Ie_ a I L 3 flu Rx ASSISIANY SECIHARY OF wnmmu o 7030i 5 i JUN EH9 i ANDIVAtuanou - I MEMonArlou roe Tl-lE or DEFENSE i a MA SUBJECT PRM345 S IA es-The raft of pen-45 recently provided by State for 050 review omits or 025 not adequately emphasize important considerations for future R0 defense programs I believe these areas Should be included in the is ues to be reviewed by the June 7 SEC and forwarded to the President for decision 5 examines the withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea as a result of the intelligence community's re-estimate of the North Korean ground order pf battle Not only are North Korean ground forces ab Ut 70% stronger than we believed at the time of PD-l8i there is some-possibility that the United States would have to introduce sub stantial ground reinforcements in a war to prevent defeat of_the Rog This will remain true thrOugh if ROK force improvements proceed as presently planned There is no reason however why South Korea-- with twice the population and already three times the GNP -cannot eventually match the defense effort of the North I I because l believe that it will help to detera war I support a substantial deday in the planned withdrawal of the 2nd Divisio plane '26 Welcome t h u fl A 4 1' a welif- 4 not during this period of adjustment However strengthening the ROK ground forces must he one of the highest-priority goals in our common defense efforts Moreover given the very tight constraints on U S Army man- power it is impartant that we eventually acquire more flexibility in the use of the 2nd Division No matter what its peacetime location it should be eventually programmed for contingencies throughout Asia - including the Persian Gulf and not only in Korea notes several critical deficiencies in ROK forces and sketches some corrective measures 'but it ignores or excludes almost_ all means to accomplish the measores The PRM fails to make any connection between a decision to delay or stop_ground force withdrawals and a 30K decision to do more to strengthen its own ground forces I believe thad before giving the Japanese government a cc rilment to delay or stoplthe-geound force withdrawals the should seek a commitment from the ROK to do more than it #155 a cmsuncn 0F KEG DEF NO X- Ll - - DODIDFOISR were tutor-aw swam E $52out and agon3030Hwh KWTW 2 now plans to strengthen its ground forces Moreover we should emphasize that expensive projects Such is F-ls purchases or aircraft co assembly to improve ROK capabili- ties in air and naval forces where the U S can most easily fill the gap should receive much lower priority than urgently needed ground force improvements -3 PRH also argues for the-position made by the Ambassador endorsed by General Vessey that ROK defense spending uld not be increased Significantly However _according 050 and CIA economic analyses ROK defense spending ld be increased from the projected level of about 5 51 at least-71 with little etfect on ROK economic growth standards of living while recognizing that the political of Seuth Korea is clearly a U S interest we something to improve the military balance on the7Penin a reduce the demands on scarce U S Army manpower Th nomic burden on Korea can be eased by U S and even more ropriately by Japanese assistance PRH suggests that if the 2nd Division stays in Korea credits and IMET funding for Korea can be reduced lysis of ROK needs suggests the opposite The planned credits of aboot $250 million and IHET funding of about-' million annually for the next few years support the present 2nd lnfantry Division stays in Korea In fact some reases in FMS might be needed to cushion the imediate act of the surge in ROK defense spending that we should recomnending PRM does not consider ways that Japan could contribute ROK defenSe Such as those we suggested in the recent PRC k-up book on the Consolidated Guidance Since defense of th Korea helps protect Japan's interests Japan shoold pay 'e of the cost perhaps indirectly The U25 should use decision to increase its planned contribution to ROK tributiona a lly the FEM does not consider the indiredt cost of preparing another U S division for conflicts should the 2nd not be withdrawn and configured as currently programmed 1 d 1 believe that it is possible to remedy the most serious defi- ciencies in FOK ground forces-and to bring the projected 1985 North to MWTW -- Force Improvement Plan and will be needed whether or not ense--suth as stopping the-withdrawalo-to elicit a Japanese1- - '53 1 eg we eriir' i l'I UhmJy - 'uh xll i a a 3 South firepower ratio of ground forces in Korea down from more than 2 1 to l 5 l Although only sketchy ROK cost data are available tentative estimates indicate that the package would cost a total of $8 billion in 1979 dollars in the period increasing the ROK defense allOcation from-the present 5 6% to about 7% of GNP would generate roughly 55 billion during l98l-85 assuming 5% real GNP growth as opposed to the better than 10% annual real growth that Sooth Korea has achieved since l972 The remaining-$3 billion needed by the ROK could be shared equally by the U S and Japan um Som of the argument over improving ROK ground forces seems to center on wheth the RDK can increase its defense expenditures substantially in the next year or two However the real target for a substantial get well program is later than that In fact production constraints will preclude any significant equipment increases before 1982 However it is important that we get agreement on a 5 or 6-year ROK improvement program as part of any decision to delay withdrawals 3 Erwin- - a If f ease u 19 L a - 211 zen-we - w 2 73 $5 55 F a - $313 5 abi u In addition to placing greater emphasis on ROK force improvements l the PRC should also consider - Early U S Air Augmentation To make effective use Of the very limited warning available the United States should adopt a pdlicy of conducting responsive exercises to augment our air forces on early warning indicators Also to make the U S tacair contribution more effective in the partiCularly crucial early days of a war we should consider increased peacetime stationing of U S air forces in_Korea i fl dul a - - Har Termination Policy The understanding that an allied counter- offensive would stop at the present DMZ weakens deterrence In discussing - the possible need for U S ground reinforcementsr which is much greater g now than we thought it was in 1977--we should make it clear that U S reinforcements would have the capability of ending the war on terms t more favorable to the defense of Seoul than the existing DMZ Although is we will obviously want to emphasiZe our expectatiOn that deternence will 1 continue to work rather than what happens if it fails I think that we can both strengthen deterrence and reassure the South Koreans by noting that the North would place its own territory at risk if it attacked the South Russell Murriy 2nd Russell Hurray 2nd Assistant 5ecretary of Defense Program Analysis 5 Evaluation CC asousni - 7 1 4 d Prep by memo for SecDef subj PRH-45 S Rm 2E 33mzx-57341 - won-m2 - D1str1bution SecDe - Cy I DepSecDef - Cy 2 - Spec Asst Mr Nest - Cy Se Def - Cy 4 050 Mai Room ASDE ISADcaL - by 8 ti Chron - '33 Porter if- 21 re 11' e mus-Innate 1 -- m3 29 53 2 7                    National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu