Even so in 1976 and 7 CIA-RDP79300457A000700100001-5 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CONFIDENTIAL Table 4 Estimated Characteristics of the Modified RYAD Computers I Thousand Speed Operations - Memory Model Second Characters ES-1012 10 64 ES-102 2 I 00 5 1 2 ES-1032 200 1 024 ES-1033 150-200 1 024 ES- 1 050 500 1 024 1977 at least total production may not reach the maximum level- achieved for the original RYADs in 1975 fora variety of reasons The changeover involves disruption to the of production dissatisfied-users of are shipping their machines back to the factory for conversion into 1022s and shortages have al- ready surfaced in the supply of higher powered integrated circuits 1 i 1 In Eastern Europe only'Hungary and Poland have introduced upgraded models in the first series of RYAD machines In 1973 Hungary introduced an upgraded called the Further modifications such as the ES-1012 will not be able to run RYAD applica- tions pregrams as was the case with the Poland has developed the-E84032 a model that has operating speeds comparable with those of the Soviet ES-IO33 It appears to have been developed independently of Accept-1 ance testing was under way in mid-1976 and the model may now be in production Poland claims to have the capacity to produce many more than 25 units annually and will produce the ES-1032 on a special order basis addition to the computer proper the- USSR isattempting to improve the capabilities and diversity of peripheral devices for usewith- RYADS In 1974 the Soviets claimed to have developed 33 new peripherals including rela- 8 Approved For Release 2001 0 22 tively advanced types with advertised- specifica- tions close to those inruse- in the West a few years ago A few of these for example graphic terminals data transmission equipment plot-r ters have been shownat trade fairs usually in a nonoperating mode none of the advanced de- vices have been observed in use with RYAD in a user environment Indeed RYAD computers are still being delivered with the standard cone figurations of the peripherals offered five years-- ago in many cases these peripheralsare simply repackaged versions of devices developed for even earlier computers Thus significant new peripherals apparently are notyet being pro- duced at least in quantity Some progress has been made by Bulgaria in mastering the technology for manufacturing high capacity magnetic disc devices which are needed to exploit fully the inherent processing capabilities of the new models In late 1976 US visitors to the East German plant that produces ES-1040 observed'a large number of Bulgarians madeSD megabyte drives The East Germans allege that the drives operate reliably The US visitors were not allowed to inspect the drives to determine if the components especially the magnetic recording heads Were of Communist or Western origin - - 1 1 For its part the USSR also'clairns' to'be producing 30-megabyte dri-vesesorne have been displayed at trade fairs abut these claims are doubtful The Soviets are still attempting to acquire US technology to make such drives and the Ministry of the Radio- Industry reportedly- has been experiencing technical difficulties with production - Prospects for a RYAD l Generation In October 1974 the RYAD partners an nounced' that a new generation of RYAD c'om- puters called RYAD II wasunder development but a target date for production hasnot been announced RYAD IIs -patterned after theicurw rent IBM Series 37'0_computers areto be much more powerful than current models and-to represent a majoradvance in Communist com- puter technology They areto- be compatible with existing RYADs and with both IBM-360 CONFIDENTIAL 11 1511 1 11 11 1 1111 51 1 21 1 1 - 1 111 13111111 v- - I I 1111 1 111 11 1 if 11-11111-1r 11 11111111111111 1111 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 and IBM-370 machines According to Commu- nist sources RYAD Ils will have 0' A much larger capacity for internal storage of data This will be accomplished in part through the use of semiconductor memories and in part through the use of virtual memory 13 0 A larger number of data channels and high- speed multiplexers 14 These features will per- mit the use of higher speed peripherals and greatly increase data processing capabilities - A capability for network operations that is for computer-to computer communica- tions 0 Improved reliability through computer self-diagnosis of faults The technology of RYAD II is far beyond current state of the art in the USSR and Eastern Europe In particular RYAD II will need very high density integrated circuits large-scale inte- gration L81 for internal memory and some logic processes Circuits currently in use are rela- tively simple low density small-scale integra- tioanSI types The capacity of the disc drives needed 100 megabytes and larger exceeds the capacity of drives available from Bulgaria by more than three times and of drives most com- monly in use by almost 15 times The com- plexity of the software needed to operate RYAD 11s is considerably greater than that now in use The Soviets claim to have developed working prototypes of two models of RYAD IInearing production of these two models The USSR conceivably could produce a small number of these models during the 10th Five Year Plan because of the enormous leap in technology required however any units produced would L1A technique for increasing the apparent internal storage of a computer by special programs that allow disc storage to act as internal memory 14Channels are provisions for external access to the computer multiplexers are devices that permit more than one external device to be connected to the computer via a single channel 15This model is assumed to be a redesign of the of the original RYAD series that was never produced CONFIDENTIAL CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL have few of the advanced features indicated above In particular network operations are doubtful for many years because of the lack of data transmission equipment If RYAD 11s are to be produced according to design specifications before 1980 a great deal of Western machinery and production know how will be required Indeed the vigor with which the Soviets seek this technology by both legal and illegal means will provide an indication of the priority attached to this program Economic Implications In the near future the number of RYADs in operation will be too small to give a noticeable boost to the Soviet economy By 1980 5 000 RYADs may be installed and at work in the USSR No more than half are likely to be in production facilities as opposed to institutes and universities and many of the larger plants will have more than one Of the roughly 50 000 industrial enterprises fewer than 5 percent will be equipped with RYADs by 1980 that is with a modern data processing capability RYADS in place will continue to be used unproductively by US standards Soviet com puters are operated 11 to 12 hours a day whereas 16 to 18 hours or more are considered necessary for economic use in Western eco- nomies The almost desperate shortage of quali- fied personnel is another factor impeding effec- tive utilization The planned replacement of existing MINSK-323 with RYADs adds another costly and disruptive element as noted pre- viously complex modifications of programsare needed before this software can be used on RYADs Higher echelon organizations at the ministry or national level will be especially hard put to carry out complex planning and management activities with RYADs since only the smaller machines will be generally available develop ment of required software will require huge in- vestments of technical resources Moreover the collection and processing of data from subordi nate echelons will be difficult and inefficient since data transmission facilities for computer 9 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL to computer communications will not be avail- The increasing a_vailability 'of RYAD com- puters in plants institutes and other organiza- tions should result in some reductionuof the share of manpower assigned to clerical work It is not clear however that they will provide a net labor savings for industry or the economy as a whole Users need to acquire personnel and staff to service and maintain the computers the Soviets have found that it takes 150 to 200 percent more people on the average to operate a computer than it does in the West In addition computer people command higher wages than the people they are replacing Military implications TheSoviets have traditionally used special purpose computers for military systems with specific functions such as missile guidance or airborne navigation These special purpose com- puters probably will continue to enjoy a high priority in the Soviet computer industry In addition the USSR needs general purpose com- puters with good data handling capabilities for a large variety of military activities such as control and menitoring of space activities com- mand and centre and logistics Nonmilitary computers Such as and M-2225 have always been used for these purposes RYADs especially the newer models now in production Will provide- improved data-handling capabilities over these models Currently there is limited use of RYADs in Soviet military plants and institutes Their em ployment for the broader military problems listed above will have to await full development of larger RYAD systems including especially 10 major-improvements in disc storage capacity and software maintenance and user experience Use of RYADs for these complex military purposes cannot be expected before the 1980s Perspective Since World War -II the Soviet economy has expanded more through extensive grOwth the channeling of larger and larger amountsof labor and capital into production than through inten sive growth the achievement of higher and higher yields from each unit of labor and capital Experiences in the computer field illus- trate this general economic pattern The modernization of the Soviet computer industry has been given high priority by the central lead ership and planners have provided increasing inputs of factory oorspace technicallabor and funds to purchase foreign technology At the same time difficulties and delays common to the whOle economy have appeared such as setbacks in production schedules short- ages of peripheral equipment and support services support services tend to be neglected under central planning and reluctance of potential users to accept the disruptions that accompany a transition to new equipment or to new models of old eQuipment Use of the c0m puter tends to underscore the worst features of the Soviet economy Thus while the USSR 'is gradually incorporating the fruits of the com- puter revolution into its ecOnomy its mastery of the computer'is approximately 10 years be hind the West The author of this paper is USSR Eastern Europe Division Office of Economic Research Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to Mr -relephone 351-6 716 25X1 A CONFEDENTIAL 1A sandy - x w llwlsway i i is as 'ux in saunas mumin is l ii lid i s as ii if Tfilliil Approved For Release 2001 03 22 APPENDIX Methodology For Production Estimat s Unit Production Little hard information is available on which to base estimates of RYAD production in 1971 75 The numbers in table 1 in the text have been put together from a variety of sources including open source 25x1 information reports of emigres observations by Western visitors to Eastern computer plants and other 25X1 _he numbers are estimated through 1974 with high confidence The 1975 estimates especially for the USSR are more tenuous 25X1 _visits by US personnel to the Minsk Plant allowed an estimate to be made through 1973 for the ES-1020 and through 1974 for the 030 In 1974 several US visitors to the Minsk Computer Plant observed production of the and made some estimates of thercapacity of the plant They observed that the plant was producing at a capacity of 400-500 computers annually and that twice as many ES-1020s as MINSK-32s were being produced 300 138-10203 and 150 MINSK-32s For 1975 the capacity remains the same but it is known that MINSK-32 production was being phased out Production of the 138-1030 for 1974 represents a reasonable production of the series from the previous years Total production of the East German ES-1040 for 1971 75 was given to various US personnel on several occasions and was confirmed by random 25X1B The annual series represents a logical a ocation is tota ota AD production for the period in Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary and Poland is provided and in the case of Hungary by open sources The annual figures are distributed on the basis of fragmentary information Ruble Production USSR Table 2 provides an estimate of the production value of Soviet RYAD computers as a percentage of the total value of Soviet computer production The latter series is from official Soviet statistics whereas the RYAD value series is based on the unit estimates in table 1 and published prices of 525 000 rubles for the 138-1020 and 920 000 rubles for the ES-1030 CONFIDENTIAL 11 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Con den al Con den al Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Con den al Con den al Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 25X1A 25X1A Approved AHA a no 100001 -5 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 - KT 2 705 3 7G07 Hq ACTION I DIRECT REPLY 5 PREPARE REPLT APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION comm FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks Please annotate each paragraph as'follows 1 Classification including unclassified 2 If possible underline classified material and indicate in the margin the reason for classification e source -- cite number such as and 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2 Director 1 ECS 2 USSR 15 OER Room 4F2113 1 1 1 STATINTL 31 Room 7007 Hq - 1 Department of Commerce Dr John S Aird FDAD Rm 105 711 14th St NW for Murray Feshhach ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Disseniination List for OER Report ER 77-10491 Job 4'25-1095-77 continue d No of Copies 7 31 X01 var list '48 1 eat Total 313 copies Recipient National Security Agency Attn Room 213024 Ft Meade Md National Defense University Attn Classified Library Rm 30 Ft Leslie J McNair Washington D C 20319 Mr John D P-afenberg INA Department of the Air Force Room 4A882 Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency A Bldg AHS Departmentdof the ligregs ggy Office oflntellig'ence Snippet rt Dolores A O Dell Rm 4326 15th St Ave Department of State Room 6510 New State Bldg 1 - George Hamilton Off of Under Sec for Security Assistance 1 - John Polanaky 9 -- 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Executive Office Building Mr Edward G Sanders Deputy Associate Director International Affairs Division Office of Management and Budget New Executive Office Building Vincent Clephas Executive Assistant to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 46 Executive Office Building Marshall Shulman Special Consultant to the Secretary on Soviet Union Affairs Department of State 7The Honorable Anthony Lake Director Policy Planning Staff Light Department of State 67 Mr Patrick Hayes Special Assistant and Staff Director Interdepartmental Politico-Military Group Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State Vlmr Leonard Ross Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Department of State George H Aldrich Deputy Legal Adviser Department of State g2 The Honorable George S Vest Assistant Secretary Bureau of European Affairs Department of State Mr William Luers Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of European Affairs Department of State James Shinn Special Assistant and Staff Director NSC interdepartmental Group for European Affairs Dapartment of State Approved For Release 2001 03 22 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 Nicholas G Andrews 59 Si 60 19 i Director Office Of Eastern European Affairs Bureau of European Affairs Department of State Mr Mark Garrison Director Office of Soviet Union Affairs Bureau of European Affairs Department of State Mr William T Shinn dr Director Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs Bureau of European Affairs Department of State Mr William G Barraciough Deputy Assistant Secretary International Trade Policy Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Department of State Mr William A Root Director Office of East-West Trade Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Department of State Mr Haroid H Saunders Director Bureau of intelligence and Research Department of State Mr Paul K Cook Director Office of Research and Analysis for Europe and the Soviet Union Bureau of intelligence and 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Commerce The Honorable Jordan d Baruch Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Department of Commerce 309 Mr Rauer H Meyer Director Office of Export Control Bureau of East-West Trade Department of Commerce g Mr John Richardson Director Office of Telecommunications Department of Commerce gj Mr Allen Lenz Director Office of East West Trade Analysis Bureau of East-West Trade Department of Commerce Mr James Murrin 5 3 Director Office of East-West Trade Development Bureau of East-West Trade Department of Commerce 3x Mrs Hertha Heiss Chief USSR Division Office of East-West Trade Development Bureau of East-West Trade Department of Commerce Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 4 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 7 35257Mr David N Laux Room 3520 Main Commerce Department of Commerce Mr Stanley Marcus Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulatory Affairs Department of Commerce Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 i Ap'proved FOIfRe'Ieese 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 4142 43 44 4546 47 4a 49 505152153 152 63 54 ssleaw ea 59 10 7 12 73 7 75 1577 5 9 an 1111111111111111111 1 111111111111 1 1 1 11 51 1311911114 11410119 10541 1 - 1111121 1111510111 1e161 WMQA 1551111119 1 11 1 I la 11M WUL 11410111- 111111511111111111 11 11 1111 1111 1111 11'11111'1111111' 111111111111 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79800457A000700100001-5 STATINTL Approved i 100001-5 UNCLASSIFIED 1 I CONFIDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE ANITIALS 1 All DI 2 1 2 pm DER new 4 ASHER 5 make 6 Acnou mam REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL msmcu RECOMMENDATION comm m5 RETURN INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks 6% We FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO DATE quxm 1mm CONFIDENTIAL FORM I0 237 Use previous aditions 40 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79300457A000700100001-5 E72 W27 mm 422 2 0 2 700 00001 -5 257% Ved eleasg- 2 owe 1% 000 mob e 32 2 -- 92 522 2722 7% 2 222 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gpf Title Responsible Analyst and Branch SOVIET BLOC PACIFIC ulgaria Sofia Australia Canbe rra Melbourne fCermany Berlin Philippines Manila Hungary Bu apest - New Zealand Wellington olan I v USSR Moscow FAR EAST I PRC- Burma Rangoon Formosa Taipei l l-long Kong Austria Vienna Indonesia Jakarta VEelgiumI Japan Tokyo gpy of all reports for Korea Seoul Talp'li Moore US Mission to Laos Vientiane 1 copy for US Mission to the Malaysia Kuala Lumpur European Communities Singapore Denmark COpenhagen Thailand Bangkok England London SEAT Finland Helsinki -X France Paris Germany Bonn Munich Iceland Reykjavik Ireland Dublin - Italy Rome - A ya La Luxembourg Luxembourg CW 4 Malta Velletta I Netherlands The Hague Norway 0510 Aft-max Meg EUR OPE CANADA OTTAWA Portugal Lisbon - 27 21 02 514 Spain Madrid - Xxx Sweden Stockholm Switzerland Bern lgv Geneva zurmh - mi 7m $541 2001 03 22 CIA- sec Verse 51 France Paris US Missm to OECD RDP79300457A000700100001-5 J- REEHVH Approved For Release Soviet Computers An Industry in Trouble Project No 118905 21 July_1977 Analyst 25X1A - OER - Approved For Release rs Approvea GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PRO Rating forms will be completed for each machine-supported system and information the parts of section I and II Room 2G 40 xl829 red or x5577 black ATI N's SOURCE SURVEY GRAMS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE finished intelligence publication prepared by the and This is a ust be gathered in a formatted fashion Therefore each analyst will complete of this form Please type or print legibly Questions should be directed to OF PATEP 25X1A - PUBLICATION TITLE AND CONTENTW X-69 DATE PUBLISHED I2 mat SURVEY NO 1-6 he 7-VEEAEPE PUBLICATION NUMBER 1 7m MRPD I I I FOR OCI ONLY CIB PUBLICATION DATE IIB-IBI MO DAY TITLE 24-80 we CARD 2 RECORD OF ICE 9 10 SURVEY TYPE c5505 Wb gds 536% MI 7 8 02 0Ei' on OBOIHTVM 57 05 55 55 7 40 DIA 70 State 70 Imam OFFICE Ispnciiyl Domestic Politics International Relations I Economics Military Science 8 Technology Geography Biography LIST CATEGORY I- GEOGRAPHIC AREA 1 52 USSR China Africa SPECIFIC COUNTRIES BUIGABIAI EAST Eastern Europe Other Far East Near East N Africa South Asia Latin America Western Europe A w TO BE COMPLETED BY CGAS REC TYPE 7-8 TOPIC II I I2 SECRET I 253 IMPDET CL 8V 007692 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79B00457A000700100001-5 Approved For Release 2001 03 22 CIA-RDP79B00457A000700100001-5 Er- 99- 5 KING sum- c 8982 WIU- CCISUILUUZ BSBGIGH J0 l 3m 313130 JELLICIEI idV O EAOWEIH ELLVCI Wail ALIHHDEIS 7 49 w NOI Horwaal It Wall a d A 'W dm'a 80 HEIO MEIABH 130038 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu