man was '21 memo was doamoqd 130918991390 W1 - nuns NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL July 24 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM JOHN MARCUM Attached is a revised memorandum concerning a proposed effort to disuade South Korea from purchasing a French built reprocessing plant The memorandum has been rewritten to re ect recent South Korean assurances - - - - - In addition to the calls you have received George Vest has asked that we expedite this decision to the extent possible He is scheduled to testify on Tuesday in restricted session before Senator Symington on US initiatives with regard to this and other proliferation problems - XGDS By Authority Of General Scowcroft 33 3 - 123 - 8 qs- 43 191' eyJ iy new Man was a piano mm 1 qu poms-Irma NATIONAL SECURITY 33 9 SECRETARY KISSINGER JAN M LODAL 594 Jul y 24 1975 DAVE ELLIOTT b SEC-HT - XGDS 3 51 111 A - MEMORANDUM FOR FROM SUBJECT Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing As a result of growing concerns over South Korea's nuclear weapons intentions and specifically over their intention to purchase a pilot reprocessing plant from France there is a bureaucratic concurrence at the staff level on a guidance cable Tab A that would authorize the Embassy in Seoul to approach the Koreans directly and -- Point out that the Korean reprocessing plans could jeopardize US peaceful nuclear assistance particularly a pending Export-Import Bank loan for the KORl-ll their second US-built power reactor -- Ask them not to proceed with their planned reprocessing plant and -- Offer support for ROK participation in an eventual multi- national regional reprocessing plant in East Asia Ambassador Sneider supports such an approach Tab C Bureaucratic Factors Recognizing the inevitable potential for leaks and for resulting difficulties with the French and Koreans as in the case of the ERG-Brazil affair and the intimate relationship between the nuclear weapons plan and our security commitment there we tasked to prepare an options paper for use in obtaining a policy level decision on this problem Unfortunately they prepared a advocacy memorandum SEGR-ET - XGDS By Authority Of General Scowcroft was - 91 7 27 95 gear usc mmizmh Oats Amen m1 '11 mos mos AW Tab B instead which State only reluctantly submitted to the NSC process Scowcroft called Eagleburger This paper does not deal with the basic problem of the ROK's perceived need for long term nuclear guarantees and our inability to provide them or with the problem of French involve- ment and consistency with our non-proliferation policy Regional Factors If Korea begins to build a reprocessing plant in addition to the essential nuclear reactors we have agreed to supply it will be widely assumed that it is seriously working on a nuclear weapons program This per- ception would be potentially destabilizing in all of Northeast Asia North Korea would certainly press its allies for a similar capability and both China and the Soviet Union might see potential nuclear threats to their own territory Perhaps most important deve10pment of nuclear weapons in Korea could tip the balance on proliferation in Japan Korean Intentions Korea's policy towards future_ development of a nuclear weapons capability seems fairlY arma- ment program plans and from Park's statement indicating that exercise of the nuclear option would depend on the continuation of U S security guarantees Unfortunately this Korean attitude is well-known in Congress and in the international arms control community It will make it very di ficult for the U S to continue normal civil nuclear commerce with Korea unless some specific protective measures are taken Reprocessing will not be necessary for South Korea's nuclear power economy for several years and in view of current controversy over the dangers of plutonium recycle perhaps not for the foreseeable future Both officials concerned with civil power development and those in favor of weapons production could probably be persuaded to defer the reprocessing effort if necessary to avoid jeopardizing acquisition of essential nuclear power reactors We are pessimistic about longer term prospects however since the basic incentives for ROK nuclear weapons deve10pment will remain and they could either approach another supplier or eventually build their own reprocessing plant 55% - XGDS mod '3 pt l b 11101 Km Korean Assurances Korea has taken some steps recently in order to reassure us and others that its civil program is for peaceful purposes They ratified the NPT when Canada made it a condition of acquisition of Canadian reactors they recently accepted our tortured interpretation of our bilateral nuclear agreement that gives the U S veto rights on reprocessing of spent fuel from U S supplied reactors and have provided similar assurances to Canada The Koreans undoubtedly have their limits though and the request from the U S for them to forego a planned reprocessing plant may approach that limit Compounding this is the fact that they might also have to pay certain termination costs as dis cussed below The French Connection The reprocessing plant that the Koreans are planning to acquire is of FrenChOriginIniplications for Non-Proliferation Policy In reaching your decision on this issue you should also consider its imPIications for our overall non-proliferation policy As a result of FRG and French Opposition it is now clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Conference will result in controls on reprocessing that are less stringent than those in the ERG-Brazil nuclear accord and considerably less stringent than those we would hpose on South Korea In a recent bilateral discussion the PEG informed us that they would wait until after the conclusion of the Suppliers Conference to nalize their umbrella agreement with Iran probably with the expectation that we would not Oppose exports which were in accordance with the Suppliers' agreement Similarly following the conclusion of a Suppliers' agreement it is conceivable that the ROK would approach another supplier such as the FRG and purchase a reprocessing plant under the agreed guidelines and we would then find it more difficult to interfere SEW-T - XGDS mm Ma '3 mm mo 5mm summon The real question as we work toward the goals of conclusion of a Suppliers Agreement of strenthened IAEA safeguards and of increased NPT ratification is whether we will be willing to accept these as adequate controls both in terms of permitting U S exports on this basis and not objecting to bilateral arrangements between other suppliers and client states In this regard a comprehensive review of our non-proliferation policy is in progress in the VPWG and may serve as a useful basis for determining the extent to which we should continue to play an activist role in bilateral approaches rather than being content with the inter- national regulatory mechanisms we are deveIOping However this study will not be completed in time to serve as a basis for your decision on the Korean approach Options The State prOposal would have the advantage of closely following the Canadian demarche and would utilize our special leverage to exert maximum pressure on the ROK to abandon its plans It would also be timely and if the ROK agrees would improve the prospects for pending Congressional approval of the Export-Import Bank loan and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing of fuel shipment for the reactor The approach would have some risk however of antagonizing the Koreans and through public disclosure irritating the French who have already complained about publicity on the Suppliers Conference If successful the question would also remain of who would reimburse the French for their four million dollars in deve10pment costs 0n the basis of a preliminary examination we have not identified any reasonable method of paying the French directly -- which would be interpreted in Congress as buying them off or of compensating the Koreans through our AID or Military Assistance they are already unhappy over reduced amounts in the latterprogram Alternatively we could rely on Korea's NPT obligations -- including safeguards in its facilities and nuclear explosive deployment prohibitions their assurances that they will not reprocess fuel from Canadian of U S reactors and additional barriers coming out of the Suppliers Agreement to satisfy our concerns Unfortunately such undertakings can be con- sidered as mere 'paper assurances and some elements of Congress see it in these terms In addition if the ROK proceeds with this reprocessing plant its neighbors would assume it is seriously working towards a nuclear weapons capability SECRET - XGDS man was '11 mm won 5mm pomnmooa Your De cis ion That we continue bilateral efforts to deter ROK acquisition of a reprocessing plant and forward the instruction cable to Seoul as the next step That we make no further effort to deter their acqui- sition of a reprocessing plant and rely instead on the ROK's NPT obligations IAEA safeguards and Suppliers Conference controls to ensure that they do not develop nuclear weapons Jack Froebe concurs SEER-ET - XGDS This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu