I 1 I RECOMMEND FULL RELE AS Doc #20 Dos MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From Cyrus Vance Harold Brown @333 ward WW 2 0 DEC i979 Subjett The Situation in the Republic of Korea have asked that we weigh in strongly and without delay to ensure continuation of civilian rule and preserve command relationships in Korea We believe our central objectives at this stage are threefold to prevent a dangerous disintegration of army unigg to preserve the momentum toward broadly-based democratic government under orderly civilian leadership and to deter North Korea from adventurism through A keeping the ROK military strong and focused on preserving ROK independence The latter will require buttressing the image of President Choi and the cabinet as much as possible Ambassador Gleysteen and General Nickham have under instruction moved without delay to pursue these objectives in a forceful manner Gleysteen has seen the President the new Prime Minister the most powerful civilian figure in the new government and General Chun Tu-hwan the leading figure among the insurgent generals group General Wickham has seen almost all of the other key senior military players The message has been a stiff one stressing the importance of moving ahead with orderly civilian political procesSes and avoiding any further action which might jeopardize unity within the military To the generals we have let it be known that a military-led reversal of political progress or military takeover of the government would have grave consequences for-future cooperation between our governments and military establishments To the civilian cabinet we have also stressed the importance of establishing a clear public timetable for constitutional change and national elections and have now been assured that President Choi will announce such a timetable on Friday At present the situation has stabilized at least temporarily The greatest danger probably lies in the possibility for further unraveling of the military chain of command and additional direct moves or countermoves by segments of the military after the bottle was uncorked by the actions of one group on the night of December 12 If this can be prevented military affairs may return gradually to normal although with new leadership Those now calling the tune in the military are competent and well trained The major uncertainties concern their political views and ambitions pal - 070 7 Sec Def Cont Nr At the moment they are defensive about their aims General Chun Tu-hwa has pledged to Ambassador Gleysteen that the military will stay out of 'politics and the new Army Chief of Staff has publicly repeated that pledge on December l8 Since little purpose is served by challenging their sincerity we are making it clear that we will judge them by their deeds It remains to be seen whether their involvement can be as limited as they now claim Meanwhile the civil government has regained some of its momentum and Ambassador Gleysteen has pressed President Choi to announce on Friday in his inaugural speech a definite timetable for constitutional reform and new elections thus providing a framework which will be greatly reassuring to the Korean people Most political discussion of this topic in Korea has assumed that about one year would be appropriate to carry out these transitional tasks in an orderly manner Since the events of December l2 President Choi has proceeded to announce his new cabinet largely composed of neutral figures and includ ing several persons who are very reassuring to dissident and opposition groups Three places were determined by the younger generals though only three and those not clearly filled with their own group Also in the past few days there has been further dismantling'of'the indictments and prosecutions against opposition figures and an announce- ment that the remaining amnesties under the now abolished Emergency Measure No 9 will be granted at the time of the inaugural Thus we do not see any immediate evidence of a move to stop the political process to turn the clock back Your message of congratulation to President Choi will be helpful in buttressing his position and the commitment to political evoiution The Violation of Command Relationships After Army Chief of Staff Chung's guards resisted his arrest on the evening of December 12 and some Capital Security Command forces tried to stop the forceful action launched by the younger generals one of the generals involved in the insurgent planning brought a regiment of the Ninth Division normally deployed in a reserve role north of the capital- into Seoul to help secure the situation in the early hours of December l3 The Ninth Division is part of the Third ROK Army which is operationally under the Combined Forces Command Although the movement of this small force did not in itself jeopardize Korean defenses John Wickham impressed on senior RDK military officers in the most forceful way the grave danger of actions which break the chain of command and invite schisms which could seriously erode the command and control within the military General Nickham has requested an official explanation of this apparent violation of the spirit and legal intent of the Combined Forces Command arrangements In this instance of course the Korean chain of command itself was badly breached It was that serious breach which by extension in the case of the unit of the Ninth Division meant that the CFC chain was also violated We find both aspects equally serious and have made these points strongly While we believe that key themes of our policy concerns have now been fully conveyed to all relevant actors in Korea we will look carefully at discretionary areas of cooperation with the ROK military in coming weeks until we are fully reassured that military unity and cooperation are being maintained and that the government is being allowed to pursue constructive policies of democratic development After President Choi's announcement on December 21 of a timetable for constitutional revision and elections General Hickham will convey to the new military group that their support for this process will be the first significant test by which we will determine our cooperation in these matters                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu