• G · OUT ING TELEGRAM INOICATE ' • • D cower 423 - 1 fS 4 epartment O tate- -· AmEmbassy TEL AVIV -ifn pa LIMDIS 09407 c i rf Classification ACTION s r 0 ' s J ff' i L---11 ' 1 _ _ _ _S_E_GR_tE_T_ _ _X _J _ 04 CHAAGlTO i c w p • _ 'urren-- ' - - - - - - a ·t 8 d 1 tt 10 1 2 if 52_ _ _ _ _ Y iO Please convey f IDJing me i§a gjLJ 'Q _Uhko l from Pre s ident A-t 8-tq 9f D ' - 'JZ 7 'f QUOTE March 19 1964 Dear Mr Prime Minister I am distressed to learn from Ambassador Barbour that you feel unable be approve of our reassuring President Nasser about the peaceful character of the Dimona reactor We are far from confident that apprehension as to Israel's atomic a potential will as you suggest help deter Nasser from attacking Israel Quite the contrary we believe that Nasser's fear of a developing Israeli nuclear power may drive him to a choice between accelerating th e UAR military build- • I up or a desperate pre-emptive attack 1 would have the gravest effects on the security of Israel b We think it plain that any pos sible deterrent value tha t migh t ' Either of t hese choices come from keeping Nasser in the dark is trivial compared to _J these risks 0 -'t d S S - Mr Text received from WH mj 3 19 NE - Mr Davies BXXXB ¥ XKKIIUXHX i t e Hous e - Mr Bund REP CO IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED M - Gov Ha rriman 0 ' DS-322 Classification Page -·2 1 of telegram to _ T e A v-- i _ v ___ __________ ___ ______ _ SECRcET Classification r 7 It is also hard to see how Nasser could adversely exploit reassurance that Israel's nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes We certainly do not intend to provide him with details Nor did he misuse our reassurances when with the agreement of your government we last informed him along these lines Indeed our doing so served to ease Arab-Israeli tensions Therefore I hope you will reconsider your decision on this ' matter on which I am sure you will agree that our ultimate interest-enhancement of Israel's security--is the same as yours With warm regards Sincerely Lyndon B Johnson UNQUOTE You should make following points orally to Eshkol 1 Nasser aware past US visits to Dimona and eventually will learn of January visit from other countries Israel has agreed we may take into our confidence Preferable permit us give Nasser information directly to gain maximum favorable results 2 Content February 22 Nasser speech not new Every Arab politician must inveigh against Israel to survive politically L istic Real- and moderate resolutions taken by Arab Summit Conference reflec SECRE'f Classification - L ---- - __ ' c _____--- -----# -- _ Pag __1- ____ of teIegram to _ _ Am Embassy TEL AVIV SECRET Classification I 7 Nasser's position more clearly than his words 3 Al-Ahram editorialist Hassanain Haikal confidant of Nasser has publicly voiced UAR recognition that war against Israel is not possible because of US support 4 Israel's security lies in US capability and preparedness to ward off aggression Total security is not possible however even US lacks that 5 Tank issue unrelated to Nasser reassurance FYI Jewish Observer February 14 carried article entitled Dimona Report Studies that referred to a top secret report from American experts who had studied the potentialities of Israel's principal nuclear reactor at Dimona •• While word visit not used idea is implicit especially to those aware already of our earlier inspection Moreover early in February Israeli newsman here specifically inquired about US interest in Dimona and rumored visit by US scientific team END FYI END GP-3 _J L G BAI l SECRE'f Classification NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03