r- R ep rod u ced frolll m the U nd a m ssmifie d Daedi a ssaifie dHllllollrdi llngs•o•fthe- Niiilaliiilll ·on•al•Aa-rt h ives- - - 21 - • - - • ·· -· _ ·- - - _ _ - - - DECLASSmEO - i Authority NNt 'JOO • J __ 1 1 - ' fl le_ ' -------lfLEGRAM Department Of'St iie-- I '- I SECRET Control 2236 Rec'd March I Info 4 1964 7 30 a m FROM I ACTION Secstate 919 IMMEDIATE INFO Cairo 149 IMMEDIATE DATE March 4 Midnight SECTION ONE OF THREE '· I LIMDIS EMBTEL 916 and DEPTEL 757 When I called on Levavi March 3 to receive Prime Minister's reply he informed me that £_rime Minister had come ta conclusi 9n our Israeli and US ob j ectives not now best served b y r e__uc uranrP to Nasser about Dimona Sai Pri me Mi nister had reached this dec i sion a ft er 1 heart-searching and despite fact he anxious not to differ with President Johnson Levavi read and then hande me aide memoire substance of which as follows ' wer ---· G ff 1 · T @ ' Prime Minister has considered suggestion that USG reassure Nas on Dimona After careful consideration he finds no grounds to depart f rom viewp int he conveyed to Ambassador Barbour on AuNt 19 1963 i e desirable that Na·sser not be completely reass Israel not working toward nuclear weapons production that th could have useful deterrent effect against Egyptian adventures EMBTEL 204 August 19 1963 and which was previously expressed by Ben Gurion on May 14 1963 EMBTEL 894 Prime Minister's position derived from two considerations 1 Does not appear advisable to re ease Nasser rom any appre sion he may have as t Israel's military capacities since he loses no opportunity public to emphasize war with Israel inevitable as soon as his military p a r a ·s suf iciently advanced e g on February 22 1964 ser ci i l red p iclyff'_ Pal --e people must return to I ho i and an ha e it ib l rig11t restored The prospect for ' the fu1juj e- is agains Istael l shall determine its time I l anJd pl¼e ' f In - tioni i -eaihing rom BcfucWb fhtf 1JlSnfrl'- tPv 15 I 1 i ••oH Trn UNLESS c mo Reproduced from he Unclassified Declassified Holdin9S of the NaHonal Archives SECRET -2- 919 March 4 Midnight SECTION ONE OF THREE from Tel Aviv public posture represents true direction and objective Nasser's policy Prime Minister holds view that removal from Nasser's mind of uncertainty regarding Israel's deterrent capacity contrary to best interests of both US and Israel 2 It would appear highly imprudent apprise Nasser of nature US-Israel contacts on this as on other matters In view past experience P·rime Minister considers Nasser cannot be relied on not to exploit such informati either publicly or through diplomatic channels If such informatic became known harmful consequences and repercussions would ensue Prime Minister wishes assure President Johnson above viewpoint reached only after careful consideration all aspects of matter By way f elaboration Levavi went on Israelis have reached conclusion Egyptians going all out militarily and economically to prepare for war and that progress made by Egyptians this direction impressive and worrying He noted also that Nasser has long history breaking his word when it suits him that he might easily reveal US-Israeli contacts in speech attacking US and that such information could get to Soviet bloc and be used for its purposes GP-3 BARBOUR REE Note •' Advance copy to S S-0 at 8 50 a m 3 4 64 Passed White House at 9 08 a m 3 4 64 SECRET re - aiJliiiii iiiiill------------ •• - Al a- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - DECLA°ssiiiU O - - ReprodUcad from the Unclassified Declassified Holdings of lhe National Archives J - · Authority 'NN6 s 90 TELEGRAt-A Departm-eTT- ·urv-1 - p- pv · SECRET ° 6S Info Control 2 43 8 rv- · FROM w ACTION Rec'd Aviv March 4 1964 10 59 a m Secstate 919 IMMEDIATE INFO Cairo 149 IMMEDIATE DATE March 4 Midnight SECTION TWO OF THREE LIMDIS In the circumstances and despite fact Levavi sure Prime Minister · would not change his mind I requested earliest possible appoint · ment with Prime Minister Levavi tried arrange this at once by telephone This turned out to be impossible as Prime Minister unbeknown to us then making arrangements get married early I afternoon However he agreed see me 1630 hours I conveyed to Prime Minister substance six points contained r DEPTEL 757 which I indicated had been received since previ demarche However obvious Prime Minister was not going chang ' j' mind As different tack I inquired noting that this not conta my instructions how Prime Minister would feel about our reassbr Nasser peaceful intent Dimona without stating how we are cert I of this Prime ¥ inister responded by saying he had better idea noting that he was thinking aloud He asked how it would be if l 12 albot told Nasser Israel prepared give solemn public undertat Jn not to attack any Arab cQ JJDtry and Na § Se r should make similar statement re Israel I I replied that this not same problem Problem is to assure Nass Israel has no nuclear capability Tb this Prime Minister who i fine fettle responded somewhat emotionally and volubly that Nasser constantly reiterating his desire destroy Israel that ''he is thirsting for our blood therefore why allay his fears Would this not encourage him to attack Israel Israel is like a j lamb among 12 or 13 wolves Surely President Johnson would un rstand SECRET RE RODUC° TtON FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIE0H Reproduced from the Unclassified I Declassified Holdings of the National Archives olai I DECLASSfii'IED Authority -· l'iNfi 15' 7006 --- - --- --- --- - r SECRET -2- 919 March 4 Midnight SECTION TWO OF THREE from Tel Aviv understand our fears The President s ould visit Israel althoug he realizes this not feasible even if for only 24 hours so tha he could sense the atmosphere of this small country surrounded · by enemies The Israeli approach is an emotional one and necessa so This remnant of a people and its children have a right to live in peace I noted that comparison of Israel to a lamb not exactly accurate and repeated familiar arguments about the danger of preventive war by Nasser which would ensue should Nasser rightly or wrongly come to conclusion that Israel making atomic weapons Prim Min ister asked why it should not be possible to convince I Nasser that Israel is not preparing aggressive war and why US did not put more pressure on Nasser He noted that if Israeli talked as aggressively as Nasser US would be angry and bring heavy pressure to bear on Israelis To this I rejoined that we c ' talk to Nasser and that we do try to influence him award peacefv 1 policies GP• 3 BARBOUR REE Note ----· Advance copy to S S-0 at 11 a m 3 4 64 Passed white House at 12 20 p m 3 4 64 SECRET i TElEGRA Department of State ' dion SECRET Control Rec'd 2385 March 4 1964 10 22 a m FROM Tel Aviv ACTION Secstate 919 IMMEDIATE INFO Cairo 149 IMMEDIATE DATE March 4 Midnight SECTION THREE OF THREE LIMDIS j At this point Prime Minister reiterated his views that Talbot should try to convince Nasser of Israel's peaceful intentions I· that the time is inopportune to reassure Nasser about Dimona that it is good for Nasser to worry about Israel's military capabilities He also wondered about whether US would really step in quickly and if it would would it be quick enough in event Nasser should launch sudden massive rocket and air ' attack against Israel Prime Minister was plainly worried th l US would not respond soon enough he noted at this juncture ' l that he had not yet received any definite word on the questio ' '- _ of US supplying tanks to Israel As further worries he mentione d Arab sunnnit meetings and Ben Bella threats I again endeavored reassure Prime Minister regarding reliability and timeliness of US support in event of attack by Nasser Also commented that others in Europe had expressed similar doubts ' but referring to McCloy's recent speech in London said I though record our intermention in two European wars confirmed we could be depended upon to take necessary steps in righteous causes despite cost to ourselves Upshot all foregoing is of course unhelpful to our objective of allaying Nasser's fears as step to area stability Aside from enuine conviction Prime Minister displays that Nasser determined acquire maximum arsena reg e 1 eve pment and that consequently it desirable as dett rrent 1 that tie be I - ratruw a SECRET REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED 1 1 1 14 -- Archives •• __ _ ___ - - - - - - - - -- Reproduced from lhe Unclassified I De ffied Holdings or the National DECLAS IFl D - - - NNe---1s 00 --- -- r_ thority SECRET I -2- 1 919 March 4 Midnight SECTION THREE OF THREE from Tel Avi I I llowed worry about Israeli nuclear rincitj concern of i shkii is any assurances passed to him This concern is t nderstandable in light present political situation here Public revelation US visits Dimona especially any idea of US inspectio that installation would subject Prime Minister to wide criticism not only from right wing HERl T adherents but i n broader circles including sections of h i s own Mapai party which are sensitive to JTIY appearance of derogation from Israel's pc sition as sow· t·eign power In such event Prime MiEi tcr 1 s -c1bility to I carry out his pr mises of further US visit Dimo could also i 1· be prejudic d GP - 3 BARBOUR REE l te Advance copy to S S O at 11 29 a m 3 4 64 Passed White House at 11 50 a m 3 4 64 t II • I II SECRE'i' NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03