ZZGi fl l 0 IIIS'I III 'iTORY LANDA I lJROI'EAN DEFENSE BOOKINEW STUDIES J ' drnll 2-23-12 0- Almost Successful Recipe EO i35 26 i 4 c 25Yrs The United States and East European Unrest prior to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Throughout the Cold War the United States tried to maintain a delicate balance in its policy toward the Soviet satellites in Eastem Europe It sought to promote enough disaffection to loosen their ties to the Soviet Union but not so much as to provoke violence and brutal retaliation by the local Communist regimes or Moscow In a 1953 remark that applied to the entire region U S High Commissioner for Germany HI COG James Conant said the aim in East Germany was to keep the pot simmering but not to bring it to a boi1 1 When the pot boiled over as it did there in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956 the Eisenhower administration made clear as would later administrations its unwillingness to intervene militarily a move that might precipitate war with the Soviet Union Over the years labels attached to the policy meant little Whether called containment or liberation bridge building a gentle nudge or detente the approach toward the Soviet bloc with temperature adjustments and varying emphases basically followed the same recipe U The administration's passivity in responding to unrest masked an internal debate inherited from Tmman 's over how best to maintain the balance 2 Early studies This study treats East Germany as one of the East European satellites along with Czechoslovakia Poland Hungary Romania Bulgaria and Albania although policymakers often viewed East Germany separately from the others or as linked to the overall Getman question 880Ft I Dilpwhnant of IIDIIte MIIIIIJIIIMI' Change to- - - --- - -- - 1 Release Exolse Deny lasslly Exemptions b E O 13526 25X Deolasslly after With conoummce of WJUJ' IF ' Lli SI ED o I IPS 'JJ71 1 J l'f II FULL Authonly EO 13526 Chmf Rerords Oeclass Div WHS o te JAN 2016 oJr' 1 2-M 1vPIO 2 emphasized the apparently more aggressive nature of Eisenhower's policy giving much weight to Republican rhetoric during the 1952 presidential campaign that seemed to signal a break with Truman's approach and to the persistent recommendations of Eisenhower's activist aide C D Jackson 3 They contended that the goal was to roll back Soviet control ofEastem Europe words that appeared infrequently in policy papers or government officials' private and public statements Later works have pointed out that the administration early on abandoned thoughts of oveiilu owing the satellite regimes and instead sought to encourage their evolution along the lines ofTito's national communism in Yugoslavia 4 Other recent scholarship has argued that while Eisenhower may not have pursued as aggressive a policy as once thought in effect he talked a tough game As a result the administration's bellicose rhetoric needlessly prolonged the Cold War and laid the groundwork for a U S national security state 5 U U S interest in the region dating back to World War I and derived from emotional ties felt by Americans of East European descent assumed a military aspect after World War II In its dealings with the USSR the Truman administration tried to use American resources and power to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence a policy promulgated by diplomat George Kerman that became known as containment When communists seized power in one East European country after another and threatened to do so in France and Italy the administration countered with strong measures including Truman Doctrine assistance to Greece and Turkey Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe airlifting food and supplies into West Berlin during a Soviet blockade and taking the lead in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO U Office of the s crctnry of Defense S' Sl rS'l Chief RDD ESD W S 1 Date ll JO f ___1g_ Authority EO 13526 Dcdassi fy Deny in Full ___ Declassify fart j Reason 5 MDR __lh_-fA- lf 'lo @liii@ RT F r LA E F ED If FULL Authonty EO 13526 Ch1ef Recnrds Declflss Dlv WHS Dole I I WI N 2016 QSM9 3 The operative policy paper on Eastern Europe NSC 58 2 of December 1949 noted that the westward advance of Soviet power had been checked at least for the time being and substantial progress had been made in developing the defensive capabilities of the Western European nations The time is now ripe for us the paper stated to place greater emphasis on the offensive to consider whether we ca1mot do more to cause the elimination or at least a reduction of predominant Soviet influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe It continued These states are in themselves of secondary importance on the European scene Eventually they must play an impm1ant role in a free and integrated Europe but in the current twovworld struggle they have meaning primarily because they are in varying degrees politicovmilitary adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power into the hea11 of Europe So long as the USSR represents the only major threat to our security and to world stability our objective with respect to the USSR's European satellites must be the elimination of Soviet control from those countries and the reduction of Soviet influence to something like nom1al dimensions The paper stressed that only measures short of war were to be employed A resort to war should be rejected as a practical altemative 6 an injunction which guided policymakers throughout the Cold War To help achieve the objective U S intelligence and military organizations established contact with resistance elements in the communistvdominated countries The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 raising fears that the Soviet Union might launch an attack on Western Europe made such contacts seem more important A decision was made to try to develop large scale underground forces in Eastern Europe particularly in Poland to retard the advance of the Red Army if war came and to assist U S ainnen downed behind enemy lines In pa11 to meet this possible military requirement in Europe and also because of the war in Asia the Office of Policy Coordination OPC the CIA's u572R jR DF r L ' 'SlF ED 11 1 FULL Authont o EO 13526 Ch1ef Rersrr Dec ass Div WH'3 Date fJ fJ JiW 20 b ll EfM I T 4 C r A 1 '-i cove1i operational arm expanded dramatically Between 1949 and 1952 personnel strength increased ten-fold and its budget soared Expectations varied as to what could be accomplished behind the Iron Curtain Army and Ai1 Force representatives thought much could be done by clandestine means in Eastern Europe to develop resistance mechanisms capable of producing a massive retardation contribution State CIA and some Defense officials put aside their belief that these representatives were engaging in a very great deal of wishful thinking and went oso 1 4Ce along 7 U The 1952 Election Campaign Tit for Tat The 1952 election which saw Eisenhower decisively defeat Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson and the retum ofthe Republicans to the White HOuse after an absence of two decades represents an illusory watershed in policy toward Eastern Europe 8 The issue dominated the early part of the canipaign with Republicans denouncing the Truman administration's policy of containment as too defensive Eisenhower and others pmiicularly the party's chief foreign policy expert Jolm Foster Dulles who had resigned his position as ambassador at large to take an active part in the carnpaign called for greater U S initiative in weakening the Soviet hold on the satellites without promoting violence what they called the peaceful liberation of countries behind the Iron Curtain Although their words were obviously aimed at Americans of East European descent they believed in what they were saying The rhetoric was not just a gimmick designed to win votes But the harsh attacks produced a sharp response from Democrats who castigated the talk of liberation as recklessness Partisan hyperbole thus obscured the two parties' 9PGPPT DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhorrty EO 1352B Chlaf Records D d 1s$ Dill WHS Date I I IAN 2016 CR l 5 underlying agreement on how to deal with Eastern Europe and left the impression that the new administration would pursue a more forceful policy than it intended U In addition to Dulles the campaign brought to prominence C D Jackson an executive with Time-Life and President of the National Committee for a Free Europe later renamed the Free Europe Committee Jackson who had worked under Eisenhower during World War II on psychological warfare operations arranged an unusual meeting in May 1952 in Princeton New Jersey to discuss ways to strengthen effmis in this field Pat1icipants included academics representatives from Radio Free Europe RFE and prominent government officials including CIA Deputy Director Allen Dulles and State's Charles Bohlen Jackson told the group that RFE had created salients in Eastern Europe but was not prepared to follow up because no one thought it could have been done as deep and as fast l-Ie claimed that U S high-level officials had failed publicly to state a long-term desire for the satellite peoples to be free Yet two billion people are looking over our shoulder all the time on both sides of the Iron Curtain and they are going to get encouragement or discouragement or faith or despair out of what our big men say The 'big man o doesn't have to be precise 9 U After much discussion the group drafted a statement for a high-level official to make Allen Dulles prefened that it be issued soon before the political parties' nominating conventions in July If it appeared to be an electoral appeal it will lose its effect abroad to the people to whom it is addressed He was not too concerned about its impact on the sate11ite populations I am not sure that one of the things that we have lacked in these countries is maybe a martyr or two to inspire these people This thing is never going to come about unless there are people who are ready and willing to stand w ilil R MT l F L l'OS F ED lt-1 FULL l ut11only EO 13526 Ch1ef HeC lrds Declass Dlv WH8 Date lt l 2016 6 up and be counted and take the consequences After all we have had over a hundred thousand casualties in Korea-but there are more than eighty million in Eastern Europe and if we have been willing to accept these casualties I wouldn't WOITY ifthere were a few casualties or a few martyrs behind the Iron Curtain without desiring to stir up a situation of a revolt Dulles thought that the United States had essentially been on the defensive in conducting psychological operations Perhaps the time had come when in certain areas among them the 'satellite' states we should go over to the offensive Bohlen did not feel the proposed statement contained anything Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had not already said Although he and Dulles agreed to work on getting the government to release it nothing seemed to have come of their efforts 10 U Jackson had more success elsewhere He sent a copy of the conference proceedings and statement to the person he hoped would become the big man his former boss Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General Eisenhower who had recently declared his candidacy for president Impressed with Jackson's call for a more vigorous psychological warfare program Eisenhower used him during the campaign as an adviser and speechwriter 11 It is perhaps more than coincidental that many ofthe ideas the Princeton group discussed appeared a fortnight later in a magazine article written by Foster Dulles Allen's brother which strongly criticized the administration's containment policy 12 His views were nothing new He had said much the same thing in a 1950 book in which he argued that history had shown how dictatorships could be shaken from within by peaceful methods 13 U At its July convention the Republican Pmty adopted a foreign policy platform plank largely the handiwork of Foster Dulles promising that it would repudiate secret 'IF t V '3SJ ' ED tf l FULL 1 uthonty EO 13526 ChuJf RPrsrds Declass Div WH'3 Date I I 1M 2016 'qgggf Lf c 7 understandings entered into during World War II specifically the Yalta agreement which it charged had consigned Eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence It would also make clear that the United States as one of its peaceful purposes looks happily forward to the genuine independence of the satellite nations What gave the plank a partisan bite was the declaration that the new policy would mark the end of the negative futile and immoral policy of'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism The Democratic Party platform said some of the same things yet in a milder way We look forward to the day when the liberties of Poland and the other oppressed Soviet satellites will be restored to them and they can again take their rightful place in the community of free nations It promised to expand Voice of America VOA programming for penetration of the 'Iron Curtain ' bringing truth and hope to all the people subjugated by the Soviet empire 14 U Before launching his campaign Eisenhower met with Republican Congressman Charles Kersten Wis 1 sponsor of an amendment to the 1951 Mutual Security Act appropriating $100 million for the purpose of recruiting training and arming East European ref11gees to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO 15 Kersten who talked about forming the refugees into units for use in ovetthrowing the satellite govenunents tried to elicit from the candidate an endorsement of his objective Eisenhower refused While Democratic nominee Stevenson privately expressed alrum over the Republicans' anxiety to create the illusion of some positive foreign policy of their own the British Embassy in Washington thought their comments at the beginning of the campaign were su rprisingly mild and reasonable Instead of condemning the Truman administration's basic policies Eisenhower and Dulles maintained that these OJSCI io f CL'-''3-S'IF ED If FULL Aulhw ty EO 13526 Chief Record f Deci JSs Oiv W'IS Dale II 15 Ji I 4AN l iJ ' qjiJCJ 1 8 policies had been poorly implemented Indeed if we leave aside the legitimate political rhetoric-upon which much of the discussion by the press and politicians has naturally been focused the Embassy remarked we find like the Red Queen that after all this running we are very much where we were before It noted that Dulles had explained emphatically that he does not want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals but rather to preoccupy the Kremlin with its O VU homework and with holding down the restiveness of its captives He had been reticent to describe specific actions proposing little that was not already covered by present policies save for the emphasis on greater coherence which is in fact needed The Embassy regarded his statements and the platform as almost straight electioneering albeit electioneering with as wide an eye open as possible to the likelihood that opportunities for radical change will not look so brilliant when the facts have to be faced Hence Dulles had made great efforts to describe a policy which really seems to be different and more forthright but at the same time to avoid commitments to specific action which might boomerang dangerously 16 U The liberation theme produced the campaign's initial major disagreement with the Republicans firing the opening salvo In late August before the American Legion convention in New York Eisenhower delivered his first major campaign speech declaring that the American conscience can never know peace until the satellite peoples are restored again to being masters of their own fate The U S Government must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands 17 U However W Averell Harriman Director for Mutual Security former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and an unsuccessful contender in 1952 for the ocopQfi IJl ah'Hf' Er 9 1 Democratic presidential nomination warned that the notion of liberation was a trap that would lead to premature uprisings like the 1944 Warsaw uprising ' Dulles called Haniman's view nonsense The only trap he saw was in the Democrats' platform because o'they look forward to liberation of all these peoples but they aren't willing to do anything about it That's a trap to get votes He denied that Eisenhower's policy meant violent revolution Instead quiet methods like passive resistance work slowdowns and industrial sabotage would be employed 18 U Republican statements brought a rebuke from Stevenson who called them irresponsible and dangerous He suggested that Dulles 1'could serve the country better with more candor and less claptrap Speaking in a heavily Polish-American Detroit suburb he said that Eisenhower's speech had aroused speculation here and abroad that if he were elected some reckless action might ensue in an attempt to liberate the people of Eastern Europe from Soviet tyranny He vowed he would not say one reckless word on this matter because the grip of Soviet tyrarmy upon your friends and relatives cannot be loosened by loose talk or idle threats Elsewhere in Michigan on the same day Stevenson declared that he had no fundamental difference with Eisenhower on foreign policy which he described as building the unity and collective strength of the free countries to prevent the expansion of Soviet dominion and control and gradually but surely lessen the relative power of the Soviet Union on world events President Truman ' On 1 August 1944 as the Red Atmy approached Warsaw Polish resistance forces within the city rose up against the Germans During the 63 days of fighting that followed Soviet forces did not enter the city As many as 15 000 Polish insurgents and upwards of 150 000 civilians were killed RiiT f lf - L ' 'SI EU 1to 1 FULL 1 uthoniy f O 13526 Ch1af f-lel'0rc1s Declass Qiv WHS Dote fi JAN 2flfli 10 joined the fray defending his administration's approach to Eastern European problems and denouncing the insincerity of Republican rhetoric 19 U Like the British Embassy the Voice of America stood outside the partisan electioneering In a broadcast to Western Europe it stressed that the Republican and Democratic candidates agreed on the main points of foreign policy Despite a charge by Moscow's Pravda that Eisenhower's speech meant that he intended to conquer Eastern Europe and Asia and concern expressed in West European newspapers over what he did mean the VOA assured listeners he had said nothing about using force to liberate the satellites and that Dulles had emphasized the peaceful nature of the process In saying that the American conscience can never be at peace while so many captive peoples live in slavery the VOA continued Eisenhower was ''expressing the profound feeling Americans have not only now but have had throughout their history It quoted Steve11Son as voicing essentially the same sentiment In fact later in the month sounding much like Eisenhower and Dulles Stevenson held out the hope that the intensification of peaceful pressures against the Soviet Empire will sharpen the internal contradictions within that empire that in time free peoples may lift their heads again in Eastern Europe and new policies and leadership emerge within the Soviet Union itself ' 2 U During the campaign Eisenhower reminded Dulles to make clear in his public statements that the liberation of the satellites would come through peaceful means something that Dulles on one occasion had failed to do Eisenhower also privately assured a former Polish general involved with the decision to launch the 1944 Warsaw uprising that he would continue to support the liberation of the satellite nations without encouraging their peoples to statt premature or futile uprisings After the election Dulles Msnsr ilF 'CL''' '- '1'-' J 'I'' FULL tlltlOflly EO 13526 Ch1ef Rer Ydo Declass Dlv WHS Dote ft'J JIW 20 6 o II o TPRDi whom Eisenhower promptly named as his Secretary of State went to great lengths to point out that the nation's foreign policy would remain fundamentally the same under the new administration Journalist C L Sulzberger stated that Europeans wanted 'very much to have a full explanation of the new political word 'liberation' and to know what it means in tem1s of policy which he thought might not differ that much from Truman's approach It was not yet understood that it can represent a logical maturation of what is 21 so widely known as 'containment ' U Did Dulles regret the excessive campaign rhetoric he and others had employed Probably not At his confirmation hearing in January 1953 where Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chided him for Republican distortions of the historical record he defended the denunciations of the Truman administration as factual but he did not want to justify them at the hearing for fear of reopening old controversies Years later Livingston Merchant who served under Dulles as Assistant Secretary of State for Eumpean Affairs observed that he had a certain amount of practical political cynicism Dulles thought that both sides in an American election use an extravagance of language to clothe what may be really very small differences which the public should be sufficiently sophisticated to accept For him talking about rollback was clothing in exaggerated electioneering language a thought in which he believed-namely that a more aggressive policy of containment should be pursued with the ultimate hope for a result of a loosening of the ties between the satellites and the Kremlin Robe11 Bowie who became State's Director for Policy Planning said that Dulles never thought that 'liberation' meant what it was labeled by people who were trying to make fun of it He never intended to use force to liberate the satellites he 1 SFS STn 1 L''' I t J 11 1 FULL 1 ulhrn v r o 13521 Chi o R' t - Jc Dedas flil Wi i'3 JAN 201 M Ci 0 12 simply did not like the overtones of containment or at least the way in which containment was accepted by some people-namely as settling for the status quo But Dulles had not clearly worked this out in his own mind according to Bowie and his phrasemaking ''made him subject to the quite legitimate criticism that he didn't really mean what he appeared to be saying Indeed only a few months into the new administration Eisenhower's only criticism of Dulles was that he sometimes did not understand the effect of his words and manner on otherpeople 22 U During the campaign each party thus fashioned a straw man for attacking the other Republican charges that Truman's containment policy represented weakness born of a willingness to accept the long-tenn subjugation of the satellite peoples and perhaps sell them down the river were patently false As was the Democrats' portrayal of Republican advocacy of a more vigorous containment policy as tantamount to a call for war U Sobering Setbacks How realistic was the talk during the campaign about ending communist rule in Eastern Europe On this question opinion within the government was divided at least regarding the shmi-term capabilities for stirring revolt Recent operations according to a CIA paper in 1952 revealed that the Communist authorities do not have complete control of the situati-on in these countries and that the area can be successfully penetrated On the other hand a Psychological Strategy Board PSB staff member felt that capabilities for penetration had in the main been decreasing and that we had no clear way to increase them in sight By 1952 many emigres at Radio Free Europe had begun to doubt whether liberation of their homelands would occur soon a view shared by spqpppr nu Lli Sf EDrr r FULL I Lith J'rty f O 1Jf126 Chref Rec xdc Oe fass Date t Jl 1 1016 Div WH 13 Franklin Lindsay CIA's Deputy Chief for Political and Psychological Warfare A trip to Europe during the late summer persuaded him that new techniques especially in stimulating unorganized mass passive resistance had to be developed Lindsay concluded that the increasingly effective security controls behind the Iron Curtain made it quite difficult for resistance organizations to conduct subversive operations with any ex ' c o The author did not conduct research in the files of the Anny's Counter Intelligence Corps at the NACP The only published account ofits European operations is Sayre and Botting America's Secret Army which focuses primarily on the organization's history prior to 1945 wri'FOF r' DECLASSIFIED IN PART AU hoot ' EO 13526 Chlaf Records Oeclass olv WHS DOlo t'l JAN 2016 14 Still another fiasco not yet fully apparent im ohoe operations in Albania The substantial literature on the subject leaves certain aspects of the operations unclear While attention has tended to focus on the degree of responsibility of Soviet mole Kim Philby for their ultimate failure the impression has arisen that U S o Uif 6 1 ' dCJ' DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulllonty EO 13525 Chief Records Declass DIY WHB Do e '1 oI dAN lflliJ t H 10 ' 7# activity was more extensive than it really was and that its primary aim was to overthrow the Communist regime ofEnver 1-Ioxha In fact U S objectives mostly of a probing nature were not intended to topple him 27 U Neither the United States nor Great Britain maintained diplomatic relations with the tiny economically backward country The British broke off talks to reestablish relations in 1946 after Albanian mines in the Strait of Corfu damaged two British destroyers causing 44 fatalities That same year U S -Albanian negotiations to resume relations collapsed over disagreement regarding the Alban an Government's assumption of the country's prewar indebtedness U Ci f'l l L t DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Rq_ooj'ds Doclass Dlv WHS Data' I 'I # N l1l16 16 The agency concluded that a successful overthrow was unlikely a conclusion that produced a more modest aim-1'to reduce the value of Albania by persistently and continuously undennining Communist authority and by harassing the regime with domestic difficulties The idea of an overthrow was not abandoned but put on a back bumer On learning that the American approach now was to let Hoxha stew in his own iilifGPF$1 DECIJ SSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS DoW tit 111W 2016o 17 juice a Foreign Office representative quipped that British policy would go further by adding a little pepper 33 U U S -sponsored infiltrations did not begin until November 1950 a year later than originally planned They were a tragic comedy of errors The first involved nine men parachuting into the country Fmiunately the pilot had trouble locating the drop point 'here security forces again were waiting In fmstration he dropped the men at a considerable distance N eveiiheless one was captured while the others made their way out via Yugoslavia A second mission in July 1951 this time with 12 men resulted in complete disaster 10 were killed and the others captured In October the survivors were tried in public in Tirana During the trial the Americans inexplicably dropped another team of five which also encountered a waiting security force that killed two of them the others escaped 34 U Certainly the prospect of overthrowing Hoxha had not increased In November 1951 an intelligence estimate concluded that the Albanian resistance represented a nuisance but not an immediate threat to the regime If it remained divided and without substantial extemal aid the security forces would be able to control it The estimate noted ailE ilitCI DECLASSIFIED IN PAHT Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS D '' 1 I JAN 1016 ' fiiAAET that Albania's neighbors- Italy Greece and 18 Yugoslavia -all preferred continuance of the status quo to a change which would be favorable to the others 36 U Instead of bringing operations to a close the dismal results led the CI ner elyto modify their approach by conducting smaller and hopefully more secure advocate of paramilitary operations in Eastern Europe the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans Frank Wisner voiced reservations as early as June 1952 As Smith had done the previous fall Wisner pointed to the project's cost as weJl as the way it reduced the agency's capability to go after other and perhaps more useful targets Furthermore a liberated Albania would become an economic drain on the United States Wisner said it might be wiser to concentrate on disorganizing the country's already weak economy thus leaving the Russians with the unhappy alternative of pouring in resources of their own or allowing the fate of a rotting and desperate Albania to appear before all the world spc iiT DECLASSIFIED IN PART AuthOnty EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS Data '1 'I JAN 2016 ''o 9 'ii TE as further evidence of what becomes to countries and peoples within the Soviet orbit 39 An intelligence estimate at the end of 1952 also reflecting wariness indicated that all of Albania's neighbors and Great Britain still opposed an attempt to overthrow Hoxha They would resent any coup attempt carried out against their advice or without consultation as a reckless and provocative action especially if the U S hand was apparent Regardless of the outcome the major Westem European powers would feel too much had been risked for too small a potential gain 40 U J iL' l i C C LA ' c iF f F DECLASSIFIED IN PARl AtJthollty EO 13526 Chief fi@cords Oeclasa Dlv WHS Dato J1 rt dAN I'J tl j'FOM I n 20 The agency was also having difficulty meeting the two requirements U S military authorities had estal lished for it in Eastern Europe developing escape and evasion E E facilities for U S servicemen's use in the event of war with the Soviet Union and creating paramilitary capabilities to help retard an initial Soviet advance From 1950 on the CIA had attempted to infiltrate agents into all the bloc countries to contact existing resistance groups or stimulate fonnation of such groups but had found no organized resistance worthy of the narne DECLASSIFIED IN PART AuthOnty eo 13526 Chief Raoortfa Oedass Dlv WHS Oalo I I WI 2016 JFGPFTE 21 On top of these problems relations between Defense officials and the CIA were not always smooth While the Deputy Secretary of Defense was the department's designated representative for dealing with the CIA day-to-day liaison on covert operations and paramilitary activities was handled by the Office of Psychological Policy which in July 1953 was expanded and renamed the Office of Special Operations The office head retired Marine General Graves Erskine often delegated liaison responsibilities to staff member William Godel Though East Gennany was a special case where U S assets were greater and operational difficulties less pronounced the Eisenhower administration inherited an extremely shaky situation in the other satellites the declining success of illegal infiltration absence of evidence that organized resistance groups existed the CIA's termination or shrinkage of more than half its projects and curtailment of the training of nearly all emigre paramilitary emban assing and involvement and of questionable efficacy and security With Albania however Truman s il i 'RFT a DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chlaf Records Oeclass Dlv WHS Date 111 WI 2Vl i ei G l 22 did what Eisenhower eight years later with preparations to invade Cuba would do for Kennedy Each turned over to his successor well-advanced plans to attack a communist government ventures that would both end in disaster U Stalin's Death The Chance for Peace The death on 5 March 1953 of Josef Stalin the dictator who had ruled the Soviet Union for almost three decades should not have found the Eisenhower administration poorly prepared But it did The previous November the PSB had put together a contingency paper detailing actions to take in the event Stalin died But Jackson now Eisenl1ower's Special Assistant for Cold War Activities dismissed the paper as terribly inadequate and argued after Stalin's death that it be scrapped and a completely new effort undertaken U The key element in a fresh plan Jackson and the PSB hastily devised was a speech to be given by the President offering the olive branch to the new collective Soviet leadership headed by Georgii Malenkov a speech that came to be called The Chance for Peace Not delivered until 18 April it evolved out of intensive discussion and numerous drafts with input from several persons The delay greatly upset Jackson who told the President he considered his first weeks on the job a failure because he had not persuaded him Secretary Dulles or anyone else that it was essential to move immediately on the single most impOJtant event since V-J Day H U In substance as well as tone the speech differed significantly from what some drafters had originally intended Walt Rostow for one felt it should give the Soviet bloc peoples a new vision of possibilities by emphasizing strands which unite rather than divide them from the rest of the world It should refer to Soviet military and economic S EUR1 1 Authonly EO 13526 Ch1el Ret 8rrJs Der lasr Div WH'3 Dolo ''I o II #It 2016 Ci i u 23 achievements the World War II alliance with the West and the Russian cultural heritage and recognize the legitimacy of Russian security interest in Europe Along with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill Rostow thought that there should be a major diplomatic conference preferably involving the four major heads of state When the Department of State strongly opposed holding a conference the idea was dropped 48 U Another drafter Paul Nitze head of State's Policy Planning Staff and briefly a holdover from the Truman administration urged that the speech not imply that liberation of the satellites was a necessary precondition for achievement of other advances toward a peaceful world while describing it as a necessity for a genGral and lasting settlement 49 On the other hand Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes wanted the speech to make the lifting of the Iron Curtain a sine qua non for peace Eisenhower inclined to Nize's view A few days before the address the President told speechwriter Emmet Hughes that he wanted to add a sh011 paragraph saying ''we know a lot of these things will take years-I mean obviously we aren't going to liberate East Europe tomorrow my god that's a job for ten years-but what we want what we want first and above all it's simply this--some ACTS ANY acts that show a desire to be nice boys U In the speech Eisenhower held out hope for a broader European community conducive to the free movement of persons of trade and of ideas which along with the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe He posed a key question for the Soviet leadership ls it prepared to allow other nations including those of Eastern Europe the free choice of their own forms of government 51 U SEtkbf DFI l ' '21 10 ED 1o FULL Autl'1onty EO 13526 Chfl' ll RervrLif Doclass Div WHS Dote I I JAN 2016 if@it 1 d' 24 Whatever olive branch Eisenhower himself may have intended to hold out was pulled back shortly thereafter by Dulles in his own address to the same gathering which played down the possibilities of an East-West accommodation This may have been what U S Ambassador to Great Britain Winthrop Aldrich had in mind when he complained a few weeks later that he did not have the vaguest idea what American policy is because every time Eisenhower sets it out in a speech Dulles makes another speech modifying it 52 U Some scholars have dismissed Eisenhower's speech as primarily a propaganda gesture to keep Stalin's successors off balance Certainly there was this element in the PSB's intentions According to an ambitious PSB plan the United States during the first few weeks after the speech was to identify the issues it felt most important and place the onus on the Soviet Union for failing to accept U S offers to resolve them This initial period would be followed by a series of steps to make the Kremlin assume maximum liability if it did not accept the President's proposals During this phase measures would be taken to generate the seeds of disunity and to probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system If events proved very favorable these steps might lead to a third phase Climax in which the communist system would break into open internal conflict 53 U Despite Republican rhetoric during the election campaign about the satellites' throwing off their communist yokes and the PSB's enthusiasm few within the U S Goverrunent believed that major disturbances could break out CIA Director Dulles told a gathering of con-espondents in April 1953 that you don't have civil uprisings in a modem totalitarian state as you did in France you don't revolt in the face of tanks SEGPF31e lfCL'- SSI Ii lJ 'l 1 FULL ult-onty E 13S26 Chif'l1 f- ecarrJ 1 D Odass Div WH Doto 1 1 JAN 2016 T0i@f j 0 25 artillery and tear gas Revolutions are now at the top with the army going to one side or the other 54 U Dulles's pessimism reflected a view the CIA had formally adopted With the Polish experience fresh in mind it concluded that the chances of mounting successful resistance operations in Eastern Europe had grown slim Defensive and provocative measures taken by Soviet and satellite security services are continually improving in scope and quality the agency reported to the President's Committee on Intemational Information Activities Moreover the capabilities and contacts of emigre groups in their home countries were constantly diminishing to the point where with very fe v exceptions they can no longer serve independently to maintain the will to resist in the countries concerned or to procure intelligence Nearly all their claims had proven empty Instead of trying to stir popular resistance the agency planned to concentrate on governmental and communist party leadership I C ' As might be expected some emigre employees at Radio Free Europe disagreed Although the station began in 1952 to moderate the strident tone ofits broadcasts a reversion to form took place in the period after Stalin's death An ultraliberationist approach briefly surfaced in which every trick in the psychological warrior's bag would be utilized to press developments b hind the Iron Curtain toward their ultimate denouement This thinking reflected in Sl CI JC broadcasters DEClASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Ch1ef Raoords Declass 0111 WHS Dale' I I JAA 016' 26 regarding The Chance for Peace speech emphasized that it marked the end of the American policy of containment and the beginning of the Eisenhower policy of liberation Listeners were to be told that liberation previously only an aspiration was now a major mticle of policy and a condition of any future peace 56 U The administration now turned its attention to finding a way to utilize for military purposes the manpower represented by the thousands of displaced persons in Europe The idea also behind the Kersten amendment was nothing new Senator Henry Cabot Lodge R Mass sponsored a bill in 1950 providing for alien enlistment in the U S Army but the response had been disappointing The Army also had created labor service organizations composed of German nationals and East Europeans to perform non cornbat duties and thus relieve regular service personnel of these responsibilities U S military authorities were generally cool to the notion of forming such persom1el into combat units primarily because of concern about the poor quality of potential recruits When Lodge whom Eisenhower appointed Ambassador to the United Nations managed to obtain the President's backing in the spring of 1953 for establishing a Volunteer Freedom Corps VFC support for the concept surged but waned when the West German Government raised objections and Eisenhower lost interest For the next few years the VFC remained under consideration but despite backing from Lodge and Jackson by 1955 it had effectively been abandoned 57 U Another potential source of East European manpower for possible use in wartime or other emergencies were demobilized Polish veterans in Western Europe that could be activated as volunteers General Wladyslaw Anders a World War II hero and member of the Polish Govemment-in-Exile in London claimed the support of nearly 100 000 such 81iHJI l 5 f 'IF C ll Sir o E D ' 'FULl_ Aurh mty r o tJ526 Clw f Rer w J l' Dec J c Div WH Date f I IAN 2016 t 27 SEQRi' T to support his veterans Anders began in 1 organization's publication and community activities and for his value as a symbol than his men's steadily diminishing fighting ability one point in 1955 Defense's General adn1itt od that he could not take seriously Anders's claim that people in Poland looked incessantly to the exiled government for leadership in their sttuggle against Soviet domination I often feel Erskine remarked that emigres who have been out of their countries and have avoided the hardships imposed upon their compatriots are not truly material for revolutionary leadership '' ' ' _L C l f '1 c In the spring of 1953 the United States had virtually no assets inside the satellites save for East Germany or outside-shm1 of the direct employment of U S forces--to assist and sustain any outbreak of violence But in spite of setbacks elsewhere at least the Albania project was still alive It had received a boost when the PSB in November 1952 recommended that a plan be prepared to detach the country from the Soviet bloc thus resurrecting the final phase of the original Anglo American scheme Without identifying the source it noted that a upreliminary estimate had concluded that Albanian personnel could accomplish the task without overt involvement of Western military forces 59 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulllonty EO 13526 Chlof Record Declass Dill WHS Data' 1 I JAH 101S aS 5 QR@T 51 28 Turmoil in Czechoslovakia and East Germany Perhaps RFE broadcasts contributed to the turmoil developing in Eastern Europe in the spring of 1953 But localized strikes and disturbances such as the short-lived food riFQpFr a DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty Eo 13526 Chief Records O clas Otv WHS Data' ' ' Wf l'OI6 7 12l i 'iHl I IT 29 rioting that broke out in Bulgaria in May had their own roots and were not uncommon in the region Nor was it surprising that Czechoslovakia became the first satellite to experience major unrest The only one that had enjoyed a prewa ' democratic government it was also the last taken over by the communists Moreover the people were generally westward-looking Geography played a part The industrial city ofPlzeil for example was farther west than any major satellite city except those in East Germany U Ironically what provoked the trouble was the Czechoslovak Government's announcement on 31 May of a currency refonn that would have wiped out savings accounts exactly what RFE had rumored would happen the previous year The next day wol'kers at the Skoda manufacturing plant in Plzeti protesting the announced reform staged a demonstration that Jed to rioting and the sacking of government buildings 62 U At most the U S role in the events was indirect--the result of recent history In the spring of 1945 American troops liberated the Plzefl area while the Red Army freed the rest of Czechoslovakia By the end of 1946 both U S and Soviet forces had left the countty but in Plzeit memory of the American presence was still strong During the demonstration striking workers caJTied a banner proclaiming that the boys from the USA will come back again Others paraded behind youths carrying Czechoslovak and American flags The turmoil ended the following day with the an ival from Prague of special security forces imposition of a curfew and marliallaw and the an est of2 000 people Dozens were injured but there were no fatalities The U S Embassy in Prague apparently did not leam of what had taken place until several days later As discontent over cmTency reform spread to other regions including Prague the govermnent finally admitted in a radio broadcast that the refonn had been met with open I@ DECLASSIFIED IN PARt AuthOnty EO 13526 Chief lll fj O t Olv WHS p to l'l' SCi I 7 lliii'i'liWiiT 30 resistance and condemnation Although the public reaction in Prague was the most violent the Embassy had seen in two years it believed no open outbreaks would occur without effective leadership or dramatic assurances of assistance fi om the nonCommunist world 64 U On the heels of the Czechoslovak turmoil a more serious outbreak of violence took place right under American noses in Berlin that spread to hundreds of cities and towns in East Gem1any It started with a strike on 16 Jurie by East Berlin construction workers protesting an increase in work norms announced in late May followed by a massive rally the next day that tumed into violence and which was eventually put down by Soviet troops when local police proved not up to the task U The U S role prim to and during the uprising was substantial but-despite an abundant literature--certain aspects remain obscure 65 Two sharply different views have emerged Then and for years afterward East German and other communist sources charged that Western agents particularly Americans instigated and helped spread the unrest in accordance with a long-planned X-Day operation Allen Dulles allegedly came to Berlin to oversee it a charge without foundation although the press did report the an ival in the city on 12 June of Eleanor Dulle a German specialist at the State Depattment and Allen's and Foster's sister 66 U The United States had no X-Day plan Like all other interested parties-Soviet East and West Getman Governments British and French it was surprised by the outbreak of unrest West Berlin Mayor Ernst Reuter and both the U S and British High Commissioners for Germany were out of the country Jackson was in Cleveland Ohio not Washington Under the circumstances it is highly unlikely that plans for an uprising 0 ilii l f' Lf ' ' ll 1H FULL 1 ull' mty EO 13526 Chit Rt' 'c J Oeclass Dlv WHS D e lltf MN 21 % QECRI T 31 if they had existed would have been carried out at this time Communist allegations were nothing new For years they had been talking about the plan and had fixed 1948 as the date of origin with Allen Dulles as the mastennind 67 Like frequent attacks against the Kersten amendment propaganda about an X-Day plan not only emphasized the U S Government's sinister aggressive designs but also suggested that its capabilities for action were greater than they actually were U Blaming outside instigation a reflexive response of communist regimes to domestic disorder during the Cold War was understandable So too was the opposing Western view that the uprising was entirely spontaneous that it grew out of widespread disgust with the regime and that no external incitement was involved As Secretary Dulles remarked to Frank Wisner a year later the less we put our label on the East German uprising the better it is He added that outbreaks are wonderful if they appear spontaneous 68 But the truth regarding the East German events is probably closer to the Communist view than many Western accounts have acknowledged U There can be no doubt about U S intentions While avoiding inciternent to open insurrection the United States sought to promote in East Germany the kind of labor unrest that in fact developed in 1953 According to a PSB paper the previous fall the object was to stiffen popular resistance to Soviet-Communist rule and thus a weaken the political economic and military system in the Soviet Zone and b to lay the groundwork for eventual incorporation in the free Western community This would be accomplished by conducting in a non attributable mmmer psychological political and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone and to prepare under controlled conditions for such active forms of resistance as may later be authorized 69 U srcpp a F L 'Sit I D o -1 FULl Authonly 0 -1 J526 Chief RerarJs De la - Oio - WHc o I I JoiN 20 6 a gcpsre The CIA's Berlin Operations Base BOB one of its largest overseas unit DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authcmty EO 13526 Chief Records Decless Olv WHS DelEUR11 1 f JAN 2016 32 '131 1 The popular West Berlin station Radio in the American Sector RIAS furnished the United States an additional instrument for both disseminating propaganda and collecting intelligence Not only did it provide air time to several West German What set RIAS broadcasts apart from those of other stations including the BBC and Radio Free Europe was that it regularly and openly urged listeners to take specific actions For example when collective contracts were introduced in Soviet zone industrial plants the station hammered away at the difficulties they posed for workers and learned from East Zone visitors that workers in a particular factory had successfully petitioned to improve their working conditions As the station's deputy director Gordon Ewing explained lf you reported that in one plant the actions of those men were going to be imitated in other plants and then sure enough men would come in fi om other plants and say aha we've done it too You could start the ball rolling It was absolutely fascinating to observe the power of broadcasting in these special circumstances By 1953 at the beginning of 1953 the people working full-time on Soviet zone broadcasts began talking in the DECLASSIFIED IN PART n as Olv WHS Date' 1 I JAN 2016 34 editorial meetings about what they thought was a developing ne 't' spirit in the Zone They began to get a feeling of more resistance 74 In the period prior to the uprising RlAS regularly reported on the growing labor troubles programming whose objective a joumalist described as slow patient sabotage A leading scholar has concluded that its commentary on successful strikes came 'close to giving instructions for rebellion 75 U The Western argument that the upt'ising was spontaneous rests in part on the contention that it was a complete surprise 76 This is only partly true The CIA certainly did not harbor much hope that discontent in East Germany and elsewhere following Stalin's death would provoke an uprising As Director Allen Dulles had done a few months before its Office ofCwTent Intelligence discounted the signs of unrest and their potential for fmther development because they were not inspired by organized indigenous resistance movements which no longer are known to exist in any Eastern European Satellite It thought that the efficient police apparatus in each country would effectively control any manifestations of organized resistance and contain and suppress spontaneous outbreaks of unrest 77 U RFE may have been one of the few organizations that understood what was happening In Czechoslovakia it said popular resentment of the currency reform had produced results far beyond our expectations ' leading to demonstrations that anywhere other than a police state would amount to a potentially revolutionary uprising It also heralded a 10 June East German Government resolution backtracking on measures designed to Sovietize the economy as ''the greatest retreat from communism which has occurred in any Soviet satellite since 1947 The weakness of the satellite governments 81 181 2 r- Lt ' 'Sir t AurhonlJ' 'f FULL r o 13526 Chref Records Declass Div WHS D e I I Jill 201 ettk@l 2 35 and popular resistance to them seemed greater than anyone has yet assumed A program guidance regarding Czechoslovakia said the moment was ripe to increase passive resistance and by taking all possible steps by which fighters for freedom are capable without jeopardizing the even more active role they may have to play in the future U RIAS too perceived a changed mood in East Germany after Stalin's death Staff members responsible for analyzing listener mail noticed that people were speaking up for the first time In May the station began accumulating evidence of strikes throughout the Soviet Zone During the broadcast campaign against the raising of work norms it received letters describing 16 industrial sit-down strikes On the evening of 15 June the station reported tlu ee isolated demonstrations that day in East Berlin against the new norms a story that other news services doubting its authenticity did not carry 79 U To what degree was the U S Govemment or the organizations it supported responsible for the decision to launch the strike An internal report by Soviet officials in Germany charged that the construction workers' strike committee maintained ties with agents of West Berlin organizations who incited them to act Although an early noncommunist study stated unequivocally that no Western agents tried to influence the construction workers on or before the day of the strike later ones have speculated on whethet' this indeed had happened A British post-mortem supports this view The SPD Ost-Buro admitted to British officials that it had met with strike leaders visiting its West Berlin office on the 161h and 1J'h and discussed action they would take 80 This seems however the only direct connection beforehand that West German organizations had with the strikers U dJIJCI i f 'IF lli'OSI IlD 1' 1 FULL Authonty EO 13526 Chief Rec-8r J Ot Ji'Jss Div 'I'HS Date II 1 JAN IIJ 36 iSEGiliW Once the trouble began on 16 June the role of RIAS and the West Getman organizations is more difficult to assess Louis Fischer an American journalist who aJTived in Berlin just after the outbreak of the violence asserted that RIAS was the general staff and signal corps of the rebellion encouraging the citizenry to rise giving them political slogans telling them 'to exploit the uncertainty and insecurity of the authorities Another account concluded that the station was perhaps more deeply involved in the events than many observers would have liked Its broadcasts served as something of a command post by transmitting information about the location of the protesters in Berlin explaining problems and demands reporting the results of negotiation and t U ough its infonnation sources in the GDR acted as a catalyst for protests in other East German cities The station came perilously close to involvement 81 U Late that afternoon a delegation of striking workers appeared at RIAS and asked to go on the air Ewing opposed it not only because their lives would be endangered if they returned to the East but also because their use of the facility would make the station a participant instead of a reporter And report it did It was the first media source to announce that a major strike had taken place By evening Ewing had decided to devote the entire commentary to the day's events U A recent study maintained that the station's commentary that evening rebroadcast throughout the night and into the early morning aimed to transform a general strike against work quotas into a revolt against the GDR that focused on achieving major political reforms It helped make RIAS a partner of the strike movement by stressing the bond between the station and its listeners and pushing protesters to try and achieve 01 961 7 Y CL ' ' 81'- ED tt- 1 FULL Autl'or ty 0 13526 Chief Rec PJ Oecfass Dfv WHS D e I I JIW 2016 'el CRE 1 7 37 greater gains The commentary closed with the words We dear listeners would be happy if we could continue to report of further victories in the coming days In approving the text of the commentary Ewing acted largely on his own It was impossible he recalled for a State Depar1ment official in Washington 1'to tell me what to do with RIAS He couldn't conceivably know enough or have the spirit of it the feeling for this extraordinary event and for that matter neither could a man sitting down in Bonn He did telephone a friend working in HICOG's political section Charles Hulick who advised him that the line should be ''sympathetiC reporting The broadcasts were more than repmiorial Hulick after staying up much of the night listening to them called Ewing and said My god Gordon watch your step You can start a war with that station This may have been around 5 a m on the 17th about the time that Soviet tank units began to move into the city and RIAS issued a call for the people of East Berlin to support the demonstrators A member of the U S mission in Berlin later praised the infmmal guidance given Ewing by Hulick and another colleague in the mission James Ruchti 82 It is conceivable that Hulick or Ruchti were in telephone contact with Washington U Another area ofuncettainty is how much credit RIAS deserves for spreading word of the trouble to the rest of East Germany Its broadcasts of 16 and 17 June were reportedly heard as far away as Leipzig Magdeburg Erfurt Dresden Merseburg and Halle leading one joumalist to conclude that without them while Berliners would have still known of the strike because word-of-mouth would have spread the news to the suburbs the Soviet Zone would not have learned about it for days and the national insurrection might never have taken place 83 U eSFQPRr a ' 1o ' o 0 o 1 FULL to 1J 2G t litt' lnty Chmf Rec Js ecla s Dlv WH Dote I I JAN 2016 7 QPFfid' 38 There is good reason however to question the extent ofRIAS's reception Because of its growing popularity East German authorities began during the fall of 1952 a massive jamming of its transmissions By the following May according to an intemal U S Government report jamming had limited the station's audible range to Berlin and the Brandenburg area around the city According to one scholar RIAS's role in the uprising though important should not be exaggerated since it could not be received in some of the towns that witnessed the greatest upheaval For example a strike leader in Bitterfeld said that jamming equipment there was so powerful that you seldom could hear RIAS Interviews with refugees in the fall of 1953 revealed that over a twoMyear period the station had lost about a quarter of its zone listeners because ofjamming 84 U Did RIAS or any other U S organization egg on the demonstrators once the trouble started There certainly were Americans present in the unruly crowds in the Soviet sector on the 16111 one of them aRIAS staff member whom Ewing sent to learn what was happening And Eleanor Dulles saw the trouble firstMhand While she was in a meeting on the morning of the 17'11 someone rushed in and announced 'The plasterers and other construction workers in white smocks are running into the British sector across the line from East Berlin The meeting broke up and Dulles and the others joined a crowd gathering near the Brandenburg Gate and Potsdamer Platz Standing on the fringe she heard people shout We want freedom She then visited the U S Mission where she had lunch while Western Allied military and political officials held a closed meeting After lunch accompanied by a friend in the German Red Cross she went to the sector border The crowd was raging she recalled My friend told me not to speak but to cany his briefcase He was afraid if they knew I was American they might mob me REBI i - Er L ' tiF 0 ' ''FUll Auth Jnty to t3G26 Chief Recc-r ' Dei I JI Div WI-IS Dote 1 1 JAN 2016 FGP8 39 They came to him shouting 'Why don't the Amis give us guns We could take over their guard posts We could free the city ' 85 U On the morning of 17 June U S Berlin Element and RIAS despatched staff members all over the city to gather infmmation some wound up at Potsdamer Platz when the shooting started Early that morning Ewing asked the same person sent the day before to return to the Soviet sector where he phoned in reports to the station about the influx of Soviet troops At one point he found himself in the middle of a demonstration with people throwing rocks and breaking windows A sudden rainstorm sent him home to change wet clothes fortunately just before the Soviets closed the border and declared martial law Communist authorities later identified his car and license plates as having been in East Berlin which they cited as evidence of the American plans for X-Day 86 U No evidence has been found to implicate U S personnel working the demonstrations to stir up trouble A member of the British Military Government's Political Section discounted the more extreme communist statements about Western instigation although he felt Western incitement on June 17'h may have slightly speeded up the reaction RIAS broadcasts of the strikers' demands gave the impression that workers should remai on strike until they were met 1 and he further believed the station's announcement of the demands along with specifying the time and place of the planned rally may have had a perceptible effect in increasing the number of workers who came out the following morning In general he considered the programs as tending toward 'the sensational ' Many featured eyewitness accounts of the rioting which could only 'have served to excite tempers 87 U 8 21 1 rzilHCREr 40 RIAS came under attack from two sides from the communists and others for encouraging the uprising and from critics in the United States for being insufficiently anti-communist Because the United States could not publicly admit that RIAS had helped promote the uprising the official line emerged that by simply reporting developments the station spread the news of what was happening but did not stimulate action That spring and summer Senator Joseph McCarthy R-Wis and other members of Congress were attacking overseas information programs as being sympathetic to communism RIAS received special scrutiny Ewing whose German wife had aroused suspicion for visiting the Soviet Union as a young woman during the 1930's was summoned to Washington by McCarthy in late June but he refused to come Such attacks on the station created a dilemma for those who valued its work Asked by a reporter about McCarthy's charges an unnamed high official in Bonn probably Conant replied The management of RIAS will stand on its record as an effective agency against communism especially at this critical time The difficulty was to defend the station without suggesting that contrary to U S policy it had instigated or promoted the uprising Shepard Stone of the Ford Foundation and former High Commissioner Jolm McCloy defended RIAS and its employees McCloy told Secretary of State Dulles that the station was partly responsible for the East German uprising and that he did not want to see McCarthy blunt their best weapon Apparently because of McCloy's intervention and probably that of others the State Department approached McCa1thy who agreed to drop his summons of Ewing 88 U Also difficult to assess are the roles played by American military political and intelligence personnel in Berlin Their general response was restraint but with 4il RPwn lr'fL ' ' ' 1 1FUll Autr n1 C 1 i 1t 2G l h1d r eo' i c LJ u ' Div WHS Dote Lf f JAN 2016 41 exceptions Cecil Lyon the top U S civilian official in the city who also served as Deputy U S Commandant recalled that we were terrified that the whole thing might blow up Our one worry was to prevent West Berliners from charging over to help their colleagues on the other side Because then the Russian troops would have fired on them We would have had to send our troops to protect them More succinctly anothe American official characterized the response by the three Western commandants all of whom were relatively new on the job as Got to be careful that we don't have a revolt spilling over into our part of the city 89 The commandants apparently gave little or no thought to providing arms to the demonstrators or assisting them in any way U The United States had prepared contingency plans to deal with possible Soviet harassing measures restricting access to the city perhaps even a reinstitution of a complete blockade as had occun ed in 1948 90 But Berlin Command had done no planning for a huge public disturbance in the Soviet sector Not until 10 a m on the 17th well after Soviet troops entered the city and the massive rally began did its G-2 Section realize that a revolt was taking place and decide to set itself up in the Command's operations room to suppox1 Commandant Maj Gen Thomas Timberman Military officials were not the only ones surprised by the magnitude of the unrest Conant recalled We were all caught unawares without any plans for which all of us got sufficient blame Lyon nevertheless Timbennan became commandant in January 1953 A Chinese language specialist he had served in the China theater during World War II One of his staff in Germany described him as 'extremely shrewd and a very good negotiator while he struck journalist Sulzberger as a very affable guy'' who 'seems to spend much of his time socially Diary entry 23 Aug 53 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 893-94 U French Commandant General Pierre Manceux-Demian had also assumed his position in January t i '' ' _ ' ' 'S r ED n 1 FUU 1 loir' oni r -' iJf 26 Cll f f p _ o ll _ l Dalr 1 I J11N 2016 Dh WH-S 42 took umbrage at a journalist's contention that he and Timberman didn't know this thing was going to happen and when it did happen they dido 't know what to do 91 U British and French militaJ ' authorities viewed developments quite differently than the Americans According to a U S member of the Kommandatura staff some Western officials were upset because the Gem1ans had taken up anns ''against an allied power The British were worried stiff that the occupation forces might be attacked and they might have to take action '' Generally they thought the Americans were too sympathetic to the rioters and insufficiently so to the Soviets The British High Commissioner in effect told Conant You Americans are playing much too favorably to the people who are revolting over there How do you lmow the West Germans won 1 t turn around and stat1 throwing rocks at you 92 U Timberman and his British and French counterparts met at 11 a m on the 1ih and again late that aftemoon 93 At the morning meeting they agreed that since their mission was to preserve order they should try to dissuade any West Berliners or East Zone residents transiting the western sectors from taking part in the demonstrations They also disapproved of the sites near the Soviet sector border where West Berliners intended to hold sympathy demonstrations later that aftemoon 94 Timbennan who had under his command around 6 000 troops--mostly Anny constabulary ordered their confinement to quatiers at 5 p m 95 U The Commandants undoubtedly had been in telephone contact with their superiors probably beginning late in the day on the 161h but no record or even reference 1953 Major-General Charles F C Coleman became the British Commandant in October 8 fCBFT o ' l _ i UJ o 1 F1Ji 1 t tl v ' ' l 1 2' Chio f ch ' ' Olk l D1v h'HS Dote I I JAN 20 o 43 to their conversations has been found Only a few references exist to telephone traffic between political officials in the city and Washington Ewing recalled that on the 1ih Berlin Element reported by cable and telephone to Washington like mad British Prime Minister Churchill also directed the Foreign Office to stay in touch with Berlin by telephone and provide him periodic repmis on the situation What did the West Gennan groups oso I 'ICc 96 U C X f l I Y c during the uprising Here the British again provided an in fanned mildly critical perspective They learned that the Combat Group on three occasions had sent up balloons with pamphlets Twice on the 17th the British also spotted a van probably belonging to the SPD at a sector border broadcasting appeals to East Berlin police to defect and on the following moming the SPD launched its own leaflet balloons In language similar to that used by the communists the British concluded that inciten ent by West Berliners had the greatest effect along the sector boundaries where there was appreciable mingling of crowds between East and West and provocation from Western hooligans and political parties The mingling may have had some wider effect in encouraging the demonstrators to believe they had Western support Twice on the afternoon of the 1ih British Commandant General Coleman had to admonish the West Berlin police chief to stop the acts of incitement That evening Coleman issued an order specifically forbidding the Combat Group from fmther balloon launchings in the British sector In the end he concluded 1'Though general encouragement from the West may have contributed to the scale of the demonstration on June 17 and incitement by West German agencies 1952 DECLASSIFIED IN PARI SFCP fC Authonly EO 13526 ChiBf Raoonls Oeclass Dlv WHS Doto - 1 1 JAN 21116 44 SFRRiT n doubtless aggravated the situation on the sector borders I am satisfied that it was not in any way responsible for the outbreak of disorders A U S intelligence estimate characterized the outbreak of open resistance on 16-17 June as largely spontaneous 97 U Because the French High Commissioner in Bonn also believed the disturbances were at least in part incited by West Berliners the U S High Commissioner's Office went to considerable lengths in discussions with British and French colleagues to disclaim any direct action by German propaganda groups'' in which the Americans were cove1tly interested The British Deputy High Commissioner like General Coleman saw no evidence to suggest that Western incitement was more than a secondary cause of the disturbances af1er they had already started A subsequent visit to Berlin confirmed his view that incitements from across the sector boundary were sporadic and smallscale due to excess of zeal by professional propagandists He was convinced that British authorities and probably also the French were doing everything possible to avoid any pretext for communist charges of Western incitement But he was 'not so happy about 98 the American sector where the propagandists do not always seem under control U A dispute has arisen about recommendations the BOB made during the crisis According to the head ofthe CIA's Eastern European Division John Bross the BOB chief cabled Washington asking permission to distribute pistols and Sten guns to the rioters Bross contacted Wisner who said 11 Give support and offer asylum But don 1t issue guns Wisner felt that since the Red A1my had 22 divisions in East Gennany it would amount to murder Allen Dulles never forgave Bross for not taking a more aggressive position Jackson also upset at the failure to supply the rebels with arms told Si 8 5 Tn 45 Bross that it did not matter whether people were killed as a result since the blood of martyrs would help discredit the Soviet systern 99 U A BOB officer had a somewhat different recollection According to him the message to Washington did not concern providing anns Instead it urged that the United States make some plausible military gesture that would give the Soviets pause to think before the Red Army clanked further over the hapless East Germans It suggested symbolic mobilization of the Sixth Infantry Regiment Timberman's token garrison force in Berlin and putting U S forces in West Ge1many particularly the 82d Airbome Division on combat alert and moving them close to the Iron Curtain The message argued that the East Germans would not have risen against their oppressors without open and covert U S support The United States should it said stand up to its responsibilities even if it meant risking a showdown with the Russians '' 100 No message suppotting either version has been found U In the end the U S High Commissioner's office provided a succinct balanced description of the U S role The East Getmans were enabled and encouraged to exploit the momentary period of Soviet SED weakness due to the presence of the Westem Allies and their controlled Gennan agencies in West Berlin These combined forces had succeeded in keeping a spirit of resistance in the past 'When the first signs of open resistance became apparent on June 16 these same forces were instrumental in nourishing and expanding sporadic unorganized demonstrations into a more organized and sustained ublic demonstration of defiance throughout East Berlin and the Zone 1 1 U Washington's Belated Response However inadequate the Truman administration's contingency plan for dealing with Stalin's death might have been it at least anticipated his demise For the outbreak of iifGFWI 7 46 widespread violence behind the Iron Curtain like the East German uprising nowhere in the U S Government had any planning been done The basic reason was that Washington as Allen Dulles had confidently said in April did not consider such an occmrence possible U The cautious tardy response was much as it had been to Stalin's death By the time Washington digested what was happening it was all but over A six-hour time difference helped events outrun the policymakers' ability to react At a mid-morning press conference on the 17'h at about the same time Soviet forces were effectively mopping up in Berlin Eisenhower called the uprising a significant thing but claimed ignorance beCause 1'my dispatches are a little behind the papers this morning The British Embassy in Washington reported that other U S comment official as well as informal was equally cautious 102 U In telephone conversations that rooming with officials in Berlin and B01m State's Office of German Affairs confirmed the accuracy of press reports regarding the previous day's demonstration Its briefing paper noted that the Western Commandants had taken every possible precaution to prevent sympathy demonstrations in West Berlin from violating the Sector boundaries and thereby creating a dangerous situation Media were being instructed to rep011 the demonstrations factually and as fully as possible They were to emphasize their spontaneous nature and the Commandants' efforts to keep them from taking on dangerous propm1ions For the time being State did not intend to seek a high-level statement because we do not wish to run the risk of identifying ourselves with the demonstrations 103 U o'I 'c r ' 1 HJU lOll- o ' ' ' o ' ' 1 i 2' C'v r f c _ ' 1 '- '-l 'po 1 _1 o Dote f 2lllfi ' f JIIN 47 After Jackson returned to Washington during the afternoon of the l7 1h he set up a working group to start planning for what he termed the aftermath of the uprising and the Czechoslovak unrest The working group's suggestions reflected interest in the uprising's wider ramifications We should give all possible moral support to the East Berliners' efforts to improve their conditions in order to help them achieve actual benefits or to stimulate further Soviet repression author's emphasis The latter would in tum provide us with ammunition at fmthcoming political conferences Bennuda Korea etc but care should be taken to avoid neutralist suspicion on the U S as instigators of the East Berlin uprisings It would be psychologically significant at this juncture to capitalize on the Berlin developments in other parts of Eastern Europe especially where some resistance has shown its head such as Czechoslovakia Rumania ctc 104 U At the regularly scheduled weekly NSC meeting on the morning of 18 June Allen Dulles asserted that the United States had absolutely no hand in inciting the East German riots which were evidence of the boundless discontent and dissension behind the Iron Curtain Jackson observed that events had moved past the riot stage and were close to insunection The problem was whether to abet the development It was perfectly possible to fan the flames of discontent but if we did so we could be sure that heads would roll Eisenhower agreed adding that 11 the heads would be those of our friends n A decision to intervene would depend 11 on how widespread the uprising became If disorder spread to China or the Soviet Union we would probably never have a better chance to act and we would be well advised for example to supply anns Eisenhower thought that if providing arms to the East Getmans was just inviting a slaughter of these people you cet1ainly didn't supply the anns Jackson did not let the matter drop Should the United States he asked help make the turmoil more serious and widespread aetcrlt 'ilEGPETo 48 Eisenhower replied it was not quite time to do so It would first have to spread to China While the Soviet Union would have no difficulty in crushing uprisings in Europe it would find it difficult to contend with unrest there and in the Far East The President directed the PSB to prepare an operational plan to exploit the unsettled situation and indicated he would convene a special NSC meeting if necessary to consider it Jackson felt he had made the case as strongly as possible that the recent disturbances might be the start ofsomething 105 U The plan PSB D-45 not completed in draft until 22 June magnified the scope of unrest citing not only East Gennany and Czechoslovakia but also signs of trouble in Romania Albania and Hungary It saw 11 little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany will abate and stated that 11 popular resentment in all the European satellites is near the boiling point 11 The situation presented 11 the greatest opportunity for effective U S psychological operations to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light Jackson called the draft a huge waste basket because we put everything anybody could think of into it When he went over it orally with the NSC Planning Board however it was unimpressed He recorded his distress over its apathy or lack of appreciation of unfolding oppmtunity 106 U When Jackson presented to the NSC on 25 June a summary list of recommendations drawn from the draft which he thought met with considerable enthusiasm he explained that the PSB had tried to avoid approaching the question in a starry-eyed and unrealistic fashion One of the few criticisms a remark by Secretary Dulles with which Eisenhower agreed suggested that the list give more emphasis to MJfU f c ' 1 Fu 49 1 8@1 1 passive as opposed to active resistance With this change and revision of another paragraph the NSC adopted and the President approved the list l 07 U An unabashed call for action the draft plan's objectives were to 1 nourish resistance to communist rule without compromising its spontaneous nature 2 undermine satellite governments' authority and 3 exploit umest as 10proofthat the Soviet Empire is beginning to crumble Short-term measures included I covetily stimulating acts and attitudes of resistance shmi of mass rebellion 2 establishing where feasible secure resistance nuclei capable of further large-scale expansion and 3 encouraging elimination of key puppet officials Some long-term measures which the plan noted would require considerable preparation and depend on developments were in fact umealistic--Jackson 's disclaimer notwithstanding Among those with no likelihood of implementation were the organizing training and equipping of underground organizations capable of launching large-scale raids or sustained yvarfare when directed and the promoting of cooperation between satellite resistance elements and nationalists in non-Russian Soviet Republics '' 108 U Impatience was partly responsible for the PSB recommendations Pointing to disturbances in Bulgaria signs of unrest in the Baltic and the East German uprising a staff member argued that the time is propitious to encourage disaffection and unrest throughout the satellites and even the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union He was not worried that the uprisings might fail If we really believe what we say the people cam1ot be much worse off than they are already Some will die in fact probably large numbers but with the MGB Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti-Soviet Ministry of State Security operating efficiently they die in numbers every year anyway Unless BIWI i r_ t ' Al J - Iii r_ ChPf l _ Q e I I c _ '-if U _ h' l - l ' fJ - JAN 2016 liifil@ftEj 50 someone can project the possibility of a chance that is better than we have at the present time then this is the moment of execution 10g U By contrast high level public comments were restrained Except for the President's brief remarks on the l7 1h they were also late in corning Two weeks after the trouble started Eisenhower and Dulles expressed admiration for those Germans who had taken action but rejected the idea of U S intervention Dulles essentially repeated what he had sWd during the election campaign He had long believed that the Soviet Union was overextended and that the satellites would eventually regain their independence particularly if the free peoples kept alive the hope of the captives and showed them that they were not forgotten 11110 U Eisenhower was somewhat ambivalent When asked at a press conference whether opportunities existed for taking concrete action to liberate the satellites he at first responded negatively and unequivocally 111 do not believe that there is any thought of taking any physical action of any kind that could be classed as intervention However he backed off by declaring with the circumlocution he often employed on such occasions that official public comment 11 should be directed towards showing what is the meaning of that kind ofthing under these situations and to try to show people that are suffering like that they do have friends in the world and people that are standing by to help so far as is possib1e 11111 He did not indicate what kind of help this might be U That the administration was learning the difficulty of responding quickly and decisively to developments in the Soviet bloc was apparent only to some One of Secretary Dulles's aides suggested to White House speech writer Emmet Hughes that the President in his public addresses should remind people how the administration's iiJSU I I ' '- t 1 i -'Ll i FUI_i Ch t '-- Detc _- ' Iff Jllll Jl ' - ''io hli O 21Ji 51 dynamic foreign policy had achieved results and had even contributed to the arrest in late June of Soviet spy chiefLavrenti Beria Hughesls reaction Such pap We have been confronted with matchless opportunity Stalin's death the messy triumvirate the Germans' revolt now Beria's faU and the sober truth is that we have no idea what to do with these opp011unities 112 U What If It Happened Again For the next several months the possibility of another outbreak and how to respond preoccupied Washington officials U East Germany remained a likely place Before returning home Eleanor Dulles again accompanied by her German Red Cross friend visited a refugee camp sheltering many of the demonstrators We walked through the camp I was assumed to be German and talked with various groups of men Each time we stopped to ask questions a large group gathered around and closed in on us arguing among themselves and speaking vehemently about the events Some of the men could not wait to get back to the east sector to show the Communists what they could do to them Several spoke of the need for Allied support If the Americans do not help us now they had better go horne Others said What are the British and French thinking if they don't help us 113 U The State Department noting that recent unrest had created the impression among some in Washington that Soviet control of the satellites might be starting to crumble asked the embassies in Prague Warsaw Budapest and Bucharest whether clrronic popular discontent with regimes has recently shown tendency to take overt and bolder fo1111 and if so how when and where 11 But each post reported no sign of growing unrest or that regime controls were weakening 114 U I MCI l i e 52 FGPRlie Those who favored a more aggressive policy like Jackson found few sympathetic listeners At a Cabinet meeting on 10 July Allen Dulles stated that Beria's fall was almost as serious a blow to the Soviet Union as Stalin's death Jackson then made a plea for action contending that Beria's disappearance would send shock waves through secret police ranks throughout the satellites If we really step in he said we could have passive resistance on a grand scale Yet his comments elicited no reaction and the discussion turned to domestic issues 115 U In the wake of the East German uprising the United States successfully carTied out a massive program in West Berlin for both humanitarian and propaganda reasons to supply food to East Berliners willing to cross the sector boundary to receive it 116 And it undertook a sharply focused initiative to heighten unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe In mid-July Radio Free Europe and Free Eumpe Press combined on a crash project codenamed Prospera to launch more than 6 000 balloons carrying I 0 million leaflets and other items illto Czechoslovakia The targets were industrial and mining districts in northwest Bohemia the Ostrava region and the areas around Prague and Plzeil On one side of the leaflets were photographs of the East Berlin riots on the other a text recounting those events as well as the purge ofBeria The text stressed the growing strength of popular resistance in Czechoslovakia the weakening grip of the govennnent and the extent of outside support 'We want you to know that you are not alone Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you Their help will grow as your detennination grows The message provoked a @@8 1 ' 1 1 L'i ' ' _ r D'' 1 H JLI f_ J 13 Hi Ch f p D od u II ldH o 1 f JAN 2016 oJl iiWtt0T 53 controversy within RFE One director complained about the stupidity of giving such advice another threatened to resign when it was proposed 117 U It also caused concern at the CIA Tracy Barn construe the message as advocating revolt most Iron Curtain would people particularly those behind the They would also infer that active suppmi would be provided What Barnes urged was a clarification of U S policy This type of program is fine if we really mean it It is my impression however that if a revolt occurred and help was needed it is extremely doubtful that it would be fmthcoming in any strong military way or even in the form of direct equipment and materiel suppmi If my conclusion is correct it seems to me more than probable that within a relatively short time the advantage which we can rightfully say has fortuitously been given us will disappear and backfire pretty badly On the other hand if my conclusion as to the support is wrong the time has certainly come for the ambiguity to be removed from our policy position Assuming that active suppmi would not be given Barnes recommended that RFE's propaganda be softened 11 Richard Helms the agency's Chief of Operations thought that the fuzzy thinking behind policy toward the satellites was caused by a desire at top levels of the Qoverrunent to make good on certain campaign pledges at the expense of hard headed appraisals of the operational problems in tenns of the basic facts of life There seemed uan inclination to raise hob in the satellites and beat up on the Red Chinese since this would be popular on the domestic political scene but there is no comPensating intention to devote the necessary overt forces and support to insure a favorable outcome to such aggressive cold war approaches Wisner joined the chorus saying that Barnes and Helms had raised the same questi-Ons he was recently discussing with Dulles Deputy tiiUGPM1 7 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chlaf Records Declaoo Dlv WHS Data' ' I I JIIN 2111 54 Director for Intelligence Robet1 Amory and others namely What is our ultimate objective in stilTing up trouble in East Germany and the satellites and what major or over-riding policy are we working to support He stated that we have a certain responsibility as operators to continue to press for as much clarity in our policy guidance as can be obtained ' c 1 OSD l II G A reluctance to face the issue persisted even among the diplomats most involved Though the guidance prepared for the September 1953 meeting in Vienna of U S ambassadors and ministers to the Soviet satellites included the question of what the United States should do if events similar to those of June 17 reoccurred in East Germany or other satellites the representatives avoided addressing the question They discussed at length the need for a more cautious policy one that would avoid incitement to violence and would hopefully prevent a reoccurrence of something like the East German uprising They agreed that at present there existed no chance for successful uprisings in the Soviet bloc including East Germany so the United State should not encourage them When Conant asked Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen what he thought that country would do if another explosion occurred behind the Iron Cmtain he replied that Moscow would take whatever measures were necessary to deal with it It would be a frightful exhibition of Western impotence if the West encouraged an uprising and then did nothing 120 In the spring and summer of 1953 the adtninistTation conducted re-examinations of overseas info1mation policy and basic national security policy The first effort resulting in a lengthy detailed repot1 in late June by the President's Committee on International Information Activities headed by William Jackson left one unhappy official ilii8MT DECLASSIFIED IN PAR'r Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Rec ol' lt DAslsss Dlv WHS Dote' j i JI N 11 li - o o FGP r 55 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense William Godel with the impression that U S political warfare activities during the past five years have been characterized by lack of inter-departmental understanding poor coordination lack of clear policy and direction and a record of some rather dismal failures expensive both in money and international understanding '' A second effort the Solarium exercise so named because it grew out of a May discussion Eisenhower had with Secretary Dulles in the White House solarium established three panels of experts from within and outside the government to defend alternative national strategies In simplified terms they were containment liberation and a blend of the two The panels worked in secret for six weeks before presenting their recommendations to the President in an all-day session on 16 July For Panel C whose task was to defend the liberation strategy the objective was to force the Soviets to shift their efforts to holding what they already have rather than concentrating on gaining control of additional territories and peoples and at the same time to produce a climate of victory encouraging to the free world Its final report stressed the need for stand-by forces to support the military in the event of war and to exploit unrest in the absence of war even if we are not now presently capable of building U S controlled underground resistance movements in the Satellites It perceived a widening gap between what was needed in this area and what was available When it is fully understood that the stand-by @ff9@ MT a DECLASSIFIED IN PART A llhonty eo 13526 Chief Recon ls Deoless Plv WHS DotG - - o Y 1 I JAN 2015 -o 8 56 FCRW apparatus which the military will require on D-Day is the same apparatus required to exploit targets of opportunity such as the recent uprisings in East Germany the tragic consequences of this gap become readily apparent The panel recommended a continuation of effmts to hamper Soviet control and to keep alive the aspirations of the satellite peoples for independence without inciting them to premature and suicidal insurrection while at the same time building up a covert underground in preparation for more intensive activity at a later date 122 In the opinion of George Kennan a member of the panel defending containment Eisenhower made a brilliant summation of the competing arguments at the concluding session He spoke with a mastery of the subject matter and a thoughtfulness and a penetration that were quite remarkable Kennan left with the conviction that Eisenhower was a much more intelligent man than he was given credit for being The President made clear that he had rejected Panel C's defense ofliberation Jackson had the same impression but noted that Eisenhower's remarks disturbed him because they virtually tlll'ew cold water on all action '' 123 U As a follow-up to the Solarium exercise the CIA prepared an estimate in coordination with the rest of the intelligence community as to whether time was on our side in the Cold War The estimate concluded that in one sense time was on the side of the Soviet Union since it was closing the economic gap with the United States Moreover Soviet acquisition of weapons capable of crippling the United States meant the end of American invulnerability to direct attack However two factors favored the United States One was the improving U S position as Western defense capabilities around the Soviet periphery continued to increase The other was the inherent weakness of the Soviet Af RMI o II GRJ T 57 empire Vhile no collapse within the Soviet bloc can be foreseen the USSR may lack vitality over the long run From this point of view time may be on the side of the U S but this factor wil not show up critically for 10 or 15 years yet 124 U Still optimistic about the possibility ofstitTing revolt in Eastern Europe Jackson nevertheless recognized the dangers involved It was wrong he told an Army War College audience in October to say that nothing could be accomplished If the President were to ask for an uprising in a satellite country he could have it fairly soon but then there would be one terrible mess because it could only work if closely geared into the over-all forward movement of this entire govemment We just can't be creating little salients anymore 125 U He continued to believe discontent rife There is a sensing in the intelligence community Jackson informed Under Secretary Smith in November ''that serious food scarcities are going to affect Soviet control of their satellites during the coming winter this area promises to be a prime target of opportunity He wondered whether the June PSB plan took sufficient account ofthe various contingencies which might arise and whether enough attention was being paid to actions we would take if we were faced with a repetition of the June 17 incidents on a widespread scale an indigenous general strike call or food riots We might even be confronted with a premature mass uprising 'a Ia Warsaw ' deliberately provoked by the Soviets 126 U Operations Coordinating Board OCB staff members who drafted much of the language in Jackson's memo for Smith also called his attention to unsubstantiated press reports from Berlin and London that between 5 000 and 10 000 anti-communist East Germans Czech partisans and Red army deserters directed by a unified command were wif 4 1 58 fighting their way to freedom in the West Jackson apparently did not put much stock in the rumors for they were not mentioned in his memo to Smith The omission was wise the exodus was far less than thought The group consisted of only five Czechs who had crossed the border seeking contact with Western officials in Germany--three made it successfully Soviet and East German authorities and their propaganda organs had oveneacted as thousands of troops were employed on a largely fruitless month-long manhunt 127 U As memory of the June upheaval faded fewer people were willing to accept the contention that another violent outbreak was imminent When Jackson raised the possibility at a January 1955 OCB meeting that riots were almost certain in Berlin during the upcoming Foreign Ministers conference everybody nodded their heads he observed but nothing was decided He told Smith and Allen Dulles that it would be dreadful negligence on our part if this kind of dramatic development took place and we were totally unprepared He assured them he was not suggesting an airlift of75mm recoilless rifles which is what I have been accused of 128 U Jackson had left Time-Life on a twelve-month leave of absence his return was pushed back from January until April 1954 to allow him to attend the Berlin conference 129 Afterward he told the President in a sort of farewell message If during 1954 we have the guts and the skill to maintain constant pressure at all points of the Soviet orbit we will get dividends from such a policy Furthermore our pressure can take the form of much bolder harassment than we have yet felt advisable Eisenhower asked him to provide specifics which he spelled out in writing Several suggestions focusing on propaganda to the satellites were conventional Others in the form of direct CJiCREF 59 MORET action in East Gem1any were more daring 1 infiltrating and organizing factory cells in order to instigate 'a series of flash strikes and demonstrations over an extended period of time 2 sabotaging industrial and agricultural shipments out of the East Zone destined for Russia and 3 secretly applying terroristic pressure against members of the East Gennan regime He added that if an Ulbrichto or two didn't show up at the office some morning few would weep One can only speculate whether he meant they should be murdered or merely scared away from reporting for work 130 U Jackson discussed the proposals with Wisner and Allen Dulles On 26 March Wisner responded agreeing with some such as intensifying certain propaganda efforts but taking issue with organizing factory cells to foster strikes and demonstrations Because the Soviets would be able to identify the agitators and inflict reprisals we would want to assess the program in tem1s of net over-all gain and one of our major considerations therefore would be the expense to CIA in texms of the loss of leadership and members recommendation for terroristic pressure Wisner felt would quite obviously require a prior decision on the highest level If this were forthcoming we could very likely organize and execute such an action Consideration should be given to whether such action would be significant unless taken as a part of a larger program for anned revolt Wisner posed the Number One question thus far unanswered regarding the stilTing of umest in the satellites Suppose that our effmis are _ ' ' 1 ' 'Walter Ulbricht First Secretary ofthe Socialist Unity Party Sozialistische iJZ Ml DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhooly EO 13526 Chief Records Dt IB Ill Dlv WHS 0 0 ' I I diW 2016 ' o 60 'M l ift81 - successful and that there comes to pass an outbreak of violence of large propm1ions and of a magnitude which would pose the kind of challenge to the Russians that would require them to move in on the situation with massive military repressive measures The oso lAC Albanian Finale On another issue--Albania Jackson also weighed in heavily but wound up losing During the summer of 1953 that country's detachment from the Soviet bloc an idea put on hold until after the June Italian national election assumed new life as a result of the troubles in Czechoslovakia and East Gennany and the purge ofBeria U C I J Io'- Eienheitzpartei Deutschlands or SED SEGPPffirt DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonly EO 13526 Chief Raoortls Dedass Dlv WHS Dale li f IAN 201 ji61 1 6 61 oso t o ic aA 1 '- C It may have been this document or an earlier version that Richard Bissell a Princeton University professor temporarily working in Washington for the CIA recalled seeing He concluded that the plan was preposterous Bissell who some years later would become the chief architect of the Bay of Pigs invasion felt the United States would not be able to supp011 an Albanian operation at such a great distance and its size ensured it would not remain secret It would have put the Bay of Pigs in the shade he recalled 134 U The NSC immediately took up the CIA paper Though Jackson tried to speed implementation ofthe_recormnendations Secretary Dulles urged first creating a task force to coordinate action The PSB decided that the initial step would be consultation G CRPY DECLASSIFIED IN PAR f Authonly EO 13526 Chief Records Daclass Dlv WHS Date' I 11ll l l '- __ 62 with the British then discussions with the Greeks Yugoslavs and Italians On leaming of the plan Eisenhower observed that Albania was a very difficult case because of the question of who gets it and who gets hurt 135 U For different reasons the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked coldly on the proposal William Godel in OS D's Office of Special Operations felt it was not a plan but an attempt to relieve CIA of pressure to do something and nothing will come of it because it was contingent on State's taking too many preliminary actions If we wait till State actually does all emphasis in the original of these things Albania will remain a Soviet satellite forever Godel and his office head General Erskine proposed concentrating on Bulgaria instead of Albania 136 For the Joint Chiefs the ove1throw ofHoxha had lost much of its appeal A member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee the JCS long-range planning body told CIA representatives that the plan's initial phases almost entirely concerned State and CIA Although Albania's detachment would have relatively little strategic value he agreed that the psychological impact would be great Still an unsuccessful operation would have most serious psychological and diplomatic repercussions in Western Europe and elsewhere 137 The formal JCS response on 3 September was even more negative The plan should be discouraged because potential gains would not justify the military commitments likely to develop and favorable trends underway in the Balkans ' might be disrupted 138 fl ' At State Policy Planning Staff Director Robert Bowie and Raymond Thurston Deputy Chief of the Office of Eastern European Affairs also expressed reservations c zZII BI 1te ry C o' ' ' t'D '' 1 FULl- 1 loll' _ r t - 1 s Ch 1of 1 lJo I o- '' 1 1 JAN 2016 1 1- 'H ' FGD iti 63 Both agreed that preliminary diplomatic soundings could be made but Thurston wanted ' them to focus on contingency plans in the event of armed hostilities or to deal with a totally spontaneous uprising He was opposed to concerted action to stimulate such an uprising or bring it to fruition Thurston stated that the chief regional objective was achieving a working agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy '' meaning a settlement of their dispute over Trieste and that exacerbating the Albanian problem would only increase tensions between the two countries 139 This is exactly what happened On 29 December 1953 Radio Tirana announced that it had captured and would soon publicly try the agents infiltrated by the United States The wmouncement did not deter Jackson before he left government service in the spring of 1954 fi om continuing to urge that preliminary pla1ming be undet1aken to detach Albania from the Soviet bloc 11in anticipation of an eventual green light He accepted the rationale for the delay namely the still umesolved Trieste dispute But when he discussed the matter with the President Under Secretary Smith and Allen Dulles in March 1954 they reaffirmed the decision to take no action until Trieste was settled 141 U DECLASSIFIED IN PARl tSPGDET AuthOrity EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS Data' 1 1 WI 1016 - - ' 64 In April 1954 the trial in Tirana and sentencing to death of seven m e n e n t into Albania effectively ended U S thoughts of intervention Plans were instead made to take advantage of any sudden favorable developments including the spontaneous outbreak of revolt But by the beginning of 1955 the intelligence community concluded that although a few remaining resistance bands isolated from one another and without much in the way of mms or supplies might remain active for a while the security forces would eventually liquidate them Less Vigorous Stirring NSC 174 OSD 1 4 C Throughout 1953 administration officials were engaged in drafting a new policy paper on Eastern Europe to replace one dating back to 1949 Finally approved in December 1953 as NSC 174 it ruled out use of military force to liberate the satellites either directly or through suppm1 of revolutionary movements U S military intervention probably would precipitate general war would be unacceptable to the American people and would be condemned by world opinion The United States should avoid encouraging premature action by anti-Soviet elements which will bring upon them reprisals involving further terror and suppression Continuing and careful attention must be given to the fine line which is not stationary between exhortations to keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance and invitations to suicide 143 U Tilglunan B Skip Koons an NSC special staff member who worked on the paper noted a basic conflict that the Solarium exercise had tried to resolve If the United States is not willing to intervene by force in the Satellites to support anti-communist uprisings if it is unwilling to risk general war by such or related actions and ifit feels that the net advantage to the United States of the freeing of the satellites is at best small ilsli@h iOECLASS FIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Dacless Dlv WHS Dote' 1 1 JAN 1016 iJ'GPET 65 this has been the conclusion to date then the best that can be done is to straddle the issue This means that you do what you can to keep alive hope in eventual freedom without encouraging open revolt The paper admitted the impossibility of laying down at this time firm courses of action for responding to open revolt The problem argued Koons has to be kept in mind however and the appropriate departments and agencies should be as prepared as possible on a continuous basis with alternative courses of action which might be adopted 144 When Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler briefed the NSC on the paper he analyzed the crucial issue of avoiding premature revolt Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Harold Stassen voiced concem about the the paper's failure to indicate a course of action or plan which the United States would follow in the event of a successful revolt by one of the countries against its Soviet masters Both Allen Dulles and Jackson assured him that plans were being made for this contingency 145 U This was not true Wisner made a point of researching the question and could find nothing authorizing the CIA to plan for exploiting satellite uprisings or inciting them The only guidance even touching on the question was an admonition regarding East Getmany which emerged in CIA exchanges with HI COG the previous summer to keep the poi simmering-but to avoid boiling it over He also came across an OCB instruction that had been carried out to stockpile explosives and demolition materials in Europe for use if needed But he emphasized that we have NO policy guidance governing the infiltration thereof either at the present time or under any specific set of circumstances in the future '' Troubled by the lack of understanding at higher government levels on this general szcr i Sl Si 1' 66 subject Wisner urged that the CIA either obtain guidance to clarify its responsibilities or disabuse people ofthe notion that we are all set to go or are in the process of developing plans to touch off or support uprisings in the satellites His own understanding shared by Helms and Barnes was that current policy did not call for provoking uprisings which he felt could succeed only if outside military forces were prepared to march in and actively help the insurgents consolidate and hold their gains Nor were there any adequate US forces to move in and give support to an attempted revolt He continued to believe that the present policy of encomaging resistance to the satellite regimes in order to keep the pressure on and to retard the consolidation of Soviet controls was the proper one But he said it is one of the most difficult unanswered questions of the day as to what US or Western policy would be in case of an attempted revolt occuning in any of the satellites within the foreseeable future and prior to the withdrawal of Soviet military power from the immediate or adjacent area 146 U Within the agency Wisner Helms and Bames were not alone in their concern Noting that NSC 174 affords more leeway in stimulating satellite revolt but cautions against the incitement of premature revolt that would sacrifice resistance movements unnecessarily and prohibits U S military involvement in support of satellite liberation Jolm Bross head of the East European Division felt that an aimed uprising in East Gennany would fail because of the presence of the Red Anny and the improved repressive capabilities of the regime Unless significant quantities of munitions and other support are introduced from the outside on a sustained basis he said and undoubtedly unless U S military forces were overtly committed to support an East German revolt we believe that the resistance elements would be liquidated in a very S i PE' _ o c H L L '' 1 FUU P- t l or l' r_ 1 -lf G Ct - I - f ' J' _ f ' o J o '- l jo ' 1 I JAN 2D16 I 'fj - S RErte- 67 short time Chances of a successful revolt in Poland Hungary or Czechoslovakia he believed were 'nil The only possible contingencies he envisioned involved civil resistance such as widespread strikes agricultural non-deliveries civil disobedience food riots or the like However he admitted that CIA had no plans for internal action in the event of any of the above happenings coolness of the State Depaiiment and diplomats to the idea and opposition at the CIA among high officials other than Allen Dulles Jackson was obviously swimming against a strong tide 'Nhile a historian the first who mined the fascinating output of recommendations and remarks that Jackson made during his roughly year's tenme as 'White House special assistant called him one ofthe most significant figures in U S Cold War history another scholar's assessment is closer to the mark He possessed one of Washington's lowest batting averages in tetms of ideas accepted and put into practice but he seldom let failure discourage him from swinging away the next time up 148 tl Jackson remained concerned about the lack of planning for a major outbreak of violence in Eastern Europe No longer in the government he ' Vfote to Allen Dulles in February 1955 arguing that it was time to get going on the Albania operation and activate the Volunteer Freedom Corps as quickly as possible The latter action would take care of a ceriain number of youthful exiles possible problem children because they Siifilll 'l DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Ch ef Records Declass Dlv WHS Dale' I 1 iii N l015 I@I Ciffii 68 have nothing to do and no hope and would also furnish satellite nationalist cadres for eventual emergencies He asked What are we prepared to do if the tension in the satellites were to reach a c1itical mass and blow this year '' Jackson was not sure whether the CIA Director knew the answer but he thought the VFC if not the complete answer was 'at least a start 149 U Jackson's departure from Washington created a shortage of imaginative ideas for exploiting unrest in Eastern Europe In August 1954 an OCB working group describing what should be done during the next six months to be ready to exploit any future disturbance similar to the East German riots of 1953 came up with only two actions 1 keep harvest results for the CUITent year under review with an eye to exploiting possible shortages with offers of food or other action and 2 have the CIA and the United States Information Agency USIA analyze the East German uprising and develop 'lspecific courses of action to be taken in the event of a similar occurrence The agencies were to report Uteir findings by 1 December The NSC Board Assistants noted that although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be in the future the U S should be prepared by feasible cun ent actions or future planning to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-controlled areas and power With an Albania operation now off the table they suggested that the working group examine other possible actions particularly a major coordinated action by all agencies designed to detach one of the impmtant Soviet satellites from the Soviet bloc 150 U The joint CIA-USIA response submitted in January 1955 was almost entirely negative The two agencies pointed out that if something like the East German uprising occurred again the position which the U S Government must take would not differ Q XT 1 t- Chtd Date nt o r_r 1 - t- r ' J J_ _ Oio 'H 1 I JAN 2016 69 GPEFfi materially from the stand we assumed in 1953 CmTent policy severely circumscribed actions the United States might take It must not do anything to 1 precipitate hostilities e g armed aid logistic support etc 2 cause a premature uprising and annihilation of dissident elements because of exhortations or unsupportable promises and 3 alienate allies If a revolt did occur the United States would have to confine itself to disseminating information expressing sympathy providing moral support and taking whatever political steps would be deemed feasible and effective at the time 151 U The Thaw and Khrushchev's Secret Speech During 1955 statements regarding U S policy continued to reflect the changing attitude toward Eastern Europe what some called an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach Instead of encouraging resistance within the Soviet bloc a new basic national security policy paper NSC 5501 adopted in early January 1955 called for fostering changes in the character and policies of Soviet bloc governments by influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which while in their national interests do not conflict with the security interests of the U S lf resolutely pursued this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce and ultimately a peaceful resolution ofthe Soviet bloc free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment 152 U The shif1 in emphasis was reflected in another paper the NSC approved at the end of January NSC 5505 1 that focused on exploiting the Eastern European region's vulnerabilities This paper which included a summary of a report by a committee chaired by Max Milliken of M I T 's Center for International Studies CENIS identified two considerations that should govern strategy '8l8 I I r - 'o 'c o o 1 'r ' r il J l' I FULL i 1 ' I o 6 - n1 ' w 0 Ei'iRiii 70 a Barring external military aid and intervention no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed at present The United States is not now prepared to undeiiake such aid and intervention Accordingly although it is in the interest of the U S to foster conditions which in the event of either general war or changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt or related activities such as sabotage partisan movements etc it is not in U S interest at the present time to encourage revolution as a major element of its strategy toward the Satellites b Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet leadership that the U S is implacably dedicated to the overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may negate the possibility of exerting U S influence towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or Soviet society Planners were urged to keep a variety of contingencies in mind so that assets could be maintained to exploit crisis situations or general war so far as this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above strategy The new strategy was to govern political warfare operations departure from which should be underiaken only for cause and with a clear recognition of possible conflict 153 U The statement of policy listed several principles to be applied in exploiting discontent 1 creating and increasing 11popular and bureaucratic pressures to produce evolutionary change in governmental policies and conduct which would reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on the United States 2 continuing to oppose the Soviet system and to state its evils while stressing evolutionary rather than revolutionary change and providing assurance that the United States did not intend to impose by force its ideas of government on Soviet bloc countries and 3 generally portraying the causes of discontent not as inherent conditions reparable only by revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action ' Covert operations would not necessarily have to confonn to these principles but were to be conducted so as not to impair their effectiveness 154 U SFGPW ri _l ' '2 ' i oc 1 f-UI_I AL ll' Jnl ' r_ j 'j Ch 'f Rer --- iJ _ __ Ji ' 1 'H Date 1 1 JAN 10 5 811 CICE ro 71 The new approach stemmed not only from the practical difficulties of conducting operations behind the Iron Cur1ain but was also a response to the willingness by the postR Stalin Soviet leadership to riegotiate with the West Two international proceedings in 1955-Rthe conclusion ofthe Austrian State Treaty in June and the Geneva Summit Conference in July--produced a less confrontational climate which encouraged the United States to soften its stance U The Austrian State Treaty requiring withdrawal from the country that fall of all occupying military forces-Soviet as well as Western--and the maintenance of Austrian neutrality increased the exposure of the satellites to the outside world This was especially true of Hungary which acquired a new frontier with the West and Czechosloval ia whose borders with the West were extended The OCB believed this would increase the ferment and discontent in these two countries It also expected that a visit by Soviet leaders to Belgrade and a resultant declaration recognizing the possibility of achieving 'socialism' in diverse ways would have a significant effect on the satellites Unless the Soviet Union was prepared to relax control increased passive resistance and non cooperation may follow Aware that U S capabilities remained limited for directly influencing developments pat1icularly for developing organized resistance the OCB nevertheless thought the fluid diplomatic situation presented the greatest opportunity for furthering the objectives of policy toward Eastem Europe since the adoption ofNSC 174 in December 1953 155 U The Geneva Summit Conference of July 195 the first gathering of the leaders of the four major powers since 1945 produced agreement among them to work for greater East-West cooperation including the exchange of people and information and the i ililiMT ' _ oJ d Ch r ' 0 ' ' o '' ' _ FUU - o o - L li 'HS I I JAN 2016 R To 72 breaking down of economic barriers Never a fan of summit meetings Secretary Dulles was especially opposed to this one According to Bohlen he felt the spectacle ofthe President of the United States shaking hands with the Russians would have a hannful effect on resistance elements behind the Iron Curtain Bohlen thought just the opposite that the spectacle of the President of the United States and the Soviet leaders sitting down apparently in reasonable amity to discuss things would tend more to weaken the Communist hold on the satellites 156 U The question was how much emphasis during the conference the Westem powers should place on the satellites' lack of independence Although the British and the French agreed to having the issue raised Bohlen believed the Soviets would strongly oppose any formal discussion of it The NSC issued rigid guidance for the U S delegation stipulating that it maintain and publicly assert that Soviet control of the satellites is one of the principal causes of world tension and is incompatible both with lasting conditions of peace and with the basic principles of freedom and self-determination It was insb ucted to seek every opportunity to weaken or break the Soviet grip on part or all of the satellite area and 'avoid in all circumstances any action that even appears to indicate any abandonment of this objective However Dulles believed they should not insist on making the satellites a matter for negotiation and felt he probably could accomplish more in private conversations than in fonnal sessions Bearing out BoWen's prediction the Soviets showed little willingness to discuss the satellites As CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory later described the Soviet reaction the minute you'd touched on their belt their cordon sanitaire from Poland to Bulgaria they just froze up and almost equally as strong on East Gennany They were intent he said on projecting an SECKEl a ' 1'C 1o 'f ' 1 c-U 1 f'ULL Alott wt - i_ o -' oo 'i Ch f ' ' c o l1-- - t'i'' ' H' Datp o I I JIIN 2016 i@LCIG f 73 image of strength that they would not be pushed around and that they will not take lying down the liberation of the satellites 157 U Nevertheless Dulles came away from the conference in a hopeful frame of mind Asked at a congressional hearing whether the United States should help the Soviet Union increase its standard of living he replied that so long as it maintained an empire in Eastem Europe it was not good business to help it because I believe that economic weaknesses and strains are going to be very potent in breaking that grip Ifthe grip was broken and the Soviet Union returned to its nmmal boundaries he thought it would probably be better to help and to give their people a higher standard of living and a stake in peace which they do not now have He did not want to put an exact date on when that contraction would occur but the way things are going I think within 5 years that there is a very good chance that will happen 158 U To allay fears in the satellite countries that the conference and a follow-up meeting of foreign ministers had meant the United States was losing interest in seeking their independence Eisenhower and Dulles broadcast over Radio Free Europe a Christmas message to the peoples of Eastern Europe Soviet First Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev criticized it as not being in accord with the views expressed in Geneva The White House responded that it had been made abundantly clear at the conference that the 'spirit of Geneva' could not and did not involve any relaxing of the peaceful purpose of the United States to achieve liberty and justice for the oppressed peoples of the world The statement concluded The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been is and until success is achieved will continue to be a major goal of the United States foreign policy 159 U r Jilli tkif _ c r_ ru r_ 1 o '' ch f nc o u L _ Uio 'H'3 ' t_ ll 'r t ' 0 '' 1 JW 2016' JECJC 1 o 74 Now made more pronounced by the spirit of Geneva the inherent ambivalence in policy toward the satellites continued to cause concern within the U S Government Early in 1956 the OCB again took note of the limited U S capabilities for influencing events in the region particularly in the development of organized resistance which could basically alter the status of the satellites '' The continuation of d6tente would make it difficult to promote passive resistance and other anti-communist activities Striving for negotiated settlements and encouraging evolutionary changes were ''not always compatible with programs intended to keep alive the hopes and aspirations of the captive peoples The OCB suggested a re-examination of policy toward the satellites that would provide 10 some guidance as to the resolution in practice of such incompatible policies It was not optimistic It may be that the United States will have to undertake to follow simultaneously two policies with inconsistent courses of action representing divergent approaches to the one objective 160 U The unexpected then occurred Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech in February 1956 at the 201h Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which he denounced Stalin for crimes he had committed created a sensation in the Communist bloc and accelerated the thaw in relations with the West 161 The idea has since gained widespread acceptance that the U S Government's obtaining a copy of the speech represented a major achievement Secretary Dulles called it the greatest feat by American Intelligence in a number of years Much later CIA official Ray Cline went further saying it was one of the agency's greatest coups of all time 162 Exactly how it obtained the text is not clear a cloudiness CIA representatives may have fostered to enhance the aura of the agency's effectiveness But the accolades do not seem justified 'e Ci l o ' l' r o o - fC o'I FULl 1 l d v ot_ ' o 'o- ' l'f ' I IJalt - ' 1 1 JAN 2016 75 The Western powers secured at least four copies of the speech all seemingly from Poland and all at approximately the same time The United States acquired two the British and the French one each Acquiring a copy in Poland where they were sold on the black market was not that difficult A communist patty official in Warsaw recalled that more than 15 000 copies were printed and distributed He claimed to have given copies to a French correspondent and to two American repmters who according to him transmitted them to the West However one of the reporters later denied that they received copies Although the United States tried to persuade the Yugoslav Govemment to furnish it a copy and journalist Louis Fisher reportedly obtained extracts from a Yugoslav source all evidence points to Poland as the source of the text the CIA obtained apparently early in Embassy in Warsaw Willard Barber also claimed credit for obtaining a copy l-Ie bon owed it fi om a Polish source and had Army communications staff at the embassy photostat it and transmit the text to Washington The French probably got theirs from one of their correspondents in Warsaw On 14 May Bohlen reported that a French colleague in Moscow had shown him a copy of a dispatch fi om the French Embassy in Warsaw containing what was purported to be a summary ofthe speech which the Embassy considered authentic 164 U OSD ll c The key question was what to do with the text At Allen Dulles's meeting with his deputies on 16 May Wisner announced that the agency had obtained a copy ofthe speech Noting that its authenticity had not been confitmed he asked what dissemination fi8i l DECLASSIFIED N PARl' Aulhonty EO 13526 Chlef Record D cla ss 0111 oWHS Doto' 1 1 JAN 2016 76 should be made After discussing the matter fi uther he gave a copy to a British Embassy Allen Dulles offered a reward for obtaining the speech and that the CIA had it for a few days without telling anyone in order to have its authenticity checked Shown a copy Kennan prepared for Wisner a detailed analysis of the document and its probable impact According to Angleton Dulles said What we do with it will depend on the President ''' -' o ' qt ''P and my brother Consideration was given to disseminating the speech tlrro gh the Free Europe Committee but committee officials were disinclined to do so in part because it would raise questions as to how it had come into their possession and also because it stood to gain as much from the document's release whoever published it Cline recalled that he favored making the entire speech public but that Wisner and Angleton objected wanting instead to feed certain parts of the speech to select audiences to maximize its impact He stated that Allen Dulles with his brother's concurrence did not make the decision until2 June to release the full text which the New York Times printed two days later In circulating the published version to overseas posts the British Foreign Office said it was believed to emanate from Polish sources Publication of the speech has been credited for helping fan the unrest in Eastern Europe that nearly brought the collapse of Soviet rule that autumn This claim too is largely undeserved for the shockwaves that Khmshchev's speech sent throughout the regionoccurred primarily in the spring well before the text appeared in print in the West sgcgs t DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Deems Olv WHS Date' 1 1 JAN 1016 MERE I 77 In Poland for example discussion of the speech already had helped create factions among the ruling elite emboldened party activists in their criticism of the higher echelons and encouraged Polish society in general to challenge the basic tenets of the Communist system 168 U In Hungary the speech was apparently not translated into Hungarian But the general contents became known and raised hopes that there would follow if not a clearcut break with the past at least a moderating of the government's harsher practices An address in mid-May by Communist Party leader Matyas Rakosi in which he ranted against U S imperialism and spoke openly about alleged American supp011 of spies and saboteurs and which seemed to the U S Legation almost a throwback to the old Stalinist times disappointed those harboring even most cautious hopes and has given rise to even greater general discontent and disaffection towards Rakosi The legation recommended that he be attacked as strongly as possible because some Hungarian and party officials would welcome and silently acclaim a diplomatic offensive aimed at Rakosi and his secret police which they could use in their efforts to bring about reform 169 U Satellite unrest obviously worried Moscow At a May Day luncheon in the Kremlin attended by Soviet bloc diplomats Khrushchev castigated Poland's leaders who he said were turning their back on the Soviet Union looking to the West and thinking of leaving the socialist camp The Yugoslav Ambassador was struck by Khrushchev's reference to the camp implying that differences with Poland were an internal Soviet affair not as though they concerned Moscow's relations with another 1 1E8f l 78 country It gave him the impression that the Russians are prepared to use force to keep the 'camp' under their complete control 170 U Despite the ferment by early June few Western observers predicted significant challenges to communist governments or violent upheavals in the region State's Bureau oflnte ligence and Research saw the changes occmTing as manifestations of flexibility by the governments which implied tone and toughness and reflected regime selfconfidence The bureau concluded that under present circumstances the existing system of entrenched Soviet controls appears adequate to offset any unexpected vulnerabilities that such experiments may produce 171 U The CIA's Senior Research Staff on International Communism took a longer view While the Soviet party congress in February would likely spur the satellites to seek their own roads to socialism an outside chance existed that communism itself would mellow not during the next decade but more likely over a generation or two Once freed from the confines of permanent tensions mental attitudes may develop which could become stronger than Communist faith and discipline Such a transformation would be slow at first hardly noticeable but it might work itself up persistently from the grass roots to the leading circles It is impossible to estimate how long such a process would need to become apparent nor is it possible to foresee its ultimate outcome Much would depend on the character of future Soviet leadership 172 U The Spark in Poznan The United States had good reason to be pleased with the tmmoil in the communist world following Khrushchev's speech In a 21 June address Dulles hammered away at the speech's implications which he termed the most damning indictment of despotism ever made by a despot Reiterating one of his favorite themes Dulles said If we can continue to show freedom as a dynamic liberalizing force then we need not fear AFOP fi1 '- c - ' ' ' FD '' 1 FULL P t J onho r r 1f J ' ' J'ff Mtt -' Dlo 1 lJS 79 the results of the peaceful competition which the Soviet rulers profess to offer More than that we can hope that the forces now at work within the Soviet Union and within the captive countries will require that those who rule shall increasingly conform to principles of freedom This would usher in a world wide era of true liberalism a possibility now clearly visible for the first time in many years 173 U During a closed meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee several days later Dulles declared the Soviet system in serious trouble with Khrushchev perhaps on the ropes '' If the United States could maintain pressure a very great disintegration within the apparatus of the international communist organization would occur Once the satellites began to break away Dulles felt no one could tell where the process might end The key thing was to get cracking in there and once you get the crack in and you use the leverage you may open the door a lot further than the fellows think that first pennit you to get the crack 114 U On 27 June Dulles held the State Department's first televised news conference According to columnist James Reston he entered the room full of bounce and confidence and seemed to gloat over developments in the Soviet bloc The Secretary was like a military commander suddenly perceiving a crack in the enemy's line He identified it with a whoop and ordered a general offensive 175 His remarks in fact were more restrained than they had been before the Senate committee He noted that a revolt against the Stalinist legacy was taking place in the communist world For the present the West's main task was to maintain support vigorously and resourcefully adapt to new conditions the basic policies of unity which are now beginning to pay off Although focusing primarily on the repercussions of Khrushchev's speech on Western communist SF GEE ' 1f r L' O lr ED 1 - FULL Auli- CJnty E 13526 Ch c f Recc rJ c U O o kw Dh WHS Dale 1 1 JAN 2016 80 patties he also refened to the changes taking place in the satellites I believe that there is a growing tide within the Soviet bloc in favor of greater liberalization greater humanity greater freedom of speech greater enjoyment of the fmits oflabor and opportunity to think and speak more freely 176 U According to Reston Soviet expetts in Washington found it difficult to see how Dulles could expect to deepen and widen the breach in the Communist world by proclaiming publicly that these divisions jeopardize the unity and success of the whole communist movement Many believed the deep divisions within the Communist Party are more likely to be encouraged by silence than by jubilant pronouncement in the State Depatiment Dulles later admitted to the President that his remarks had been hyperbolic When Eisenhower informed him of a letter the White House had received criticizing his public statements about Khrushchev's difficulties he replied that it had been uvery important from the standpoint of the Mutual Security legislation to portray our past policies as successful and to have some reason such as their success for continuing these policies 177 U Events moved faster than Dulles anticipated The very evening of his news conference officials from the U S Embassy in Warsaw attending the Poznan intemational trade fair in western Poland found themselves seated in a restaurant with a Polish businessman who confided You know this place is going to blow sky high tomorrow Asked what he meant the man replied Yep they're going out on the streets and they're gmma raise hell The Americans returned to their hotel and telephoned a report to the embassy The next day they Vllitnessed mass demonstrations and riots that shook the Polish govemment and reverberated throughout Eastern Europe but they had lSEt l@ EGRET 81 nothing to do with instigating or encouraging the violence We were very much on the sidelines one recalled We stayed on the fringes of the mob and I don't think we had particularly good insights as to what was going on '' 178 U The riots started early in the morning of 28 June when workers at the Zispo manufacturing plant upset over unfair work norms and poor pay proclaimed a general strike marched into the city center and were joined by workers from other factories and townspeople As the crowd swelled to 100 000 people some attacked a prison and freed inmates others destroyed equipment on the roof of a government building used to jam Western radio broadcasts still others besieged the headquarters of the state security apparatus and broke into arsenals where they seized arms Local security forces could not deal with the violence By late afternoon two Polish armored and two infantry divisions some I 0 000 soldiers and 360 tanks began entering the city 179 U Although the United States had not been officially represented at the fair the embassy quickly sought to show the flag In the absence of Ambassador Joseph Jacobs Charge d'Affaires Barber rode from Warsaw to Poznan in the embassy's limousine adorned with an American flag Having received instructions to be as ostentatious as possible he drove back and forth through the streets to make visible the U S presence 180 U British and U S diplomats thought that the presence of so many foreigners in the city for the trade fair had contributed to the demonstrators' decision to act For visitors as well as residents the fighting became a spectacle One eyewitness felt he was in the middle of a Wild West movie Another compared the event to spectators watching a tennis match at Wimbledon Most of the fighting occurred the first day but sporadic o iii if E'T' V C L ' 'rW D o I FULL Autl 8rJly EQ 3526 Chi f Rl'lt l ' U ubo Dlv I HS 0 ' I I 1016 '-- flii'itlliim 82 confrontations lasted for tiu ee more In the end 57 people were ki11ed and some 600 wounded More than 700 were arrested many prisoners were beaten and tortured to extract confessions that Western intelligence agencies were behind the demonstrations 181 U Secretary Dulles first learned of the uprising when his brother Allen telephoned on the evening of the 28111 o The secretary remarked When they begin to crack they can crack fast We have to keep the pressure on During a discussion with his staff the next morning about how to respond he emphasized the need to apply pressure on Soviet economic vulnerabilities because 'the Soviet economy is overextended they are trying to match and indeed surpass the U S military effort they are trying to increase their capital development they are trying to develop their foreign aid program He spoke of the need to take risks when going on the offensive Nothing is achieved he said that did not have some risk to it and we should not seek to make all our programs riskless 182 U Much as in 1953 the official U S response took the fonn of relatively mild public statements and an offer of food The State Depattment expressed shock at the shooting of people who had merely been expressing grievances extended sympathy to their families and noted that all free peoples will be watching the situation closely to see whether or not the Polish people will be allowed a government which will remedy the grievances which have brought them to a breaking point An offer by the U S Government to send food tlu ough the International Red Cross to alleviate the economic distress that had contributed to the outburst was rejected by the Polish Govemment Vice President BiOFWi r QPFT e 83 Richard Nixon made only brief public mention of the events saying they eloquently illustrate the modem type of colonial imperialism the Communists have imposed By voice vote the Senate approved a resolution expressing deep admiration for the people of Poznan the House unanimously urged that the Polish situation be brought before the United Nations 183 For Radio Free Europe the most important task according to an internal postmmtem had been to avoid encouraging listeners to engage in bloody but useless sacrifices but also to keep listeners froni feeling abandoned Its nan ow difficult course was to hearten but not incite sympathize but not deplore 18 q U Although U S propaganda had aimed at loosening control of the satellite governments over their populations and no doubt had some effect on the Polish people however difficult to measure the United States played no direct part in stimulating or prolonging the riots Its involvement was definitely less than it had been in East Germany in 1953 Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr told State officials the policy had always been that we take no action which would precipitate troubles behind the Iron Curtain which would lead directly to bloodshed All agencies had assured him that they had not violated this policy with regard to the Poznatl events An inter agency Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Jacob Beam had responsibility for coordinating on a day-to-day basis the U S Government's responses During the committee's discussion on 2 July the view was expressed that while such violence should be exploited in appropriate ways to call o On 8 June Eisenhower suffered an attack of ileitis an inflammation of the intestines and was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington D C On 30 Jtme he left the SECRET 't8ffi8Pft 84 attention to Soviet domination of the satellites it is U S policy not to incite abortive revolts Beam later told the OCB No open encouragement of additional rioting or revolts is being given but there is no discouragement of additional spontaneous demonstrations 185 U At the OCB meeting on 3 July both Hoover and Allen Dulles raised the possibility of discussing the riots in the United Nations Beam cautioned against this because it might be hannful to our long-term interest should these internal disturbances become a matter of discussion by a UN agency When Beam mentioned the idea to his committee he again expressed reservations commenting that the General Assembly probably would not take up the matter because few countries would support such a move However he said State would explore the possibility of bringing it before the Economic and Social Council and raising the entire satellite issue before the General Assembly when it convened in November 186 State also concluded that the Security Council would not inscribe the matter and if it did no favorable outcome would occur Other countries would view the riots as strictly an intemal Polish matter 187 U In communist countries the reaction to Poznat was along predictable lines Propaganda organs throughout the bloc blamed Westem instigation Pravda claimed that imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents taking advantage of certain economic difficulties incited serious disturbances and street disorders Soviet organs continued to harp on the Kersten amendment condemning the Senate's recent appropriation in the Mutual Security Act of an additional $25 million for subversive hospital and began a period of recuperation at his Gettysburg Pennsylvania farm He 9PQPfiii i Lf ' ' I EU I FUll Autkmt ' 'l J 26 Ch f Rroc r1 oo Oio hH' Date 1 1 JAN 2016 85 activities In fact the Senate had approved only $5 million in the form of grants to private organizations to maintain the will for freedom in Eastern Europe 188 U Echoing charges it had made after the 1953 uprising the East Getman communist press saw Allen Dulles as the mastem1ind behind the riots For evidence it cited his brother's ''well thought out statement for the American State Department on the happenings in Poznan almost before any news came out ofPoland 189 an apparent reference to the Secretary's 27 June news conference When asked a few weeks later about communist charges that the Kersten amendment authorized the subversion of foreig11 governments Secretary Dulles said Congress had taken no final action on the mutual security bill but whatever amount was appropriated would be used only for making known to the peoples of the world the good fiuits of a free society It is not going to be used for subversive activities as it is alleged 190 U It is difficult to say to what extent Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders believed that the United States instigated the riots Given to bluster Khrushchev complained a few weeks later to the Yugoslav ambassador about anti-Soviet elements in Poland Hungary and other satellites who were using Yugoslavia as a model for turning to the West and splitting the Soviet bloc Behind it all stood Dulles he said who had gone a lot further this time than was thought possible The Americans had incorrectly drawn the conclusion that the Soviet Union was weak We shall show them that they've made a great mistake 191 U - - ' OfJ '' 1FUll r ' -- f 1'3 Ch- 1 i- - LJ _ ' j ' 1 1o 'l' t o 1 Utl 0 ' 1' returned to Washington on 15 July SJiGPPYsr I 'I JC J ' JAN 2016 SF GMT 86 Fresh Ingredients By the summer of 1956 the reorientation of policy toward the Soviet bloc begun as far back as 1952 was well along In early June the NSC Platming Board had under consideration new policy papers calling for expanded East-West trade and more informational and cultural contacts with the communist world as well as a new overall policy paper on relations with the satellites 192 U Given the third major outbreak of anti-regime violence within the bloc in three years and especially viewed against the backdrop of growing political and cultural fetment in the satellites one would have thought further outbursts would be anticipated and planning begun for that contingency This was the conclusion of C L Sulzberger who lamented that the Westem powers despite the advice of many diplomatic experis had not coordinated their policies after the East German uprising to decide what to do if something like it reoccurred in Eastern Europe It was now an urgent necessity since a new wave of reactions hopes debates an possibly turbulence may again shiver through the orbit 193 U Before 1956 East Germany was the only country where U S planners thought disturbances might again break out though they regarded the probability slight even there Nevertheless the OCB in May 1955 had deemed it useful for planning purposes to consider what action the United States should initiate in the event of a mass uprising at some future date It noted that West Ge many's achievement of sovereignty and the Austrian State Treaty along with continued dissatisfaction over intemal economic and political conditions might eventually lead to such an uprising in East Germany The board noted that existing policy ruled out incitement to open revolt and restricted 'I@ I SM'f ' rSPI Ri iT 87 psychological warfare to the maintenance of the resistance potential of the East German population Given these limitations it recommended several weak diplomatic economic and propaganda measures including having RIAS and USIA extensively cover any disturbances that might break out A year later in May 1956 the OCB noted that comments on these proposals by the missions in Bonn and Berlin and subsequent developments had shovm certain of the recommendations to be impracticable 194 In short the East German effort produced little of significance And no record has been found that any contingency planning was done to cover the possibility of an uprising elsewhere in the Soviet bloc U Final consideration of the new East European paper coincided with the immediate aftermath of the Poznan riots The Planning Board approved without major changes State's draft and circulated it for discussion at the NSC's 12 July meeting Designated NSC 5608 the paper somewhat modified the statement of US basic objectives in Eastern Europe and redefined the general courses of action to bring them into confotmity with the present situation in Eastern Europe and with a more realistic assessment of US capabilities to effect developments in that area '' It recognized that the security apparatuses in the bloc countries made it difficult to conduct covert operations there and that specific operations required much time to prepare Because of recent setbacks it was 'of the utmost importance to proceed with extreme care in this field with a view to solid accomplishment for the long run The paper rejected two extremes either using military force to liberate the satellites or accepting Soviet control for an indefinite period Between them lay a large area for actions to weaken and eventually eliminate the Soviet hold But the paper cautioned that this would not happen in the near future 195 U 8 821 1 11 '- l '- o i U' 11-ULt l t 1 - ' r - o '' 21 _ o o I P' 'I- _I _I JAN 2016 88 At the 12 July meeting presided over by Vice President Nixon Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Dillon Anderson said the new paper reflected a shift in emphasis The old objective was to undetmine the regimes the new one to foster changes in them Anderson paused in his remarks to allow discussion of the paper's recommendation that the administration seek congressional approval for greater flexibility in using economic incentives with the satellites such as offering surplus agricultural commodities Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey argued that Congress which had been balking at other administration requests would never approve Supporting Humphrey Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson said he did not want to raise the standard of living in the satellites by providing surplus food thereby indirectly promoting their political stability and military power Secretary Dulles pointed out that the paper did not advocate trade with the satellites It merely wanted the U S Government to be able to make such an offer to a satellite government which it could not reject without putting pressure on the Soviet Union to match the offer If accepted the United States would gain political influence in that country It was more a question of political and economic warfare-1'gestures and feints in confi onting the communist bloc-- than of trade Dulles recalled that when we made our offer recently to the people of Poznan we never seriously thought that we would be able to provide food to these people Our main idea was to embarrass the Govenunent of Communist Poland When Nixon said he also agreed with Treasury's position Dulles replied that he had no intention for the present to go before Congress seeking such authority and would agree to delete the disputed language But if the situation later warranted it he would request such authority U t OB'ii'RET a 1 11 - U 'FUU_ AEGt ST 89 At Dulles's request they tumed to a paragraph in the paper calling for the United States to encourage the satellite peoples in passive resistance to their Soviet dominated regimes when this will contribute to minimizing satellite contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for desirable change In doing so the United States was to avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U S objectives Dulles considered this paragraph too negative in character and proposed adding the following clarifying statement In general however do not discourage by public utterances or otherwise spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime despite risks to individuals when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State and the Director of CIA on the basis of feasibility minimum risk and maximum contribution to the fundamental interests of the United States The situation had changed in Eastern Europe he believed and it might be quite useful for the United States to have some violent outbursts in the satellite countries Moreover we shouldn't necessarily be appalled by the fact that if such uprisings occurred a certain number of people would be killed After all one cannot defend or regain liberty without some inevitable loss oflife Dulles added that of course he did not want to have a lot of low-level officials running around and stirring up riots and uprisings in the satellite countries Only under exceptional circumstances and only after the most careful and cautious consideration at the very highest levels should such disturbances be encouraged U Nixon opposed any policy based on the view that essentially nothing could be done to change the status quo-an attitude he attributed to George Kennan He felt the Si Li f4 90 paper had such a tone it suggested that the United States should relax because it can do nothing to remedy the unhappy conditions in the satellites On the other hand Special Assistant William Jackson pointed out that the paper with conditions now more favorable for action in Eastern Europe allowed the United States to be more active short of violence Allen Dulles said that the new paper would not restrict the CIA in any way from carrying out activities already under way such as RFE broadcasts balloon operations support of exile groups and encouraging defection U Reverting to the concerns Nixon had expressed Secretary Dulles said that ce1tain language and the negative tone of a paragraph in the annexed staff study had greatly bothered him since it would prevent the United States from encouraging outbreaks like the 1953 East German uprising and the Poznan riots Sometimes umest of this smt and uprisings like these he said were an impmiant part of the way we have to play the game Nixon voiced agreement After all we are not saying that we are going to initiate uprisings and violence in the satellites We are merely saying that that we will not always discourage such uprisings and violence if the uprisings should occur spontaneously U The members generally agreed with Allen Dulles's expressed reservations about supporting national communism which he said might be ''very damaging to the democratic idealistic and religious people in the satellites who looked to the United States for guidance and ultimate relief He thought carefully selected assistance should be given to national communist movements ''in cetiain circumstances and ''very discreetly and perhaps only by covert means When Wilson expressed strong disapproval of support for any national communist movement Secretary Dulles q fjtj@f 1 1'1' -_' '- 1 ' '1- _ II JAN 2016 ji 8I i 91 explained that the objective was simply to loosen the ties between a satellite and the Soviet Union He did not advocate open support of national communist movements The Vice President added that from the point of view of domestic politics or of our international relations nothing would be worse than the occurrence of a leak tending to indic ate that we at the highest levels were agreeing on a policy for national communism under any circumstances Discussion then focused on ways to prevent leakage of the contents of the new paper which Foster Dulles called rather a rarity among our policy papers in that in this paper we were dealing with the offensive vis-it-vis the Soviet bloc rather than as usual dealing with the defensive The council finally decided to take out cetiain sensitive portions and include them along with Dulles's proposed additional statement in a limited distribution appendix 196 U One has to wonder whether those present felt freer to express themselves as they did because of Eisenhower's absence In any event on 18 July Eisenhower now back at the White House approved the amended paper NSC 5608 l after dire ting that the appendix stipulate that certain operations required the authorization of the the Secretary of State and the President and that it omit reference to the Director of Central Intelligence As approved the appendix was carefully hedged legalistic and vague The United States it stated should do the following 1 Avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U S objectives In general however do not discourage by public utterances or otherwise spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime despite risks to individuals when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President on the basis of feasibility iJFOPSWr ' o Oi ''1 o I Jf N 2016 OiiEJMT 92 minimum risk and maximum contribution to the basic U S objectives in NSC 5608 1 2 As a means of encouraging the eventual establishment of freely elected govemments in the satellites as a disruptive device and not as an end in itself be prepared on a case-by-case basis generally covertly and under appropriate policy guidance to assist nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from Soviet domination ando when U S and free world cohesion would not be jeopardized thereby 197 U NSC 5608 1 diverged from its predecessor NSC 174 in two seemingly contradictory ways It represented what the Planning Board had intended-a further shift toward an evolutionary approach what some like Nixon saw as a softer policy But its appendix was a move in the other direction--toward greater willingness to view bloodshed in the satellites as desirable and in ce1tain well-proscribed circumstances to undertake operations that might precipitate violence Although the Poznan riots came up only in passing during the 12 July discussion they likely contributed to the greater willingness of Secretary Du11es and others to embrace the latter approach This dual policy1 framed in a slightly different way than previously continued to reflect the underlying ambivalence in the U S attitude toward unrest in the region U The riots not only made an impression on Secretary Dulles but also on his brother A few days after the President approved the new policy the CIA Director repeated to a visitor the same sentiments the Secretary had expressed about the desirability of bloodshed in the satellites and that he himself had voiced at the 1952 Princeton meeting - o ' I 1 ' l l ot EURFGPiH oo 1 n _ o Li 1 1 JAN 21l 6 ''1o ' Io'' 93 I got very angry vith some of my people for not sending others after the June 171 1953 thing in Germany It would have been hon ible if people had gotten killed But the horrib Ie thing in that Czechoslovakian thing 1953 Plzeri riots was that nobody got killed I'd have felt much better about that and the Czechoslovakian people would have stood much higher in the world's estimation if there had been a thousand or ten thousand people killed in that We kill more people on the roads every day for no purpose They were killed in that Poznan affair You've got to take some risks and you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs 198 U The President may not have agreed Vhen the NSC met in September to consider revising policy toward East Germany this time with Eisenhower presiding a new draft paper had a special atmex with language virtually identical to that in the appendix to the East European paper The body of the paper called for encouraging passive resistance when this will contribute to minimizing East German contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for reunification1' and for fostering disaffection in the East German anned forces ' 1 Eisenhower and now Foster Dulles too expressed reservations If strikes or violence broke out said Dulles the communists could claim that the United States was responsible Eisenhower unsure whether passive resistance included strikes worried about encouraging the East Gennan people to run risks and incur reprisals when we are not actual1y in a position to help them He prefened to say that passive resistance should be encouraged so long as it did not involve reprisals against the population Special Assistant Jackson explained that passive resistance not violence was the objective the latter possibility was covered in the special annex Not satisfied Dulles argued that if the statement on passive resistance became known the communists might contend that the o In approving NSC 5608 1 Eisenhower directed that the words nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from Soviet domination and replace the words 'National Communist' movements that had been in NSC 5608 iiliJSi I ' -- I Li t_o 1 o c ' i ' - oo o' t JAN 2016 L f 0 94 United States had encouraged the kind of violence that had broken out in Poznatl Despite all the questioning no substantive changes occurred in the language The NSC decided merely to remove from the body of the paper statements about encouraging passive resistance among the general population and disaffection within the East German armed forces and add them to a limited distribution special a1mex 199 U Did the United States in the late summer and fall of 1956 carry out the kinds of activities in Eastem Europe and East Gennany-uoperations that might involve or lead to local violence -that the new NSC papers' annexes sanctioned Far from conclusive available documentation suggests that these kinds of operations did not take place U What the CIA apparently had in mind was a stepped-up propaganda campaign directed at the satellites At the same time that the Planning Board was drafting NSC 5608 the agency was developing its own new policy paper A Comprehensive Covert Plan for the Satellites 200 which apparently took a somewhat more aggressive line than the NSC paper The agency's Clandestine Services Division felt that the NSC effort did not adequately reflect the degree of change that had occurred within the satellites nor the real opportunities that the U S and other western powers may have to influence the direction of these changes and the resultant ferment which it believed the CIA paper ' more adequately covered OSP 1 4 e The CIA also prepared a new statement of policy governing the operations of the Free Europe Committee which it felt accorded with its own paper on Eastern Europe The statement noted that because political warfare depends upon contact with the enemy there is now a real oppmtunity to wage it in the satellites This oppmiunity is the more exploitable because of the many indications that events in the satellites are moving S FQPDT a DEClASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Records Daelass Dlv WHS '' 1 1 JAN 2016 95 more rapidly than the leaders expected or were fully prepared to cope with The paper defined FEC's major objectives as inducing the people and elites of the captive nations to seek 1 freedom from Soviet control over their internal and extemal affairs in the latter case to the extent that it could be brought about by neutralization on the Austrian or Firmish model with the resulting withdrawal of these nations from the 'Warsaw Pact and 2 freedom to fonn non-military regional agreements or federations and eventually either directly or through regional units to negotiate entry into all-Eumpean non-military organizations or into an ali-European federation or confederation 202 No mention was made of encouraging violence on a small-scale or even widespread passive resistance U OSP 1 4 C Another reason for doubting that the CIA tried to incite violence in Eastern Europe is that the agency still had little means to do Yet a myth has arisen perhaps derived in part from communist propaganda about the Kersten amendment that the CIA was training thousands of East European emigres in the West during the 1950s to invade their homelands and ove1ilu ow the communist regimes The notion gained credibility when retired CIA official James Angleton in 1976 spgpsw DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Deoless Dlv WHS Dotoo 1 1 JAN 2016 96 told a rep011er that this had been the case Many scholarly accounts subsequently swallowed the story One based on further information apparently supplied by Angleton claimed that the Poznan riots were viewed as ushering in a wave of national uprisings in Eastern Europe with the support of a CIA operation called RedS ox Red Cap That summer and fall so the story went the CIA carried out plans for uprisings in Hungary Czechoslovakia and Rumania Red Sox Red Cap groups like latter day Trojan Horse forces one account declared were inserted into those nations' capitals and plans were made final for the 'freedom fighters' to throw off the evil yoke of communism '' 204 In fact Red Sox and Red Cap were two separate programs that focused on the Soviet Union Neithel' had anything to do with tmining paramilitary groups to overthrow East European governments 205 U Despite Republican campaign rhetoric in 1952 and Democratic efforts to make it seem more bellicose than it was the Eisenhower administration did not pursue a more aggressive policy than Truman's toward the East European satellites Fmmer Secretary of State Acheson for one believed that the policies of the two administrations did not essentially differ -only the words did British Ambassador Roger Makins recalled that Eisenhower entered office apparently committed to a policy of liberating the satellites Following a relaxation of tension the liberation policy soon appeared almost indistinguishable from that of'containment ' George Kennan said much the same thing but gave it a personal twist He considered Foster Dulles in effect a closet version of himself though he did not use that word If the two men disagreed on what should be said publicly on such nmtters as liberation of the Eastern European countries Kennan ShCI to 97 felt they did not differ on what should be done practically Dulles knew that he would have no choice but to follow my line Beyond the practical constraints he thought that there was great intimacy of thought between them that 'we understood each other better than anyone else did Dulles differed with him publicly in Kennan's view because he was concerned about how Republicans in the Senate viewed him and went too far in his public comments to please them 206 U Though the administration's ambivalent public rhetoric has drawn the most scrutiny there was also a fuzziness in the language of its and the Truman administration's internal deliberations Vhat exactly was meant by statements with the 1944 Warsaw uprising often in mind that the United States should not suppm1 premature or abortive uprisings Were only successful uprisings to be supported or were the words merely a way to describe a do-nothing policy Two months into the Eisenhower administration a PSB staff member expressed concem that such talk meant 207 the latier what he derisively called dynamic passivi1y Perhaps the closest anyone came to defining premature was when Eisenhower in discussing the possibility of aiding the East German insurgents in June 1953 observed that upheavals within the Soviet empire would have to spread and also occur in China or the Soviet Union before the United States would actively intervene The heyday of CIA activity in Eastem Europe did not come during the Eisenhower administration but in the period 1949-52 By 1952 a scaling back of the agency's efforts had already begun If Eisenhower's policy proved less aggressive than Truman's it was in large pat1 because of the relaxed international climate fostered by Stalin's death the Austrian treaty the Geneva summit and Khrushchev's secret speech ' C' f oo ' 1 f I 'I ' o o I ' ' 11 JAN 0 6 'H gFGQJiF T 98 Tmman likely would have responded to these events in much the same way as Eisenhower did U Throughout both administrations official policy looked with disfavor on the direct pr motion of violence that might lead to bloodbaths Eisenhower seemed parlicularly anxious to avoid this Privately however such key figures as the Dulles brothers and C D Jackson expressed the opinion that a little bloodshed creating martyrs to Soviet repression would be a good thing U Disappointed by the poor results achieved in stirring satellite unrest the Eisenhower administration felt limited as Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover explained in March 1956 to 'playing for the breaks' and doing our best to maintain the morale of the populations of the satellite states 208 By the summer and early fall of 1956 the policy of improvising and muddling through had proved on the face of it almost successful though the degree to which its statements and actions influenced events within those countries is debatable It is striking that the administration having concluded that organized resistance had vit1ually been eliminated ignored the possibility of another large-scale uprising despite concerns expressed by high CIA officials and others that lack of platming for that eventuality would leave the United States unprepared as it had been in June 1953 to take advantage of new opportunities to loosen Soviet control over the satellites This is indeed what happened in the fall of 1956 when the pot boiled over more than expected and Hungarians incredibly by theif own force of anns almost managed to overthrow their communist regime U SECRET ' o- o 1 ' f ' _ 1 1 JAN 2016 99 I Hersh berg James B Conant 660 U 2 For the intemal debates within the Truman administration see Corke US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy and Callanan Covert Action in the Cold War 15-69 U 3 The best treatement of Jackson's service as Eisenhower's Special Assistant is Brands Cold Warriors 117-37 U Cook in First Comes the Lie U and Declassified Eisenhower U and Evica in A Certain Arrogance 164 87 U exaggerate Jackson's influence Vhile disagreeing in certain respects with Cook's analysis lngimundarson Containing the Offensive generally accepts her portrayal of Jackson's part in shaping policy toward Germany U See also O'Gonnan The One Word the Kremlin Fears U and Stem Propaganda in the Employ of Democracy U 4 Kovrig Myth of Liberation and his updated Of Walls and Bridges U were pioneer efforts See also Borhi Rollback Liberation Containment or Inaction U Hixson Parting the Curtain U Tudda Truth Is Our Weapon U Grose Operation Rollback U Lucas Freedom's War U Krebs Dueling Visions U and Mitrovich Undermining the Kremlin U 5 For example see lvie Eisenhower as Cold Warrior U Osgood Total Cold War U and Chernus Apocalypse Management U 6 NSC 58 2 United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe 8 Dec 49 FRUS 1949 5 42-44 50 U 8M@ IK3fl o j 'I 'I - -- D le I I JI N 21l16 ' 1 7 ili@fH31 a 100 Karelekas History of the Central Intelligence Agency 41M43 U Wamer ed CIA under Hany Truman xxv U memo Joyce for Matthews 31 Dec 52 FRUS 1950-55 intelligence Community 387-92 quote U 8 Regarding the campaign and particularly the debate over policy toward Eastern Europe see Divine Foreign Policy and U S Presidential Elections 1952MJ960 122-29 and Kovrig Myth of Liberation I 06-20 U 9 Princeton rntg verbatim transcript 10 May 52 3M4 30 Jackson quotes atchd to ltr Galanti ere to Jackson 6 Jun 52 Doc CK31 00249445 DDRS U I 0 Rostow Europe Jifler Stalin 39-41 U Morgan comments mins PSB Staff mtg 12 May 52 Doc CK31 000059628 DDRS U Princeton mtg verbatim transcript afternoon session I 0 May 52 Doc CK31 00249335 ibid U draft suml 1ary of Princeton mtg atchd to ltr Galantiere to Jackson 9 Jun 52 15 Doc CK31 00249445 ibid quote U For the final text of the group's suggested statement see Rostow Europe Ajler Stalin 134-35 U 11 In April 1952 Jackson wrote to an Eisenhower aide at NATO complaining about the failings of U S psychological warfare planning and that he intended to gather a group to develop a Plan for the USA based on the assumption that Psych war can be successful He learned that his letter had been shown to Eisenhower who had expressed the wish to receive a copy of whatever plan the group developed ltrs Jackson to Biddle 17 Mar 52 and Biddle to Jackson 17 Apr 52 fldr Biddle Anthony J Drexel Mrs box 35 Jackson Papers DDEL U '' _ 1 F'J L 5 CRET ' -- o 'j 1 I JAN 2016 o I ' 101 12 A Policy of Boldness Life 9 May 52 146-60 passim U According to a picture caption 148 Dulles wrote the article a fortnight before publication 13 Dulles War or Peace 242 U 14 Republican Party platform 10 Jul 52 and Democratic Patty platform 24 Jul 52 New York Times II 25 Jul52 respectively U 15 Section 101 a I ofP L 165 Mutual Security Act ofl951 10 Oct 51 65 Stat 373 The act as fmther amended is in American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1950-55 2 3059-86 U Regarding Soviet bloc reaction to the Kersten amendment see Mastny Cold War and Soviet Insecurity 119-20 U 16 New York Times 14 Aug 52 ltr Stevenson to Truman 23 Aug 52 quoted in Greene The Crusade 188 U desp 402 Washington to For Off 21 Aug 52 FO 462 6 Confidential Print United States of America NAK U 17 New York Times 26 Aug 52 U 18 HaJTirnan and Dulles delivered addresses on successive days at the annual convention in Buffalo of the American Political Science Association Summaries of their remarks are ibid 27 28 Aug 52 U 1_9 Stevenson quoted in desp 903 Saving Washington to For Off FO 462 6 Foreign Office Confidential Print United States of America NAK U Hamtramck address l Sep 52 Major Campaign Speeches 53-56 U Grand Rapids address I Sep 52 Johnson ed Papers f Adlai E Stevenson 4 65-68 quote 66 U San Francisco address 9 Sep 52 ibid 82 U For the text of Truman's speech at Parkersburg West Virginia _ on 2 September see New York Times 3 Sep 52 U iiJFGPET c _ o l t JJ o o t f- __ o i C ' L -o - Ll'l a' f -'AN 200i Io I I MEIV l 20 102 New York Times 7 Sep 52 U Hartford address 18 Sep 52 Johnson ed Papers ofAdlai E Stevenson 4 97 U 21 Adams Firsthand Report 88 U Sosnkowski memo of conv with Eisenhower 30 Oct 52 Sosnkowski Materialy Historyczne 372-73 U New York Times 6 9 Nov 52 U 22 Ibid 16 Jan 53 U SFRC Hearing Nomination ofJohn Foster Dulles 5 Jan 53 13-18 24-27 U interv Livingston Merchant by Philip Crowl 13 Mar-17 Apr 55 33-34 JFDOHP PU U interv Robert Bowie by Richard Challencr I 0 Aug 64 47 ibid U Eisenhower diary entry 14 May 53 Galambos et al eds Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower 14 224 U 23 Paper Summary of a Report from the Central Intelligence Agency I Aug 52 Annex D to PSB D-30 FRUS 1950-55 intelligence Community 3 5 U memrcd Morgan 10 Jul52 Doc CK31003112 9 DDRS U Mickelson America's Other Voice 86 U Lindsay's repm1 of 17 September 1952 to the DCI on his European trip has not been found It is referred to and sumtnarized in memos to the Chief P P from Helms of 18 September and from Hulick of 6 his ideas into a long paper entitled HA Program for the Development of New Cold War Instruments dated 3 March 1953 that he submitted to Dulles under cover of a memo of23 April 1953 sanitized text of Lindsay's 3 March paper is Doc CK3100527646 DDRS U Gliilf f' DEClASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records D etaas Dtv WHS Daleo 1 I JltN 20 6 C r P 1 '-' oso l 'l C 103 24 Lukes Rudolf Slansky Affair 160-87 also McDetmott 'Polyphony of 25 Polish Press Agency communique 28 Dec 52 in Polish People's Republic Documents on the Hostile Policy of the United Stares Government 204 40 U Rositzke CIA 's Secret Operations 170 U Grose Rollback 176-79 U Aldrich Hidden Hand 164-67 U Bagley Spy Wars 118-29 See also CIA WiN's operations and contacts with the British in the early postwar period see DoiTil M 6 249-63 U C I I I ' 26 27 Little if anything has been written about covert operations conducted independently against Albania by Italy Greece and Yugoslavia Regarding the jMOiWiT DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authooty EO 13526 Chief Records Decless Dlv WHS Date 1 1 JAN 2016 - oo -' -- -- - - 104 Anglo-American effmis the fullest treatment is Bethell Betrayed U See also Aldrich Hidden Hand 160-65 U Winks Cloak and Gown 394-403 U Prados Sq efor Democracy 58-64 U Grose Rollback 154-63 Verrier Through the Looking Glass 66-77 U Powers Man Who Kept the Secrets 44-45 U and Felix McCargar Short Course in the Secret War 280-87 U Some secondary accounts border on fantasy For example Moseley claims without citing a source that the British and the Americans in April 1950 infiltrated an mmy of 500 Albanian emigres from across the Greek border of which 200 were killed upon mival and another 120 captured and executed Dulles 278 U For the insistence that the operation was a probe see interview of James McCargar by Charles Stuart Kennedy 18 Apr 95 24 FAOHC U 28 For British-Albanian relations during and shortly after World War II see Dorril 11116 354-65 U For the U S -Albanian fruitless negotiations see Peters Albania US Position on Recognition U and Costa Albania 111-28 U CIA operation was codenamed 29 BGFJEND the British operation VALUABLE U 30 C r - - 1- c Jeffery Secret History q M 6 712-14 extract red ofmlg between Acheson and Bevin 14 Sep 49 FO 371 78218 Foreign Office General Con'espondence NAK U 31 '' Bethell Betrayed 71 87 U Pearson Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy 374-78 U Jeffery Secret His Oiy ofM 6 715 states that 29 men not 20 were j GPEW a DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chlaf Racord l D class Dlv WHS Dale' - - -' - ' r ft JAN 20 I 105 put ashore and that one group of five was killed and another group repmied missing 32 33 ORE 71-49 Current Situation in Albania IS Dec 49 I CIA website U See also ltr King Belgrade Embassy to Rumbold For Oft 5 May 50 and draft ltr Rumbold to King nd PO 371187508 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U 34 Bethell Betrayed 168-70 U 35 Assembly President 19 Nov 51 FO 371 95027 Foreign Office General Cmrespondence NAK U 36 NIE-42 The Current Situation in Albania with Particular Reference to Greek Yugoslav and Italian Interests 20 Nov 51 fldr NIE 42-51 box 3 Enhy 1373 N Es SEs and SN Es RG 59 NACP U An excised text is on the CIA website 37 Bethell Betrayed 175-76 U o ' ' c 38 ORElia DECLASSIFIED IN PART AU honly EO 13526 Chlaf Records Declas s Dlv WHS I I JAN 2016 Dalo o - o _ - - -- _ - - '' _ -_ '' 106 39 40 NIE 42 1 Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania 20 Oct 52 fldr NIE 42 1-52 box 3 Entry 1373 N Es SEs and SN Es RG 59 NACP U SE-34 Consequences of an Attempt to Overthrow the Present Regime in Albania 30 Dec 52 fldr SE-34 box 2 ibid U Partially declassified copies of the estimates are on the CIA website U 41 DoiTil M 6 399-400 U 42 43 Front 5 U Tomek's study furnished the basic materials for a November 2009 exhibition in Prague organized jointly by the U S Embassy and the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regin1es 44 45 Memo Erskine for DepSecDef 6 Jul 53 with atchd draft memo for ServSecs et al fldr Chrono box 13 Special Operations Files Ace 63A-1575 RG 330 WNRC DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Records Daclass Dlv WHS Doto _ 't 'f WI 1 116 ' ' ' sl tkfi 4 46 107 PSB D 24 Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power 1 Nov 52 FRUS 1952-54 8 1059-60 U See also Stevens' memo for Morgan 21 January 1953 transmitting State's suggestions for instructions for U S official output in the period immediately following Stalin's death ibid 1071-73 U 47 Memo Jackson for Pres 2 Apr 53 f1dr Eisenhower Dwight D Correspondence 1953 2 box 50 Jackson Papers DDEL U Regarding the prolonged drafting of the speech see Hughes Ordeal of Power 100-15 U and his diary entries for the period 5 March-18 April in box 5 Hughes Papers PU U See also Rostow Europe Ajler Stalin 38-60 102-10 U 48 Rostow's supporting thinking for 151 draft ofmsg to Soviet Govenunent and Russian peoples 6 Mar 53 Rostow Europe After Stalin 89 U 49 Memo Nitze for SecState 2 Apr 53 fldr Pres 's Speech Apr 1953 1 box 1 Draft Conespondence and Speech series John Foster Dulles Papers DDEL U 50 Diary entries 11 and 12 Apr 53 fldr Diary 1953-1957 box 5 Hughes Papers PU U 51 Address 11The Chance for Peace 16 Apr 53 Eisenhower Public Papers 1953 179-88 quotes 185 187 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chlaf Records Deolass Dlv WHS aii'iMP - t _ ' o ' -- - o '' I I JAN 2016 - o -- - MEl I 52 108 Address The First 90 Days 18 Apr 53 Department of State Bulletin 27 Apr 53 603-08 U Gardner Poisoned Apples 85-86 U diary entry 3 Jun 53 Sulzberger Long Row of Candles 877 U 53 PSB D-40 Plan for PsychOlogical Exploitation of Stalin's Death 23 Apr 53 Doc CK3100141169 DDRS U 54 Chronological account of Dulles's background talk not for attribution at Overseas Writers' luncheon 3 Apr 53 CIA-RDP-00058R00010051-3 4 7 55 56 Mickelsen America's Other Voice 86 U Puddington Broadcasting Freedom 56 U Special Guidance No 8 16 Apr 53 CIA website U 57 Regarding the VFC and its predecessors see Brands A Cold War Foreign Legion U Carruthers Between Camps U and Carafano Mobilizing Europe's Stateless U 58 Ltr Erskine to Anders 30 Jul54 fldr Chrono box 13 Special Operations Files Ace 63A-1575 WNRC C ltrs Erskine to Allen Dulles 10 Jan 55 U and 24 May 55 C both in fldr Chrono box 12 ibid 59 PSB D-3 I A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 1015 26 Nov 52 FRUS Intelligence Community 1950-55 379 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART 'FGPFr Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records D roless Dlv WHS Date 1 1 JAN 1016 - ' o ' - 09 'J ZICE 11 60 61 62 In early May strikes by workers in tobacco factories in southern Bulgaria led to rioting that governmental negotiations with the strikers quickly defused See Kramer 11Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle Pt 1 15-17 U and a report on the disturbance in Plovdiv 7 May 53 Ostennann Uprising in East Germany 1953 86-89 U 63 McDermott Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia 291-92 296-97 U Ulc Pilsen 47 U Smula Party and Proletariat 168-69 U RFE rpt 8 Sep 53 Ostennann ed Uprising in East Germany 130 U Kramer ' 1Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle Pt 1 17-22 U See also the report from British Ambassador Ketmode in Prague to Prime Minister Churchill 23 Jun 53 FO 470 7 Foreign Office Confidential Print Czechoslovakia NAK DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonly EO 13526 Chief R _wrcts Declass Dlv WHS Oat ' I if dlfN 2016 -- o _ ' o -- I I0 BliGUiilt 64 Office of Evaluation and Review Daily Intelligence Abstracts No 25 9 Jun 53 fldr PSB 350 5 Intelligence Abstracts 3 box 25 PSB Central FilesDDEL U 65 English translations of early Gennan accounts of the uprising include Baring Uprising In East Germany U Brant East German Rising U and Hildebrandt Explosion U For a review of works that appeared at the time of the 50 111 anniversary see Sperber 17 June 1953 Revisiting a Getman Revolution'' U See Stebbe The SED German Communism and the June 1953 Uprising ' for a review of other recent literature U 66 HI COG Daily Radio Digest No 12I covering Soviet and Soviet-controlled Gennan-language broadcasts of24 June fldr R AS Official Reports box 1 Ewing Collection Marshall Library U See also the repprt prepared by Rutgers University's Department of Sociology Soviet Reporting on the East German Uprisings U East German spy chief Markus Wolf recalled that one of his agents inside the U S military mission reported that Allen and Eleanor Dulles carne to the city just before the uprising Wolf Man Without a Face 63 U As an enclosure to a letter of27 June Allen Dulles sent his brother and sister transcripts of various European radio broadcasts r_epeating the claim that he along with Eleanor had been in Berlin during the uprisings In the letter he said You may be amused at the radio broadcasts-----Communist and other-with regard to family matters and Berlin fldr Berlin June 12-23 1953 box 31 Eleanor SRCPET bECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13526 Chlaf Records Declass Dlv WHS Pti IP - ' 1 1 JAN 2016 ' ' o lll 67 See the statement by Chairman of the Polish delegation at the UN General Assembly Wierblowski 20 Oct 51 detailing the origins of the alleged ''Plan X in Documents on the Hostile Policy ofthe United States Government 197-99 U 68 Telcon Dulles and Wisner 12 Jun 54 Microfilm Reel 2 Dulles Herter Telephone Conversations U 69 PSB D-21 A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Ge1many 9 Oct 52 FRUS 1952-54 7 370-80 1st quote 375 U A more complete but still sanitized text is Doc CK3100140576 DDRS 2d quote 9-1 0 U 70 71 72 The Soviet Commandant in Berlin General Vassiliy Chuikov complained about the activities of these organizations in a letter to U S High Commissioner Walter Donnelly 1 October 1952 Department of State Bulletin 1 Dec 52 861-62 U Donnelly's reply of 1 December rejected Chuikov's charges as baseless and a travesty of the facts American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1950-55 1742 il GDW DECLASSIFIED lti PAR1' Authority EO 13526 Chlaf Records Decli IIIS Dlv WHS oatoo - ' ' ' ' ooo - o ' 0 - ' ' 1 1 JAN 20 6 -- - - _ _ - 112 M CI i Bailey Battleground Berlin 107-08 U and Smith Kidnap City 98-106 U 73 Uf - 1 '1 c c 74 Interv Ewing by Brewster Chamberlin and Jurgen Wetzel 18 May 81 38-40 box 1 Ewing Collection Marshall Library U An extract of the interview in German is in Spittmann and Fricke 17 Juni 1953 212-15 U 75 Fischer Two Days that Shook the Soviet World 15 U Oste1mann The United States the East German Uprising of1953 and the Limits ofRollback 14 U For a brief survey of the published literature on RIAS's role in the uprising see Schlosser 'Berlin Radio War 76 198 99 n 2 U Jackson said that nobody foresaw the uprising neither G 2 nor CIA nor Mayor Reuter nor his incredible intelligence se1vice in Berlin Address U S Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania 8 Oct 53 14 War College Lectures USAMHI U 77 Office of Current Intelligence Survey of Unrest in Eastern Europe 13 Jun 53 CIA-RDP9JTO 1172R0002003 100019-7 CREST NACP U 78 RFE Guidance No 12 The Change of Communist Line in Eastern Germany 11 Jun 52 and unsigned paper Analysis of Soviet Policy and Current Developments in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia 12 Jun 53 atchd to ltr Caesar to Jackson 15 Jun 53 fldr RFE box 5 Jackson Papers DDEL U Caesar SilOM T a DECLASSIFIED IN PARl Authonty EO 13526 Chief Records Decless Dlv WHS Data - --- --- - --- f f JAN 2016 re et t 113 mentioned that Jackson saw the two papers at a meeting with RFE staff on I 3 June He said that the results of the meeting were terrific and that RFE was hard at work this moming implementing your decisions U See also the quoted extracts from Phenix memo 18 Jun 53 in Puddington Broadcasting Freedom 56-57 U 79 1nterv with Gerard Ger1 by G Lewis Schmidt 30 Dec 88 2 FAOHC U Hildebrandt Explosion 49 U Browne History and Programming Policies of RIAS 282-87 U Schlosser Berlin Radio War 209 U 80 Rpt Sokolovskii Semyonov and Yudin 24 Jun 53 in Ostermann Uprising in East Germany 259 U Baring Uprising in East Germany 39 U Smith Germany Beyond the Wall 225 U ltr Rose to Johnston 23 Jun 53 FO 371 103842 Foreign Office General Conespondence NAK U Regarding the activities of the West German organizations at the time of the uprising see Rexin Zur Rolle Westdeutschlands und West Berlin am 16 17 Juni 1953 84-91 U and Hagen DDR-Juni '53 87-88 U 81 Fischer Two Days that Shook the Soviet World 15 U Pactor 'Unintended Consequences 5 U Other studies ofRlAS's role include Browne History and Programming Policies ofR AS 283-95 U and Knabe 17 Juni 1953 124-30 U 82 Schlosser Berlin Radio War 217-22 U Ewing interview 47-49 cited inn 74 U interv Karl Mautner by Thomas Dunnigan 12 May 93 8 FAOHC U Hulick was the Chief of the Political Division Eastern Element HICOG Berlin SERPFT a mCICE iL 114 and later became the Deputy Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State March 1954-August 1956 FRUS 1952-54 7 xvi FRUS 195055 Intelligence Community xxvi U 83 Brant East German Rising 67 U Ostermann Uprising in East Germany 14 U O'Donnell Led a Riot Against the Reds 28-29 92 U Fischer Two Days that Shaak the Soviet World 14-16 21 22 25-27 U 84 New York Times 8 Oct 12 Nov 52 U Browne ''History and Programming Policies ofRIAS 90 U memo Connors for Smith 28 May 53 FRUS 1952-54 7 1576-78 U rpt to Pres by Cmte on 1ntemational1nfo Activities 30 Jun 53 FRUS 1952-54 2 1828-29 U Dale ' Like Wildfire' 115 n 39 U Hildebrandt Explosion 75 U memo East Germany 6 Jul 54 6-8 Doc CK3100523615 DDRS U L fetime 85 Ge11 interv 2 cited inn 79 U Dulles Chances ofa 253 U 86 Interv Ewing 53 67 cited inn 74 U interv Klaus Bolling Berliner Zeitung 14 Jun 03 U interv Gert 2 cited in n 79 U 87 Ltr Olver to Hope 19 Jun 53 FO 371 103842 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U Commenting on the letter the Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner for Germany did not consider that the mild encouragement which may have been given to the East Berlin demonstrators once the demonstration had started bears any comparison with the grotesque accusations of Western provocation ltr Chancery Wahnerheide to Central Dept For Off 23 Jun 53 ibid U FCBW no r _ ' ' 1 ED ' 'FULL 1 ull mtv - IJ 26 C h f I C sr Dt d G _ Di' - 'HS Date 11 JAN 1016 J f 9 25Ja 88 115 New York Times 22 Jun 53 U telcon McCloy and Dulles 23 Jun 53 II 10 am Microfilm Reel I Dulles Herter Telephone Conversations U New York Times 27 Jun 53 ltr Stone to Ewing 21 lui 53 fldr RIAS Gordon Ewing Letters box 1 Ewing Collection Marshall Library U 89 lnterv Cecil Lyon by John Bovey 26 Oct 88 17 FAOHC U interv Karl Mautner 8 cited inn 82 U 90 For example see NSC 132 1 United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin 12 Jun 52 and notes of 4 1 mtg Ad Hoc Berlin Cmte 30 Jun 52 FRUS 1952-54 7 1261-69 1275-77 U and PSB D-21 2 National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin 3 Feb 53 Doc CK3100140396 DDRS U 91 Berlin Command Historical Report 1 Jan 1953 to 30 Jun 1954 encl w memo McLaughlin to CINCEUR I Dec 54 81 box 325 U S Army Berlin Collection USAMHI U interv Conant by Gordon Craig 11 Jul 64 21 JFDOHP PU U interv Lyon 17 cited inn 89 U 92 Interv Martha Mautner by Thomas Dunnigan 7 Nov 95 5 FAOHC U interv Conant 21-22 cited inn 91 U For the British response to the uprising see Lall'es ''Preserving Law and Order U 93 Verbatim mins 6111 and i 11 Extraordinary Commandants mtgs 17 Jun 11 15 am and 5 01 pm FO 1112 60 Allied Kommandatura Directives Minutes and Papers NAK U 1 ' ' ' - ' l ' LD I i OllilT FULL AU lflty ' i3 2G Ch1 of 1' ec r _ Ui'' 'H Date 1 1 JAN 2016 116 94 Verbatim min 6' Extraordinary mtg 17 Jun 53 cited inn 93 U tel 1670 Berlin to State 17 Jun 53 in Ostermann ed Uprising in East Germany 194-95 U 95 Financial Appendix NSC 540411 I Dec 53 FRUS 1952-54 7 1394 U Berlin Command Historical Report 91 cited inn 86 U 96 Interv Ewing 53 cited inn 74 U min B E to Strang 17 Jun 53 FO 371 103849 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U 97 Tel119 Berlin to For Off 18 Jun53 FO 371 103839 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U tell28 Berlin to For Off 19 Jun 53 FO 3711103840 ibid U NIE 12 4-54 Probable Developments in East Germany Through 1955 22 Jan 54 3 CIA website U 98 Te1s 559 and 564 Wahnerheide Ward to For Off 20 and 22 Jun 53 ibid U 99 Powers Man Who Kept tl1e Secrets 46 U 100 Stockton Flawed Patriot 46-47 U 101 Extract working paper Eastern Affairs Division Berlin Element HI COG 25 Jun 53 FRUS 1952-54 7 1594-95 U The printed extract of the working paper sent to State as an attachment to a despatch of 10 August omits 16 pages of background and discussion The author was unable to locate the full text of the working paper the dispatch or any of its attaclunents in the cited decimal file in RG 59 at NACP or __ - li ''I FULL A ll ' 'i ' r- l 2G Ch ' h co_ _ - o - Jc Div ' JH s iliGRW Dote 1 I JAN 2016 iFGiiT 102 117 r News conf 17 Jun 53 10 30 am Eisenhower Public Papers 1953 440 U desp 540 Washington to FO 20 Jun 53 FO 462 7 Foreign Office Confidential Print United States of America NAK U I 03 Memo Straus for Phillips 17 Jun 53 fldr Germany box 3 Jackson Records DDEL U 104 Memo of informal PSB mtg 17 Jun 53 fldr PSB 337 Minutes box 24 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U entry 17 Jun 53 fldr Log-1953 2 box 68 Jackson Papers DDEL U Powers Man Who Kept the Secrets 46 U I 05 Memo of disc I 50th NSC mtg 18 Jun 53 Doc CK310p504727 DDRS U Extracts are in FRUS 1952-54 7 1586-90 U and more fully in Ostennann ed Uprising in East Germany 225-31 U See also log entry 18 Jun 53 fldr Log1953 2 box 68 Jackson Papers DDEL U 106 Draft rpt PSB D-45 ttlnterim U S Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe 22 Jun 1953 Doc CK 3100099744 DDRS U address U S A1my War College Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania 8 Oct 53 cited inn 76 U mins PSB staffmtg 22 Jun 53 fldr PSB 337 Staff Meetings 1 box 24 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U log entry 22 Jun 53 fldr Log-1953 2 box 68 Jackson Papers DDEL U 107 Log entry 25 Jun 53 ibid U Sanitized texts ofthe memo of the NSC discussion of the satellite issue at its 25 June meeting are in FRUS 1952-54 8 65-69 U and Ostemmnn ed Uprising in East Germany 329-31 U Briefing notes for Allen Dulles's use at the meeting are Doc CIA-RDP80R01443R00010024000l-5 'Rillf a ' ' - r ru '' 1 1-'t LL 1 l l 'rl C' _ G23 Cll f l' n l 'v OI' '- H-S ' I I JAN 20 6 3EGRSTn 118 CREST NACP U For NSC 158 United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States 29 June 1953 see Ostermann ed Uprising in East Germany 332-34 U A heavily excised text of the PSB's longer report PSB D-45 Interim U S Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe which the PSB approved at its infmmal meeting on I July is Doc CK3100088772 DDRS U 108 NSC 158 29 Jun 53 cited inn 107 U 109 Memo Enyart for Morgan 23 Jun53 fldr PSB 091 4 Eastern Europe I box 15 PSB Central Files NSC Staff Papers DDEL U 110 News conf 30 Jun 53 American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1950-1955 2 1745-46 U 111 News conf 1 lui 53 Eisenhower Public Papers 1953 463 468-69 U 112 Entry 13 Jul 56 tldr Diary 1953-1957 box 5 Hughes Papers PU U 113 Notes on Visit to Camp Sheltering Demonstrators of June 16 and 17 20 Jun 53 fldr Germany and Berlin 1951-1953 box 12 Eleanor Lansing Dulles Papers DDEL U 114 Tel4 State to Prague repeated to Warsaw Budapest and Bucharest 6 Jul53 FRUS 1952-54 8 69 U For the responses dated between 7 and 9 Jul 53 see ibid 70-74 U 115 Diaryntry 10 Ju1 53 fldr Diary 1953-1957 box 5 Hughes Papers PU U 7 1 H @MIT 1 -r l t ' '' - L L1 I FL c I Aull Jrrt ' i n Ch 'f 1 e o i l Date f j 2 Jis ' _ 19 e fi WPnFT 116 For the food relief program see Ingimundarson The Eisenhower Administration the Adenauer Goverrunent and the Political Uses of thee East German Uprising in 1953 ' 394 409 U 117 Memo Czechoslovakia-Guidance No 10 30 Jun 53 summarized and quoted in Holt Radio Free Europe 147-49 U paper Walker PROSPERO Preliminary RepOI1 21 Jul 53 w atchd banknote and leaflet texts fldr Balloons box 2 Jackson Records DDEL U Puddington Broadcasting Freedom 63-64 U Johnson Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 51-52 U I 18 Memo Barnes for Chief Ops DD P 5 Aug 119 Memo Helms for Dep Dir Plans 6 Aug 53 memo Wisner for DDI 8 Aug 53 120 Memo Thurston for Merchant 11 Sep 53 fldr Chiefs of Mission Meeting Vietma Sept 1953 box 32 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for Eumpean Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U memo Bross for DC 2 Oct 121 Memo Godel for DepSecDef 29 Jun 53 fldr Chrono box 13 Special Operations Files Ace 63A-l575 122 WNRC Paper A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force 'C' of Project Solarium on a Course of Action Which the United States Might Presently or in the Future Undertake with Respect to the Soviet Power Bloc Alternative 'C' SOL- sse NT DECLASSIFIED IN PARl Authonly EO 13526 Chief Recorda Daclass Dlv WHS Date 'o - -- - - -- -- I I JAN 201 01 0RQT 20 TF C-1 158-59 fldr Project Solarium TFC 5 box 9 Subject Subseries NSC Files DDEL 123 Kennan and Goodpaster comments 27 Feb 88 Pickett ed George F Kennan and the Origins of Eisenho wer 's New Look 20 24 log entry 16 Jul 53 fldr Log-1953 2 box 68 Jackson Paper's DDEL U A good treatment of the Solarium exercise is Immerman John Foster Dulles 60-74 U 124 Allen Dulles remarks memo of disc 57' NSC mtg 30 Jul 53 FRUS 1952-54 2 435-36 U 125 Address 8 Oct 53 cited inn 76 U 126 Memo Jackson fat Smith 16 Nov 53 copies to Cutler and Staats fldr Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and US Policy Towards 3 box 7 Special Staff File Series NSC Staff Papers DDEL U Jackson also apparently sent a copy to Allen Dulles 127 Draft memo Hirsch Taquey Comstock Jackson for OCB 3 Nov 53 atched to memo Hirsch for Jackson 3 Nov 53 Doc CK3100317730 DDRS U The saga of the five Czechs is related in Masin Gauntlet U 128 Memo Jackson for Smith and Allen Dulles 13 Jan 54 Doc CK31 00276589 DDRS U 129 Ltr Jackson to Dibella 4 May 54 fldr Di-Misc box 46 Jackson Papers DDEL U oSECtt 1 i8eKl f4 130 121 Memo Jackson for Pres 22 Feb 54 FRUS 1952-54 7 1215-20 quote 1220 U memo Jackson for Wisner 27 Feb 53 Doc CK3100069979 DDRS U memo Jackson for Smith 15 Mar 54 Doc CK31 00193054 ibid U 131 132 133 134 Thomas Very Best Men 87-88 quote 88 U OSD 1 4 tJ 135 memo of disc 136 57' NSC mtg 30 Ju1 53 FRUS 1952-54 2 439 U Memo Godel for Erskine 30 Jul 53 fldr Chrono box 13 OSO Records Ace 63A-1575 RG 330 WNRC memo for PSB members Excision 11 Aug 53 atchd to memo Erskine for SecDef llAug 53 DECLASSIFIED IN PART AUthOnty EO 13526 Chief Records Oectass DIV WHS onto 1 1 JAN 1016 122 137 Major Gen Elmer J Rogers USAF in a conversation with Baker and General Jesmond Balmer on 19 August 138 Quoted in memo Wisner for DC 4 Mar 54 ibid 139 Memcon Baker wrfhurston 4 Sep 53 ibid f f I 41 Memo Jackson for Pres I Mar 54 fldr Cutler General Robert box 45 Jackson Papers DDEL U log entry 8 Mar 54 fldr Log-1954 2 box 68 ibid U A sanitized version of the I March memo is Doc CK3100111989 DDRS U 142 I 0-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 12 Apr 55 8 CIA website U memo Bishop 4 Jan 55 fldr Soviet Satellites 1955 box 30 Entry 1586 OCB Files RG 59 NACP U English language translations of Tirana radio coverage of the indictment trial proceedings and sentencing 4-13 April 1954 are in FO 3 71 71263 Foreign Office General Correspondence NAK U Out of the goverrunent for nearly a year and apparently unaware of the decision to abandon the Albania operation SFUMF DECLASSIFII D IN PAR f AUthon y EO 13526 Chtef Records DQ_Qit p Dlv WHS Doto t I JAN 1Ulb lltitEl o 123 Jackson continued to push for it referring to resolution of the Trieste dispute in October 1954 and asking What stands in the way of initiating proper talks with Yugoslavia Great Britain Italy and Greece or any combination of these four to get going on this operation which would have a more resounding impact in 1955 than in any previous year He also raised a broader question What are we prepared to do if the tension in the satellites were to reach a critical mass and blow this year Maybe Allen knows the answer But lam not so sure Memo 'Operation Kremlin Kracks 16 Feb 55 atchd to ltr Jackson to Rockefeller and Dulles 17 Feb 55 Doc CK3l 00497636 DDRS U 143 NSC 174 United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe ' 11 Dec 53 printed in full in Ostermann ed Uprising in East Germany 1953 392-413 U An excised version is in FRUS 1952-54 8 ll 0-27 quote 126 144 Koons paper ''Satellites ' 30 No v 53 fldr Soviet Satellites in E Bur US Policy 3 box 7 NSC Special Staff Series DDEL 145 Memo of disc l77'h NSC mtg 23 Dec 53 FRUS 1952-54 8 127-28 U 146 Memo Wisner for DCJ 8 Jan 54 FRUS Intelligence Community 1950-55 46971 U 14 7 Memo Bross for DCl 13 Jan 54 app to CJA 148 Cook Declassified Eisenhower 122 l quote U Brands Cold Warriors 117 2d quote U BORE a DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authonty EO 13528 Chief Records Declass Olv WHS Dale f r dllli l Ji 124 GEOiliiiit' 149 Memo Operation Kremlin Kracks 16 Feb 55 cited in n 149 U 150 OCB Wrkng Grp papers ''List of Agreed Courses of Action for Period 7 I 54- 12 31 54 to Implement NSC 174 and Additional Actions to Implement NSC 174 Which Have Not Been Accepted by the Working Group 25 Aug 54 atchd to memos Staats for OCB 20 Aug and 7 Sep 54 fldr Soviet Satellites 1953 1954 box 31 Entry 1586 OCB Files RG 59 NACP U The paper listing the agreed courses of action without the attaclnnent is in FRUS 1950-55 Intelligence Community 31-39 U 151 Memo Delaney for Stevens EE State 24 Jan 55 FRUS 1955-57 25 10-11 U Delaney did not say specifically that his response reflected CIA input but the language suggests this was the case 152 NSC 5501 Basic National Security Policy 7 Jan 55 FRUS 1955-57 19 24-38 quote 31 U 153 NSC 5505 1 Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities 31 Jan 55 Doc CK3100129330 DDRS quotes 11-12 U NSC 5505 1 consisted ofthree parts I a statement of policy 2 a summary of the report by the special committee on exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite vulnerabilities Milliken Committee and 3 a memo of6 January from the JCS Adviser to the NSC Planning Board Gerhart to the Board describing his and JCS objections to the Milliken Committee Repmt A sanitized text of the statement of policy with excisions is in FRUS 1955-57 24 20-22 U 154 Ibid 3-4 U MlCPlib l r v ' I''TD o 1 FULL At l 1r ty C' J 26 Ch f t- f' - u L c'J Dl H- ' '' 1 - dAN 20T6 j'Jijf iiflEi 155 125 Draft Outline Plan of Operations on NSC 174 with Respect to Soviet Satellites in Eastern Ew-ope I Jul 55 Doc CK31000 8292 DDRS U 56 nterv Charles Bohlen by Philip Crowl 23 Jun 64 25-26 JFDOHP U 157 NSC 552411 Basic U S Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations 11 Jul 55 FRUS 1955-57 5 295 U memo Dulles for Eisenhower 18 Jun 55 FRUS 1955-57 5 240 U address 25 Aug 55 17-19 cited in n 57 158 Testimony 25 Jul 55 Executive Sessions ofthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1955 7 734-35 When the heretofore closed transcript of the hearings was published in 1975 the committee chairman John Sparkman D Alabama criticized Dulles for his 'wildly optimistic prediction that the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe would collapse within five years ibid vi U 159 Statement White House press sec 30 Dec 55 American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1956 450-51 U 160 OCB Progress Rpt on NSC 174 United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe 29 Feb 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 126 U 161 Allen Dulles's address in Los Angeles Purge ofStalinism 13 Apr 56 in which he surveyed recent developments in the Soviet Union in the wake of the pat1y congress is CJA-RDP70-00058R000100250065-2 CREST NACP U 162 Memo of disc 289' NSC mtg 28 Jun 56 FRUS 1955-57 24 121 U Cline Secrets Spies and Scholars 162 U In a subsequent interview Cline altered his DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhorrty eo 13526 Chief Raoords Oeclaros Div WHS Dale 1 1 JAN 2016 EOliliBf 126 163 ofln tAl cj 164 Toranska Them 56 U interv Stefan Staszewski by Toranska nd ibid 174 U interv Flora Lewis interviewer not identified 7 Jan 96 Cold War Interviews Episode 7 National Security Archive website U Jtr Moore to Allen Dulles 1 May 56 Digital Series Allen Dulles Papers PU U Estabrook memo of talk w Barber 26 Aug 57 fldr Willard F Barber box 1 Estabrook Papers JFKL U Melman and Raviv Journalist's Connections 219-25 U tel2582 Moscow to State 17 May 56 FRUS 1955-57 24 103-04 U tel2558 Moscow to State 14 May 56 ibid 103 n 2 quote U 165 166 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Author ly eo 13526 Chhtf R QOrdl Oeclass D v WHS PalO 1 I JAN 2016 127 167 OSD 1 4 C J Tel1339 State to Moscow 31 May 56 FRUS 1955-57 24 107-08 U Wisner Secrets Spies and Scholars 163-64 U For Off paper Khrushchev's' Secret Speech' to the Congress ofthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 24-25 1956 FO 418 97 Confidential Print Russia and Soviet Union NAK U 168 Kemp-Welch KhiUshchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics 182 U 169 Tel430 Budapest to State 24 May 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 168-70 quote 169 U 170 Diary entry 3 May 56 MicunoviC Moscow Dimy 42-45 U 171 Paper Tims and Klosson Soviet Control of the Eastem European Satellites 7 Jun 56 fldr OCB Subcommittee on Soviet Problems III box 29 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U 172 Paper Senior Research Staff on Intemational Communism The 201h CPSU Congress in Retrospect Its Principal Issues and Possible Effects on International Communism CIA SRS-1 13 Jun 56 10 16-17 CIA website U 173 Address San Francisco 21 Jun 56 Department of State Bulletin 2 Jul 56 3-7 quotes 4 7 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Au hoflly EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS Date' JAN 21 16 128 174 Statement 26 Jun 56 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign RelaNons Committee Historical Series 84' Cong 2 ' Sess 8 501 503 510-11 U 175 Reston The 'Victory' of Dulles New York Times 28 Jun 56 U 176 News conf 27 Jun 56 Depmtment of State Bulletin 9 Jul 56 47-53 quotes 47 50 U 177 Reston cited inn 165 memcon Dulles and Pres 13 Jul56 FRUS 1955-57 24 127-28 quote 128 U 178 1nterv Richard Johnson by Charles Stuart Kennedy 30 Jan 91 15-16 FAOHC U 179 Summaries of the Poznml events are in Korboilski Warsaw in Exile 110-24 Lewis A Case History of Hope 139-50 U and Matthews Tinderbox 87-137 U 180 Estabrook memo of talk with Barber 26 Aug 57 cited inn 164 U 181 CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary 5 Jul 56 pt 1 4 CREST NACP U New York Times 1 Ju1 56 U msg 131 Warsaw to For Off 3 Jul 56 FO 417 53 Confidential Print Poland NAK Citation for casualties and torture 182 Telcon 28 Jun 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 181 notes Howe 29 Jun 56 fldr Minutes Dec 9 1955-July 30 1956 box 6 Entry 1609 Secretary's Staff Meetings RG 59 NACP U 183 Department of State Bulletin 23 Jul56 151-52 U statement Actg Chief News Div 29 Jun 56 American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1956 503 U New York Times 1 4 Jul56 U SECRISII 'l-Ull J -26 Rccc lic' ' Dl'' ' --c 'ti ' OD t l ml ' Ch f Date f -1 IAN Oiu 'H 129 184 RFE rpt nd atchd to memo Egan Dir RFE for Shepardson 6 Jul 56 fldr Free Europe Committee 1956 5 box 54 Jackson Papers DDEL U 185 Notes Howe 2 Jul56 fldr Minutes Dec 9- 955-July 30 1956 box 6 Entry 1609 Secretary's Staff Meetings RG 59 NACP U memo Comstock 22 ' Spec Cmte mtg 2 Jul56 fldr OCB 000 1 USSR File #2 I box 1 Central File Series OCB Records DDEL U red of actions OCB mtg 6 Jul 56 ibid U 186 Notes on OCB mtg 3 Jul 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 189 U memo of23'' Spec Cmte mtg 5 Jul 56 fldr OCB 000 1 USSR File #2 I box 1 Central File Series OCB Records DDEL U 187 Memo of 27th Spec Cmte mtg 16 Jul 56 ldr OCB 000 1 USSR File #2 1 box I Central File Series OCB Records DDEL U memo Wilcox to ActySecState 6 Jul56 FRUS 1955-57 25 197-98 and 198 n 1 U 188 Pravda 1 Jul 56 in Zinner ed National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe 136 U New York Times 3 Jul56 U 189 Atlantic City Press 2 Ju156 U 190 News conf II Jul 56 Department of State Bulletin 23 Jul 56 50 U 191 Diary entries 14 15 Jul 56 Micunovic Moscow Dimy 86-89 U 192 See NSC 5607 Statement of Policy on East-West Exchanges 29 Jun 56 FRUS 1955-57 24 243-46 U an memo Steering Committee of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to the Council Chairman 13 Jul 56 ibid 10 377-80 U For Eisenhower's and Dulles's comments supporting the provision of surplus agricultural products to Soviet bloc countries see the editorial note quoting the 8@@ 1$1 o ' t _' '_ J' I f'u l 1 J I 11 r Ch 'f l o y dAN 21 1 io ' '11'- 130 disc at the 277 NSC meeting 27 Feb 56 ibid 25 118- 9 U and memo of disc 281 NSC mtg 5 Apr 56 ibid I 0 330 U 93 New York Times 30 Jun 56 U I94 OCB paper Suggestions for United States Action in the Event of Recurrence of Mass Uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Gennany undated but probably May 955 FRUS 1955-57 26 533-37 OCB paper Progress Report on United States Policy Relating to East Germany NSC 174 17 May 56 ibid 556-57 U 195 Memo Elbrick to SecState 10 Jul 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 211 U NSC 5608 U S Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe consisted of a draft statement of policy dated 3 July and a staff study circulated separately and dated 6 July A partial text of the draft statement of policy is in FRUS 1955-57 25 19094 the complete text is Doc CK31 00286602 DDRS U The complete text of the staff study is in Bekes Byrne and Rainer eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 119-28 U a partial text is in FRUS 1955-57 25 198-209 U 196 Smith briefing paper Item 1- U S Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe NSC 5608 II Jul 56 fldr Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and US Policy Towards 2 box 7 Special Staff File Series NSC StaffPapers DDEL U memo of disc 290 NSC mtg 12 Jul56 fldr 290o NSC Meeting box 8 NSC Series Whitman File DDEL U A substantially excised text is in FRUS 1955-57 25 212-16 U A more complete but still partial version is in Bekes Byrne and Rainer eds l956 Hungarian Revolution 129-35 U 131 197 NSC 5608 1 U S Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe 18 lui 56 including the appendix is ibid 152-56 U As printed the appendix contains an error in paragraph 2 The word nationalists should read nationalism 198 Stenographic notes conv between Dulles and M Max Millikin 21 Jul 56 6-7 Doc C1A-RDP80R01731R000800210007-8 CREST NACP U 199 Memo of disc 296' NSC mtg 6 Sep 56 FRUS 1955-57 26 560-62 U Statement ofPo1icy on U S Policy Toward East Gennany Supplement to NSC 160 1 12 Sep 56 ibid 563-67 U Several lines of the special annex are not printed in FRUS For the full text see Doc CK3100102417 DDRS U The statement of policy did not replace the existing paper NSC 160 1 which covered Germany in general only those sections pertaining to East Germany NSC 160 1 United States Position with Respect to Germany 17 Aug 53 is in FRUS 1952- 54 7 pt 1 510-20 U 200 Several documents mention the CIA plan not completed and approved until August but the author has not found a 201 Memo Wisner for DDJ 16 Jun 56 fldr 12 4 NSC Papers 1956 box 48 SiklPSJi DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhonty EO 13526 Chief Reoordt Oeclass Olv WHS o 1 1 JAN 2016 132 202 Memo Meyer Chief International Organizations Division CIA to DepDir Plans 15 Aug 56 w atchd paper Agreed Policy Governing Free Europe Committee Operations 7 Aug 203 Memo Helms for Chief Fl 5 Oct Silva Sub Rosa 87 U Gati Failed Illusions 5 73 93 U 204 OSD 1 4 e Washington Post I Dec 76 U Corson Armies ofIgnorance 369 U see also Ranelagh The Agency 287 U 205 The Redsox program involved the illegal infiltratiOn of agents into the Soviet Union The results were disappointing and it was replaced in the mid-fifties by a program codenamed Redskin that utilized legal travelers to collect infonnation Begun in 1951 Redcap monitored Soviet officials abroad and encouraged them to defect rpt Kirkpatrick 31 Aug 51 FRUS 1950-1955 Intelligence Community 203 n 2 U Regarding Redcap activities in Berlin see Murphy Kondrashev and Bailey Battleground Berlin 238-52 U 206 Diary entry 14 Oct 54 Sulzberger Last of the Giants 95-98 quote 98 U desp 29 Makins to Lloyd 27 Nov 56 FO 462 10 Foreign Office Confidential Print United States of America NAK U interv George Kennan by Richard Challener 3 Mar 67 39-41 JFDOHP PU U 207 Memo O'Connor for Morgan 24 Mar 53 fldr PSB 091 4 Eastern Europe I box 15 PSB Central Files DDEL U 208 Memo of disc 280' NSC mtg FRUS 1955-57 25 128 U Bf BMJ DECLASSIFIED IN PARr Authority EO 13526 Chlel Records Decla a Dlv WHS o ll dAN 20l 1 O Hist Landa Bibliographies 3rd draft 2-23-12 Almost Successful Recipe The United States and East European Unrest prior to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Working Bibliography OFFICIAL RECORDS AND PERSONAL PAPERS Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC National Clandestine Service Records Job 79-01228A Executive Registry Files Job 80-B01676R Executive Registry Files Job 80-0l731R History Staff Records Job 83-00739R History Staff Records Job 83-00764R Dwight D Eisenhower Library Abilene Kansas Eleanor Lansing Dulles Papers John Foster Dulles Papers C D Jackson Papers C D Jackson Records NSC Staff Papers Operations Coordinating Board Records Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Ann Whitman Files George C Marshall Library Lexington Virginia Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS JAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date l I JAN 2il16 2 Gordon Ewing Papers Hoover Institution Stanford California Paul Henze Papers Radio Free Europe Radio Libe1ty Corporate Records John F Kennedy Library Boston Massachusetts Robet1 Estabrook Papers National Archives College Park Maryland General Records of the Department of State RG 59 Central Decimal Files White House Daily Summary Entry 396F Executive Secretariat Daily Summary Entry 3961-I Executive Secretariat Daily Staff Summary Entry 3961 Intelligence Reports Entry 449 hltel igence Briefs Entry 450 Miscellaneous Intelligence Reports Entry 451 Policy PI arming Staff Files Entry 558 Charles E Bohlen Files Entry I 075 Policy Plarming Staff Files Entry 1272 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files Entry 1274 NIBs SEs and SN Es Entry 1373 Operations Coordinating Board Files Entry 1586 Secretary's Staff meetings Entry 1609 Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff RG 218 Page detoo mined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS lAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date '1 1 JAN 2016 3 Central Decimal Classified File 1951-53 Entries 11 12 Geographic Classified File 1951-53 Entries 14 15 Central Decimal Classified File 1954-56 Entry 17 Geographic Classified File 1954-56 Entry 20 Chairman's File Admiral Radford 1953-57 Entry 51 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency RG 263 Records of the National Security Council RG 273 Records of the Army Staff RG 319 Microfilmed Messages 1942-62 Entry 1014 Records of the U S High Commissioner for Germany RG 466 Records of the Office of the Executive Director Entl'y 2 Records of the Berlin Element Entry 4 Records of United States Army Europe RG 549 Assistant Chief of Staff 02 Intelligence Cables Entry 2020 CREST Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool Database National Archives Kew London Foreign Office General Correspondence FO 371 Foreign Office Confidential Print Poland FO 417 Foreign Office Confidential Print Russia and Soviet Union FO 418 Foreign Office Confidential Print United States of America FO 462 Foreign Office Confidential Print Czechoslovakia Entry 470 Budapest Legation Files FO 1087 Allied Kommandatura Directives Minutes and Papers FO 1112 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS lAW EO 3526 Section 3 5 Date ft rt JAN 1ilt6 4 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington DC Subject Files Princeton University Princeton New Jersey Allen Dulles Papers John Foster Dulles Papers Emmet Hughes Papers George F Kennan Papers United States Army Military History Institute Carlisle BatTacks Pennsylvania Thomas Timberman Papers U S Army Berlin Collection War College Lectures Washington National Records Center Suitland Maryland Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense RG 330 SA Files Accession 60A- 025 OSD Files Accession 63A-1575 Special Operations Files Accession 63A-1575 Charles E Wilson Files Accession 63A-I768 OSD Subject Files Accession 64A-2093 ISA-NSC Files Accession 68A-4024 ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS German Historical Institute Washington DC Bowie Robert R Interviewed by Robett Gerald Livingston eta 19 February 2008 History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington D C fage determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS lAW EO U526 ction 3 5 Date Lhl lm 5 Angleton J arnes July 984 OSO lAic CXP I '- Cline John Foster Dulles Oral History Project Princeton University Princeton New Jersey Bal'bour Walworth Interviewed by Philip A Crowl 5 August 1966 Bohlen Charles E h1terviewed by Philip A Crowl 23 June 1964 Bowie Robert Richardson Interviewed by Richard D Challener 10 August 1964 Conant James Bryant Interviewed by Gordon Craig 11 July 1964 Han iman W Averell Interviewed by Philip A Crowl 16 July 966 Harsch Joseph C hlterviewed by Richard D Challener 29 March 1966 Kennan George F Interviewed by Richard D Challener 3 March 1967 Merchant Livingston T Interviewed by Philip A Crowl 13 March 17 Aprill965 The Eisenhower Administration and NATO Nuclear Strategy An Oral Histo1y Roundtable 16 March 1990 Conducted by David A Rosenberg and Robert A Wampler Participants R Gordon Ameson Robert Bowie Douglas MacArthur II Edwin Martin Ernest May Jennifer Sims Frontline Diplomacy The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training http memory loc gov ammernlcollections diplomacy Blake Robert 0 Interviewed by Horace G Torbert 29 December 1990 Bowie Robett R Interviewed by Robert Gerald Livingston et al 19 February2008 Davies Richard Townsend Interviewed by Peter Jessup 9 November 1979 Gert Gerard M Interviewed by G Lewis Schmidt 30 December 1988 Johnson Richard E Interviewed by Charles Stuart Ketmedy 30 January 1991 Lyon Cecil B Interviewed by John Bovey 26 October 1988 Mautner Karl F Interviewed by Thomas J Dunnigan 12 May 1993 Mautner Martha C Interviewed by Thomas J Dmmigan 7 November 1995 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Aulhol'rty EO 13526 Chief R I' JS Declass Div WHS DaiO 11 'f dAN 2Ulii 6 McCargar James Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy 18 April1995 Stoffel Albert Interviewed by Thomas J Dunnigan 9 May 1994 National Security Archive Washington DC www gwu ed nsarchiv Lewis Flora Interviewer not identified 7 January 1996 Pickett William B ed George F Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look An Oral History of Project Solarium Monograph Series No I Princeton N J Princeton Institute for Intemational and Regional Studies Princeton University 2004 INTERNET DOCUMENTARY DATABASES Central Intelligence Agency www foia cia gov Declassified Documents Reference System Digital National Security Archive www nsarchive chadwyck com 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