Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 Message Text SECRET PAGEOI PARIS28641 01 OF 03 29180lZ 42 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-OI ISO-OO SSO-OO NSCE-OO 1026 W 030610 OR 291743Z NOV 74 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4708 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY BDNN AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY TOKYO USMISSION NATO SEC RET SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 28641 EXDIS E O 11652 GDS TAGS FR PARM CA TECH SUBJECT FRENCH VIEWS ON COORDINAnON OF NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY REF A STATE 241799 B PARIS 22150 NOTAL I SUMMARY THE FRENCH TOLD ACDA DIRECTOR IKlE THAT THEY WERE NOT YET IN A POsmON TO RESPOND TO THE U S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO CONSIDER MEANS TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS ON THE FIVE POINTS THE U S SUGGESTED FOR DISCUSSION AT THAT PROPOSED CONFERENCE REF A PARA 5 THE FRENCH POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WOULD IAEA SAFEGUARDS BE EXTENDED TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO NWS IS IT FEASIBLE TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LIKE REPROCESSING THAT ARE ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN WOULD NOT INTERNATIONAL COOPERAnON ON PHYSICAL SECURITY UNWISELY PUBLICIZE METHODS OF PROTECTION THOUGH THE FRENCH DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR TO ATTENDING THE PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL CONFERENCE THEY CLEARLY INDICATED THEIR oPPosmON SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 PARIS 28641 01 OF 03 29180lZ TO MULTINATIONAL RULE-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THEIR Declassified Released US Department of State EO SystematIc Review 30 JUN 2005 Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systemallc Review 30 JUN 2005 PREFERENCE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS THEY ADDED THAT THEY WERE NEGOTIATING THE SALE OF REPROCESSING PLANTS TO PAKISTAN AND SO ITH KOREA BUT DEMANDING IAEA SAFEGUARDS ATMOSPHERE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WERE COR DIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE END SUMMARY 2 IN A SERIES OF TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE MET WITH MFA SCIENTIFIC AF FAIRS DIRECTOR DE NAZELLE CEA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 01 RECTOR GOLDSCHMIDT MFA NATOIDISARMAMENT CHIEF SCHRICKE AND QUAI SECRETAR Y GENERAL DE COURCEL DE COURCEL MEET ING REPORTED SEPTEL ON NOV 27 TO DISCUSS U S PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE ON EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIP MENT HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING HOW PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED BY THE PROLlF ERATlON OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HENCE IT WAS IN BOTH NA TIONS INTERESTS TO SLOW PROLIFERATION HE THEN DISCUSSED THE AIDE MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON NOV I IN WHICH THE U S PROPOSED A SMALL PRIVATECONF ERENCE OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO EXPLORE HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM REF A IN ADDRESSING EACH OF THE 5 POLICIES SUGGESTED FOR DIS CUSSION IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE HE STRESSED THE PRELIMINARY NATURE OF U S THINKING AND OUR DESIRE TO CONSIDER CON STRUCTIVE CRmCISM AND SUGGESTIONS IN REPLY THE FRENCH POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS GIVEN BELOW 3 ON SUGGESTED POINT I REF A PARA 5 EXTENDING SAFE GUARDS TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AS OPPOSED TO WEA PONS ONLY THE FRENCH HAD NO OBJECTIONS BUT SHOWED IN TEREST IN U S OBJECTIVES CONCERNING THE BILATERAL LI MITED TEST BAN TREATY NEGOTIATION AND IN THE RECENT VLADIVOSTOK DISCUSSIONS GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED ABOUT THE PNE PROVISION IN THE LTD TREATY WHICH IKLE EXPLAINED HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT 4 ON SUGGESTION 2 NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NON NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES NNWS THE FRENCH ASKED IF THE U S WERE PROPOSING A REQUIREMENT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS ONLY ON EXPORTS TO NNWS OR WOULD IT INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AS WELL THE HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF CA NADIAN EXPORTS OF URANIUM TO U S WAS RAISED BUT BEHIND SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 PARIS 28641 01 OF 03 29180lZ THE QUESTIONS LAY CONCERN OVER EXPORTS TO FRANCE AND AS LATER REVEALED AWARENESS OF ISSUES IN PROPOSED FRG SALE TO SOVIET UNION IKLE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WORD ING POSED AN UNINTENDED PROBLEM AND WAS INTENDED TO RE FER TO COVERAGE AND DURATION NOT TO THE COUNTRIES TO WHICH Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 SECRET NNN SECRET PAGE 01 PARIS 28641 02 OF 03 291803Z 42 ACTION SS-2S INFO OCT-OI ISO-OO SSO-OO NSCE-OO 026 W 03061' OR 291743Z NOV 74 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4709 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY TOKYO USMISSION NATO SEC RET SECTION 02 OF03 PARIS 28641 EXDIS IAEA SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE APPLIED GOLDSCHMIDT THEN ASKED IF THE U S ENVISAGED RULING Olff BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS HE NOTED THAT IN THE CASE OF TAIWAN THE U S MIGHT PREFER BILATERAL RATHER 11IAN IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS THAT THE PRC OBJECTS TO MEMBERSHIP IN ANY ORGANIZATION DEALING WITH TAIWAN FRENCH REFERRED TO THEIR PAST PRACTICE OF DECIDING 11IE QUESTION OF BILATERAL VS IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS S ON POINT 3 SPECIAL RESTRAINT ON EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY E G ENRICHMENT OR REPROCESSING GOLDSCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN PUBLIC SINCE 11IE MID-1950'S THAT MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT IS EASILY OBTAINABLE AND THAT AT LEAST 20 TO 25 COUNTRIES COULO NOW BUILD REPROCESSING FACILITIES ON THEIR OWN DE NAZELLE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SUCH SPECIAL RESTRAINTS WOULD DISCRIMINATE AGAINST 11IE LESS INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS FORCING 11IEM IN EFFECT TO ACCEPT NPT RESTRICTIONS GOLOSCHMIDT 11I0UGHT 11IAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTRICT 11IE FLOW OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE THE WRAPS Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 PARIS 28641 02 OF 03 291S03Z OF SECRECY HE EXPLAINED HAD BEEN REMOVED IN THE 1950'S AND CDULD NOT BE REPLACED THE FRENCH WERE ALSO DISTURBED BY POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAINING OF STUDENTS IN SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED IF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD LIMIT THE SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY BY PRIVATE FIRMS HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING ON BETWEEN A GERMAN FIRM AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT 6 ON POINT 4 OF REF A PARA 5 PHYSICAL SECURITY IKLE NOTED THAT NUCLEAR NATIONS COULD GAIN ADVANTAGES BY POOLING KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY HE SPOKE OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE IAEA'S GREY BOOK ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY PERHAPS VERIFIABLE BY THE IAEA AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES TO PROTECT NUCLEAR SHIPMENTS GOLDSCHMIDT QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF TAKING MULTILATERAL STEPS THAT COULD PUBLICIZE THE METHODS OF PROTECTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS HE WARNED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTRICT INFORMATION AT THE IAEA THAT IAEA INSPECTION WOULD INFRINGE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE AND THAT THERE WAS LmLE LIKELIHOOD OF SABOTEURS OBTAINING WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL DE NAZELLE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SUCH AS EXIST IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST THE DRUG TRAFFIC GOLDSCHMIDT NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO STEAL ONE OF 7 000 U S WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND SAID THE WHOLE CONCERN SEEMS A BIT lAMES BONDISH AND UNREALISTIC TO HIM 7 ON POINT 5 CONCERNING EXPORTS TO SENSITIVE AREAS THERE WAS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBIGUITY INHERENT IN SUCH A DETERMINATION GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED IF THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD APPLY TO THE STATES WHO RETIRE FROM THE NPT OR WHO SUODENLY REFUSE TO ADMIT IAEA INSPECTION S DE NAZELLE STATED THAT THE FRENCH UERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO GIVE AN OPINION ON THE PROPOSALS IN THE U S AIDE MEMOIRE HIS BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH POSITION ACCORDED GENERALLY WITH REF B HE SAID HIS SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 PARIS 28641 02 OF 03 291803Z GOVERNMENT OBJECTED TO THE NPT BECAUSE IT DISCRIMINATED Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 BETWEEN NNWS AND NWS WAS NOT A REAL DETERRENT AGAINST NUCLEAR WARFARE AND OFFERED NO PROTECTION TO NNWS THE FRENCH SAFEGUARDS THOUGH AUTONOMOUS WERE CAREFUL AND STRINGENT AS GOOD IN EFFECT AS THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS FRANCE HE CONTINUED STROVE NOT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY NATION OBTAINING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY HE OFFERED AS EVIDENCE THAT THE FRENCH IN THEIR NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT FOR SELLING REPROCESSING PLANTS TO THE PAKISTANIS AND SOUTH KOREANS ENVISAGED IAEA SAFEGUARDS COMMENT THIS IS THE FIRST CONFIRMATION THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED OF THESE TWO DEALS SEE PARA II BELOW 9 DE NAZELLE ADDED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH TO THINK IN TERMS OF MULTILATERAL STRUCTURES HOWEVER THEY WERE AL WAYS WILLING TO HAVE BILATERAL TALKS AND TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL POINTS ABOUT THE SAFEGUARDS PRACTICED BY OTHER COUNTRIES HE REMAINED NEUTRAL ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR EXPORTING SECRET NNN SECRET PAGE 01 PARIS28641 03 OF 03 291806Z 42 ACTION SS-2S INFO OCT-0 I ISO-OO SSO-OO NSCE OO 1026 W 030807 o R 291743ZNOV 74 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4710 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY TOKYO USMISSION NATO SEC RET SECTION OJ OF 03 PARIS 28641 EXDIS NATIONS DEVELOPING A MODEL AGREEMENT TO BE USED BY Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 Declassified Released US Departmenl of Stale EO Syslemalic Review 30 JUN 2005 ALLIN NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR EXPORTS HE WAS CLEARLY HOSTILE TO THE POSSIBILITY WHICH HE RAISED OF A MULTILATERAL STRUCTURE DECIDING RUlES AND APPLICA TlON Of THE RUlES 10 COMMERCIAL COMPETITION FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMMERCIAL COMPETITION ALTHOUGH SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CAME TO THE SURFACE MOST EXPLICITLY WHEN GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED VERY POINTEDLY HOW U S COUlO EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSED FRG SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING HELD UP OVER SAFEGUARDS HE ASKED WAS THIS NOT COMMERCIAL INTERFERENCE FRENCH SlOE SEEMED WElL INFORMEO ON THIS ISSUE PARTICULARLY LA ROCHEFORDIERE OF QUAI II REPROCESSING PLANTS PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA' IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION MFA NUCLEAR EXPERT ALLINE WHO HAD EARLIER DENIED EXISTENCE OF SOUTH KOREA DEAL TO SCIATT WAS ASKED TO EXPLAIN STATEMENT OE NAZELLE SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 PARISli64 1 O OFO 291806Z MADE TO IKLE THAT AGREEMENTS ON SAFEGUARDS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED WITH SOUTH KOREA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN BUT THAT CON TRACTS HAO NOT BEEN SIGNED FROM ALLINE'S REPLY IT APPEARS THAT NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN WITH PAKISTAN IN 1970 ON AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT FRENCH BUILT REPROCESSING PLANT IN PAKISTAN WOUlD BE SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATIONS TOOK A COUPLE OF YEARS TILL PAKISTAN AGREED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATIONS ON AGREEMENT WITH IAEA THEN FOLLOWED AND NOW PAKISTAN STILL HAS TO WORK OUT NECESSARY FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS THOUGH ALLINE IS VAGUE IT APPEARS THAT ONLY FORMALITY OF CONTRACT SIGNATURE REMAINS SIMILAR PROCESS HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH SOUTH KOREA WITH DIFFER ENCES THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE LESS AOVANCED AND AGREEMENT WITH IAEA WILL NOT BE A GENERAL ONE BUT WILL COVER aNtY REPROCESSING PLANT ALLINE WAS VAGUE ON POINT OF WHEN DISCUSSIONS WITH KOREANS BEGAN COMMENT OURING DISCUSSIONS WITH IKLE IN VIENNA IAEA INSPECTOR GENERAL ROMETSCH SAID VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN YET ABOUT HOW ANY REPROCESSING PLANT MIGHT BE SAFEGUARDED THESE ARE VERY DIFFICUlT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS STILL TO BE SOLVED RUSH SECRET Declassified Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu