ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 A 7 I I we DECLASSIFIED BY gm - arm 2 2 MAY 1979 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS i i 2 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY or DEFENSE 550Habib Mission to Korea I am told that the President decided at last Friday's foreign policy- breakfast to dispatch Phil Habib to Seoul later this week to attempt to - arrange a trilateral meeting between the President and representatives from North Kim and South during his trip to South Korea in late June I believe this is a lousy idea Substantiveiy it is a loser The timing is atrocious Procedurally embarking on an initiative of this kind before there has been any serious interagency discussion of the PRM makes a mockery of the Administration's policyemaking procedessa not 5 I would urge you to reclama the decision at this point since I am unclear as to who originated the idea and I do not understand what we expect to accomplish I do believe however that an attempt to press for meeting in conjunction with the President's trip is flawed in these respects - - It elevates form over substanCe If we are going to actively inject ourselves into North-South political discussions we Should first have Va clear idea of our objectives and a strategy for achieving them We have neither This Administrationras well as its predeceSSors has been so mesmerized by questions relating to the venue and format of Korean talks that no serious effort has been undertaken to analyze the issues that would arise Ain negotiations or to define the proposals we would put forward Without that prior analytic-effort -- and this is not a strong feature of the PRM -- this kind of shortefuse initiative is a sham little more than a gimmick designed to hype the visit with a diplomatic spectacular for which we are ill-prepared - - A 2 It concentrates on the initiation of discussions at the expense of creating inducements for both Pyongyang and Seoul to approach North-South discussions seriously The basic problem goes back to our tr00p withdrawal policy Diplomatically unconditional withdrawals send the wrong signal both to Seoul and Pyongyang The RDKG is nervous about entering serious discussions with the North when it is uncertain of the backing we will provide As for the North if we are going to withdraw forces without requiring a quid pro quo they haveno compelling incentive to enter a substantive dialogue with the South to facilitate our withdrawal Until we sort Out where we are going with respect to our'futUre withdrawal'plans it is prematUre to put forward dramatic'diplomatic initiatiVes - w -vww ss 3 Ha w ta a 3 This proposal forfeits an opportunity to press the Chineae into a more active and constructive diplomatic roie on the peninsula Back in l975 Kissinger proposed a Korean political conference involving those countries most directly concerned the US Chin 3 and the two Koreas The Chinese _have displayed little enthusiasm for%participating in such a conference 'no doubt reflecting the North's pos tien But that is no reason to let them off the hook Indeed one of the parposes of normalization was to engage the Chinese more deeply in parallel efforts to stabilize the status quo in Asia The concept of the trilateral talks on Korea puts them On the sidelines free to concentrate on their rivalry with the RusSians for influence-in Pyongyang while leaving to us the maintenance-of stability Q Park will not go along There is little jn-such a meeting for him unless we are-prepared to terminate troop withdrawals and or help_him forge economic ties with the PRC The South has neyer liked the idea of 'trilateral talks since they fear such talks would merely serve as a cover for direct contacts between Washington and Pyongyang legitimizing the North's pretenses to special status while relegating Seoul to a secondary role in 2discussions Moreover the_timing of this initiative will appear curious to Park inasmuch as recent ROKG efforts to lure the North into serhous discussions 'proved abortive Kim il-sung is still unwilling to deal with Park as an equal And in hosting the international ping-pong champibnship the Notth completely excluded Seoul from the competion Thus it is difficult to maintain that it is an Opportune time to probe North Korean intentions 5 Nor would this proposal serve wider diplomatic purposes The Japanese_will likely find it strange if we embark on a proposal of such far-reaching significance without having conveyed a hint of such an_idea during Ohira's recent trip to Washington ' Beyond this rumors of new US departures toward North Korea tend to stimulate ill-conceived-GOJ initiatives designed simply to assure that Japan does not fall behind the US in normalizing realtions with any Asian communist country 6 Thus most Asians 4- and i su5pect most serious US journalists -- will regard an effort to get a trialogue going at the summit as a gimmick We should approach this trip as a demonstration of American steadiness balance and staying power in Northeast Asia 1 A dramatic-geSture of this kind -- aimed essentially at the North will work directly at cross purposes with these aims -- In short this idea has little chance of success Pr0posing_ it will generate doubts about our judgment and steadiness in both Seoul and Tokyo it will not serve our wider purposes at this time We are ill- prepared to follow up on it effectively in the unlikely event it is accepted by both Koreas - It is gimmicky There is no discernible strategy By pushing this now we may forfeit promising opportunities which could arise once we have clarified to ourselves and to our friends in the area adjustments we may have in mind for future troop withdrawals a unm u What is to be done First i suggest that you call Zbig and find out precisely what it is that the White HouSe peOple think can be actomplished through this initiative at this time I have an uneasy suspmcion that the PR people in the White House may have ginned up this idea as a Tszpectacular for the Summit Korea is not however a promising locale for a mini-Camp David if that is what they have in mind Second if it is impossible to turn off this idea then I suggest that you urge that Phil's mandate be cast in the broadest possible terms If he must go then his task should be_simply to carry out the substantive advance work for the Summit and he should be prepared to discuss all the major issues on the agenda troop withdrawals diplomatic initiatives economic cooperation and human rights Since the PRC meeting on Korea is not scheduled until June 7th I wouldssuggest either that Phil's trip be delayed or the PRC meeting be moved up - Third if Zbig is determined to have Phil focus principaliy on this initiative I suggest that you point out in the strongest terms that such an effort would be feckless and counter-productive unless we previously clarify to President Park the nature of prospective adjustments in the troop withdrawal schedule The adjustment most likely to elicit an ac commodating ROKG stance would be suspension of the withdrawals pending evident progreSs toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula and'the develop- ment of durable North-South peace arrangements This would indicate that we are serious and are prepared to Use some leverage to make such negotiations succeed Michael H Annacost Deputy Aesistan Secretary M-T-AWAMHE e74 A in v                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu