otr LASSI 1C O ··---- E O •• • • • 11 r- '11 11 1 • • 't •r- lr ·• l Sed Hi JU ' '' ul TELCON President Mr Kissinger 6 24 12 lZ ZS p m RN Henry how did the briefing go HAK I think it RN Was there a great deal of interest w t very well HAK Oh yes I thought it would e a Jiv or 10 kept me for 45 minq tes the pre ss t1om · inute thing--they RN What kind of questio as did th-ey ask and what kind did you dodge laughing HAK I dodged them in a way--I didn1t say a damn thing but I made it sound terribly profound RN Did you get across the point which I think i's very important you know that our r elations with them are very good--thatJs the thi g HAK Oh yes RN That1 s the think that I think will really bust or burn the Soviet1 s ass and also it will make these people HAK Oh yes I got that across-- said first of all I want to thank --on the Presidentts behalf--the leaders of the People'ls Republic for the extraordinarily courteous reception we received--then I described our program which in itselflis made them a little pop-eyed-Then I said things are moving forward n all fronts--there would be more exchanges more trade and then I said RN Did you make the point that those initiatives that were offered to the Soviets were offered to them or did you not want to do that HAK I did not want to do that comparison RN I see--that is probably just as well too--burn the ass of the Soviets HAK Well we don1t want to burn the ss of the Soviets RN That's right thati's what I mean r ·· • lb r L ' '' ul TELCON President HAK Page Z HAK Also it would annoy the Chinese to think that they were sort of laggin g behind RN bn Vietnam-- HAK Oh god about 50 o--I said nothing--ever since we came into office the President has asserted that negotiations were the bext way of ending the war--we are proc ding on that course They said well will negotiations start soon-· %u know I wanted to set up what you were going to say on Friday so I said gentlemen it is not a question of procedure it is a question of substance--as soon as we have made some progress of assuring ourselves some substance thefe will be negotiations and we will then announce it And we are working on that inten si vely RN Very good very good HAK Then they said did you discuss it with the Clfnese leaders and I said yes at great length and I said but I want you to understand these are men of principles --they don't share our views on Vietnam but that isn't the problem the problem is whether with everyone · recognizing the need for peace it is possible to find a formula • • end tape 1 Begin new tape of 6 24 72 - #3 K ••• without saying a damn thing P Well as · a matter of fact things are going on Henry K Well of course Mr President something tremendous is going on P Sure sure K I talked to P Oh tell me apout K Slobbering all over me saying how serious his leaders are and when can I let him how whether we are ready to negotiate I said on Monday I'll give him an answer Because I think we should first notify the North Vietnamese They shouldn't hear it from them P What will the gameplan be there Henry Dbb gain 1 hls morning t •• • •• II••• 111 •1 'u I• • - t t n$1 1 0 f O 2 Sed 3 6 ' ' '' TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 2 5 p m June 2 4 1972 K The gameplan is that Monday we will tell the North Vietnamese we accept·· the 13th p For a public session K Right And the 18th or 19th for a private session They said will private talks start again today I said we never talk about private talks ·but of course we don't stand on p odedural issues we'll explore every channel - - P Right Now when will the announcement of the fact of the public talks be made in your opinion K Well it's up to you You should make it on your press conference on Thursday P I think that would be good don't you K That's what I had planned if you were willing P Here 1 s what I thought -- that we could make the troop announcement maybe Wednesday low key - How does that sound to you K Excellent P Rathe·r than doing it in the press thing Otherwise the interest in the press conference we build up too much And the troop announcement will go down K f Oh no I think you should do-the troop thing on Wednesday and then follow it on Thursday night-- an d I wouldn't make it as a formal announcement P Answer to a question you mean K Because that would annoy them P Just an answer to a question K Yeah because you are sure -to get it In any event you can plant it P Oh I don't worry we'll get it and I'll see that it's planted too K Right 'I••• II• •1 '11 1 1 L_ t- 1 ·• 1 •·• • 1 1 F-1 ' '' ul TE CON ' - Otr l S$1 1 0 E O 2 Sed Ui Page 4 The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 P• m June 24 1972 P And then I just say yes we are going back to public talks on the 13th K On the 13th P Well K Right Well another thing is Dobrynin Ylhen he talked to me this morning he had just received a message and he said you-- you remember you told Brezhnev t the grain deal in your last discussion P Yeah K He said they've considered it and there's a man coming over on ruesday to conclude a grain deal P laughter K You know that's another result of the China trip P Uh-huh K Cause as soon as we do something to China they feel they've got to do something towards us But they want us to keep that secret until it 1s concluded P That's right we don't heed that now K Well we get i concluded by the end of July I'm sure P It seems to me that Peterson's trip --I've just been sitting here as you talked -- should be scheduled right after the Democratic Conventic m K That's right P We start grabbing the news K That's when w e have it scheduled the 15th P Maybe then cause_I won't be back from California till then --wait a minute the 15th that's while their Convention is just ending and that's a little soon 'I don't want to have hi s arrival -- K We '11 put it off a week you prepare me a little bit of answer on that God ott l $$1 1 0 • · ••• •• '11•1• Ill• 1 - 1111 I E O 2 Sed 3Ji ' '' 1 1 11 TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 P But what I want him to do --I think what he could would be to-Because we're going to stay iri California over the weekend after the Convention because I've got to meet the Teamsters out there K Right When are you planning to come back P Tuesday after the Convention That would be the 17th or 18th or something like that K Right P Which will give a little more time for all of us we all need that K Oh God · yes P So Peterson might even come out there but anyway don't have him go You can give Peterson a ring and say that I thought of this but I don't want him to leave and be in Moscow right at the time the Convention because nobody is going to pay any a ention I want him to go right afterwards K Good We'll do it a week later We'll just slip it a week P Or rirlght even slip it 4 or K Right But it woUld be useful to announce it say the Tuesday after the Convention and then leave on Friday or Saturday P Right right K Well we've got this thing humming now P How is the offensive coming The Hue offensive I went out today looking over the disaster areas of Pennsylvania -- K They've knocked out 22 tanks yesterday P My God I can't believe it They're doing something because they knocked up 15 earlier in the week K Mr President Abrams has certainly learned one thing He had 91 B-52 _sttikes around Hue yesterday P laughter s· days that's about all ot t LAS$1f1 0 •• 1 I l • 1• lila 1 11 l1 I E O Sed 3 F i IU ct O o ul TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 Page 6 K 91 Mr President We had lO -- that's three times as many as we used to do in all of Vietnam P Is that right K Yeah P K I 1ll bet he's glad that we forced him to take those B-52s don't you think M' Oh God Tha Commander took me around that B-52 base You cannot believe it Those ·B-52s are stacked one on top of another It is absolutely awe inspiring P Did you meet any of the men K Yes P How's their moral K Tremendous P Is it K Oh yes They have a B-52 strike in Vietnam now every 41 minutes P Oh boy Listen Henzy this is punishing these people believe me K I would say that if these 100 B-52s are dropping their· bombs at random without even aiming at anything they've got to hit something if it's in such a concentrated area P Sure sure sure Well around Hue -- Well look what's already happened Anloc saved Komtum saved K Yeah p' Iiroi entally one thing though Abrams has got to tell Thieu he's got to get that goddatnn 21st Div ision into Anloc It's just ridiculous that's becoming a laughing stock don't you think K Oh yeah But we told them every other week Mr President There's something deeply wrong there He's got to replace that ill Corps Commander I think incidentally Mr President we ought to send Haig out there for two reasons One to give us an assessment For three reasons Two to make sure we and Thieu are together on the •••• •• •1 ' 1• • ' •t-L·• ul Qtl' l $1f1 0 E O 2 Sed U PJ ct li • 1 1 TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 K cont'd P Good I'm all for it and when do you think he should go K I think he ought to go maybe Thursday P negotiations And three it will just show even more activity Sure That's good That a MOuncement can go-- you know what I mean that'll be very very -good · q K Jus before your press coJ lfere ce we'll announce it P We'll have so much damn stuff going on there'll be smoke in their eyes K Exactly And it's all real too it's not just maneuvering P I know I know K Because we haV'e to be you know in some sort of agreement with them P Yeah yeah that's right Good And also to look at the military situation kick Abrams in the ass a little and Thieu and the rest I've been constantly telling --when the Vietnamese Ambassador left and he said what do you want me to tell our President I said just as soon as he can he must launch some kind of an offensive You've got to launch an offensive K Right Well they're planning that for the 28th P Are they K Yeah• P You mean on Quang Trior what K Yes P You know they might find that there's a lot of paper up there They may just go K The problem may be we may find them in North Vietnam before the next three months are over P Do you think so · •• • - • • IIL • ••• 1 t- l•• wl ot r l S $1 1 0 E O 1 2 d 3 5 p l ctY • 1 11 T LCON 'rhe PresidentfMr Kissinger 12 25 p m JWle 24 1972 Yeah Oh absolutelY • Until we get K That's right They are no good on the offensive that's the only thing that stops this P Well I know That's what I thought tanks were for And we have a iot of tanks out there now haven't we • K I thi K 0 • • 0 we ought to let then1 go 0 a settl m ent ' 'p Ji · Yeah But they are just not aggressive on the offensive They are fighting very weU ·o t'iothe defensive 0 0 • • I P Uin-humm ·I'm ·worrl d about SALT I think that· it's important ne we e k that you sort of pick up the threads of that and get Buckley Jackson and all those guys or ·the ones you can back of -- K Well Jackson has sort of simmered down a lot Right now he's on a _sort of a nitpicking kick _ easically That's right But having some argument about SALT is fine Did yoil get a chance to read what I said about it P Yes outstanding P Haig' s people did a hellva job in preparing the talking points but I added a little You see what I'm thinking about is to change the emphasis To change the emphasis to basically from well if we don't get this offensive weapons then I've got to --then Laird says I've got to oppose this Well that gives the impression that this is a bad deal for us K Exactly P We've got to say this deal is good for us period Good for the security of the United States But two tpe security of the United States also requires the ether And third if you want real arms limitation the gig step it requires is second I mean let's stick it right to them K I think that'·s ·exactly right P They didn't ask you about that in your conference today did they K No ' a• • • • '•·•••••·· l•oC• t l $1 1 0 E O 2 Sed 3 IU ' '' ull TELCON The President Mr s singer 12 25 p m · June 24 1972 Page 9 P Well then we've probably got that pretty well simmered down K There was no question about that It was all either China or Vietnam Oh they were fascinated China still is the fascinating •• P It is it is K But I think we'll get good stories tomorrow I didn't go overboard because I don't want to nee phe Russians too much P Oh no I'm going to write a handwritten note to Chou En lai K That would be very good P And of course we'll photostatit so you can see it and have a copy K I shoulkl get it delivered P Yeah yeah that's what I mean But it will be a handwritten note and I'll photostat·it and you can deliver it That's one of the grace notes he'll appreciate K Very much P I don't think the Russians would particularly appreciate one do you K No it's no longer necessary with them P However never fail to find an opportunity to write Brezhnev so that he feels that he and I are writing K Oh yeah No we owe him a letter now And I've invited Dobrynin to come out to the West Coast p Very good We'll give him a personal message there I should get a letter off to Brezhnev every three weeks or so you know about just s orne damn thing K Right Oh there '11 be plenty of occasions I think once we get the talks started we ought to do it again P You think we've got Rogers positioned properly Qtr l $$1 1 0 · 1• 1 1 'l•1• 1 I E O 1 1 11 l1 I II - f Sed 3 fi --- IU ' '' uJ TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 Page 10 K Oh yeah When he left at the airport today he said there's no sign of any progress on the North Vietnamese P Oh K Actually he was too tough P He said it was t0o pessimistic K But that's all right P There's no reason for him to say that because he knows there is going to be progress doesn't he We told him K Yeah Well he just isn't very subtle P Ifilie d aid Look I'm just not going to talk about it we're working boy Oh - that 1s all right -·· on it K Well I left the impression that a hellva· lot was going on Mr President P With Rogers Henry I meant we didn't cover a thing except the real meat Except you know who's going to do what when We didn't tell him the dates did we K No no we'll have to notify him P Well those must be kept and also the troop withdrawal thing K Well that you've told him P Yeah 1 just wonder if on that-- Well I think 10 000 is right K We shouldn't do more We cannot · P' I don't mean more I'm thinking of less K Yeah We'-v e P Oh have we K Yeah cl ared it wi Abrams now so we should let it go a• • • •• '•··· •• r r • t llft •••' t- lr •a ul QEI' LA$SI 1r O E O 1 2 Sed 3Ji IU c O o uJ il·tli TELCON The President Mr Kis inger· 1Z Z5 p m June 2A 1972 v 'iA Ojjr J$l IV Page 11 P Cause I'm goi Iig to be gotten off this kick that it's got to be at a certain numb r a month sort of •• you know they'll react to that but the point is My God we've already cut the rate and we're cutting it again• K That's right We've got to as we get down to -- P Otherwise we'll be to zero K That's right P This puts Exactly Just a shade below actually P· What do we have in Korea K 43 00 P Well see there we are Incidentally that should be a subtle point made when the troop cut thing is done This means we now have less than in Korea K Yeah I think that's a good point P I have a feeling this all-volunteer thing Bill didn't react to it pa rticularly but I think that's mean something to people what do you think K That means a hellva lot more than troop levels What people are worried about isn't troop levels but whether their son is going P Even if ere'_s only 6 being killed i f they think well he doesn't have to go to Vietnam unles he's a volunteer I think that's something It's a very good thing to hit Well · I hope you get a good rest and see your kids I'll bet they're excited about going West again K Oh they are really thrilled by it P When will they come down - ' Ulil befo e J- we know it to about what we have in Korea right now ot t l $1 1 0 - •• • • IIL • u•'l'_ • ul IU c• • 1 1 f O l -8 Sed U r TEL CON The President Mr Kissinger ·12 25 p m June 24 1972 r f I · lit Page lZ K Friday morning I don't know when we are going Friday P We're going Friday afternoon about 3 00p m or so I just can't tell tilll see how much I have to scrap up because o£ Congress K Yeah Well they're coming Friday morning then P There's a terrible problem with the debt limit and those bastards may stick around and force o stay a day But if so they ought to go out with Bus -- They wottldn't mind staying a day in Washington with you anyway would they K No not at all P Have they seen the Pandas K I don't think so P Why don't you plan to take them out to see the Pandas on Friday Wouldn't that be great K That would be great P There's an idea You didn't see the Pandas did you K Yeah I've seen them P I haven't But anyway you ought to take your youngsters or maybe we'll have --I don't think Tricia has seen them -- we'll have Tricia take them out to see the Pandas and that's a hell of a China story K That would be great P Mention that to Bob at his convenience Everytime we can touch up the China thing we should touch it up a little K I think that would be terrific P Because when you really come down to it sure we disagree on Vietnam but this China thing is a lead up back on what we've done in these 4 years It's still going t o be the biggest thing we've done over the long haul K It's made everything else go l ECLASSIFI ED Authority _ D -9 -- __ j ZL P Byot1 NARA Date Page 13 TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 P But also there is a different relationship with China they need us K Exactly P They need us K Well I told Haig this morning they are our best ally right now except on Vietnam P You know come to think of it they are K Because they are tough P Yeah I have another thought that might be of interest In this case rather than my writing or maybe if you think I should I think we ought to get a note to about a dozen of the top people in these estate types about your visit to China What do you think K Yeah that might not be a bad idea P Right We can say I just wanted to give you a report on Dr Kissinger's visit to China K At least the reliable ones Heath McMahon -- P Heath McMahon and I think you could even cover the Mexican President in a thing like this K No that son-of-a-bitch has really not behaved too well P You mean he's kicking about our -- K Well he got after us again in New York P You mean about not helping Latin American -- K Yeah and that you didn't seem to know much about thi salinity issue P Oh I didn't see that K Yeah P I didn't know about it Christ I knew too much that's why I didn't want to make the deal They fear our assessment of the Soviet Union I think it ought to come from you It's inexcusable DECLASSIFIED ' Authority _D 2-9 ---­ Byai1 NARA Date - 2-1 p Page 14 TELCON The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 K No we shouldn't do anymore for him do it Now for the Brazilian we might P Let's do it for him then Fine Maybe he was just pandering to those he met with a shocking group I don't know why State would ever have done it I F Stone --what the Christ is he meeting with him for K That's right Arthur Schlesinger -- P What the hell is he doing Why dirl State arrange such a thing in his schedule They're always wanting to meet with intellectuals but why with total enemies K I couldn't agree more P What do you think K I think it was a great mistake p That' s where he said all this you know K I know it P He was pandering to them But he should have said a lot of positive things because Good God we built him up we gave him that kind of treatment I saw him twice at great length You know all they do is talk and talk and talk K Exactly P Haig will tell you K Exactly P What do you think some Left Wing influence K Oh yeah P Um-humm K So I wouldn't reward him right now quite honestly P Fine Don't you think that was poor planning Very wrong Frankly that's why I'm mad at him I mean we just bent over backwards for that fellow Exactly right He's trying to cater to the Left Wingers Well I suppose that's the problem But I would cover Heath Pompidou-- 1 · •· • •• '•·•• '1 •II• - ult a 11 •' t-·• ul 111 ' ' 11 ott J$1f1 0 E O 8 Sed 3 TELCON The President Mr Kiss ger 12 25 p m June 24 1972 Page 15 K Oh yes any of them Yeah absolutely P What about the Canadian No 1 don't think so K No we have to worry about not leaking it back P Right All right fine K And Brandt we can give a 1tt 'l palaver too P Yeah K Right P I notice one other thing that would interest -- Tanaka they say now has a goqd chance I thought Fukuda was going to get it What's your evaluation K I think Tanaka has an excellent chance I'm not so worried about him becaus he's L p etty tough guy P Well he incidentally -- K He'll turn out to be more nationalistic P On a pe rsona1 basis he's very friendly to me supporter in '68 He told me so K Oh really I didn't know P When she was in school here Oh yeah K No no I think you'll be all right with Tanaka I had a long talk with him P Well that's good that's good You think he's pretty tough K Oh yeah And I'd like to pick three or four smaller countries His daughter was our ' Break in tapes - Start Tape #3 P ••••• • He couldn't make it this morning but at this point the only thing keeping this war going is McGovern That's got to be made by somebody sometime -- - A - ••••• I •••••• 1 • '1 11 It • '-1· ·••' 1 IU ' '' ul TEL CON Page 16 The President Mr Kissinger 12 25 p m 1 June 24 1972 K Yeah but I think we should give it a little more -- In fact I'm wondering about the following Mr President as a tactical device I'm wondering whether I shouldri't call McGovern and give him just enough of a feel for the negotiations so that we can say afterwards knowing what we're doing the son-of-a-bitch is coming us anyway P Uh-hUh ·· h ' ' - · K And asking to lay off f r a while P If you could do it discre·etly I'd do it K Well eve·n if it leaks P All right fine K I mean I'd call him and say look1 I wa nt you to know what's going on P I'd do it also with Humphrey and Muskie K Right P We should do it with the three of them K Together P No not together But I'd be sure that I'd coilered all three so that McGovern's opponents will not-- because some of Humphrey's supporters will desert MeGovern ·I don't want them to think that we just started to play McGover n K Right P Cover Humphrey cover Muskie K Right But I think it has the advantage that we can then say he knew and he went ahead anyway p That's right that's right K Good P Well get a little rest K Right Good Thank you Mr President