I 3 6187 8024441 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL x3 8024442 WASHINGTON 9 6 mm 1 UNCLASSIFIED WITH November 21 1980 CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT 0 MEMORANDUM FOR t1 0 Peter Tarnoff 1l 7 Executive Secretary 2 Department of State 13 SUBJECT MEMCON with Kim Kyong Won OLD Attached for your information is a Memorandum of ersatio nz between Dr Brzezinski and Kim Kyong Won of Korea Christine Dodson Staff Secretary p1 5 ltv 5 Attachment r95 5 24 UNCLASSIJFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT DEGASSIFIED ww a' I WW of 10 DECLASSIFIED Authority 5% 3 5S 6187 El THE WHITE HOUSE 8024442 WASHINGTON - MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Subject Summary of Dr Brzezinski's Meeting with Kim Kyong Won PARIICIPANTS Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Donald Gregg NSC Staff Member for East Asia Kim Kyong Won Secretary General for the Blue House Kim Yong Shik Korean Ambassador Park Kun Woo Korean Counsellor DATE TIME November 18 1980 5 30 - 5 45 p m PLACE Dr Brzezinski's Office After an exchange of pleasantries Dr Brzezinski said that he had two basic points to make and that he would welcome a response from Kim First Dr Brzezinski said that he felt that it was time for the US and Korea to place their security relationship into a broader context Dr Brzezinski said he felt that our relations must be viewed against the background of what has been happening in Europe and the Persian Gulf He said that he feels that there are now three strategic zones in the world that are of key concern to the US--Western EurOpe East Asia and more recently the Persian Gulf Dr Brzezinski noted that Afghanistan and Iran are no longer buffer states in the Middle East and that the question of security in that area has become of acute concern since Soviet dominance of that regiOn could directly influence the other two zones both of which depend on the Middle East for oil Dr Brzezinski also spoke with concern of the Soviet use of VTEEnamese proxies in Indo China and noted that the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea could be considered a second pincer Afghanistan being the other aimed at cutting out Western influence and access to the Persian Gulf area C Dr Brzezinski said that new forms of consultation between the US and Korea will have to be devised to deal with these interrelated problems and that the question of Korea's security can no longer be thought about in isolation C For his second point Dr Brzezinski turned to the Kim Dae Jung case Be said that US support for the Republic of Korea will be undercut if Kim is executed Dr Brzezinski said that the US has a strong feeling of kinship with Korea deriving from our strategic interests and the history we have lived through together 051mm may Dr Brzezinski Fgougomo vmzolo - In c 0 Ex 3 63 3 1 Dr 3 Bass NSC '1o13 la DECLASSIFIED Authority 3 55 He said that Korea's international reputation would be badly damaged by what would be perceived as a political not a criminal verdict Dr Brzezinski said that we have kept our pressure private rather than public out of deference to the Korean courts but that our concern runs very high Dr Brzezinski said that he could not predict specifically what the damage to US-Korean relations would be but that it would be more than marginal Dr Brzezinski also said that he had indications that the incoming Reagan administration feels very much the same about the Kim case Dr Brzezinski said that the Japanese also are very much concerned over Kim's fate and asked that Kim convey these views to President Chun C In response gig said that he fully agreed with Dr Brzezinski's depiction of the need for a broader strategic acnsideration of RDK-US relations He said that he felt that new links should be forged gig then turned to the subject of the Security Consultative Meeting SCM which has been delayed by US concern over the Kim case and developments since December 12 1979 i2_said that holding of an SCM during the last month of 1980 would send a strong signal to North Korea and would also place the US-ROK security relationship in a broader context C Turning to Dr Brzezinski's second point gig_said that the Kim Dae Jung case was still pending in the courts and that it would go to President Chun for final resolution some time in December gig said the case was complicated and sensitive and he could not predict what Chun would do Eim_said that the Korean military was putting strong pressure on Chun to execute Kim Dae Jung and that Chun would have to take this pressure into account as he makes his decision gig said that the Western press had missed a major point in its narrow focus on the Kim Dae Jung case this was that Korea had come through an extraordinarily difficult year in very good shape It had not become another Iran in the wake of President Park's assassination Cl Br Brzezinski responded that Korea did deserve to be congratulated for what it had achieved in many spheres He said that no abstract American standard could be applied to other countries but that because Korea had done so well it would be tragic if such a record were damaged by Kim's execution Speaking personally Dr Brzezinski said that the Koreans would be well advised not to the Kim Dae Jung case develop into a cliff hanger I where the pressures became so intense that any solution would be heavily criticized He urged that measures be taken so that the case could be resolved sooner rather than later and that it not be allowed to degenerate into a no-win situation Dr Brzezinski referred to the case of Ali Bhutto in Pakistan noting that President Zia had not wanted to execute the man Pressures had built up and the case dragged along for such a length of time that the no-win situation developed and Zia reluctantly authorized Bhutto's execution Dr Brzezinski urged that the Koreans avoid such a situation C -2- DECLASSIFIED - Authority 3 CON-FEW gig replied that he very much appreciated the fact that the US had kept its feelings on the Rim case in private channels He commented that the western press did not seem to be so concerned at the possible fate of the gang of four in the PRC Dr Brzezinski noted that they were being tried under a different system and that Korea to be consistent with its own record and international standard should not proceed with what would be perceived internationally as a political execution C Kim passed along a letter from President Chun to President Carter expressing regrets over results of the US election U The meeting ended after both Dr Brzezinski and Kim expressed the hope for more meetings in the future U                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu