3H9 Authority i 3 'ngo Dat f- lB gzkAaA DEPARTMENT OF sure BRIEFING MEMORANDUM Smut - lrl SIS SECRET NODIS December 4 1975 To The Acting Secretary FROM - Winston Lord me EA - Robert H Miller Acting Your Meetings with the French and CanadianAAmbassadors on Korean Reprocessing As you know the Secretary has approved strength- ening US Opposition to a ROK nuclear reprocessing facility through an approach to the Korean Prime Minister followed by an approach to President Park if the initial approach fails Tab 4 Our telegram instructing Ambassador Sneider to implement his approach in Seoul is attached at Tab 3 The Secretary also approved complementary approaches to Canada and France in which we would -- ask Canada to undertake a complementary approach to the and inform France of our renewed efforts formally advise them of our firm conclusion that the ROKG has embarked on a covert program to develop a nuclear weapon and note the importance to our efforts of their continuing to refrain from early implemen- tation of the contract pending resolution of the issue SECRETZEODIS XGDS-3 @sz 1 Authority M 7 599 SECRET NODIS -2- We are attaching talking points to this effect at Tab 1 Canada and at Tab 2 France for your use when you call in Ambassador and Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet the bureau views regarding these footnotes at Tab 5 Attachments Tab 1 Talking Points for Canadian Ambassador Tab 2 - Talking Points for French Ambassador Tab 3 Instruction Cable to Seoul Tab 4 Memorandum to the Secretary ml 'l I Tab 5 - Discussion of DES Footnotes Drafted 12 4 75 x28986 I Concurrence PM - Mr Oplinger 0E8 - Mr Bengelsdorf lr zar - Mr Kelly F EUR - Mr Swartz INR - Mr Locke Intelligence only h6M u220 e ikd 1 3 Authoritye - j get SECRET moors I DE TAB 1 Talking Points for Canadian Ambassador -- As you will recall from our previous consultations in London and washington on this subject we have engaged in vigorous efforts to prevent Korean acquisition of a pilot reprocessing plant from France We wish to bring you up to date on our efforts in this area and to solicit your support in the next stage of representations to the ROK -- The facility in question has the capability of producing enough weapons grade plutonium for at least several nuclear bombs per year in the event the ROK abrogated its NPT and other safeguard obligations -- we have concluded that a secret program to develop a future nuclear weapons capability is underway in the we are convinced that apart from any economic motives a major factor in South Korea's desire for a reprocessing facility is its utility in that program Because of this assessment we formally asked the ROK in August to cancel its French reprocessing contract but without disclosing the nature of our concerns regarding its nuclear weapons intentions 0E5 recommends that you add the following sentences to this statement We believe that this may represent an effort either to fabricate a nuclear device as soon as possible or to achieve a contingent capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice at a later stage Either scenario however would be prejudicial to our interests DES would be amenable to deleting the word may if this would facilitate acceptance of this point The other interested bureaus do not support this addition Brief explanations are attached at Tab 5 SECRET NODIS 3w 3 AuthorityW1- gg i 1 r eefr SECRET NODIS I -- The Acting Foreign Minister recently rejected this request offering to accept supplementary US inspection of the facility instead We are not now prepared to accept this counter-offer and Secretary Kissinger has instructed that we renew our strong request for cancellation to the Prime Minister and if necessary President Park In so doing we will specifically warn the ROKG that going ahead with the reprocessing deal will result in withdrawal of the Ex Im request to Congress for $249 million in credits for the Kori 2 nuclear reactor Lest the Koreans be laboring under any misapprehensions we will also confirm I our intention not to authoriz nany national KOK reprocessing of US-derived nuclear fuel and inform the Koreans that going ahead with their deal could seriously affect our future governmental nuclear cooperation The French have recently reconfirmed to us that they would not hasten the pace of their dealings with the Koreans and would not object to Korean cancellation of the contract we intend to advise them of our assessment of Korean nuclear weapons intentions and to keep them generally informed of US efforts to obtain Korean cancellation -- we would greatly welcome any actions that your Government could take to complement our approach to the ROK we recall that earlier this_year you and we achieved veto DECLASSIFIED AuthorityP 715 912 i Dat 'i l Q SECRET NODIS I -3- rights over reprocessing spent fuel derived from nuclear reactors supplied by us However the ROK is discussing with the French acquisition of nuclear reactors which could in time effectively evade these particular constraints on its ability to reprocess This strengthens our interest in obtaining cancellation of the deal -- In particular we would appreciate urgent Canadian consideration of a parallel request that the ROK cancel its reprocessing contract We would also welcome your consider ation of leverage Canada might effectively bring to bear in the nuclear area for example with regard to nuclear reactor sales or credits and an explicit denial of national ROK reprocessing of Canadian fuel We are instructing Ambassador Sneider to make his approach to the Korean Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity so as to leave the RDK under no illusion that we are acquiescing in the reprocessing plant Therefore if your government is as we hope prepared to make a parallel approach to the RDK it may be best for both of our Ambassadors to consult directly on their approaches in Seoul Naturally we would look forward to keeping in touch in Washington as our respective approaches develop FYI Since the matter is of growing urgency we would greatly prefer not to delay Ambassador Sneider's approach SECRETZNOD IS 1 Sega Authority-M 7 i Dais i SECRET NODIS -4- if you are asked about the effect 2 the French Pakistan reprocessing_ transaction 23 our Korean approach -- While we are concerned about prospective Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability we believe that both our information on Korea's covert nuclear program and thetsecurity implications of nuclear proliferation in Korea warrant continued strong efforts to obtain cancellation of the French Korean transaction SECRETZ NODIS p- - I I pat-WW EHUB 2 Talking Points for French Ambassador -- we have had very useful consultations on Korea's desire to acquire a pilot reprocessing plant from France both in London and in our respective capitals Your Govern - ment knows of our concerns about the potentially destabilizing implications of such a facility in the Korean peninsula We for our part know of and welcome France's readiness to accept Korean cancellation of the reprocessing contract as well as your authorities' recent assurance that you would not hasten the pace of your dealings with Korea -- We wish to bring you up to date on our efforts to obtain Korean cancellation and to solicit your understanding of the next stage of our representations to the ROK As you probably know the RDK Acting Foreign Minister recently i declined to cancel this transaction Secretary Kissinger has therefore authorized us to pursue our strong request for cancellation at higher levels of the Korean Government -- We have concluded that a secret program to develop a future nuclear weapms capability is now underway in the OES recommends that you add the following sentences to this statement We believe that this may represent an effort either to fabricate a nuclear device as soon as possible or to achieve a contingent capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice at a later stage Either scenario however would be prejudicial to our interests OES would be amenable to deleting the word may if this would facilitate acceptance of this point The other interested bureaus do not support this addition Brief explanations are attached at Tab 5 SECRET NODIS or CLASSIFIED i Authority 0 715 90 Buggy- SECRET NODIS -2- we are convinced that apart from any economic motives a major factor in South Korea's desire for a reprocessing facility is its utility for a nuclear weapons program -- In light of this assessment I trust you recognize the unusual context for our deciding to maintain our strong opposition to a national reprocessing plant in Korea we are seriously concerned about the political and security implications of such a plutoniumrproducing facility even under international safeguards in a highly volatile area of the world where the US is deeply committed -- we will keep you informed on this issue I would appreciate your carefully protecting this information in reporting it back to your Government Finally we hope that it is clearly understood in Paris that our difficulties are uniquely associated with the transfer of weapons-usable nuclear technology to Korea and in no way with the transfer of nuclear reactors and fuel SECRET ODIS FEE cl' LASSIFIED 1 33155 71 1 36 5% SECRET NODIS -3- 2 you are asked whether the Hg is asking France to take the initiative to cancel the sale -- The purpose of our approach to you is to keep you informed of what we are doing and of the reasons for our deep concern The United States feels that in light of our assessment of Korean nuclear intentions it is obliged to urge the Koreans to cancel the reprocessing plant We would of course welcome it if France would in its own interests come to a similar judgment with regard to this matter SECRETZNODIS I Ly 2 BECLASSIFIED Authorityeth a Tab 5 Dat l SECRETZ NODIS Discussion of DES Footnotes DES believes the addition recommended in its footnotes to the talking points is essential to avoid creating the false impression otherwise likely to be created by the pro posed talking points that the US has absolutely firm know- ledge that the ROK is intent on acquiring a weapon as soon as possible OES believes that it would be exceedingly unwise to convey a more definitive impression to a foreign government even for understandable tactical reasons when we have not so advised the Congress or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in conjunction with recent exports to the ROK The proposed addition conforms more closely to the fully cleared guidance we have given NRC Without the suggested qualification however 0E8 believes that if they were ex- posed to the proposed talking points both Congress and the NRC would favor a complete and immediate suspension of all US-ROK nuclear cooperation EA PM and EUR do not support this addition They believe that the present formulation accurately re- flects our certainty that the ROKG is seeking the reproces sing plant as part of a program to develop a future nuclear weapons capability They maintain that the question of when South Korea would activate a nuclear weapons capability is not relevant in the Present context and has not been a consideration in USG efforts to terminate the ROE French deal and thereby deter acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability These bureaus are concerned that the DES addition could be misconstrued as indicating uncertainty regarding a firm conclusion on which the US has based its own efforts and that it thus could seriously detract from the effectiveness of our approaches to Canada and France They feel that the difference between our approach to the French and the guidance given NRC is warranted given the different policy issues involved They emphasize that we already indicated to the Secretary that under his approved approach we would formally advise France of our firm con- clusion that the ROKG has embarked on a covert program to develop a nuclear weapon while advising him of OES's exception to their views on the nature of our intelligence Tab 4 pages 3 and 6 INR believes that either the or OES statement would be accurate from an intelligence standpoint - SECRETZNODIS                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu