1 MEMORANDUM 4112_x HOUSE it - i WASHINGTON Si gm July 5 1979 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS U S President Carter Nicholas Platt Staff Member NSC Note Taker Korea President Park Chung Hee Ch'oe Kwang-Su Senior Protocol Secre tary Office of the President Inter- preter DATE TIME Saturday June 30 1979 12 23 1 30 PM AND PLACE The Blue House Seoul Korea President Carter Briefing the Note Taker on the Circumstances of the conversation before the Note Taker entered the room I told President Park that I had come with the sincere intent to work closely and had been taken aback by the adamant deman the U S force levels could not be changed at all when the numbers involved represented only about 1 2 of l% of the tote- defense forces available to South Korea I asked him why the great disparity in military capability between North Korea and South Korea when the South Korean economic capacity was so great President Park responded that the North Korean force buildup had not begun until after we announced our with- drawal policy in 1977 I told him that that information was not accurate according to our own intelligence sources and that it would be impossible to build up so significantly in such a brief span of time I asked him what he could do to increase his forces if he and I could work harmoniously on force levels He has just given his answer and the interpreter is about to put it into English President Park I understand that U S forces cannot stay in Korea forever They must be withdrawn someday but the North Koreans are superior to us now and there has been no change in their policy The most important thing that we can do is to prevent miscalculation What I am asking you for is that no further withdrawal of U S forces take place until the disparity between North Korea and South Korea is changed and until North Korea changes its policy What I want to say is that they should stay for the time being Review on June 30 2009 Extended by Z Brzezinski MSL Reason for Extension NSC l lB a 5 3 President Carter I can't promise that we will freeze force levels I will work jointly with you however on force levels What is the intention of your country to eliminate the disparity not only in force levels as they but also in the rate of the buildup of force levels President Park Even before it became known that North Korea had substantially built up its power we had a Force Improve ment Plan The first phase will end in 1981 We have imple- mented every point of this plan Our intent was that our forces should achieve parity by the end of the first phase if the North Koreans did not augment their own forces ' As you know the North Korean Communists did build up their forces As a result we should have another phase of the Force Improvement Plan As you know we levied a series of defense taxes four years ago to expire in five years I believe now that we will have to extend the taxes another five years after they expire next year We will go ahead with our Force Improvement Plan regardless of whether further withdrawal of U S forces occurs or not but I honestly desire that until North Korea changes its policy that the mainstay of the Second Division remain in South Korea and the Combined Forces Command continue to function The force levels whether in the 100's or in the 1000's is your pre- rogative to decide as President President Carter Would the second phase of the Forces Improvement Plan FIP be designed to match the North Koreans President Park If the North Koreans do not make substantial increases of their own our forces will match theirs President Carter Are you prepared to accept this disparity President Park We would make further efforts President Carter Are you not in that condition now Mr President President Park As time goes by our economic capabilities will grow and the total financial means of the Government will grow By the end of the second stage of the PIP we might be able to accelerate our program President Carter This is obviously a decision for you to make President Park We spend 6% of you spend about 5% of GNP on military requirements while North Korea spends about 20% on defensive and offensive capabilities It is of concern to me that you would want five or six more years to match the North Korean buildup AJequlleiJeo Adoo 3 President Park We would start making further efforts as our own strength grows It doesn't mean we would start increasing spending five or six years later We plan to spend 6% of our GNP Last year a number of supplementary budgets were passed which reduced the percentage of defense spending somewhat Our plan is to spend between 6 and 6 5% of GNP on defense That percentage five years from now would be much higher then due to growth in the economy President Carter Let me pursue one more question Mr President I still see the prospect that the North Korean advantage will continue to increase if your expenditures are maintained wondering if you are willing to accept this situation President Park We cannot tell for sure what percentage of GNP North Korea is now spending on defense The common estimate is 20% But their economy is much smaller Six per cent of our 0 GNP equals 20% of theirs It will be difficult for them to g maintain expenditures at 20% of GNP President Carter I don't want to argue Mr President but if 6% of the South Korean GNP is as much as 20% of North Korea s a how have North Korean forces built up so much more rapidly than 3' yours Our intelligence information is that aid from the Soviern Union and China to North Korea has been very small in recent years o- 3 President Park The North Koreans have a totally different 2 economic social and political structure than ourselves If we spent 20% of our GNP on defense there would be immediate riots The North Koreans can do this but we cannot President Carter I fully realize that South Korea cannot spend 20% of its GNP on defense My need is to see how the Republic of Korea with U S forces levels either stable or not could reduce the disparity with the North The disparity could continue indefinitely and might even get worse U S troops could never be withdrawn President Park It is only an assumption that the North Koreans are Spending 20% of GNP However it is our purpose to strength- en defense to the best of our ability We cannot however do this at the expent of the structure of society and the standard of living of the people Nevertheless we plan to do our best At the moment North Korea is superior to us in some categories of equipment particularly tanks and airplanes But even if they attack the people of South Korea would fight to the end They have no place to go They would win Our primary objec- tive however is to deter an outbreak of war The presence of U S forces deters war and prevents miscalculation Even though we reach parity a continuation of the stationing of forces will still be the best way to deter attack Though disparity exists in our equipment the quality of our forces is better As I said before we will not lose but we would prefer that a war not start in the first place President Carter As you increase your military strength wherr do you see your increases most needed In ground forces or som other element of the force structure President Park Although priorities are difficult to define we give priority to ground forces We are inferior in the air but we can expect immediate assistance from the U S should we be attacked Our priorities are ground forces air forces and the navy in that order President Carter Do you have present plans to build up your ground forces President Park Yes President Carter In personnel levels President Park At the moment we do not plan to increase the number of standing ground forces We have an agreement with the United States signed in 1954 which freezes the level at 600 000 We want to improve the equipment and upgrade the cape- bility of our homeland reserve divisions We also want to our armour and fire power We have-three million members of the ready reserve which can be mobilized in a short time They need better equipment 1 President Carter Do you want to maintain a limit of 600 000 or do you want it removed President Park Of course if we need to increase the number of ground forces we would consult with you The 600 000 man ceiling was set in the past because the forces were maintained by U S grant aid and there had to be some limit Now we receive no grant aid so if we saw a need to increase levels we would consult with you However at the moment we would pre fer to concentrate on equipment The North Koreans for example have over 2 000 tanks We have about 850 President Carter Our impression was that you had 1050r President Park The number may have changed President Carter General Vessey told me this morning that you have more than 1 000 President Park That may be true Mr President we don t think the number of men should increase to match the North Koreans but that we should increase the quality of our equipment par ticularly tanks anti tank weapons like TOWs and aircraft with anti-tank capabilities We are trying also to utilize the terrain to block the enemy We are building fortifications and ditches President Carter My understanding is that you are particularly concerned about the presence of the Second Division and the Combined Forces Command Do you also want the U S to maintain its protective nuclear umbrella as well President Park Yes President Carter If we decide to modify or reduce other force levels you would like adequate notification and consultations President Park Yes President Carter Let me raise another issue that concerns me human rights have studied the question of human rights in South Korea with great attention in an effort to understand your position as best I can I know that you have to maintain the stability of your society and your government My belief is that the people of your country are deeply dedicated to freedom and democratic procedures of government The most serious problem that exists in the attitude of U S citizens toward your country is in the human rights area A few situa- tions here have been greatly exaggerated in our press and through- out our nation To you these things are not so significant but in our country they color the entire attitude We have observed and appreciated the release by you of some students and political activists in recent months In fairness they were also highly publicized in the U S My own wish would be that you could rescind Emergency Measure 9 and release as many prisons you hold as possible Obviously I have no desire or ability to influence your decision other than to express my opinion of the tremendous improvements that would occur in U S relations if these measures could be taken It may not be possible for you to take such action but if you could it would permit you and me to wipe out the unpleasant picture of your country that Americans have It is a shame that one of our strongest and most valued allies and one of the finest nations on earth should be regarded critically in the U S because of this one issue Perhaps you could explain to me your reason for the situation and what might be done President Park I have great admiration for your human rights policy throughout the world and the Spirit behind it I would like to suggest however that you cannot apply the same yard stick to all countries Every country has unique circumstances You cannot apply the same yardstick to countries whose security is threatened as to countries whose security is not You went to the front line area Mr President and drove back to Seoul Our capital is only 25 miles from the DMZ Right across the DMZ hundreds of thousands of soldiers are poised We have suffered a tragic war We must deal with the situation whether we like it or not otherwise we might fall into the same situa- tion as the Vietnamese Some time ago several members of Congress came to call on me I told them that if dozens of Soviet divisions were deployed at Baltimore the U S Govern ment could not permit its people to enjoy the same freedoms they do now If these Soviets dug tunnels and sent commando units into the District of Columbia then U S freedoms would be more limited We support the human rights policy Respect for human rights is also our concern I want as much freedom for our people as possible But the survival of 37 million people is at stake and some restraint is required Some reporters in the American press say that I wield dictatorial powers As you have observed I am applying limited restraints If we lifted EM-B and released prisoners the effect on our relationship would be favorable and I would be able to meet with you in a much lighter frame of mind But people are trying to overturn this government and we cannot let that that happen We have released those who showed repentance and will release more I hope you will understand that we cannot take these measures all at once President Carter Is it your response that you would have to continue to_impose President Park I hope you will understand but it is difficult to rescind EM-9 at this point Of course we don't intend to maintain it indefinitely I will heed your advice and do more in that direction but I cannot take these measures at this time If I took these measures I would be praised in America and people would say they were taken in consultation with you President Carter This is all I have Mr President Is there anything more that you would like to raise AJeJqu Jeiiec Adoc m - 7 President Park I understand your concern in this regard and will do my best President Carter What I want is to remove all problems that exist between us I respect your responsibilities I don't want to attempt to impose my will on your own Only you can judge the importance of these measures                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005 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