- S' ltJO · r _• •' - q Y- --- ---- NA1 FORI i8 ' N A o te SECRET ' - f - vE DISTRIBUTION p femo andum UNITED I -uu4Z L - NEA - Mr Talbo TO This document consists of i pages number_ _ of 5 copies Series A uu lERNMENT IG l 1 it The blue check above indicates that Mr Talbot has seen this meno per ENWilliams NEA Staff f - DATE October 29 1964 Asst r li 1-#- - ' l cJ-J FROM NE - Rod er Pl na ies SUBJECT Dangers of Delaying Israel's Request to -- efer Dimona Inspection F-- '2 t- fr-O t 126 fa -e Discussion ll - _ e- d f' b 5 ·f _ ri fl V J 11 lP J We are concerned that delaying rejection of the Israeli proposal to defer inspection of the Dimona reactor sets in motion a dangerous drift toward a turning point in the history of the Near East namely a decision by Israel to deve op nuclear weapons 1 Psychological Effect on the Israeli Leadership The psychological -e ffect on Israeli leadership of a US failure to react promptly could be damaging to our national security interests _While we do not consider Dimqna an election issue ·the timing of the Israel proposal suggests that Eshkol may ' 'he absence of a swift unambiguous reaction will confirm his belief and provide justification for his ascribing an overriding importance to domestic political consi erations in Israel and strengthen his resistance to US pressures for inspection as the Israeli election approaches A greater danger however is that although Fshkol's proposal may be sincere our failure to react promptly will provide the proponents of security through development of an independent deterrent with an opportunity to bring strong pressure on the Prime Minister The division of Israeli leadership on the best course to assure Israel's security is not clear-cut The theories of the independent deterrent and dependence upon foreign military support each haSe its supporters Thus far ·Eshkol has not shown a clear prefer nce He might however find pressures for a decision to go nuclear irresistible assuming its justification is to assure the survival of the JewLsh people We can assume that the elements that helped create the present opportunity will not fail to press their advantage An itmnediate clear-cut rejection of the Israeli proposal would bolster those wary of developing an independent deterrent btt every day that passes strengthens the their opponents SECRET · _ NEA NE BERueLS ell ANNyerges · Mlcroftlmecl tar LBJ LlbrarY f · i t AP- li a -- f'' GROUP 3 at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified Downgraded f SECRET - 2 - 2 Long-range U S Prospects of Deterr i g Israel 1 l - if •_ l Since Israel would' ·not risk discovery of' preparations to develop nuclear weapons 6rtc-i ' 'smbd'rked upon the nuclear weapons road evidence suggests the decision may already have been taken it could well withstand any pressures for ins ection we might bring to bear Our major means of coercion are cti ti£1ft'Jnt of military and economic aid Israel however can survive and i 'eri' £16urish without our economic assistance It lilas informed us it does not need major deliveries of militAry materiel despite earlier heavy importuning until November 1965 or nearly two years Nf 'e r the last Dimona inspection ample time to develop a nuclear weapons making capability The only eftective way to prevent Israel from embarking on -·nuclear weapo'ns c utse i i Wot to p rndt an opportunity for such a decision to be imp ebl'e'nted covertly Failing this the only chance for reprieve would be on terms offered by the independent deterrent school and these would be high To by experience and current indications Israel would ask for high _pe formance jef military air lanes and or Pershing niissiles This would ctlrry4 us far down the path of a Near East arms r ce and at best Vb ld mer ly1 ostpone the ultima te Israeli decision on a nuclear 1 det $rr nt J That you d aw on the foregoing to persuade Governor Harriman that our best chance for regaining the initiative on Di opa inspections -situation' i s to r ject Eshkol''s proposal prior to the ijovember 3 elections ·1 _ SECRET - -- I i' - - ----·-·--------- ---- - NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03