DECLASSI FIED Authority m3 7gzi-Downgraded To SECRET E0 11652 KGIJS l L' uihdrizcd By H of July 21 19 nuclear weapons I FOREJGIS SERVICE 3 August4 1975W i- - ma a M I appreciate very much the opportunity given me by your letter n- I consists of pages of UNITED STATES Pum- Serles 2 4 i Americ I 8 I August 5 1960 on the policy governing the storage of It may well be that present policy as outlined in your letter best meets United States interests but I 2 would have less doubts of this if a high level review of this policy I could be made taking into account the following points I and Other Nate Allies I the clandestine storage of A policy which treats 'm Charade Hypo woman-cm 936 E012 - STATE DEPT DECLAFSIFECATEOM REVIEW Retain class n Ivan B White Esquire 4 8471 DocIdz589306 It is my understanding that the United States will not store nuclear warheads in any other Nato country without the agreement of the country conc Agreement with and do not preclude introduction and storage of nuclear weapons but that the United States will not store nuclear weapons in Canada with- out the consent of the Canadian Government States considered unacceptable the risks which would be involved if so other Nata ally would it seems to me have to be Justified on 't rTe basis that the importance of having nuclear warheads in sufficiently vital to the United States to outweigh the risks involved should the clandestine storage of these warheads be discovered the falidity of such a justification which I believe requires review It is possible that the competent Defense Dep would hold that the storage of nuclear warheads in important than in Canada which was consulted in advance and in fact less important than in many-if not all other Nato countries each of which would be consulted in advance The paragraph from Philip J Farley's letter of July 17 1959 to William E Lan Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs OASD quoted in your letter accurater evaluates the probable Deputy- Assistant Secretary for European Affairs - Department - Washm' etantT-r out -- -v I also understand that both the Defense the Leased Bases Agreement with Canada if Presumably the United 0 nuclear warheads in Canada was discovered huh I a0'0 JP less favorably than Canada on camp-u - fficials is less 1 a uh soz 5x5 can impact - E02 5x6 OSD 3 al I 0 1 193 slum-in snag-oases Dace 3-25-2015 DECLASSHHED Lu Au xw yaruijisgiSJQ 2 Lg9 an '2 -%625x5 OSD I 'E025x6 OSD Department of State gran-us 1 Draw - - impact'of the disclosure of the storage of nuclear warheads I withOut prior eement particularly during peace time on- United StatesJ lrelations In addition the possibil- a ity'of ithdrawal from Nate in protest should not be overlOpked 5 Although the probable impact-on other ocuntries iS'outside my area of responsibility a dramatic row with over this issue oeuld be expected to have an unfortunate effect on our friends and allies to affect adversely our interests as far as neutrals are concerned and to provide a propaganda field day for our enemies NewFSituation in his letter of September 30 71 1959 is that prior Would multiply the risks becoming knoWn to the reason he gave for recon - _The_major point made by 1957 and confirmed in consultation with the of thefpresenoe of these weapons in Soviets This is certainly true and iaf pending against priOr consultation _ IfImportant as secrecy is in these matters there seems to be greater flexibility now_than in l957 'For example the press has Ecarried reports on the agreement with Canada regarding the storage of nuclear weapons there 7The Soviets should have no difficulty in figuring out there in Canada at least some of these weapons will probably be Stored The communique following the December 1957 Nate Ministerial meeting and the public announcement regarding the Ato 'c ner COo'eration and cleardindicatiens of our intentions 'Furthermore 3 ov1e the safe side must assume that the United_States g already has nuclear Weapons in storage in Under the circumstances whatever increased risk of disclosure is involved in consulting the Government'would not seem of great importanCe a urge important new element in the situation is that the Foreign Minister in June 1960 formall asked Whether the_' United States hadyatomic weapons stored in land whether atomic ff rere carried through gj June 21 1950 This interest would indicate the likeli- - hOOd of a comparable question at some future time Hardboiled and V jfind it difficult'to visualize our infor A 'the Government of we have no nuclear Warheads in if Incidentally DocId 589306 trealisti as the United State appibaOh to this prOblem muSt QECLASSIFIED AuthOFityW mug 0 w jQM E025x6 Department of State Incidentally Istatement in his September 30 I_l957g letter that '1 we are ever found out it will be under I circumstances that would make accusations of deception and bad faith inconsequential in comparison with what would be happening is certainly true if disclosure occurred when hostilities were 1 1 'imminent but would not be true if disclosure occurred in peace time Security Problem There is some uestion in mind as to how minimal the risk of the llearning of the storema 5 nuclear warheads wou1d be The security problem at the base is complicated by the small size of the secure areas the accessibility of the base to the public the small cemmunity atmos- phere there with everyone knowing to a large extent what is going on and the speculation which newsand stricter security regulations might arouse Position on Storage of Nuclear Werheads boncern as stated in his letters over prior - consultation with the was based on the fear 5 disclosure rather than the pessibility of a negative reply from I In fact such a pc sibility was not mentioned I I do not believe_that it is possible to predict with any certainty what the response of the would bev to a request to store nuclear warheads here without prior informal discussion of the matter with the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister From the oint of View of respect for the rights and soverw eigntx o l the fact that it might not agree to the storage r er haplear weapons here could be considered as making prior consulta- uf ticha the more necessany In reviewing Urited St tee policy regarding the storage of nuclear warheads in it is suggested that the following swelternatites be considered l - ozsxs oso 1 that facilities OSD Department of State I nab DocId 589305 DECLASSHHED mirin that facilities for the storage of nuclear weapons if required and not yet built 'j cted that nuclear ' capable weapons be stored in qungmm ired and that no nuclear warheads he's or in without the prior agreement of the 41 2 that unless vital military requirements would not be met or unacceptable logistic problems would result the question of moving nuclear Warheeds_intc be hi postponed until hostilities appeared imminent under which circumstances the possibility of objections on the part of would be minimized and 3 that should a review of Ur ted Stat policy result in 1 a deci ion not to request prion agreement for the sterage of nuclea Warheads the introduction of such warheads intoi lbe delayed if feasible until hoStilities ere imminent _Aithoughyquf' re3ent policy may be the best we can develop 7 1 I would comfortable if a good hard look at it could be 111 I best regards Sincerely E025x5 oso E025x6 OSD Department of State v DocId 589306