-- -- --------------- WtitP ouse M ldman rv • Dr• 11111 Of u '' ' OlmJ ·Approved by M ·7 29 64 Approved b7 WH 8 3 --- --Ii1 S Ip Al ---4T OP SECRE· · Ai - 1 f r _ AJ ' DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum ol Conversation DATE June l 1964 SUDJECT1 Johneon Behko1 Bxohana• of Viowe ORIGINAL COPY TO RlvVR FOR RECORDING ir-r ·· xpnJ IeN PARTICIPANTS COPIES TO The President Myer Feldman Deputy Special Counsel Excellency Levi Eahkol Prime Minister of Israel Ris Excellency Avraham Barman Ambassador of Israel Participants who entered mid-wy in discussion • l' J S His ISRi1 EL Mr Komer Shimon Peres Governor Harriman COMPLETE DISTR BUTIOW MADE BY CMS 8 3 64 -ir ·ralbot S S- e C OSD ISA- C EUR c _C NEA-2c c - White Houae -2cC NE-2' r'- INR 0D c Amembassy rEL AVIV -c --- r 7 The President began by saying to the Prime Minister that the United States was and would continue to be interested in the security of Israel The President said that he appreciated very much the way Mr Feldman had been received by the Prime Minister The President said that as long as he remained in the White Rouse Mr Feldman would continue to serve as his Prime Minister on the question of Israel I The President went on to say that he was foursquare behind Israel on all matters that affected their vital security interests Just as the U S was in Southeast Asia they would be wherever they were needed rhe President took up the specific problems on the agenda With regard to tanks he said he appreciated the readiness of Israel to agree to the manner in which tanks could be provided Re pointed out that they could not provide tanks directly but they would be glad to help Israel in every· way possible to get a sufficient quantity of tanks elsewhere ''We believe the Centurion is a good tank he said and it will certainly be available However we will also do everything we can to help in the M-48 I The President then referred to the fact that Senator ibicoff had · discussed thia matter with him and also that he appreciated the fact that the tank matter bad not been made• public i1aua but bad been kept discreet • J L fl'O _ $-125 C GBOU lxoaptcd f'r 111 auto a r n l' i e n 9 b r I •• DECLASSIFIED Aud orilyAa O cnqs I i- J TOP SECRET •- 2 - On the question of water the President pointed out that all the Arab capitals have been informed that the United States supports the 3ohnston Plan There can be no doubt in anyone'• mind concerning U S commitment to this water project The President said ''We back Israel fully on the Jordan water We want Israel to have more water For that reason we are ready to undertake a study in connection with the desalting program which will also provide Israel with the water it needs If the study proves that •the desalting project is feasible we will help in working it out We will help Israel on this as much as possible We have told the Arab Governments about this Of course we will get some backlash from the Arab countries as a result of your visit with me However I am not worried by that It is important both to you and to the United States that everybody should know that we are friends So that is no reason for us not to go forward with this desaltin proje ct 11 l I I The President asked Prime Minister Eshkol to make clear to his people that if we turned our backs on the Arabs it would hurt Israel We are ' deeply concerned with Israel's security Our Joint Chiefs of Staff keep a close watch on this And we are more confident of the Israeli deterrent than the Israelis seem to be We don't blame them for running scared edge but we hope they will listen to well meant advice 1 I I Of course we know that the Israeli Government is worried over the U A R missile threat But that threat is likely to remain feeble through 1970 Israel should not hasten to counter it and accelerate in arms race It ·can always count on the United States in an emergency The President pointed out that the Arabs will inevitably tie Israeli missiles to Israel's nuclear potential He said that he should like to remind the Prime Minister that the U S is violently against nuclear proliferation · If Israel is not going to get into nuclear production why not accept IAEA controls and let U S reassure Nasser about Dimona It is U S firm policy to keep the U A R from getting into nuclear production and it will do everything it can to restrain them I I want to assure you the President said that we are not being naive about Nasser What we want to do 1a to try and prevent him from leaning over too far towards the llussians The President summarized by listing the following six points l · On water the U S will support the Johuton Plan 2 On tanks the U S will aaaist Israel in obtaining them 3 On security the U S will stand foursquare behind Israel 4 On missiles the u s Government feel • that larael i8 too worried about primitive V A I weapons TOP §BQRBT -'t--------- ·--·---------· ------ --------- • DECLASSIFIED AudlontYAw I ct7Q S5' · TOP SECRET - 3 - 5 With regard to nuclear weapons the U S is against their proliferation 6 On the desalting program the U S is ready to help as much as possible The President expressed the view that the visit was good for both the United States and Israel for both the Prime Minister and his nation Following the visit it will be possible for Prime Minister Eshkol to explain U S concerns and friendship to bis people I The President said that he was glad that the issues had been kept out of the pressures of the election year and that the whole ma ter has been kept quiet Because of this they can go to the Germana and be of help The President said that he saw a bright future for Israel The Prime Minister could leave knowing that the U S will help Israel in the future both morally and financially as much as she can I Prime Minister Eshkol responded by first reciting the basis for the feeling of the Israelis that they needed additional strength He said that after thousands of years of wandering his people were now trying again to take their fate into their own hands and to do things for themselves This was the meaning of going back home to Israel In Turkish rule the area of Palestine had been 100 000 square k m but now Israel had been cut down to 20 000 sq k m It waa in this area that we tell our people that they must work out their destiny by depending on themselves and doing things for themselves Of course they always look for friends and they were immensely fortunate in having the U S as a friend But what he told the people of Israel was to rely on tbeir friends but that the fundamental importance for Israel was do it yourself They had to build their own agriculture and their own industry their own army and all the other essentials of the nation They had to be able to create their own future The problem of security wen back a long way Even before Hitler there had been pogroms in Czarist Ru sia Therefore security waa the moat important and the first consideration At this poiJt the President summoned into the room Governor Harriman Mr Talbot Jtr Komer who were accompanied by Mr Shimon Peres the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense As they were sitting down the President turned to the Prime Minister and said to him Harriman and Feldman are my Prime Ministers on Israeli questions The President then said that the Prime Minister has just begun his statement and that he wanted t em to hear it The Prime Minister thereupon continued ''When the independence of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 we thought we could live in peace but we found that we were encircled by enemies The recent visit by l hrusbchev served to give Nasser additional prestige additional armor and 'lllOUey This makes him a dangerous enemy Israel knows that the U S ia a real friend We believe this We are told that there ia a United States commitment to Israel But I cannot ask q people to rely on this alone When I diacuaa this matter with my people the question they ask• ii 'do have enough tanks It may be true that the Egyptian miaailea are not yet accurate but the •1 Aviv DECLASSIFIED you AuthoriC IAwD 979 551 I I- · TOP SECRET - 4 - area with a million people is an easy target The man in the street wants to hear from me that we are on guard What if one day Nasser even against the advice of Khrushchev the Prime Minister interpolated that he thought Khrushchev's reference in his speeches in Egypt on Israel had been somewhat mild in language and that he did not believe that l hrushchev wanted the destruction of Israel or war against Israel and against the wishes of the U S were to attack Israel he would do that if he felt that he could do it Then in one day or two or three days he could do a great deal of damage What the man in the street in Israel wants to know is whether Israel would then be able to protect itself whether it woul be strong enough to protect itself No one could forecast what other problems the U S would have at that time 11 On tanks the Prime Minister insisted that only the needs Re said it would be bad if Israel were compelled Israel had ·some Centurions and knew them Israel cannot and therefore it is very important for us that ve should need said the Prime Minister M-48 would meet Israel's to take the Centurion buy new tanks every day get today the tanks we Prime Minister Eshkol pointed out that the autonomy of the Centurion was four to five hours while that of the M-48 was 8 hours This was very important to Israel He said that if the Germans objected to doing it directly it could be done through Italy With regard to missiles he said that if Nasser was willing to give up his missiles Israel would acquire none but Nasser already has about 200 The Prime Minister added I think that Nasser is planning to build these missiles in the hundreds We have some indications of this For example we know that he bought quantities of steel It is impossible for me to believe that Nasser is not improving his missiles the Prime Minister went on to say that Israel would be prepared to wait a year or two but Nasser is constantly improving his missiles and in the next 2 to 3 years Nasser ia likely to attack and to use them Eshkol said he was always glad to hear complimentary things for it implied that the Israeli armed forces could always overcome a 1 to S disadvantage This might not always be true At the present time Nasser haa 3 to 4 times as many planes and 3 to 4 times as much armor At the present time the disparity between Nasser and Israel in respect to numbers is one against 10 or 15 or 20•-clepeuding on whether we take only Egypt into account or also the Arab countries The same goes for tanks where the Arabs have 3 times as much as Israel Nasser'• advantage is great The Prime Minister observed that he waa sure it would be possible to make peace with Lebanon and though difficult it would probably be possible to make peace vi th Hussein But if Nasaer attacks all the other Arab states will join him Mr Eshkol said le did not aoe any way in which he could explain to hia country or even hi• own political party a failure to do something about the 'fOP SECUT DECLASSIFIED AutboritY Au I t79SS I J I TOP SECRET -smissile threat The Prime Minister said that he did not see any way a1 a citizen of his country or as a leader to explain to his people that he would just sit back and do nothina iD relation to the missile threat In any ca••• for a year or two there would be no missiles in Israel How could he go and explain to the country or to his own political party or to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset and when he is asked what he is doing to face the missile threat simply reply ''The Americans told me that the Egyptian missiles are no good Nasser has always been the first n introducing new weapons He was the firat in jets he was the first in Komara and the first in missiles I am told he said that my boys in the army are very good But it is too much for me to demand of my boys that they should face a situation like this without the proper materiel at their disposal 11 The Prime Minister went on to say ''We cannot afford to lose This may be our last stand in history The Jewish people have something to give to the world I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties we have survived it means that history wants us to continue We cannot survive if we experilnce again what happened to us under Hitler You may view the situation otherwise and it may be difficult to grasp how we feel I believe you should understand us It 1a important that you should understand us The Prime Minister suggested that his visit would be successful if it had helped the President and the American people to understand the situation of Israel What Israel wants is peace Nothing less makes sense War made no sense for Israel Israel could not possibly conquer Egypt But Nasser did not have an equivalent attitude What Nasser was calling for was for driving the Israelis into the sea The Prime Minister said ''We want your help but we feel that we must do everything· that is within the power of a small nation to do to protect itself If you can persuade Nasser to give up his tanks and missiles we will do the same The Prime Minist r offered to destroy all of his arms if Nasser would do likewise Then the Prime Minister went on to suggest that he would appreciate it if the President would tell Erhard when he came to visit that the U S had an interest in helping Israel and in Germany helping Israel Historically he felt the Germans had an obligation to do so The reparations they paid were merely monetary compensation The Prime Minister added The reason I think it would be very important to tell this to Erhard is that sometimes we hear from the Germana that they are not so sure that you are interested in them helping us On the question of the U S relationship to the Arab nations the Prime Minister said it was not in the interest of Israel that the U S break off its relationships with any other nation But he asked whether it would not be poaaiblt for the United States to tell Nasser to work out a development plan and to have assistance rendered Nasser go into the development of Egypt rather than into other areas He said that Bgypt bad much to do He said What I ·am saying is that you should be pushiug Egypt into development and building and out of the field of spending chair resources on armaments · TOP SECIE't • DECLASSIFIED ' Aud crig Awn tl ISS1 I j ' ·-- TOP SECRET - 6 - The Prime Minister suggested that in some instances it would be wise to help Israel publicly Khrushchev had no reluctance in publicly promising Nasser everything he requested But when it comes to assistance to Israel their friend• feel it must be done surreptitiously It reminds the Prime Minister of the German expression Don't greet me in public Perhaps a public greeting he said would show that the friends of Israel mean to support that state and be conducive to world peace In summary the Prime Minister said 1 Tanks--the tanks we need are the M-48 I am glad over your decision of the tanks and I leave our meeting feeling that I am entitled to tell my Government that we will have these tanks It would be better if we could set them direct for it would not be good if the Arabs were left in any uncertainty that Israel would be helped in matt rs such as tanks However if you do it indirectly that is all right for after all the important thing is that we should get the tanks that we need But please do not push us into the Centurions 2 Missiles--there would be no missiles for 1 to 2 years 3 Water--the support of the United States is appreciated very much 4 Desalination--the statement of the President is good news Israel is prepared to pay rather more for water for irrigation than would be considered possible in other countries Therefore the project should be feasible 5 Dimona-•I cannot agree that Nasser should be told the real situation in Dimona because Nasser is an enemy After 16 years they withhold peace from Israel I notice that in your joint communique with l f ng Hussein there was included a point of just peace I don't understand the meaning of this term I know what peace means What should have happened ia that the armistice should have been following immediately by peace It would be a great thing if you could induce our neighbors to change the armistice into peace instead of pursuing escalation in tanks and missiles In the meantime while the U A a remains an enemy and is committed to the de1truction of Israel it would seem inadvisahle to communicate such matter• to them Besides Nasser has worked for years to become a nuclear power He will continue to do so A message that Dimona is not manufacturing nuclear weapons would have no effect The Prime Minister then adverted to refugees by saying that Shukayri says there are refugees but they really-are not people within the classic meaning of refugees They are used by the Arab nationa to develop euemiea agaiust Israel · He stated that Israel waa not engaged in nu clear weapons production but posed the question ''Why tell lfaHert lie asked Why aboul4 va tell lfaaser when·we don't a ow fram bia what he ia doing about miaailea'l tor SICUt - ___ _______ ····- - --- I -----·--------- I oECLASSIFlED l Autborit ' Awl 919SS I ·--··- - - --- • - ' • TOP SECRET - 1 The Prime Minister concluded by saying that he thanked the President for his decision was a grand thing and very imaginative The President asked Mr Feldman to comment and he made a brief statement on the need for cooperation on the tank question and said that Peres would hold meetings while he was in this country in an effort to establish a various procedure whereby Israel would receive them In the meantime there was a great need for secrecy I Under Secretary Harriman also made a brief statement dealing with the need to reassure the Israelis by having them inspect the 6th Fleet and other places where the military potential of the United States was evident I Under Secretary Harriman said that he agreed that it was necessary to add meaning and credibility to the U S commitment He added that tanlca were the major issue and that he hoped that could be worked out The President said that it was important that there should a feeling of Isecurity on Israel's part • Under Secretary Harriman said that they were more hopeful about their Istrategy dealing with Nasser than the Minister seemed to believe be Prime Mr Feldman said that it was important that the tank question be kept quiet It is understood he said that only three people in Italy would have to know about it · I The President then reviewed matters briefly adding that there would be sane mutual assistance in intelligence matters We would help Israel with our knowledge of Arab intelligence and Israel would exchange information that they had with us Prime Miniater Eshkol 1uggested that it would be helpful to have semi-annual meetings at the political and military level where there could be mutual exchange of all matters of concern between the two natioua I Under Secretary Barri man 1aid this would be an excellent idea and thauwe would establish aome method whereby tbi1 can be accomplished I The President closed the meeting by saying beginning ''Well tbia has been a good l 'tOP SECRET J NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03