e same HRS 2 7 OCT 1 979- - - War 3 3 4 Hm SUBJECT Korean Situation and Future us MEMORANDUMCU Background On 25 October 1979 Republic of Korea ROK President Pak Chung Hui con- vened a meeting of senior ROK security and cabinet officials concerned with internal domestic security KCIA Director Kim Chae Kyu Presidential Security Force Director Cha Chi Chol Blue House Senior Secretary Kim Kye Won and several cabinet ministers were in attendanCe During the meeting President Pak severely criticized the officials present for failure to keep him informed on the current domestic situation He accused the ROK security services of being inaccurate in their assessments of the domestic situation He felt the primary problem was a lack of communication between the Blue House and the p0pulation The President directed the situation be corrected and that a Complaint Bureau be established When Director Kim of the KCIA returned to his office after the meeting with Pak he was very depressed His depression had been growing over 3 three months as civil unrest had increased 0n the evening of 26 October 1979 at about 6 President Pak Director Kim Security Force Chief Cha and Presidential Secretary Kim met at a house run by the KCIA for dinner - During the dinner KCIA Director Kim and Presidential Security Chief Cha got into an argument over security matters Reportedly President Pak tried to stop the argument Reports indicate the Director of the KCIA drew a pistol and shot at Cha President Pak and Cha were both hit The President's Secretary Kim Kye Won placed the wounded President in his car and rushed him to a hospital He died enroute - General Law Deputy Commander Combined Forces Command has indicated to the US Embassy that it was the Chief of Presidential Security Che not KCIA Director-Kim -who shot the President - The Ambassador believes this impassioned argument theory has conSiderabl plausibility based on the temperament of the KCIA and Security Chief The South Korean government has taken the following actions - The Prime Minister Choi Kyu ha has been named acting President - Martial law has been declared but Cheju island has been exempted 'This exception allows civilian control of the government to continue Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung Hwa has been named martial law administrator RR Iii-Ma 0720 f Mai-2 2 All military leaders have pledged their support of President Choi Opposition leaders have expressed their regrets and are playing a wait and see game - Horth KOrea has annoonced Parkis death but no outward signs of attack preparations or unusual military activity have been noted The Korean pOpulace remains calm curfew has been estended from 2205 to business is functioning normally the people are somber-and quiet The Future Evidence provided so far does not support reports of a military coup but neither does it rule out the We do not know and may never know exactly what happened if the above fit of rage explanation is correct it does not rule out Army Chief of 'Staff Chong or some other determined individual attempting to turn the situation to his advantage Acting President Choi is a professorial type whose limitations are widely recOgnized indeed he is already reported to have commented upon the heaVy responsibility which has suddenly been thrust upon him - General Chong is a man of energy honesty -drive and determination He reportedly has wide support among ROK colonels and below For his reformist initiatives but many general officers apparently resent those same eftOrts - KCIA seems to be rapidly disappearing at the none too tender hands of its archriyai the Defense Security Command The latter is in charge of the ongoing investigation and is arresting members wholesale Under the constitution the 3 000 member National Committee tOr Unification - which functions something like an electoral college should meet within 90 days to elect a new president The_etfectiveness of this procedure is problematic US Policy A few reports record Korean comments that perhaps this is the time to move toward a more democratic system and certainly from our perspective this would be the best possible result However nothing in Korea's long and turbulent history has prepared them to accept compromise as a political modus yiyendi and the continued severe North Korean threat also militates against a functioning western style democracy 'Neverthel ss Korea and Koreans have di5piayed a remarkable adaptivity -especiaily over the last l8 years under President Park Through sensitiVe and judicious advice we may be able to affect the flow of Korean events at the margins toward a more Open system Our best course of action will be at best initially to 3 remain cautious wait and see who emerge as potential leaders and be clear but discr p in exerting our influence In the long run we want a strong respOnsibTe independent ally in Korea one that will be a model not only of western economic develOpment but also of the democratic political system Such a development would benefit both the west as a whole and the Korean people as individuaiss In the short run we want to avoid even the appearance of manipulating a puppet Fortunately these goals are c0mpatible In sum our current posture shouid be threefold by out ally to discourage North Korean rashness IThis has already begun in our strong and promEt press statement and in the demarches to Beijing and Moscow - - Cautious observatiOn of emerging political currents in Korea Praising President Park's accomplishments as apprOpriate but also dis- cretely inserting an occasional reference to his personal integrity which was unquestioned and to democracy or the Open system toward which he was steering his country which may in fact be debatable but will be to our purpose to assume - Private communication to the new leadership as they are identified of our hopes for a Settlement of recent political tensions and the institu tionalization of the give and take and open communicatiOns of a truly democratic society We should stress the long-term strength the resiliency of democracy compared to the brittleness of aut0cratic regimes We would not expect any significant change in Korean defense policy 3 Drafter Brig Gen T C x54175                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu