# • • 7 - 33l May 28 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The Eshkol visit may be a strenuous one ' Eshkol is being briefed to the nines on every issue which might arise Also it is peculiar to US Israeli relations that even secondary issues often can only be settled at the top level Even so we're confident this exercise will be a success a Eshkol needs to make it one even more than we do b we have a very forthcoming menu planned In fact the only big risk is that we 1ll look so frienc ly as to create extra Arab problems following hard on Khrushchev's all-out pandering to the Arabs in Cairo 1 The sheer fact that Eshkol is the first Israeli PM ever to visit officially marks a big political plus for him He'll portray the visit as a success ahnost regardless of how much bacon he takes home J 2 The Israelis seem actually relieved that we 1 re helping them find tanks elsewhere they apparently expected a flat v irndown They 1ll keep pressure on us till another deal can be arr l ged and we 're still far from it but the heat won't be too intense just now 3 We can also offer more financial aid if tank purchases elsewhere create an extra burden 4 Most iinportant we can carry your February desalting offer a big step further by offering a prompt go-ahead on joint feasibility studies and a promise of financial help if the studies pan out This could easily be the biggest public plus of the visit S We'll also get some very good public noises in speeches and CO llIIlunique For example if Eshkol will publicly deny any expansionist ambitions big Arab beef perhaps we can reiterate our stand against Arab aggression too Substance of the Visit I've underlined and annotated State's extensive briefing book because you'll want to be up to date on the issuee Eshkol will raise the Israelis will hang on everything you say and repeat it later Since we won 1t be able to brief you this weekend 1 111 try to summarize everything in this memo We can also lay on a briefing session Monday morning if you desire __ - DEOASS1fTED · __ _ - ' ' E O 12356 Sec 3 4 - -8 SCRE'f NLJ By 86- d 3 - 'df NARA Date JJ g 5ii8ltEI 2 1 Reaaaurance to lar h _ To get the meeting off on an ideal footing and disarm Eshkol why not tell him right off the bat that the US stands foursquare behind Israel'• security and well-being This has in fact been the consistent policy of the US since 1947 We don't intend to let Israel go wider to the contrary we have from the outset done more than any other country to help build it up including over $1 billion in aid While we have necesaarily had to maintain an element of superficial balance in our public posture and have at times disagreed with Israeli policy the record of our support is crystal clear This has cost us much with the Arabs and given the Soviets a big opening to exploit but we don 1t intend to swerve fro n this policy The one thing we ask of Israel is not to keep trying to force us to an all-out pro-Israeli policy We ask this not just because a balanced policy is essential strategically to keep the Soviets out of the ME and economically because of oil but because it is as much in Israel's interest as ours If we choose Israeils side so openly that the Arabs form alli·ances with Moscow Israel loses just as much as we Our present policy gives the Arabs an incentive not to swing too far away from the West This is simple common sense z Our Jordan Waters stand is just the latest example of our support We designed the Johnston Plan and stand fully by it as the Arabs know 3 Desalting We recognize how vital water is to Israel's future and since readily available sources are about exhausted you have personally inaugurated a new joint enterprise to exploit desalting--tb e only great new hope for water We will be as forthcom ing here aa the still uncertain state of the art will allow We'll work jointly with Israel to survey what kind of nuclear desalting plant would be technically and economically best and would be prepared to help finance a plant if and when a mutually satisfactory scheme can be worked out this could cost us as much as a $100 million loan 4 Israel's own deterrent posture We've always kept a close eye on the Arab-Israeli military balance Our JCS and intelligence people just reviewed it again and see Israel as able to maintain quite a deterrent edge for the foreseeable future We also think Israelis tend to discount the US deterrent role though we 1re confident the Arabs know the score McNamara will brief Eahkol on our capabilities We 1ve always regarded _ 5i iCRET SECRET 3 our economic aid as permitting Israel to buy enough modern arms in Europe to compensate for our inability to provide them directly Even so when nothing else was available we caxne through on HAWKs s Tanks We appreciate Eshkol 1 s understanding as to why we simply afford to sell Israel tanks directly But we 111 do everything we can to help get them elsewhere Eshkol will probably say he 1s grateful for our proffered help but is dubious over whether Israel can get what it needs elsewhere He will probably make a strong pitch that only M-48A 3s from Germa wil fo Since a German deal even through another intermediary looks questionable so far we must insist that the Israelis consider the UK Centurion which is available It hasn't got the range of our M-48A3 but is otherwise just as good and our military say it 1 s adequate to meet Israel's defensive needs My instinct is that Israel will make every efiort to get M-48s but fall back on the UK if this fails So we ought to make every effort to help them with the Germans but not let them come back to us if this aborts can 1t 6 Other arms requests Eshkol may in the course of describing Israeli security worries mention other arms needs such as the jet bombers he mentioned to Feldman or so ne co mter to the UAR 1 s Sovietsupplied missile boats Our response is that our JCS and intelligence people see Israel as still alie to maintain quite a deterrent edge Nor should the Israelis for get our own deterrent supp rt 7 The UAR Missile Threat and Israelis Own Missile Plans We've been over this ground many times unsuccessfully but Feldman put Eshkol on notice that you'd have a personal try Attached Tab A is a Defense study which counters the latest Israeli allegations now it 1 s chemical warhaads Perhaps the best argument with Eshkol is that his military like our own so often may have sold h iin on a very expensive and dangerous counter to a threat they hadn't really evaluated We probably can't get Israel to cancel its existing French contract which zuay be only for Rand D missiles though we just don't know We can1t veto Israel's m issile plans but as Israel1s security guarantors we're entitled to ask it not to buy operational missiles until after it has consulted us 8 Dimon a Reactor We appreciate Israel's commitment to regular inspe ti n but are disturbed at Eshkol 1s refusal to let us reassure the Arabs in general terms you sent Eshkol two messages on this We 1re firmly convinced that Israel's apparent desire to keep the Arabs guessing is highly dangerous To appear to be going nuclear without really doing so is to invite -e sltdRE'f - GECRE'f 4 trouble It might spark Nasser into a foolish pre-emptive move Without in any way implying that Israel is going nuclear one has to admit that a functioning secret breeder reactor plus an oncoming missile delivery system add up to an inescapable conclusion that Israel is at least putting itself in a position to go nuclear This could have the gravest repercussions on US-Israeli relations and the earlier we try to halt it the better chance we have This is why your raising a to-do about missiles even if unsuccessful will at least put Israel firmly on notice that we may be back at it again 9 IAEA Controls Israel's reluctance to accept IAEA controls also adds to our suspicions We can't make Israel exception because we 1 re making sixty or so other clients of ours toe the IAEA line The immediat issue is over renewal of a piddling 1-MW research reactor but any new reactor on which we help Israel would have to be under IAEA We hope you'll personally tell Eshkol they should bite the bullet now 10 Economic Aid Israel 1s economy is doing so well that Dave Bell sees no economic justification for new c lD loans Israel has had a fantastic 9-10% growth rate has over $600 million reserves a per capita income of over $1 000 better than Italy etc While Eshkol worries over Israel 1 s great foreign debt fact is that Israel bonds are being paid off mostly in Israeli pounds for tourism et al However Eshkol is determined to show that Israel still needs help and there may be a political requirement here Bell hopes we can keep trend downward from $20 million DL this year but could live with $10 million per annum in 1965 our presentation was $0-10 and 1966 But we would want to m ake clear that this is help in financing indirectly Israel's arms purchases i e an additional incentive for them to go to European suppliers ll OurArab Policy No one can blame the Israelis surrounded as they are for repeatedly sniping at our Arab policy The top people want to believe that we kuow what we 1re doing and many Israelis agree with our policy bat they 1 ve been conditioned by living under the gun for so long to a fortress Israel psychology which leads them to over-react In turn the constant Arab verbal attacks are in reality a reflection of Arab frustration at their own im potence We want to avoid at all costs a situation in which we become lined up so overtly behind Israel that the Arabs choose the USSR as their champion It is Soviet arms not US wheat which creates the real threat to Israel -SEC tET SEC '1' - s The greater the Soviet presence in the Midclle East the greater the threat to Israel If you will only drive home these facts of life politely but firmly to Eahkol it will help mightily in toning down the kind of repeated pressure from Israel and its friends which poses such a dilemma for us in the Middle East R W Komer S BGRDT Summary of topics Prime Minister Eshkol may raise during U S visit desalting military aid tanks UAR missile threat Israel's missile plans Dimona reactor U S Arab policy economic aid IAEA controls White House 28 May 1964 U S Declassified Documents Online https link gale com apps doc CK2349271207 USDD u wash74137 sid USDD xid 53d43aa5 Accessed 9 July 2020 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03